REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON STATE SECURITY AND TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

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REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
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PREFACE

This Report is based on the discussions at two meetings of the Working Group on
State Security and Transnational Threats (Working Group),\(^1\) summaries of which are
included as Appendices B & C to this Report. In addition to the meeting
deliberations, we gained insight from presentations by Working Group members, two
commissioned background papers,\(^2,3\) and our experiences and readings. The Working
Group reached general agreement on most of the points in this Report and full
consensus on some points. The Report is not, however, a consensus document but
reflects the views of the co-authors as informed by the Working Group’s
deliberations. The Report was written by David Fidler, Laurie Garrett, Peter Bergen,
and Dawn Hewett, who are grateful for the helpful comments on earlier drafts from
Working Group members and other readers.

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\(^1\) The members of the Working Group and other individuals who participated in its deliberations are listed
in Appendix A: Members of the Working Group and Other Participants.

\(^2\) David P. Fidler, *Transnational Threats to National Security: Daniel Deudney’s Case Against Linking
Environmental Degradation and National Security*, PRINCETON PROJECT PAPERS, 2005

\(^3\) Peter Bergen, *The Evolving Threat from Militant Jihadist Groups; a Discussion of Underlying Causes;
Some Thoughts on the Future of Terrorism and Some Policy Recommendations*, PRINCETON PROJECT
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Princeton Project on National Security established the Working Group on State Security and Transnational Threats (Working Group) to examine the primary security threats to the United States today beyond interstate war and conflict. The Working Group faced a host of transnational threat candidates to analyze, including terrorism, environmental degradation, infectious diseases, drug trafficking, resource scarcities, and natural disasters. This task required the Working Group to challenge traditional definitions and conceptions of U.S. national security, which historically have focused primarily on military threats other states pose to the United States.

2. The Working Group believed that its mandate was important to the Princeton Project on National Security’s objective of rethinking the foundational premises of U.S. national security because non-traditional, transnational threats will continue to expand in foreign policy and national security significance for the United States over the course of this century. As the Bush administration’s *National Security Strategy for the United States* (2002) acknowledged, responding effectively to the events of September 11, 2001 requires building a new, lasting security perspective that recognizes threats neither controlled nor necessarily supported by any particular state.

3. The Working Group’s mandate required it to examine various traditional and non-traditional ways of defining and thinking about “national security.” Traditional definitions of U.S. national security have focused almost exclusively on the potential of violent attack by other countries on the United States, its citizens, and its vital overseas interests. This state-centric “violence paradigm” offers no room for transnational threats, even violent threats posed by non-state actors, such as terrorists, to be considered national security issues. Without a framework that transcends the violence paradigm, most transnational threats cannot, by definition, be considered national security issues.

4. Much of the “new thinking” on national security the Working Group reviewed sought to broaden the concept of national security away from the state-centric violence paradigm so that serious threats not emanating from the military forces of other states could be analyzed as security concerns. The Working Group noted the increasing frequency with which national security strategies compiled by the Executive Branch

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\(^1\) New America Foundation.
\(^2\) Council on Foreign Relations.
have, since the late 1980s, identified many transnational problems as national security issues.\footnote{See Appendix D: Chart of Transnational Threats in National Security Strategies: Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush.}

5. Exploring the gap between traditional national security frameworks and the new thinking on national security created both a minefield and a quagmire for the Working Group. The minefield existed because moving beyond traditional notions of U.S. national security to evaluate transnational threats still proves controversial and often provokes skepticism or hostility. The incorporation of the threat of transnational terrorism into the violence paradigm has actually made it more difficult to argue that other transnational threats, such as infectious diseases or resource scarcities, are security issues. The quagmire resulted from the fragmentation of non-traditional approaches to national security into diverse approaches that are not easily reconcilable. In addition, broader notions of national security often failed to provide parameters to guide a determination of what transnational threats represented national security threats as opposed to foreign policy challenges.

6. The minefield and the quagmire challenges encouraged the Working Group to examine what exactly national security policy protects. The Working Group settled on George Kennan's definition of national security as "the continued ability of the country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers" as a starting point for deliberations on the meaning of national security. The Working Group believed, however, that transnational threats and globalization force us to broaden the categories of sources of "serious interference" in our "internal life" beyond rival states.

7. From the various definitions and explanations of national security it reviewed,\footnote{See Appendix E: Chart of National Security Definitions.} the Working Group distilled the idea that U.S. national security policy operates to secure primary public goods that are at the heart of the social contract between the people and its government: economic prosperity, governance continuity, ideological sustainability, military capability, population well-being, and territorial integrity. The environment that influences the production of these primary public goods is critical, and the Working Group considered how radically different the context for producing these goods is in the 21st century compared to the Cold War. The structure and dynamics of Cold War international politics have given way to the “networked anarchy” of globalization.

8. In the 21st century, the United States is unlikely to face an existential threat from another state the way it did from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The United States does, however, face an existential threat in the form of nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, networked anarchy exposes every aspect of the internal and external functioning of the United States to transnational processes and effects. This exposure creates the potential for serious transnational threats to inflict extraordinary direct and indirect damage to the primary public goods at the heart of national security policy.
9. The Working Group analyzed what transnational threats might contain the potential to cause the United States extraordinary damage, and this analysis was aided by the use of rough-and-ready indicators chosen by the Group (i.e., overall scale of the direct material and psychological impact of the threat; speed and mobility of the threat; duration of the threat and its impact; and the adequacy and sustainability of response capabilities).

10. Applying these indicators to the wide range of transnational threats present in the world today, the Working Group identified global conventional terrorism, terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (particularly nuclear and biological terrorism), highly infectious pandemic disease, and U.S. dependence on foreign oil as transnational threat categories requiring national security attention from the United States in the 21st century.

11. In making these determinations, the Working Group stressed the importance of understanding that the nature of networked anarchy and the complexity of transnational threats mean that the “breakout” potential for other transnational issues is significant, requiring very close coordination between foreign policy and national security. The challenges presented by transnational problems also create the need for more high-level consideration of the inadequacy of existing national and multilateral approaches to these concerns and for building broad-based governance and societal resilience within the United States, other countries, and the international system generally.

2. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING THINKING AND RECENT WORK ON TRANSNATIONAL THREATS TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

2.1 Transnational threats and U.S. national security

12. In analyzing transnational threats to U.S. national security in the 21st century, the Working Group followed in the wake of previous attempts to broaden the scope of thinking about what constitutes a national security threat to the United States and to sovereign states in general. Generally speaking, such attempts involve conceiving of a nation’s security beyond the traditional concern with the use or threat of military force by states against each other. As used by the Working Group, a “transnational threat” is characterized by an event or phenomenon of cross-border scope, the dynamics of which are significantly (but not necessarily exclusively) driven by non-state actors (e.g., terrorists), activities (e.g., global economic behavior), or forces (e.g., microbial mutations, earthquakes).

13. Transnational threats are highly complex phenomena, and their complexities often reveal levels of connectivity and synergy that make them difficult to separate analytically. The overlapping nature of many transnational threats, combined with the accelerating pace of change seen in this era of globalization, makes the evolution of these threats unpredictable and non-linear in their dynamics. These features make transnational threats dangerous in the instability inherent in their makeup and in their potential impact on societies.
14. As academic and policy attention on complex interdependence and globalization indicates, the system of sovereign states has, for many decades, been increasingly affected by transnational phenomena. The increasing importance of transnational developments in international relations plays into debates between, for example, realism, institutionalism, and liberalism as theories of world politics. Most pertinent for the Working Group’s task has been the increasing frequency and prominence of arguments that transnational activities can constitute national security threats.

15. Since the 1980s, academic, think tank, governmental, and intergovernmental analyses have contributed to discourse on the potential national security significance of, among other things, terrorism, environmental degradation, and the spread of infectious diseases. Interest in the relationship between security and transnational phenomena has also contributed to the development of such concepts as “human security” and “ecological security” as potential rivals to the traditional focus on “national security.” More recently, work designed to guide reform of the United Nations (UN) stressed the importance of “comprehensive collective security,” a concept that included not only preventing traditional threats of interstate military violence but also addressing threats from terrorism, poverty, infectious disease, and environmental degradation.

16. Much of the new thinking on national security has argued that governments have to respond increasingly to serious threats to the physical safety, material well-being, governance capabilities and principles, and social values of their populations that do not emanate from the military forces of foreign countries. National security strategies determined predominantly or exclusively by military power offer little defense or deterrence against a range of problems that can significantly degrade the welfare of citizens and the ability of the government to respond to such degradation. Even in the “war on terrorism,” many experts believe that heavy reliance on military power to respond to post-September 11th threats exacerbates rather than helps the overall effort against transnational terrorism.

17. Efforts to supplement and broaden the traditional view of national security as security of the state from organized military violence can also be found specifically within U.S. national security policy. The Working Group reviewed, for example, the national security strategies submitted by the Executive Branch to Congress since 1987; and these reports frequently included a diverse range of transnational issues in their respective analyses of the national security challenges facing the United States. Since the late 1980s, U.S. policymakers have identified, among other things, terrorism, drug trafficking, U.S. trade and fiscal imbalances, energy supply vulnerabilities, environmental degradation, demographic trends, and infectious diseases as transnational concerns of national security importance.

2.2 A minefield and a quagmire

18. The Working Group noted, however, that—apart from the threat posed by transnational terrorism—intellectual and policy making efforts to shift U.S. national security policy away from traditional paradigms to frameworks more sensitive to transnational problems have not been very successful. In connection with transnational threats, the Working Group detected a serious gap between the increasing interest in such threats found in academic analyses and policy documents and the actual practice of national security in the United States. Exploring this gap between theory and practice revealed to the Working Group that its mandate was simultaneously a minefield and a quagmire.

19. The Working Group’s mandate was a minefield because, despite all the rhetoric connecting transnational threats and national security, stepping beyond mainstream notions of U.S. national security to consider such threats still proves controversial and often meets with skepticism (if not hostility) from those comfortable with, or committed to, conventional wisdom about national security. In its deliberations, the Working Group realized how deeply entrenched, intellectually and institutionally, traditional perspectives on national security remain within governmental agencies and processes. Although Working Group members generally agreed that defining national security only in terms of military conflicts between states was not appropriate, our discussions involved many cautionary arguments about the difficulties of expanding the concept of national security beyond its traditional narrow parameters.

20. The Working Group’s mandate was also a quagmire because efforts to define national security beyond traditional conceptions have fragmented into many approaches that are not easily reconciled analytically or normatively. Some analyses are so issue-specific (e.g., a focus on infectious diseases) that drawing more general principles to guide strategic thinking on transnational threats to national security proves difficult. Sometimes these issue-specific endeavors have the feel of clothing transnational issues in the garb of national security primarily to increase policy attention on those issues. Other efforts are so general in nature (e.g., human security) that distinguishing between a foreign policy problem and a national security threat was nearly impossible. The effort to collapse foreign policy and national security policy is often intentional in order to prioritize the political over the military in international politics.

21. The Working Group also reviewed many definitions of national security in order to identify common elements that might provide support for including transnational threats within a framework for U.S. national security. A number of definitions that resonated with Working Group members contained broad notions of national security, thus accommodating thinking about transnational threats; but these definitions often did not provide clear parameters for determining what transnational threats constituted national security problems as opposed to foreign policy challenges. The lack of parameters created a context more conducive to a “laundry list” approach to national security threats than a parsimonious approach capable of informing policy making over time.

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6 See Appendix E: Chart of National Security Definitions.
22. The Working Group realized, of course, that the conceptual quagmire contributes to the existence of the policy making minefield. The fragmented, uneven quality of arguments in favor of thinking about transnational phenomena as national security threats encourages traditionalists to heighten their scrutiny and skepticism of such arguments. Members of the Working Group with experience working in the U.S. government on national security over the past ten to fifteen years generally emphasized how little impact, at the end of the day, thinking on transnational threats (outside of terrorism) had made on the way the U.S. national security institutions conceptualized and implemented policy.

2.3 Terrorism and the violence paradigm

23. The emergence of terrorism as a transnational threat to U.S. national security illustrates the difficulty of overcoming traditional mindsets about national security. As mentioned above, U.S. administrations have, since the 1980s, argued that terrorism poses a national security threat. Despite growing warnings about the threat of “new terrorism” in the 1990s, experts still detected inertia and doubts about whether this transnational problem required serious national security action. Lingering skepticism about whether terrorism constituted a national security threat to the United States that existed before September 11, 2001 vanished on that terrible day.

24. Although the Working Group did not have to build the analytical case that transnational terrorism belongs on the U.S. national security agenda in the 21st century, the rise of the terrorist threat has made arguments that other transnational threats are national security problems more difficult to make. Practical and conceptual reasons explain this situation. Practically, the September 11th attacks triggered a revolution in U.S. national security policies, the ramifications of which are still unfolding and being sorted out. The emergence of “homeland security” finds the United States scrambling to respond to global terrorist threats for which it is not well prepared to handle.

25. The Department of Homeland Security—the largest reorganization of the federal government for security purposes since the National Security Act of 1947—addresses the transnational threat of terrorism, a powerful indication that the United States has redefined what “to provide for the common defense” means under the U.S. Constitution. Properly advancing this revolutionary shift in U.S. national security policy will continue to devour political, economic, and bureaucratic capital for years to come, further squeezing the possibilities of including other transnational threats on the national security agenda.

26. Conceptually, the global terrorist threat draws on the traditional national security focus on external, organized violence directed against the United States or its vital overseas interests. Defending against state or terrorist attacks connects policies to the state’s primary responsibility for protecting itself and its population from physical violence. Terrorism expanded the “violence paradigm” to include one particular transnational threat, but it has also strengthened rather than weakened the violence paradigm’s hegemony in U.S. national security policy.
27. The current context, in which the conflict in Iraq and the war on terrorism have become interdependent, accentuates the hegemony of the violence paradigm in U.S. national security policy now and for the foreseeable future. Tolerance in U.S. national security circles for adding more transnational threats to the national security agenda, other than for rhetorical or diplomatic effect, will be minimal as long as the violent threat from the insurgency in Iraq and from terrorists energized by the U.S. intervention in Iraq remains high. Just as the United States filtered every foreign policy problem during the Cold War through the strategy of containment of Soviet power, the tendency in the near to medium-term future will be the filtering of most foreign policy and national security challenges through the lens of the war on terrorism.

2.4 Transnational problems and the violence paradigm

28. Some advocates for national security treatment of transnational problems that do not involve direct, physical violence against the United States present such threats as forces that can lead, directly or indirectly, to the perpetration of state or non-state violence in international relations. These attempts to fit transnational challenges into the violence paradigm typically go as follows: The transnational phenomena in question help weaken the capacities of states to function effectively, increasing the likelihood of civil, interstate, or terrorist violence and related conflict. To avoid such violent threats to their security, states need to address the transnational threats preventively, rather than simply responding to the violence when it emerges.

29. Linking transnational threats to the violence paradigm succeeds or fails on the quality of empirical evidence that such threats proximately cause violence of concern to a state’s national security. Empirical work in transnational threat areas, such as environmental degradation and infectious diseases, reveals, however, a complicated picture of linkages between the erosion or failure of state capacity and violence. Transnational threats compose part of a complex mosaic of factors that weaken the ability of states to function effectively with respect to their populations and in their relations with other states.

30. Even when evidence suggests transnational threats are materially contributing to state failure, the policy response may not target those threats because of more pressing problems, such as dependence on failing states for oil supplies or the intransigence of corrupt, authoritarian governments that oppose any governance reforms. Such regimes may, in the name of national security, repress domestic groups and non-governmental organizations that advocate action against transnational threats, such as environmental degradation or the spread of HIV/AIDS.

31. In addition, teasing out the impact of transnational threats on state capacity tends to turn attention to weak, developing countries and away from the United States and other states that have more robust governmental and societal capabilities. In this context, U.S. national security might be indirectly affected by transnational threats that might (or might not) contribute to the complex phenomenon of state failure in weaker nations. Although state failure in nuclear-armed states, such as Pakistan and North Korea, would constitute
a national security threat for the United States, failure of state capacity in many developing countries would not necessarily amount to a national security threat to the United States, even if the failure involved civil or interstate violence.

32. The Working Group also noted that any linkages between transnational threats (such as environmental degradation, resource scarcities, infectious diseases, or poverty) and terrorist violence are even harder to sustain empirically than connections between such threats and domestic and interstate violence. Analyses of terrorism before and after September 11th provide little to no basis for claiming that terrorists of concern to U.S. national security are motivated by environmental problems, disease epidemics, natural disasters, or poverty. The continuing grim progression of the HIV/AIDS pandemic does not, for example, apparently play any role in the strategic thinking of global terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, that organize violence against the United States and other countries.

33. The difficulty of making and sustaining linkages between transnational threats and the violence paradigm allows those committed to this conceptualization of national security to shunt arguments about transnational threats, other than terrorism, onto the side tracks of foreign and domestic policy. Attempts to play on the turf staked out by the violence paradigm simply strengthen its policy hegemony to the detriment of understanding the increasingly more complex reality of U.S. national security in the 21st century.

3. THE WORKING GROUP’S APPROACH TO TRANSNATIONAL THREATS AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

34. The most significant problem the Working Group confronted in trying to think beyond the violence paradigm was the lack of rigorous analytical frameworks that provided coherent guidance on transnational problems that threaten damage through mechanisms other than physical violence. As previously indicated, the national security literature of the past twenty years contains much analysis and advocacy for broadening the definition of national security; but this literature is more diverse than cohesive, producing a fragmented, difficult context in which to identify a single template for national security scrutiny of transnational threats.

35. The Working Group was generally of the opinion that the violence paradigm, even as expanded by the threat of global terrorism, should not monopolize how the United States conceives of its national security in the 21st century. As explored below, the Working Group perceived that the United States faces significant transnational threats that the violence paradigm does not adequately capture. This consensus confronted the Working Group with the challenge of constructing an approach to transnational threats and U.S. national security that avoids the dangers of the minefield and quagmire described above.

3.1 What exactly does national security policy protect?
36. The Working Group engaged in a number of analytical exercises in thinking about how to structure an approach to transnational threats to U.S. national security in the 21st century. Consideration of different definitions and explanations of national security revealed that, contrary to the narrowness of the violence paradigm, many definitions presented national security as a broadly based endeavor involving the state in protecting military, political, economic, and ideological objectives. These broad definitions serve a prudential purpose in providing flexibility for policy makers, but they also encouraged the Working Group to think about what exactly the United States seeks to protect through national security policy and why.

37. The various perspectives on national security examined by the Working Group indicated that the U.S. national security policy operates to help secure six fundamental interests (in alphabetical order): economic prosperity; governance continuity; ideological sustainability; military capability; population well-being; and territorial integrity. Each of these interests represents a primary public good the state is responsible for producing, sustaining, and protecting from material harm. These primary public goods are at the heart of the social contract that exists between the people and its government.

38. As the violence paradigm suggests, the role of U.S. national security policy historically has concentrated on protecting these primary public goods from violence or threats thereof from other states. Such protection requires the state to produce and maintain sufficient military power to deter or respond to organized interstate violence. The primary public good of military power has, thus, long been the exclusive province of national security policy.

39. Production of the other primary public goods involves, however, complex combinations of domestic and foreign policies, responsibility for which falls mainly outside the government agencies typically tasked with national security (e.g., Department of Defense). Producing and sustaining these other primary public goods in aggregate has historically been important for national security; but the actual achievement of these results did not, absent crises, typically require attention from national security bureaucracies.

40. Thinking about national security in connection with the production and protection of these primary public goods requires policy flexibility in connection with identifying threats to such goods. Most importantly, sensitivity to changes in the context in which these primary public goods are produced and protected is critical for effective national security policy. The end of the Cold War, and the search for new frameworks to conceptualize U.S. national security, reinforced the importance of understanding the environment in which the primary public goods described above have to be produced, sustained, and protected.

41. The expansion of the violence paradigm to include transnational terrorist threats flows from the recognition that producing and protecting economic prosperity, governance continuity, and population well-being in the post-Cold War period requires seeing transnational terrorism as a national security problem. The military power the
United States developed, maintained, and enhanced during the Cold War has proved no
deterrent to Al Qaeda violence and of limited utility in protecting the United States from
future terrorist violence. It took World War II and the developing menace of Soviet
communism to trigger the National Security Act of 1947, which reorganized U.S.
national security for the coming test of strength with the Soviet Union. The next
revolution in U.S. national security was caused by 19 terrorists, who exploited
globalization and the openness of the United States to engage in the most devastating
violence on U.S. soil since the Civil War.

3.2 National security and networked anarchy

42. The Working Group agreed that the way in which the forces of globalization
increasingly affect the United States creates the potential for transnational phenomena
beyond terrorism to pose direct challenges to the production and protection of the
primary public goods that give national security substantive meaning. Globalization
facilitates the rapid movement of capital, people, goods, services, pathogens, culture,
news, knowledge, and ideas over, under, and through borders. Countries, including the
United States, are thus exposed to accelerating factors and forces with the potential to
affect adversely economic prosperity, population well-being, ideological sustainability,
governance continuity, military power, and territorial integrity. These accelerating
transnational flows can stress and perhaps overwhelm the state’s capabilities to produce
and protect these primary public goods. Further, the quantity and quality of a state’s
military power appears increasingly irrelevant to addressing the challenges these
transnational phenomena generate.

43. The structure and dynamics of international relations during the Cold War
privileged conceiving of national security predominantly as a gladiatorial contest waged
by the great powers. This environment made military power the coin of the national
security realm, with the objective being parity with, or dominance of, the military
capabilities of rival states. The context for producing and protecting primary public goods
is, however, radically different in the 21st century. Most experts agree that the 21st
century will not experience the kind of interstate, great power conflicts that made the
20th century a nightmare for peoples all over the world. The structure and dynamics of
Cold War international relations have given way to “networked anarchy.”

44. As used by international relations specialists, “anarchy” simply describes the
central characteristic of the political context in which states interact: the absence of any
supreme, centralized governing authority. As such, anarchy does not mean, or even imply, that chaos reigns. The concept of anarchy focuses analysis on how states and other
agents in international relations organize their anarchical relations. The concept of
“networked anarchy” communicates that how anarchy is being shaped today departs
significantly from patterns seen in the past.

45. During the Cold War, the superpowers structured anarchy through a bipolar
architecture they superimposed on virtually every aspect of international relations. By
contrast, networks of governmental, intergovernmental, and non-state actors are defining
anarchy in the post-Cold War period. The process of organizing anarchy has been transformed from one proprietary to the great powers to a dynamic that is more accessible to, and affected by, a broader and more diverse constellation of participants, ranging from great powers to failed states, from human traffickers to human rights activists, and from transnational corporations to terrorists.

46. The shaping of anarchy today resembles the development of "open source" software on the Internet: it is a process subject to the agency of many actors and the various networks they form and utilize through the various channels and technologies of globalization. Such “open source” anarchy has important implications for U.S. national security that the concept of networked anarchy tries to capture.

47. Like a computer network, the environment of networked anarchy in which states interact today simultaneously becomes stronger and more vulnerable as networks expand. Strength comes from the incentives network users—both state and non-state actors—have to keep their networks functioning stably and efficiently. For example, core tenets of liberal thinking on international relations foster transnational links and connections between states and peoples, especially through trade and commerce. U.S. national security and foreign policies since the end of World War II have consistently supported the expansion of international trade and commerce in an effort to render states and peoples interdependent. The United States has, thus, been a leading champion and architect of the world of networked anarchy and continues to gain many benefits and opportunities created through fostering globalization.

48. Vulnerability appears because networked anarchy exposes every aspect of the internal and external functioning of a state to transnational processes and effects, requiring robust governance capacity and adaptability. Relative military power vis-à-vis a rival state declines in national security importance, while the national security need for governance and societal resilience within and among states and the international system increases. The broadening, deepening, and acceleration of networked anarchy also require that the production and protection of governance and societal resilience must itself be a transnationalized process.

3.3 From existential threat to the state to extraordinary damage to the nation

49. The transition from the Cold War system to the context of networked anarchy reveals an important shift for thinking about U.S. national security in the 21st century. The conventional and nuclear military power and the communist ideology of the Soviet Union made that state an existential threat to the United States. The ultimate nature of this threat helped concentrate U.S. national security and foreign policy on containment of Soviet power over the course of nearly five decades.

50. In the 21st century, the United States does not currently face, and is unlikely to confront, any state that poses an existential threat to its survival. Even China’s rise as a global power is not perceived in the same manner as the Soviet threat because of China’s increasing integration with the global economy and its lack of an expansionist ideological
agenda. In terms of transnational threats, the Working Group identified only nuclear terrorism (discussed more below) as a possible existential threat to the United States.

51. The paucity of existential threats to the state encourages the re-orientation of national security thinking toward problems that may cause extraordinary damage to the nation. For example, few experts perceive most current forms of terrorism to constitute existential threats to the United States. September 11th and the anthrax attacks taught everyone, however, about the nation’s vulnerability to terrorist violence. The embrace of homeland security in the wake of these terrorist crimes signals a shift in national security thinking toward preventing, protecting against, and responding to threats with the potential to cause extraordinary damage to the American way of life.

52. As indicated above, networked anarchy exposes every aspect of the internal and external functioning of the United States to transnational processes and effects. The “open source” nature of networked anarchy means that U.S. abilities to control its exposure to transnational phenomena are constrained. This exposure creates serious transnational challenges for the American way of life, some of which have the potential to inflict extraordinary damage, which includes the terror and fear some transnational threats can cause. Inherent in the social contract is the state’s responsibility to secure, as much as possible, the people from extraordinary harm.

3.4 Indicators for analyzing transnational issues as national security threats

53. The potential networked anarchy creates for transnational phenomena to challenge the state’s ability to produce and protect primary public goods does not mean that every transnational phenomenon constitutes a national security problem. The Working Group wanted to avoid making every transnational threat a national security issue by developing indicators that would inform policy makers when a transnational concern was indeed a national security threat. As a starting point, the Working Group agreed that the indicators should set a high threshold for when a transnational threat becomes a national security problem. In other words, the indicators should identify transnational problems that have the potential to cause extraordinary damage to one or more primary public goods that give meaning to national security policy.

54. The Working Group did not develop a rigorous analytical template for determining whether a transnational threat caused, or could cause, extraordinary damage to economic prosperity, population well-being, governance continuity, ideological sustainability, military power, or territorial integrity. One Working Group member suggested a set of quantitative indicators that established precise thresholds, but the Working Group was generally wary of adopting this approach because it might be under-inclusive and marginalize qualitative evaluations of transnational threats.

55. The Working Group considered, thus, general concepts as more useful in determining whether a transnational threat represented a national security threat. In conceptualizing extraordinary damage, the following elements were important to the Working Group: overall scale of the direct material and psychological impact of the
threat; speed and mobility of the threat; duration of the threat and its impact; and the adequacy and sustainability of response capabilities.

56. In discussing possible indicators, Working Group members focused more on damage to economic prosperity, population well-being, and governance continuity than military power, ideological sustainability, and territorial integrity. Although not explicitly discussed, the reasons for this outcome connect to the nature of transnational threats in the context of networked anarchy. For example, the Group believed that transnational terrorism posed a potential serious threat to the U.S. economy, citizenry, and government operations but not to U.S. military power, ideology, and territorial integrity.

57. In fact, the Working Group was hard pressed to think of a transnational problem that could seriously result in the potential loss of U.S. territory to another state. (Concerns about immigration flows mainly focus on the impact of such flows in the United States not their potential to create potential secessionist movements.) This outcome also signals the shift from the Cold War national security framework, which focused heavily on increasing military power, engaging in ideological conflict, and preserving territorial integrity against potential violent attack.

58. The Working Group also acknowledged that the determination whether a transnational issue constitutes a national security threat could be dependent on other national security problems facing the United States. Earlier we observed that the rise of transnational terrorism, and its expansion of the violence paradigm, will make national security consideration of other transnational issues more difficult in the future, particularly as the interface of the war on terrorism and the war in Iraq continues to have global implications. Resource constraints also feed the sense that national security determinations are context dependent.

59. Context-dependent analysis of transnational threats poses, however, dangers of which the Working Group was aware. To begin, such an approach could easily replicate the conventional wisdom about national security as concerned only with threats of organized military violence against the state. Bureaucratic inertia as opposed to objective analysis would then determine national security priorities. Second, the use of indicators to set a high threshold should undermine the legitimacy of context-dependent analysis. If, for example, pandemic influenza threatens to cause extraordinary damage to the U.S. population, economy, and governance capabilities, then its handling as a national security concern should not depend on what else is on the national security agenda.

3.5 Application of the indicators to transnational problems

60. After developing a rough-and-ready set of indicators and related criteria, the Working Group applied them to a wide range of transnational problems, including (but not limited to) pandemic infectious diseases, terrorism, natural resource scarcities, types of environmental degradation (e.g., global warming), drug trafficking, and natural disasters. Although disagreements remained within the Working Group, it identified global conventional terrorism, terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction
(especially nuclear and biological terrorism), highly infectious pandemic disease, and U.S. dependence on foreign oil as transnational threat categories requiring national security attention from the United States in the 21st century.

61. Conventional terrorism. The Working Group believed that conventional terrorism organized by global terrorist networks not reliant on state sponsorship would continue to constitute a national security threat for the United States in the 21st century. Although many Working Group members suspected that radical Islamist terrorism of the kind perpetrated by Al Qaeda would not necessarily be a century-long problem, consensus existed that the global model of terrorist operations and financing pioneered by Al Qaeda would continue. In addition, the global model may well evolve, bringing closer together terrorist groups and organized criminal elements (e.g., drug traffickers) to produce hybrid forms of transnational outlaw organizations with sufficient power to control territory in weak or failed states and exploit the channels of globalization.

62. As for Islamist terrorism, concerns in the short- and medium-term remain significant. Terrorist experts are worried that the war in Iraq is becoming a training ground for Islamist extremists in the same way Afghanistan was in the 1980s; but the Iraqi conflict exports such individuals into a globalized world that Al Qaeda effectively exploits, which creates a more dangerous situation. Further, the Islamist threat does not necessarily originate or thrive in countries we consider hostile but, as the Madrid and London bombings demonstrated, can emerge from inside the borders of our allies. The Working Group expressed particular concern about the problem European countries are now facing, and will in the near future continue to confront, with respect to the dangers posed by Islamist extremism.

63. WMD terrorism. As most analysts of U.S. national security have done since the mid-1990s, the Working Group identified the potential for WMD terrorism as a serious transnational threat to U.S. national security. Many factors point toward growing dangers of WMD material and agents proliferating globally, which increases opportunities that terrorists have to develop nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological capabilities. Transnational phenomena, such as the global development and diffusion of biotechnology research and development driven by the private sector, will significantly influence proliferation scenarios in the 21st century. No single government has control over such transnational forces, creating dilemmas for counter-proliferation strategies.

64. The Working Group probed the WMD terrorism possibilities further in order to evaluate which ones represented the most serious threats. These deliberations led the Working Group to conclude that nuclear terrorism and biological terrorism (including agro-terrorism) constituted more significant security threats than radiological and chemical terrorism. The risks that terrorist groups could develop or obtain nuclear or biological capabilities are growing, and terrorist attacks involving nuclear or biological weapons have the potential to involve devastating consequences to the American way of life, a potential the Working Group sensed that neither radiological nor chemical terrorism have. In addition, the Working Group considered nuclear terrorism to be a potential existential threat to the United States.
65. A number of factors are converging to increase the security threat to the United States from biological weapons and biological terrorism. Advances in the biological sciences have already produced, and make available to state and non-state actors, sophisticated methods of manipulating microbes and even building pathogens from scratch. These and future anticipated scientific developments confront U.S. national security policy with the challenges of protecting against malevolent uses of increasingly accessible and powerful biotechnologies, preventing accidents in a growing number of public and private laboratories and research facilities, and guarding against legitimate research producing unintended but dangerous outcomes.

66. The scope of these biosecurity challenges is global, but the extremely weak Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) does not provide an adequate foundation for robust multilateralism against these biosecurity threats. The global diffusion of "dual use" biological sciences and biotechnologies significantly complicates every potential multilateral governance option, whether that involves BWC verification, tracking the transfer and movement of microbes for scientific research, international harmonization of biosafety and biosecurity requirements at research laboratories, or regulating research with dangerous pathogens.

67. The United States also faces increased security threats from nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism, threats which constitute an existential threat to the United States. A nuclear attack by terrorists is not implausible in the future, although experts disagree on the likelihood of such an attack. State-based nuclear proliferation is likely to occur, which could have serious implications for the specter of transnational nuclear terrorist threats. Possession of nuclear weapons by an increased number of countries around the world significantly raises the potential for the intentional or unintentional transfer of nuclear weapons, material, or sensitive knowledge to terrorists. For example, the AQ Khan network’s operations provide disturbing insights into how the darker sides of networked anarchy can spin off, and feed into, state-based efforts on nuclear proliferation.

68. Even without further state-based proliferation, transfer from existing nuclear states or theft is possible, even from the United States. State-failure in any nuclear-armed state would also be of grave U.S. national security concern. As with biological weapons, international monitoring and verification mechanisms are weak and imperfect; and significant challenges remain in developing effective multilateral, non-proliferation regimes capable of handling the nuclear threats of the 21st century.

69. Pandemic infectious disease. The Working Group reviewed the growing concerns of the last ten to fifteen years triggered by the emergence and re-emergence of naturally occurring infectious diseases. The Working Group concluded that the potential damage a pandemic of a highly infectious disease could inflict on the United States and its overseas interests warranted treating the possibility of such outbreaks as a national security concern. Critical to the Working Group’s deliberations were the lessons learned, and the fears raised, by the SARS outbreak of 2003 and the mounting anxieties present all over the world about the transformation of the avian flu crisis in Asia into a virulent human
influenza pandemic. The emergence of a virulent, highly transmissible pathogen in today’s globalized, demographically imbalanced, and HIV/AIDS-ravaged world could trigger an epochal event surpassing the Black Plague’s transformation of Europe in the 14th century.

70. Dependence on foreign oil. In terms of U.S. dependence on foreign oil, the Working Group viewed this worsening dependence as a strategic vulnerability for U.S. economic prosperity, population well-being, military power, and ideological sustainability. The Working Group recalled previous national security hand-wringing about U.S. dependence on foreign oil but considered the dependence now and over the course of the 21st century as presenting a national security threat of a different magnitude and severity. As has happened in the past, U.S. dependence on access to foreign oil forces the United States to support unsavory governments and intervene in politically volatile regions. Policies driven by oil dependence have undercut other strategic U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives, such as the spread of democracy. The Working Group noted, for example, concerns among some experts that current push for democracy in the Middle East may significantly complicate the U.S. need for secure access to oil.

71. U.S. dependence on foreign oil faces, however, a new context not experienced during the Cold War. The tremendous growth of the global economy, particularly the phenomenal economic expansions underway in India and China, are creating strains on the global oil-supply system and on secure access to oil supplies for many countries. Transnational economic activities are fueling global patterns of energy consumption and thus factor in the deepening U.S. vulnerabilities concerning oil. Such transnational activities could pull states into diplomatic and perhaps military conflict over access to oil resources. The absence of any feasible energy alternative to oil would give these conflicts dangerous dynamics in 21st century international politics.

3.6 The thin, permeable line between national security and foreign policy concerning transnational issues

72. The Working Group agreed that many of the transnational issues it did not identify as national security concerns remain or have become very important foreign policy issues. Members of the Working Group emphasized that the transnational problems of environmental degradation and resource scarcities, trafficking in drugs and people, the growth of transnational organized crime, adverse demographic trends in allies and countries of strategic concern, the phenomenon of failed states, and U.S. responses to natural and man-made disasters in other countries are all significant foreign policy challenges for the United States in the 21st century.

73. A major reason why the Working Group stressed the importance of increasing and improving foreign policy attention on the range of transnational threats involves the potential for these complex, multi-factor problems to evolve rapidly, simultaneously, over a widening geographic arc, and in a non-linear manner into larger crises. Such amplified threats, and their enhanced negative synergies, could directly affect the United States or weaken states or areas of the world of strategic concern to the United States. For
example, a failing state in a remote part of the world may not, in isolation, affect U.S. national security; but, in combination with other transnational factors, the process of state failure could contribute to a cascade of problems that causes significant direct harm to the United States or material damage to countries (e.g., European allies) or regions (e.g., oil producing Middle East) vital to U.S. interests.

74. In networked anarchy, the “breakout” potential for transnational issues can be significant because the volatile dynamics of these problems do not resemble the more static and linear qualities of Cold War international relations. In addition, addressing terrorism, pandemic disease, and oil dependence as national security problems will require policy attention on the complex interrelationships and causal processes that drive these threats. This task will bring the United States face-to-face with transnational phenomena that contribute to non-traditional national security and foreign policy.

3.7 Institutional challenges nationally and internationally

75. The Working Group’s belief that U.S. national security and foreign policy communities should heighten their attention and commitment to responding to transnational threats prompted discussions about the institutional changes such an intellectual shift in thinking would require. Immediately, the primacy of the U.S. Department of Defense in U.S. national security policy raised problems because creating governance and societal resiliency against transnational threats frequently does not require the use of military power.

76. Members of the Working Group cautioned the Group not to underestimate the difficulties of reorienting existing U.S. national security processes away from military considerations to non-traditional threats. These difficulties might be compounded as the Pentagon and the U.S. national security establishment increasingly voice their concerns about the threat posed by China and its growing military power.

77. Embedding higher sensitivities towards transnational threats in U.S. national security policy would require commitment over successive presidential administrations, which increases the need for institutional change to ensure bureaucratic continuity. But lasting institutional change of the U.S. national security apparatus typically occurs only after the nation suffers a traumatic security crisis. But for September 11th, homeland security would likely have remained an intellectual play toy for policy wonks rather than the basis for one of the most far-reaching institutional shakeups of the federal government in U.S. history. A key challenge for the next stage of U.S. national security policy is to perceive transnational threats adequately and act accordingly rather than postponing action until tragedy strikes again.

78. The Working Group’s discussions of how to integrate prevention, protection against, and responses to transnational threats in U.S. national security and foreign policy processes only superficially scratched the surface of this difficult and complex topic. Working Group members agreed that, without presidential leadership over successive

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administrations, such a project had little chance to succeed absent a major catastrophe involving a transnational threat that provoked the U.S. government to make dramatic changes.

79. The Working Group’s deliberations also touched upon, but did not comprehensively consider, the problems the weakness of existing intergovernmental mechanisms pose for reorienting U.S. national security strategy towards prevention of, protection against, and response to transnational threats. Conceptually, the Working Group understood how essential effective multilateralism and international institutions are to addressing transnational threats in the world of networked anarchy. Considerable skepticism existed, however, about relying on forms of multilateralism that have in the past proved inadequate and anemic in the face of security challenges, and as indicated below, global governance (both in terms of institutions and regulations) remains weak.

80. The Working Group noted the attention currently being paid to reform of the UN, particularly the UN’s efforts to re-conceptualize its mandate for collective security to take into account transnational threats. Opinions on the Working Group differed on the prospects for UN reform and whether such reform, even if successful, would materially improve the ability of nations to deal with transnational challenges. These differences of opinion connect to concerns that the post-World War II model of liberal internationalism may have run its course without a successor approach yet emerging.

81. Working Group members generally agreed that the weakness of existing international governance in the face of transnational problems did not mean that a unilateralist, “Empire America” approach would work. The transnational nature of these threats limits the progress that can be made by countries pursuing unilateral, self-help strategies. Similarly, consensus existed that an isolationist, “Fortress America” outlook was wrong-headed because the United States is embedded in networked anarchy and committed to advancing globalization. The Working Group reached, however, no consensus on what “global governance” strategy would best navigate the United States between the futility of Empire America and the myopia of Fortress America.

4. WORKING GROUP PROPOSITIONS CONCERNING U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

82. After reviewing its efforts at understanding the relationship between transnational threats and U.S. national security, the Working Group formulated the following general propositions for consideration by the Princeton Project on National Security.

83. Examining transnational phenomena as potential threats to national security is difficult because of a lack of rigorous analytical frameworks that provide guidance on problems that threaten damage through mechanisms other than physical violence. Traditional approaches to national security based on the violence paradigm cannot capture the nature of the threats posed by transnational problems and processes. Progress in this context can only be made by crafting a more appropriate perspective on what national security policy protects and why. Thus:
1. U.S. national security policy operates to secure six fundamental interests, each of which represents a primary public good at the heart of the social contract between the people and its government—economic prosperity, governance continuity, ideological sustainability, military capability, population well-being, and territorial integrity.

84. The Working Group believes that the diversity, complexity, and dangers of transnational phenomena will increase in the 21st century and present serious problems for U.S. efforts to produce, sustain, and protect the primary public goods of the social contract. Thus:

2. Drawing speed, scope, and synergies from the processes of globalization, a diverse and expanding range of transnational problems will increasingly affect U.S. national security and foreign policy by posing existential threats to the United States or threatening extraordinary damage to American interests and the American way of life.

85. Addressing the expanding and deepening challenges of transnational problems will take place in a political context radically different from the international politics of the Cold War. The process of shaping the anarchical environment in which states interact no longer follows the familiar patterns of great power politics experienced in the two previous centuries. Thus:

3. Networked anarchy will characterize international relations in the 21st century, not architectures predominantly grounded in the prerogatives of the great powers. This new context makes the stubborn persistence of Cold War perspectives and institutions, even after September 11th, a serious impediment to forward-looking thinking and policy on achieving security in this century.

86. The Working Group acknowledged that not all transnational problems are security threats. It identified what it believed to constitute the most serious transnational threats to U.S. national security in the 21st century and agreed that these threats require unconventional approaches to national security policy. Thus:

4. The most dangerous transnational security threats—global conventional terrorism, nuclear and biological proliferation and terrorism, highly infectious pandemic diseases, and dependence on foreign oil—cannot be adequately addressed through traditional military and intelligence responses and require the creation of resilience in national, intergovernmental, and global governance mechanisms for preventing, protecting against, and responding to such transnational threats and challenges.

87. Although the Working Group identified transnational terrorism as a national security threat, it believed that this threat, and its evolution, should not become the sole prism through which the United States evaluates its national security and foreign policy priorities, particularly in an age in which dangers of many kinds are increasing. Thus:
5. Although important, the threat of terrorism specifically, and the violence paradigm generally, should not determine whether and how the United States evaluates transnational threats and issues for their national security or foreign policy significance because the nature of transnational threats requires more flexible policy approaches.

88. The Working Group concluded that the changes necessary in U.S. intelligence, military, and general national security communities to protect the American people and its way of life from transnational threats are enormous. Few institutions within the national security system seem capable of shifting perspectives and concrete activities rapidly. Further, entrenched ideologies and working assumptions are almost entirely focused on violent threats against the state. Building and sustaining support within these communities for a new national security perspective that takes networked anarchy and transnational threats more seriously will be extremely difficult. Thus:

6. Pursuing resiliency against transnational threats as a strategic national security and foreign policy objective will require presidential leadership, institutional reform, reallocation of resources, and construction of more effective forms of global governance over successive administrations and Congresses.

5. CONCLUSION

89. The 21st century will witness U.S. national security and foreign policy increasingly tested by transnational events, phenomena, activities, and threats. U.S. national security and foreign policy thinking will need to adapt to this new world. During the Cold War, in response to the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union, the United States encouraged, crafted, and defended processes and institutions that laid the groundwork for the globalized world we see unfolding in the 21st century.

90. Although the United States was a key architect of today’s networked anarchy, its national security system remains anchored to modes of operation and analysis designed for the dangers of a world no longer with us. Substantial changes have been made in both domestic and foreign security structures and funding since September 11th, but security paradigms remain almost exclusively focused on the threat of violent assault on the state, its peoples, and its overseas interests. The national security apparatus continues to perceive non-violent transnational threats as, alternatively, insignificant, the responsibility of domestic agencies, or so overwhelming in scale that decisive government action appears futile. Further, national security and foreign policy institutions have yet to craft clear, resilient forms of multilateralism through which to assess and confront transnational threats.

91. The U.S. government faces daunting responsibilities to increase the resiliency of the nation and the international system in the face of multiplying transnational challenges. How the United States fulfills these responsibilities may well determine whether the 21st century comes to be known in history as the Second American Century.
APPENDIX A

MEMBERS OF THE WORKING GROUP AND OTHER PARTICIPANTS

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APPENDIX B

SUMMARY OF WORKING GROUP MEETING #1, APRIL 29, 2005
HELD AT COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NYC

Meeting Summary prepared by Dawn Yamane Hewett (PPNS Project Manager and RA)

In attendance: Peter Bergen (co-chair), Laurie Garrett (co-chair), Bo Cutter, Roger Cressey, Douglas Farah, David Fidler, Steve Flynn, Elisa Harris, Bruce Hoffman, Anja Manuel (liaison from PPNS Foreign Policy Infrastructure and Global Institutions working group), Assaf Moghadam (representative of Jessica Stern for April 29 meeting), Steve Morse, Steve Schneider, Allona Sund (representative of Thomas Homer-Dixon for April 29 meeting), Rick Barton (PPNS Reconstruction & Development working group co-chair); Craig Cohen (PPNS Reconstruction & Development RA), Scott Rosenstein (Council on Foreign Relations RA), Dawn Yamane Hewett (State Security & Transnational Threats working group RA)

Regrets: David Heymann, Thomas Homer-Dixon, Jessica Stern

General meeting description: The meeting featured presentations from a number of working group members on the three broad transnational threat areas (Terrorism and Criminal Networks; Disease and Bioterrorism; Natural Disasters & Resource Scarcities) and then questions and discussions around these topics. At the end of the meeting, we discussed cross-cutting themes and identified areas of consensus. This summary indicates key points made during the meeting and areas of consensus, organized by topic, followed by specific points made during each of the substantive threat category presentations and discussions.

Defining the problem

What are the defining characteristics of a national security threat (in this transnational threat arena)? There was no disagreement that terrorism would be considered under the rubric of national security. There was some agreement that we needed to build an analytical model to “harden” some of the “soft” threats, like pandemics or energy issues, although this topic requires further discussion. What are the consequences/implications of labeling an issue one of national security? For example, if we decided that public health is a national security issue, would that mean we would support regime change for public health? Does labeling an issue as a national security issue necessarily mean more collective action? What is the hierarchy of these various threats? Where do we place our marginal dollar in terms of threats we want to address / How do we prioritize these threats? How much of national security is tied to international security and cooperation? If the U.S. is not a part of a growing world view of security, will this ultimately compromise our own security? There was an understanding that we will need to make some difficult choices. These are all issues that should be further explored in the June meeting.
Indirect vs. direct threats: Some threats are direct threats to national security, while others are indirect. We should decide which threats are which, and which indirect threats are causes for concern. As one member pointed out, everything affects the U.S. indirectly. Is a failed state only a national security threat because terrorists could train there and pandemics would not be able to be contained there? Is European racism a national security threat because it is a contributing factor towards terrorism and/or Islamic extremism? Are particular demographic trends (increasing number of AIDS orphans in sub-Saharan Africa) something about which we should be worried? If terrorism is largely a bourgeois endeavor, should we be worried about rising prosperity in the Middle East as a contributing factor towards extremism? Also, as another member stated, responses to indirect threats involve policy mechanisms that aren’t traditional national security instruments. If we are worried about these things, should we do anything about them? What should we do?

Scale: Does scale actually matter in determining the severity of the threat and our level of policy response? If between guns, cars, and cigarettes, cigarettes kill the most, is this what we should be most concerned about? If a pandemic flu has the potential to kill millions of people, is this a greater national security threat than Al Qaeda?

Fear / panic: Also, there was an agreement that it is not only the threat itself, but also the fear of the threat that can be extremely disruptive and paralyzing. Two examples: In terms of terrorism, people in heartland America are very scared about the extremely unlikely event that their Wal-Mart down the street will be blown up. In terms of pandemics, people in China stayed away from public areas and wore useless masks during the SARS epidemic. This type of fear can have a tremendous economic impact, and lack of information feeds into this problem. There was a question in the group as to how much of this fear is actually a deliberate campaigning or political strategy. Another member articulated that rather than just the government, there is an entire industry of fear comprised of the pharmaceutical companies, universities, think tanks, etc. Finally, there was the suggestion that if we don’t see death, we don’t have fear – some threats are therefore under-feared and thus we are underprepared for these threats.

Anti-Americanism / War of Ideas: In the war of ideas, we’re not good at communicating with rest of world. Bin Laden is more popular in many Muslim countries than President Bush is in the United States, and Islamic parties are doing well in elections around the world. Our message is being lost – partly because we are not good messengers, and partly because there are other competing messengers such as Al-Manar and Al-Jazeera, as well as grassroots leaders. For example, polio was on the verge of being eradicated, but then imams in northern Nigeria were telling people that the U.S. tainted the polio vaccines with HIV in order to kill Muslims. Now there is a huge polio crisis in a number of different countries. In another example, the meagerness of the initial U.S. response to the tsunami affected us negatively not only in the eyes of the Muslims affected, but also in the eyes of Muslims around the world who were watching critically the U.S. response. Furthermore, when the 20,000 tsunami orphans go to madrassas and grow up with anti-American sentiments, this will become a security issue in the long-term. Beyond the Muslim world, our lack of responsibility toward global warming (walking out of Kyoto, for example), has damaged our reputation in the eyes of many because we’re seen as not accepting responsibility as perpetrators of damage or helping victims of this damage to adapt. How do we neutralize ill will toward the U.S.? There was recognition that the role of diplomacy is very important in combating anti-Americanism, but that anti-Americanism is not static and is highly influenced by U.S. policy.
Going back to the tsunami example, in Indonesia, anti-Americanism and support for bin Laden has gone down significantly, while support for the US-led efforts to fight terrorism has gone up. These positive changes are due to the eventual U.S. response to the tsunami. Members noted that the war of ideas has an offensive and defensive element. Finally, one group member noted that one national security threat is the negative way in which the Europeans and Canadians see us. (Note: There is a PPNS working group on Anti-Americanism.)

### Problems with the Solutions

**Futility of a Fortress America (isolationism) approach:** There was consensus that a Fortress America approach (shutting down our borders, etc.) would be futile. We cannot stop all terrorists from entering, nor can we stop pandemics or global resource scarcities from affecting us. A Fortress America approach would be nearly impossible to implement, and the military does not want this job. This approach would also raise the expectations of the U.S. public to a level that would be difficult, if not impossible, to meet. Furthermore, when one focuses on the border, there are a number of unintended consequences. It creates more friction with neighboring countries. If fewer Muslims and people with ties to the Middle East are allowed to come to the U.S. for studying, working, etc., then they are deprived of the opportunity to learn about the U.S. first hand (a point was made about the success of the American dream and integration/assimilation into this country as a contrast to European racism).

**Futility of an Empire America (unilateralism) approach:** The working group seemed to agree that unilateralism would be mostly ineffective in dealing with the threats discussed in this working group. The U.S. needs cooperation from other countries in order to protect itself from any of these threats. For example, countries have to work together and share intelligence in order to arrest terrorists and leaders of criminal networks; they have to work together to halt pandemics from spreading; and they have to work together to stem climate change and deal with resource scarcities.

**Inability of the U.S. government infrastructure to address these threats:** The Department of Defense is traditionally the primary agency dealing with national security threats. However, is DoD the best agency to deal with some of these transnational threats, particularly the non-traditional threats such as pandemics, resource scarcities, etc.? Increasingly, these types of threats will require a response from a variety of actors and agencies within the government such as the Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, Health and Human Services, Department of Agriculture, etc. Do we have an adequate infrastructure in place within the U.S. government to work together in a coordinated fashion to deal with these threats? With whom do we link up in other governments to address these issues? (Note: The PPNS Foreign Policy Infrastructure and Global Institutions working group is also looking at this issue.)

**Lack of global mechanisms for prevention and response:** Multilateral response may work in some cases, but it was agreed that in many cases, a global approach would be necessary. Because these threats are transnational, looking at them through a nation-state perspective will not likely yield the solutions we need. However, as many mentioned, international
organizations are weak, underresourced, and understaffed and the international instruments we do have are often useless because there is no verification. Lack of U.S. support for global institutions also undermines their effectiveness. Therefore, the crisis of global governance is a serious issue with which we must contend. (Note: The PPNS Foreign Policy Infrastructure and Global Institutions working group is also looking at this issue.) It was also mentioned that the resources for global prevention and response to these issues would have to come from the North.

**Shortcomings in policy-making – Lack of perfect data regarding threats:** We don’t have adequate methodologies in place to assess the risks of these transnational threats in an unbiased manner, and our methods will never be perfect. (Note: The PPNS Relative Threat Assessment working group is looking specifically at the methodologies of threat assessments.) This, combined with the extraordinary complexity and interaction of these threats, makes policymaking more difficult, and members agreed that this means that people must increasingly make policy in the face of uncertainty (in the face of both fear and missing data). Additionally, policymakers’ inability to define, identify, and communicate the threat contributes to public fear and paranoia (as mentioned above), which in turn contributes to policymakers’ overreaction (as described below).

**Shortcomings in policy-making – Overreaction to major events:** Members agreed and shared concern that policy makers have a tendency to overreact to major events. Two examples: the response to a terrorist attack on the US (3000 deaths) was the initiation of war in two separate countries costing hundreds of billions of dollars, and the response to a possible smallpox outbreak was to vaccinate a far greater number of front-line responders than even doctors recommended to contain the threat. Members seemed to agree with the statement that this overreaction is partly to do with a desire by the government to escape accountability. It also has to do with the public fear engendered by these threats. One member suggested that boosting our critical infrastructure’s resiliency would be a security measure. Resiliency may be one answer to this cyclical overreaction to events.

**Shortcomings in policy-making – Long-term vs. short-term interests, also unintended consequences:** Another difficulty in making policy in this arena is the trade-off between making policy for the short-term and long-term. Which do we prioritize? Do they have to be opposed to each other? Government is tactical, not strategic; so there ends up being policy paralysis. Policy towards Pakistan in the 90s was brought up as an example of this uncoordinated approach. Was the priority nuclear proliferation? Democratization? Human Rights? We realize that we must make choices, and that sometimes our short-term policies actually hinder our long-term interests. For example, working with the military of a country can help us achieve our short-term goals, but then this alienates us with the population of that country, feeding the problem of anti-Americanism. How can we balance and/or harmonize these short-term and long-term goals and interests? Can we build for the long-term while addressing short-term threats/issues? In the short-term, how can we minimize conflicting policies that contribute long-term to the threats we are trying to decrease?

**Shortcomings in policy-making – Other trade-offs:** In making policy, there are inevitably trade-offs, like the ones mentioned above between short-term and long term interests. There are also trade-offs between security and privacy and civil liberties, the extent to which our borders are open, etc. Which trade-offs are important? For example, there seemed to be a consensus that the trade-off between security and civil liberties is important to consider.
However, how do we put value on the various things in the trade-off calculus? How do we evaluate the unintended consequences? For example, if we tighten regulations and classify more health research (like the section in journals describing methods and materials in conducting an experiment) to protect ourselves from bioterrorism, then this would likely stifle scientific progress. Similarly, severely restricting civil liberties and shutting down our borders makes the U.S. a less desirable place and diminishes our image as a land of freedom and democracy. Should we be making policy with a risk-tradeoff analysis (RTA) in mind? RTA would balance the acute risks and the countervailing risks. One member argued that in making a risk-tradeoff analysis, we should try to make risk superior strategies, that is, develop policies without countervailing risks.

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**Additional Points under the Each Threat Category**

*(note: many points made during these threat discussions were incorporated into the above notes and therefore are not listed below.)*

**Terrorism and Criminal Networks**

- There seemed to be agreement that Al Qaeda is focused not only on lethality, but especially on profound disproportionate consequences. For example, UBL has explicitly stated that our economy is our biggest vulnerability, and therefore terrorists should target the U.S. economy.

- There seemed to be disagreement on the severity of the threat of terrorism. One member put the threat at a 0.5 (on a scale of 0-10 where 10 would be the Soviet Union). Others seemed to think the threat was greater.

- There was also disagreement as to the existence of sleeper cells in the US.

- Members seemed to agree that we don’t know the enemy very well at all. During the Cold War, we knew the Soviet capabilities more or less, but we didn’t know their intent. Now we know Al Qaeda’s intent, but there are many unknown variables. What is their remaining capability? What kind of capability are they building in the future? Using Clarke’s breakdown of the concentric circles, how many core members are there? How many affiliates? Sympathizers? How do you identify individuals who don’t show up on watch lists? How do you detain them if you can’t identify them?

- Members agreed that we need to worry about radicalization of Muslims in Europe, both new immigrants and second/third generation. Again and again, attackers have some connection to Europe (lived there, studied there, etc.). It was suggested that we should be more afraid of LSE graduates than madrassa graduates.

- Although it’s psychologically satisfying to say that terrorists are poor and disenfranchised, the terrorism experts agreed that it was often actually the wealthier and well-educated members of society who turn to terrorism (see Alan Krueger’s research on Palestinian terrorism). It is as though it has become “intellectually enlightened” to be against the Americans. One member added that terrorist groups do still prey on and recruit from the poor – we see a pattern in terrorist groups where the leaders are often well-educated, but the rank and file terrorists are often low-level and not terribly intelligent.

- Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are incredibly adaptive operations. They learn from their mistakes and adjust their tactics in order to succeed.
We’re seeing a decentralization of terrorism. These decentralized organizations may not be as powerful or organized as a hierarchically structured organization, but it is far more difficult to combat. There are also independent outcroppings of groups that say they are Al Qaeda but have no ostensible ties to the central organization. If they say they are Al Qaeda, are they? Does it matter? If UBL issues a commander’s intent, can he actually make people act on it?

We should be worried about small arms – the world is awash with them and they are easy to obtain. We are seeing very significant exchanges in a few niche areas.

Members seemed to be convinced by one member’s assertion that different groups, even with opposing ideologies, are still able to conduct criminal business (such as arms and diamond trade) together. This debunks the myth that Sunnis and Shiites won’t work together. When it comes to criminal activity, they will put ideology aside.

Members seemed to agree that failed states, particularly those that are resource-rich, should be a big concern with regards to terrorism and criminal networks. Dangerous areas to watch out for: places like D.R.C., Liberia, Sierra Leone.

There seemed to be agreement that cyberterrorism was not a huge threat, but the use of the Internet for coordination was a very valuable tool.

Disease and Bioterrorism

The need for global mechanisms was particularly important in this area. Members seemed to agree that we need increased capacity to detect and respond to outbreaks and epidemics and increased capacity of the WHO to coordinate global outbreak responses. (Whether or not public health concerns constituted a direct national security threat was not agreed upon.) There also seemed to be agreement among the health experts that there should be global mechanisms in place to track plasmids and controls over access to pathogens.

There was a consensus that we worry a lot about anti-personnel terrorism, but not nearly enough on anti-crop and anti-livestock terrorism. The biologists on the panel believed that agricultural threats were just as important. An attack on our food supply would severely disrupt the economy.

There was also a concern that we focus a lot of attention on terrorism, when disease (and natural disasters) can be just as deadly. In fact, the people killed by disease dwarf any of the numbers associated with terrorism.

Natural infections can kill, just as terrorist attacks can. There seemed to be agreement, as well, that in addition to killing possibly millions, the psychological and economic impacts of a pandemic in the U.S. would be fearsome and devastating.

Globalization (ease and speed of travel, etc.) has provided tremendous opportunity for the spread of inflection.

Our activities may be responsible for precipitating infections. There is a link between environmental degradation/ecological destruction and emergence/spread of diseases. For instance, China’s destruction of its shores, led migratory aquatic birds to land on farms. The birds then passed the avian flu virus to chickens on these farms. This particular virus is one with which we should be concerned because never in history has a human been infected by it – meaning that no human is immune to the disease.

Health policy can have foreign policy dimensions – the sharing or not of vaccines and official denial of epidemics, for example. Therefore, health experts urged the group to develop a more complete picture of health as a foreign policy issue. However, there was a recognition that we needed a more precise understanding of what infectious disease threats have the potential to be security threats and why they have that potential.
There are also serious ethical dimensions – for example, if treatment is only available for those who can afford it.

The demographic consequences from pandemics can be devastating. For example, the youth bulge that we see in sub-Saharan Africa due to AIDS is similar to the demographics we saw with the 14th century Black Death. The orphan burden is skyrocketing and the general health of the populations of many countries is declining significantly. For example, many recruits into Russia’s army get turned away for health reasons. How much longer will Russia be able to recruit armed forces?

We focus a disproportionate amount of our efforts on intentional misuse of biological sciences, but the inadvertent mistakes can also be catastrophic, causing great harm. For example, scientists sincerely wanting to create a mouse contraceptive ended up creating mousepox that was deadly. Additionally, we have many people working with substances about which they know very little. This could be very dangerous – for example, in working with a dangerous pathogen like anthrax.

There was a question as to whether or not we could distinguish is a pandemic was biological terrorism or naturally occurring. Sometimes it’s obvious (anthrax in an envelope or smallpox, because there’s no natural way for that to be transmitted now), but other times it would be more difficult to know. One answer would be tracking plasmids, since this is one of the chief ways in which something evolves – we would be able to check to see if someone had tampered with the plasmids.

Natural Disasters & Resource Scarcities

The U.S. military is good at responding quickly to natural disasters, but not good at building infrastructure.

Environmental damage can be the tipping point for conflict, particularly when the perception is that others outside the country/region caused the problem. Additionally, Major environmental stresses will likely cause major social upheaval in very vulnerable and politically unstable parts of the world.

The global conventional oil situation is one about which we should be extremely concerned. By 2050, demand will double. The oil shocks will be even more severe than in the 1970s because the shocks will be environmental rather than political. We won’t completely run out of oil anytime soon, but we will run out of the cheapest, most easily accessible oil. It will become much harder to find, costlier to produce, and more concentrated in politically volatile parts of the world. As oil becomes scarcer, we will become increasingly reliant on unsavory regimes. This transition to oil scarcity will not be smooth, but rather, will be marked by severe and disruptive oil shocks.

Following this previous point, it was suggested that democratization in the Middle East might be a double edged sword for the United States as democratically elected regimes may not align themselves as much with U.S. interests as many of the authoritarian regimes in the region have done historically.

Policymakers often overlook the danger arising from multiple, simultaneous stresses. By looking at problems such as climate change and resource scarcity in isolation from each other, we tend not to appreciate the synergistic effect that stresses can have on each other, thus producing even greater impacts.

The Montreal Protocol was held up as a good example of an instance when the world community came together to create a global mechanism to deal with a real, transnational threat. Members agreed that our group should commission a paper on globalized threats and the effectiveness of global mechanisms/treaties/solutions.
APPENDIX C

SUMMARY OF WORKING GROUP MEETING #2, JUNE 27, 2005
HELD AT NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC

Meeting Summary prepared by Dawn Yamane Hewett (PPNS Project Manager and RA)

Attendees: Peter Bergen (co-chair), Laurie Garrett (co-chair), David Albright, Jenny Buntman (New America Foundation RA), Roger Cressey, Bo Cutter, Douglas Farah, David Fidler, Adam Garfinkle, Laurie Garrett, Elisa Harris, Dawn Yamane Hewett (Working Group RA), Thomas Homer-Dixon, Rebecca Katz (observer), Assaf Moghadam (observer), Stephen S. Morse, Scott Rosenstein (Council on Foreign Relations RA), Anne-Marie Slaughter (via conference call), Jessica Stern, Allona Sund (observer)

Regrets: Steve Flynn, David Heymann, Bruce Hoffman, Anja Manuel, Steve Schneider

Meeting objective: One of our primary missions of this meeting was to tease out an analytically meaningful definition of national security. What transnational threats ought to be considered part of national security? There is no disagreement that terrorism has now made it onto the national security agenda, but what of other threats such as pandemic disease, resource scarcities, and natural disasters? What are the consequences of classifying certain threats as ones of national security? Once we have defined some of these non-traditional threats as national security, how do we better prepare ourselves to respond to these threats?

General meeting description:
The meeting began with an update from Anne-Marie Slaughter on the overall effort of the Princeton Project and how this group fits into the overall efforts. Next, David Fidler presented his commissioned paper responding to Daniel Deudney’s 1990 article that argued against having environmental and other non-traditional threats at the national security table. In this same session, Peter Bergen also presented research on various definitions of national security, the focus on transnational threats by recent administrations, and various international responses to global threats. This led into a discussion on the elements of a new definition of national security that would fit the challenges and opportunities of this era. Bo Cutter then gave a presentation, followed by discussion, on the necessity to take a long-term view, summing the total threats over the next 25 years, and seeing what changes need to be made at the structural/institutional level to address these threats. Following this discussion, Thomas Homer-Dixon, Jessica Stern, Laurie Garrett, and David Albright made presentations on various specific national security threats and the group discussed how they might fit into a new definition of national security. During the last discussion of the meeting, the members looked for areas of consensus on which threats should be considered direct threats to national security and which should be considered contributing factors.

Toward a New Definition of National Security
Can we agree on a single definition of national security? What is our analytical framework for discussing national security threats? What are the consequences of labeling particular threats as a part of national security? What is the “tipping point” at which point a threat
would become a national security threat (rather than just a domestic policy or foreign policy concern)? What are the salient features of such threats?

National security is “the continued ability of this country to pursue its internal life without serious interference.” George Kennan. Quote taken from a speech by Robert E. Ebel, Director of Energy and National Security, to the Wilmington Club, Wilmington, DE, May 25, 1999.

“National security… is best defined as the capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity, and well-being.” Charles Maier, 1990 (Quote from Joseph Romm. Defining national security: the nonmilitary aspects

“a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that 1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or 2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.” Richard Ullman. “Redefining Security,” International Security. Vol. 8, summer 1983.

In the effort to come up with a new definition of national security, the group affirmed the importance of a definition that 1) is not simply a laundry list of threats and 2) is parsimonious in that some things would be considered not to be national security threats. There was consensus that if we employ a “threshold test” to determine which threats are national security, this bar needs to be set sufficiently high, yet not so high that we are left with a definition that would exclude something like the anthrax attacks.

We began the meeting with a presentation by Fidler on his paper responding to Deudney’s 1990 essay on delinking environmental threats and national security. In Deudney’s essay, he makes the following argument (as summarized by Fidler): “linking environmental degradation to national security is analytically flawed because (1) such degradation does not connect to protecting the state from violence from other states; (2) environmental degradation is unlikely to cause war between states; and (3) appealing to national security to increase attention on environmental problems subordinates environmental interests and values to “national security mindsets” [p. 469] incapable of appreciating the central messages of environmentalism (Part 2). Deudney’s arguments combine to reject the linkage between environmental degradation and national security both analytically and normatively.”

On the whole, group members did not agree with Deudney’s restrictive definition of national security. Nonetheless, Fidler remarked on three contributions Deudney does make to our group’s effort. First, Deudney’s essay reminds us how deeply entrenched the traditional notion of national security (the violence paradigm) is. Second, his essay warns of the analytical slippery slope – saying that everything is national security is meaningless in

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practice. Third, Deudney highlights the danger and seductiveness in falling back on ideological or personal preferences, rather than empirical or analytical reasoning. Particularly in a bipartisan project such as this one, we must come up with principles that will guide both Republican and Democratic administrations, and therefore cannot rely on ideological or personal preferences alone in crafting a definition of national security.

What the group needs is a credible, coherent definition of national security, encompassed in a framework that is not time-bound by the immediate past or future, and is driven by meaningful indicators. In this way, we can build a framework of how to think about transnational threats and how to restructure current institutions to address these threats over the long term.

Generally speaking, throughout the meeting, members used either a deductive (discussing general principles first, then seeing which threats would fit) or inductive approach (deciding which threats are national security threats, and then figuring out general principles from the specific cases), and both exercises brought some insight to our mission.

**Deductive approach to a national security definition**

*Setting general principles and seeing which threats would fall into this definition*

In discussing general features of national security threats, there was mention that these threats are like pornography – you know them when you see them. Further, whether or not something is a national security threat seems to be context dependent – it depends on what else is on the agenda. Nonetheless, members were still able to produce a non-mutually exclusive, non-exhaustive list of features of national security threats:

- body bags / numbers dead
- rate of those dying
- fear\(^9\) / idea that anyone could be next
- blood & treasure litmus test (would we be willing to spend blood and treasure to defend ourselves or go on the offensive against this threat?)\(^10\)
- intentionality (although this was disputed)
- anything that causes\(^11\)
  - 20% drop in GDP
  - declaration of martial law
  - premature death of >1% of the population
  - inability for USG to continue functioning

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\(^9\) Although most members seemed to be supportive of including fear as a feature, some were hesitant to incorporate fear or perception of the threat. Some said that the whole point of this definition setting exercise is to isolate policy making from that process, while others stated that it is precisely the fear and perception of fear that makes some of these transnational threats so severe. The latter group argued that if one focuses just on numbers, then one misses the fear engendered by the threat. For example, why did 9-11 feel so significant? Why did anthrax paralyze the government?

\(^10\) One member who spent time in government noted that the “blood and treasure” litmus test is how things operate now. Are we willing to spend blood and treasure to prevent (offensive) or protect against (defensive) a particular transnational threat? If we do not agree that this is an appropriate way to determine threats, then he argued that we must change the definition to change the litmus test.

\(^11\) The specific numbers above were disputed, as was the idea of focusing on a precise threshold. Some thought that a more general description where numbers then played a role would be more effective.
During this discussion, one member brought up the five measures set out by the Hart-Rudman Commission to define national security threats. The members generally liked these five conditions and referred to them throughout the discussion.

1. unnatural death
2. economic effect
3. continuation of constitutional life
4. continuation of government
5. territorial integrity

The Hart-Rudman Commission could not agree on a ranking of threats, but put them into ranked categories. DoD does this now by labeling threats vital, important, and humanitarian. The working group did not have a chance to rate the severity of various threats, but this, like national security threats generally, seemed to be dependent on the context of the other threats at the table. This is an outstanding issue that should be addressed in the report.

**Inductive approach to national security definition**

*Determining national security threats, and generalizing principles from the examples*

Throughout the meeting, members discussed various specific threats and whether they are national security threats or not. At the end of the meeting, members created and filled out two charts: one encompassing direct national security threats, and the other covering contributing factors. Although there was not total consensus on each of these points below, there seemed to be more or less a general agreement.

### Direct national security threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Caveats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Newly emerging pandemic disease</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons proliferation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catastrophic terrorism</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nuclear</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Radiological</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>w/ strong caveats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chemical</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>w/ strong caveats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Biological</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Crop</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Livestock</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Human</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smaller-scale terrorism</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Ex.: Oklahoma City bombing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Scarcity</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Oil / Energy</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Water</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Warming</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafficking</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Drug(^{12})</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Human</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{12}\) One member reminded us of Bush I and his establishment of drug trafficking as a national security threat. Members noted that this was not a good precedent, so we must be careful in expanding the definition.
On these issues where the group decided “no,” members added some of them (such as water scarcity and climate change) to the second chart of contributors to direct threats.

### Contributing factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributor</th>
<th>War against the US</th>
<th>Terrorism against US &amp; allies</th>
<th>Pandemic disease</th>
<th>Regional &amp; domestic instability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Democratization”(^{15})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H(_2)O scarcity</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy/Oil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Climate Change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Humiliation”(^{16})</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acute Poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics (immigration, racism, etc. in Europe)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics  •  Life-expectancy gap</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental destruction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal networks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed states</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Americanism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian regimes in Middle East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative deprivation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While this exercise was helpful, members were quick to point out that the causal process is of course, much more complex than what can be captured by these bivariate charts. There are major endogeneity problems within this bivariate model – for example, criminal networks contribute to regional and domestic instability, but regional and domestic instability can breed criminal networks. Similarly, a failed state would certainly contribute to the spread of

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\(^{13}\) Taking the inductive approach, we said that hurricanes in Florida are not a national security event (even through the response to it is military-led), but a hurricane that hits Washington, DC would be, because the continuation of government would be at peril.

\(^{14}\) This was not discussed at this meeting, however, there seemed to be general agreement that even a large-scale natural disaster in another part of the world would not be a national security threat. However, members did agree that it would be a major foreign policy issue.

\(^{15}\) Members noted that the process of democratization, particularly the middle period, can be extremely unsettling and dangerous. Therefore in this chart, we were referring to the instability that sometimes accompanies the move toward democratization.

\(^{16}\) An important point was made about humiliation arising out of relative deprivation, not acute poverty.
a pandemic disease, however, pandemic disease could also bring about the collapse of a state. Furthermore, terrorism can engender regional and domestic instability, while environmental destruction (human-driven) can cause climate change, which in turn, causes environmental destruction. Along these lines, it is precisely the simultaneity, synergy, and connectivity of these various contributors that are likely to cause large-scale nonlinear events that may threaten the U.S. Our report will need to tease out some of these more complex interrelationships and causal processes.

**National security threats vs. foreign policy challenges**

Another way members tackled the direct threats versus contributors to those threats was defining some threats/contributors as foreign policy challenges. In keeping the definition parsimonious, we will necessarily keep the list of items that can be considered national security threats small. However, there was agreement that even if the list of direct threats to national security is short, the US foreign policy apparatus will need to keep apprised of and address a wide array of stressors, risk factors, and contributors to these direct threats (as outlined in the second table). By keeping some threats on the table as foreign policy challenges (without having to elevate them to the level of national security), we will signal the importance of these threats and national security policy can hope to be successfully proactive rather than reactive. The example most often cited by the group was failed states. Some members feared that by calling failed states ipso facto a national security threat, the implication is that you have to unfail them. There are some failed states that don’t matter to us – do we care about Burkina Faso, for example, a landlocked African country without any resources? However, following the notion of simultaneity, synergy, and connectivity, a failed state combined with anti-Americanism, acute poverty, and environmental destruction might be of major concern to us. The consensus seemed to be that state or government failure should be a high priority foreign policy challenge, and members recognized failed states as a potentially great contributor towards other direct threats (such as terrorism and pandemic disease), therefore recognizing the need to keep it on the national security agenda, but as a foreign policy challenge, rather than a direct threat.

By keeping a close eye on these kinds of contributors to the direct national security threats, we can develop a system for when the contributors become severe enough or spin out of control, they would reach the level of a direct national security threat, either permanently or temporarily. For example, nuclear proliferation is technically a contributor, not a direct threat. However, we consider it a direct threat to national security because the U.S. government decided long ago that obtaining of nuclear weapons was a direct precursor to using them against the U.S., and therefore, simply the act of proliferating or becoming a nuclear weapons state is permanently considered a direct threat to national security. For another example, failed states writ large may not be considered a direct national security threat, but when the failed state is a nuclear power, this would become a direct threat to national security.

### Taking the Long View on Transnational Threats: How to Address Them?

*Beginning with the assumption of a steady state continuum in world affairs from now, out 25 years into the future, what do we think or hope the world will look like? What could interfere with that scenario? What kinds of changes do we need to see in the USG / international system to adequately prevent and respond to transnational threats? What kind of a*
framework might we use to understand the long-term principles for action on the various threats under consideration here?

When we think of the national security threats, what is the present value of the sum of those threats over the next 25 years? Kennan did this with his X article. Once we decide which transnational threats matter and say that we need to deal consistently with these issues over the long term, then we need to think about the organizational restructuring that must accompany this shift in thinking. We cannot avoid the three issues of organization, structure, and process – and we must get creative and not just move around boxes in addressing these three issues.

Along these lines, members reminded the group of DoD primacy in dealing with national security threats. For example, currently, CDC is invited to the morning national security briefings, but as another member pointed out, invitation to meetings does not mean that these other entities are actually at the table making policy in a substantive sense. In order to get health and/or environmental issues on the national security agenda in a serious way, some painful reorganization must take place. One suggestion was to create a White House entity and leadership on transnational threats we think matter and give it resources. The task force model was also mentioned. Another suggestion was the regionalization of embassies or State, much like the integrated command structures in the military. In this way, the U.S. could project an integrated influence beyond the military. However, it should be noted that there was question as to whether we should organize our security apparatus around events (such as pandemics) that might happen four times per century. Other members countered that we also have not been hit by a nuclear weapon, but we systematically prepare. Thus we can also systematically prepare for the possibility of pandemic disease.

Once we figure out the threats we must address over the long term and how we need to change or adapt present government institutions and structures to prevent and respond to these threats, we must turn to the issue of enacting these changes. Members who had been in government sounded realistic warnings about the profound organizational and institutional changes that would need to take place and the specific difficulties in undertaking these kinds of changes - getting new people to the national security table, the slow pace of reform, and the necessity of Presidential leadership to get things moving and/or done. Changing government structures is difficult, but with leadership and persistence, it is possible. However, members warned that we may have to scale down expectations of how much change we can effect.

Therefore, members agreed that three needs to be high-level engagement, preferably from the President, and a willingness to spend political capital to make these kinds of changes. Arguing for new threats on the national security agenda necessarily entails trade-offs. This report can help create the willingness to spend political capital by creating public awareness for the need for this kind of change.

17 It was noted that any one of the integrated commands has more budget discretion than the entire State Department. Also, no ambassador in the world has more than $100,000 in discretionary funding.
Outstanding issues

What exactly are we securing? This issue was broached but not resolved. Is it the integrity of the state or the security of the well-being of American citizens? Our definition can encompass a statement that explains our fundamental values and what we are protecting.

How do we adequately protect the U.S. from transnational security threats? How do we guard against current threats, anticipate and prevent future potential threats, and generally advance our national interests? This is difficult because nation/state strategies are limited, there is a crisis of global governance, and cooperative arrangements between states are often limited. Members discussed U.S. government reforms at length, but did not address solutions to the issue of the lack of global governance and global response capacity.

We spoke at length about reforming the U.S. government, but didn’t talk much about the issue of international institutions. How should we work with existing international institutions to enhance our safety and security? What kinds of reforms are needed to make these institutions function better in this regard? Are new institutions needed?
APPENDIX D

CHART OF TRANSNATIONAL THREATS IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES: RONALD REAGAN TO GEORGE W. BUSH

Prepared by Fatema Gunja (Princeton Project on National Security RA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REAGAN ADMINISTRATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose of National Security Policy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To preserve the political identity, framework and institutions of the US as embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution; To protect the US – its national territory, citizenry, military forces, and assets abroad – from military, paramilitary, or terrorist attack; To foster the economic well-being of the US, in particular by maintaining and strengthening the nation’s industrial, agricultural and technological base and by ensuring access to foreign markets and resources; To foster an international order supportive of the vital interests of the US by maintaining and strengthening constructive, cooperative relationships and alliances, and by encouraging and reinforcing wherever possible and practicable, freedom, rule of law, economic development and national independence throughout the world</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives of National Security Policy</th>
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<tr>
<td>To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against the US, its allies, and other important countries across the spectrum of conflict; and to defeat such attack should deterrence fail; To strengthen the influence of the US throughout the world by strengthening existing alliances, by improving relations with other nation, by forming and supporting coalitions of states friendly to US interests, and by a full range of diplomatic, political, economic, and information efforts; To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces; To neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase its influence through it use of diplomacy, arms transfers, economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and disinformation; To foster, if possible, in concert with our allies, restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries; To limit Soviet military capabilities by strengthening the US military, by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, and by preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies and resources to the Soviet Union; To ensure the US access to foreign market and to ensure the US and its allies and friends access to foreign energy and mineral resources; To ensure US access to space and the oceans; To discourage further proliferation of nuclear weapons; To encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and investment programs that promote economic development and the growth of humane social and political orders in the Third World; To promote a well-functioning international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investment and broadly agreed and respected rules for managing and resolving differences</td>
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<tr>
<th>Threats to National Security</th>
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<tr>
<td>Key military threat during the 1980s will continue to be from the USSR and its allies and clients. Conflict from regional tensions with a Soviet client more likely than a direct conflict with the USSR. Unstable international environment -- due to unstable governments, weak political institutions, inefficient economies, traditional conflicts, resource scarcity, increasing terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and uncertainties in Soviet political succession -- create opportunities for Soviet expansion in developing world</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Strategies

(1) Modernization of Strategic Nuclear Forces; (2) Use of General Purpose Forces as Necessary; (3) Provide Security Assistance; (4) Force Integration

Transnational Threats

WMD, Terrorism, Economic Instability

BUSH I ADMINISTRATION

Purpose of National Security Policy

The security of the US as a free and independent nation; Global and regional security; Open, democratic, and representative political systems worldwide; An open international trading and economic system; An enduring global faith in America

Objectives of National Security Policy

Deterrence and the capability to defeat aggression should deterrence fail; Strengthening our alliance arrangements and our preference for multilateral action; Maintaining stability through forward preference and force projection; Helping to preclude conflict and keep the peace (1993); Deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its allies and -- should deterrence fail -- repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies; Effectively counter threats to the security of the United States and its citizens and interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism; Improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements, modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing systems capable of defending against limited ballistic-missile strikes, and enhancing appropriate conventional capabilities; Promote democratic change in the Soviet Union, while maintaining firm policies that discourage any temptation to new quests for military advantage; Foster restraint in global military spending and discourage military adventurism; Prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and resources to hostile countries or groups, especially the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and associated high-technology means of delivery; and Reduce the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combatting international traffickers and reducing demand at home. (1991)

Threats to National Security

The Future of the Soviet Union - While the threat of a U.S.-Soviet military conflict is lower than at any time since the end of World War II, we must hedge against the uncertainties of the future. Elements of the U.S.-Soviet relationship will remain competitive, and there is always the danger that confrontations will re-emerge; The Growing Roles of Germany and Japan - Have to manage economic friction and figure out responsibility-sharing with respect to sharing the costs of US defense of Europe and Japan; New Europe - Must keep NATO strong and ensure freedom of Eastern Europe, mass migration of refugees. Other threats include Arms Control, Stemming Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons, Intelligence Programs, Illicit Drugs, and Immigrants and Refugees. Economic Challenges include Maintaining Economic Growth, Global Imbalances, Debt, Trade, Technology, Energy, Environment, and Space.

Strategies

Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance; Promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes; Promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions as the surest guarantors of both human rights and economic and social progress; Aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism and illicit drug trafficking; and Support aid, trade and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress
**CLINTON ADMINISTRATION**

**Purpose of National Security Policy**

“America benefits when nations come together to deter aggression and terrorism, to resolve conflicts, to prevent the spread of dangerous weapons, to promote democracy and human rights, to open markets and create financial stability, to raise living standards, to protect the environment – to face challenges that no nation can meet alone.” Promote a strong, prosperous and competitive U.S. economy; Ensure access to foreign markets, energy, mineral resources, the oceans and space; Promote an open and expanding international economic system, based on market principles, with minimal distortions to trade and investment, stable currencies, and broadly respected rules for managing and resolving economic disputes; Achieve cooperative international solutions to key environmental challenges, assuring the sustainability and environmental security of the planet as well as growth and opportunity for all; and Have healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations.

**Objectives of National Security Policy**

- To enhance America’s security; To bolster America’s economic prosperity; To promote democracy and human rights abroad

**Threats to National Security**

- Regional or State-Centered Threats; Transnational Threats; Spread of Dangerous Technologies; Failed States; Foreign Intelligence Collection; Environmental and Health Threats

**Strategies**

Strategy of Engagement that includes: Shaping the International Environment (adapting alliances, encouraging the reorientation of states, encouraging democratization, open markets, free trade, sustainable development, preventing conflict), Responding to Threats and Crises (countering potential regional aggressors, confronting new threats, and steering international peace and stability operations), Preparing for an Uncertain Future (transformation of military, diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, and economic efforts)

**Transnational Threats**

- WMD, Terrorism, Drugs, International Crime, Trafficking in Persons, Cybersecurity, Critical National Infrastructure Security, Global Warming & Environmental Threats, Infectious Diseases
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Purpose of National Security Policy</th>
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<tr>
<td>To create a balance of power that favors human freedom. Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. To achieve peace and promote global security.</td>
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<th>Objectives of National Security Policy</th>
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<tr>
<td>To achieve domestic stability and international order. To bring hope of democracy, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world. To use international aid (through forms like the MCA) to promote freedom.</td>
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<th>Threats to National Security</th>
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<tr>
<td>Gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology; WMD; Weak states can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states</td>
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<tr>
<th>Strategies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Champion aspirations for human dignity; Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; Work with others to defuse regional conflict; Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction; Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; Expand a circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy; Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and Transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century</td>
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<tr>
<th>Transnational Threats</th>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorism and WMD main threats. Other concerns are the Environment, Poverty, Disease, Illiteracy</td>
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APPENDIX E

CHART OF NATIONAL SECURITY DEFINITIONS

Compiled by Irina Parshikova with Assistance from Evan Magruder and Jorge Aguilar
(Princeton Project on National Security RAs)
### Quotes from the officials

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source/Date</th>
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</table>
| The Clinton administration  | “Its [national security strategy’s] three core objectives are:  
• To enhance our security.  
• To bolster America’s economic prosperity.  
| The Clinton administration  | “We must judge our national security strategy by its success in meeting the fundamental purposes set out in the preamble to the Constitution:  ...provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Prosperity,...”                                   | "A National security Strategy for a New Century". The White House. October 1998.                  |
| The Clinton administration  | “The goal of the national security strategy is to ensure the protection of our nation’s fundamental and enduring needs: protect the lives and safety of Americans, maintain the sovereignty of the United States with its values, institutions and territory intact, and promote the prosperity and well-being of the nation and its people.” | "A National security Strategy for a New Century". The White House. October 1998.                  |
| The Clinton administration  | “Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.” | A National security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The White House. February 1995.       |
| The Bush Administration     | “The US national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. … Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.”  
(same document, definition of ‘human dignity’: “America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property”.) | The National security Strategy of the United States of America. September 2002.                    |
<p>| The Bush Administration     | “Ultimately, the foundation of American strength is at home. It is in the skills of our people, the dynamism of our economy, and the resilience of our institutions… That is where our national security begins.”                                                                                                                                       | The National security Strategy of the United States of America. September 2002.                    |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
<th>SOURCE/DATE</th>
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<tr>
<td>President Bush</td>
<td>“America's vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one… Advancing these ideals is the mission that created our Nation. It is the honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is the urgent requirement of our nation's security, and the calling of our time.”</td>
<td>President Bush, second inaugural address, January 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Forrestal</td>
<td>‘ the question of national security is not merely a question of the Army and Navy. We have to take into account our whole potential for war, our mines, industry, manpower, research, and all the activities that go into normal life.”</td>
<td>James Forrestal, Navy secretary. Senate hearings, August 1945. (Romm, Joseph. Defining national security: the nonmilitary aspects. 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative Moss</td>
<td>“National security [is] such an ill-defined phrase that no one can give me a definition … In 16 years of chairing the committee … I could never find anyone who could give me a definition”</td>
<td>Representative Moss, Chairman of the House committee that considered the original 1967 Freedom of Information Act. (1973) (Romm, Joseph. Defining national security: the nonmilitary aspects. 1993)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bill Frist</td>
<td>: “We now live in a world where the United States is the only remaining superpower, yet we have seen our readiness posture erode to dangerously low levels. The world remains a dangerous and unpredictable place. I have worked hard to put the teeth back in our armed forces because it is clear that the our troops on the front lines will be the first to pay if we are not prudent custodians of our defense resources”</td>
<td>Bill Frist’s website</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President George W Bush</td>
<td>“In the twenty-first century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and assure their future prosperity. People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children—male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society—and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages.”</td>
<td>Introduction to National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President George W Bush</td>
<td>“Our first priority must always be the security of our nation.”</td>
<td>State of the Union 2001</td>
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<td>Name</td>
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<td>Condoleezza Rice</td>
<td>“We live in a time of grave threats to our national security -- to our very national life -- from terrorists, from rogue states, from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And the gravest threat of all is the potential nexus between them -- the dreadful possibility that terrorists could gain nuclear, biological or chemical weapons from an outlaw regime, thereby realizing their means -- and rationalizing their means to match their hatred.”</td>
<td>December 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Rumsfeld</td>
<td>“...six main priorities for national defense: protect critical bases of operations (most importantly, the U.S. homeland) and defeat weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; project and sustain power in distant anti-access and area-denial environments; deny enemies sanctuary by developing capabilities for persistent surveillance, tracking, and rapid engagement; leverage information technology and innovative network-centric concepts to link up joint forces; protect information systems from attack; and maintain unhindered access to space and protect U.S. space capabilities from enemy attack.”</td>
<td>“Annual Report to the President and the Congress”, 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Bill Clinton</td>
<td>“Some may be tempted to believe that open markets and societies will inevitably spread in an era of expanding global trade and communications, or assume that our wealth and power alone will protect us from the troubles of the outside world. But that approach falls for the old myth of an &quot;outside&quot; world, and ignores the defining features of our age: the rise of interdependence. More than ever, prosperity and security in America depend on prosperity and security around the globe. In this age, America can advance its interests and ideals only by leading efforts to meet common challenges. We must deploy America's financial, diplomatic and military resources to stand up for peace and security, promote global prosperity, and advance democracy and human rights around the world.”</td>
<td>A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madeleine Albright</td>
<td>“Proliferation is the single greatest security challenge that we and our allies face…”, and “Security results from a marriage of diplomacy to power and that requires using the full range of American policy tools.” Also, “The protection of national security is a bedrock task of our national government,” and “[national security is] the solemn responsibility of the executive and legislative branches in Washington, each according to its role.”</td>
<td>Hoover Institue October 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Wayne</td>
<td>“Trade as an element of national security… In essence, a strong world economy based on free trade and solid investment regimes advances not only prosperity, but also peace and freedom around the world, thereby enhancing our own national security.”</td>
<td>Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, December 5, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Security Oversight</td>
<td>“Regarding our nation's fundamental values, I recognize that it has been opined by some that national security is not a value in itself - contrasted for example with open government, but rather a condition that allows a nation to maintain its values. In this context, it has been argued that it is”</td>
<td>“Managing Secrets in a Changed World” Remarks of J. William Leonard, Director, Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) at the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
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<tr>
<td>Office</td>
<td>inappropriate to speak of national security and openness as in some kind of balance. I disagree. In fact, the Preamble to the Constitution is abundantly clear that one of the fundamental purposes of this social compact is to &quot;provide for the common defence&quot; - national security, if you will, in today's parlance.</td>
<td>2004 Freedom of Information Conference, Freedom Forum World Center, Arlington, VA, March 16, 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**(b) Contents:** Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following:

1. The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States.
2. The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States.
3. The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1).
4. The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy.
5. Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.

### NSPD, the Bush administration

“National security includes the defense of the United States of America, protection of our constitutional system of government, and the advancement of United States interests around the globe. National security also depends on America's opportunity to prosper in the world economy.”

### NSPD, the Bush administration

11 NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs) established for interagency coordination of national security policy:
1. Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations
2. International Development and Humanitarian Assistance
3. Global Environment
4. International Finance
5. Transnational Economic Issues
6. Counter-Terrorism and National Preparedness
8. Arms Control
9. Proliferation, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense
10. Intelligence and Counterintelligence

### Executive Order 12656--

“...our national security is dependent upon our ability to assure continuity of government, at

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**Source/Date**

Title 50 - War and National Defense/Chapter 15 - National Security/Subchapter I - Coordination for National Security

National security Presidential Directives, George W. Bush Administration, February 13, 2001

National security Presidential Directives, George W. Bush Administration, February 13, 2001

Executive Order 12656--Assignment of emergency preparedness responsibilities
<table>
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<th>NAME OF THE ACT</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
<th>SOURCE/DATE</th>
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<td>Assignment of emergency preparedness responsibilities</td>
<td>“A national security emergency is any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, technological emergency, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United States.”</td>
<td>Source: The provisions of Executive Order 12656 of Nov. 18, 1988, appear at 53 FR 47491, 3 CFR, 1988 Comp., p. 585.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN High-Level Panel Report</td>
<td>“The case for collective security today rests on three basic pillars. Today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as the national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to protect its own peoples and not to harm its neighbours.”</td>
<td>UN High-Level Panel Report, p.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN High-Level Panel Report</td>
<td>“Differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive as the gravest threats to our survival and well-being. Differences of focus lead us to dismiss what others perceive as the gravest of all threats to their survival. Inequitable responses to threats further fuel division. Many people believe that what passes for collective security today is simply a system for protecting the rich and powerful. Such perceptions pose a fundamental challenge to building collective security today. Stated baldly, without mutual recognition of threats there can be no collective security. Self-help will rule, mistrust will predominate and cooperation for long-term mutual gain will elude us.”</td>
<td>UN High-Level Panel Report, p.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>CATEGORY:</td>
<td>Quotes from the agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>AGENCY</strong></td>
<td><strong>DEFINITION</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>National security List (NSL) consists of 2 lists: “issue threat list” (unclassified) and “country threat list” (classified). “The issue threat list has eight categories of activities deemed to be significant threats to U.S. … The issue threats are: Terrorism, Espionage, Proliferation, Economic Espionage, Targeting the National Information Infrastructure, Targeting the U.S. Government, Perception Management, Foreign Intelligence Activities.”</td>
<td>FBI, National security List, 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>“The outbreaks [epidemics of plague, Ebola fever, avian influenza, Hendra virus, etc in India, Hong-Kong, Malaysia, Africa] have illustrated disruption of travel and commerce and potential threats to national security. The complications of the naturally occurring complex epidemics underline the global implications of the local problems.”</td>
<td>James Hughes, CDC “Emerging Infectious Diseases”. CDC. Vol.5 No.4, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>“For the first time the Department of Health and Human Services is part of the national security apparatus of the US. That reflects the change in our views on chemical and biological defense programs.”</td>
<td>Richard Clarke, “Finding the Right Balance Against Terrorism” CDC. Vol.5 No.4, 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Exec. Order No. 12,958, § 1.2(a)(4). &quot;Damage to the national security&quot; is defined as &quot;harm to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States from the unauthorized disclosure of information, to include the sensitivity, value, and utility of that information.&quot; Id. § 1.1(l).</td>
<td>United States of America, united states department of justice, and united states department of state, petitioners v. Leslie r. Weatherhead Executive Order No. 12,958, 3 C.F.R. 333 (1996), is the currently applicable Order governing the classification of national security information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>“…spreading democratic values and respect for human rights around the world is one of the primary ways we have to advance the national security interests of the U.S.”</td>
<td>Lorne Craner, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Testimony to House Committee on International Relations Washington, DC, July 9, 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>“…public diplomacy needs to be a national security priority. International public opinion is influential in the success of foreign policy objectives…”</td>
<td>Tré Evers, Commissioner, United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy Statement before the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on National security, Emerging Threats and International Relations Washington, DC, August 23, 2004</td>
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Department of the Interior  
U.S. Geological Survey  
Appendix A. Glossary of Definitions, May 2004 |
| Department of the Interior     | National Interest. The national interest concerns the well-being and security of the United States. It applies to the furtherance of the Nation’s foreign policy objectives and overseas interests; protection of the Nation from internal subversion, sabotage, espionage, and other illegal acts as well as from foreign aggression; promotion of the domestic well-being and the economic and productive strength of the Nation; and fulfillment of the public trust through the proper and lawful conduct of the Government’s business. | U.S. Geological Survey Manual  
Department of the Interior  
U.S. Geological Survey  
Appendix A. Glossary of Definitions, May 2004 |
<p>| United States Intelligence Community | “The territorial integrity, sovereignty, and international freedom of action of the United States. Intelligence activities relating to national security encompass all the military, economic, political, scientific, technological, and other aspects of foreign developments that pose actual or potential threats to US national interests.” | Website of the “United States Intelligence Community,” a federation of executive branch agencies and organizations that conduct intelligence activities (e.g. CIA, NSA). Updated March 18, 2005. |</p>
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<th>NAME</th>
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<tr>
<td>Arnold Wolfers</td>
<td>“They [national security and national interest] may not mean the same things to different people. They may not have precise meaning at all. Thus, while appearing to offer guidance and basis of broad consensus, they may be permitting everyone to label whatever policy he favors with an attractive and possibly deceptive name.”</td>
<td>Arnold Wolfers “National security as an Ambiguous Symbol”. 1962 (Quote from Romm, Joseph. Defining national security: the nonmilitary aspects. 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmut Schmidt</td>
<td>National security means “the necessity to safeguard free trade access to energy supplies and to raw materials, and the need for a monetary system which will help us to reach those targets.”</td>
<td>Helmut Schmidt, The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture (Oct. 28, 1977). (Quote from Covey, Russell Dean. “Adventures in the zone of twilight: Separation of powers and national economic security in the Mexican bailout” The Yale Law Journal, 1983. Vol. 105, Iss. 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amos A. Jordan</td>
<td>“National security … has a more extensive meaning than protection from physical harm; it also implies protection, through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten the fundamental values of the state”</td>
<td>Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., Michael J. Mazarr. American national security. 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Romm</td>
<td>“Military security has not vanished as a key element of national security, but it has certainly declined in importance relative to the issues of economic, energy, and environmental security”</td>
<td>Romm, Joseph. Defining national security: the nonmilitary aspects. 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Lippmann</td>
<td>“A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war.”</td>
<td>Walter Lippmann, 1943 (Quote from Romm, Joseph. Defining national security: the nonmilitary aspects. 1993)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>National Security Council</td>
<td>“To preserve the United States as a free nation with our fundamental institutions and values intact.”</td>
<td>National Security Council (1950s) [on the concept of national security] (Quote from Romm, Joseph. Defining national security: the nonmilitary aspects. 1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Maier</td>
<td>“National security … is best defined as the capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity, and well-being.”</td>
<td>Charles Maier, 1990 (Quote from Romm, Joseph. Defining national security: the nonmilitary aspects. 1993)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg</td>
<td>“National security is that part of government policy having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favorable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries”</td>
<td>Trager, Frank N. and Philip S. Kronenberg. National security and American society; theory, process, and policy. 1973</td>
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<td>William Proxmire</td>
<td>“Power always has to be kept in check; power exercised in secret, especially under the cloak of national security, is doubly dangerous”</td>
<td>Mein Kampf</td>
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<td>Adolf Hitler</td>
<td>“The external security of a people is largely determined by the size of its territory.”</td>
<td>Mein Kampf</td>
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<td>Robert Dreyfuss</td>
<td>“In the geopolitical vision driving the current US policy toward Iraq, the key to national security is global hegemony – dominance over any and all potential rivals.”</td>
<td>Mother Jones (March 2003)</td>
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<td>Pena, Charles, director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute</td>
<td>“the Constitution of the United States of America makes clear that one of the paramount responsibilities of the federal government is to ‘provide for the common defense.’”</td>
<td>V. Bush’s National Security Strategy is a Misnomer. The Cato Institute. 2003.</td>
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<td>Education Resources Information Center (ERIC)</td>
<td>“a) in its most basic sense national security means protection of a nation's borders and territories against invasion or control by foreign powers; b) a broader view of national security involves the promotion of national values, interests, and institutions and the protection of them from various threats”</td>
<td>Education Resources Information Center (ERIC) Digest. “National Security in the Curriculum”, June, 1989.</td>
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<td>George Kennan</td>
<td>&quot;the continued ability of this country to pursue its internal life without serious interference, or &quot;</td>
<td>Comments on the General Trend of U.S. Foreign policy,&quot; Draft Paper, August 20 1948, George F</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>SOURCE/DATE</td>
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<td>“refers to policy enacted by governments to ensure the survival and safety of the nation-state, including but not limited to the exercise of diplomatic, economic, and military power in both peace and war”</td>
<td></td>
<td>“National security.” Wikipedia Encyclopedia.</td>
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<td>General Brent Scowcroft, who twice served as U.S. National Security Adviser, headed up a 2004 reappraisal of the mission of the UN in the post-9/11 world. Warning that traditional notions of national security were obsolete in the age of globalization, Scowcroft urged leaders in the wealthy world to heed the dangers of failing states that are overcome by poverty and diseases. Such places have spawned conflicts, in some cases demanding the involvement of external military forces, Scowcroft asserted. A hallmark of failing states is an unraveling of capacity to respond to the essential health and food needs of the populace, with an ever increasing linkage emerging between health and national security.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Laurie Garrett, “HIV and National Security: Where are the Links? A Council on Foreign Relations Report.” Council on Foreign Relations, July 2005.</td>
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<td>“If we want our own security concerns to be recognized by the UN, and of course we do,” Scowcroft warned an American audience in 2004, “it (is) clear that we must recognize the security concerns of others, whose concerns are very different from ours. As I say, for much of the world, it is not issues of global war. It is not issues of weapons of mass destruction, attack, and so on. It’s how they can continue to survive in the face of poverty, in the face of disease.”</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brent Scowcroft, “A More Secure World: Who Needs to Do What.” Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, December 16, 2004</td>
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<td>Collective Security is a system for ensuring peace in which participants agree that an attack against one of them will be treated as an attack against them all and will result in a collective military response. It is the original theory behind many famous current and historical military alliances, most notably NATO. It has also been cited as a principle of the United Nations, and the League of Nations before that. By employing a system of collective security the UN hopes to dissuade any member state from acting in a manner likely to threaten peace, thereby avoiding any conflict. The theory is considered by politicians to be more successful when applied to military alliances than in attempts to use it as a universal principle as with the League of Nations and UN.</td>
<td></td>
<td>“Collective Security.” Dictionary.laborlawtalk.com</td>
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<td>Country</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
<td>A key element of <strong>national security</strong> is Australia’s ability to protect its borders</td>
<td>Australia's National security - Attorney-General's news release of 18 September 2001</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>“Key elements of the new Austrian doctrine include:… … The recognition that there can be no reference to Austria's <strong>national security</strong> without reference to the concept of &quot;European Security&quot;.</td>
<td>Georg Mader, <em>A new doctrine...</em> (from the Österreich's virtuelles Militärluftfahrt-Journal website)</td>
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<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>“Idea of <strong>national security</strong> - is the first, main and eternal of all national ideas… Thus, the idea of <strong>national security</strong> is the idea for the responsibility for the nation”</td>
<td><em>The Idea Which Everybody Looks For.</em> Hikmet HADJY-ZADEH FAR Centre, Baku, Azerbaijan</td>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>“We can speak of <strong>national security</strong> when the major rights and liberties of the Bulgarian citizens are protected as well as the state borders, the territorial integrity and independence of the country, when there is not any danger of armed attack, violated change in the constitutional order, political dictate or economic compulsion for the state and the democratic functioning of the state and civilian institutions is guaranteed in result of which the society and the nation preserve and increase their prosperity and develop” (General Provisions. Paragraph 20). &quot;The <strong>National security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria</strong> represents formally adopted political views on protecting the Bulgarian citizens, society and state against external and internal threats of any nature, taking into account the available resources, and conforming to the level of guarantees which provide the global, Euro-Atlantic and European security system and steady development.” (introduction)</td>
<td>National security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria (Adopted by the National Assembly, April 1998)</td>
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| China | “China’s basic goals and tasks in maintaining **national security** are:  
* To stop separation and promote reunification, guard against and resist aggression, and defend national sovereignty, territorial integrity and maritime rights and interests.  
* To safeguard the interests of national development, promote economic and social development in an all-round, coordinated and sustainable way and steadily increase the overall national strength.  
* To modernize China's national defense in line with both the national conditions of China and the trend of military development in the world by adhering to the policy of coordinating military and economic development, and improve the operational capabilities of self-defense under the conditions of informationization.  
* To safeguard the political, economic and cultural rights and interests of the Chinese people, crack down on criminal activities of all sorts and maintain public order and social stability.” | Chapter II: National Defense Policy (from the website of the Chinese People's Liberation Army). |
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<th>Country</th>
<th>National Security Policy/Concept</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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| Estonia  | “the goal of the Estonian National security Policy is to preserve Estonia’s independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order, and public safety” (1.1.) | National security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2004)  
Germany, Interior Minister Otto Schily. “Germany Concerned by Fundamentalism” May 18, 2005, Deutsche Welle |
| Germany  | “In 2004… the fight against Islamic terrorism continues to be Germany’s prime national security concern” | “National security Concept Finalized”, Civil Georgia, May 15, 2005 (on-line magazine)                                                  |
| Georgia  | “The draft concept of the national security sets sovereignty, security, peace, democracy, rule of law, human rights and welfare as Georgia’s fundamental national values. These values are a vital necessity for the existence and security” of the Georgian state, according to this document | Musharraf, Press conference with Tony Blair, 6 December 2004.                                                                 |
| India    | [National security is ] “The strategy of resolving political disputes actually strikes at the core of terrorism, and that is the route that we should be taking.” | Statement by H.E.Dr. Kuniko INOGUCHI, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament At the Conference on the Implementation, By the Arab States, of the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons Cairo, 18 December 2003 Conference on the Implementation, by the Arab States, of the UN Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons |
| Japan    | “It has become increasingly clear [after the end of the Cold War] that the successful attainment of national security, or the conclusion of peace pacts, does not necessarily bring security to people, and that people continue to suffer and die from insecurity resulting from war-related effects long after the war itself has come to an end, or national security is seemingly restored.” | The National security Concept (unofficial translation, website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia),  
Musharraf, Press conference with Tony Blair, 6 December 2004.                                                                 |
| Latvia   | “The national security of the Republic of Latvia is the ability of the state and its society to protect and ensure the national interests and basic values. They are - the maintenance of the state independence, territorial integrity and democratic system of the Republic of Latvia, determined by the Satversme (Constitution), as well as ensuring the internal security of the state by guaranteeing compliance with the human rights, security and protection of the people.” (1.1) | The Concept of National security (adopted July 1994). Mongolia                                                                 |
| Mongolia | “The national security of Mongolia (hereinafter referred to as "national security") represents the status when favorable external and internal conditions are secured to ensure vital national interests of Mongolia. The ideological basis of the policy ensuring national security is national patriotism” (article 2) | The Concept of National security (adopted July 1994). Mongolia                                                                 |
ONE. Structure of National security

5. The national security shall consist of the following main components:

1) Security of the existence of Mongolia,
2) Security of the social order and state system,
3) Security of citizens' rights and freedoms,
4) Economic security,
5) Scientific and technological security,
6) Security of information,
7) Security of Mongolian civilization,
8) Security of the population and its gene pool,
9) Ecological security

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<th>Country</th>
<th>National Security Concept</th>
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<td>Russia</td>
<td>“The national security of the Russian Federation is interpreted as the security of its multinational people as the bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in the Russian Federation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>“National security is concept which encompasses threat/risk perception and social, economic, and military parameters” (Hurriyet, August 8, 2001)</td>
</tr>
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| Turkey  | Turkey’s Defense Policy** is directed at defense due to her natural characteristics and is prepared to protect and preserve independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and vital interests of the country” (**National security Concept in Turkey is formally called “National Military Defense Concept”)

