

Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy: A Review of Recent Studies

I. Introduction

We have to do a better job of telling our story.
-- President George W. Bush¹

Despite ongoing U.S. efforts to “win hearts and minds,” opinion polls, news reports, and foreign editorials all tell the same story: the United States has a serious image problem. As anti-Americanism spreads and deepens across the globe, it has become increasingly clear the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus is failing to meet the challenges before it. Over the last decade, deep budget cuts, unwieldy and inefficient bureaucratic structures, and a lack of coordination have significantly hamstrung U.S. public diplomacy efforts. A former ambassador to Morocco captured the state of U.S. public diplomacy when he recently lamented, “In the battle of ideas, we unilaterally disarmed.”²

In the four years since 9/11, numerous policy makers, academics, and media professionals have weighed in on how the United States should improve its public diplomacy efforts. Over fifteen major studies have directly called for a transformation of U.S. public diplomacy.³ Several important studies have been conducted by government-sponsored commissions or agencies, including: three by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), an independent and nonpartisan investigative arm of Congress; one by the Defense Science Board, a committee of civilian advisors to the Department of Defense;⁴ three by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, a bi-partisan panel created by Congress and appointed by the President; and one comprehensive review by the Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (also known as the Djerejian Report), a panel created by the House Subcommittee on Appropriations.

Independent non-profit think tanks and research organizations have also conducted significant analyses of U.S. public diplomacy, including: the Council on Foreign Relations, a national membership organization and a nonpartisan center for scholars; the Brookings Institution, an independent non-partisan think tank; the RAND Corporation, a non-profit research organization; the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank; the Center for the Study of the Presidency, a non-partisan research center focused on key issues facing the presidency; and the Public Diplomacy Council, a non-profit organization based at George Washington University.

While the various analyses differ slightly in their prescriptions, all agree that the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus faces several chronic and systemic problems: there is no one in charge, there is no national strategy, and public diplomacy is woefully under-resourced. Although some of the recommendations made in recent studies have been undertaken, there remains significant room for improvement of U.S. public diplomacy. A review of the recent analyses reveals a recurring litany of challenges and some common recommendations for how to transform U.S. public diplomacy efforts and counter the growing phenomenon of anti-Americanism.

II. Surveying the Evolving Public Diplomacy Landscape

The goal of public diplomacy is “to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion of the U.S. national interest and to broaden dialogue between Americans and U.S. institutions and their counterparts abroad.”⁵ The broad nature of public diplomacy transcends the purview of any single agency or department, and the public diplomacy landscape remains a patchwork of players with overlapping duties. Several entities share responsibility for waging the “battle for ideas,” including: the White House, State Department, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), USAID, and the Department of Defense (DOD). A review of the primary players involved in U.S. public diplomacy provides useful context for both recent analyses and suggested reforms.

White House

Calls for greater White House leadership in public diplomacy efforts resonate throughout all the major studies.⁶ For example, a recent GAO analysis echoes findings from the Defense Science Board's latest report on strategic communications, asserting that "a unifying vision of strategic communications starts with presidential direction and that only White House leadership, with support from cabinet secretaries and Congress, can bring about needed changes."⁷

Presidential Decision Directive

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) task force, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, the Djerejian Report and others suggest the president issue a Presidential Decision Directive on public diplomacy.⁸ The CFR task force recommends the president "make clear America's commitment to reforming its public diplomacy and make it a central element of U.S. foreign policy."⁹ While the President has not issued such a directive, some observe that the Bush administration has demonstrated a strong commitment to public diplomacy,¹⁰ and since 9/11, the White House has launched a number of new initiatives. Recent reports, however, point out that several of these efforts have either ceased operations or have yet to fully realize their intended purpose.

Interagency Coordination Committees

In September 2002, the National Security Council (NSC) established the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (SCPCC) to facilitate interagency cooperation on public diplomacy.¹¹ Co-chaired by the NSC and the State Department's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the SCPCC included representatives from the executive departments, offices, and agencies represented in the NSC. However, after the March 2003 invasion of Iraq and the resignation of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the SCPCC remained dormant for sixteen months.

In July 2004 the SCPCC was replaced by a new entity, the Muslim World Outreach PCC. This new PCC, similar in composition to its predecessor, is said to be developing a strategic plan for communicating with the Muslim world. The GAO reports this committee has "collected ideas from embassies in Muslim-majority countries, developed a strategic plan for communicating with the Muslim world, and is drafting a tactical paper to operationalize the strategy."¹² The new PCC's effectiveness remains to be determined, but according to media reports, the White House recently approved the committee's comprehensive strategy to work with moderate Muslims and counter extremists—an ambitious plan that aims to influence trends and ideas within Islam itself.¹³

In another White House-directed coordination effort, shortly after 9/11 the NSC set up an Information Strategy (IS) PCC to handle covert information activities. The IS PCC was established by classified memorandum and fell under the purview of the Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism. Most analyses, however, note the usefulness of the IS PCC is constrained by a lack of responsiveness to its suggestions. One former staffer commented that his particular section of the IS PCC "developed 50 different position papers with proposed courses of action, but despite very positive feedback on content, only a mere handful of the actions were operationalized."¹⁴

Office of Global Communications

In January 2003, the President created, what was billed as the White House's primary public diplomacy coordinating body, the Office of Global Communications (OGC). Modeled after the Coalition Information Centers set up in Washington, London, and Islamabad to wage the propaganda battle during the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan, the OGC was supposed to coordinate strategic communications overseas, while integrating the administration's themes and truthfully depicting the United States and administration policies.¹⁵ The OGC's mandate also included responsibility for developing a national communications strategy.¹⁶

Recent analyses expressly criticize the OGC for failing to fulfill its intended purpose of charting the strategic direction and coordinating U.S. public diplomacy efforts.¹⁷ The Defense Science Board concludes the OGC “evolved into a second-tier organization devoted principally to tactical public affairs coordination. The OGC does not engage in strategic direction, coordination, and evaluation.”¹⁸ An April 2005 GAO report stresses that the OGC’s failure to live up to the full scope of its mandate has led to interagency coordination on a purely ad hoc basis.¹⁹

Although most studies urge the OGC to assume a greater role in coordinating public diplomacy efforts,²⁰ according to White House and State Department officials, the OGC disbanded in March 2005. The White House indicated the NSC will take over the OGC’s functions,²¹ and recent news reports note the creation of a new White House position: a deputy national security adviser for strategic communication and global outreach.²² There has not, however, been anyone publicly designated for the post. A senior State Department official suggested the dissolution of the OGC and appointments of Condoleezza Rice as Secretary of State and Karen Hughes as the Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs may signify a shift in public diplomacy’s “center of gravity”—from the White House to the State Department.²³

State Department

The United States Information Agency (USIA) long stood as the primary agency for public diplomacy. Established in 1953 to counter anti-American propaganda from the Soviet Union, USIA coordinated and oversaw information dissemination programs and outreach efforts, including international broadcasting and exchange programs. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, policymakers increasingly viewed public diplomacy as an “expensive anachronism.”²⁴ Support for USIA steadily eroded and lawmakers cut the agency’s resources, rendering the once formidable American public diplomacy machine a mere shadow of its former self.²⁵

A 1999 streamlining effort folded the USIA into the State Department—a move designed to better integrate public diplomacy and policymaking. Several assessments of the integration have noted, however, that after the integration many within the State Department viewed public diplomacy more as an “ugly stepsister,” than an integral component of the Department’s mission.²⁶ One observer commented: “In a department where making and executing foreign policy are considered more substantive endeavors, officers responsible for public diplomacy feel like second-class citizens and find themselves subject to burdensome bureaucratic rules and procedures.”²⁷ The U.S. Commission on Public Diplomacy’s review of the USIA integration emphasized the dissonance: “The State Department . . . does policy, not programs. USIA was all about programs.”²⁸

After the integration: the State Department’s public diplomacy structure

When the State Department absorbed USIA, the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was created to oversee the programs USIA had managed. The Under Secretary coordinates efforts of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (responsible for exchange and academic and cultural programs), the Bureau of Public Affairs, and the Office of International Information Programs. As the organization currently stands, the Under Secretary has very little direct control over public diplomacy assets and personnel. Several reports call for giving the Under Secretary greater authority, particularly in assignment and evaluation of public affairs officers abroad.²⁹

Many observe that by incorporating a small, relatively well-managed, agency into a large and inefficient bureaucracy, the USIA integration weakened strategic communication capabilities. Under the USIA structure, overseas public affairs officers reported to USIA area offices and directly up the USIA chain of command. Currently, public affairs directors report to regional assistant secretaries, below the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, rather than someone within the public diplomacy hierarchy. Whereas

public diplomacy field reporting once traveled swiftly to senior public diplomacy decision makers, reporting now must “endure[s] lengthy embassy staff and ambassadorial reviews that are standard procedure for State’s political reporting.”³⁰ Moreover, few officers from the public affairs cone have ascended to upper level management positions within the regional and functional bureaus.³¹

The Djerejian Report highlights the loss of communication clarity created by the current reporting and evaluation structure: “The previous direct link between senior USIA management and public affairs officers through the [USIA] Area Offices became indirect with the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and the geographic Assistant Secretaries often providing separate guidance, and the Chiefs of Mission or their deputies undertaking the performance evaluation of public affairs officers.”³² Chiefs of Mission or their deputies, who may have little or no training in public diplomacy, are currently responsible for managing and evaluating public affairs officers overseas. One commentator stresses public diplomacy officials “should be evaluated by other communications professionals, not by officers who barely understand the mission.”³³

In fact, from the moment it absorbed USIA, the State Department has been criticized for its limited understanding of the nature of public diplomacy, especially vis-à-vis public affairs.³⁴ Whereas public diplomacy—understanding, informing and influencing foreign publics—can be a powerful component of foreign policy, “public affairs” generally refers to selling U.S. foreign policy to domestic audiences. Public affairs deals largely with short-term perception management through the media and is “essentially reactive and informative.”³⁵ In contrast, public diplomacy is a long-term pro-active endeavor that engages a broad range of non-government elements of a society. Some point out that since the integration, Embassy front offices have urged public affairs officers to spend more time and energy on short-term public affairs at the expense of public diplomacy.³⁶ Reforming the reporting structure and giving the Under Secretary greater authority, would be concrete steps towards creating a more unified public diplomacy apparatus within the State Department.

Ongoing State Department efforts to improve coordination

In response to Congressional pressures and recommendations in the Djerejian Report, the State Department created an Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in September 2004. According to the State Department, the office will “provide long-term strategic planning and performance measurement capability for public diplomacy and public affairs programs. It will also enable the Under Secretary to better advise on the allocation of public diplomacy and public affairs resources, to focus those resources on the most urgent national security objectives, and provide realistic measurement of public diplomacy’s and public affairs’ effectiveness.”³⁷ While this new office represents progress in the right direction, critics assert that it stops short of giving the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs direct control of public diplomacy personnel and financial resources. Thus, the Under Secretary has responsibility without direct authority over critical aspects of the public diplomacy apparatus—a situation which some have called a “prescription for failure.”³⁸

The State Department also actively participates in two interagency coordination bodies: the Interagency Strategic Communication Fusion Team and the Interagency Working Group on U.S. Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training. According to the GAO, the fusion team, which supports the Muslim World Outreach PCC, meets weekly to bring together program-level officers to discuss proposed and ongoing public diplomacy efforts across the federal government. The GAO also notes the interagency working group meets quarterly to coordinate the exchange and training activities of 12 federal departments and 15 independent agencies.³⁹

Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)

The United States spends more than a half-billion dollars each year on government-sponsored international broadcasting. Responsibility for these efforts falls primarily to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), whose stated mission is: “To promote and sustain freedom and democracy by broadcasting accurate and objective news and information about the United States and the world to audiences overseas.”⁴⁰ The International Broadcasting Act of 1994 consolidated responsibility for all non-military international broadcasting funded by the U.S. government in the BBG, and the bipartisan presidentially-appointed board became an independent autonomous entity in 1999.⁴¹ Day-to-day broadcasting activities, however, are carried out by the individual broadcasters.

While BBG’s statutory authority creates a “firewall” between policy makers and broadcasters to ensure credibility, BBG coordinates with the State Department through a number of mechanisms. Some have suggested that program content could be even better coordinated if more formal channels for conveying programming suggestions were established.⁴² Others recommend a thorough review of BBG to ensure it operates in tune with foreign policy and public diplomacy objectives.⁴³ For example, the Djerejian Report calls for Congress to reexamine the legislation creating the BBG to ensure broadcast operations support the mission of U.S. public diplomacy.⁴⁴ According to the GAO, while BBG has been coordinating with the State Department, some USAID and DOD officials have complained the BBG has not been receptive to programming content suggestions.⁴⁵

Post-9/11 expansion of programming

Recent reports overwhelmingly support an expansion of U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting. Since 9/11, the BBG has initiated several new programs designed to attract larger audiences in priority regions, including Radio Sawa in the Middle East, Radio Free Afghanistan, Radio Farda in Iran, as well a 12-hour a day Urdu language program, Radio Aap ki Duniya. In 2004, BBG also launched two 24/7 Arabic television services to the Middle East: Al-Hurra and Al-Hurra Iraq.

While the effectiveness of these efforts is yet to be determined, several of BBG’s new broadcasting programs appear to be reaching a considerable audience. Radio Sawa, a 24-hour radio station modeled after American FM stations, began broadcasting to the Arab world in March 2002 and is often cited as one of the more successful endeavors. According to Tre Evers, Commissioner, U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, surveys show the percentage of adults listening to Radio Sawa on a weekly basis range from 11% in Egypt to 73% in Morocco.⁴⁶ While Sawa primarily broadcasts a combination of popular American and Arabic music, it also provides news bulletins twice an hour.

Al-Hurra, the U.S. foray into satellite television, has both strong proponents and detractors, and it remains to be seen if audiences will tune in to its programming. A January 2005, a Congressional Research Service study notes some have praised Al-Hurra for its roundtable discussion programs and coverage of controversial subjects (such as the Abu Ghraib scandal), while others have been put off by the patronizing name of the network—“Al-Hurra” means the “free one” in Arabic—and heavy handed promotional spots, “which show scenes of wild horses running free and eyelids slowly opening, while accompanying messages encourage viewers to ‘decide for themselves.’”⁴⁷ According to a survey released by the BBG in October 2004, weekly viewing rates for Al-Hurra among adults with satellite television ranged from 12% in Egypt to 33% in Kuwait.⁴⁸

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

The Djerejian report, the GAO, and others point out that much of USAID’s work amounts to “public diplomacy at its best,” but greater efforts must be made to communicate the extent and benefits of American development work. For example, the Djerejian report points out that, “Egyptians were grateful to the Japanese for building their opera house. But they were unaware that the United States funded the

Cairo sewer, drinking water, and electrical systems and played a key role in reducing infant mortality in Egypt.”⁴⁹ U.S. foreign assistance offers one area where a little public diplomacy can go a long way.

While it has had a limited role in public diplomacy in the past, USAID created a new position in September 2004 to help embassies, USAID missions, and implementing partners increase awareness of U.S. assistance activities. The new Development Outreach and Communication Officers will help USAID collaborate with public affairs officers and maximize exposure and understanding of U.S. assistance. According to the GAO, USAID plans to have these officers in place at each of its 84 missions across the globe by September 2005.⁵⁰

Department of Defense

Traditionally, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been reluctant to explicitly engage in public diplomacy efforts, but it has taken recent steps to define and assert its position within the public diplomacy apparatus. When it requested the Defense Science Board to examine strategic communication efforts both in the Department of Defense and in other agencies, DOD explicitly acknowledged the importance of public diplomacy to winning both short-term battles and the long-term war against terror. The role of the U.S. military in relief efforts after the 2004 Asian tsunami represents but one example of how the military can serve as a potent conduit for public diplomacy. According to some analyses, the over 13,000 U.S. military personnel delivering food and medical aid to tsunami victims helped bolster Indonesians’ lagging perception of the United States.⁵¹

The GAO reports that DOD issued an Information Operations Roadmap in 2003, which discusses DOD’s role in public diplomacy and other strategic communications efforts. DOD has also made structural changes to better define its role in U.S. public diplomacy efforts.⁵² For example, a September 2004 directive instructed the Under Secretary for Policy to serve as the DOD focal point for developing and overseeing DOD strategic communications efforts.⁵³

III. Winning the “war of ideas”: Revitalizing public diplomacy

When it comes to suggestions on how to improve the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus, there is no shortage of proposals for reform. The primary criticisms of U.S. public diplomacy efforts remain: the absence of coordination among entities involved in public diplomacy, the lack of a national strategy, and inadequate funding. Although there has been significant progress on all three of these fronts since 9/11, most recommendations from recent analyses have not been fully implemented. The following recommendations are drawn from an overview of the growing body of literature on U.S. public diplomacy and they represent the most frequently recurring suggestions.

Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure

The CFR task force proposed the creation of a “Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure” (PDSC). This structure would resemble the National Security Council (NSC) as “advisor, synthesizer, coordinator, and priority setter” and include members at the assistant-secretary level or above.⁵⁴ A 2004 Brookings Institution study, however, cautions against two negative consequences of such a move: “First it would further bloat the bureaucracy. Second and more importantly, the creation of a separate structure would separate out the public diplomacy aspects of foreign policy and remove them from the overall foreign policy process.”⁵⁵ The recent demise of the OGC presents an opportunity to create something like a PDSC, but the White House has not explicitly stated what will fill the coordination void.

New White House architecture for public diplomacy

Some, such as the Djerejian Report, have recommended that strategy and interagency coordination of public diplomacy come from a new White House office headed by a cabinet-level counselor to the president.⁵⁶ Under this proposal, all government entities would follow the unified strategic direction laid

out by the new White House office. Recent media reports, however, suggest the White House has chosen to follow something more like the Brookings Institution's recommendation: "Instead of a new 'Czar for Public Diplomacy,' what might be more effective would be to create a position within the NSC staff that would be responsible for coordinating the range of interagency public diplomacy activities and making sure they square with the foreign policy objectives of the nation."⁵⁷ Some reports indicate the recent creation of just such a position: a deputy national security adviser for strategic communication and global outreach.⁵⁸

Revive USIA or create new agency for public diplomacy

In addition to increased linkages between the White House, State Department and other agencies involved in public diplomacy, some have called for the creation of a new agency, within the Department of State and NSC process, to manage and coordinate public diplomacy efforts.⁵⁹ Proponents argue this would consolidate control over budgetary and personnel resources while removing public diplomacy from "the incompatible State Department culture that has been ineffective, slow and reactive in addressing the challenge of spreading anti-Americanism around the globe."⁶⁰

Others suggest that the USIA be "revived" and public diplomacy efforts concentrated primarily in a single agency. A 2003 Heritage Foundation report points out that in 2002 House International Relations Committee Chairman, Henry J. Hyde (R-IL) introduced the Freedom Promotion Act of 2002 to "revitalize USIA within the State Department and reform foreign broadcasting, but his bill died in the Senate."⁶¹ A senior State Department official indicated that such a development is highly unlikely and primarily represents the nostalgia of "old USIA hands."⁶²

Craft a National Communication Strategy

Recent studies overwhelmingly agree that in addition to improved coordination, U.S. public diplomacy requires a new strategic direction to effectively counter the growing phenomenon of anti-Americanism.⁶³ The Djerejian report calls for "[n]ot merely tactical adaptation or reorientation, but strategic and radical transformation."⁶⁴ The CFR task force stressed the need to "rethink how the United States formulates, strategizes, and communicates its foreign policy."⁶⁵ Many calls for a "new strategic direction" diagnose the problem more thoroughly than they prescribe a "strategic" solution, but most analyses agree there needs to be a clear articulation of a national public diplomacy communication strategy. Such a strategy should address messaging and programming for all agencies involved in public diplomacy activities. A recent GAO report (2005) finds that the lack of such a strategy significantly hinders coordination and effectiveness. The Djerejian report, quoting a 2003 GAO study, also highlights the importance of a clearly articulated strategy:

[The] State [Department] lacks a comprehensive and commonly understood public diplomacy strategy to guide implementation of . . . programs. . . . Furthermore, there is no interagency public diplomacy strategy to guide State's and all federal agencies' communication efforts. This limits the government's ability to convey consistent messages to overseas audiences and thus achieve mutually reinforcing benefits.⁶⁶

The Djerejian report continues, noting that this stands in stark contrast to the emphasis placed on communicating domestic policy. For example, when the White House "decides to advocate a course of action to improve the economy, a sophisticated, long-range plan to achieve that goal is promulgated; a broad array of government agencies and private-sector supporters is mobilized; a media plan is set; polling and other forms of public-opinion measurement are deployed; potential pitfalls are assessed; and mid-course adjustments are made."⁶⁷ While the long-term nature of public diplomacy requires a slightly different approach, many argue that a national communication strategy would lend public diplomacy similar purpose and direction. Although the White House has launched several coordination initiatives since 9/11, these efforts have stopped short of issuing a national communications strategy.

Include public diplomacy in the creation of foreign policy

Several analyses quote Edward R. Murrow, the first director of the USIA, noting that public diplomacy must be included in the formulation of foreign policy, and should be an integral part of “the take offs, not just the crash landings.”⁶⁸ Numerous analyses emphasized that enhanced feedback and public diplomacy mechanisms should be incorporated into the foreign policy making process to mitigate undesirable consequences abroad. The CFR task force points out “this does not mean that America should change its policies to suit others wishes. . . . But it does mean that Washington must be aware of the cost of anti-Americanism and form and communicate U.S. foreign policy with a public diplomacy dimension.”⁶⁹ Incorporating public diplomacy into policy making means public diplomacy officers should be included in the policy making process: “1) to ensure policymakers are aware of the likely reaction of forthcoming policies to foreign audiences, 2) to advise how best to convincingly communicate policies to foreign audiences; and to ensure that U.S. diplomats are prepared to articulate policies before they are announced.”⁷⁰

Most reports do not specifically address problematic policies, but generally encouraged the use of public diplomacy tools to craft and communicate American foreign policy and to reconcile perceived contradictions between American values and policies. The Center for the Study of the Presidency report is one of the few exceptions—it addresses policies and objectives the United States needs to communicate more effectively.⁷¹ The Djerejian Report cautions, however, that “spin” and manipulative public relations propaganda will not stem the rising tide of anti-Americanism. Foreign policy matters, and by incorporating public diplomacy into policy, the United States can achieve dramatic results.

Increase private sector involvement in public diplomacy

Analyses widely recognize U.S. public diplomacy can benefit significantly through increased government-private sector collaboration. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and others recommend that U.S. public diplomacy efforts incorporate techniques of private sector public relations firms. Pollsters and media specialists should be tapped for their valuable insights.

The GAO recently reported that State Department efforts to engage the private sector have “met with mixed results.” While collaborations on student and visitor exchanges have been successful, other attempts to forge public-private partnerships have not: “Aside from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, [the Department of] State has been unable to leverage the private sector to any significant degree.”⁷² The GAO suggests that the Secretary of State develop a strategy to guide efforts to engage the private sector in public diplomacy initiatives. One State Department official cautions, however, that the private sector and Hollywood are not filled with people that necessarily want to sell the United States abroad.

Others point to the tenure of Charlotte Beers as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs as an example of the difficulties inherent in applying private sector methods to public diplomacy activities. Beers, a former chairman and CEO of two of the top global advertising agencies, took over as Under Secretary three weeks after 9/11. Her efforts to “rebrand” American foreign policy were ambitious. She oversaw the launch of a monthly pro-American, Arabic-language newsmagazine called *Hi*, and rolled out a series of slick television spots with smiling American Muslims. While Beers brought considerable Madison Avenue advertising experience to the position, many of her programs won more guffaws than hearts or minds in the Arab world. Beers left her position after 18 months in a cloud of criticism. “The US can’t be sold as a ‘brand,’ like Cheerios,” wrote the Wall Street Journal editorial board.⁷³

Some in the private sector have taken it upon themselves to improve America’s image. In January 2004, a group of marketing and communications professionals, academics, and political scientists launched

Business for Diplomatic Action, a private organization designed to mobilize private resources and the private sector to promote better understanding of the United States.⁷⁴ One report notes that “their ideas range from basic business practices—encouraging U.S. companies to poll their international employees on how the operation is doing as a corporate citizen—to more creative marketing, such as a reality show for MTV in which three Americans and three foreign students trade places for internships at U.S. multinational companies.”⁷⁵

The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy also suggests the academic community play a larger role in public diplomacy through teaching, scholarship, and research.⁷⁶ Few other analyses address the public diplomacy potential within U.S. colleges and universities, but the Djerejian Report recommends funding a Center for U.S.-Arab Muslim Studies and dialogue.⁷⁷ The Public Diplomacy Institute at George Washington University and the Center on Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern California stand out as the most significant efforts to advance the practice of public diplomacy within the academic community.

Create a Corporation for Public Diplomacy (CPD)

The CFR task force suggests bridging the gap between public and private sector initiatives through the creation of an independent not-for-profit Corporation for Public Diplomacy (CPD). The CPD, a proposal endorsed by the Djerejian Report and numerous others, could be modeled on the existing Corporation for Public Broadcasting, and would serve as the focal point for private sector involvement in public diplomacy.⁷⁸ The CFR task force suggests the CPD could “receive private sector grants and would attract media and personalities potentially less willing to work directly with U.S. government agencies. Its proposed structure also takes advantage of the fact that private media often communicate American family values, religious commitments, and the merits of democracy more effectively than do government officials.”⁷⁹ The Brookings Institution report notes that a consensus in favor of a CPD seems to be emerging in Washington, although the creation of a CPD does not appear on the near horizon.⁸⁰ Some, however, have expressed concerns that such an entity would remove important linkages between policy and public diplomacy.⁸¹

Improve capacity to “listen” to and dialogue with foreign publics

In order to improve U.S. public diplomacy messaging, the CFR task force recommends the use of opinion polling as well as information gathered by trained and linguistically competent embassy staff, the private sector, and friendly governments to “listen” to foreign publics. The CFR report points out that the U.S. government spends only \$5 million to \$10 million annually on foreign public opinion polling (in contrast to the \$6 billion spent by U.S. businesses). By way of comparison, the government’s expenditure pales in comparison to the research costs of many U.S. senatorial campaigns. The 2004 Brookings Institution report echoes the GAO’s suggestion that “government spending [on polling] should increase by a factor of about five to ten, in order to make a difference.”⁸² The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy suggests initiatives such as the Media Outreach Center at the U.S. Embassy in London, be expanded into a network of 24-hour message dissemination and monitoring centers. These centers would liaison with local media, conduct briefings and monitor public opinion.⁸³

When asked about the State Department’s ability to “listen to foreign publics,” one senior official downplayed the value of polling, particularly given the volatility of public opinion.⁸⁴ However, the official also suggested the recent appointment of long-time Bush adviser, Karen Hughes as Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs may place greater emphasis on increased engagement through exchange programs and dialogues—given that listening to foreign publics has been one of her stated priorities. In the press conference announcing her nomination, Hughes remarked, “America’s public diplomacy should be as much about listening and understanding as it is about speaking.”⁸⁵ Some, however, caution against an over-reliance on polling. In a recent op-ed “memo” to Hughes, Robert Satloff warned, “In the Middle East, polls tend to distort and exaggerate; public opinion is episodic and

driven by news cycles; and popular attitudes seem to have little impact on people's behavior. In your old job, polls may have been essential; in this job, they are toxic."⁸⁶

Several other analyses, including the Brookings Institution study stress the critical importance of two-way communication. A recent RAND report suggests "considering differing modes of communicating the 'big ideas' of public diplomacy through debate and discussion rather than through the typical monologic conveyance of the message."⁸⁷ Some alternative modalities suggested by the RAND report include, structured debates, call-in shows, and conversation and controversy programs. Others suggest expanding English language training programs to help facilitate long-term dialogue.⁸⁸

Craft messages with greater sensitivity to foreign audiences

While traditionally U.S. public diplomacy focused on foreign elites, the explosion of mass communications and the burgeoning global media community are changing the audience and tools of public diplomacy. U.S. public diplomacy must clearly and realistically identify its constituency and craft messages accordingly. Past U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been criticized for communicating policy to appeal to the American public, rather than considering how the values and history of the audience might affect perceptions.⁸⁹

The CFR report suggests strategic long-term public diplomacy efforts should employ messages emphasizing cultural overlaps between American values and those of the rest of the world. This long-term strategy could more closely tie U.S. policies to American values, and would complement the short-term focus on issues.⁹⁰ The CFR task force and the Brookings Institution also suggest particular attention be given to young audiences, a huge population in many countries with high levels of anti-Americanism.

Recent efforts at messaging with sensitivity have met with mixed results. The Shared Values Initiative marks one recent effort to demonstrate that Americans and Muslims share certain values and beliefs. One of Charlotte Beers' marquee programs, the initiative consisted of a \$15 million television ad campaign featuring five "mini-documentaries" produced by the McCann-Erikson ad agency. The testimonial-style spots on Muslim life in America only appeared in four countries, but the State Department estimates that the program reached approximately 288 million people.⁹¹ The State Department scrapped the program, however, after it provoked strong negative reactions in several target countries. While this initiative was consistent with recommendations from recent studies of public diplomacy, many targeted audiences never saw the spots because their governments refused to air them.

Create a culture of measurement

In order to assess progress and create a results-oriented public diplomacy apparatus, several analyses suggest subjecting public diplomacy activities to measurable indicators of progress. Currently, the State Department "is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas performance measurement efforts focus on anecdotal evidence . . . rather than gauging progress toward changing foreign publics' understanding and attitudes about the United States."⁹² Several reports recommend the State Department consider expanding use of opinion research and other evaluative methods to identify best practices and build a results-oriented public diplomacy culture.

According to the GAO, the State Department's Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources is drafting a strategic plan for evaluating public diplomacy efforts, which will include guidance on how to develop realistic measures of public diplomacy activities. The office has also created a public diplomacy evaluation council, "which brings together evaluation staff from across affected bureaus to develop a unified and rigorous approach to collectively assessing the department's activities."⁹³ The GAO also notes the State Department is considering broadening the council to include other agencies to provide measurement and evaluation for public diplomacy efforts across agency lines.⁹⁴

Revive and enhance successful exchange programs

Several reports highlight exchange programs as one of the most effective public diplomacy tools. Citizen exchanges, academic exchanges, speaking tours, and other bridge building efforts complement more traditional public diplomacy efforts. Most analyses recommend more energy and resources be devoted to citizen exchanges. Programs such as the International Visitors Program, Fulbright Academic Programs, youth exchanges, and the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) program in the former Soviet Union have a solid track record and should be expanded. In particular, “programs that have been successful in the past should be reexamined and the best of them reestablished, reinvigorated or expanded.”⁹⁵ The Djerejian report points out that between 1995 and 2001 educational and cultural exchanges dropped from 45,000 to 29,000 a year.⁹⁶ According to Patricia Harrison, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (and acting Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs), the United States currently hosts 30,000 academic, cultural and professional exchanges annually.⁹⁷

Shortly after 9/11, the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) launched a number of new programs. One of the most significant new initiatives, Partnerships for Learning (P4L), is an exchange program directed towards youth in the Arab and Muslim world. Since 2002, “ECA has dedicated over \$40 million dollars to this new initiative. In FY 2005, ECA has requested an additional \$25 million for P4L, which would increase funding for the P4L initiative to over \$65 million.”⁹⁸ As part of this initiative, ECA launched the first-ever government-sponsored high school program with the Arab and Muslim world. This program has grown steadily over the past several years, and according to Harrison, “by the 06-07 school year, we plan to have 1,000 high school students from the Arab and Muslim world [including Iraq and Afghanistan] studying side-by-side with our youth.”⁹⁹ The P4L program also revived the long-suspended Fulbright programs in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Provide better access to information on American polices and values

Some have suggested reviving U.S.-funded library operations and resource centers in major city centers, especially in countries where access to information remains limited. One report notes that “[w]here foreign audiences are starved for information; U.S. public diplomacy should seize the opportunity to supply it.”¹⁰⁰ Until the integration of USIA into the State Department, public diplomacy activities were housed in accessible facilities—called cultural centers, libraries, information centers, or “houses.” The centers served as a venue for a wide range of functions, but they had two important purposes: “(1) to provide the most current and authoritative information about official U.S. government policies, and (2) to serve as a primary source of informed commentary on the origin, growth, and development of American social, political, economic, and cultural values and institutions.”¹⁰¹ Many of these centers and libraries were closed during the 1990s due to budget cuts; remaining centers are slated for closure due to increased security concerns.¹⁰²

Several new programs, designed with a sensitivity to security concerns, have been developed to provide similar functions to the closed centers: 1) American Presence Posts, which use a single American officer in an important region to further commercial and diplomacy goals; 2) American Corners, which provide a public diplomacy outpost—library, discussion forum, program venue and Internet access—for local use without American personnel; and 3) Virtual Presence Posts, which use the Internet to communicate with local publics (and Americans) and may be able to handle up to 50 percent of a physical consulate’s workload.¹⁰³ These programs allow the United States to expand its public diplomacy footprint with relatively low cost strategies. According to Tre Evers, Commissioner of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, the State Department has dramatically increased funding for American Corners and Virtual Presence posts. As of August 2004, there were 143 American Corners in Africa, South Asia, East Asia, Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and plans to open another 130.¹⁰⁴

In addition to strengthening and expanding outreach centers, the Djerejian report suggests a massive book translation program. As envisioned, the “American Knowledge Library Initiative” would translate thousands of the best American books in various fields into relevant local languages and make them available in libraries, schools, American corners, and American studies centers.¹⁰⁵

Increase readiness and capabilities of public diplomacy personnel

The GAO also reports, however, that there is a significant shortage of public affairs officers overseas. Since the USIA merged with the State Department, public affairs officers have indicated a dramatic increase in administrative, budgetary, and personnel matters, which place demands on their time and prevent them from performing public diplomacy tasks.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, among those posted at overseas embassies, many lack the language skills necessary to effectively perform their duties. Picking up on this fact, many analyses have called for a concerted effort to address the staffing shortfalls that limit the State Department’s ability to fill language-designated positions. The GAO reported in 2003 that “21 percent of the 332 Foreign Service officers filling ‘language-designated’ public diplomacy positions overseas did not meet the foreign language speaking requirements of their positions.”¹⁰⁷

Several reports also suggest increased training for public diplomacy officers. The Foreign Service Institute provides training for junior public affairs officers, but a Heritage Foundation report recommends public diplomacy and public affairs staff be given continuing career training, similar to that provided to military public affairs officers.¹⁰⁸ The CFR task force goes further, suggesting an “Independent Public Diplomacy Training Institute” to recruit and prepare foreign affairs professionals for modern public diplomacy.¹⁰⁹ The CFR task force also stresses training should not be limited to public affairs officers—all foreign services officers, and especially ambassadors should be better prepared for public diplomacy.¹¹⁰

IV. Increasing Resources for public diplomacy

Program funding for public diplomacy is concentrated in the State Department and BBG, which shared a combined annual budget for public diplomacy of almost \$1.2 billion in fiscal year 2004—just one twenty-fifth of the international affairs budget.¹¹¹ The 2003 Djerejian report calls for an “immediate end to the absurd and dangerous under funding of public diplomacy in a time of peril.”¹¹² In some instances funding shortfalls directly impede the effectiveness of programming and “[b]ecause of a lack of funds, very little public diplomacy work is carried on outside national capitals.”¹¹³ Another assessment warns: “Effective public diplomacy cannot be done on the cheap.

While increased resources alone will not eliminate anti-Americanism, the CFR task force recommended that public diplomacy be funded in line with its importance to foreign policy and national security. Funding for public diplomacy has improved since 9/11 in many strategically important regions. According to the GAO, in the two years following the September 11 attacks, the State Department’s overall public diplomacy budget increased approximately 9 percent, in real terms.¹¹⁴ The largest increases in funding went to two regions with large Muslim populations—South Asia (increased by 63 percent) and the Near East (increased by 58 percent).¹¹⁵ Significant resource challenges, however, remain a persistent cause for complaint by public affairs officers.¹¹⁶ The State Department’s 2005 Budget included \$309 million for general public diplomacy efforts and \$345 million for strategic educational and cultural exchanges.¹¹⁷

Increase resources for broadcasting—especially in sensitive regions

The 9/11 Commission made the following recommendation: “Recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for much larger resources. It

should get them.”¹¹⁸ Sufficient resources will allow the BBG to actively exploit new technologies and expand the reach of broadcasting efforts on the internet and over satellite television. In 2001, the BBG’s budget was \$440 million; the BBG’s 2004 total cost of operations was just over \$700 million.¹¹⁹

Protect exchange programs from the budget cycle

While existing exchange programs remain effective, one assessment cautions that “they lack the direction, resources and scale necessary for the current situation.”¹²⁰ The Public Diplomacy Council cautions that these programs are often subject to the shifting winds of perceived strategic importance. Funding for educational and citizen exchange programs should be an integral part of the long-term public diplomacy strategy and should be insulated from the “year-to-year vagaries of the budget cycle.”¹²¹ The FY 2006 State Department Budget request included \$430 million for educational and cultural exchanges, a significant increase since 2001, when \$231 million was earmarked for exchange programs.¹²²

Some have also recommended creation of a foundation to provide permanent off budget funding for international exchanges conducted by the civilian and military federal agencies to protect such programs from the vicissitudes of annual budgets.¹²³ While no concrete steps have been made to do so, the GAO notes that the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs has been successful in leveraging private sector support—three of the Bureau’s exchange programs received one-quarter to one-half of their funding from non-government sources.¹²⁴

Build Congressional support for public diplomacy

Several reports recommended Congress provide legislative authority for a quadrennial review of public diplomacy efforts.¹²⁵ This addresses the function of oversight, and also keeps Congress engaged in the public diplomacy process—important to sustained appropriations for public diplomacy. The CFR task force recommends that an evaluation process similar to the Quadrennial Defense Review replace “budget-driven reviews of the status quo with strategy-based assessments of themes; the current state of affairs; and diplomatic readiness, requirements, and capabilities, thereby providing a much-needed, long-term national information strategy.”¹²⁶ A new congressional committee structure, within relevant existing committees, such as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House International Relations Committee, offers another way to keep congress engaged and interested in public diplomacy.

IV. Conclusion

While some of the recent analyses on U.S. public diplomacy refer to their predecessor studies, few consider implementation of earlier recommendations. This may stem from the fact that few of the recommendations have been completely implemented. Indeed, the most recent studies echo much of what appeared in earlier analyses. A survey of the vast literature on how to reform public diplomacy gives one the distinct sense that the numerous recommendations sound more like cacophonous din to policymakers, than a clarion call for transformation. Actually, the primary barriers to positive change lie in recent analyses’ most frequent refrain: lack of coordination and leadership, absence of a coherent strategy, and shortage of resources. The recent dissolution of the OGC and the appointment of Karen Hughes suggest, however, that a transformation of U.S. public diplomacy may be on the near horizon.

Even if all of the recommendations cited above are implemented, the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus has a difficult task before it. Public diplomacy can have powerful benefits, but it is no panacea for anti-Americanism. As most of the recent analyses note, winning the war of ideas will require improved coordination, long-term commitment, and adequate resources before U.S. public diplomacy will be able to meet the challenges posed by the modern landscape.

Appendix I: Selected Reports on U.S. Public Diplomacy¹²⁷

Author	Report Title	Date	Selected Recommendations/Observations
GAO	<i>U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by Lack of a National Communication Strategy</i>	April 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Director of the OGC should fully implement the role defined for it by the President's executive order, including facilitating of a national communications strategy. • The Secretary of State should develop a strategy to guide department efforts to engage the private sector in pursuit of common public diplomacy objectives.
Public Diplomacy Council	<i>A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy</i>	Jan. 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish agency to manage civilian information exchanges and coordinate all public diplomacy efforts. • Increase public diplomacy staffing by 300 percent over five years, while ensuring that public diplomacy officers have the resources and skills necessary to perform their duties. • Establish by Presidential Directive an Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy to coordinate national public diplomacy strategy. • Create public-private partnership to permanently fund off-budget exchange programs.
U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy	<i>2004 Report</i>	Sept. 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The agents and structures of public diplomacy need coordination. • Public diplomacy messaging must become more strategic and responsive. • Public diplomacy should be a national security priority, requiring an aggressive strategy and increased resources. • The public and private sectors need to work together to face public diplomacy challenges.
Defense Science Board	<i>Strategic Communication</i>	Sept. 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening and coordinating strategic communications requires presidential leadership. • Structural changes are necessary within the National Security Council, State, and DOD to transform strategic communications. • A quasi-governmental entity should be created to provide information and analysis and facilitate private sector involvement in public diplomacy.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States	<i>The 9/11 Commission Report</i>	July 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The U.S. government must define its message and what it stands for. • The United States needs to defend its ideals abroad through increased broadcasting efforts and rebuilt scholarship, exchange, and library programs.

Author	Report Title	Date	Selected Recommendations/Observations
Robert Satloff	<i>The Battle of Ideas in the War on Terror: Essays on U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East</i>	2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fighting Islamism is a war, not an initiative--we should fight by supporting our friends, isolating our critics, and punishing our adversaries. • To build an anti-Islamist alliance, reach out to Muslims of all stripes--pious, lapsed, and secular. • Compete for the minds of young Muslims; get into the fight. Invest in education, especially English-language education. • Taking a page from the Islamists' own strategy, offer Muslims alternative models of anti-Islamist excellence.
Brookings Institution	<i>The Need to Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World</i>	Jan. 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public diplomacy is a priority • Effective public diplomacy requires coordination • No "one size fits all" agenda • Youth represents an opportunity • Emphasize values-based policy • Also provides overview of several major studies
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World	<i>Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World</i> (Djerejian Report)	Oct. 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public diplomacy requires a new strategic direction, led by the President and Congress and adequately funded and staffed. • Structural changes at the White House, the National Security Council, and State are necessary. • USAID and DOD must be incorporated in the new strategic direction. • Public diplomacy should engage the full range of American civil society, including the private sector and nongovernmental organizations.
GAO	<i>U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges</i>	Sept. 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dept. of State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts in Muslim-majority countries since September 11, 2001. • Dept. of State needs a comprehensive strategy that integrates all of its public diplomacy activities. • Increased human and financial resources are needed to improve public diplomacy. • State is not comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals.
Center for the Study of the Presidency	<i>Strengthening U.S.-Muslim Communications</i>	July 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • White House architecture for global communications must be updated to ensure policy formation and communication are sensitive to perceptions abroad • Utilize best elements of private sector • Should take advantage of new technologies • Strengthen formulation, coordination, and communication of key messages • Gain Presidential and Congressional support

Author	Report Title	Date	Selected Recommendations/Observations
Council on Foreign Relations	<i>Finding America's Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy</i>	June 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of political will and the absence of an overall strategy have hindered public diplomacy programs. • Public diplomacy should be considered in the formulation of foreign policy. • The U.S. public diplomacy coordinating structure needs strengthening, leadership, and increased resources. • An expanded private sector role would help public diplomacy deliver more bang for the government buck.
Heritage Foundation (Stephen Johnson & Helle Dale)	<i>How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy</i>	April 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public diplomacy is a strategic long-term effort. • Should restore independent reporting and budget channels for public diplomacy. • Funding should be restored to strengthen exchanges. • Foreign broadcasting should be reorganized and streamlined • The Smith-Mundt Act should be modified • Existing commissions should be utilized and their recommendations seriously considered.
U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy	<i>Building America's Public Diplomacy Through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources</i>	Sept. 2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public diplomacy requires structural reform, including presidential leadership, the integration of Congress in public diplomacy efforts, and the involvement of the private sector. • Public diplomacy should be redeveloped by building its resources.

NOTES

¹ Quoted in R.S. Zaharna, “The Unintended Consequences of Crisis Diplomacy: American Public Diplomacy in the Arab World,” *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Vol. 8, No. 2, June 2003.

² David E. Kaplan; Aamir Latif; Kevin Whitelaw; Julian E. Barnes, “Hearts, Minds, and Dollars,” *US News & World Report*, April 25, 2005, quoting Marc Ginsberg.

³ Appendix I provides a list of major analyses of public diplomacy and their main recommendations.

⁴ The Defense Science Board, composed of civilian officials, advises the Department of Defense on scientific, technical, manufacturing, acquisition process, and other matters of special interest to the Department of Defense. Motivated by a desire to better manage transitions to and from conflict, the Department of Defense asked the DSB to identify capabilities within other agencies, within the Department of Defense, and those needing development. *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, 2004, Appendix A: Summer Study Terms of Reference. See also Defense Science Board.

⁵ USIA Informational Brochure, October 1998, available at <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/overview.pdf>

⁶ *Changing Minds Winning Peace*, Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Edward P. Djerejian, Chairman, October 2003, p. 59 [hereinafter Djerejian Report].

⁷ See GAO, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy*, GAO-05-323 (2005), p.11[hereinafter GAO, *Interagency Coordination* (2005)], citing *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, 2004.

⁸ *Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy*, Council on Foreign Relations, (2003), p. 34 [hereinafter CFR, *Finding America’s Voice*]; *Building America’s Public Diplomacy through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources*, Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, (2002), p. 5.

⁹ CFR, *Finding America’s Voice*, p. 34. The Clinton administration stressed the importance of public diplomacy to American foreign policy in the April 30, 1999, Presidential Decision Directive entitled International Public Information (PDD-68). The objective of the Directive was “to enhance the use of international public information as a key instrument for preventing and mitigating foreign crises and advancing U.S. interests around the world.” available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-68.htm>.

¹⁰ Author’s interview with Bruce Gregory, Director Public Diplomacy Institute, George Washington University (April 5, 2005).

¹¹ National Security Presidential Directive 1 (13 February 2001) replaces the interagency working groups used under the Clinton administration with NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCC). These committees are responsible for day-to-day coordination of interagency national security policy.

¹² GAO, *Interagency Coordination* (2005), p.13.

¹³ David E. Kaplan; Aamir Latif; Kevin Whitelaw; Julian E. Barnes, “Hearts, Minds, and Dollars,” *US News & World Report*, April 25, 2005.

¹⁴ Arnold Abraham, *The Strategic Communication Process: How to Get Our Message Out More Effectively*, National Defense University, (2004), available at <http://www.ndu.edu/nwc/writing/AY04/5603/>

¹⁵ Office of Global Communications website, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/ogc/aboutogc.html> For more on the OGC’s mandate see Executive Order 13283 of January 23, 2003, available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13283.htm>

¹⁶ See the Executive Order creating the OGC: Executive Order 13283 of January 23, 2003, available at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13283.htm>

¹⁷ GAO, *Interagency Coordination* (2005), p.11.

¹⁸ *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication*, 2004, p. 33.

¹⁹ GAO, *Interagency Coordination* (2005), p. 13.

²⁰ See for example, Stephen Johnson & Helle Dale, *How to Reinvigorate Public Diplomacy*, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, April 23, 2003 (“The White House Office of Global Communications should become the coordinator for interagency public diplomacy programs and help dissolve resistance to public diplomacy activities in U.S. departments and embassies.”) See also *Building America’s Public Diplomacy through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources*, Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, (2002), p. 5.

²¹ Author’s interview with Administration official (May 5, 2005).

²² See Kaplan et al, “Hearts, Minds, and Dollars.”

²³ Author’s interview with State Department official (May 5, 2005).

²⁴ Antony J. Blinken, “Winning the War of Ideas,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2002. p. 105.

²⁵ One observer notes that “[b]etween 1989 and 1999, the budget of USIA, adjusted for inflation, decreased by \$150 million, or 10 percent.” Blinken, “Winning the War of Ideas,” p. 105. Another commentator points out that, “resources for the USIA mission in Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country, were slashed in half. . . . From 1995 to 2001, academic and cultural exchanges dropped from 45,000 to 29,000 annually, while many binational cultural centers with accessible downtown store-front libraries either were abandoned or became ‘information resource centers’ stuck in spare rooms of fortress-like embassies.” Johnson & Dale, *How to Reinvigorate Public Diplomacy*, p. 4.

²⁶ See United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Consolidation of USIA into the State Department: An Assessment after One Year*, October 2000.

²⁷ Blinken, “Winning the War of Ideas,” p. 105.

²⁸ United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *Consolidation of USIA into the State Department: An Assessment after One Year*, October 2000.

²⁹ See e.g., Djerejian Report, p. 64.

³⁰ Johnson & Dale, *How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy*, p.7.

³¹ William Kiehl notes: “Since the reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies in October 1999, only a single public diplomacy officer has been assigned to a regional bureau at the DAS level, and that was only in the summer of 2003. Even at the office director level in the regional and functional bureaus, PD cone officers are rare indeed.” William P. Kiehl, *Can Humpty Dumpty be Saved?*, AmericanDiplomacy.org, November 13, 2003, available at http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_10-12/kiehl_humpty/kiehl_humpty.html

³² Djerejian Report, p.62.

³³ Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, *New Leadership, New Hope for Public Diplomacy*, Heritage Foundation, WebMemo #688, March 15, 2005.

³⁴ See e.g. *A Call for Action on Public Diplomacy*, A Report of the Public Diplomacy Council, January 2005, p. 8 [hereinafter *A Call for Action*].

³⁵ Kiehl, *Can Humpty Dumpty be Saved?*

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Office of Policy, Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, State Department website <http://www.state.gov/r/ppr/>

³⁸ *A Call for Action*, p.8

³⁹ GAO, *Interagency Coordination* (2005), p. 8. Created by an executive order of the President in 1997 and legislated by Congress in 1999, the interagency working group “has been tasked with developing a database on U.S. exchange and training programs, promoting greater understanding and cooperation among government agencies, identifying areas of program overlap and duplication, and developing a coordinated and cost-effective program strategy.” *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Broadcasting Board of Governors website, at http://www.bbg.gov/bbg_plan.cfm

⁴¹ This was the result of the 1998 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (Public Law 105-277).

⁴² GAO, *Interagency Coordination* (2005), p. 19.

⁴³ *A Call for Action*, p.14.

⁴⁴ Djerejian Report, p.32.

⁴⁵ GAO, *Interagency Coordination* (2005), p. 18.

⁴⁶ Tre Evers, Commissioner, U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Statement before the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, August 23, 2004.

⁴⁷ See Jeremy Sharp, “The Middle East Television Network: An Overview,” CRS Report for Congress, January 9, 2005, p.4.

⁴⁸ See Sharp, “The Middle East Television Network: An Overview,” p.6.

⁴⁹ Djerejian Report, p. 20.

⁵⁰ GAO, *Interagency Coordination* (2005), p.16.

⁵¹ Jim VandeHei, “Bush Says Tsunami Aid Benefits U.S.,” *Washington Post*, March 9, 2005. President Bush’s comments were supposedly based on a poll conducted by Terror Free Tomorrow, a non-profit organization “advocating a strategic framework to defeat the support base that empowers Al Qaeda and its allies.” See Major Change of Public Opinion in the Muslim World, <http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/articlenav.php?id=56>

⁵² GAO, *Interagency Coordination* (2005), p.17.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.17.

⁵⁴ CFR, *Finding America’s Voice*, p. 33.

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- ⁵⁵ *The Need To Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World*, Brookings Institution, January 2004, p. 39.
- ⁵⁶ Djerejian Report, 59.
- ⁵⁷ *The Need To Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World*, p. 40.
- ⁵⁸ Kaplan et al, "Hearts, Minds, and Dollars." Interviews with several public diplomacy experts and State Department officials could not confirm this.
- ⁵⁹ *A Call for Action*, p. 11.
- ⁶⁰ Ibid. p.11.
- ⁶¹ See Johnson & Dale, *How to Reinvigorate Public Diplomacy*, p.1.
- ⁶² Author's interview with State Department official (May 5,2005).
- ⁶³ See Djerejian Report, p. 13.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid, p.15.
- ⁶⁵ CFR, *Finding America's Voice*, p.30;
- ⁶⁶ Djerejian Report, p. 57 (quoting GAO, *U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges*, GAO-03-951 (2003), p. 13[hereinafter GAO, *State Department Expands Efforts*].).
- ⁶⁷ Djerejian Report, p. 57.
- ⁶⁸ CFR, *Finding America's Voice*, p.30.
- ⁶⁹ Ibid, p.31.
- ⁷⁰ Ibid. p.31.
- ⁷¹ See *An Initiative: Strengthening US Muslim Communications*, Center for Study of the Presidency, July 2003, p. 34. In the section titled "Craft and Communicate Key Messages,"
- ⁷² GAO, *Interagency Coordination* (2005), p.20.
- ⁷³ See Clay Risen, "Re-Branding America: Marketing Gurus Think They Can Help 'Reposition the United States and Save American Foreign Policy,'" *Boston Globe*, March 13, 2005.
- ⁷⁴ "Selling the Flag," *Economist*, February 26, 2004; See Business for Diplomatic Action website <http://www.businessfordiplomaticaction.org>
- ⁷⁵ Teresa Lindeman, "Branded?; Group Seeks to Promote Better Global Understanding of U.S and Other Countries," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, December 19, 2004.
- ⁷⁶ *Building America's Public Diplomacy through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources*, Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, (2002), p. 7.
- ⁷⁷ Djerejian Report, p. 49.
- ⁷⁸ CFR, *Finding America's Voice*, p.37.
- ⁷⁹ Ibid, p.38.
- ⁸⁰ *The Need To Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World*, p. 27.
- ⁸¹ Author's interview with Senior State Department Official (May 5, 2005).
- ⁸² *The Need To Communicate: How to Improve U.S. Public Diplomacy with the Islamic World*, p. 41.
- ⁸³ U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *2004 Report*, p. 7.
- ⁸⁴ Author's interview with senior State Department official (May 9, 2005).
- ⁸⁵ Announcement of Nominations of Karen P. Hughes as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and Dina Powell as Assistant Secretary of State For Educational and Cultural Affairs, March 14, 2005 at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43385.htm>. For more on Karen Hughes' nomination, see Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale, *New Leadership, New Hope for Public Diplomacy*, The Heritage Foundation, WebMemo #688, March 15, 2005
- ⁸⁶ Robert Satloff, "Memo to: Karen P. Hughes, Re: The Mission of Public Diplomacy," *Weekly Standard*, March 28, 2005.
- ⁸⁷ Charles Wolf and Brian Rosen, *Public Diplomacy: How to Think about It and Improve It*, RAND Corporation, 2004, p.22.
- ⁸⁸ United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, *2004 Report*, p. 25 (2004);
- ⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 8; see also CFR, *Finding America's Voice*, p.30 and Zaharna, "The Unintended Consequences of Crisis Diplomacy: American Public Diplomacy in the Arab World."
- ⁹⁰ CFR, *Finding America's Voice*, p.36.
- ⁹¹ GAO, *State Department Expands Efforts* (2003), p. 3.
- ⁹² Ibid, p. 13.
- ⁹³ GAO, *Interagency Coordination* (2005), p. 15.
- ⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 15.

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- ⁹⁵ *A Call for Action*, p. 6.
- ⁹⁶ Djerejian Report, p.46.
- ⁹⁷ Patricia S. Harrison, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Statement Before the House International Relations Committee, August 19, 2005.
- ⁹⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁰ Johnson & Dale, *How to Reinvigorate Public Diplomacy*, p. 11.
- ¹⁰¹ USIA Informational Brochure, October 1998, available at <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/usia/usiahome/overview.pdf>
- ¹⁰² Tre Evers, Commissioner, U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Statement before the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, August 23, 2004.
- ¹⁰³ *The New Diplomacy: Utilizing Innovative Communication Concepts that Recognize Resource Constraints*, A Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, July 2003, p. 1.
- ¹⁰⁴ Tre Evers, Commissioner, U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Statement before the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, August 23, 2004.
- ¹⁰⁵ Djerejian Report, p.40.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 26.
- ¹⁰⁷ GAO, *State Department Expands Efforts*, (2003), p. 27.
- ¹⁰⁸ Johnson & Dalle, *How to Reinvigorate U.S. Public Diplomacy*, p. 12.
- ¹⁰⁹ CFR, *Finding America's Voice*, p. 39.
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid, p.40.
- ¹¹¹ GAO, *Interagency Coordination*, p.7. USAID and DOD have relatively small budgets explicitly devoted to public diplomacy activities.
- ¹¹² Djerejian Report, p. 8.
- ¹¹³ Ibid, p. 26.
- ¹¹⁴ GAO, *State Department Expands Efforts*, (2003) p. 9.
- ¹¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹¹⁶ See generally Ibid.
- ¹¹⁷ State Department Budget in Brief, FY 2005, available at <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/bib/>
- ¹¹⁸ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Against the United States, *9/11 Commission Report*, p. 395 (2004).
- ¹¹⁹ See Broadcasting Board of Governors, FY 2001 Annual Report, available at <http://www.bbg.gov>; Broadcasting Board of Governors, *FY 2004 Performance and Accountability Report*, Nov. 15, 2004, available at <http://www.bbg.gov>
- ¹²⁰ *A Call to Action*, p. 6.
- ¹²¹ Ibid, p.10.
- ¹²² State Department Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 2006; State Department Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 2001.
- ¹²³ *A Call for Action*, p. 16.
- ¹²⁴ GAO, *Interagency Coordination* (2005), p. 19.
- ¹²⁵ *Building America's Public Diplomacy through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources*, Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, (2002), p. 7.
- ¹²⁶ CFR, *Finding America's Voice*, p. 34; This idea was also endorsed by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy's 2002 Report.
- ¹²⁷ This builds upon a similar chart appearing in GAO, *Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy*, GAO-05-323 (2005).