Non-Military Strategies For Countering Islamist Terrorism:
Lessons Learned From Past Counterinsurgencies
Kurt M. Campbell and Richard Weitz
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The Princeton Project Papers

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Introductory Observations

Since the tragic attacks of 9/11, strategists and commentators have searched for the appropriate historical analogies and political metaphors to deal with the struggle against international terrorism. One of the most interesting suggestions is that the global war on terror resembles traditional counterinsurgency missions. What is missing in many of these historical comparisons, however, is a comprehensive review of what actually occurred in past counterinsurgency situations, ranging from Vietnam to Malaysia to El Salvador. We have sought to undertake such a review to determine what insights, if any, might apply to antiterrorist efforts. Our analysis identifies certain areas of comparison meriting further consideration. In particular, we find that political strategies combined with properly conducted military and intelligence efforts can help counter both insurgencies and terrorist movements.

Over the past five years, the United States has struggled to develop effective approaches against terrorist threats. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism – the main doctrine defining U.S. policy regarding the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) – affirms the need for both military and non-military strategies in order to deal with a multifaceted and evolving threat.1 The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) also acknowledges that "battlefield success is only one element of our long-term, multi-faceted campaign against terrorism. The activities employed to date range from training and humanitarian efforts to major combat operations. Non-military components of this campaign include diplomacy, strategic communications, law enforcement operations, and economic sanctions."2 Yet these efforts have been clearly secondary to the application of American military power to the problem.

Indeed, much of the debate regarding strategies to manage radical Islamist terrorism has focused on how the U.S. military can best kill terrorists. For several years, the George W. Bush administration has highlighted the number of terrorist leaders eliminated or captured, while the administration’s critics have emphasized the continued failure to bring Osama bin Laden to justice. Such is the focus on individual terrorists that President Bush has kept an al Qaeda scoreboard and has been crossing out the leadership’s faces as they are found.3

This preoccupation with killing terrorists is understandable given the American outrage over the destruction wrought by the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, these terrorists make seemingly nonnegotiable

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1 “This National Strategy reflects the reality that success will only come through the sustained, steadfast, and systematic application of all the elements of national power – diplomatic, economic, information, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and military. . . .” (National Strategy forCombating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2002), 29.
demands and constantly pursue new opportunities to harm Americans. These conditions have ensured sustained popular support for increased spending on defense and homeland security and for using U.S. military forces in a worldwide campaign against terrorist threats. Yet a strategy focused on capturing individuals has limited utility when facing the multifaceted challenges posed by the broader Islamist movement. For one, while the "scorecard" metric tells us how many individuals have been taken out of the al Qaeda apparatus, it does not tell us how many remain or have recently joined. Further, adherents of radical Islam are not a monolithic bloc; rather, as Steven Metz and Raymond Millen write, they are part of a "transnational Islamist insurgency which includes a dizzying array of subcomponents."

Indeed, many other terrorism scholars agree that today’s Islamist movement is in many ways like an insurgency. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon lament "we [the U.S.] still lack a comprehensive program to deal with a growing global insurgency and the long-term threat of radical Islam."7 Daniel Byman states: "The conceptual key is to see al-Qaeda not as a single terrorist group but, rather, as a global insurgency."8 Dale C. Eikmeier pointedly entitles a January 2005 article, "How to Beat the Global Islamist Insurgency." Thomas Donnelly and Vance Serchuk argue that "the American military finds itself entrenched in a host of open-ended, low-level counterinsurgency campaigns across the Muslim world. To no small extent, these guerrilla conflicts have become the operational reality that defines the global war on terror."9 In an interview with BBC anchor David Frost, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld even observed:

[I think] the struggle is not so much a global war on terror. Terror is really the weapon of choice; it’s the technique they’re using. What the struggle really is, it’s almost a global insurgency by a very small number of extremists and radicals that are determined to attack the state system, countries, civilized societies in an attempt to terrorize them and intimidate them and alter their behavior.10

As such, the link between insurgencies and terrorism is more than conceptual. Insurgencies help militarize societies and provide a major source of terrorist recruits. Prominent examples include the wars in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Palestine, Chechnya, and now (especially) Iraq.11

If the war on terrorism is actually a fight against a global insurgency, can the United States learn any valuable lessons from recent counterinsurgency missions? More crucially, are there non-military measures that might yield durable results? By examining a range of counterinsurgency operations – in particular, the British success in Malaya in the 1950s, the French defeat in Algeria from 1958-64, and the U.S. military failure in South Vietnam during the late 1960s and early 1970s – this paper highlights recent history’s most important lessons and concentrates on which strategies proved successful in the past and how they might enhance future U.S. counterterrorism operations. Although our analysis focuses on defeating the international Islamist extremist terrorism network, our policy recommendations could apply to combating other terrorism movements as well.12

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Similarities

A comparison of the threats presented by Islamic terrorist groups today and those posed by past insurgencies raises suggestive similarities. Both the terrorists and the insurgents seek to overthrow U.S. allies and establish new political orders governed by fundamentally different principles. Being insufficiently powerful to defeat their opponents’ conventional military forces, both rely on violent but asymmetric means. For this reason, both terrorism and guerrilla warfare have been described as “weapons of the weak.” Similarly, they both pursue political power through bullets rather than ballot boxes – either because they lack the popularity to achieve success in free and fair elections, or because the established political authorities deny them this option.

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11 U.S. Department of Defense, “Test of an Interview with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Discussing Iraq, NATO and Terrorism,” The Pentagon, July 13, 2004. See also Rumsfeld’s interview with CNN’s Maria Ressa on June 4, 2004, in which the Secretary said “what I see is a global insurgency – a global struggle – where a small minority in that religion are attempting to hijack and to persuade people to oppose the state system in our world; to oppose civil society, to oppose free systems, not just the United State, not just the West” (Department of Defense transcript). He also used the term “global insurgency” at his May 30, 2004, commencement address at West Point (available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ speeches/2004/sp0406529-scidef0962.html).

12 The boast that the war in Iraq has given to terrorist recruitment is discussed in Aleix Debat, “Osama bin Laden’s Heir,” The National Interest (Summer 2005): 158-160.

13 The U.S. military defines an insurgency as an “organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict” (Headquarters, Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Operations, FMI-07.22 (October 2004), 1-1). The U.S. government defines “terrorism” as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003), 1).
boxes – either because they lack the popularity to achieve success in free and fair elections, or because the established political authorities deny them this option. Typically, terrorist and insurgent operatives represent small activist minorities within larger populations, many of whose members sympathize with their goals if not their methods. Since both groups tend to be highly motivated and willing to die for their cause, it can take decades for such conflicts to end. Insurgency is sometimes referred to as a “strategy of protracted revolutionary war,” and the adjective “protracted” applies likewise to many terrorist campaigns because of these tendencies. A wide range of affiliations (ethnic, religious, etc.) and ideologies (Marxism, radical Islam, nationalism, and even liberal democracy for the original guerrillas in French-occupied Spain) can induce people to become either insurgents or terrorists.12 The demanding conditions associated with both types of fighting normally mean these personal and political attachments are deeply held.

North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap's description of the anti-French insurgency in Vietnam clearly applies to most guerrilla wars as well as to the GWOT: “There was no clearly defined front in this war. It was there where the enemy was. The front was nowhere, it was everywhere.”13 Another analogy, the “war of the Flea,” describes the strategy of terrorism as well as guerrilla warfare: “the guerilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog’s disadvantages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long enough – this is the theory – the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anemia without ever having found anything on which to close its jaws or to rake with its claws.”14

In their guerrilla wars, the Vietnamese Communists and the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) also used terrorist tactics such as attacks against civilians to disrupt local government administration, eliminate rivals, and create a general climate of fear. For example, the FLN developed a well-integrated underground network in Algiers, from which its operatives could organize terrorist bombings of nearby targets. This network proved brutally effective. From November 1954 to May 1957, FLN terrorists killed 6,350 Muslims and 1,035 Europeans.15 The effect, replicated in Vietnam, was to undermine the population's faith in the government's competence – especially its capacity to protect them – and thus encourage fence sitting and a “wait-and-see” attitude. The insurgents in Iraq are employing the same tactic.16

Al Qaeda itself shares the characteristics of both traditional guerrilla and terrorist movements. It is much larger than traditional terrorist groups, especially if one considers its network of affiliated organizations – including Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central Asia, and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Its thousands of operatives dwarf even extensive and long-established terrorist groups such as the hundreds of active members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA). Most other terrorist groups, even when not motivated by a narrow separatist agenda (such as Italy's Red Brigades), have had even fewer operatives as well as a smaller base of supporters and sympathizers.17

Al Qaeda's core members train intensively to conduct specific terrorist attacks, but the organization also supports the broad insurgencies waged by many of its affiliate groups – such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, the Chechens in Russia, and several extremist Sunni guerrilla forces in Indian-occupied Kashmir. Participation in these conflicts allows al Qaeda to expand its networks of influence and gain support among Muslims who sympathize with such resistance movements but who would not otherwise endorse involvement with terrorist groups.

The members of al Qaeda have long expressed interest in guerrilla tactics. Even before the Coalition invasion of Iraq, al Qaeda's information department began to publish articles and Internet documents on how Muslims could emulate past successful insurgencies in Vietnam and Afghanistan to defeat foreign troops in Iraq. One online essay was entitled, “Guerrilla Warfare Is the Most Powerful Weapon Muslims Have, and It Is the Best Method to Continue the Conflict with the Crusader Enemy.”18 Although generally seen as insurgents, the fighters in Iraq supplement their operations against the U.S. and Iraqi security forces with terrorist attacks against civilians. Modern insurgencies and terrorist campaigns share an ironic paradox of intent. Unlike most conventional wars, which normally involve a dispute over a specific territory or a particular policy, both insurgents and terrorists often have far more expansive aims, at least initially. They regularly seek to replace the existing sociopolitical order

[12] Metz and Millen note that Marxism and Islamic extremism possess different advantages and disadvantages as military doctrines: “Because of its transcendentalism, radical Islam can inspire suicide terrorists – a phenomenon uncommon in secular insurgencies. But radical Islam is also a less forward looking and inclusive ideology than Marxism, its appeal outside its historical cultural realm is limited” (Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, 14).
[16] Bruce Hoffman, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq (Santa Monica, California: RAND, June 2004), 15.

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with one they consider more just. Although they usually lack the means to realize their objectives, their beliefs sanction the most destructive tactics.

The governments under assault, however, typically operate under a variety of constraints that restrain their response. These restrictions stem from ethical and legal considerations, geography, foreign governments, and coalition partners. These limitations can also arise from the affected host nation’s particular cultural taboos or religious considerations. Frequently, a government’s desire to control costs also imposes limits. While guerrillas or terrorists usually consider themselves involved in a total war, foreign sponsors – upon whom governments rely for financial support – invariably apply a cost-benefit analysis in determining the level and length of their commitment. Since these constraints most strongly affect military operations, it becomes all the more important that the counterinsurgents effectively use non-military strategies and resources such as intelligence, law enforcement, and strategic influence campaigns.

Admittedly, history has seen cases when brute force alone has suppressed an insurgency. The ancient Romans crushed several Jewish uprisings, and Saddam Hussein mercilessly overcame guerrilla fighters in both southern and northern Iraq despite having just decisively lost the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Nevertheless, modern democracies find it difficult to stomach a purely repressive response to an insurgency. One of the main reasons why the French lost in Algeria, despite defeating the urban terrorists and the rural guerrillas, was their pervasive use of torture that undermined military morale and aroused indignation among intellectuals and other influential social groups – both in Algeria and, more importantly, in France.15

From the analysts’ perspective, both counterinsurgencies and counterterrorist campaigns share another troublesome similarity: the difficulty of determining who is “winning.” Body counts and other measures of effectiveness (MOEs) drawn from traditional conventional wars provide misleading indicators during counterinsurgencies and counterterrorist campaigns. Indeed, as Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld pointedly asked in 2004, “are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the [religious schools] and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?”20 In other words, have the terrorists’ losses exceeded their replacement capacity?

Even in retrospect, it is difficult to determine which factors had the most impact on the course of the fighting and if and when a turning point occurred. Given these conflicts’ protracted nature and absence of major military engagements, it is also important to understand the adversary’s measures of success and to distinguish between short-term MOEs (terrorist leaders eliminated, funds blocked, etc.) and long-term indicators of progress (democratization of the Middle East, de-legitimization of terrorism, etc.).

The American experience in Vietnam underscores this measurement problem. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established a Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) to provide MOEs for the pacification campaign. This computer-based system incorporated monthly feedback from U.S. district advisors’ answers to a variety of security and development questions. Each advisor had to file monthly reports on the situation in some twenty to fifty hamlets in his district. Unfortunately, advisors’ limited knowledge of their geographic area of operations weakened the utility of their evaluations.21 Officials acknowledged the subjectivity inherent in the HES but thought it nevertheless suggested trends. They later tried to improve it by incorporating less subjective MOEs, such as numbers of defections, refugee returns, and terrorist incidents.22 U.S. pacification experts established a large Research and Analysis division that developed a range of MOEs independent of the HES, including direct polls of rural inhabitants. Despite these endeavors, the HES could not overcome the perception that it exaggerated progress in pacification, especially before the 1968 Tet offensive.

History provides other examples of the difficulty in assessing an ongoing insurgency. In Algeria and Vietnam, the French and Americans “won” almost every battle until they lost the war, while for a long time in Malaya the British justly feared another defeat in their effort to retain their colonial empire. Terrorist campaigns also have been replete with rapid and unanticipated changes in fortune. In the early 1980s, the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah achieved a sudden triumph after several of its operatives inflicted devastating suicide strikes against the French and American military forces there,

15 Whatever its value in interrogations, the widespread (and often gratuitous) use of torture by the police and especially the army had a very destructive effect on French morale. Several senior French military officers in Algeria resigned in protest. The “torture question” divided French opinion, and helped undermine support for the war within the media and among the intellectuals. For more on this issue, see Gil Morom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failure of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

16 Daniel Byman argues that the five most useful if still frustratingly inexact measures of success in the current GWOT are: (1) the terrorists’ freedom to operate; (2) domestic support for counterterrorism policies; (3) damage to the terrorists’ leadership and command structures; (4) disrupting recruitment; and (5) the frequency and scale of terrorist attacks (“Scoring the War on Terrorism,” The National Interest (Summer 2003)). Rumsfeld’s memo is reprinted in The Boston Globe, September 8, 2004.


leading to their withdrawal. Similarly, the terrorist bombing campaign in Israel during the mid-1990s quickly undermined the promising Oslo peace process by discrediting it in the eyes of Israeli voters. Even the clearest sign of U.S. success in the GWOT today – the absence of another 9/11-scale attack inside the United States – might be misleading, given al Qaeda’s long planning horizon.

Differences

Our analysis and recommendations also recognize the differences between insurgencies and terrorist campaigns. For example, whereas guerrillas seek to establish and then expand base areas that manifest their control over people and places, terrorists lack the means to control large geographic regions. Instead of occupying an area, terrorists try to cow its inhabitants into submission through violence directed against them as well as at the security forces. Furthermore, while guerrillas initially concentrate their operations in rural areas, where they can more easily blend into the surrounding population and where government control is normally weakest, terrorists usually focus their activities in urban areas since assassinations, bombings, kidnappings, hijackings, robberies, and attacks against symbolic targets like the Eiffel Tower or the World Trade Center yield the most publicity. Finally, although guerrillas will employ terrorism for short-term tactical gains, they prefer to influence the population through sustained indoctrination and propaganda campaigns, organizing strikes and demonstrations, and other non-terrorist methods. Terrorists favor more indiscriminate violence aimed to make people feel that no one is safe and to provoke an excessively harsh government response.

At the individual level, some terrorists appear to enjoy creating mayhem for mayhem’s sake; for them, terrorism becomes an end in itself.

A major problem in seeking to proffer policy prescriptions is that the diverse nature of modern terrorist groups, even those professing allegiance to the principles of jihad as defined by al Qaeda, makes generalization difficult. Al Qaeda’s formation and modern communications technologies (especially the Internet) enabled a global terrorist network to emerge whose members shared financing, training, ideology, logistical support, and lessons learned. Nevertheless, Obama in Laden deliberately designed al Qaeda as an organization “that actively encourages subsidiary groups fighting under the corporate banner to mix and match approaches, employing different tactics and varying means of attack and operational styles in a number of locales.” Another classification problem is that some terrorist movements have global reach; others have only national or even predominantly local areas of operations. A final complicating factor is that terrorist groups constantly learn and adapt to their changing environment. The al Qaeda of today, for instance, differs sharply from that which existed before September 11, 2001. As a result, counterterrorist strategies or tactics that work at one time might prove less successful at another.

In practice, any counterterrorist strategy will need to be tailored to the specific characteristics of the challenge it confronts, particularly the nature of the government under attack and the most important operational features of the relevant terrorist groups. For example, an influence campaign that might work in Indonesia, with an 88 percent literacy rate, probably would not prove as effective in Afghanistan, which has a 31 percent literacy rate. Similarly, strategies to discourage terrorist recruitment would need to differ fundamentally in South Asia and Western Europe given that the latter’s population is not primarily comprised of Muslims. An effective global counterinsurgency requires efficiently managing scarce resources to counter the most serious threats.

In terms of both motivation and capacity, al Qaeda and its partners clearly represent the main enemy. The 9/11 Commission Report observes that the threat to the United States emanates not from generic terrorism but “Islamist terrorism – especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology.”

24 General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a April 27 session of the Senate Appropriations Committee that, “The US will have won the Global War on Terrorism when the US, along with the international community, creates a global environment uniformly opposed to terrorism and its supporters. We will have won when young people choose hope, security, economic opportunity, and religious tolerance, over violence. We will have won when disenfranchised young people stop signing up for Jihad and start signing up to lead their communities and countries toward a more prosperous and peaceful future—a future based on a democratically-elected government and a free, open, and tolerant society.” Congressional Quarterly, Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, April 27, 2005.
25 The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism describes the administration’s “desired endstate” in the GWOT as to render terrorism “Unorganized,” “Localized,” “Non-sponsored,” and “Rare” (15).
26 Bard O’Neill, Terrorism and Insurgency (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1998).
31 For a systematic analysis of the factors shaping the evolution of five terrorist groups see Brian A. Jackson, ed., Aptitude for Destruction, vol. 1: Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2005), and Brian A. Jackson et al., Aptitude for Destruction, vol. 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica, RAND, 2005).
32 Al Qaeda’s remarkable ability to adopt to the most hostile post-911 environment is described in Jessica Stern, “The Prostate Enemy,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 82 (July/August 2003).
Lebanon’s Hezbollah also combines an antipathy towards the United States with an ability to attack U.S. and other foreign targets. Hezbollah operatives, for example, killed hundreds of U.S. Marines in 1983 and bombed Jewish/Israeli targets in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994. Besides al Qaeda and Hezbollah, however, other non-Islamist terrorist groups presently do not possess the capacities to undertake sophisticated large-scale attacks, lack a “global reach” that would enable them to strike the U.S. homeland, or do not target Americans.49

The Bush administration has given priority to combating terrorists that could use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the U.S. homeland. In the words of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/State Department Strategic Plan for 2004-2009, “The gravest danger to the United States lies at the crossroads of terrorism and technology – the possibility that catastrophic technologies could fall into terrorist hands. We must therefore give priority to defeating terrorist organizations of global reach and preventing their state sponsors from supplying them with weapons of mass destruction or related technologies.”50 The administration’s critics, however, complain that it has identified too many enemies, from rogue states to WMD proliferators, and has spread U.S. counterterrorist resources too thin, especially by waging a war of choice against Saddam’s Iraq thus stimulating anti-Americanism and terrorist recruitment in the process. These analysts argue that more progress in the GWOT would result from concentrating American attention and assets against the preeminent threat presented by al Qaeda and its affiliates.51

APPlicable Lessons

Political and Socioeconomic Reforms

The Muslim countries of the Middle East, from which much anti-American terrorism emanates, clearly require major political and economic transformations. The July 2002 Arab Human Development Report found that Arab countries have less political freedom than any other region of the world, and that only sub-Saharan Africa had experienced lower per capita income growth during the preceding twenty years. Its Arab authors concluded that the region’s inhabitants, especially women, confronted a “poverty of capabilities and poverty of opportunities.”52 Numerous polls have found that Arabs value civil and personal rights as highly as other peoples, if not more so.53 Many analysts argue that defeating global terrorism requires addressing its root causes, such as economic deprivation, limitations on social and political rights, violations of the rule of law, unwanted military occupations, and extremism and intolerance resulting from insufficient education or public debate.54

Soon after the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bush administration identified improving the socioeconomic status of people who might support or become terrorists as an important objective. For example, the 2002 National Security Strategy highlighted the importance of “development” along with “defense” and “diplomacy” in promoting U.S. interests abroad. The administration has made managing “fragile states” a priority on the grounds that state failure and government incapacity contribute to terrorism, organized crime, and other transnational problems.55 It also has relied heavily in Afghanistan and Iraq on the so-called Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) for rapidly funding short-term infrastructure projects designed to achieve quick socioeconomic improvements (e.g., in water, sanitation, electricity, and health care). Finally, President Bush himself has stressed the need to promote democracy in the Middle East as part of a “forward strategy of freedom.”56

49 The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC) represents the main non-Islamist terrorist threat to U.S. interests today. While al Qaeda is primarily a terrorist group whose affiliates sometimes wage insurgencies, the FARC is primarily a guerrilla movement that also employs terrorist tactics against select targets. For an assessment of the FARC see Kim Czug and Sara A. Dale, The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2004); and George H. Franco, “Their Darkest Hour: Colombia’s Government and the Narco-Insurgency,” Praetorian (Summer 2000), 83-95.


51 See for example Jeffrey Record, Bonding the Global War on Terrorism (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 2003); and “Three Years after 9/11: An Interview with Peter Bergen,” Spotlight on Terror, vol. 2, no. 10 (September 13, 2004), reprinted in Julie Stern et al., eds., Unmaking Terror: A Global Review of Terrorist Activities (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 2004), 23-29. Record fears that the administration’s strategy in the GWOT “is strategically uncoordinated, promises much more than it can deliver, and threatens to dissipate scarce U.S. military and other means over too many ends. It violates the fundamental principles of discrimination and concentration” (vi).


56 See for example his November 2003 speech marking the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy.
Nevertheless, U.S. declaratory policy recognizes that no simple correlation exists between terrorism and poverty, undemocratic political systems, or other undesirable socioeconomic conditions. For this reason, documents such as the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the USAID/State Department Strategic Plan stress that U.S. assistance aims “to diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit.” One study comparing the reasons for the British success in Malaya and the U.S. failure in South Vietnam found that the British more readily jettisoned failing policies and adjusted their response to better accord with the exigencies of the situation.

Past counterinsurgencies also suggest that the potential contributions of political and socioeconomic reforms in reducing anti-regime violence have been overestimated. Often, by the time an insurgency had broken out, it was too late for the reforms to have much impact. Similarly, an extensive study found that improving economic conditions did not appear to have reduced terrorism in countries where violence had already become prevalent. Furthermore, whereas unmet economic and political grievances drove most insurgencies, Jihadi terrorists are motivated primarily by religious concerns, which Western-style socioeconomic reforms might even exacerbate (as the pro-Soviet governments in Afghanistan found in the late 1970s).

Foreign countries also face difficulties in trying to induce a threatened government to introduce meaningful reforms. Not only are incumbent officials wary of diverting resources from the main military threat, but they also fear the unintended effects of reforms. In addition, they believe their precarious situation should preclude foreign backers from pressing them too hard. Although the typical response is to promise reform, take the aid, and then fail to implement the pledge – as the current government in Uzbekistan has done – some governments will simply renounce the foreign assistance to maintain a free hand. For example, Guatemala’s military government rejected U.S. military assistance in 1977 when the new Carter administration conditioned aid on the Junta’s improving its human rights record.

Free elections represent the one socioeconomic reform that does appear to function as an effective counterinsurgency tool. The successful elections in Malaya in 1953 (which were widely interpreted as contributing to the territory’s full independence from Britain), the Philippines in 1951, El Salvador during the mid-1980s, and Afghanistan and Iraq during the last few years weakened popular support for the insurgency – substantially in the earlier cases. Encouraging Islamist extremist movements to participate in free elections also might make sense in certain circumstances. Bernard Lewis and others have argued that U.S. tolerance of undemocratic practices in Muslim states only breeds resentment among their residents, who see American policies as hypocritical and untrustworthy. Sometimes the requirements of winning elections and good governance encourage political moderation and pragmatic policies. Such factors appear to have influenced Muslim politicians in contemporary Turkey, for example. In Egypt, factions within the Muslim Brotherhood may be undergoing a similar democratic transformation.

On the other hand, the examples of Iran and the Palestinian Authority under Arafat show that this tendency is by no means a universal law. In the former case, not only has the regime in Tehran not substantially moderated its policies, but once in office the ruling Mullahs have warped the electoral system so as to block non-Islamists access to political power. Concern persists that, after winning one election, extremists would never permit another. Finally, analysts point out that elections alone do not ensure a functioning and sustainable liberal democracy. The right to vote must be complemented by measures that guarantee human and civil rights (especially for women and minorities), the rule of law, and the other attributes of a true democratic polity.

U.S. declaratory policy recognizes that no simple correlation exists between terrorism and poverty, undemocratic political systems, or other undesirable socioeconomic conditions. Free elections represent the one socioeconomic reform that does appear to function as an effective counterinsurgency tool.
These considerations warrant taking several precautions before permitting Islamist extremists to compete in free and fair elections. One safeguard could be to enshrine protections for minority rights in national constitutions. A more recent idea, which several Arab reformers have endorsed, is for governments and all major opposition groups (i.e., Islamist as well as secular) to adopt “national pacts” or “national charters” that define in advance the basic rules and procedures for such elections and any subsequent transfer of power. Another safeguard might be for governments to allow Islamist groups to compete for local but not national elections. The demands of local administration might keep them preoccupied without giving them sufficient additional resources to facilitate their seizing control of the entire country.

Fragmenting the Adversary

In both counterinsurgency and counterterrorist campaigns, a divide-and-conquer strategy can have three dimensions: exploiting divisions within the adversary’s camp, separating the operatives from their domestic supporters, and isolating them from their foreign sponsors.

Past insurgencies show how divisions among the guerrillas, or the people they seek to influence, can assist the counterinsurgency. In Malaya, the existence of a disaffected Chinese ethnic minority made the insurgency possible, but the fact that the majority of Malays identified the guerrillas as predominately ethnic Chinese limited their influence. In Algeria, Vietnam, and Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, however, the authorities could not persuasively depict the insurgents as an unrepresentative minority, particularly given their own dependence on non-native troops, which allowed the guerrillas to characterize the war as a “liberation” insurgency. French, American, and Soviet policy makers also had very little success in exploiting divisions among the insurgent leaders. Furthermore, they proved unable to cultivate a viable “third force” of moderate nationalists that could stand up to the insurgents without extensive foreign backing – something that remains an issue in Afghanistan and Iraq today.

The value of amnesty programs in weakening insurgencies is less clear. Their purpose is to encourage defections by less dedicated or otherwise dissatisfied guerrillas. If successful, their direct effect is to fragment the adversary. In Malaya, the British amnesty program yielded important tactical and strategic intelligence and encouraged further defections. Financial rewards for South Vietnamese responsible for a defection (under the “third-party inducement plan”) proved especially fruitful. One senior communist leader’s own bodyguards murdered him so they could collect a $200,000 reward. Other surrendered enemy personnel frequently led the military or police to their former guerrilla units. In the Philippines, offers of free land and basic supporting infrastructure (i.e., roads, housing, and liberal loans) induced some Huk guerrillas to surrender.

Similar programs proved far less successful in Algeria or Vietnam. Although the South Vietnamese government began offering amnesty and “rehabilitation” (job training, welfare services, and resettlement assistance) to Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese defectors as early as 1963, the program encountered several problems. Former Prime Minister Nguyen Ky lamented: “Often the Vietcong used the program to get medical attention, decent food, and a few weeks’ vacation from the war. Once they were rested, they re-defected to the communists and continued to fight us.” Low-level VC or even fake guerrillas participated for the free food, shelter, and other material benefits. Monetary awards for South Vietnamese responsible for a defection (under the “third-party inducement plan”) led to phony defectors who split the reward money with corrupt officials. Defectors also encountered suspicion and other resistance when they genuinely sought to reintegrate into South Vietnamese society. The various amnesty programs introduced recently in Afghanistan also have experienced only modest success.

Pursuing a “divide-and-conquer” strategy in the GWOT would mean attempting to undo al Qaeda’s most important achievement – its success in combining terrorist foot-soldiers from many different ethnic groups and nationalities into a single, eclectic but cohesive movement with operations in more than sixty countries. Bin Laden has managed to get antagonistic rivals – such as Egypt’s two main terrorist groups, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Group – to set aside years of mutual hostility to cooperate against common enemies.

In the GWOT, logical fissures to exploit include divisions within al Qaeda, between al Qaeda and its affiliate terrorist groups, and between the terrorists and their active network of supporters. At

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The CFR Task Force concludes, “Washington should support the political participation of any group or party committed to abide by the rules and norms of the democratic process while pushing for constitutional arrangements that protect minority rights and, more generally,” evolutionary, not revolutionary, change” (5, 10).

Yacoubian, “Promoting Middle East Democracy II,” 7-10.

For an analysis of the differences between “national” and “liberation” insurgencies see Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, 2-3.

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57 Gibson, Perfect War, 304.


At a minimum, U.S. policies should aim to counter al Qaeda’s strategy of subsuming all local conflicts under a war of civilizations between the Muslim world on the one hand, and the United States and its non-Muslim allies on the other. Left to themselves, local groups will give priority to local concerns. Most Islamist terrorists in Palestine, Xinjiang, and Chechnya want to focus on their immediate enemies (Israel, China, and Russia, respectively) and will seek to avoid becoming entangled in a direct conflict with the United States unless given cause to do so.

Tensions between Shiite and Sunni extremists offer another opportunity for dividing the adversary. Many Shia Muslims in Iraq have declined to join the insurgency because some Sunni Muslim terrorists – influenced by Takfiri ideology, which depicts Shia Muslims as apostates – have attacked Shias. Some Sunni terrorist groups in Pakistan also have designated Shia Muslims as explicit targets. Bin Laden’s strengthened ties with Shiite-hater Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, especially his designation of him as al Qaeda’s head, provided additional opportunities for the United States to cultivate Shiite support against Sunni terrorist organizations like al Qaeda.

A further division within the global Islamist terrorist movement might be emerging between the Arab members of al Qaeda and its Central Asian allies. During the late 1990s, these two groups worked in harmony under the auspices of the IMU, which developed extensive connections with al Qaeda and the Taliban. In May 2001, Taliban authorities even appointed IMU military leader Juma Namangani head of a sort of Islamic foreign legion. Consisting of a variety of non-Afghan Islamic fighters, including Pakistanis, Turks, Uighurs, and Uzbeks, the brigade fought against the Afghani Northern Alliance until U.S. forces destroyed it after September 11, 2001.39 Pakistan’s recent crackdown on the terrorist operatives who subsequently fled to North and South Waziristan has led to friction between the Arabs and Central Asians there. The two groups compete for hideouts and the affiliation of the local tribes. They also have different priorities, with the Central Asians focused on overthrowing the region’s secular governments rather than attacking Americans, which could draw the U.S. military further into their region. According to media reports, this rivalry has seen captured Chechen, Tajik, and Uzbek suspects divulging information to Pakistani intelligence about the identity and whereabouts of senior Arab members of al Qaeda – including the arrested Libyan operative, Abu Faraj al-Libi, described as al Qaeda’s third-highest leader.40

Another way to counter the extremists is to empower Islamic moderates. Just as Social Democrats represented one of the strongest bulwarks against Soviet-allied Communist Parties in Western Europe during the Cold War, so Islamic moderates can drain support and legitimacy from jihadi extremists. Even some otherwise radical Islamist groups could, whatever their subjective views, objectively assist the United States to counter jihadi terrorism. Some of these groups opposed al Qaeda’s 9/11 operation on the grounds that the timing was inappropriate. In particular, they maintained that the strikes should not have occurred until Muslims were more united and better prepared to resist U.S. retaliation.41 (Bin Laden anticipated that the attacks would further such unity by rallying Muslims against the expected harsh and indiscriminate U.S. response.42)

A salient if controversial target for such a strategy might be the Hizb-ut-Tahrir (“Party of Islamic Liberation”), an international Islamic movement with as many as one hundred thousand adherents concentrated in Eurasia. Although its followers seek to replace the existing regimes in the Middle East and Central Asia with a multinational Caliphate governed by the Islamic laws and practices that existed at the time of the Prophet Muhammad, they insist that such change must occur through non-violent means and dismiss the violent tactics of IMU and al Qaeda as ineffective.43 Despite the Hizb-ut-Tahrir’s anti-American rhetoric and some of its adherents’ conversion to violent terrorism, the U.S. government has persistently refused to designate it a Foreign Terrorist Organization like al Qaeda. Keeping such “cafés Islamists” preoccupied with theocratic debates and their never-ending project of writing the perfect constitution for their envisaged state should become an important goal. The presence of Hizb-ut-Tahrir and other nonviolent Islamic movements, notwithstanding their immoderate rhetoric, provides a non-violent means of expression for many Muslims. Its elimination would likely result in many of its adherents joining radical Islamist terrorist groups.

41 Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda, 19.
On the other hand, the United States should continue to exert pressure on violent Islamist extremists to exacerbate differences among them – just as the firm U.S. stand against the Sino-Soviet alliance during the 1950s helped divide rather than unite them. In essence, the Soviets feared that the Chinese communists would drag them into a conflict with Washington over Taiwan. Similarly, al Qaeda’s affiliate organizations might break with the radical Islamist network to avoid the fate of the Taliban if, for example, al Qaeda operatives sought to attack a U.S. target in their geographic area of operations notwithstanding the heightened American antiterrorist response that would ensue. Exploiting such differences also could enhance U.S. deterrence against WMD attacks. U.S. policies must make clear to all terrorist groups that joining al Qaeda’s violently anti-American network would result in their becoming targets of an exceptionally robust U.S. response.

Intelligence Requirements
Conducting an effective divide-and-conquer strategy requires excellent intelligence regarding policy disputes, ideological differences, and private vendettas between the terrorist leaders. For example, the United States needs to know more about the relationships between al Qaeda and its regional affiliates, between Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and between bin Laden and other regional leaders. As the global network of radical terrorist groups continues to fragment – seen most saliently in the rise of the “lone wolf” individual inspired by, but not connected with, a specific terrorist group – intelligence analysts will find it increasingly challenging to keep abreast of the network’s evolving components, diverse goals, strategies, and tactics.

Both counterinsurgencies and counterterrorist campaigns raise the problem of distinguishing friend from foe. Although guerrillas sometimes wear distinctive clothing, terrorists almost never do. Nevertheless, both groups hope that the authorities will alienate the population through indiscriminate or inappropriately severe measures against innocent civilians mistakenly identified as terrorist operatives or sympathizers. Unfortunately, these strategies are often successful – the tragic killing of the Brazilian national Charles de Menezes in response to the London bombings is a case in point. Killing guerrillas and terrorists is not difficult. The problem is finding them.

Intelligence is also necessary to identify the foreign and domestic supporters of insurgents and terrorists; determine how they move personnel, supplies, and equipment; and communicate among themselves and with their foreign contacts. Understanding these connections is a prerequisite for effective border control, interception operations, and targeted diplomatic pressure against foreign sponsors. Since terrorists are fewer in number and normally have a narrower base of support than guerrillas, identifying their logistic networks is harder but, if successful, more detrimental to their operations.

Obtaining better information will require strengthening horizontal integration within the U.S. intelligence community by reducing technological, cultural, and other barriers. In Malaya, the system of intelligence collection and analysis improved immensely after the British and their indigenous allies established a unified intelligence organization under a single chief of intelligence. The British created district, province, and national intelligence fusion centers run by the police but with military and civil government liaison representatives. The British also made it a priority to strengthen the local Malayan Police Special Branch, whose members spoke the local language and knew most about local conditions.

In Vietnam, the United States launched the Phoenix program to coordinate and exploit better the overly compartmentalized and frequently competing U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence programs directed at neutralizing the civilian Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). This clandestine political and administrative organization performed essential functions for VC cadres, including recruitment, propaganda, logistics, intelligence, and terrorism. U.S. and South Vietnamese intelligence sought to identify VCI members and then induce them to defect, recruit them as spies, or capture or kill them. The official U.S. role was limited to providing advice regarding intelligence collection and analysis. Americans were not supposed to participate in the subsequent operations to exploit the intelligence.

Phoenix became quite controversial for reasons that could pertain today. First, U.S. civilian and military analysts could not agree on the size of VCI – estimates ranged from thirty-four thousand to two hundred twenty-five thousand. Although many VCI members and supporters were captured, counterterrorist campaigns. Bin Laden’s intent to provoke a global military crackdown against Islam is discussed in Michael Scott Doran, "Somebody Else’s Civil War: Ideology, Rage, and the Assault on America,” in How Did This Happen?: Terrorism and the New War, edited by James F. Hoge, Jr., and Gideon Rose (New York: Public Affairs, 2001): 31-32. Quote from Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, 9.


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most were not influential or senior operatives. 71 Second, the Provincial Reconnaissance Units involved in the exploitation operations gained the reputation as assassination squads, leading American commanders to curb U.S. military participation in Phoenix. South Vietnamese officials apparently used the program to eliminate their noncommunist opponents. Third, a quota system encouraged the punishment of innocent people. Rampant bribery allowed possible VCI members to escape arrest. Finally, widespread allegations of torture during interrogations discredited the program within the United States. 72

During some counterinsurgencies, an intelligence “tipping point” can occur. In order to secure intelligence and cooperation from populations affected by insurgencies or terrorist campaigns, the government authorities must demonstrate that they can protect their supporters – either through direct defense or by keeping informants’ identity secret. Ideally, at some point the government acquires increasing information regarding the insurgents, which in turn facilitates more successful operations against them. In turn, this success increases the population’s confidence in the government’s ability to protect them, making them more willing to provide additional information and other forms of assistance. The counterinsurgency campaign achieved such a tipping point in Malaya, but not in Algeria or Vietnam. Although Coalition forces have yet to gain the population’s confidence in Iraq, local intelligence agencies appear to have attained some successes in securing greater popular assistance in many Muslim communities.

Although the United States profits from working with these foreign intelligence services whose agents often have better access to local information and a more thorough understanding of important regional dynamics, these services have their own biases and motivations. Over the longer term, the federal government will need to work with U.S. universities to train more Americans to become truly knowledgeable about the Arab Middle East. Enrollment in Arabic language classes is still shockingly low; while 10,584 college students took Arabic in 2002, 746,267 took Spanish. 73 The Cold War, which saw federal sponsorship of Soviet bloc area and language studies, might represent a good model to encourage Middle Eastern studies. 74 Alternately, federal authorities might revise their security procedures in order to permit more expatriates and recent immigrants to make their first-hand area expertise readily available to their newly adopted country.

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Importance of Police and Law Enforcement
In both counterinsurgencies and counterterrorist campaigns, the police often provide the main link between central government security institutions and local communities. Unlike soldiers or special antiterrorist units, police units typically establish a long-term presence in a locality and can cultivate relations with community leaders. Police officers often can enforce security-motivated restrictions on civil liberties, such as curfews and checkpoints, which would arouse greater resistance if conducted by soldiers, especially foreigners. Placing police outside a mosque, religious school, or other sacred institution usually provokes less outrage than stationing soldiers there. Established police tactics, such as regular patrols, patient observation, and establishing a rapport with community leaders tend to yield substantially more information about potential terrorist or guerrilla operations than quick “search-and-destroy” or mass detention operations. This approach is especially effective in urban areas where the terrorists and the insurgents’ civilian infrastructure often locate to facilitate intelligence collection and command and control. Similarly, law enforcement personnel usually can more effectively capture and detain suspected terrorists than regular soldiers. As of mid-2003, the police in over one hundred countries had arrested more than three thousand suspects linked to al Qaeda, while their militaries had captured only six hundred and fifty enemy combatants. 75 Finally, upon completion of a counterinsurgency or counterterrorist operation, police units can help restore the rule of law and permit the timely demobilization of military forces.

Experience shows a clear link between effective police operations and successful counterinsurgencies. In Malaya, the British undertook a sustained effort to strengthen the local police forces. The British

upgraded their equipment, recruited thousands of additional members, and seconded British Army officers to police units, including several hundred sergeants demobilized from operations in Palestine, to help improve tactics and training. They also formed a Special Constabulary of some thirty thousand men (mostly Malays) to guard critical infrastructure targets such as bridges and road junctures, which allowed British troops to focus on conducting mobile operations.\textsuperscript{78} In addition, police officers enjoyed formal equality in operational matters with military officers and civilian government representatives. Due to their knowledge of local conditions and criminal procedures, they took charge of many intelligence-gathering operations and most interrogation sessions. In urban areas, moreover, they arrested many guerrillas and impeded insurgent attempts to expand their recruitment base beyond the alienated ethnic Chinese minority.\textsuperscript{77} At the insurgency’s peak, the number of police in Malaya (seventy thousand regulars) exceeded the number of soldiers (forty thousands British and Commonwealth troops, which included ten thousand Gurkhas).\textsuperscript{79}

In Algeria and Vietnam, the local police were less effective. Instead of strengthening the undermanned and under-equipped local civilian police, the French army assumed full police powers at the local level throughout most of Algeria.\textsuperscript{78} Poor police procedures combined with the suspension of many civil liberties following the National Assembly’s enactment of a State of Emergency Bill resulted in the indiscriminate arrest of many innocent Muslims, many of whom became more radical during detention. The failings of the French civilian police, especially police intelligence, combined with the limited French administrative presence in many areas made it difficult to expose and extirpate the FLN civilian infrastructure. In South Vietnam, police officers were underpaid, corrupt, and often incompetent. President Ngo Dinh Diem had unsuccessfully used the police as a tool to stave off a military coup. After South Vietnamese generals succeeded in deposing him, they kept the police corps weak and under close supervision. The quality and morale of police officers remained low despite military coup. After South Vietnamese generals succeeded in deposing him, they kept the police corps weak and under close supervision. The quality and morale of police officers remained low despite

Winning the GWOT will require improvements in the national law enforcement capabilities of many countries and in mechanisms for multilateral cooperation – especially the exchange of intelligence. Insofar as U.S. opponents in non-state conflicts increasingly resemble urban gangs, effective police tactics become all the more important.\textsuperscript{81} A particularly important function for civilian law enforcement bodies in counterterrorist operations is to disrupt terrorist financing and uncover links between terrorists and organized criminal groups. (Many modern terrorist groups, like some insurgents, derive substantial funds from narcotics trafficking and other illicit activities.) Good police forces contribute to criminal justice as well as public security. Their role will become even more important if the goal of the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism – to “return Terrorism to the ‘Criminal Domain’” – is ever achieved.\textsuperscript{82}

Enhancing Interagency Cooperation

Past counterinsurgency campaigns show the importance of effective interagency cooperation to integrate political and military operations, or at least to limit incompatibilities between them. A particularly useful institutional response has been to convene representatives from all relevant military and civilian agencies (including the police and intelligence services) involved in the counterinsurgency in a single coordinating body with responsibility for a specific geographic area of operations (local, regional, or nation-wide).

In Malaya, the British established an integrated civil-military strategy under a single chain-of-command. This integration occurred at two levels. At the top, the ambush and killing of British High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney shocked the British Government into combining civil and military authority in one position.\textsuperscript{83} In February 1952, London appointed General Sir Gerald Templer as both High Commissioner and Director of Operations, with “powers that no British soldier had ever had since Cromwell’s day.”\textsuperscript{84} The integration of civil military affairs also occurred in the field. After an area was declared “white,” civil development agencies would begin reconstruction operations under the protection of the security forces. Concern about not losing public support through needlessly killing civilians resulted in strict civilian control of military operations. Daily meetings of police, military, and government representatives in each area of operations (known as “morning prayers”) provided civilian

\textsuperscript{76} Harold Ickes, Fighting Dirty, 127.
\textsuperscript{78} J. L. S. Goling, People’s War: Conditions and Consequences in China and South East Asia (New York: Praeger, 1969), 360. For more on British policies towards the police during the insurgency see Blaufarb and Tanham, Who Will Win?, 31, and Harry Miller, A Short History of Malaysia (New York: Praeger, 1965), 176.
\textsuperscript{80} The contribution of the police in past counterinsurgencies is discussed in Douglas S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, Who Will Win?: A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary Warfare (New York: Crane Russak, 1989), 27, 31.
\textsuperscript{81} See for example Max G. Manwaring, Street Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2005), especially pages 4-5.
\textsuperscript{82} National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 13. The figures indicate that such a reduction in terrorism’s scope and capability would result in its becoming “unorganized,” “localized,” “Non-sponsored,” and “Rare” (13).
\textsuperscript{83} Although he was Director of Operations, Briggs did not exercise any formal control over the military or the police; his main method of influence was persuasion (Joel E. Hamby, “Civil-Military Operations: Joint Doctrine and the Malaysian Emergency,” JFQ: Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn 2002): 56.)
\textsuperscript{84} Allen, Savage Wars of Peace, 36.
officials with frequent opportunities for oversight and intervention. These "war executive committees," which operated at the local, regional, and national levels, ran the entire counterinsurgency campaign.81 For example, they had to approve most air and artillery strikes in advance.82 Except at the federal level, the committees had far more civilian than military members.83 The committees empowered local authorities to exploit their specific conditions and reinforced the civilian administrative presence in areas outside the national capital.

In Vietnam, the sheer number of U.S. and South Vietnamese agencies involved in pacification initially created confusion and inefficiency.84 American personnel pursued their own preferred programs with little regard for other U.S. efforts or understanding of how their projects advanced larger U.S. war aims – resulting in the absence of an integrated strategy.85 As a result, in May 1967 President Lyndon Johnson established the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS).86 Within a few months, the new structure brought together all U.S. civil and military pacification programs in South Vietnam under a single chain of command, nominally headed by General William C. Westmoreland, but actually run by his new civilian deputy, Robert Komer. The newly unified American civil-military advisory team structure worked with the South Vietnamese agencies involved in pacification at all administrative levels. CORDS created the first fully integrated civil-military field organization in U.S. history and considerably improved U.S. and South Vietnamese interagency coordination. Unfortunately, by the time that CORDS became an effective counterinsurgency tool after 1968, North Vietnam’s conventional forces had replaced the Viet Cong guerrillas as the main adversary.

In contrast, the French military dominated the counterinsurgency in Algeria with minimum civilian control. French officers were free to rely on their preferred tactics – torture and counter-terror – notwithstanding their counterproductive long-term effects. The absence of civilian oversight allowed the military to ignore political guidance, sabotage peace negotiations with the insurgents, and even overthrew the civilian government in Paris in a coup.87

Effective interagency integration is needed for the GWOT as well. No single U.S. government entity can win the war by itself. The military needs the support of the intelligence community, the State Department (for diplomacy, including information campaigns), USAID (for economic development), the Department of Justice and the FBI (for law enforcement), and other assistance. The Bush administration has recently established NSC-led Regional Action Plans for Combating Terrorism (RAP-CTs) to improve interagency coordination in the GWOT.88 Nevertheless, it is premature to evaluate their effectiveness or whether they adequately represent civilian as well as military concerns.

Winning Foreign Publics’ Support

Popular support is important if not decisive in both counterinsurgency and counterterrorist campaigns. For example, the Israelis have survived Palestinian guerrilla and terrorist campaigns for decades despite overwhelming Palestinian opposition to Israeli occupation of various territories under dispute. Furthermore, people who support insurgents or terrorists can provide them with information, food, shelter, and other assistance. The greater logistical needs of insurgents, however, make them more dependent on popular support than terrorists are. In many countries, terrorists recognize that they cannot gain much popular support. They therefore fall back on instilling sufficient fear that people will lose faith in the government’s ability to protect them and adopt a position of sullen neutrality. Such a stance deprives the government of intelligence, and can harm the morale of its forces. Terrorists also rely on an indirect strategy to gain popular support: they hope to trigger such a harsh government response to their provocations that the authorities will alienate the population.

Many people, both within and outside the U.S. government, have offered ideas regarding how to improve the image of the United States and its policies among non-Americans – or at least to weaken popular support for anti-American terrorism. A U.S. government-sponsored panel warned that Muslim hostility toward the United States is rising and already “has reached shocking levels.”89 The Department of Defense argues that, as during the Cold War, the United States will win the GWOT “only when the ideological motivation for the terrorists’ activities has been discredited and no longer has the power to motivate streams of individuals to risk and sacrifice their lives.”90 The Final Report of the 9/11 Commission called for “much stronger public diplomacy to reach more people, including students

82 Blaufarb and Tanham, Whom Will We?, 19.
84 Komer, Bureaucracy at War, 83.
89 U.S. Departments of Defense, National Defense Strategy of The United States. The lessons of the Cold War for how to fight the GWOT are further elaborated in Carafano and Rosenzweig, Winning the Long War.
and leaders outside of government. Our efforts here should be as strong as they were in combating closed societies during the Cold War. Studies of Muslim opinion show that, in some places – such as Central Asia – popular views of the United States remain malleable. In other countries – such as Egypt, Indonesia, and Morocco – researchers have concluded through focus groups that targeted U.S. information campaigns directed at local and regional media could abate anti-Americanism by helping counter misperceptions about the United States and its policies in their countries.

Besides persuasion and argument, another way to weaken the anti-American ideology of extremist Islamist terrorism is to show the Jihadist movement’s inability to achieve its goals over a protracted period. The repeated failures of Marxist-Leninism and nationalism to meet the needs of an early generation in the Middle East enervated these doctrines and provided an opening for radical political Islam. Other factors that historically have led to the mellowing of fanatical movements include severe internal splits (such as between the USSR and China) and the emergence of new priorities (often associated with a new generation of people, like the more materialistic grandchildren of the Bolsheviks).

But pursuing an effective strategy to neutralize anti-American sentiment is not easy. Strategic influence campaigns regularly encounter problems with cultural and linguistic misunderstandings, ingrained distrust and prejudices, and competing sources of information and perceptions. Much anti-U.S. feeling results from a deeply rooted alienation from American culture and values. Other hostile sentiments reflect opposition to long-standing U.S. polices, such as support for Israel. Changes to these policies likely would be discounted as tactical retreats, deceptive practices designed to obscure underlying continuities, or indications that terrorism works and should continue. For example, the U.S. decision of the Bolsheviks).

The influence campaign appears to have achieved most success, however, at winning support among jungle aborigines. The influence enjoyed by the Psychological Warfare Section, led and dominated by civilian staff, reflected Field Marshal Templer’s dictum: “The answer lies not in pouring more troops in the jungle, but rests in the hearts and minds of the Malay people.” Templer expanded the territory’s information service so that government-provided information could reach previously isolated areas. Nevertheless, the overall impact of the “hearts-and-minds” campaign remains a subject of debate among historians. Relations between the police and the ethnic Chinese began to improve after police units established permanent posts in Chinese villages, replacing the rotating military garrisons, and undertook a public relations campaign that stressed the police’s role as public servants. The influence campaign appears to have had many middle eastern anti-American feelings in the Middle East.

The British employed an extensive strategic influence campaign in Malaya to help defeat the insurgency. The influence enjoyed by the Psychological Warfare Section, led and dominated by civilian staff members, reflected Field Marshal Templer’s dictum: “The answer lies not in pouring more troops in the jungle, but rests in the hearts and minds of the Malay people.”Templer expanded the territory’s information service so that government-provided information could reach previously isolated areas. Nevertheless, the overall impact of the “hearts-and-minds” campaign remains a subject of debate among historians. Relations between the police and the ethnic Chinese began to improve after police units established permanent posts in Chinese villages, replacing the rotating military garrisons, and undertook a public relations campaign that stressed the police’s role as public servants. The influence campaign appears to have achieved most success, however, at winning support among jungle aborigines.

Different targets require different influence strategies. Segmenting the targeted market is essential. The public diplomacy tools used must vary according to the group and its situation. A recent RAND report found that “influence campaigns are highly sensitive to operational environments” – meaning contextual variables such as cultural factors, media networks, etc. Since the host government will normally understand these subtleties better than any foreign state, its representatives should have much influence in developing and implementing the information campaign, even when friendly governments (such as the United States) fund it.

References:
99. Miller, Short History of Malaysia, 182.
103. Kim Cragin and Scott Gernade, Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005).
104. “Moreover, campaigns that do not take these sensitivities into account not only fail but are counterproductive” (x).
The U.S. also must prevent potential recruits from becoming terrorists and dissuade ordinary people from supporting terrorism. Convincing moderate political, economic, and religious leaders to fight terrorism is especially important given that a more direct U.S. effort would likely have less impact. Any visibly U.S.-directed influence campaign likely would fail and perhaps even backfire. People naturally distrust foreign propaganda, and suspicions of American values and policies pervade many communities.

A major caveat is that weakening popular support for terrorism might not have much immediate influence on terrorist recruitment. Only a small percentage of people holding anti-American views become terrorists. One estimate is that, out of the one and a half billion Muslims in the world, two hundred million to five hundred million sympathize with radical “Jihadist” ideology, fifty thousand to two hundred thousand join Jihadist groups, and only several thousand commit acts of terrorism.\footnote{Richard A. Clarke et al., Defeating the Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action (New York: The Century Foundation, 2004), 16-17. “An extremely small number (tens of 1 percent) of Muslims are jihadists, although a growing number may be sympathetic to one or more aspects of the jihadist agenda such as the establishment of new governments.” (17).}

Reducing these figures by a few percentage points likely would not change the underlying dynamics of the GWOT, especially since an estimated sixty thousand recruits trained at al Qaeda camps before September 11, 2001.\footnote{The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2002-2003 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 9.}

A more effective policy might be to target influential elites like Islamic clerics who could then affect larger public opinion. The goal would be to induce local political, educational, and religious leaders to counter radical interpretations of Islamic religion and the other elements of the ideology of violence.\footnote{The applicability of this strategy is assessed in Rohan Gunaratna, “Global Terrorism Outlook for 2005,” DSS Commentaries (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, December 31, 2004), 6, available at www.idss.edu.sg.}

In Iraq, U.S. commanders recognize that popular opposition to the military occupation remains so vigorous that they cannot soon hope to win a “hearts-and-minds” campaign. Instead, they have sought to cultivate popular support for the new Iraqi government, army, and police.\footnote{David Zucchino, “U.S. Turns to Iraqi Insiders in Battle against Insurgency,” Los Angeles Times, March 22, 2005.}

Another indirect approach, endorsed by the Bush administration, is to work to de-legitimize terrorism in the manner that genocide, slavery, and piracy are now considered beyond the bounds of proper behavior. Unfortunately, all three evils persist, and past norm-changing campaigns took decades of concentrated effort to achieve even this limited progress. It would help if countries and organizations besides the American government (such as Arab political and religious leaders) took the lead in seeking to discredit extremist propaganda and empower moderate Muslims, perhaps by exposing how the extremists distort Islam and its sacred principles. Based on the experience of Saudi Arabia during the past year, a message that emphasizes how jihadi terrorism has killed thousands of Muslims as well as non-Muslims might have some resonance.

Besides a long-term effort to empower moderate elites, the United States should be ready to exploit opportunities to influence the wider Muslim audience through indirect means. For example, the Bush administration appreciated how providing disaster assistance to stricken Muslims after the December 2004 Asian Pacific Tsunami could vividly demonstrate U.S. concern to alleviate Muslim suffering and give American representatives a chance to cultivate popular support for the new Iraqi government, army, and police.\footnote{Stephen Schwartz, “Getting to Know the Sufis: There is a Tolerant, Pluralist Tradition in Islam. We Can’t Afford to Ignore It,” The Weekly Standard (February 7, 2005).}
how the U.S. military could help Muslims. Subsequent polls showed a decline in popular support for terrorism in many Muslim countries. The Vietnam case highlights the importance of understanding the target audience. Initially, U.S. propaganda experts distributed numerous pro-American pamphlets that the population ignored because of their inappropriate language and iconography. Later, U.S. information operations drew on the testimonials of defectors, who better understood the target audience. This experience also shows the need for “feedback mechanisms” to warn when novel tactics (e.g., new message) or even strategies (i.e., new audiences) are needed.

The most comprehensive assessment of the current U.S. strategic influence campaign found that initial efforts after 9/11 to win the “battle of ideas” lacked a clear organizational structure, an agreed national strategy, and adequate financial and especially human resources. In recent months, however, the CIA, the military, and other U.S. government agencies have organized a new, better financed and integrated campaign to try to direct Muslims in more moderate directions. The administration is also restructuring how it conducts public diplomacy. To improve interagency coordination among the multiples executive branch bodies involved in U.S. strategic influence campaigns, it created the new position of deputy national security adviser for strategic communication and outreach. Additional changes might be needed. When Congress pressured the Clinton administration to merge the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) into the State Department in 1999, the various USIA components were scattered across the Department. Some of these elements might need to be recombined under a strengthened under secretary of state for public diplomacy. Obtaining such effective coordination will become even more important if the United States is to carry out the State Department’s injunction that U.S. representatives will “quickly counter propaganda and disinformation” through various means.

More funding might be needed as well. According to the Fiscal Year 2006 International Affairs budget, the administration has proposed spending $5.8 billion in assistance “to our partners” in the GWOT, $120 million for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (described as “a cornerstone of the President’s strategic approach to supporting economic, political and social reform in the region”), $651 million for “International Broadcasting,” and $328 million for “public diplomacy to influence foreign opinion and win support for U.S. foreign policy goals.” The proposed budget would allow the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to continue local and live news coverage to the broader Middle East region through satellite and land-based transmission of the Arabic-language Radio Sawa and the al-Hurra television station. It also would support the development of libraries and information centers, called American Corners, in the Muslim world. Once U.S. measures of effectiveness have improved, it would be in a better position to determine whether both the overall level of spending is appropriate, and whether the amounts allocated for each mission are optimal.

Winning Foreign Governments’ Support

The need for the support of foreign governments is axiomatic in both counterinsurgencies and counterterrorist campaigns. The U.S. Army field manual on counterinsurgencies notes that “one of the key recurring lessons is that the United States cannot win other countries’ wars for them, but can certainly help legitimate foreign governments overcome attempts to overthrow them.” Defense analysts Steven Metz and Raymond Millen write that, in contemporary counterinsurgencies (in which they include the local manifestations of the GWOT), “the key to success is not for the U.S. military to become better at counterinsurgency, but for the U.S. military (and other elements of the government) to be skilled at helping local security and intelligence forces become effective at it.”

110 Defense. 111 D. Feingold during her appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 16, 2005. There are many confounding variables.” It is also more complicated determining the views of groups as opposed to their constituent individuals. 112 Cragin and Gerweth, Dissuading Terror, 30-32. The authors define “strategic influence” as comprising “the entire spectrum of influence campaigns, from highly coercive or enticing efforts (e.g., force or bribery) through to public diplomacy. In general, the purpose of these campaigns is to affect the beliefs, opinions, attitudes, and actions of potential adversaries” (7).

113 Cragin and Gerweth note some of the difficulties involved in assessing the effectiveness of an information campaign: “First, it is difficult to determine whether the influence operation affected the attitudes of the intended audiences. Second, it is difficult to determine whether the affected attitudes actually caused the desired behavior. Finally, attempts to measure these attitudes—and changes in attitudes—face many confounding variables.” It is also more complicated determining the views of groups as opposed to their constituent individuals. 114 Secretary Rice acknowledged some of these measurement problems in a response to a question from Senator Russell D. Feingold during her appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 16, 2005.

115 Both the State Department and the CIA had drastically reduced their specialists in this area after the Cold War. 116 David E. Kaplan, “Hearts, Minds, and Dollars: In an Unseen Front in the War on Terrorism, America is Spending Millions . . . To Change the Very Face of Islam,” U.S. News & World Report (April 25, 2005).

117 “We will alert senior officials and Embassies to hostile propaganda and disinformation and offer counterstrategies through both public statements and diplomatic intervention with media and governments. We also will sensitize our diplomats in the field to watch for skewed portrayals of the United States and proactively seek to clarify the truth. To better communicate U.S. positive involvement in the world, we also will use positive foreign citizen testimonials that share successful development and humanitarian assistance stories” (United States Department of State and United States Agency for International Development, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2004-2009: Aligning Diplomacy and Development Assistance (Washington, D.C., 2004), 31).


Past counterinsurgencies show how providing foreign assistance to friendly governments can play multiple roles in the GWOT. First, it can strengthen their ability to resist direct terrorist attacks by improving their intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and military defense capabilities. Second, it can serve as a tool to influence recipients’ policies in ways that discourage terrorism, for example, by promoting political and economic reforms, strengthening secular education, and cracking down on extremist and anti-American propaganda – including that emanating from government agencies. Third, it can help construct and sustain a multinational coalition against terrorism – that is, a global counterterrorism coalition to counter the global jihadi terrorism network. Its specific manifestations would include collaboration on terrorist financing, WMD proliferation, and anti-terrorist intelligence sharing as well as traditional military alliances.

The history of counterinsurgencies also highlights the importance of denying insurgents foreign state sponsors. As the U.S. Army field manual explains: “The need for access to external resources and sanctuaries has been a constant throughout the history of insurgencies. Rarely, if ever, has an insurgent force been able to obtain the arms and equipment (particularly ammunition) necessary for decisive action from within the battle area.” The successful FLN, the Viet Cong, and the Mujahidin in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan enjoyed extensive help from other countries. In contrast, the inability of the Malayan or Huk insurgents to secure much foreign help contributed to their isolation and eventual defeat.

The global nature of the GWOT makes it imperative to work with other national governments to counter terrorism – at a minimum by ending state sponsorship for terrorist movements. Not only is the al Qaeda network inherently multinational, but even terrorist groups that conduct strikes inside a single country rely on transnational support networks. Terrorist groups have been cooperating across borders for years.

The United States has helped bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of supportive foreign governments by providing training, intelligence, and financial assistance. It also has successfully pressured the governments of Libya, Sudan, and other countries (though not completely in the important case of Pakistan) to cease their official sponsorship of external terrorism. Despite its unilateral inclinations, the Bush administration has worked through the United Nations (UN) as well as regional security groups like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to rally and coordinate opposition to terrorism. Most decisively, the Bush administration has employed military force to change the regimes of Afghanistan and Iraq, thus ending their role as safe havens for foreign terrorist organizations.

Critical uncertainties remain, however, regarding many countries’ commitment to cooperate with the United States given competing priorities and their concern about becoming terrorist targets themselves by associating too closely with unpopular U.S. policies. Despite recent improvements, such negative factors continue to affect the governments of Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, intelligence sharing has proven particularly problematic due to concerns about protecting peoples’ privacy and national sources and methods.

The administration has prioritized collaboration with other governments to reduce terrorists’ financial resources. In the words of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: “We will identify and block the sources of funding, freeze the assets of terrorists and those who support them, deny terrorists access to the international financial system, protect legitimate charities from being abused by terrorists, and prevent the movement of terrorists’ assets through alternative financial networks.” For example, the State Department has encouraged all governments to sign and ratify UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which targets terrorists’ finances, and to apply it to all terrorist groups.

119 According to one expert, the United Nations has made four main contributions to the GWOT: “First, it can enhance the legitimacy of state actions, including military actions against state sponsors of terrorism. . . . Second, the UN can help to create and develop international norms and international standards of accountability. . . . Third, the UN can help share the economic burden of the fight against terrorism. . . . Fourth, the UN can also help share the burden politically” (Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, “Combating Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 4 (Summer 2003), 174). See also the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York: United Nations, 2004), 13, 49-50.

120 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 22.
advancing its goals independently after its defeat in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, al Qaeda operatives continue to share advice and training with other members of the global jihadi movement.

Although al Qaeda has shown significant leadership depth, the limited effectiveness of its recent attacks might reflect the arrest of so many of its original leaders, though other causes—such as more effective U.S. counterterrorist policies in other areas—might have had a greater impact. The death of bin Laden—from natural causes or otherwise—would further deplete the original leadership cadre, as well as remove a most important inspiration for terrorist recruiting and general anti-Americanism within the Muslim world. Most enticingly, the departure of such a unifying and respected terrorist leader could result in splits among his successors, who might engage in a vicious power struggle. Competition among the ethnic, national, ideological, geographic, and personal groups within al Qaeda, which like most terrorist or insurgent movements lacks a clear procedure for leadership succession, could result in the emergence of less powerful, perhaps mutually competing, factions. Some of them might even challenge bin Laden’s revolutionary dictum to concentrate their attacks on the “far enemies” (the United States and its allies) rather than the “near enemies” (the supposedly apostate regimes found in most Muslim countries). On the other hand, it would prove much harder to negotiate a comprehensive settlement with a leaderless terrorist group—a problem we are encountering in Iraq today.

A Negotiated Settlement?

Although normally protracted, insurgencies eventually end, most often with a government military victory, but sometimes with a guerrilla triumph. Occasionally, as in El Salvador and Nicaragua, a peace agreement leads to the successful reintegration of most of the insurgents into the political process; most often, though, as in Vietnam, one or both sides renegotiate the settlement and resume fighting when a favorable opportunity arises. Similarly, most terrorist campaigns eventually wither away as terrorist leaders die or are captured, the government changes or adopts new policies, or, rarely, through a negotiated settlement. Such a negotiated settlement might be the best way to handle a leaderless terrorist organization.

The evidence regarding the success of this effort has been mixed. While al Qaeda functioned before September 2001 as a kind of terrorist Ford Foundation— soliciting, evaluating, and supporting proposed terrorist actions with money, advice, and other assistance—recently its affiliates appear to rely instead on their own sources of financing, especially donations by wealthy backers and money earned through illicit activities such as drug trafficking and kidnapping.

The Decapitation Option

Past counterinsurgencies suggest caution about assuming that killing or capturing Islamist terrorist leaders will yield great benefits. The (natural) death of North Vietnamese founding leader Ho Chi Minh in September 1969 had no noticeable impact on the insurgency in the South, and the French coup de main in seizing the FLN external leadership in mid-flight did not cause the insurgents to modify their demands for total independence. Today, the guerrillas in Iraq have no clear leader. Even Saddam Hussein’s capture has not appreciably weakened the resistance. His arrest might even have removed an obstacle to many recruits who opposed the U.S.-led occupation but feared facilitating Hussein’s return to power. On the other hand, the Sendero Luminoso (“Shining Path”) insurgency in Peru (which also relied heavily on terrorist attacks) largely collapsed after the authorities captured the movement’s leader, Abimael Guzman.

The effect that bin Laden’s capture would have on the GWOT would depend on the extent to which he continues to exercise control over al Qaeda and its affiliate groups. According to Bruce Hoffman, al Qaeda abandoned its highly centralized organizational structure and transformed into an extensive “international movement or franchise operation with like-minded local representatives, loosely connected to a central ideological or motivational base but

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through a negotiated settlement. Formal peace agreements are difficult to achieve among the parties given their levels of animosity and distrust, the sharp divergence in their preferred end states, and that even hinting at an interest in negotiating often gives the impression of weakness.

Osama bin Laden periodically has made audio-taped statements that offer a temporary cease-fire or perhaps something more durable and substantial if Western countries “stop attacking Muslims or interfering in their affairs.” Representatives of Western governments and other analysts have regularly dismissed these proposals as aimed at dividing them, undermining support for their counterterrorist operations in Iraq and elsewhere, and expanding al Qaeda’s status among Muslims disquieted by its violent tactics.101 Although bin Laden has endorsed non-violent efforts to overthrow existing Muslim regimes, he argues that violence would be justified should such efforts at peaceful change fail.11 Even if bin Laden were to support a peace arrangement, it is unclear whether he could enforce his endorsement throughout the entire anti-American terrorist network. Aspirants for leadership of the GWOT might see an opportunity to outflank him. Any successor to bin Laden would, given his presumed lesser authority, probably find it harder to secure and implement a comprehensive settlement.

During the Cold War, and with some internal conflicts, the UN secretary general was able to offer his “good offices” and other forms of diplomatic intervention to permit hostile parties to explore possible settlements. UN peacekeepers also became involved in ending a large number of civil wars during the 1990s. The ability of the United Nations to make such a contribution in the GWOT is uncertain. Not only have UN agencies been heavily involved in efforts to limit worldwide support for terrorism, especially terrorist financing, but the Islamist insurgents and terrorists in Afghanistan and especially Iraq have deliberately attacked UN targets, most notably the UN headquarters in Baghdad. Bin Laden personally has denounced the United Nations for sanctioning the oppression of Muslims – starting with Palestine’s partition in 1947 and continuing through the wars in the former Yugoslavia and the Persian Gulf: “We are being massacred everyday, while the United Nations continues to sit idly by.”12

In the GWOT, achieving a long-lasting negotiated settlement with Islamist extremists is unlikely given their sweeping demands: the replacement of the existing governments in the Middle East, Central Asia, and much of East Asia with Taliban-style theocratic regimes, and a severe reduction in the influence and perhaps presence of non-Muslims in the region. Their bill of particulars against the United States includes its military deployments in the Middle East; its perennial support for Israel and corrupt Muslim regimes; its indifference to Muslim suffering and persecution; and its exploitation of Arab oil resources. Reviewing this situation, terrorist expert Daniel L. Byman argues: “Because of the scope of its grievances, its broader agenda of rectifying humiliation, and a poisoned worldview that glorifies jihad as a solution, appealing al-Qaeda is difficult in theory and impossible in practice. It is hard to imagine what would suffice, as so many U.S. interests are involved that even significant policy changes would be only the tip of the iceberg.” Byman’s conclusion: “In essence, al-Qaeda seeks America’s unconditional surrender.”13

If this assessment is correct, then the United States and its allies will need to brace themselves for a long struggle. America’s experience during the Cold War against the equally messianic doctrine of communism suggests that, despite the magnitude of the challenge, we should be able to prevail until another ideology – hopefully, one less violent or at least less anti-Western – supplants jihadi terrorism. In the interim, we must sustain our defenses, especially against the proliferation of WMD, and exploit opportunities to weaken the terrorist threat by using all elements of our national power and some of the strategies and tactics that proved effective against past anti-Western insurgencies.

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104 Daniel L. Byman, “Al Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?,” World Politics, vol. 56, no. 1 (October 2003): 139-164. Similarly, terrorist expert Scott Atran writes, “Osama bin Laden and others affiliated with the mission of the World Islamic Front for the Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders seek no compromise, and will probably fight with hard power to the death.” He adds, however, “The tens of million of people who sympathize with bin Laden . . . are likely open to the promise of soft-power alternatives that most Muslims seem to favor – participatory government, freedom of expression, educational advancement, and economic choices” (“Soft Power and the Psychology of Suicide Bombing,” Terrorism Monitor, vol. 2, no. 11 (June 3, 2004), reprinted in Suits et al., eds., Unmasking Terror, 7).