

# Reform and Innovation in Stabilization, Reconstruction and Development

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## I. OVERVIEW

This paper provides an overview of existing proposals to improve the institutions and infrastructure of overseas stabilization and reconstruction operations and an analysis of the gaps that still exist in US capacities. The paper then concludes with a series of recommendations for a way to address the shortfalls noted<sup>1</sup>. The proposals explored range from long-term, sweeping changes, to incremental bureaucratic adjustments of the way the government goes about its daily business in conflict prevention, management and recovery. Two of the most recent efforts by the Government are closely examined: the new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at the State Department and the established Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process at the Department of Defense (DOD).

It is clear there are wide gaps between the proposed actions and the reality of what Congress and the current Administration is ready to implement. Beyond cultural differences between government departments and normal bureaucratic inertia, the creation of new capabilities is constrained by demands on personnel, funding, and resources by the engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some gaps result from trying to convert our current infrastructure *ad hoc* to meet new needs. These areas include:

- 1) a **human resources gap** driving the need to recruit, identify, re-orient and retrain Foreign Service and Development personnel into a core stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) staff as well as an ongoing mechanism to integrate lessons into civilian practice and training;
- 2) a **definitional gap** requiring a re-examination of national security legislation to meet the needs of stabilization and reconstruction, building in revisions of development assistance legislation; and
- 3) an **organizational gap** that must be bridged through mainstreaming conflict prevention, resolving issues of civilian command and control, investigating regionalization of approach and infrastructure, and adequately building in multiple methods of international cooperation.

Other challenges include how to better partner with international organizations, coalition partners, and the plethora of private contractors and NGOs. The operational demands of reconstruction activities are pushing the State Department towards transforming their relationships with key partners. This coincides with a much larger US government reform process with the US Agency for International Development (USAID)'s fragile states initiative and Defense's re-organization to improve S&R capabilities. It also mirrors an international reform process with the recent United Nations push for a Peacebuilding Commission and Support office and efforts in the European Union and key bilateral partners, most notably in the United Kingdom.

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<sup>1</sup> It is not meant to tackle the larger institutional changes needed to improve the wider process of overall development assistance, which, while necessary, would require more in-depth attention.

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Since 9/11, the US Government has reorganized the intelligence sector and created a framework of homeland security to face new threats. However, in the arena of traditional national security, the institutions and relationships that were built out of World War II are being asked, fifty years later, to stretch to fill both old and new roles. This needs to be changed.

The demands of overseas stabilization, reconstruction and development missions in manpower, flexible funding and interagency cooperation have pushed the limits of the National Security process within the Executive branch, and tested funding and oversight relationships with Congress. These strains have illustrated the need for reform in the way we plan, execute, fund and oversee these missions and overall response to issues of national security. This reform should include a review of the National Security Act of 1947 and clarification of the tasks and institutions of stabilization and reconstruction as a now vital component of our overall strategy, as well as options on how to improve funding and oversight mechanisms.

It is important to keep in mind, with the burgeoning number of transformative recommendations, that there is clearly no easy answer to these issues. As the Center for Global Development's Commission on Weak States has noted: "If easy, clear solutions were available, they would already have been implemented."<sup>2</sup> Instead this exercise discusses options and develops recommendations that continue to push the effort of transforming our capacity to engage in stabilization, reconstruction and development.

### **II. A BROAD LOOK AT THE PROPOSALS**

Since 2003, a series of proposals have laid out plans for reforming the way the US government (both civilian and military) prepares for, conceptualizes and implements reconstruction. These plans have run the gamut from federalizing a US Civilian Police force and creating rapid reaction civil administration teams, to raising the profile of USAID to a Cabinet-level department. Most resemble the efforts of Senators Lugar and Biden to increase the speed and effectiveness of civilian agencies reacting to conflict by providing "for the development, as a core mission of the Department of State and the USAID, of an effective expert civilian response capability to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities in a country or region that is in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife."<sup>3</sup>

With this mission, the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 (S 2127, 108<sup>th</sup> Congress) is the most comprehensive legislative attempt to establish an office of stabilization and reconstruction at the State Department, with a Coordinator reporting directly to the Secretary of State.<sup>4</sup> It called for a "Response

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<sup>2</sup> Center for Global Development, *States on the Brink: the Commission on Weak States and National Security*, Summer 2004

<sup>3</sup> Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2004 (S 2127, 108<sup>th</sup> Congress)

<sup>4</sup> Two other legislative proposals attempted to cover similar ground. The International Security Enhancement Act of 2004 (H.R. 4185), introduced by Representative David Dreier (R-CA), focused on a

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Readiness Corps” made up of 250 federal personnel prepared to deploy immediately to crisis zones and set in place emergency activities as well as a "Response Readiness Reserve” of more than 500 professionals from other federal agencies and NGOs with special skills needed for stabilization and reconstruction operations. There was also provision for an interagency training program. At the center of the authorization is a contingency fund of \$100 million designed to allow the office to flexibly and rapidly respond to international crises with other activities budgeted at \$80 million. While this bill passed unanimously out of committee, it never saw a vote on the floor. It is now included, with some modifications, as Title VII in S. 600, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2006 and 2007.<sup>5</sup>

This bill was highly influenced by key Washington think tanks and institutions. As a prelude, the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the US Army (AUSA) Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction laid out a large-scale strategy in January 2003 to include Directors of Reconstruction posts within State to lead US field activities with a coordinating office within USAID to support the Directors in the field<sup>6</sup>. It also pushed a civilian rapid response capacity in a FEMA-like form, to mobilize US expertise outside State and USAID. This would include a reserve force of 1000-1500 to perform post-conflict security tasks within Integrated Security Support Components.

CSIS also recommended that one agency be put in charge of disarmament, demobilization and rehabilitation (DDR); they also recommended a civilian reserve police system to be formed with the requisite authorizations. It called on Congress to create a US training center for post-conflict reconstruction. Unlike other proposals, they focused specifically on Civil Administration and the need to create a mechanism for fielding civil administration experts in teams that could build civil administration capacity on the ground. This would be funded through a Marshall Security Development Account of \$350-450 million annually, partially modeled on the flexible Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA), to address immediate needs and bridge funds.

The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) proposed an Office of Rule of Law Operations (ORLO) in the spring of 2004, which focused specifically on the need to build up capacity in Rule of Law. ORLO would bring together all the current Rule of Law

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State Department office led by an Under-Secretary for Overseas Contingencies and Stabilization, an International Contingency Training Center, a Civilian Overseas Contingency Force and an Emergency Stabilization Operations Support Fund. The “US Assistance for Civilians Affected by Conflict Act of 2004” (H.R. 4058) was introduced by the Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, Representative Henry Hyde (R-Ill). This act invests increased authority in the Office of the President to assist in protecting citizens during foreign crises, in supporting democracy, and in rehabilitating victims of war. This requests a \$200 million emergency fund.

<sup>5</sup> Chairman Richard G. Lugar, Opening Statement for Hearing on Stabilization and Reconstruction: Building Peace in a Hostile Environment, June 16, 2005, available at <http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2005/LugarStatement050616.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> Association of the United States Army (AUSA) and Center for Strategic and International Studies, Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction, January 2003

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programming under one roof (from Justice<sup>7</sup> and State) as well as create a federal Rule of Law Reserves (based on the US National Guard) to include constabulary forces, a police roster, and a reserve list of judges and other court personnel ready to be deployed under the auspices of the USG.<sup>8</sup>

The Center for Global Development's Commission on Weak States and US National Security in June 2004 called for increased investment in prevention, seizing opportunities to respond to trigger factors, organization of US assets to respond to conflict, and efforts to share the burden of responding to failed states internationally. This proposal recommends that development become a cabinet level department and raises the bar to a \$1 billion countries-in-transition fund for emergencies. It calls for a rapid response unit, as well as a special focus on security assistance (military and police, borders and DDR) run (like the CSIS and USIP proposals) by an interagency coordinating mechanism. The Commission also called for effective information strategies and opening up information lines (including classified channels) among all groups working on crisis response. This would hinge on a National Security Council (NSC) led consolidation of early warning systems across agencies and setting of priorities.

The Council on Foreign Relations' more recent report said it was time to "get serious about nation-building" by formally charging the NSC with establishing and coordinating S&R policy; elevating the State Department coordinator to Under Secretary of State; establishing a fund of \$500 million for this office; creating a Deputy Administrator for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations at USAID to oversee day-to-day execution of field programs; and establishing coordinators for reconstruction in other agencies including: Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor and Health and Human Services.<sup>9</sup> It advocates a standing multilateral reconstruction Trust Fund, managed under the auspices of the G8. The report says that "the new fund should be capitalized at approximately \$1 billion and would be managed by a donor board consisting of G8 member states representatives, the UN, World Bank and non-G8 country contributors."

Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson at the National Defense University, looking at the problem from a Defense Department perspective, proposed including dedicated units for Stabilization and Reconstruction at Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) headquarters in the form of well-staffed civilian-military units (C-MACs). Partners to be included in this were the State Department, Department of Justice (DOJ) Rule of Law programs, the Foreign Agricultural Service, and the Office of Management and Budget field office team. In this model, success in a working civil-military relationship in S&R operations depends on a permanent interagency S&R team to deploy with the military and an on-call civilian crisis management corps with the requisite skills to undertake nation-building.

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<sup>7</sup> Current Rule of Law programs include the Department of Justice Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT), and the DOJ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).

<sup>8</sup> United States Institute of Peace, *Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations The Rule of Law Component*, April 2004

<sup>9</sup> The task force report was released in July 2005. Council on Foreign Relations, *In the Wake of War: Improving US Post-Conflict Capabilities*, Independent Task Force Report 55, 2005

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Thomas Barnett, in his *Pentagon's New Map*, added to the debate by proposing a new "Systems-Administration" force, which includes military and civilian teams that manage the transition from war to peace activities. He recommended the creation of two different militaries: one to win wars, and another larger, internationally-integrated "Systems Administration force" to win the peace with "overwhelming presence". This second force would operate on a longer timeframe necessary to ensure a viable internal government, reestablish peacetime activities, and bring in coalition partners. As Barnett noted, there are mechanisms to rescue economically bankrupt states through the IMF and World Bank- there are no such rescue services for politically bankrupt states. These activities would be funded through an international reconstruction fund, based on the model of the IMF, citing the funds used in Bosnia and Kosovo which were similar, but *ad hoc*.<sup>10</sup>

As Americans continue to examine the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, the body of work, conferences and talks on reconstruction and development continue to expand exponentially. USIP is working on a new project to "Fill the Gaps" of our understanding, focusing on: mass media, role of women, governance, role of natural resources, and assessment of progress (monitoring and evaluation) in post conflict operations. This is in addition to the ongoing effort of international institutions like the World Bank that have been wrestling with the problems of development for decades and are still seeking solutions.

It should be noted that these proposals has been occurring concurrently with a larger international process of beefing up civilian capacity for post-conflict operations both at the UN through the Process of the High-Level Panel on Challenges, Threats and Reform, the Secretary General's recent report on reform and multiple efforts among partner countries including the UK and the EU.

### **III. A GROWING CONSENSUS: MAJOR ISSUES COVERED**

While many of the proposals differ in scope, they all grapple with key elements of organizing US capacity to respond: interagency coordination, funding and resources, change in planning mechanisms, training and human resources, and civil-military cooperation. There are several important ideas and dilemmas that emerge.

#### *Coordinating the interagency:*

Several proposals recommend that the National Security Council (NSC) coordinate stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) activities as it is the only organization with Presidential authority and the ability to win cooperation from all the necessary agencies. Some have suggested a new directorate within the NSC. Others would give the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at State a dual role within the NSC.

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<sup>10</sup> This force was envisioned to only include 1/3 military personnel as it developed to become "mom's military"- older, gender-balanced, better educated and able to exist under civilian law. It would engage parts of all the services, house civil affairs and be controlled out of the Regional Combatant commands.

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CSIS' Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II report recommends housing an Office for Complex Contingency Planning at the NSC under a Senior Director, standardizing an NSC-led interagency planning process as envisioned in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) XX<sup>11</sup>, and deploying Interagency Crisis Planning Teams which will work with Interagency Task Forces on the ground. It also recommends that the NSC lead a process to develop a doctrine that clearly defines agency roles and responsibilities.<sup>12</sup>

These suggestions for raising the profile and strengthening the role of the civilian post-conflict leadership and creating a mediator between Defense and State are crucial. However, they raise difficult dilemmas as well. The challenge is to define the role of the NSC as a major coordinator while avoiding executive over-reach as we saw with the Iran-Contra affair. The NSC does not have the legislative authority or operational capacity to do S&R. This creates a tricky balance of stemming NSC over-reach, mandating effective State and DOD cooperation under an NSC head, and enabling the NSC to lead with a small staff who by design, have no operational capacity. The proposals for NSC leadership remain constrained by these parameters. Since Congress cannot legislate the makeup or the work of the NSC- there is no way to ensure continuity from one administration to the next with this design. But in order for S&R operations to work, a Presidential authority must be able to coordinate the interagency process.

### *A New, Flexible Funding and Staffing Base:*

All of the proposals argue that more money and more effective funding mechanisms are necessary for civilian activities in reconstruction and development, either by raising the profile of USAID (and its budget) or by providing a large flexible fund under the auspices of the coordinating interagency body (currently S/CRS).

While the flexibility of the fund has caused concern in a Congress strapped by the enormous costs of the Iraq war, movable financial and human resources are key to responding quickly to a crisis. This is especially true for the civilian effort because unlike the military, it does not have a large budget to re-organize priorities and re-program their funding to meet short-term challenges. The civilian budget is strapped and already over-extended. While the military re-programs funds or plans for a supplemental when contingencies arise, the civilian agencies cannot count on Congress to approve re-programming. Flexibility has to be built into the plan itself.

As an example, the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase II recommends a \$350-400 million S&R Fund housed in the DOS, to bridge the transition between emergency and longer-term development aid.<sup>13</sup> It calls for expanded operational civilian capacity including 250

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<sup>11</sup> CSIS in particular endorses the National Security Presidential Directive XX as key to interagency coordination. This model was developed to replace PDD 56, which used the Deputies Committee to form interagency working groups to prepare for and respond to contingency operations. PDD 56's provision for planning was a Pol-Mil plan, which combined the efforts of all participating agencies. NSPD XX (never signed) institutionalizes the process described in PDD 56 by creating a Contingency Planning Policy Coordination Committee (PCC), which would meet monthly to monitor countries of concern.

<sup>12</sup> Michele Flournoy, CSIS, briefing to the Working Group on Foreign Policy Institutions and Infrastructure.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

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full-time staff members, 500 reserve, and \$200 million for salaries, training and equipment. Incentives schemes<sup>14</sup> are recommended including promotion based on field time, and “jointness” assignments between agencies with the creation of a National Security Career Path.<sup>15</sup>

USIP proposes that Rule of Law activities alone need an increase in reserve personnel of 50 judges, 30 legal officers, 4 protection personnel per judge, 50 prosecutors, 50 defense attorneys and 50 corrections officers for a total of almost 500. They call for a constabulary force of 2000, by Kosovo numbers.

The disparity between CSIS’s budget and staff numbers and the Center for Global Development’s call for a \$1 billion fund begs the question: are we thinking “big” enough? People fear that Congress may be wary of “nation-building”, in reaction to the very large Iraq and Afghanistan supplementals. S/CRS was made small out of the belief that it was all that Congress would tolerate. However, State’s incremental moves, a few million dollars and 10s of staff at a time may miss the opportunity to push for a larger transformation to organize and fund these operations.

### *A new way to plan:*

Not surprisingly, as the lessons of Iraqi reconstruction roll in, proposals focus on how civilian agencies can create a robust way to plan for emergencies - while finding an integrating mechanism with military planning. While most civilian agencies will say that they regularly “plan” for contingencies as part of the daily work of diplomacy and development, the word “plan” for civilians and military means two different things. The military planning process starts with an objective, is handed over to the many layers of the military planning machine adding in resources, strategy, intelligence, training, and gaming. Given the objective, the military will come up with a plan to achieve it.

The civilian planning process up until now has been much more *ad hoc* and more conceptual in nature.<sup>16</sup> The planning process tends to concentrate more on developing the objective- what it should be- and less on the exact details of how to get there. As a result, post-Iraq reform proposals attempt to meld the two approaches- informing the military planning process with the subtleties of reconstruction challenges, and operationalizing civilian planning.

The Defense Science Board envisions Contingency Planning and Integration Task forces as full-time, sustained activities in Washington that would direct a coordinated “robust” planning process, led by regional and functional experts, and managed through the NSC.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> This mixture of incentives originally gave Goldwater-Nichols its success in promoting “jointness” within the military.

<sup>15</sup> USIP proposes that Rule of Law activities alone need an increase in reserve personnel of 50 judges, 30 legal officers, 4 protection personnel per judge, 50 prosecutors, 50 defense attorneys and 50 corrections officers for a total of almost 500. They call for a constabulary force of 2000, by Kosovo numbers.

<sup>16</sup> Groups like FEMA and DART are possible exceptions to this as their rapid response planning is more operational.

<sup>17</sup> Report of the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities

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This then requires a doctrine to address political, economic, social and security issues. While doctrine forms the basis for military planning, an equivalent does not exist for the civilian effort. CSIS and the Council on Foreign Relations focus on the need for a joint doctrine (Civ-Mil) to guide reconstruction efforts in the future.

### *Training and Human resource development:*

Many of the proposals have noted the need for training at multiple levels. The Defense Science Board (DSB) calls for a national center for contingency support to “augment the skills and expertise of government task forces, provide a broad range of in-depth capability, support the planning process, and provide the necessary continuity.” Sandia National Laboratories Advanced Concepts Group and the Peacekeeping Institute at Carlisle have been researching the idea of a National Stabilization and Reconstruction Center (NSRC) for capacity building, which would respond to the DSB.<sup>18</sup> CSIS goes further with a National Training Center for Post-Conflict Reconstruction which would serve as a training vehicle for US personnel, develop training assistance programs for use on the ground (training local entrepreneurs, civil servants, civilian overseers of the military, etc.), and allow for enrollment of students from post-conflict countries to learn in the US.<sup>19</sup>

Binnendijk and Johnson argue for a cultural shift to emphasize stabilization and reconstruction activities as a goal for training activities within the military. The peacekeeping institute at Carlisle has been supportive of this effort. The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) could energize a similar focus at the State Department. Until recent efforts however, civilian training has been hampered by the lack of one agency responsible for incorporating lessons into training and gaming programs and ensuring the lessons are actually learned. This is where the military excels. As shown below, S/CRS has begun these changes, but a much larger focus on training is necessary before the lessons identified in recent S&R missions can be integrated into practice.

### *Civil-Military coordination:*

As Barnett notes, earlier military reform concentrated on reducing conflict between the services; current reform must do the same for civilian agencies. As he notes, transformation is not a line item- it is a series of relationships.<sup>20</sup> Several of the proposals look at ways to heal the civilian-military and civilian-civilian divide through the creation of new relationships.

Joint Forces Command has proposed the institution of “full-spectrum” Joint Inter-agency Coordinating Groups (JIACGs) to integrate civilians into the military structure. These would be full-time permanent planning and advisory bodies to the Combatant

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<sup>18</sup> White paper on the need for a national stabilization and reconstruction center, Sandia National Laboratories

<sup>19</sup> Frederick Barton, Scott Feil, Michele Flournoy, Johanna Mendelsohn-Forman, Robert Orr, “Play to Win: the Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction”, CSIS/AUSA, January 2003

<sup>20</sup> Thomas Barnett, CSPAN briefing on the “Pentagon’s New Map”, Alexandria, VA, December 20, 2004, available at [www.cspan.org](http://www.cspan.org)



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Commander (COCOM). This would form the equivalent of the Commander's "country team" at the regional command level.<sup>21</sup> The JIACG would work with the Embassy country team on the ground, keeping the COCOM in touch with civilian activities. The Core team would include representatives from State, USAID, Commerce, Treasury and Justice. Energy and Agriculture might also join depending on the region. The Director would be a civilian planner. It allows for quick "add-ons" to gain needed expertise and bring in relevant agencies.<sup>22</sup> Though more civilian in makeup, JIACGs remains within a military planning framework.

CSIS recommends NSC-chaired interagency "summits" in each region on a quarterly basis. These summits would bring together the regional representatives from all key departments (and Combatant Commands) to work on a combined strategy. This strategy would then be processed through Interagency Crisis Action Teams, which could deploy as a coordinated interagency group on the ground. They would report to the NSC.

### **IV. CURRENT US GOVERNMENT REFORM ACTIVITIES**

Within the government, there have been serious reactions to these proposals and the problems faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congress has drafted several bills ranging from UN rapid deployment of police to amendments of the War Powers Act to require Post-Conflict planning. These efforts have not yet coalesced into a comprehensive reform package.

The Department of Defense and the Joint Forces Commands have begun to rethink and refocus S&R reform in an about-face from the earlier minimalist military approach. As such, the Department of Defense has made significant steps to include stabilization and reconstruction activities in their core mission, and begun stronger coordination with the civilian agencies. As Ryan Henry, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy said in his June 16<sup>th</sup> testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

"DOD is working diligently to make stability operations a core competency of our armed forces. However...the military can not accomplish these missions alone. Efforts must be made to build the capacity of our partners abroad and augment the ability of civilian components of the USG to respond rapidly and effectively. The ability to mobilize civilian resources quickly is as important as the ability to mobilize military resources in achieving US national security goals."

The March 2005 National Defense Strategy designates civil-military cooperation and a new concentration on stability operations as important for "denying enemies sanctuary, improving proficiency against irregular challenges, and increasing capabilities of

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<sup>21</sup> As described in Neyla Arnas, Charles Barry, and Robert Oakley, "Catalogue of Models for Interagency Cooperation in Stability and Reconstruction Operations", NDU Forthcoming

<sup>22</sup> Importantly, JFCOM sees this proposal as complementary to S/CRS' activities- when S/CRS activates its planners, JIACG would facilitate their integration into the COCOM's activities.

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international and domestic partners”.<sup>23</sup> A draft DOD Directive on Stability Operations (still awaiting clearance) identified stability operations as a “core mission” of the US military. These operations are defined as “military and civilian activities conducted in peacetime and across the full range of conflict to establish order in states and regions”.<sup>24</sup> For this purpose, DOD has established a Defense Reconstruction Support Office within the Pentagon, which could act as a partner for S/CRS. The office’s functions include representing DOD “in interagency fora on pertinent operational matters.”<sup>25</sup>

The January 2005 Joint Operating Concept (JOC) discusses the possibility of stability operations during all phases of major combat operations: pre-crisis, during combat, and postwar. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) has included stability tasks in ongoing and future military engagements.<sup>26</sup> Unit readiness is to be judged not only on combat readiness, but also on language capability, cultural awareness and ability to interact and assist local forces.<sup>27</sup> Their training regime for US forces in Iraq includes multinational exercises with US and international civilian partners.

On the operational level, JIACGs now exist in some form in all the COCOMs. Three DOD funded positions were made available for representatives from Treasury, State, and Justice at each COCOM, however each has different reporting structures and focus.<sup>28</sup>

The Provincial Reconstruction teams in Afghanistan are the largest current civ-mil cooperative arrangements. They are now being expanded and handed over to NATO oversight. Under this model civilians are assigned to PRT teams and work on a wide range of governance, rule of law and social issues in their districts. However, as of June 2005, only 13 of 19 staffing positions from State were filled and there is limited interest. Without incentives and a new civilian reserve corps, the success of these cooperation arrangements is compromised.<sup>29</sup>

On the civilian side, the challenge of failing states has led to a reordering of USAID priorities through its “fragile states initiative,” an improved early warning process at AID, Treasury and the National Intelligence Council, and introducing the G-8 spawned Global

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<sup>23</sup> The National Defense Strategy, March 2005, Section IIIA, available at:

[http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/nds-usa\\_mar2005.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/nds-usa_mar2005.htm)

<sup>24</sup> Department of Defense Directive No. 3000.ccE (Draft), as quoted in Crocker et al, May 2005. The DOD policy created cites that stability ops are to “be given priority and attention comparable to combat operations, and to be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities.”

<sup>25</sup> Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Establishment of the Defense Reconstruction Support Office.”

<sup>26</sup> As quoted in Crocker, Ewers and Cohen, “Rethinking and Rebuilding the Relationship between War and Policy: Post-Conflict Reconstruction, CSIS (Forthcoming) from a briefing by Col Christopher C. Conlin, USMC, Multinational/Interagency Experimentation, Joint Futures Lab (J-9), US Joint Forces Command, Presentation given at PKSOI Stability Operations Conference, Carlisle, PA, December 13, 2004

<sup>27</sup> Crocker et al.

<sup>28</sup> Neyla Arnas et al. JIACGs have focused on counter terrorism and counter narcotics but there is overall interest in going “full-spectrum” as discussed above.

<sup>29</sup> General Karl Eikenberry has noted that there are a wide range of skills requested by Afghans that are not currently met by the PRTs including city planners, and civil engineers. These skill sets would have to be targeted through a potential civilian reserve.

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Peace Operations Initiative to increase capacity for peacekeeping in Africa.<sup>30</sup> State is developing the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Vicenza, Italy. It is now operating and training its first recruits- the goal is to train 3000 commissioned and non-commissioned officers within the next 5 years.<sup>31</sup>

### **1. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)- One year on**

The most ambitious civilian effort is the Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization established in August 2004. The mission of the S/CRS office is: “to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize US Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.”<sup>32</sup>

#### ***The Plan:***

Much of the last year has been spent planning and organizing this mission. The functions assigned to S/CRS are as follows:<sup>33</sup>

- **Monitor and Plan:** Identify states and regions of greatest risk and importance through “early warning”, launching an intensive interagency planning process. This is operationalized through the deployment of “Humanitarian, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Teams” (HSRTs) to Regional Combatant Commands to participate in post-conflict planning;
- **Prepare Skills and Resources:** Establish and manage an interagency capability to deploy personnel and resources in an immediate surge response through an Active Response Corps to deploy as first responders in Advance Civilian Teams, and a Standing and Technical Corps for immediate deployment, backed by quick-start flexible funding through a proposed Conflict Response Fund;
- **Mobilize and Deploy:** Coordinate the deployment of U.S. resources and implementation of programs in cooperation with international and local partners, to be expedited through Interagency Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Groups (CRSGs) in Washington and within regional bureaus;
- **Leverage International Resources:** Work with international organizations, international financial institutions, individual states and NGOs to harmonize approaches, coordinate planning, accelerate deployment of assets, and increase the interoperability of personnel and equipment in multilateral operations;
- **Learn from Experience:** Incorporate best practices and lessons learned into functional changes in training, planning, exercises, and operational capabilities

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<sup>30</sup> GPOI is the one action that has clear funding from Congress with \$80 million appropriated in fiscal year 2005 and a commitment of \$660 million over 5 years. See Nina M. Serafino, The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 16, 2005.

<sup>31</sup> COEPSU Project Document, Carabinieri General Headquarters

<sup>32</sup> Information available at [www.crs.state.gov](http://www.crs.state.gov).

<sup>33</sup> As drawn from Ambassador Pascual’s testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 2005 as well as from <http://www.crs.state.gov>.

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that support improved performance including planning, essential tasks frameworks and preparatory gaming exercises.

### ***The Status:***

As of July 2005, there were significant developments in all these areas. Eight positions and \$536,000 were reprogrammed in FY04 with Congressional support. With \$7.7 million in the enacted FY05 Supplemental S/CRS was able to jumpstart their first coordination efforts on Sudan activities.<sup>34</sup>

By the end of August 2005, it had 54 staff members including seconded personnel from USAID, OSD, the Joint Staff, Joint Forces Command, the Corps of Engineers, Justice, Treasury and the Intelligence Community with the promise of additional support from these agencies.

*Crisis monitoring and prioritization:* The speed and effectiveness of response hinges on early warning and decision-making about US involvement. As a result, the creation of the S/CRS prompted a revised way to identify countries that are headed into crisis. Under this system, the National Intelligence Council provides a watch list of countries of concern (currently every 6 months). Through consultations with State regional bureaus, and relevant agencies, S/CRS is tasked to work on specific countries. S/CRS works with coordination on Sudan as well as monitoring and planning for several other countries.

*Planning:* S/CRS is working with JFCOM and other interagency partners to develop a common planning framework for S&R operations similar to that provided by military doctrine. The planning framework is also meant to be compatible with multilateral planning procedures.

*Coordination:* A standing Policy Coordinating Committee on S&R has been established with interagency working groups on transitional security; rule of law; democracy and governance; infrastructure; economic and social well-being; humanitarian issues; management; and monitoring and resources.

*Training and Gaming:* S/CRS has also initiated a new interagency training and gaming program with the Foreign Service Institute and other partners. The goal is to develop a core group of officials as the basis of the Standby Corps.

*Non-governmental and international coordination:* In perhaps their most effective foray at coordination, S/CRS is establishing strong partnerships with NGOs, think tanks, the private sector, academics, and operational experts to tap their country and technical expertise, learn from their experiences, identify gaps in coordination, and strive to make S/CRS' operational models as interoperable as possible on the ground.<sup>35</sup> They have built ties to UN agencies, the UN Secretariat, and bilateral partner organizations with similar missions.

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<sup>34</sup> Ambassador Carlos Pascual, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 2005

<sup>35</sup> Anderton, Melanie, *S/CRS UPDATES*, July 1, 2005, available at [www.crs.state.gov](http://www.crs.state.gov)

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*Coordinating Knowledge transfer and lessons learned:* S/CRS identifies lessons and shares knowledge about reconstruction issues. USG officials coming out of reconstruction missions are placed at S/CRS to debrief their experiences and share their knowledge. S/CRS released their version of the Post-conflict reconstruction essential tasks matrix, built off of the "Joint CSIS/AUSA Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Task Framework" of 2003 through an interagency collaboration to identify the full spectrum of tasks that might need to be performed to support countries in transition from conflict or civil strife. The first thematic guide was completed on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), documenting lessons learned and providing a "how-to" for practitioners in the field.

### ***The Challenge:***

Despite enthusiastic support, growing ties with the UN and bilateral partners, and the Lugar-Biden efforts, S/CRS continues to struggle to gain necessary funding. The FY 2006 Budget proposed a \$100 million Conflict Response Fund and \$24.1 million for the Active Response Corps and related costs. It also included 100 new posts within multiple agencies for stand-by capability.

The House countered with a fraction of the request. As of July 2005, the Senate markup gave \$74 million for the Conflict Response Fund to assist in stabilizing and reconstructing countries suffering from conflict or civil strife with the \$24 million requested to administer these funds. The budget has to go to conference and it is not expected to be fully decided until late fall 2005. The request supports 54 positions which, with detailees from other agencies, would bring the total to 80 people- a very small group to take on this mission.

Progress on human resource development and the standby corps are contingent on the budget request for the starting corps of 100 people. This doesn't include the 250-person "Active duty corps" reserve from the Lugar-Biden bill. In Army terms, that is less than a small battalion of well-trained people who must act as "a modest but vigorous force-multiplier that would greatly improve our nation's stabilization capacity."<sup>36</sup>

### ***Cooperation with the Department of Defense:***

Despite the expectation of suspicion, there has been significant initial operational support from DOD.<sup>37</sup> As Assistant Under Secretary Henry testified in June, DOD has 6 liaisons on a regular basis at S/CRS; they have held a series of conferences, seminars, trainings and exercises with S/CRS; they are funding a feasibility study on the development of a Civilian Response force; and have worked to support S/CRS planning efforts and the development of operational concepts for coordination.

More interestingly, DOD has pushed the Section 1204 legislative proposal to allow DOD to help State fill the "civilian deployment gap" until S/CRS is able to do so. This proposal requests the authority to transfer up to \$200 million in goods, services and funding to

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<sup>36</sup> Statement by Senator Lugar at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 2005

<sup>37</sup> It is important to note that some of the most enthusiastic support for S/CRS' activities and the project of getting civilians involved from the start of S&R planning has come from the uniformed military.

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S/CRS through FY06. The goal is that DOD assistance would provide bridging support until S/CRS is built up enough to deploy.

Yet this strong show of military-civilian cooperation has not been included in either the House or Senate FY06 Defense Authorization bills. Henry bemoaned this in June explaining that DOD does not have enough flexibility to support civilian partners.<sup>38</sup> According to Henry, the time and funding restrictions as well as the lack of deployable civilians have limited the ability of the USG to conduct S&R missions abroad. Thus, full funding of S/CRS and State in FY06 is critical to develop the Active Response Corps, as they fund the feasibility study for the establishment of a Civilian Response Corps.

### ***Support from the Administration:***

The transition from Secretary Powell to Secretary Rice has not reduced the level of support for S/CRS. At her confirmation hearing, Condoleezza Rice stated that, “creating a strong US Government stabilization and reconstruction capacity is an Administration national security priority.”<sup>39</sup> She said the US must have the capacity to manage 2-3 S&R operations concurrently and the necessary staff to “manage and deliver quality programs.” The President has also mentioned S/CRS in his statements, specifically applauding an Active Response Corps as “first responders” to crisis situations.<sup>40</sup>

There remain serious questions about the level of support S/CRS will be able to attain and if their State home is the strongest base from which to move the interagency process. In the first year their first tests are in Sudan and Haiti. It will be interesting to see how much leeway they are given before Congress and the Administration start demanding results beyond their capabilities (due to current staffing and budget constraints).

## **2. The Quadrennial Defense Review Process**

The second major project is the Quadrennial Defense Review Process. This is the first wartime QDR, the first with consistently growing Defense budgets, and the first in the post-9/11 environment.<sup>41</sup>

### ***The Status:***

As Under Secretary Henry testified, this QDR will attempt to align strategy with capability, shifting from a “threats-based” force to a “capabilities-based” force that is more flexible to the range of situations that the military will have to face. The QDR will

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<sup>38</sup> As an example Henry cited the restrictions of the Economy Act which states that DOD can only use items from existing stocks to support activities that it has that authority to do itself. Draw-down is slow and prohibits the transfer of funds or the ability to contract – both vital for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Testimony by Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Ryan Henry to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 2005. As he stated, DOD support to S/CRS seeks to integrate civilian and military efforts across the spectrum of peace and conflict through cooperative training, planning and operations. The current limiting factor for joint exercises is S/CRS’ confined time and funding.

<sup>39</sup> Opening statement by Senator Lugar at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 2005

<sup>40</sup> The President’s remarks at IRI as cited in Crocker et. al.

<sup>41</sup> Jack Spencer and Kathy Gudgel, The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review: The View from the Pentagon, summary of remarks by Under Secretary Ryan Henry, discussion at Heritage Foundation, March 2005

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define the new needs of the military. It is this reassessment of the strategic environment that has the most impact on Reconstruction and Development thinking.

The matrix of the new strategic environment, as defined by the March 2005 National Defense Strategy, contains these threat components:

<b>Irregular Threats:</b> These are challenges arising from the adoption or employment of unconventional methods by non-state and state actors to counter stronger state opponents. Examples include terrorism, insurgency, civil war, etc.	<b>Traditional Threats:</b> These are challenges posed largely by states employing legacy and advanced military capabilities and recognizable military forces, in long-established, well-known forms of military competition and conflict.
<b>Catastrophic Threats:</b> These are challenges involving the surreptitious acquisition, possession, and possible terrorist or rogue-state employment of WMD or methods of producing WMD-like effects.	<b>Disruptive Threats:</b> These are future challenges from competitors developing, possessing, and employing breakthrough technological capabilities intended to supplant our advantages in particular domains of operation. <sup>42</sup>

This presents a problem for the Department of Defense especially as facing irregular and disruptive threats require the skills of Barnett's "Sys-Admin" force focused on reconstruction and development and less on traditional military operations. In the four "core problems," identified by the Secretary of Defense as those that the US must be able to address: Partnerships with failing states to defeat international terrorist threats, Defense of the homeland, including offensive strikes against terrorist groups, Influencing the strategic choices of major countries, Preventing proliferation of WMD; S&R operations are likely to take a new prominence.

It is not clear how useful the QDR itself will be in altering the infrastructure of Reconstruction and Development, but early signs show a large about-face from the 2000 process in favor of working S&R into the core mission, and applying manpower and research to the issue. It is unlikely however, that the larger proposals such as Thomas Barnett's will be approved.

### **V. GAPS IN CURRENT PROPOSALS AND REFORM**

The following section focuses on key gaps within current activity and proposals in the key areas of Human Resources, Definitions and Legislation, and Organization.

#### **Human Resources Gaps**

The majority of proposals understandably start with the resources we already have for reconstruction and development and try to reorganize them to fit these new needs. The assumption is that USAID and State, given the right resources and training, will have no problem slipping into the roles of managers of reconstruction. There are several potential gaps in this assumption:

- 1- Diplomats are not trained to be reconstruction professionals;

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<sup>42</sup> Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, March 2005

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- 2- Becoming a reconstruction manager may require working for a different national interest;
- 3- The international system as a whole has not mastered capacity building; and
- 4- Foreign Service officers do not necessarily want to be reconstruction professionals.

Foreign Service officers today are no longer the sole embodiment of the US in a foreign capital. While they have networking, advocacy and team-building skills, reconstruction is often significantly different than traditional diplomacy. Reconstruction managers need to be process thinkers, able to facilitate the interaction of all sectors, and work with all actors. These managers need a range of skills from diplomacy to development that are not currently covered under any one sector of the US Government.

Unlike the typical Foreign Service portfolio, many processes of reconstruction may diverge from traditional US national interest (without a broad redefinition of this term). Reconstruction managers must be committed to creating and supporting the interest of the society being reconstructed. This may mean downplaying US involvement, removing logos, and taking responsibility for tough unpopular choices that can bolster local government. This is where the mindset of the Foreign Service may be a drawback. .

Likewise, capacity-building is not a skill that is currently taught to the Foreign Service. Effective capacity building remains the most elusive goal of the development game. Extensively more energy, research, and attention must be turned to effective capacity building, going far beyond training of trainers and other short-term training efforts. This is hampered by six month rotations and job descriptions created in Washington which may not fully address local needs.

Foreign Service personnel (at both State and USAID) do not volunteer in sufficient numbers to do reconstruction, illustrating the need for a clear change in the incentive structure. Six State slots in PRTs are empty in Afghanistan, which is the best model of cooperative reconstruction activities currently in place. State struggled to fill 13 slots, pulling several officers out of retirement.<sup>43</sup> Most of these positions are filled by contractors. Without the incentive structure to work in interagency reconstruction, the assumption that State will be ready to fill the gap could be flawed. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 grappled with this and the problem was only finally breached when promotions were contingent on “joint” experience. The same system of incentive change and support for joint training and re- education are necessary to change this basic equation.

This problem can be solved by developing a core of specific S&R personnel. To create this core it is essential to form a training center; create a specific S&R curriculum that is significantly re-oriented from the foreign service curriculum; propose new incentives for training, deployment and special skill development for S&R operations, as well as interagency deployments; and develop a broader list of skills and experiences for S&R staff recruitment, pulling in people with a range of field and multilateral experience.

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<sup>43</sup> Conversation with Robert Perito, Afghanistan Experience Project, USIP



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### **Definition, Authorities and Legislation Gaps**

*“National Interest”*: While there is some acknowledgement that S&R operations may require a redefinition of the “national interest” (i.e. in good elections vs. a winning candidate “good” for US interests), there has not been significant guidance or examination of what this might mean and how personnel can be trained and prepared for it. Such a change may require supporting indigenous businesses, buying from local farmers, or funding security forces trained by neighbors instead of US contractors. This requires a conceptual change that has not yet been fully laid out as well as a re-examination of the Foreign Assistance Act which now regulates foreign aid and food for peace programs.

*Command and Control*: There remains a problem in command and control. In most crises, the Ambassador is the head of the country team and the military attaches work for him/her. The Ambassador is the supreme authority, but the military and civilians have their reporting lines back to their own departments. However, in the conduct of military operations, the Ambassador is not part of the military chain of command headed by the President. This has caused difficulties when civilian and military heads on the ground disagree. There is no agreement on how to coordinate civilian activities (and political development) during military operations and how to coordinate military operations during the political, economic, and development phase in the S&R environment. This grows more complicated as portions of the country are transferred to civilian control during military operations.

The President is the arbiter between the civilians and military. The Secretary of Defense and the President are the national command authority for US military forces. The role of the civilian ambassador does not clearly fit into this line according to title 10 of the US code. As a result, without changes to legislation, the President has to empower the civilian leadership in activities necessary to the operation. However, it is not clear when the civilian head gets this authority – it would be necessary to rewrite the country team concept to indicate these lines and phases of authority. This may also be done through Presidential directive.

### **Organizational Gaps**

*Conflict Prevention*: Despite the addition of conflict prevention to the mandate of S/CRS and increasing lip service to the need to prevent “slippage” through insurgency/spoiler action, the mechanisms for preventing conflict before, during and after a crisis occurs are not in place. The CFR report suggests that peacekeeping and reconstruction should be seen as conflict prevention done late. The more successful the diplomatic and development efforts to prevent and mitigate conflict, the less likely the United States will be called to embark on these difficult and costly post-conflict missions.<sup>44</sup>

This would mean shifting the entire way we think about S&R operations, the ways we claim “victory” and the rate and methods by which we promote “stabilization”. As recent cases show- Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, and Liberia- even in post-conflict situations, the chances of new conflicts are high. Without increased attention and resourcing to target

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<sup>44</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *In the Wake of War*, 2005

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the triggers of conflict and its essential root causes, we may be destined to repeat missions for years.

A new dialogue on conflict prevention is required and conflict prevention awareness and skills development should be included in all new training programs, in tandem with increased support to the conflict prevention aspects of the S/CRS mandate.

*Non-traditional solutions to regional and centralized problems:* We need to focus on regions, not countries individually.<sup>45</sup> The State Department's country focus, the lack of overlap between Defense regional designations (CENTCOM, EUCOM) and State's regional designations (Africa Bureau, Eurasia bureau), and the mismatching of countries into regional sectors (Turkey in EUCOM, Iraq in CENTCOM), hurts regional planning. There have been suggestions for regional ambassadorial summits, creating regional field offices, or the harmonizing of State and Defense regional designations, however this requires larger examination.

Further gaps result from focusing planning and resources on centralized capitals. Lessons learned in Bosnia, Iraq and Kosovo showed that a plan for just Sarajevo, Pristina and Baghdad were inadequate. Planning must be far more comprehensive both in Washington and on the ground. On the military side, the planning team deployment with the Combatant commands is not fully effective without deployment at Division and Brigade level. The civilian plan has not made adequate provision for the Tuzlas, Najafs and Mitrovicas. The organizational tendency is to concentrate on the capital both in terms of resources and attention. As was learned in Bosnia- the battalion commander in Brcko faced a small, local military problem, but with national political implications. Few of the proposals adequately design these multi-layers in the civilian infrastructure.<sup>46</sup> Non-traditional ideas on decentralized planning and regional solutions need to be highlighted and encouraged.

*Focusing on International Cooperation:* S/CRS has also been concentrating on building cooperation links with bilateral partners who are developing their own civilian capabilities in stabilization and reconstruction missions: namely the UK and the European Union. They have also kept in close contact with the BCPR at UNDP and the Departments of Peacekeeping and Political Affairs at the UN as they undergo similar reforms. It is important to note however, that this is based on the drive and commitment of the team at S/CRS, not an institutionalized cooperation. Most of the proposals treat international coordination and cooperation as important, but something to be done once we "get our own house in order". This ignores possibilities to build new mechanisms of coordination and reinforces "stove-piping". For example, State-based initiatives must go through the International Organizations bureau to pursue relationships with international partners.

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<sup>45</sup> On the Democracy promotion side, the Senate ADVANCE Democracy Act of 2005 proposes Regional Democracy hubs in several embassies to bring a regional focus to democracy programming.

<sup>46</sup> This kind of planning requires a different kind of operative- as well as a very different outlook and training. Second and third-tier planning needs the local knowledge and outlook of personnel who now mainly gain their experience in NGOs and local government.

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More work is needed to identify new avenues for communication and cooperation that are needed for S&R purposes as well as trans-governmental networks that can expedite them.

*The “Iraq” problem:* The impetus to develop improved “nation-building” capacity was driven by the problems in Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, the planned civilian response has been conceptualized as a complement to large-scale military involvement. This is the basis for the recommendations for more robust civilian-military units in the Combatant Commands. It is also the premise for coordinated training and gaming with civilians and the military, as well as a number of other developments. The drawback is that there is a great possibility of smaller crises, where the US military does not have a strong role, which will demand full involvement of civilian response capability. Civilian teams will be committed to international peacekeeping missions that operate without significant US Military presence (such as in Sudan), or to humanitarian operations like the Tsunami relief effort.

The military is often criticized for preparing to fight the last war, and the civilian effort appears to be doing something similar. As the list grows for the coordinated civilian response in Sudan, Haiti, and other crises where the US Military does not play the lead role, it may be necessary to further bolster the civilian training, supply, and staffing requirements- particularly in the case of public security and other roles the civilian effort is not yet ready to undertake.

### **VI. CONCLUSIONS: THE WAY FORWARD**

Given the current status of reform, the competing demands on Congress, the funding climate, and the extensive proposals for institutional change, it is difficult to plot a clear course forward. The energy and initiative taken within the USG through S/CRS and the changes at DOD should be fully supported. S/CRS, as the agency for civilian reconstruction efforts within the State Department and the larger interagency process, should be fully funded and raised in profile. Opportunities to cooperate between DOD and State on S&R planning, gaming, and training should also be promoted and supported financially, including accepting the DOD offer involved in Legislative Proposal 1204, joint training, and institutionalized secondments.

Tackling the complex issues of Civilian Reserve Corps, mustering Stability Police forces, funding Security Sector Reform, and confronting the civilian weaknesses in command and control require legislative change and Congressional support. All the proposals have dealt in some way with the current legislation gap- either through the inadequacy of the Foreign Assistance Act for current Rule of Law requirements, or the need for a National Security Planning Directive. Many of the proposals however, have presented only band aids. We remain focused on the symptoms and not the cause. The reorganization efforts of Beyond Goldwater Nichols and other projects fix important command and control problems among others, but they cannot build the nation that has been broken.

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In the four years since September 11<sup>th</sup>, we have tackled intelligence and homeland security, but the Washington community has not engaged in changing the interagency mix. The National Security Act which governs the organization of the institutions and the process by which the government of the US goes about providing security needs to be re-evaluated. It has been 58 years since the last time those institutions were examined *en toto*. The NSA of 1947 was a reflection on the experiences of 1940-1945. It was written to prevent or meet the needs of a third world war.

The demands of stabilization, reconstruction and development missions have pushed the limits of the National Security process within the Executive branch, and tested funding and oversight relationships with Congress. These strains have illustrated the need for reform in the way we plan, execute, fund, oversee and define these missions and respond to issues of national security. This reform should include a review of the National Security Act of 1947, clarification of the tasks and institutions of stabilization and reconstruction as a vital component of our overall strategy, and options for improving funding and oversight mechanisms.

The threats we face today are increasingly non-military. Treasury, Justice and State now have as big a role in the security of the US as Defense. However, funding and manpower allocations have not caught up with this reality. Legislative changes need to include organizational changes in committee structure and oversight. The goal must be to harmonize appropriations for international operations so that civilian activities are appropriately funded to balance the demands on the military.

Drawing from the well-reasoned arguments of the proposals examined here, it is now government's turn to act as we continue to be confronted with the evidence of needed change in our response to Iraq and Afghanistan. We cannot wait to reorganize- there isn't time.