| 010702 |
Shock and Awe: The Performance Dimension of
Galen’s Anatomy Demonstrations |
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Maud W. Gleason, Stanford University |
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Abstract: Galen’s anatomical
demonstrations on living animals constitute a justly
famous chapter in the history of scientific method.
This essay, however, examines them as a social
phenomenon. Galen’s demonstrations were
competitive. Their visual, cognitive and emotional
impact (often expressed by compounds of
ѳαῦμα and
ἔκπληξις)
reduced onlookers to gaping amazement. This impact
enhanced the logical force of Galen’s arguments,
compelling competitors to acknowlege his intellectual
and technical preeminence. Thus, on the interpersonal
level, Galen’s demonstrations functioned
coercively. On the philosophical level, Galen was using
a rhetoric traditional to Greek science, a way of
arguing that involved a unitary view of nature and an
emphasis on homology between animals and man. But he
was also using a rhetoric of power and status
differentiation articulated via the body. As played out
in the flesh, public vivisection resonated with other
cultural practices of the Roman empire: wonder-working
competitions, judicial trials, and ampitheater
entertainment. |
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| 120602 |
Aristotle's Metaphysics M3: realism and the
philosophy of QUA |
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Reviel Netz, Stanford University |
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Abstract - The article provides a new
translation and interpretation of Aristotle’s
Metaphysics M3, arguing that Aristotle uses
there the QUA as a perspective of intellectual
action: an operator on actions rather than a filter
on objects. Instead of Aristotle’s mathematics
being a science of “Objects QUA
mathematical”, we should consider it as a science
whose manner of action is “QUA
mathematical”. A discussion follows as to
Aristotle’s view that his QUA account salvages a
realist reading of mathematics without invoking special
mathematical objects. This view depends on the
deceptively compelling assumption that a statement
which is true QUA X is also true simpliciter. If
this assumption is false – as I believe the
experience of modern science suggests – then
Aristotle was wrong and we must indeed either deny the
reality of mathematics, or invoke special mathematical
objects. |
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