| 091201 |
Relevant Expertise Aggregation: An Aristotelian
middle way for epistemic democracy |
|
Josiah Ober, Stanford University |
 |
Abstract - Decision-making in a democracy
must respect democratic values, while advancing
citizens’ interests. Decisions made in an epistemic
democracy must also take into account relevant
knowledge about the world. Neither aggregation of
independent guesses nor deliberation, the standard
approaches to epistemic democracy, offers a
satisfactory theory of decision-making that is at once
time-sensitive and capable of setting agendas
endogenously. Analysis of passages by Aristotle and
legislative process in ancient Athens points to a
“middle way” that transcends those limitations.
Relevant Expertise Aggregation (REA) offers an
epistemic approach to decision-making in democratic
organizations with minimally competent voters who share
certain interests and knowledge. REA allows better
choices among options to be made by basing choices on
expertise in multiple relevant domains, through a
time-sensitive process conjoining deliberation with
voting. REA differs from a standard Condorcet jury in
aggregating votes by relevant domains, based on
reputations and arguments of domain-experts. |
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This paper replaces version 121101 posted in
December 2011, version 071102 posted in July 2011, and
version 090901 posted in September 2009. |
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| 071201 |
Democracy's Dignity |
|
Josiah Ober, Stanford University |
 |
Abstract - Dignity, as equal high standing
characterized by non-humiliation and non-
infantilization, is democracy’s third core value. Along
with liberty and equality, it is a necessary condition
for collective self-governance. Dignity enables robust
exercise of liberty and equality while resisting both
neglectful libertarianism and paternalistic
egalitarianism. The civic dignity required for
democracy is specified through a taxonomy of
incompletely and fully moralized forms of dignity.
Distinctive features of different regimes of dignity
are modeled by simple games and illustrated by
historical case studies. Unlike traditional meritocracy
and universal human dignity, a civic dignity regime is
theoretically stable in a population of self-interested
social agents. It is real-world stable because citizens
are predictably well motivated to defend those
threatened with indignity and because they have
resources for effective collective action against
dignitary threats. Meritocracy and civic dignity are
not inherently liberal, but may persist within a
liberal democracy committed to universal human
dignity. |
|
This paper replaces version 011201 originaly posted
in January 2012, and 071101 originally posted in July
2011. |
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| 011201 |
Democracy's Dignity |
|
Josiah Ober, Stanford University |
|
This paper has been revised. See 071201 entry. |
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| 121101 |
Weighted Expertise Aggregation: An Aristotelian
middle way for epistemic democracy |
|
Josiah Ober, Stanford University |
| > |
Abstract - Decision-making in an epistemic
democracy takes into account not only citizens’
interests but also their knowledge about the world. The
dominant epistemic approaches to democratic
decision-making focus on aggregation of independent
guesses and on deliberation, but neither offers a
satisfactory means of decision-making that is at once
time-sensitive and capable of setting agendas
endogenously. Analysis of two passages by Aristotle
points to a hybrid “middle way” that transcends these
limitations. Weighted Expertise Aggregation (WEA)
conjoins diverse forms of expertise in multiple domains
through a time-sensitive process of deliberation and
voting. WEA differs from a Condorcet jury in
aggregating the marginal probability of correct
judgments on domain- experts, rather than on the
substance of complex issues. Although it requires
procedurally competent voters who share common
knowledge, WEA offers a realistic approach to
decision-making in democratic organizations. |
|
This paper replaced version 071102 originally
posted in July 2011. It was revised in September 2012;
please see 091201 entry. |
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| 081103 |
The Function of Criticism ca. 432 BC: Texts and
interpretations in Plato’s 'Protagoras' |
|
Andrew Ford, Princeton University |
 |
Abstract: Plato’s Protagoras is a
unique text in the history of criticism, the only
extended example of practical poetic criticism that we
have from classical Greece. This long passage
(338E-347C) shows a group of fifth-century intellectual
luminaries debating the meaning of a dense lyric poem
by Simonides: the text is quoted at length and its
language examined closely and methodically and wildly.
My paper first attempts to pinpoint how this passage —
often written off as a parody or a joke or
misunderstood as a simplistic polemic against
“sophistry” — fits into the work. I argue that Plato is
more serious here than is usually supposed, and that
the passage gives his best account of uses and limits
of literary criticism. In a coda, I consider an
analysis of the passage by Glenn Most, which suggests
some reflections on recent developments in academic
literary criticism. |
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This paper replaces 120501 originally posted in
December 2005. |
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| 071102 |
Weighted Expertise Aggregation: An Aristotelian
middle way for epistemic democracy |
|
Josiah Ober, Stanford University |
|
This paper has been revised. See 121101 entry. |
|
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| 071101 |
Four Kinds of Dignity and Democracy |
|
Josiah Ober, Stanford University |
|
This paper has been revised. See 011201 entry. |
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| 051002 |
CHAPTER 1 of The City-State Commensurate: Plato
and Pythagorean Political Philosophy: “Aristotle’s
Description of Mathematical Pythagoreanism in the 4th
Century BCE” |
|
Philip Sidney Horky, Stanford University |
 |
Abstract: Scholars of the history of ancient
philosophy have been hesitant to attribute particular
characteristics to those Pythagoreans called
“mathematical” by Aristotle. Aristotle himself,to be
sure, not only felt it important to distinguish this
type of Pythagorean from the more traditional
“acousmatic” type, but he also invested in this
distinction the basic tenets of his own philosophical
methodology regarding the pursuit of knowledge from
first principles. In this chapter, I describe the
philosophical system (pragmateia) of the
mathematical Pythagoreans by analyzing and comparing
the accounts of Pythagoreanism in both the surviving
treatises of Aristotle (especially Metaphysics)
and the fragmentary works on the Pythagoreans preserved
in Iamblichus’ On the General Mathematical
Science and On the Pythagorean Way of Life.
This is the newest version of the first chapter of a
book-length study in which I describe the philosophical
and political history of the mathematical Pythagoreans
and their influence on Plato’s later thought. |
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| 021001 |
The instrumental value of others and
institutional change: An Athenian case study |
|
Josiah Ober, Stanford University |
 |
Abstract - A primary motive for certain
Athenian rule changes in the direction of increased
legal access and impartiality in the fourth century
B.C. was Athenian awareness of the increased
instrumental value of foreigners. New Athenian rules
were aimed at persuading foreigners to do business in
Athens. Foreigners gained greater access to some
Athenian institutions, and fairness, in the sense of
impartiality, was more evident in some forms of legal
decision-making. These new rules appear to have worked;
Athens became more prosperous by the later fourth
century, at least in part because foreigners liked the
new rules and so did more business there. Because
increased access and impartiality were not prompted by
a changed Athenian approach to the ends/means
distinction, a Kantian deontologist would deny that the
new rules made Athens a better place. A
consequentialist might disagree. Written for a
Leiden/Penn collection of essays on “Valuing Others,”
in progress, edited by R. Rosen and I. Sluiter. |
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| 090909 |
Antonomasia, Anonymity, and Atoms: Naming
Effects in Lucretius’ "De rerum natura" |
|
Wilson H. Shearin, Stanford University |
 |
Abstract - This essay argues that selected
proper names within Lucretius’ De rerum natura,
rather than pointing deictically or referring with
clear historical specificity, instead render Lucretius’
poem vaguer and more anonymous. To make this case, the
essay first briefly surveys Roman naming practices,
ultimately focusing upon a specific kind of naming,
deictic naming. Deictic naming points (or attempts to
point) to a given entity and often conjures up a sense
of the reality of that entity. The essay then studies
the role of deictic naming within Epicureanism and the
relationship of such naming to instances of naming
within De rerum natura. Through analysis of the
nominal disappearance of Memmius, the near nominal
absence of Epicurus, and the deployment of Venus
(and other names) within the conclusion to Lucretius’
fourth book, the essay demonstrates how selected
personal names in De rerum natura, in contrast
to the ideal of deictic naming, become more general,
more anonymous, whether by the substitution of other
terms (Memmius, Epicurus), by referential wandering
(Venus), or by still other means. The conclusion
briefly studies the political significance of this
phenomenon, suggesting that there is a certain popular
quality to the tendency towards nominal indefiniteness
traced in the essay. |
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| 090908 |
Haunting Nepos: "Atticus" and the Performance of
Roman Epicurean Death |
|
Wilson H. Shearin, Stanford University |
 |
Abstract - This paper, written for
Hedonic Reading, a collection on Epicurean
reception I am co-editing with Brooke Holmes of
Princeton, reads the famous death of T. Pomponius
Atticus (as recounted in Cornelius Nepos) against a
backdrop of other Stoic and Epicurean deaths. It
develops the figure of “haunting” as a way of speaking
about the absent presence of Epicureanism in
Atticus, which strikingly never mentions that
philosophy by name – despite the fact that Atticus
himself was one of the most well- known Epicureans of
the Late Roman Republic. Its reading of Atticus’ death
suggests that the biography’s greatest Epicurean traces
may be found – rather than in the letter of the text –
in the ways in which the details of Atticus’ death fail
to conform to the Stoicizing interpretation Nepos’
himself offers. That is, the work is anti-teleological
(and thus Epicurean) in its resistance to the clear,
teleological (Stoic) reading offered within the
biography itself. The paper is thus interested in
developing “Epicurean” notions of reading, which – if
not entirely adumbrated in antiquity – are potentially
present in moments such as Lucretius’ comparison of
letters and atoms, where the composition of the world
and the composition of the text are juxtaposed. |
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|
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| 090901 |
An Aristotelian middle way between deliberation
and independent guess aggregation |
|
Josiah Ober, Stanford University |
|
This paper has been revised. See 071102 entry. |
|
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| 120602 |
Aristotle's Metaphysics M3: realism and the
philosophy of QUA |
|
Reviel Netz, Stanford University |
 |
Abstract - The article provides a new
translation and interpretation of Aristotle’s
Metaphysics M3, arguing that Aristotle uses
there the QUA as a perspective of intellectual
action: an operator on actions rather than a filter
on objects. Instead of Aristotle’s mathematics being a
science of “Objects QUA mathematical”, we should
consider it as a science whose manner of action is “QUA
mathematical”. A discussion follows as to Aristotle’s
view that his QUA account salvages a realist reading of
mathematics without invoking special mathematical
objects. This view depends on the deceptively
compelling assumption that a statement which is true
QUA X is also true simpliciter. If this
assumption is false – as I believe the experience of
modern science suggests – then Aristotle was wrong and
we must indeed either deny the reality of mathematics,
or invoke special mathematical objects. |
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| 110601 |
Die Katharsis im sokratischen Platonismus
(Katharsis in Socratic Platonism) |
|
Christian Wildberg, Princeton University |
 |
Abstract - In this paper, written in German,
I am exploring the concept of purification
(katharsis) in early Platonic dialogues. The
evidence suggests that this variant of
katharsis, which possesses a marked cognitive
dimension, might well have Socratic roots. More
importantly, however, its serves as a useful backdrop
for an understanding of Aristotle's enigmatic
conception of dramatic katharsis as broached in
the Poetics. Modern discussions of the latter
have so far largely ignored the Socratic-Platonic
precursor, with which Aristotle was undoubtedly
familiar. |
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| 090607 |
Simplicius und das Zitat Zur Überlieferung des
Anführungszeichens |
|
Christian Wildberg, Princeton University |
 |
Abstract - This paper was published in a
somewhat inaccessible Festschrift for Dieter
Harlfinger. Taking the lead from an obscure passage in
Simplicius, which can only be understood if the
quotation marks in the medieval manuscripts are taken
into account, the paper surveys the usage of quotation
marks in the medieval in extant papyri and some
manuscripts. The evidence suggests that quotation marks
and other signs of interpunctuation were widely used in
late antiquity, and that it is a mistake of editors of
texts written in late antiquity to ignore such marks if
and when they appear in the manuscript tradition. The
paper observes in passing that the famous "Sentence of
Anaximander" is not marked as a direct quotation is the
extant Simplicius-manuscripts. |
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| 090604 |
From “Socratic logoi” to “dialogues”: Dialogue
in Fourth-century Genre Theory |
|
Andrew Ford, Princeton University |
 |
Abstract: This paper argues that we can only
have a just appreciation of the rise and early
development of philosophic dialogue in Greece by
bracketing the immense influence that the Platonic
version of the form has exerted and turning instead to
tracing how “Socratic logoi” came to be recognized as a
new prose genre in fourth-century Athens. A
consideration of the early terms used to name the form
suggests that dialogue should not be derived from
fifth-century mime or drama but should be understood in
the context of the burgeoning rhetorical literature of
the period; in particular, dialogue will be shown to be
one of many innovative kinds of fictional speech-texts
that were proclaiming new and special powers for
written prose. |
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| 070604 |
Natural Capacities and Democracy as a
Good-in-Itself |
|
Josiah Ober, Stanford University |
 |
Abstract - A paper on moral and political
philosophy, arguing on Aristotelian grounds, that
democracy is not only an instrumental good, but a
good-in-itself for humans, because the exercise of
constitutive natural capacities is and end, necessary
for true happiness (understood as eudaimonia), and
democracy (understood as association in decision) is a
constitutive natural human capacity of humans.
Forthcoming, winter 2006 in Philosophical
Studies. |
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| 070602 |
Socrates and democratic Athens: The story of the
trial in its historical and legal contexts. |
|
Josiah Ober, Stanford University |
 |
Abstract - Socrates was both a loyal citizen
(by his own lights) and a critic of the democratic
community’s way of doing things. This led to a crisis
in 339 B.C. In order to understand Socrates’ and the
Athenian community’s actions (as reported by Plato and
Xenophon) it is necessary to understand the historical
and legal contexts, the democratic state’s commitment
to the notion that citizens are resonsible for the
effects of their actions, and Socrates’ reasons for
preferring to live in Athens rather than in states that
might (by his lights) have had substantively better
legal systems. Written for the Cambridge Companion
to Socrates. |
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| 050601 |
Saving the Appearances: The Phenomenology of
Epiphany in Atomist Theology |
|
Jacob L. Mackey, Princeton University |
 |
Abstract: In this paper I propose an
approach to Epicurean theology that avoids the
stalemate of "realist" and "idealist" interpretations.
I argue that Epicurean theology is more
phenomenological than metaphysical, its purpose less to
ground and justify dogmatic commitment to whatever form
of existence the gods may enjoy than to account for a
prevalent aspect of ancient religious experience,
epiphany, and to assimilate that experience to
Epicurean philosophical therapeia. In the process I
reconstruct and reassess the equally epiphanic theology
of Democritus that forms a source for Epicurus'
theological thought. His theology has also been
unprofitably construed by modern scholars as a
reductive dismissal of the gods as mere psychological
effects or manifest fictions. Instead, Democritus was
at least as accommodating of the phenomena of religious
experience as Epicurus: his own theology is likewise
founded on epiphany and he too attempts a therapeutic
analysis of its attendant effects. |
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| 120501 |
The Function of Criticism ca. 432 BC: Texts and
interpretations in Plato’s 'Protagoras' |
|
Andrew Ford, Princeton University |
|
This paper has been revised. See 081103 entry. |
|
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