| 090909 |
Antonomasia, Anonymity, and Atoms: Naming
Effects in Lucretius’ "De rerum natura" |
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Wilson H. Shearin, Stanford University |
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Abstract - This essay argues that selected
proper names within Lucretius’ De rerum
natura, rather than pointing deictically or
referring with clear historical specificity, instead
render Lucretius’ poem vaguer and more anonymous.
To make this case, the essay first briefly surveys
Roman naming practices, ultimately focusing upon a
specific kind of naming, deictic naming. Deictic naming
points (or attempts to point) to a given entity and
often conjures up a sense of the reality of that
entity. The essay then studies the role of deictic
naming within Epicureanism and the relationship of such
naming to instances of naming within De rerum
natura. Through analysis of the nominal
disappearance of Memmius, the near nominal absence of
Epicurus, and the deployment of Venus (and other
names) within the conclusion to Lucretius’ fourth
book, the essay demonstrates how selected personal
names in De rerum natura, in contrast to the
ideal of deictic naming, become more general, more
anonymous, whether by the substitution of other terms
(Memmius, Epicurus), by referential wandering (Venus),
or by still other means. The conclusion briefly studies
the political significance of this phenomenon,
suggesting that there is a certain popular quality to
the tendency towards nominal indefiniteness traced in
the essay. |
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| 090908 |
Haunting Nepos: "Atticus" and the Performance of
Roman Epicurean Death |
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Wilson H. Shearin, Stanford University |
 |
Abstract - This paper, written for
Hedonic Reading, a collection on Epicurean
reception I am co-editing with Brooke Holmes of
Princeton, reads the famous death of T. Pomponius
Atticus (as recounted in Cornelius Nepos) against a
backdrop of other Stoic and Epicurean deaths. It
develops the figure of “haunting” as a way
of speaking about the absent presence of Epicureanism
in Atticus, which strikingly never mentions that
philosophy by name – despite the fact that
Atticus himself was one of the most well- known
Epicureans of the Late Roman Republic. Its reading of
Atticus’ death suggests that the
biography’s greatest Epicurean traces may be
found – rather than in the letter of the text
– in the ways in which the details of
Atticus’ death fail to conform to the Stoicizing
interpretation Nepos’ himself offers. That is,
the work is anti-teleological (and thus Epicurean) in
its resistance to the clear, teleological (Stoic)
reading offered within the biography itself. The paper
is thus interested in developing
“Epicurean” notions of reading, which
– if not entirely adumbrated in antiquity –
are potentially present in moments such as
Lucretius’ comparison of letters and atoms, where
the composition of the world and the composition of the
text are juxtaposed. |
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| 090901 |
An Aristotelian middle way between deliberation
and independent-guess aggregation |
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Josiah Ober, Stanford University |
 |
Abstract - A well-known passage of
Aristotle’s Politics (3.1281a42-b10)
concerning the “wisdom of the crowd” offers
an attractive and plausible alternative to deliberation
and independent guess aggregation, the two
currently-prominent approaches to judgment and decision
in an epistemic democracy. The Politics passage is
clarified by reference to Aristotle’s discussion
of the six parts of tragedy (Poetics
1450a6-14). |
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| 120602 |
Aristotle's Metaphysics M3: realism and the
philosophy of QUA |
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Reviel Netz, Stanford University |
 |
Abstract - The article provides a new
translation and interpretation of Aristotle’s
Metaphysics M3, arguing that Aristotle uses
there the QUA as a perspective of intellectual
action: an operator on actions rather than a filter
on objects. Instead of Aristotle’s mathematics
being a science of “Objects QUA
mathematical”, we should consider it as a science
whose manner of action is “QUA
mathematical”. A discussion follows as to
Aristotle’s view that his QUA account salvages a
realist reading of mathematics without invoking special
mathematical objects. This view depends on the
deceptively compelling assumption that a statement
which is true QUA X is also true simpliciter. If
this assumption is false – as I believe the
experience of modern science suggests – then
Aristotle was wrong and we must indeed either deny the
reality of mathematics, or invoke special mathematical
objects. |
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| 110601 |
Die Katharsis im sokratischen Platonismus
(Katharsis in Socratic Platonism) |
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Christian Wildberg, Princeton University |
 |
Abstract - In this paper, written in German,
I am exploring the concept of purification
(katharsis) in early Platonic dialogues. The
evidence suggests that this variant of
katharsis, which possesses a marked cognitive
dimension, might well have Socratic roots. More
importantly, however, its serves as a useful backdrop
for an understanding of Aristotle's enigmatic
conception of dramatic katharsis as broached in
the Poetics. Modern discussions of the latter
have so far largely ignored the Socratic-Platonic
precursor, with which Aristotle was undoubtedly
familiar. |
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| 090607 |
Simplicius und das Zitat Zur Überlieferung des
Anführungszeichens |
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Christian Wildberg, Princeton University |
 |
Abstract - This paper was published in a
somewhat inaccessible Festschrift for Dieter
Harlfinger. Taking the lead from an obscure passage in
Simplicius, which can only be understood if the
quotation marks in the medieval manuscripts are taken
into account, the paper surveys the usage of quotation
marks in the medieval in extant papyri and some
manuscripts. The evidence suggests that quotation marks
and other signs of interpunctuation were widely used in
late antiquity, and that it is a mistake of editors of
texts written in late antiquity to ignore such marks if
and when they appear in the manuscript tradition. The
paper observes in passing that the famous "Sentence of
Anaximander" is not marked as a direct quotation is the
extant Simplicius-manuscripts. |
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| 090604 |
From “Socratic logoi” to
“dialogues”: Dialogue in Fourth-century
Genre Theory |
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Andrew Ford, Princeton University |
 |
Abstract: This paper argues that we can only
have a just appreciation of the rise and early
development of philosophic dialogue in Greece by
bracketing the immense influence that the Platonic
version of the form has exerted and turning instead to
tracing how “Socratic logoi” came to be
recognized as a new prose genre in fourth-century
Athens. A consideration of the early terms used to name
the form suggests that dialogue should not be derived
from fifth-century mime or drama but should be
understood in the context of the burgeoning rhetorical
literature of the period; in particular, dialogue will
be shown to be one of many innovative kinds of
fictional speech-texts that were proclaiming new and
special powers for written prose. |
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| 070604 |
Natural Capacities and Democracy as a
Good-in-Itself |
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Josiah Ober, Stanford University |
 |
Abstract - A paper on moral and political
philosophy, arguing on Aristotelian grounds, that
democracy is not only an instrumental good, but a
good-in-itself for humans, because the exercise of
constitutive natural capacities is and end, necessary
for true happiness (understood as eudaimonia), and
democracy (understood as association in decision) is a
constitutive natural human capacity of humans.
Forthcoming, winter 2006 in Philosophical
Studies. |
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| 070602 |
Socrates and democratic Athens: The story of the
trial in its historical and legal contexts. |
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Josiah Ober, Stanford University |
 |
Abstract - Socrates was both a loyal citizen
(by his own lights) and a critic of the democratic
community’s way of doing things. This led to a
crisis in 339 B.C. In order to understand
Socrates’ and the Athenian community’s
actions (as reported by Plato and Xenophon) it is
necessary to understand the historical and legal
contexts, the democratic state’s commitment to
the notion that citizens are resonsible for the effects
of their actions, and Socrates’ reasons for
preferring to live in Athens rather than in states that
might (by his lights) have had substantively better
legal systems. Written for the Cambridge Companion
to Socrates. |
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| 050601 |
Saving the Appearances: The Phenomenology of
Epiphany in Atomist Theology |
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Jacob L. Mackey, Princeton University |
 |
Abstract: In this paper I propose an
approach to Epicurean theology that avoids the
stalemate of "realist" and "idealist" interpretations.
I argue that Epicurean theology is more
phenomenological than metaphysical, its purpose less to
ground and justify dogmatic commitment to whatever form
of existence the gods may enjoy than to account for a
prevalent aspect of ancient religious experience,
epiphany, and to assimilate that experience to
Epicurean philosophical therapeia. In the process I
reconstruct and reassess the equally epiphanic theology
of Democritus that forms a source for Epicurus'
theological thought. His theology has also been
unprofitably construed by modern scholars as a
reductive dismissal of the gods as mere psychological
effects or manifest fictions. Instead, Democritus was
at least as accommodating of the phenomena of religious
experience as Epicurus: his own theology is likewise
founded on epiphany and he too attempts a therapeutic
analysis of its attendant effects. |
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| 120501 |
The Function of Criticism ca. 432 BC: Texts and
interpretations in Plato’s 'Protagoras' |
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Andrew Ford, Princeton University |
 |
Abstract: Plato’s Protagoras is
a unique text in the history of criticism, the only
extended example of practical poetic criticism that we
have from classical Greece. This long passage
(338E-347C) shows a group of fifth-century intellectual
luminaries debating the meaning of a dense lyric poem
by Simonides: the text is quoted at length and its
language examined closely and methodically and wildly.
My paper first attempts to pinpoint how this passage
— often written off as a parody or a joke or
misunderstood as a simplistic polemic against
“sophistry” — fits into the work. I
argue that Plato is more serious here than is usually
supposed, and that the passage gives his best account
of uses and limits of literary criticism. In a coda, I
consider an analysis of the passage by Glenn Most,
which suggests some reflections on recent developments
in academic literary criticism. |
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