Against Ornament: O.M. Freidenberg’s Concept of Metaphor in Ancient and Modern Contexts

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Abstract: Application of the neglected developmental theories of Olga M. Freidenberg (regarding “metaphorization”) to the poetry of Pindar. Originally delivered at a conference on Historical Poetics (Chicago, May 2011), it will appear in a revised version in the proceedings of that event.

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Alice cannot be in the poem, she says, because
She’s only a metaphor for childhood
And a poem is a metaphor already
So we’d only have a metaphor

Inside a metaphor. Do you see?
They all nod. They see. Except for the girl
With her head in the rabbit hole.

From “And as in Alice,” by Mary Jo Bang

This essay on historical poetics will comprise two parts: historical and poetic. To put it another way, I will attempt to offer a theoretical examination and then a practical explication, the former dealing with the concept of metaphor as developed and employed by the sadly neglected Soviet-era philologist and theoretician Olga Mikhailovna Freidenberg, the latter centered on the poetry of Pindar. The goal is to see how Freidenberg’s work might still be of relevance and usefulness, not just in relation to more recent theories of metaphor, but also as a heuristic device in the study of archaic Greek poetry, one of the areas on which her voluminous work centered.

Realizing that “historical poetics” names a specific phase in the history of poetics, I will not undertake a more general survey of the concept of metaphor, other

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2 I am grateful to the organizers of the Historical Poetics conference for the opportunity to revive a personal interest from years past in the work of O.M. Freidenberg. As I most likely will never revisit my youthful plan of translating her book Poetika sjuzheta i zhanra: period antichnoj literatury, this would be the right moment to thank all those who once long ago generously took the time to advise me regarding her life and work: Kevin Moss, Elliott Mossman, Ann Shukman, Ann Pasternak Slater, and Efim Etkind. More recently, I have benefited from conversation with Freidenberg experts Nina Perlina and Nina Braginskaia.
than as a backgrounding technique to highlight some of Freidenberg’s more interesting claims. At the same time, it bears saying that the study of metaphor in Classical poetry could benefit from further alignment with general theories of metaphor. The fairly recent collection by Boys-Stones goes part of the way toward meeting this desideratum, but is constrained by its focus on the philosophical rather than the literary and philological, and also by what I would call an “etic” reliance on concepts developed by critics rather than an investigation into “emic” systems that might be discovered in early Greek culture. By bringing to the discussion some recent ethnographic work, I hope to open up our hermeneutic procedures in a way that Freidenberg herself might have found appealing, though mine is perhaps a somewhat messier attempt than her own tidy schemata would countenance.

That metaphors should not count—that they just get in the way of rational discourse—is a sentiment that for a long time hobbled the study of this trope. Although in *Image and Concept*, and in general, Freidenberg does not single out earlier writers with whom to disagree, it is clear that much of the force of her chapter on metaphor derives from an enthusiastic and liberating reaction against the dismissive or reduced treatments of metaphor that had resulted from the ossification of rhetoric, on the one hand, and on the other, from positivist thought. (More immediate influences on her direction will be mentioned a bit further on.) Among the “enemies of poetry” in this regard we might include the nascent scientism of Hobbes, who famously asserted in *Leviathan* (1651) “the Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; Reason is the pace; Encrease of Science, the way; and the benefit of man-kind, the end. And, on the contrary, metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words are like *ignes fatui*; and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt.” (I.5)

Of course, it does not take much reflection for anyone to deconstruct this obstreperous call for “pure” analytical language, and one gets the feeling that Hobbes himself is slyly showing off rhetorical

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3 Boys-Stones (2003), the outgrowth of a 1997 conference at Corpus Christi College Oxford; to be read in conjunction with the insightful review by Lamberton (2004).

4 See Patten (2009) 7-35 for a good overview of the “scandal of catachresis” represented by rhetoric and its major figures, as seen from the side of philosophy.

5 Edition of Waller 1904.
skill at the employment of metaphor even as he decries it: definitions are to be “snuffed and purged” like candle-wicks or gutters; the progress of reason is likened to walking on a path to a goal; and the “senslesse” words are (in simile, near kin of metaphor) a kind of swamp fire.  

Later in the same century, John Locke in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) acknowledges that some genres of discourse can use metaphor—just not the serious ones. “Since wit and fancy find easier entertainment in the world than dry truth and real knowledge, figurative speeches and allusion in language will hardly be admitted as an imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, in discourses where we seek rather pleasure and delight than information and improvement, such ornaments as are borrowed from them can scarce pass for faults. But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness; all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheats: and therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them” (3.x.34). I underline the terms that undergird his latent structural opposition: on the one side we have: truth, judgment, reality, improvement through instruction, “things as they are”; on the other: fancy, passions, deceptive entertainment that brings pleasure. “Art” and the “artificial” are dangerously close; the figurative is the invented, what is “applied”—almost physically, like a needlework appliqué—in short, “ornaments”. The basic suspicion about imagination (fancy, invention) as we know, persists stubbornly into the modern world, so that the

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6 Brito Vieira (2009) 54-58, within a comprehensive study of Hobbesian thought on metaphor, distinguishes his appreciation for rhetorical use of striking metaphors from his quest for a philosophically purified language.

7 Walker (1994) 131-56 analyzes Locke’s apparently contradictory views and practices, in the course of his full-scale critique of Paul de Man’s classic 1978 essay on Lockean metaphor.
emblematic musician conjured by Wallace Stevens still faces a similar interrogation about values (and would today):

They said, ‘You have a blue guitar,
You do not play things as they are.’

The man replied, ‘Things as they are
Are changed upon the blue guitar.’

The rift between reason and the imagination was not so wide in pre-modern thought. Yet the 17th-century critics may have thought they found support in a strain of ancient thinking concerning tropes, especially metaphor. The Spaniard Quintilian, training would-be rhetoricians at Rome in the 1st century AD, says “The name of trope is applied to the transference of expressions from their natural and principal signification to another, with a view to the embellishment of style (ornandae orationis gratia) or, as the majority of grammarians define it, the transference of words and phrases from the place which is strictly theirs to another to which they do not properly belong” (Quintilian Inst. Orat. 9.1.4). As in Locke, notions of “borrowing” and “ornament” rub shoulders. But it is important to be more precise about the differences between these. The “borrowing” in ancient terms is not from another type of discourse (imagination-based vs. scientific) but, within the range of natural language, from one area of application, conceived of as “natural,” to another in quo propria non est. “Propriety” of speech (another controverted literary-critical term) turns out to be important in judging the stylistic suitability of a given figurative expression (something already evident in Aristotle), but that is not the same thing as seriousness

8 “The Man with the Blue Guitar.” Steiner (1986) 15, as I now find, cites this to a rather different effect in her useful overview of ancient metaphor. On Stevens’s views about metaphor and his poetic use of images of ornament, jewels, and artifice, see Bowie 2008. His practice, I would argue, is relevant to similar uses in Greek lyric.

9 Trans. Butler (1922) 351. Ramus had already in the mid-16th century made a vigorous and clarifying attack on Quintilian’s definition [see Ramus (1549) 131-42] of which Hobbes was doubtless aware: on the counter-reformation against Ramism in the development of Hobbesian rhetoric and metaphor, see Zappen (1983).
of purpose, or as any Lockean distinction between (easy, entertaining) dulce and (improving) utile. For Quintilian as for Horace the two should commingle.\(^\text{10}\)

Cicero, too, thinks in terms of adornment and borrowing, in his extended and simile-rich account of metaphor at *De oratore* 3.155-56.\(^\text{11}\)

"The third mode, that of using words in a metaphorical sense [*transferendi verbi*], is widely prevalent, a mode of which necessity was the parent, compelled by the sterility [*inopia*] and narrowness of language; but afterwards delight and pleasure made it frequent; for as dress [*vestis*] was first adopted for the sake of keeping off the cold, but in process of time began to be made an ornament of the body and an emblem of dignity [*ad ornamentum etiam corporis et dignitatem*], so the metaphorical use of words was originally invented on account of their paucity, but became common from the delight which it afforded. For even the countrymen say, *gemmare vites*, that ‘the vines are budding;’ *luxuriem esse in herbis*, that ‘there is a luxuriancy in the grass;’ and *laetas segetes*’ that ‘there is a bountiful crop;’ for when that which can


In the context of contrasting art and science, Bukharin corrects Potebnja as being insufficiently “dialectical” about the interplay of the two terms, which Potebnja (likely a source for Freidenberg) aligns with *image* and *concept*, respectively. It is furthermore interesting that Bukharin refers to the Marrist concept of cultural “palaeontology” in the course of his observations, while not citing Marr explicitly: “Examine a word, and you discover the palaeontology of language. Words are the depository of the whole previous life of mankind, which has passed through various social-economic structures...”. More work is needed on the relation of Bukharin to both Formalists and Marrists in the 1930s.

\(^{11}\) At *Brutus* 262, a cognate simile is applied to Caesar's commentaries: “stripped of all ornamental clothing of style” (*ornatu orationis tamquam veste detracta*)”, in contrast to Caesar’s oral style, described at 261 as making good use of *oratoria ornamenta dicendi*. On the passage see Innes (2003) 7.
scarcely be signified by its proper word [verbo proprio] is expressed by one used in a metaphorical sense, the similitude taken from that which we indicate by a foreign term [alieno verbo] gives clearness to that which we wish to be understood. These metaphors, therefore, are a species of borrowing [quasi mutuationes sunt], as you take from something else that which you have not of your own. Those have a greater degree of boldness which do not show poverty [inopiam], but bring some accession of splendor to our language. (translation by J. S. Watson)

Cicero’s account represents an evolutionary approach to the development of tropes, as they arise out of a process in natural language that comes into play when there just is not a “right” word for some concept, thus compelling or allowing a “foreign” word to fill the semantic gap. In spirit, his view comes very close to an historical poetics, on this point at least. The decorative value of metaphor is, in this version, an outgrowth but not a replacement for the originating solution. The growth of MacMansions does not abolish the need for housing, any more than molecular gastronomy does for food. Synchronically, one will find both sorts of metaphor co-existing in the linguistic landscape. (Later analysts will worry more about “dead” metaphors.)

A treatise most likely from the time of Cicero’s youth, the Rhetorica ad Herennium (circa 82 BC) lists metaphor as just one of ten exornationes verborum (4.31.42) to be explained and illustrated. It has no particular claim, however, to be any more apt for “ornamentation,” compared with other tropes. The Rhetorica in its brief treatment (4.34.45)--the first in any Latin handbook--lists a number of uses for metaphor, among which ornamentation is merely one, alongside the creation of vivid mental images (rei ante oculos ponendae causa e.g. “insurrection woke up Italy”) and obscenitatis vitandae causa--e.g. “whose mother delights in daily marriages”).

Although the author of the Rhetorica does not resort to a Ciceronian clothing metaphor to describe metaphor, the abiding concern with propriety, with which the brief treatment ends, fits with a notion of style as comportment, a matter of gesture

12 On the Rhetorica see Calboli 2007, who sees its doctrine of exornationes as arising from re-tooling of Peripatetic doctrine by scholars active in Rhodes (Athenaeus of Naucratis and Apollonius Molon).
and movement: They say that a metaphor ought to be restrained (*pudentem*), so as to be a transition with good reason (*ratione*) to a kindred thing, and not seem an indiscriminate, reckless, and precipitate (*temere et cupide*) leap to an unlike thing.”

This emphasis on restraint and proportion in one’s troping style is a good reminder, were one needed, that the extant ancient analyses of metaphor after Aristotle come almost exclusively from rhetorical treatises, and even from practicing orators, like Cicero. On the Greek side, there is a somewhat wider range of toleration for extremes in style—especially as poetry is included along with oratory—but critics like Longinus and Demetrius focus on the frequency, audacity, or appropriateness of metaphors. One should tone down the more dangerous ones by converting them to similes (Demetrius *On Style* 80), but if you need to act as if swept along by emotion, raise the floodgate: true sublimity and high emotion will counterbalance a rush of many metaphors (Longinus *On the Sublime*, 32.4). These emotions “sweep everything along in the forward surge of their current” (*tôi rhothiôi tês phoras pephuken…parasurein*). In other words, Longinus favors an occasional literalization of the “carrying” (*phora*) that lurks in *metaphora*. Thus writer or speaker, in his interpretation and style, enacts the trope.

This brings us to Aristotle, whose more complex thinking will turn out to offer us the best framework within which to place Freidenberg’s thoughts on metaphor. Like the later rhetoricians, Aristotle seems to have been hard pressed to describe metaphors without resort to metaphor. As Innes points out, “the word *metaphora*, found first in this meaning in Aristotle and his contemporaries, is itself a metaphor: it means ‘carrying across’ or transference (cf. Latin *transferre, translatio*), and vocabulary of movement, change/exchange, and place/domain is frequent, reflecting the basic idea that a term is transferred from its original context to another.”

Instead of stylistic clothing or ornamentation, the metaphor for Aristotle represents something deeper, dwelling in the bones of language rather than protecting its skin. His is a much subtler view of metaphor than that found in the rhetoricians, for whom it represents a species of “ornament.”

The kernel of later developments—the clothing and ornament metaphors—can be found if one knits portions of the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* together, but it is certainly not Aristotle’s primary view. Thus, in chapter 22 of the *Poetics* (1458a18-31), his

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concentration is mostly on appropriate level of style, and not unlike Longinus, although of course he favors the mean rather than the sublime extreme. If one composes only with “standard” terms (kuria onomata), which generally is the way to obtain the most clarity (saphestatê) the result, says Aristotle, is banal (tapeinê)—whereas excellence of diction (lexeós...aretê) lies in being clear without banality. The solution is to use “exotic” terms (xenikon—literally “foreign”), including metaphors. Not too much—that would produce either riddles (if one uses all metaphors) or barbarisms (if one uses only loan-words). The right mix is what should be aimed at (kekhrasthai). Comparing this with Rhetoric 3.2.2, we find Aristotle using, for the opposite of tapeinê, the participle kekosmêmenê “adorned”, describing the effect of figured language. At 3.2.10, he uses the verb kosmein “ornament” in his recommendation that those who employ metaphor use better species (from the same genus) to carry out what is essentially praise of the subject (the opposed procedure being “to depreciate” the subject: psegein). The adornment of praise is kept at arm’s length from an explicit clothing metaphor, however, as that comparison comes, just before the passage cited, at 3.2.9, nested within a comment on propriety. One must avoid to aprepes (the improper) through close attention to proportion in choosing metaphors that “fit” (harmottousas). “We must consider, as a red cloak suits a young man, what suits an old one: for the same garment is not suitable for both.”

Aristotle, then, uses when convenient a notion of ornamentation, but the clothing metaphor-for-metaphor, as we have seen, is anchored by deeper ideas of propriety—one can’t just wear anything. It should be emphasized that in the Poetics, metaphor is explicitly kept distinct from kosmos “ornament.” In chapter 21, Aristotle lists metaphor alongside “standard term, loan word (glôttai), ornament (kosmos), neologism, and various modifications to normal words (lengthening etc.: 1457b 1-4). He then goes on to discuss each in turn. Unfortunately, the discussion about kosmos seems to have slipped out of the Poetics at 1458b33, as was noted by Robortello as early as 1548, and the few later mentions of the term in the Poetics do not elucidate it. Schenkeveld has argued persuasively, on the basis of a similarly structured list in a late 3rd-century BC papyrus preserving parts of a Hellenistic handbook (tekhnê) on rhetoric or poetics, that kosmos designated the poetic epithet.14 I shall return later to

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14 On the problem and earlier suggested solutions regarding the lacuna, see Schenkeveld 1993a. The papyrus (Pap. Hamburg. 128) was published in 1954 by
the larger issue of the meanings of *kosmos*, but note for now that such a potential significance for the Aristotelian term already undercuts the notion that *kosmos* denoted mere adornment. Of course, the status of the “ornamental” epithet in poetry, especially Homeric epic, has itself for centuries been a point of debate among critics, only intensified by the findings of Parry and Lord regarding the usefulness of the formula for verse composition-in-performance.\(^{15}\) Put another way, it is conceivable that *kosmos* was far more than cosmetic.

In the view of Paul Ricoeur, it was Aristotle’s failure to lodge metaphor at the level of discourse (speech-acts and utterances) rather than of the single word (a semiotic rather than discourse-semantic level), and his insistence on starting from a notion of “proper” meanings for single words, that eventually triggered the degraded treatment of metaphor and made it simply decorative.\(^{16}\) Be that as it may, it is equally important to stress (with Ricoeur) the value of another aspect of Aristotle’s approach to metaphor, his treatment of it as a *cognitive* tool, an aid to instruction.\(^{17}\) “Easy learning is naturally pleasant to all, and words mean something, so that all words which make us learn something are most pleasant...It is metaphor that above all produces this effect; for when Homer calls old age stubble [*Od*.14.213], he teaches and informs us (*epoiêse mathêsin kai gnôsin*) through the genus” (1410b10-15= *Rhet*.3.10.2 trans. Freese). To this the *Poetics* again provides a useful supplement: “much the greatest asset is a capacity for metaphor. This alone cannot be acquired from another, and is a sign of natural gifts (*euphuia*): because to use metaphor well is to discern (*theôrein*) similarities” (1459a5-7, trans. Halliwell). Halliwell remarks that the latter passage shows “some awareness of the special potency of metaphor” not unlike that of the Romantic poets but “this attitude towards metaphor remains in the *Poetics* an intriguingly suggestive one” and metaphor is a sort of exception: the only thing ‘one can never learn from another’.\(^{18}\) The fuller value of this skill for discerning similarities can be found described in Aristotle’s *Topica* (1.18, 108b7-14): it is useful

\(^{15}\) Parry (1974) is a useful starting place; Foley (1988) a good summary.

\(^{16}\) Ricoeur (1977) 46.

\(^{17}\) Ricoeur (1977) 33-4.

\(^{18}\) Halliwell (1987) 162
for making definitions, for inductive arguments, and for hypothetical deductions— in short, not only for dialectic but for any sort of reasoning about the world.¹⁹

After Aristotle, with the exception of Vico in the mid-18th century, the recognition that metaphor has a cognitive value has not been given much if any attention.²⁰ Only in the later 20th century has the tide turned. While the rhetorical uses of metaphor continue to be investigated, and in a much more rigorous way thanks to text linguistics, another result of the post-1960s revolution in linguistic thought has been the growth of the related areas of psycholinguistics, cognitive science, and semantics. As Boys-Stones notes in the preface to his recently edited collection, “there is now general agreement at least that an account of metaphor which makes it merely an ornament to language, verbal wrapping-paper brought in only after the serious business of meaning has taken place, simply does not hold up to the realities of metaphorical usage. Metaphor (or whatever should stand in its place) belongs, we now believe, at the heart of thinking about language use in all its aspects—not sidelined as a form of ‘deviant’ usage of primary interest only to students of literature”.²¹ Linguists, philosophers, psychologists, even economists, have joined in efforts to recover the ways in which metaphors work, as a phenomenon tied to specific utterances, but furthermore how metaphors work to focus the mind on certain features of reality, and even to generate widely shared belief.²² The later might be seen as a product of “rhetoric” but one without rhetoricians; in other words, languages themselves, by embedding and naturalizing what analysts might recognize (from the outside) as metaphors, can produce an unconscious acceptance of certain processes as analogous, even though there is no rational basis for such beliefs. The headline-grabbing work in this area, of course, has been that of George Lakoff, who has dared to bring his findings into the public print in relation to presidential elections and progressive politics. In various single-authored and collaborative publications

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¹⁹ On this passage, see Kirby 1997, who usefully outlines a semiotic theory of metaphor in Aristotle.

²⁰ On the role of metaphor in the glottogenetic theorizing of Vico, see Danesi 1993.


²² See for a start the essays in Ortony (1993) and the survey in Taverniers (2002).
reaching back to 1980, Lakoff has sought to show that metaphors structure human experience through dense networks of basic analogies connecting widely diverse forms of social life with images derived from other, often more tactile, spheres. One of his elementary examples (conventionally put in capital letters), ARGUMENT is WAR, can be said to underlie such utterances about verbal debate as “he attacked my point,” or “her position is indefensible” or “that was right on target” or “he shot down what I had to say.” Once persuaded to look at the dynamics of ordinary language in this way, we can soon find very little that can not be taken, somehow, as metaphor--time is money; life is a journey; seeing is understanding; business (or marriage) is a zero-sum game--and so on. Attempts to group such root metaphors under higher headings lead to all-purpose super-metaphors (“containers”; “force”; “balance”). Such essential base metaphors strike one as abstractions that, it could be argued, have more to do with the structure of human spatial environments and with linguistic deixis.

There are other concerns. Raymond Gibbs of UC Santa Cruz, one of the founding figures of this sort of study, calls the field “real-world metaphor” analysis. But whose world? How language-specific or culture-driven are the models? Debate still rages (metaphor!) about the universality of Lakoff-inspired schemata. Cultural anthropologists have tried, if not to dislodge, at least to add nuance to the picture.

It is time, finally, to turn to Freidenberg’s ideas about metaphor as one can find them developed in several publications, especially *Image and Concept*. I will be attempting to fit her view into the framework of ancient ideas, knowing that Freidenberg was well aware of these in both Greek and Latin, while seeing how they might relate to the contemporary cognitive approach. The fit, as it will emerge, is far

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23 See Lakoff and Johnson 1980.
25 Gibbs 2010, where he offers a rapid up-to-date survey.
27 Regarding her expertise in ancient rhetoric and poetics, it is worth noting that one of her publications (Freidenberg 1936) was a co-edited anthology on precisely such topics.
from perfect, but the gaps are potentially productive; the still exciting aspects of Freidenberg’s work in this area are her attempt, first, to explore a diachronic dimension to the figure—even to discover a place and time “before” metaphor; and, second, her determination to bring together a cognitive with a rhetorical function, or rather, to see the rhetorical function of metaphor, in archaic Greek literature in particular, as continuing an earlier cognitive function. As I will suggest, her work in this regard is still unique and deserves comparison with yet other contemporary trends.

In one of her posthumous publications, “The Origin of the Greek Lyric,” (originally written in 1946?) Freidenberg has articulated the kernel of her more extended notion on metaphor. She will even use the same example--Homer’s “iron sky”--some years later in Image and Concept. But here she concentrates on lyric as the primary locus for metaphorical expression. In this she comes close to tacit agreement with Aristotle, who in the Poetics [1459a9-12] apportioned, as being most suitable for the respective genres, compound words to dithyramb, loan words (glôttai) to epic, and metaphors to iambic verse—whether that of iambos genre or of dramatic speeches is unclear. Unlike Aristotle, she peers beyond the existing structures of language, in which we can categorize the various strategies of metaphor use (proportional analogies, genus-to-species transfers, etc) and detect them in everyday rhetorical usage. Yet she does retain something of an Aristotelian interest in the genesis of genres. Lyric, she asserts, arises from the process of metaphorization “at a

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28 Freidenberg (1991a) from the version published in 1973 in Voprosy literatury (11) 101-23. For further explication of the ideas in this article, see Perlina (2002) 31-32 and 203-5.

29 Most critics take it to be iambic speech, since Aristotle elsewhere refers to this as the meter most like natural speech, and metaphors, as he too recognizes well before Lakoff, are also a part of everyday discourse. But one could make the case that he refers to a genre of iambos (not just part of the dramatic genre), which, in the hands of Archilochus and, even more clearly, Semonides (fr. 7--women as sows, vixens, dogs etc), specializes in making metaphorical, denigratory expressions. Cf. the party-game of eikasmos, the practice of which is alluded to in Aristophanes Wasps 1209-14.
stage when the image takes on the function of a concept for the first time.” This densely packed pronouncement is central to the entire structure of her notion and so requires more extended comment. Vital to the notion is the evolutionary sense—something we saw in Cicero’s idea that metaphor arise from “natural” use in language, where it has been invented to cover lexical gaps (and then takes on an aesthetic life of its own). But Freidenberg’s evolutionary scheme takes us, it seems, into deeper antiquity, to a stage when “metaphor” as such could not exist because there were, in effect, no gaps to be spanned.

Still beholden to a late 19th-century developmental view of Greek genres (in which epic precedes lyric), she upholds the “later” genre as more involved in the process of metaphorization, while relying on the “older” genre” for examples of “images.” Put another way, an “image”—her word for the basic (even pre-verbal) apperception of a natural phenomenon—does not allow or require metaphorical treatment, because the perceiver/speaker is not conscious that s/he is making a transfer (meta-phora) between one genus or species and another. To take her example: the “iron sky” mentioned in Homeric verse (Od.15.329), for example, when Eumaeus speaks to Odysseus when he contemplates going amongst the suitors “whose hubris reaches the iron sky” (τῶν ὑβρις τε βίη τε σιδήρεον οὐρανόν ἰκει). Freidenberg claims that this is not a metaphorical expression as Greeks of the Homeric age thought the sky was in fact made of iron. Now, we can dispute this point on several grounds. First, how do we know what they believed? To assume that because they have the expression it must have been a possible belief merely begs the question. Second, the archaeology tells against us: the Iron Age, as the Hesiodic paradigm of the Ages and the evidence from the ground concur, came late—so any belief in an “iron” sky must be similarly late, if the poet(s) of the Odyssey are using a term from their own environment, or else such a belief is a relic of a time when iron was only a magical element, not used in weaponry or agriculture. In her favor, commentators on Homer do make the suggestion that belief in an “iron sky” could have been prompted by the ancient observation of meteorites.31 And there is the

30 Freidenberg (1991a) 6. For a detailed account of Freidenberg’s “pre-Aristotelian” concept of metaphor, which relates it to her earlier work on Greek lyric and similes, see the important discussion in Perlina (2002) 226-34.

parallel idea of a “firmament” in the heavens, cited from *Genesis*; and Lucretius’ expression (6.954) *caeli lorica*, “shield of the heaven”--or is that a metaphor, too? Clearly, accepting the notion of “image” in Freidenberg’s terms means going along with the notion that once upon a time all predication indicated belief: the sky is iron. Obviously, tangled as we are in the web of language, we can only hypothesize such a golden age. It may make for a useful thought experiment; in a way, it is the obverse of the Lockean search for language without figuration, an age of belief rather than science, but at least one transparent in its beliefs, without the bawds and cheats of metaphor. Freidenberg might have done better to start from the related metaphor (or belief?) of a brazen sky, for in this case, one can connect the expression to a more specific image, in an archaic formula, the bronze-thresholded home of the gods (*khalkobates do*). But, such quibbles aside, the attempt by the philologist to bring to bear theories of primitive mind on an evolutionary stance on metaphor (going beyond *Urdummheit*) is invigorating and admirable. It merits the attention of those interested in historical poetics (and pre-historical) as opposed to synchronic and rhetorical analysis.

Wrapped up in Freidenberg’s approach, of course, is a parallel story, of equal interest, about the evolution of authorship. For such relics of primitive thought as are represented by the “images” embedded in Homeric formulae are assumed, in Freidenberg’s version, to be “cultural survivals” (*perezhivaniia*) of a collective belief. Metaphors, by contrast, arise with lyric which arises (in the conventional narrative) with the “individual voice.” This makes for some tricky argumentation, which Freidenberg does not have time for in her short article on lyric origins. If a poet like Sappho or Pindar were to use the expression “iron heart” for example (neither does, nor does any other lyric writer, to my knowledge), it presumably would represent a metaphor. Yet the expression is used in Homer (*Il.* 24.205; cf. *Od.* 4.293). So this means that epic has metaphors, as much perhaps as does lyric. Such an erosion of the standard developmental scheme (epic-lyric-drama) might be uncomfortable but can be contained, if one does further statistical study (as no one yet has) on metaphors per line in the two corpora (epic vs. lyric). What is more disturbing and harder to get around is the contingency of usage: since we are not dealing with native informants of

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32 On this image see the discussion at Edwards (1991) 104.
a pre-poetic, pre-metaphor age, but with texts (albeit of oral origin) our interpretations have to be based on the utterance use of metaphors within discourse. Thus, at II.24.205, when Hecuba chides her husband Priam for wishing to visit Achilles, killer of his sons, she exclaims: “you have an iron heart! (sidêreion nu toi êtôr)” If it had ever been an article of belief among archaic Greeks that the heart actually was iron, then certainly that time has passed by the era in which this Homeric line was composed. (Oddly, and without documentation, Freidenberg says explicitly in Image and Concept (p.47) that hearts were iron “in myth”.) Its entire force depends on the notion that hearts are not iron but (metaphorically, in the rush of impassioned rhetoric--Longinus would approve) can be said to be. This is an artistic “deviation” from the linguistic norm, an aesthetic and stylistic innovation for which the Formalists rather than the Marrists have the more plausible explanatory apparatus.

In her 1946 article on the “Origin of the Epic Simile,” Freidenberg further develops the basic idea expressed in nuce in the short piece on lyric.34 Her strategy is to read the Iliad in intertextual relation to the Theogony of Hesiod. Not only does this anticipate more modern ways of exploring the mythopoetic workings of both texts--I think especially of Leonard Muellner’s brilliant reading of Achilles’ mënís through backgrounding it with theogonic and cosmic themes in other hexameter poetry--but it also enable readers to compare actual textual evidence (in contrast to the rather untethered style of Freidenberg’s less mature analyses).35 Thus, II.2.780-85:

Oê δ’ ἄρ’ ὠσ’ σαὶ ὡς εἶ τε ποιὴ χρῶν πᾶσα πάνειμοτο-γάλα δ’ ὑπεστενάχζει Διό ὡς τερπικεράνενς
χωμένων ὅτε τ’ ἀμφὶ Τυφώεῖ ἀλαν ἰμάση
εἰ Ἀρίμοις, ὃθε φασὶ Τυφώεος ἔμμεναι εὐνύσ
ὡς ἄρα τῶν ὑπὸ ποσά μέγα στεναχεῖτο γαλα
ἐρχομένον· μᾶλα δ’ ὡκα διάπηρησαν πεδίων

So marched they then as though all the land were swept with fire; and the earth groaned beneath them, as beneath Zeus that hurleth the thunderbolt in his wrath, when he scourgeth the land about Typhoeus in the country of the Arimi, where men say is the couch of Typhoeus. Even so the earth groaned

34 Freidenberg (1991b).
35 Muellner 1996.
greatly beneath their tread as they went; and full swiftly did they speed across the plain. (trans A.T. Murray)

Her comparison of this great simile with *Theogony* 665-820, the account of an “actual” battle between Zeus, blazing with thunder and lightning, and his enemies the Titans, brings to a point the methodological and interpretive issues raised by metaphor (and, in a crystallized form, simile). “Actual” is of course the key, and brings us back to the essential pre-requisite of audience or cultural belief in mythological narrative. Freidenberg rightly sees that there *is* a connection between Iliadic poetic fantasy (in the way of simile) and Hesiodic description. Just as the phrase “iron sky” is not a metaphor for those who think the sky really *is* iron, so a simile comparing human battle to a divine cosmogonic precedent--in which the audience “believes”--is something both less and more than a simile, as conceived in modern poetic or rhetorical terms. Rather than providing decoration or adornment, the comparison makes a mythopoeic assertion: this is like that, *hic et nunc* equals *illud tempus*. (Freidenberg does not put it exactly this way, but I am extending her interpretation by paraphrase.) This is a useful provocation to further thinking about the texture and impact of the poetry, whether or not we want to imagine that the “mythic” image preceded the “poetic” (a point Freidenberg does not push here so much). Two other interesting investigations are sketched out by her at this point. First, her further remarks on “tautological similes” (pp.29ff.) brings up some curious examples in the *Iliad* where the tenor and vehicle are, to our eyes, identical, differing only in the matter of scale. The river that nearly overtakes Achilles at *Iliad* 21.257-64 is compared to an irrigation stream propelling stones ahead of it and nearly overtaking the gardener who cleaned it out. In other words, rushing water is compared to rushing water, one on the cosmic level, the other on the horticultural. A bit later in the scene, water in a boiling cauldron is the comparison chosen to represent boiling water in the river (*Il.*21.362-65). Freidenberg’s point seems to be that this represents a sort of simile degree-zero, and can be a key to an earlier kind of thinking in which what matters is not the semantic *transfer* among genera or species, but a deeper *identification* of two phenomena; if we see this as evidence of mythopoeic thinking, we can imagine archaic people having the perception that these are not *two* phenomena at all. This point--and once more we have to tease out the argument more than Freidenberg actually articulates it--relates finally to an extremely productive
obsession for her criticism in this era, the notion of the “double”. If more archaic images involve binarism, the acceptance of a sort of shadow behind every image, what is the equivalent on the level of motif and plot? Freidenberg’s answer, for Homeric epic, is the friend. Patroclus and Achilles, that is to say, instantiate at the level of the narrative the very mechanism that operates at the level of the trope. Or, if you like, the double is the master trope, not because the poets consciously think in such terms but because originally neither metaphor, nor simile, nor plot-doubles were “tropes” at all: they are categories of belief. Freidenberg’s range of reference here, typically, blossoms out to include the medieval literature and modern folk beliefs, the motif of the twin, the Doppelgänger, and so forth, building on her 1935 piece “Pre-Homeric Semantics,” in which she explored the complex relations of the motifs of twins, brothers, friends, comrades and royal ritual substitutes. All of which is exhilarating, at least as an heuristic roller-coaster ride.

The most extended discussion of metaphor by Freidenberg comes in the first full chapter of *Image and Concept*, the book which she worked on in the early 1950s until a year before her death. The placement is significant; it symbolizes the key place that metaphor has in the whole edifice of her theorizing about epic, lyric, and drama (the lattermost taking up most of the book). For Freidenberg “the structure of the metaphor acts as basic model for all Classical art” (*Image* 69). Her ideas about “binomial” construction are what have led some critics to see her as a forerunner of various modes of structuralist analysis. It is important, therefore, to map out carefully how the binomial character inherent in the metaphor works, in her view. Beyond this, we can look at some possible sources for her particular idea of “metaphorization” and then compare the notion with some contemporary analogues.

What strikes one first is how Freidenberg has clearly reacted against the mainstream “rhetorical” evaluation of metaphor, which I have been associating with ornament, while not ever overtly naming this traditional view as her intellectual nemesis. Objecting to the habit of Classicists to read ancient metaphor in exactly the same way as they interpret modern European poetry, she rejects the notion that it is merely a trope and juxtaposes this with a further rejection of what she calls the modern habit of dividing image from concept, assigning the former to poetry and the

36 Freidenberg (1991c).

latter to prose (Image 31). It is clear, in other words, that Freidenberg is dealing with the fallout of the “scientific” marginalization of poetry, and the Lockean call for purified, non-figurative language. Her own method will attempt to heal the rift; we should note especially the adornment metaphor in her formulation of this: “image and concept in Greek literature are not two pieces of clothing, inner and outer, but a single semantic whole that can be dissected only by science” (Image 35). The role of “science” is here ambivalent—moderns can only get inside ancient metaphor by its aid, but at the same time that means that the archaic “whole” is “dissected” (anatomiruietsia)—in what is not quite Wordsworthian murder but nevertheless a regrettable dissolution. The long tradition of talking about METAPHOR is DRESS, which we have seen going back to Cicero, is here given a new twist: the deeper pre-metaphoric components of expression are organically related like parts of a body (before we even get to clothe it), separable only by the scalpel.

How does “metaphorization” work, once we anatomize it? We can detect several strands in Freidenberg’s account, not all of them compatible; or, rather, strands that we might now see emerging, askew, from different levels of analysis. First, one must postulate that in the pre-metaphorical stage, “concrete” images hold sway. This is not a pre-logical phase. It seems, instead, that Freidenberg means to say that the hypothetical speakers in this era have no need to express or perhaps think about predicates—at least that is one way of understanding her stress on the irreducible individuality of every image. In other words (mine not hers), one need not require a concept “hardness” if you just pay attention to every stone and do not think about the qualities that unite all stones. This golden age is “mythological” as well, which accords with notions she may have held (taken from 19th-century myth study) about ancient animism (e.g. every rock and tree is different, having its own genius, etc.).

She alludes to something like this idea in asserting that Arrogance (hubris) “was an agrarian divinity” (Image 47—the reference is to Aeschylus Persians 821-22), and therefore the tragic poet’s verse saying “hubris bloomed and brought forth Destruction’s fruit” is based in a concrete “image” reality; it is not a poetic fancy so much as a working out of the original semantics of the tenor. Yet not every metaphor, it must be said, can be traced to a personified divine essence.

38 Stewart (2006) gives an overview of such approaches.
The evolution out of this phase is both the most intriguing and the most difficult to pin down. We must notice that “overcoming the concrete-image element” is an ongoing process, started in Greece and not finalized until the Romans (Image 38). One can still observe the process going on in Homeric epic; the poet does not yet “have conceptually” forces of nature, like water or fire, but instead “Poseidons, Hephaestuses” (Image 41, an obscure allusion on Freidenberg’s part, perhaps stemming from her awareness of the Homeric use of the god’s name to mean simply fire as at Il.2.426: σπλάγχνα δ’ ἔρ’ ἄμπείραντες ὑπείρεχον Ἡφαίστοιο, “skewering the innards they held them above Hephaestus”). On the other hand, Freidenberg notes, Homer has distinguished the original binomial Achilles/Patroclus pair into separate characters (a good illustration of her easy slide between tropes and plot elements). From other comments in this difficult chapter, it seems that Freidenberg relies on analogies from linguistic phenomena to make the case of a gradual de-mythologization and new move toward the “concept.” Particularly telling are her examples of an “image” of concrete, daily life--labors pains (ōdines)--being used to indicate “pains” generally, an image turning into a concept while retaining its concreteness; and of the expression she purports to find in Sophocles, “he walks around” (khodit vokrug) that means in context not literal walking but “confusing the issue” by skirting it (Image 45-6). It emerges from these that, at least on one level, Freidenberg is talking about semantic extension and the bleaching of original “concrete” images. This may, in her mind, be related to loss of mythic/concrete image as it makes its way to concept, but it is a commonplace phenomenon in the development of the lexicon. Aristotle and Quintilian, as we have seen, acknowledge that similar extensions of linguistic resources relate to metaphor. Current debates

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39 There seems to be some confusion of passages in her mind, as Creon does not say this to the guard in the Antigone (pace Freidenberg); it is the guard who recalls “circling myself for a return” at line 226; the line cited ad loc in the notes to the second Russian edition of Obraz (Freidenberg [1998] 696 n.11) refers to Antigone 241-2, which does fit what Freidenberg alludes to—Creon’s remark to the guard—but does not fit the phrase she wants, instead reading “you have fenced yourself around” (apophragnusai laklói).

40 See Innes (2003) 11 who cites in addition Demetrius [On Style (86): ‘Almost every expression in common use involves a metaphor but we do not notice because they are
over how “dead” metaphors may or may not be in a given lexicon seem to favor the Lakoff school view, that many are in fact working to structure thought, if not always consciously activated in the mind of a given speaker.\textsuperscript{41} What Freidenberg, then, apparently points to is the co-existence of “concrete” qualities—we might paraphrase this as “live” images—alongside “dead” metaphors. Common verbs can themselves depend on such underlying metaphors. She is right to stress that archaic Greek most likely had a greater proportion of the former, but as with the problem of “iron sky” we are stuck once more with the impossibility of knowing what the individual speaker perceived or believed. If any sample of contemporary Americans or Europeans comes up with totally mixed results regarding the perception of metaphoricity, why do we suppose a sampling of ancient Greeks would not do the same? The data set, of course, with which we try to reach the latter, is problematic to begin with, being comprised of poems. It certainly seems that (in poetry) there are

The last strand in the presentation by Freidenberg has to do with how the shift takes place. While we may know the result—a “conceptual” language—the motives and actors are opaque. She at several points describes the event without mentioning overt agency: “Metaphor appeared on its own (\textit{voznikala sama soboi}) as a form of the image in the function of concept” (Image 46). But the condition for this emergence, she states a few paragraphs earlier, is the appearance of “artistic thinking” which enabled people to have an “image” of the visible world. Art then became more abstract as it moved away from representing visible objects, until in tragedy what counts is the revelation of the hidden (Image 45). “Epic” or “tragedy” as genres are said to carry out the metaphorization process; but Sophocles and Aeschylus are mentioned only in connection with the way in which they work along the archaic thought-lines, spinning out metaphors from the skein of image-material. In sum, the safe metaphors, such as “clear voice”, “keen man”, “rough character”, “lengthy speaker”, and all the other instances where the metaphor is applied so aptly that it seems the proper term’\textsuperscript{[\textsuperscript{41}]} and continues “All this reflects a natural wrestling with the fact that metaphor is part of ordinary speech (Aristotle, \textit{Rhetoric} 1404b34–5: ‘we all use them’; Cicero, \textit{De Oratore} 3.155; Quintilian 8.6.5), and that extended meanings of a word are frequent and often part of normal usage.”

\textsuperscript{41} Müller 2008 concludes that the degree of perceived “life” in a metaphor may vary from one to another hearer in the same community.
processes that Freidenberg hypothesizes are anonymous, collective, co-opting the individual artist but not directed by him or her. As has been recognized by several critics, this simply echoes the main disjunction between aesthetic criticism and historical poetics.

It is an interesting question to what extent such an approach, the evocation of diachronic depths and pre-metaphorical stages, ultimately comes to resemble the apparently synchronic focus of the Formalists. Both after all deal with the perdurance of structure, and both seem at first glance to under-value the individual innovating artist. Yet a Jakobsonian style of reading lyric, in which langue and parole, system and performance, tradition and spontaneity all tango dizzyingly (and authors count) is hard to imagine coming from historical poeticians. Lotman’s critique may come closest to the truth, when he observes how the “semantic palaeontology” of Freidenberg and others influenced by Nikolai Marr never managed to take into account the synchronic structure of the past cultural eras it was investigating.\footnote{Lotman (1976) esp. 260-62.} Instead, random “relict” forms are chased down, without reference to their interconnection; the result as seen in Marr’s own linguistics would not bode well for the method. It must be said in Freidenberg’s defense that her Image and Concept does manage to focus on one genre, and on whole plots, as she investigates the mythopoetic roots of individual dramas. Her most interesting readings are those that are the least Marrist.

But this takes us beyond the immediate topic of metaphor. On that feature, Freidenberg can be seen as re-directing and invigorating the study of a key feature, taking it far away from the moribund rhetorical tropology that had already begun to degrade in late antiquity. Her most promising moves, within the chapter, are those that connect metaphor to riddles, to ecphrasis, and to the illusions of mimesis. “Imitation” and metaphor is a fruitful topic for further investigation still. One wishes she had worked these out more fully, for they anticipate to some extent Tzvetan Todorov’s approach to “genres of discourse” as well as the work of genre-oriented folklorists such as Dan Ben-Amos and Richard Bauman.\footnote{Todorov 1990; Ben-Amos 1969; Bauman 1986.} On a broader front, Freidenberg’s appreciation for the time-depths underneath Greek literature--her assertion, for example, that its imagery had a millennium worth of pre-literary...
development—show her well ahead of most of her contemporaries, not just in Russia but Europe generally. Few other Classicists for at least another generation took seriously the importance of collective “folk” material for every stage of Greek literature, up to the present. Her work on lyric shows a prescient distancing from the Romantic school of finding emotion-laden individual biographies beneath each verse. Her remarks, in the short piece on lyric origins, concerning the idealized melding of the figure of the human poet and a god, and the cultic connections of singers with divinities, are well ahead of their time, an area that is not seriously looked at again until Gregory Nagy’s Best of the Achaeans (1979). Coming back to metaphor, we can say that her greatest achievement, in retrospect, was to take it so seriously. Greeks, for her, invented figurative speech, and this in turn marked its cultural acceleration, as that speech “paved the way for the future, for a new kind of thinking, for multiple levels, for linking unexpected phenomena and for their mutual transition, for the free and universal generalization of individual phenomena, free of any conditions or dependence on space or conceptual discursiveness” (Image 68). The Greek miracle, in short, grew from this “trope” that was in reality a cognitive revolution. We need not totally reject such a view; after all, the work of G.E.R. Lloyd has shown how contestation and agonistic debate shaped Greek thinking; and Lloyd himself notes that debate specifically over the nature of metaphor—as reflected in Aristotle and others—was part of that broader sharpening of the mind. Even now reading the Pre-Socratics (for example), we have to pause, as Lloyd points out: “When the theologians speak of everything coming from Night, say, or Empedocles invokes a cosmic principle of Love how exactly are we to understand this? Is this literally night, literally love? In which case how are we to relate what is said to what we ordinarily mean by those terms? But if not literally intended, what are the metaphors metaphors for?” That realization makes us appreciate all the more Freidenberg’s pioneering formulation of the problematic.

Was it really hers? I leave it to others to comment on the affiliations of this view on metaphor as they might be found in the Formalists or in Freidenberg’s

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44 Paradigmatic studies of the interaction of folk traditions with Classical and post-Classical Greek literature can be found in Alexiou 2000a and 2000b.
45 Braginskaia (1998) 693 cites Lloyd’s Polarity and Analogy; on metaphor in philosophy, see Lloyd (2003).
predecessors. Nina Braginskaia has written cogently on the connections to the theories of Potebnja, Veselovskii, and Marr, as well as the important ties to the theories of Usener, to Lévy-Bruhl, and especially to the theorist of culture Cassirer, the latter by way of the work of Freidenberg’s friend and co-worker Frank-Kamenetskii.\textsuperscript{46} His extended article “K voprosu o razvitii poeticheskoi metafori” first published in 1935, tries, within the limits of Marrist semantics and Veselovskii’s parallelism, to distinguish the mythological roots of metaphor from what we might call “literary” developments, drawing on Sanskrit poetry and poetics.\textsuperscript{47} But in contrast to Freidenberg, he seems not to have explored the dynamics of the metaphor itself, as a “binomial” linguistic phenomenon. She, at least, believed that her own approach to the semantics of metaphor outpaced his, writing in her recollections that her “simple theory” that “all the metaphors of one and the same image are identical in meaning”

\textsuperscript{46} Braginskaia (1998) 693-94, 739-40, 754-56. Cf. Braginskaia 1975. As Alan Cardew (2008) points out Cassirer begins with a notion of “mimetic cultures” where signifier and signified are interfused (as in onompatopoeia); the road to abstraction, for him, goes by way of metaphor and analogy; Freidenberg’s notions are close to this in some ways. This may be the place to clarify the resemblance between Freidenberg and Bakhtin, noted by some (e.g. Lotman 1976). Kevin Moss [ (1991), esp. p.3.] who has carefully calibrated the publications and careers of Bakhtin and Freidenberg, concludes that they never interacted, although their work would seem at first sight to be startlingly similar in many regards. Bakhtin mentions Freidenberg once, with praise, in a footnote to the Rabelais book, while she, on the other hand, (though she identifies him as “Blokhin”) seems to have been apprised of his authorship of Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (attributed to Voloshinov). Moss also documents the more fundamental oppositions in the respective approaches of the two writers, from their views on parody to their notions of cultural wholeness (found, for Bakhtin, in dialogue, but for Freidenberg in the “mythological” concept that requires palaeontological analysis). As Moss points out, “Bakhtin’s whole is found on the level of syntagm—the actual putting together of two opposites in a concrete dialogue. Freidenberg’s whole is paradigmatic—she compares each of the opposites to a third unit that is in fact absent, but which shows their semantic identity.”

\textsuperscript{47} Frank-Kamenetskii 1935.
was immediately appreciated by Frank-Kamenetskii ("Khona") and “resolved all the difficulties of the formation of primary metaphors.”

I have attempted to point out how Freidenberg’s deep interest in metaphor is first of all noticeable for taking metaphor seriously as something much more than trope; she is as far against its treatment as ornament as one might get. She reminds me of the Alice figure in my epigraph, from Mary Jo Bang’s poem, who, while others make disquisitions at a distance about the limits of fictional metaphor, proves a point by plunging herself deeply into a very real rabbit-hole. Freidenberg’s enthusiastic approach to metaphor appears, compared with others that might be seen to share the same early 20th-century cultural evolutionist roots, completely dynamic. Myth-born metaphors may be relicts, but in her version they are constantly working changing and making changes on other parts of the language and thought-world of archaic Greece. Like the culture, its prime metaphors are always in process, shifting gradually from objective image to ideational concept—she might assert, causing that very process. In this, I stress, she comes quite close to contemporary students of cognitive semantics.

But, to my mind, Freidenberg bears an even closer resemblance to a less celebrated but perhaps more powerful contemporary approach, that associated with interpretive anthropology. Both the Lakoff cognitive direction and the ethnographic cultural direction blossomed in the early 1980s (both with a nod to Vico), but the latter has made fewer headlines. In part, it stands as a challenge to the more visible “universalist” theorizing of the cognitivists, as the anthropologists question whether there even exist non-culture-specific metaphors. A Chicago symposium in November 1987 gave a boost to this field of ethnographic metaphor study, resulting in the wide-ranging volume Beyond Metaphor: The Theory of Tropes in Anthropology.

All of the pieces therein are helpful in shaping questions about Greek poetics, but I will return to one in particular, as it bears on the questions that Freidenberg has challenged us to formulate and ask. But now it is time to turn to Pindar, for a test of “metaphor” between “image” and “concept.”

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49 On their shared roots, see Taverniers (2002) 82-93
We have only to glance at a few of the many family-relationship words in Pindar to realize how his poetic system follows and extrapolates from the anthropomorphizing representations of Greek myth and religion regarding divinity.\(^{51}\) It is largely indisputable, in Greek myth, that certain figures descend from certain parents (though there are some ambiguous cases: Aphrodite and Persephone for example). This seems to be a matter of “belief” in the way, at least, that “myth” is believed—it is not dogma. I wish to approach Freidenberg’s notions of metaphor and image by focusing on just one relationship trope in the poetry, that of “daughter.” Of the 27 interpretable occurrences in Pindar’s extant work of the Greek for daughter (\textit{thugatêr}), many are just of this mythic-identifying sort.\(^{52}\) In Freidenberg’s terms these would be the equivalent of pre-metaphoric “images”; it is not metaphorical or “conceptual” to say, for instance, that Artemis is daughter of Leto. This subset comprises the following:

1) “Real” daughters of divinities or heroes (14x):

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Nem.}3.10: άρχεν δ’ οὔρανοῦ πολυνεφέλα κρέοντι, θύγατρ (Muse of Zeus)
  \item \textit{Pyth.} 2.39: θυγατέρι Κρόνου (Hera, of Kronos)
  \item \textit{Ol}.3.26: Λατοὺς ἱπποσόα θυγάτηρ (Artemis, of Leto)
  \item \textit{Pyth.} 3.8: Φελέγων θυγάτηρ (Koronis, of Phleguas)
  \item \textit{Pyth.} 4.46: Εὐρώπα Τιτυῶθυγάτηρ (Europa, of Tityos)
  \item \textit{Isth.}8.42: Νηρέος θύγατερ (cf. \textit{Nem}. 3.57: Νηρέος θύγατρα) (Thetis, of Nereus)
  \item \textit{Ol}.9.58: θύγατρι ἀπὸ γὰς ᾪπειῶν Ὄποσεντος (daughter of Opous)
  \item \textit{Ol}.6.95: Δάματρα λευκίππου τε θυγατρῆς (Persephone, of Demeter)
  \item \textit{Pyth.} 9.17: Κρέοισ’ ἔτηκεν Γαίας θυγάτηρ (Creusa, of Gaia)
  \item Fr.52h44=52m13: Κοίου θυγάτηρ (Asteria, of Koios the Titan)
  \item \textit{Pyth}.3.97 θυγατρες ἔρημοσαν πάθαις (daughters of Kadmos)
  \item \textit{Paean} 52h15: Οὐράνοι τ’ εὐπέπλω θυγατρὶ Μναμ[ο][σύ]νι (Memory, of Ouranos)
  \item \textit{Isth}.8.17: δίδυμαι γένοντο θύγατ’ θυγατεɹες Ασωπίδων (Thebe and Aigina, of Asopos)
\end{itemize}

\(^{51}\) Cf. Boris Maslov’s explication (forthcoming) of such metaphors in terms of cosmogony. My section on the odes is woefully under-annotated, as far as Pindarists might desire, since the debates concerning individual passages are not my main concern in this essay. In general, a helpful lexical guide to the range of Pindaric images is Grinbaum 1990.

\(^{52}\) For the record, only two instances refer to human non-mythic daughters: \textit{Pythian} 9.111 and \textit{Partheneion} 94b68. I have not checked possible denotations by kora “girl, daughter”.

In these instances, we are not knowingly dealing with metaphor; the closest one comes to it is in the case of Thetis, whose mercurial nature, as a goddess of the sea and daughter of the Old Man of the Sea, Nereus, may be genetic. The others are familiar from Hesiod and other theogonic testimonia. No one would argue for these being the individual inventions of Pindar.

The second subset is different in effect but identical in morphology and syntax with the first. Furthermore, in the poetics of Pindar (and probably of archaic poetry generally) they are identical in deployment—that is, they are most frequently evoked or invoked in proemial portions of the poetry, whether epinician, or other genres. No doubt this is a relic of hymnic usage. To express it more formally: the poetic feature “+ daughter” can be further marked as “+ framing” in compositional terms. Here are the “metaphorical” daughter sets:

2) Metaphor-like
Pyth. 8.2: Φύλωφρον Ἡσυχία, Δίκαις δὴ μεγιστόπολι θυγατέρ (Calm, of Justice)  
Fr.78.1 Κλῦθερ Ἀλαλά, Πολέμου θυγατέρ (battle-cry, of War)  
Pyth. 5.28: Ἐπιμεθέδος Ἕραμος δραμών θυγατέρα Πρόφασιν (Excuse, of Hindsight)  
Ol.10.3: θυγάτηρ Ἀλάθεια Διός (Truth, of Zeus—named alongside Muse)  
Ol.8.81: Ἑρμᾶδεθυγατρὸς ἑκούσας Ἀγγελίας (Report, of Hermes)  
Ol. 9.15: Θέμις θυγάτηρ τέ οί σώτειρα … Εὐνομία (Order, of Themis/Custom)

The impossibility of distinguishing set #1 from set #2 above is key to the point I would like to make, extrapolating specifically from Freidenberg and approving of her principle: the existence of a “real” predicate (like “iron” sky) in image systems (or, in the case at hand, we can think of descendants as “predicates” or implicatures) is what enables the creation of new concepts—yet there is nothing new about the template into which these are slotted.

It is worth observing that exactly this trope of genealogical connection is still common in discourse of all types, but especially literary. It is unlikely that the modern use all derives from ancient precedent, though some instances clearly do. In a fascinating study, Death is the Mother of Beauty, inspired and introduced by Lakoff, Mark Turner has attempted to trace the ten “basic metaphoric inference patterns about
kinship” as seen in poetry of the last few centuries. The range of “concepts” implied by saying “X is son/daughter of Y” includes such things as causation and succession, similarity, occupying same place/time, and inheritance--or semantically pregnant mixings of these. War-cry comes from Battle and is instantly co-present. Report is like her father Hermes, and also the product of his actions. Daughter imagery, according to Turner, can indicate a relation of submission or even inactivity--hence, Peace daughter of Justice? Note that some of these equations are already present in Hesiod’s Theogony (Themis/Eunomia); others are unfamiliar but sound perfectly plausible, because they make a certain sense (if Zeus controls his daughters the Muses, why not also Truth?). The accident that abstract nouns in Greek are often feminine in gender certainly eases this creation of new daughter figures. Given that the Muses are already daughters (of Zeus by Memory); and Truth (Pindar’s constant purpose) is also a daughter; we are led mytho-logically to “believe” the (clearly metaphorical) final extension of the daughter-trope when Pindar says, with reference to the healing power of epinician verse: “Songs, wise daughters of the Muses enchanted them” (Nem.4.3: αἱ δὲ σοφαὶ Μοισάν θύγατρες ἀοιδαὶ θελξαν νυν). In Freidenberg’s terms, we have watched, within the imagination of one author, as “image” (mythical genealogy) produces “concept.” A rich new mythology is thereby brought into being, forcing us, among other things, to cast our minds back to epic song and its relationship to Muses and poets (is it submissive? inactive?).

A further point might be made in aid of understanding the mid-stages of this process of “metaphorization.” Within the “real” mythic genealogical system, there are already sub-fields where innovative and creative myth-tellers (poets or others) can exercise their skill at analogical extensions. (In fact, every speaker of a language does the same at some level in learning to handle speech: the process of analogy has been recognized since antiquity as a primary force in language development). In the case of myth, the belief in animistic presences in epichoric landscape features, in Greek and other systems, enables--one might say, requires--a constant extension of the “descendant” or “daughter” trope. As the genealogical template already exists, and a basic element can be said to unite “parent” and “daughter,” the mythopoeic imagination undertakes its bricolage so easily and deftly that we are never quite sure

53 Turner (1987) 15. His book title, it should be noted, quotes a Wallace Stevens line.
54 Idem pp.26-29.
whether the “mythic” affiliation is new or archaic. In Pindar, we see two examples that bring to mind Freidenberg’s “tautological” similes—the cases of daughters of water divinities, namely Delos and Camarina.

3) half-way points

Fr.33c.3: πόντου θύγατερ (Delos, of Sea)
Ol.5.2: Ὠκεανοῦ θύγατερ (Camarina—nymph of lake)

In this small set, parent and daughter share some quality (wateriness, e.g.) and are apparently connected for that alone. Yet there is no “concept” articulated out of the imagery (unlike the case of Excuse daughter of Hindsight). Instead, as in the aquatic similes of the Iliad mentioned above, one body is a smaller version of another (a lake, daughter of Okeanos); Delos is a slight extension of the method—she drifts around (like water) until pinned down (like land). She is daughter of open sea.

This first collection of test data, then—genealogical “metaphors”—indicates that Freidenberg’s insights into metaphorization might fit the ways in which Pindar engages the tradition and pushes its poetic envelope. Genealogy, of course, is the easiest and most obvious way of naturalizing concepts. If any image system is essential, it is that of kinship, along with related image systems of bloom and growth.55 But what if we were to choose the least essential? Within the corpus of Pindar images, would not pure “metaphors” outweigh any of the semi-metaphorical half-way points between “image” and “concept”? And would not images of decoration be the least organic, by their very nature and content? After all, if the notion of metaphor could evolve (or degrade) even within antiquity to become a matter of “ornament” versus essence, “adornment” and clothing versus the naked truth, might we not catch Pindar already participating in this employment of metaphor? Are there signs of the inorganic nature of metaphor usage in his own frequent mentions of adornment, such as the elaborate conceit at Nem. 7.77-79: “The Muse…binds together gold and white ivory with the lily flower she has taken from under the dew of the sea.” Is his art form, in fact (as one wag put it in relation to this image) just “coral” poetry? I propose to approach the question—though not resolve it—through a study of the word for “adornment”—kosmos. This is my second and final test collection.

The noun *kosmos* and forms of the derived verb *kosmeô* occur a total of 14 times in Pindar. We can start small. When Hermes and Artemis are said to harness Hieron’s chariot horses, the poet phrases the act as a placement of *kosmos* (αὐγλάεντα τίθησι κόσμον, Ol.2.10). The horses have just been described two lines earlier as having “embroidered reins” (*poikilaniou*s), so we may think of the decorative or cosmetic valence. But the fact remains—chariot horses do not race without reins. This is far from useless ornamentation; or, if you like, the *utile* in this case has been crafted to be something also aesthetically *dulce*, without destroying its utility.

At *Olympian* 3.13 the crown of olive won at the games is called “grey-colored *kosmos*” (γλαυκόχροα κόσμον ἑλαίας), which would seem simple enough to pass over as “ornament” or “adornment” (Race chooses the latter translation). What we need to remember, however, is the deep mythic past of this symbolic crown, and Pindar obliges, characterizing the olive first as the “memorial” (µνᾶµα) of the games which Heracles intended when he brought to Olympia the olive trees. Synecdochically, the crown represents the symbol of Heracles’ care for human welfare, as the story Pindar next tells pivots on how the hero saw that the participants in the games needed shade and hence brought the trees from the land of the Hyperboreans (16-34). The winners’ crown thus shares in the *thauma* of the tree (cf. line 32) even more marvelous given the reminiscence of its distant origins. Thus a particular *kosmos* is, paradoxically, an *essential* adornment, a reminder of more cosmic activity and structures.\footnote{On the significance in this passage of landscape in its connection with Heracles, see further Steiner (1986) 91, 114. *Ol.*8.83 (shining *kosmos*) likewise alludes to the Olympic crown, this time as gift of Zeus to the victor: on the importance of the connection made in the passage, see Lattmann (2010) 114.}

The crown as *kosmos*, emblem of victory is a visual cue and trigger for Pindaric song, as expressed at *Ol.*11.13-15:

ίσθι νῦν, Ἀρχεστράτου/παῖ, τεῦχς Ἀγησίδαμε, πυγμαχίας ἐνεκὲν κόσμον ἐπὶ στεφάνῳ χρυσέας ἑλαίας ἀδυμελὴ κελαθῆσω…

“For the present rest assured, Hagesidamus son of Archestratus: for the sake of your boxing victory, I shall loudly sing a sweet song, an *adornment* for your garland of golden olive..”
As the lines suggest, the “crown of song” is an adornment to the adornment, a musical offering atop the athletic symbol. But I would argue it is no more a superimposed nicety than is the kosmos of the crown itself. What may appear decorative is in fact organic and at the core of the laudandus-laudator exchange. Through the inextricable combination of Pindaric praise and athletic success, the laudandum himself becomes an “adornment” to the city-state, as Timodemus of Acharnai does for Athens (Nem.2.8). The ideology of heroes, living and dead, as Kurke and Curry have explained, guarantees that this sort of kosmos is also the farthest from dispensable ornamentation. Given the rippling outward circles of victory—from ceremony and crown at the site, to song (on or offsite) to fame in the city, we can wonder whether at Isth.6.66-69 the father of the victor is celebrated simply for a rather vague civic-mindedness:

“Lampon, “taking care with his work,” honors these words of Hesiod, and he advises his sons with them too, thus bringing a shared adornment (xunon...kosmon) to his city.”

Or is it instead the concrete song-and-dance chorus that his son’s victory has brought to the city that qualifies as the kosmos? Most plausibly, the social package as a whole

57 Steiner (1986) seems not to discuss the term kosmos in relation to the metaphor of the “crown of song” (title of her book), but does discuss wreathing: see esp. pp.36-37. Another example of the kosmos of Pindaric song itself is fr.194.2-3, where the poet urges his chorus to build, upon a foundation of songs, “an elaborate adornment that speaks words” (tr. Race: ποικίλον κόσµον αудάεντα λόγων). Three remaining passages, not discussed above, feature the verb kosmeó twice in specific reference to concrete ‘adornment” related to the games (Isth.1.19: tripods and other vessels the results of being crowned; Parthen.2.49: the family has won cosmos of crowns). A third (Nem.1.22) completes the circle of praise by punning reference to the “fitting” dinner (harmodion deipnon) set out in good order (kekosmētai) for the poet who has come to praise the victor. In view of these uses, kosmos might be considered a delimited term of art for the effects, causes, and appurtenances of Pindaric choral poetry.

58 Kurke 1993; Currie 2005. For victors as living kosmos and object of song, see also Nem.3.31-2 (where reference is intentionally blurred between the immediate laudandum Aristokleidas and all the Aeacid heroes).
is summed up in the one term: fame, family repute, and visible, performative “adornment” carefully “shared” in the democratic discourse practiced by aristocrats. Lampon has given his polis all this.⁵⁹

In Nemean 6, Pindar associates the notion of kosmos with praise of an island polity, Aegina (lines 45-53):

πλατεῖαι πάντοθεν λογίοισιν ἑνὶ πρόσοδοι
νάσων εὐκλέα τάνδε κοσμεῖν· ἐπεὶ σφιν Ἀιακίδαι
ἐπορον ἔχοχον αἰσαν ἄρε-                
τὰς ἀποδεικνύμενοι μεγάλας,
πέτσαι δ’ ἐπὶ τε χθόνα καὶ διὰ θαλάσσας τηλόθεν
ὄνυμ’ αὐτῶν· καὶ ἔξω Ἀἰθίοπας
Μέμνονος οὕκ {ἄν} ἄπονοστή-
σαντος ἐπαλτο- βαρῦ δὲ σφιν
νεῖκος Ἀχιλεὺς
ἐμεθέρε αχαῖλ ἀπαβαίς ἄφρ’ ἄρματων,
φανενᾶς υίὸν εὐτ’ ἐνάριξεν Ἀδός ἄκμι
ἔγχεος ζηκότοιο. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν παλαιότεροι
όδον ἄμαξιτῶν εὐρον· ἐπο-
μα δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχουν μελέταν

“There are broad avenues open on every side for storytellers to adorn this glorious island, since the Aeacids provided them by example with an outstanding share of great excellence. [50] Their name flies far, over the land and across the sea. It even reached the Ethiopians, when Memnon did not return to his home; Achilles descended from his chariot and fell upon them, a grievous antagonist, when he slew the son of the shining Dawn with the edge [55] of his raging sword. Poets of former times found this highway, and I myself am following them; this is my concern.” ⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Kurke (1989)
⁶⁰ All Pindar translations are by D. Svarlien via Perseus website unless otherwise stated. On the way in which this complex road image ties together hero, poet, and athlete, see Steiner (1986) 79-80.
In a typically complex Pindaric interaction, not one but two metaphors with the same semantic weight are used to frame a third. Thus metaphor #1 “access to tradition” as a general concept is embodied twice: in the initial image of roads of song (prosodoi) that allow the poet to praise/adorn (kosmein) the home of the Aeacids (Achilles and kin), the conceit is that these extend from or into every direction (pantothen--cf. the proem of the Odyssey, where the poet calls on the Muse to sing hamothen--“from whatever point”). The second evocation of metaphor #1 has to do with a contrasting linear route, Pindar’s unidirectional following along the path that others have blazed in time (literally they “discovered the wagon trail”--hodon amaxiton). Pindar’s art (meletan implying both “resolution” or “concern” and “poetic preoccupation” cf. Slater Lexicon to Pindar [1969] 320) is thus poised between spontaneity and tradition: there are many roads (the figure-family of “abundance”) but in fact there is one road (the figure-family of “tradition”). Although Pindar does not here dramatize the Robert Frost moment of choosing the road “less traveled by” one wonders whether the particular amaxiton is colored here--positively--by its further implication of being an old road as opposed to a (semantically) unmarked approach via prosodoi (a coloration that is instead used to negative effect in another Pindaric passage, the proto-Callimachean Paean 7.b.11 with its rejection of the “worn wagon-road”). At any rate, the poet here does not turn his epinician choice into a self-regarding career track, in contrast with Frost, who coyly stages, in our presence, his preference for what, as it turns out, only appears to be marginal, as he picks the old route “having perhaps the better claim/Because it was grassy and wanted wear; Though as for that the passing there/Had worn them really abou...

At the same time as the ancient poet stalks along the song-lines, his subject is flying above him, as it were, by way of metaphor #2 (petatai). We should compare for the image, that of another poet, Theognis, who gave “wings” to his beloved and praise-object, Kurnos (lines 236-37):

Σοὶ μὲν ἔγὼ πτέρ’ ἔδωκα, σὺν οἶς’ ἔπ’ ἀπείρωνα πόντον
ποτήσῃ, κατὰ γῆν πᾶσαν ἀειρόμενος
“Wings I have given you, with which you will fly, lifted above the whole earth, over the boundless sea”.

61 On the heritage of the trope see Hunter and Fantuzzi (2005) 68-71.
A familiar time-warp allows Pindar to praise the island in the *hic et nunc*, as he makes fresh approaches to this concern of adornment, while its praises are in fact *already* aloft and widespread (like the roads: compare *pantothen* with the merismus “land and sea”), and it is *already* “famous” (*euklea*). For that matter, the *amaxiton* that he is following was “discovered”--not made, cut, blazed--by the “older” poets, another case of an always-already. Pindar as always consciously sings in an echo-chamber. But the main point we should draw from this passage is how *unmarginal* Pindar considers his poetic task: he is no Frost, wandering to muse in the yellow wood. Pindar’s epinician practice conspicuously keeps in use the ancestral pathways of praise, on which the fame of Aegina, the island and its ruling clan, depends.

Let us at this stage apply Freidenberg’s “iron sky” test to this Pindaric metaphor system. If “iron sky” is not a metaphor because the predicate is in fact not conceptual but an essential part of the image itself--i.e. if one believes the sky is iron, there is no metaphorical invention--then what can we say about the latent equation “song is adornment”? In other words, is there a way we can understand archaic Greeks to have perceived song “really” as adornment? Can we take this seriously--that is to say, the “metaphor” is not in Freidenberg’s terms actually metaphorical because *there is no* semantic slide from one term to the other. Or is the equation itself (merely) figurative “adornment”?

It seems counterintuitive--that “adornment” is not just adornment. In this case, there are indeed a number of arguments against adornment, or perhaps we should say against the “merely” ornamental in favor of the absolute centrality of the very notion of adornment, a centrality that most academic cultures (excepting perhaps the French) find puzzling if not embarrassingly superficial. I will conclude with a bare suggestion, that internally and externally to archaic Greek culture, one can find “adornment” to be an essential cultural value--perhaps *the* essential value--if one looks in the right places. First, we should remember that there is a sociopolitical sense of the very word, as attested in some of the earliest Greek written laws in which *kosmos* means a regulator or legislator, one of a body of *kosmoi* (see LSJ s.v. III). This accords with

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62 Details and bibliography of laws from Dreros (7th c BC) and Gortyn: see Gagarin and Cohen (2005) 54, 310-11. Interestingly, there is a verbal component to this office, reminiscent of Pindaric usage: the archaic Cretan *kosmos* “regulator” can have his own sub-official “*mnâmon*” “remembrancer”--perhaps a scribe or oral expert in legal
the “cosmological” sense of *kosmos* attested in later literature, starting in the 5th century BC, but that seems to be physical rather than a personification of the human “regulator.”

Second, a semantic pivot can be seen in the use of the verb to mean both “regulate” by giving “orders” and “make a pleasing order.” We can examine a curious double marriage at the end of *Pythian 9* (114-)

\[\text{ἔστασεν γὰρ ἄπαντα χορόν}\\ \text{ἐν τέρμασιν αὐτίκ’ ἁγώνος}\\ \text{σὺν δ’ ἀξιόλοις ἐκέλευσεν διακρῖναι ποδῶν},\\ \text{ἄντινα σχῆσιοι τις ἥρω-}\\ \text{ων, ὃςοι γαμβροί σφιν ἠλθον.}\\ \text{oὐτοὶ δ’ ἐδίδου Λίβυς ἄρμόζων κόρα}\\ \text{νυμφίον ἄνδρα: ποτὶ γ’ραμμῇ μὲν αὐτὰν}\\ \text{στᾶσε κοσμήσαις, τέλος ἔμμεν ἄκρον,}\\ \text{εἴπε δ’ ἐν μέσσοις ἀπάγεσθαι, ὃς δὲν πρῶτος θρόνον}\\ \text{ἀμφὶ ὀι ψαύσειε πέπ’λοις.}\]

For right away he stood the whole throng at the end of a course, [115] and told them to decide with a footrace which of the heroes, who came to be bridegrooms, would take which bride. The Libyan too made such an offer in joining his daughter with a husband. He placed her at the goal, when he had **arrayed her as the crowning prize**, and in their midst he announced that that man should lead her to his home, whoever was the first to leap forward and touch her robes.\(^{63}\)

Micah Myers has shown how the image matches a mythical “chorus of young women” (the Danaids) to the single figure of the eligible maiden who will be the prize for a footrace in the later marriage contest, thus evoking the important genre of lore. Cf. *Ol*.3.13ff, discussed above, with its *kosmos* of the olive represented as the *mnâma* of the games.

\(^{63}\) Trans. Svarlien with modification.
maidens’ choral song (partheneion) within that of male-oriented Pindaric epinician.\textsuperscript{64}

Taking a cue from Freidenberg we might in addition read this pairing of old and new bride-races through the sort of binomial logic she applied to the metaphor and its predecessor form. In this case, the originating paradigm (the khoros set up by Danaos, comprising his 48 daughters) is the real event (in the mind of the later Libyan imitator) but his own awarding of the daughter is no less real. Paradigm is thus like pre-metaphor, the alignment of two equally performative events, in which the force of belief (Antaios “had heard” how Danaos operated in Argos and therefore followed suit) holds sway. In the Pindaric passage, kosmésais “having arrayed/adorned” applies overtly to the second-order marriage event (we imagine the bride herself as adorned object--think of the beautifully decorated “original” bride, Pandora); but the verb can apply equally well on a latent level to the first-order marriage prize, the khoros of Danaids, for kosmos is the essence of the concept of choral cohesion, propriety, and display, as we can see elsewhere in Plato, but also in a range of surviving choral songs.\textsuperscript{65}

In this connection, it is perhaps useful to cite a late convert to the social utility of chorality, the philosopher Plato. Still playing the role of the analytic outside observer, however, at \textit{Laws} 655a4-8, Plato insists on a more careful distinction in descriptive terms, having his Athenian stranger say that “music is a matter of rhythm and harmony, and involves tunes and movements of the body; this means that, while it is legitimate to speak of a ‘rhythmical’ or a ‘harmonious’ movement or tune, we cannot properly apply to either of them the chorus-masters’ own metaphor ‘brilliantly-coloured’ (ἐὔχρων δὲ μέλος ἣ σχῆμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἄπεικασάντα, ὰσπέρ οἱ χοροδιδάσκαλοι ἄπεικάζουσιν, ὰρθῶς φθέγγεσθαι: trans. Saunders 1970).\textsuperscript{66} From this off-

\textsuperscript{64} Myers 2007. The only other Pindaric passage that seems to associate kosmos with a garment is Pyth.3.82, contrasting fools, who cannot bear troubles “with propriety,” in opposition to the good, who “turn the fine side outward” (τὰ μὲν ὄν οὐ δίναντε νύσι Κόσμῳ φέρειν, ἀλλ’ ἄγαθοί, τὰ καλὰ τρέψαντες ἔξω.)

\textsuperscript{65} For kosmos as a key descriptive term in the ideology of choral self-presentation and representation of its formation, see Peponi (forthcoming). Further on the essential Greek religious-aesthetic notion of “attractive performances,” see Naerebout 1997.

\textsuperscript{66} Pender (2003) 58 cites this passage in support of his effort to show that Plato is highly conscious of the insufficiency of metaphor for philosophical discourse.
hand remark it can be gleaned that the very practitioners themselves, the experts on ancient chorality, used synaesthetically a visual term *eukhrón* to capture the aural and kinetic features of the art-form. This glimpse of an emic system of performers’ own metaphorical terminology, in addition, makes us realize how the notion of *kosmos* could well apply to--indeed, could be the summation of--the *Gesamtkunstwerk* that was the archaic *khoros*. The activity of *choreia* was, in turn, all important for the organization of the city-state, as can be seen even in such late survivals as Athenian theater and dithyramb. So *kosmos*, in this view, is a crucial ordering device as well as being at the same time an attractive mode of self-representation in a social group.

This essay has tried to understand a small element of historical poetics historically in context, but also to see what remains in it that can be vital and of use as a hermeneutic guide. I found that Freidenberg’s work on metaphor, while clearly outdated and even outrageous in some ways, is in its obsessive attention to the actual dynamics of metaphor, a quite good guide to the poetry of Pindar and by extension to Greek archaic poetics more generally. But what has marked all her work is the refusal to isolate the “poetic” feature--plot, metaphor, simile, character--from the social pragmatics of particular performances--drama, in the case of *Image and Concept*, but in other parts of her scholarly work, the novel, hagiography, proverbs, sagas, epics, even puppet theater. This and her constant search for ethnographic parallels embolden me to adduce an external analogy that may help re-inforce the argument here about the power of adornment--or, more precisely, suggest that adornment, *explicitly and intimately related to metaphor*, is of the essence.

The ethnographer Terence Turner, in an article “We are Parrots; Twins are Birds,” attempts to unpack the titular proverbial sayings by asking what role metaphor plays in the lives of the cultures that say these things (the Bororo and Nuer, respectively). Do these traditional people really think that they, or some of them, are birds? Rejecting some of the more positivist elucidations (that for instance birds are soul-carriers and so this is a proleptic expression for “we are mortal”), Turner instead looks at what roles birds play in Bororo and Kayapo cultures (the latter a people whose songs often assert an identity between the human singers and birds). It is much more complicated than a mere metaphor, for synecdoche enters in--birds, especially parrots, are prized for feathers, which in turn are essential to regalia and in particular

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headdresses. (One thinks of Pindaric crowning.) These in turn are associated with
dance. Donning the feathered regalia metonymically, says Turner, means that the
wearers have acquired the spirit power of the birds that once used them in powerful,
beautiful flight. The lightness of the original owners is conveyed to the human
“birds.” And it is through the ordering of dance-groups and their artistically shaped
social messages that village life is ultimately expressed, negotiated, and formed.
Crucial transformations of social relations are put into effect by the songs and dances,
so that from a feather and a bird metaphor, in fact, there come solid sociopolitical
facts. This is the power of ornament, as more than “ornament”. For a mirror epigraph
to Alice and her rabbit-hole, I quote Turner on birds, while having in mind the Greek
kosmos that I have argued is “real,” as real as an iron sky. Kosmos and its kindred
concepts make Pindaric “metaphors” less and more than metaphorical…less “poetic”,
perhaps, if we insist on using that term to connote individual originality in expression,
but more culturally rooted, more “real,” and able to set in motion real cultural effects.

“To become a flying being metaphorically means acquiring the power to
separate oneself from one’s normal terrestrial mode of social existence, in
which one acts within the received framework of social and cultural forms,
and to assume an external attitude toward that framework as a whole, a bird’s-
eye view of it, as it were. To don feathered regalia metaphorically figures the
power to generate form (in this case, social and cultural form). The generative
spirit power to create form which the Bororo believe to be embodied in the
feathers is thus metaphorically enacted by both Kayapo and Bororo dancers as
they metonymically transform their own forms by donning the culturally
elaborated feathered forms of headdresses and other ritual regalia.”

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