Abstract: Scholars have long noted Platonic elements or allusions in Callimachus' poems, particularly in the Aetia prologue and the 13th Iambus that center on poetic composition. Following up on their work, Benjamin Acosta-Hughes and Susan Stephens, in a recent panel at the APA, and in papers that are about to appear in Callimachea II. Atti della seconda giornata di studi su Callimaco (Rome: Herder), have argued not for occasional allusions, but for a much more extensive influence from the Phaedo and Phaedrus in the Aetia prologue (Acosta-Hughes) and the Protagoras, Ion, and Phaedrus in the Iambi (Stephens). These papers are part of a preliminary study to reformulate Callimachus' aesthetic theory.
The Cicala's Song: Plato in the *Aetia*

This paper prefigures a larger study of Callimachus and Plato, a study on which my Stanford colleague Susan Stephens and I have now embarked in our co-authored volume on Callimachus. Awareness of Platonic allusion in Callimachus is not new, although its significance has not really been appreciated—a close reading of the two authors remains a real desideratum, and it is indeed this need that we hope our work will one day fulfill. The main focal points of the present paper are two passages of Callimachus, and two passages of Plato, that, read together, configure a remarkable intertextual dialogue on poetry, reading, and the inspired voice. I begin, however, with a close reading of an epigram, and will return to close reading of several other epigrams in the concluding pages. For Callimachus' use of Plato is one that transcends generic boundaries.

Callim. Ep. 53 GP (23 Pf.), is a poem that features a reading, or misreading, of Plato.

\begin{quote}
eιπάς "'Ηλιε χαίρε" Κλεόμβροτος ὄμβρακιώτης
ήλατ' ἀφ' ὑψηλοῦ τείχεος εἰς' Αἴδην,
ἀξίων οὐδέν ἵδων θανάτου κακόν, ἀλλὰ Πλάτωνος
ἐν τὸ περὶ ψυχῆς γράμμα' ὀναλεξάμενος.
\end{quote}

On saying, "Farewell Sun", the Ambraciot Cleombrotus leapt from a high wall to Hades, not that he had seen some evil that merited death, but rather because he had read one writing of Plato's—On the Soul.

With one bound Cleombrotus leaps to literary immortality, and into the beginning of a long reception of his death as figured in these lines; his consciously tragic farewell appears to echo that of Euripides' *Alcestis*, and so from the first Callimachus implicates

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* Dedicated to Erich S. Gruen, with much esteem and affection, on the occasion of his retirement from teaching at the University of California at Berkeley.


2 Eur. *Alc.* 243: "Αλιε καὶ φῶς ὀμέρας, "Sun, light of day", 
another author and genre in this short poem. The reference to Alcestis' exemplary noble non-death also suggests something of the complex character of this epigram. In naming Cleombrotus in the second hemiepes Callimachus propels himself into dialogue with Plato, a dialogue grafted here on to each line of the epigram. Cleombrotus is, notably, one of the companions not present at Socrates' death, as Phaedo informs Echechreates at Phd. 59c3-4; rather, Phaedo reports, these two were in Aegina. Distance and displacement are integral components of Callimachus' poetics (as Selden among other scholars has noted); that Cleombrotus is not only absent in this narrative, but absent elsewhere, may be one feature of the dialogue's opening that caught Callimachus' eye. Plato does not name the Cleombrotus missing at the death of Socrates as "the Ambraciot", and this has troubled scholars in firmly ascertaining that the Cleombrotus of Callimachus' epigram is the figure mentioned as absent in the Phaedo, the companion of the founder of Cyrenaic philosophy, Aristippus. But surely it needn't. By specifically naming the author (line 3) and entitling the dialogue (line 4), Callimachus carefully points his audience in the direction of the Phaedo. Yet even were it the case that the Ambraciot were not the Cleombrotus of Phaedo's comment, but a homonymous enthusiast of Plato, (and play with homonyms in philosophical context is not uncharacteristic of Callimachus), the specific naming of the dialogue in the epigram's fourth line cannot but bring to mind the figure absent at Socrates' death. For Callimachus, Cleombrotus' original absence provides the excuse for his distanced participation in the discussion of the deathless soul (by reading), and Cleombrotus' misreading of the Phaedo's argumentation (the Phaedo specifically disallows suicide, 61c-62c).

3 Pl. Phd. 59c3-4: EX. Τι δὲ; Ἀριστιππός καὶ Κλεόμβροτος παρεγένοντο; ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δήτα ἐν Αἰγίνη γὰρ ἔλεγοντο εἶναι. Ech."What then? Were Aristippus and Cleombrotus there?" Phaed. "Not at all; it was said they were in Aegina."

4 Selden 1998.

5 White 1994 argues that Callimachus' Cleombrotus is the figure in Plato's dialogue; but cf. Williams 1995: 154-69.

6 τὸ περὶ ψυχῆς appears as an alternate title for the Phaedo already in the 13th Epistle 363: ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς λόγῳ. Whether or not the epistle is genuine, this does suggest that the alternate title was already in circulation before Callimachus' time. Cf. P.Oxy 2087.22: Πλάτων(ος) Π(ερὶ) ψυχῆς. Certainly Lucian in his dialogue Philopseudeis knows this as the title of Plato's dialogue. Lucian 34.27: ἀνεγίνοσκον γὰρ τὸ περὶ ψυχῆς τοῦ Πλάτωνος βιβλίον ἐνφ' ἱστορῆς. "For I was quietly reading Plato's book on the soul."

7 As both Ion in Iambus 13 and Heraclitus in Ep. 2 Pf. (=34 GP) demonstrate.
Each line of Callimachus' epigram brings us one step closer to the discovery of the Socratic context: Cleombrotus (line 1), the wall (line 2, conventional attribute of the opening of many a Socratic dialogue, among others, notably, the *Phaedrus*), the figure of Plato (line 3, whom we do not acknowledge as Plato the author per se until the following line) and one specific writing on the soul (there are, after all, several, but τὸ περὶ ψυχῆς is clearly the *Phaedo*). The epigram's own transition from speaking (line 1: εἶπας) to reading (line 4: ἀναλέξαμενος) carries us, its audience, from an awareness of a performative to a retrospective situation, and, interestingly, from Callimachus (author of the epigram) to Plato (author of the *Phaedo*) to Callimachus (or Cleombrotus) reading Plato. The epigram performs a dialogue of authors and genres, and, at the same time, completes the earlier work, or rather carries it to a further stage; the *Phaedo* is, after all, the recalled narrative of Socrates on the soul, not the reading of the same.

I would add two further notes. The singular γράμμα that begins the final hemiepes is striking; like the singular ἔπος of *Aetia* fr. 1.5, the singular γράμμα urges the reader to engage with further definition. Used in this way in the singular, it can signify a single work, and is so used, intriguingly, both by Asclepiades (Ep. 32.4), and Callimachus (fr. 398 Pf., a fragment of an epigram; the subject of both is Antimachus' poem *Lyde*. There seems to be an intended association of the two epigrams, Callimachus Ep. 53 and Ascl. Ep. 32, and Callimachus' fragmentary non-appreciative assessment of Antimachus' poem (fr. 398). Both epigrams feature the (not common) use of ἀναλέγομαι in the sense of "read through, peruse", as well as the singular γράμμα; further both epigrams play a bit

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8 It's intriguing that it's a wall and not something more obvious, as e.g. a tower, such as that from which Heracles suggests to Dionysus that he cast himself at Arist. *Rh.* 130. The opening premise of this play, that Dionysus seeks to go to Hades as a result of reading Euripides' *Andromeda* (*Rh.* 52-54), bears an odd similarity to Callimachus' epigram, and of course Callimachus does combine both literary models in e.g. *Aet.* fr. 1.

9 Callim. fr. 1.5: ἔπος δ’ ἐπὶ τυρθόν εἶλε.

10 Lυθή καὶ γένος εἰμί καὶ οὖνομα, τῶν δ’ ἀπὸ Κόδρου

σεμνοτέρη πασῶν εἰμὶ δι’ Ἀντίμαχον

τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἐμ’ ἥεισε; τίς οὐκ ἀνελέξατο Λυθήν,

τὸ ξυνὸν Μουσῶν γράμμα καὶ ὁ Ἀντιμάχου;

*Lyde is both my race and my name, and than all from Codrus am I more noble, Antimachus' doing. For who has not sung or perused me, Lyde, the shared work of the Muses and of Antimachus?*

11 Callim. fr. 398 Pf.:Λύθη καὶ παρ’ γράμμα καὶ οὐ τορόν, "Lyde is a thick poem and not clever".
with "titles".  

More to the point here is the linked association Callimachus/Plato, Asclepiades/Antimachus and the theme of reading. Plato, we recall, was partial to Antimachus (T 1-3 Wyss), as was, clearly, Asclepiades; Callimachus, however, was not.

This Antimachus testimonium just mentioned (Proclus to Plato's *Timaeus* 21 C) is an important corollary to Callimachus' Cleombrotus epigram, and it is well worth reconsideration.

εἴπερ γάρ τις άλλος καὶ ποιητῶν ἀριστος κριτής ὁ Πλάτων, ώς καὶ Λογγίνος συνίστησιν ὁ Ἡρακλείδης γούν ὁ Ποντικός φησίν, ὅτι τῶν Χοιρίλου τότε εὐδοκιμούντων Πλάτων τά Ἀντιμάχου προούπήμησε καὶ αὐτόν ἔπεισε τὸν Ἡρακλείδην εἰς Κολοφώνα ἐλθόντα τὰ ποιήματα συλλέξαι τοῦ ἀνδρός· μάτην οὖν φλῃναφώσι Καλλίμαχος καὶ Δοῦρις ώς Πλάτωνος οὐκ ὄντος ἱκανοῦ κρίνειν ποιητᾶς

Callim. fr. 589 Pf. (=Antimachus T 4 Matthews)

For Plato was as excellent a critic of poets as anyone, as also Longinus proves. For Heracleides Ponticus says that of the poets famous at the time of Choerilus, Plato preferred Antimachus, and he persuaded Heracleides, when he was going to Colophon, to collect Antimachus' poems. Callimachus and Duris speak nonsense when they say that Plato was not competent to judge poets.

Pfeiffer and others debate the context of this observation, an issue that need not concern us here. Rather for us the value of this testimonium lies in the circumstantial information that can be derived from it, which is simply the following: 1. Callimachus read Plato on poetry; 2. in his own work Callimachus reacted to Plato's reading of poetry; 3. at issue are questions of judgment, preference, and, possibly, aesthetics.

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12 Gow Page in their commentary to Asclepiades Ep. 32 suggest that this is an epigraph meant to be inscribed at the head of the *Lyde*; I have suggested elsewhere that Callimachus Ep. 51 Pf. (15 GP) may be a similar epigraph.

13 At issue is whether this comment is written in response to Callimachus' discourse against Praxiphanes (fr. 460 Pf.) or another prose work rather than to Callimachus' epigrammatic take on Antimachus.
Callimachus' epigram on Cleombrotus' misreading (cited at the opening of this paper) similarly provides clear and invaluable information on Callimachus and Plato. For from this poem we know the following: 1. Callimachus unquestionably read Plato, and specifically the *Phaedo*; 2. Callimachus epitomizes themes of Platonic dialogue (often extensively treated in Plato) briefly and synoptically in verse; 3. Callimachus' representation of Plato allows for (even highlights) the possibility of misreading Plato.

One question that arises here is the significance of Callimachus' naming earlier cultural figures to mark variation in their presentation, cultural value or reading, as Plato here, Hesiod in Ep. 56 GP (27 Pf.), or Hipponax in the first line of *Iambus* 1. In the case of Ep. 56 the poem praised with the words 'Ἡσίόδου τὸ ἅγεισμα καὶ ὁ τρόπος is, ultimately, *not* Hesiod's. The Hipponax of *Iambus* 1 is not, or not exactly, the Hipponax of archaic tradition. And here in Ep. 53 reading Plato becomes the occasion for self-inflicted death (which must, in part, be the point of the genitives at first seemingly in apposition of line 3: θανάτου...Παλάτωνος, for the reader of line 3 is not immediately aware of a different semantic value of the latter). This is perhaps not the place to engage at length with this question of Callimachus' use of ὄνοματα/πρόσωπα, which rather merits its own study, but it's one that cannot but arise in light of Cleombrotus' misreading.

A further association comes to mind in this third line of Ep. 53, and that is the association of Plato and epigram *tout court*. Among the epigrams attributed to Plato are two (*FGE* 3 and 6), that center on figures from Socratic dialogue (here from the *Symposium*) set, in these two instances, in erotic epigram.14 Few scholars now would attribute these epigrams

14 Plato *FGE* 3

_τὴν ψυχὴν Ἀγαθῶνα φιλῶν ἐπὶ χείλεσιν ἔσχον_
_ήλθε γὰρ ἡ τλῆμων διαβηθεσμένη._

_I held my soul upon my lips as I kissed Agathon. For she, poor wretch, came to cross over._

Plato *FGE* 6

_νῦν, ὅτε μηδὲν Ἀλεξίς οὐσιών μόνον εἴδ᾽ ὅτι καλός,_
_ὀπταῖ, καὶ πάντη πάς τις ἐπιστρέφεται._
_θημέ, τί μηνύεις κυσίν ὡστέων, εἰτ᾽ ἀνήψῃ_
_ὑστερον; οὐχ οὔτω Φαίδρων ἀπολέσαμεν;_
to Plato; but the question is rather not whether Plato composed epigram, (surely not), but whether he might have been even partially plausible as an epigram author to an Alexandrian audience, and even, furthermore, to an Alexandrian poet. He was, apparently, to Meleager, whose lines on Plato's inclusion in his *Garland* betray no doubt as to his suitability for a catalogue of epigram poets.\(^{15}\) This is in itself not insignificant; Meleager's catalogue does not include other authors known primarily for their prose works, nor does Meleager apparently see any inconcinity in setting the author of the *Ion* and *Republic* X among the ὄμοσθεταί of his garland. In a sense even false attribution is contingent on plausibility; ironically, the long discussion in the scholarship of the authenticity of these epigrams in part bears witness to this. To rephrase the question: is Callimachus, in casting Plato in an epigram, in alluding to a specific Platonic dialogue, in part responding to a tradition that knew, or thought it knew, Plato as an author of epigram? Plato as, paradoxically, a poet? There is not a clear answer. Ludwig thought the epigrams were composed in the 3\(^{rd}\) cent. BC (he first discerns the influence of these epigrams on Dioscorides, that is the second part of the century). It remains a tantalizing possibility that Plato, the philosopher who appropriates the imagery of Muses and μοῦσική for philosophy written in prose might have made a plausible composer of the short elegiac poem, might, in other words, have been believed to have committed something of the μετανόια with which Plato's dialogue *On the Soul*, or the *Phaedo*, actually begins, and to which I know turn.

Plato's *Phaedo* opens with the final visit of Socrates' companions, and with Socrates' discussion of his own "poetic" activity. This discussion is not pursued subsequently in the *Phaedo*, but its position at the opening of the work, and the specific elements

\(^{15}\) Meleager Ep. 1.47-48:

ναὶ μὴν καὶ χρύσειον ἀεὶ θείοιο Πλάτωνος
κλώνα, τὸν ἕξ ἄρετής πάντοθι λαμπάμενον

and the golden bough of ever divine Plato, resplendent with virtue throughout
involved, are of great significance to Callimachus, I shall argue, and for this reason I follow them closely here. I give the passage in full—Cebes is speaking.

Pl. Phd. 60c8-61b7 Ὅ σὺν Κέβης ὑπολαβὼν, Νή τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, εὖ γ' ἐποίησας ἀναμνήσας με. περὶ γὰρ τῶν ποιημάτων ὅν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Ἀἰσώπου λόγους καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἀπόλλων προοίμιον καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς με ἢδη ἤρωντο, ἀτὰρ καὶ Ἐὔνης πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ὅτι ποτὲ διανοθείς, ἐπειδὴ δεύτερο ἤλθες, ἐποίησας αὖτα, πρότερον οὐδὲν πώποτε ποίησας. εἰ οὖν τί σοι μέλει τῷ ἔχειν ἐμὲ Ἐὔνην ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅταν με αὖθις ἔρωτα—εὖ οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἔρησεται—εἰπὲ τί χρῆ λέγειν.

Λέγε τοῖνυν, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ὁ Κέβης, τάλθη, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκεῖνῳ βουλόμενοι λέγετε τοὺς ποιήσασιν αὐτῷ ἀντίτεχνος εἶναι ἐποίησας ταύτα-ηδῆ γὰρ ὡς οὐ ράδιον εἴη-ἀλλ᾽ ἐνυπνίων τινῶν ἀποπειράμονας τὴν λέγει, καὶ ἀφοσιούμενος εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις ταύτην τὴν μουσικὴν μοι ἐπιτάττοι ποιεῖν. ἢν γὰρ δὴ ἄττα τοιάδε: πολλάκις μοι φοιτῶν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνύπνιον ἔν τῷ παρελθόντι βίῳ, ἄλλοι ἐν ἄλλῃ ὤψῃ φαινομένων, τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λέγον, "Ω Σώκρατες," ἔφη, "μουσικὴν ποιεῖ καὶ ἐργάζομαι." καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν γε τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ὑπελάμβανον αὐτῷ μοι παρακελεύσθαι τε καὶ ἐπικελεύειν, ὥσπερ οἱ τοῖς θέουσι διακελευόμενοι, καὶ ἔμοι οὔτω τὸ ἐνύπνιον ὅπερ ἔπραττον τοῦτο ἐπικελεύειν, μουσικὴν ποιεῖν, ἡς ψιλοφοσίας μὲν οὕτως μεγίστης μουσικῆς, ἐμοῦ δὲ τοῦτο πράττοντος, νῦν δ᾽ ἐπειδὴ ἡ τε δίκη ἐγένεται, καὶ ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐορτὴ διέκκαλε διὰ ἀποθησκέων, ἔδοξε χρὴναι, εἰ ἄρα πολλάκις μοι προστάττοι τὸ ἐνύπνιον ταύτην τὴν δημώδῃ μουσικῆν ποιεῖν, μὴ ἀπειθῆσαι αὐτῷ ἄλλα ποιεῖν: ἀσφαλέστερον γὰρ εἶναι μὴ ἀπιέναι πρὶν ἀφοσιώσασθαι ποιήσαντα ποιήματα πειθόμενον τῷ ἐνυπνίῳ. οὕτω δὴ πράτων μὲν εἰς τὸν θεὸν ἐποίησα οὖ ἢν ἡ παρούσα θυσία: μετὰ δὲ τὸν θεόν, ἐννοησάς ὅτι τὸν ποιήσας δεόι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιήσῃς εἶναι, ποιεῖν μύθους ἄλλο ὡς λόγους, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἡ μυθολογικός, διὰ ταύτα δὴ ὁ γὰρ προχείρους εἶχον μύθους καὶ ἡπιστάμενος, τοὺς Αἰσώπου, τούτων ἐποίησα οἷς πρώτοις ἐνέτυχον.

Cebes interrupted and said," By Zeus, Socrates, you’ve done well in reminding me. Others have asked me, and just recently Euveneus, about the poems you composed, setting Aesop’s tales to verse and the prooimion to Apollo. They asked what you’d had in mind, since you came here, in composing these, since earlier you never composed anything like
this. If you'd like me to have something to say in answer to Euvenus, when he asks me again, for you know that he will ask, tell me what to say."

"Tell him the truth, Cebes", Socrates said, "that it was from no wish to rival him or his poetry that I undertook this, for that [sc. task] I knew would not be easy, but rather I was trying out the meaning of certain dreams, and hoping not to neglect its message if it frequently bade me compose this sort of music. For this is what happened. The same dream, frequently coming to me in my past life, now appearing in one form now in another, but always saying the same thing: 'Socrates', it said, 'make music and work at it.' Now I in earlier time understood this to bid and enjoin me to do what I was doing, as do they who encourage runners, and so I understood the dream to bid me do what I was doing, and to make music, understanding that philosophy was the best music, and that this was what I was doing. But now, since the trial occurred, and since the god's festival hindered my death, I thought it expedient, if indeed the dream were to be enjoining me to make what is conventionally understood as "music", not to leave this life before making good by obeying the dream and composing poems. So first I composed one to the god of this festival. And after the god, realizing that a poet, if he wants to be a poet, should compose myths and not speeches, and since I'm not myself adept at myth-making, for this reason I took up the myths I had to hand and knew, those of Aesop, and made poems of the first I chanced on."

The reader of Callimachus fr. 1 cannot but be struck by the compositional elements of this narrative. Socrates' "poetic" narrative figures 1) Apollo, 2) Aesop, 3) dream visions and 4) injunction. Socrates composes poetry as the result of an (albeit enigmatic) dream. His decision to embark on this act of poetic composition is not the result of poetic rivalry, but of obedience to a vision. Set against this narrative, the opening of the Aetia becomes the more tantalizing. Apollo's injunction to the poet is followed (lines 29-34 of fr. 1) by his rendering Aesop into verse in his comparison of the donkey and the cicala, and then (frr. 3-4 Massimilla) by the dream of his youthful transference to Helicon. Most revealing, and most significant for Callimachus' engagement with Plato, is the definition of mousike as philosophy or song—a moment in Plato that effects an equivalency of the two, an equivalency that makes the appropriation of each into the other the more
understandable, indeed perhaps inevitable. The image of Socrates at the end of his life celebrating Apollo in song leaves open the door to ongoing discourse—what is the language/activity of the muses?

It is possible that the *Phaedo*, and specifically Socrates on song, is implicated a second time in the opening of the *Aetia*. The final image of our extant lines is the sadly fragmentary evocation of winged clarity of lines 39-40:

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\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots ] \text{c.} [\ldots] \text{πτερόν σύκετι κινεῖν} \\
\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots ] \text{Η τῆς} \text{μου} \text{ένεργότατος}
\]

(... no longer to move its wing (...) then most vivid

Many scholars, including the present one, have thought these lines might be a continued (or second) reference to the cicala and the quality of its sound, but there are compelling reasons to see as well an evocation of Socrates' association of himself on the realization of his death with the swan (*Phd. 84d9*-85b9), though this is implicated in Callimachus' text with several other models of old age and the swan's song.¹⁶ I'm not sure that the evocations of two images, of swan and cicala, necessarily need exclude each other (the *Aetia* prologue is itself, after all, a mosaic rather than a hierarchy of models); certainly, though, Socrates' depiction of himself as vatic voice of Apollo would be a very effective presence at this moment in Callimachus' poem where the poet, the obedient ἀκηθητής of Apollo, embarks on the metamorphosis that makes him the interlocutor in dialogue with the Muses on Helicon, and where the Muses' area of activity turns out to be a surprisingly learned version of their function as attributed by Aelius Aristides to Pindar in fr. 31 Snell-Maehler—namely the celebration of cult foundations and the divine deeds they recall.¹⁷

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¹⁷ Pind. fr. 31 Snell-Maehler=Aelius Aristides *In Defense of Oratory* 420

Πίνδαρος . . . ἐν Δίως γάμῳ καὶ τούς θεοὺς αὐτοὺς φησιν ἐρωμένου τοῦ Δίως, εἰ τοῦ δέοιντο, αἰτήσαι ποιήσασθαι τινας αὐτῷ θεοὺς, οἵτινες τὰ μεγάλα ταῦτα ἔργα καὶ πᾶσαν γε τὴν ἐκείνου κατασκευὴν κατακουσάντοις λόγοις καὶ μουσική.

*Pindar says at the wedding of Zeus, when Zeus asked the gods themselves if they needed anything, they asked him to make some gods for himself, who would adorn his great deeds and his all his arrangement with words and music.*
Plato's earlier *Phaedrus* outlines this same question, the activity of the Muses, and here specifically in the explication of the cicala (258e7-259d8). In an earlier part of the dialogue (248d-e) *mousike* is specifically associated with the life of the philosopher,\(^\text{18}\) whereas the life of the poet is reduced to the sixth category of merit,\(^\text{19}\) a disjunction that becomes the more significant in the definition of the cicalas and the "music" of the oldest Muses, Calliope and Urania:

*Plato Phdr.* 259b5-259d8  Οὐ μὲν δὴ πρέπει γε φιλόμουσον ἄνδρα τῶν τοιούτων ἀνήκουν εἶναι. λέγεται δ᾿ ὡς ποτ’ ἦσαν οὗτοι ἀνθρωποί τῶν πρὶν Μούσας γεγονέναι, γενομένοις δὲ Μουσῶν καὶ φανερής φόδης οὕτως ἀρα πινές τὸν τότε ἐξεπλάγησαν υφ’ ἰδονής, ὥστε ἄδοντες ἡμέλησαν σίται τε καὶ ποτῶν, καὶ ἔλαθον τελευτῆσαντες αὐτούς· ἐξ’ ὧν τὸ τεττίγων γένος μετ’ ἐκείνο φύεται, γέρας τούτο παρὰ Μουσῶν λαβόν, μηδὲν τροφής δεῖσθαι γενομενον, ἀλλ’ ἅπαν τε καὶ ἄποτον εὖθυς ἅδειν, ἔως ἂν τελευτησθηση, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἔλθον παρὰ Μούσας ἀπαγγέλλειν τίς τίνα αὐτῶν τιμὰ τὸν ἐνθάδε. Τερψιχόρα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς τετμηκότας αὐτὴν ἀπαγγέλλοντες ποιοῦσι προσφιλεστέρους, τῇ δὲ Ἐρατοὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς, καὶ ταῖς ἀλλαῖς οὕτως, κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἐκάστης τιμῆς· τῇ δὲ προσβύτητῃ Καλλιόπῃ καὶ τῇ μετ’ αὐτὴν Οὐρανία τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγοντάς τε καὶ τιμώντας τὴν ἐκείνων μουσικῆν ἀγγέλλουσιν, αὗ δὴ μάλιστα τῶν Μουσῶν περί τε οὐρανόν καὶ λόγους οὕσαι θείους τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνους ἰάσιν καλλίστην φωνήν. πολλῶν δὴ οὖν ἐνεκα λεκτέον τι καὶ οὐ καθευδητέον ἐν τῇ μεσημβρίᾳ.

*It's said that these [sc. the cicalas] were once men before the Muses were born, and at the Muses' birth and the appearance of song these men were so struck then by pleasure,*

\(^{18}\) *Plato Phdr.* 248d2-3: τὴν μὲν [sc. ψυχὴν] πλείστα ἰδοὺσαν εἰς γονὴν ἄνδρος γεννησομένου φιλοσόφου ἢ φιλοκάλου ἢ μουσικοῦ τινος καὶ ἐρωτικοῦ

*the soul that has seen the most [shall enter] into the birth of a man who will be a philosopher or lover of beauty or of a "musical" and loving nature*

\(^{19}\) *Plato Phdr.* 248e1-2: ἕκτη ποιητικὸς ἢ τῶν περὶ μίμησιν τις ἀλλος ἀρμόσει

*to the sixth will be fitted a poet or other imitative artist*
that they sang with no thought for food and drink, and so unconsciously died. From them the race of cicalas was born after this, obtaining this honor from the Muses, at birth to have no need of nourishment, but straightway to sing without need of food nor drink, until they die. And on their death they go to the Muses, and tell them who here honors which of them. Telling Terpsichore of those who honor her in dance they make them the more beloved, and Erato those involved in love poetry, and the others in the same way, according to kind of honor of each. To the eldest, Calliope, and she who comes after her, Urania, they tell of those who spend their time in philosophy and honor their particular music, and these Muses are the ones most concerned with heaven and divine and human speech, and their voice is the most beautiful. And so for many reasons we should talk, and not sleep, at noon.

Again there is much here that strikes the Callimachean reader, and should. Plato's birth and catalogue of the Muses is, first of all, a re-working of Hesiod's catalogue of Muses at Th. 52-79. As in Hesiod, so in Plato Calliope is the pre-eminent Muse, and Urania immediately precedes her. In Plato, unlike Hesiod, some men (those who evolve into cicalas) are older than the Muses. The cicalas sing above Phaedrus and Socrates, are able to bestow on men the gift they have themselves obtained from the Muses—they are thus intermediaries, προσφήται, of the Muses, and their relationship to the Muses is an intimate, not a subordinate one. The discourse is framed in terms of φιλία: it befits the cultured, "muse-loving" man (φιλόμουσον ἄνδρα) to know the origin of the cicala and their particular gift; the cicalas, in turn, cause certain men to be more beloved (προσφιλέστεροι) to certain Muses. We immediately recall that Callimachus defines the Telchines as those who are no friends of his Muse (fr.1.2: νήπιδες οἱ Μούσης οὐκ ἐγένοντο φίλοι), and closely follows his wish to "sing among the cicalas" with the observation that the Muses do not thrust aside their friends when the later become old (lines 37-38). The passage in the Phaedrus of course narrates an aition, the origin of the cicala, and it is in part with this aition in mind that Callimachus sings (fr. 1.29-30) ἐν τοῖς γὰρ ἄείδομεν οἱ λιγών ἤχον | τέττιγος, we sing among those [who love] the shrill

20 Terpsichore in Hesiod's catalogue precedes Erato; Plato also recalls Hesiod's ἐρατόν ὀδόσαν ἵεσα (lines 67 and 65) in ἱσαὶν καλλίστην φωνήν.
sound of the cicala. When transferred in dream to Helicon, Callimachus engages in dialogue with two Muses, Calliope and Clio; the preferred calling again marked with two patronesses rather than one, and one of these is Calliope, the Muse whom Callimachus will call "our Calliope" in fr. 75.77: ἔνθεν ο ραίδός | μῦθος ἐς ἱματέρῃν ἐδραμε Καλλιόπην. Given the extent of the Platonic coloring in the Aetia's opening lines, I would hazard a suggestion for Callim. fr. 1.2: νήμες οι Μούσης οὐκ ἐγένοντο φίλοι, a line often translated as "not friends of the Muses" (and so "uncultured"). There is, however, one Muse here, not a plurality. Some scholars (including this one) have seen something of an image here that prefigures Roman elegy's "my Muse=my poetry", and it may be true that the later poets look to this, but a more likely possibility, in my opinion now, is that "are no friends of my Muse" means "are not friends of Calliope", phrased, significantly, in terms of "philia", and with Callimachus, as once Socrates, associated with the pre-eminent muse.

It is worth noting here also that the conjectured imperative of Callimachus' "invocation" (fr. 2 Massimilla) is ἀμνήσσητε, while this finds many lyric parallels, is also a crucial term for Plato on the process of learning and recognition of the immortality of the soul, particularly in the Meno and, intriguingly, the Phaedo. As, of course, is the dialogic form itself, and dialogue in search of definition, in which both Plato's work, and at least the first two books of Callimachus' Aetia, are framed.

Plato's appropriation of mousike effects, as Penelope Murray has elegantly shown in several recent studies, something of a small revolution in semantic terms. Pre-Socratic philosophy is composed almost entirely in poetry; it is with Plato that philosophy is transformed into prose dialectic, bringing with this transformation the figures of earlier philosophy's inspiration (as e.g. Empedocles) to prose. The Mouseia of the Academy and the Lyceum are emblematic, in a way, of this transformation. The poets who come after Plato, perhaps especially those associated with the Mouseion in Alexandria, compose in light of this earlier transformation. In this sense, a better term for "Hellenistic", historically accurate but in some ways culturally inexact when talking of poetry, might

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22 Pind. Pyth. 1.47 ὀμνάσσειν, Pyth. 4.54 ὀμ νάσσει; Sapph. fr. 94.10 V. ὀμνάσσει.
well be "post-philosophical"—Plato's appropriation of the Muses, and philosophy's appropriation of poetry as subject of discourse, interpretation and evaluation, has already happened. Hence the irony of Cleombrotus' plunge to the underworld, his peculiar *katabasis*—his misreading of Plato is cast in verse, and the result of philosophical study is fall from sublime height.

I return, finally, to Callimachean epigram, and in particular to two often read erotic poems that I would like to consider in this new light, namely their likely Platonic resonances. The first is Callimachus’ poem on Polyphemus (ep. 3 GP=46 Pf.):

> ως ἀγαθὰν Πολύφαμος ἀνεύρατο τὰν ἐπαοιδάν
tóραμένοι ναὶ Γάν, οὐκ ἀμαθῆς ὁ Κύκλωψ.
> αἱ Μοίσαι τὸν ἔρωτα κατισχυόντι, Φιλιππεῖ·
> ἢ πανακές πάντων φάρμακον ἀ σοφία.
> τοῦτο, δοκέω, χα λειμός ἔχει μόνον ἐς τὰ πονηρά
tόγαθόν· ἐκκύπτει τὰν φιλόπαιδα νόσον.
> ἔσθ' ἀμίν ἰχν' ακασταζ' ἀφειδέα ποττόν ἔρωτα
tούτ' εἴπαι, "κείρευ τὰ πτερά παιδάριον'
> οὐδ' ὅσον ἄτταραγόν το νεδοίκαμες, αἱ γὰρ ἐπώδαι
> οἴκοι τῷ χαλεπῷ τραύματος ἀμφοτέραι."

*What a good charm Polyphemus discovered for one in love. By Ge, the Cyclops was not unlearned. The Muses slenderize love, Philippos. Indeed poetry is the all-healing remedy of everything. This, I think, and hunger, alone have some good effect against ta ponera. They cut short the boy-loving disease. This we can say to unsparing Love: " cut your wings, little boy. We're not even a bit afraid of you, for we've both charms at home for the dread wound."

Scholarship on this epigram traditionally focuses on its relationship to Theocritus *Idyll* 11, and the association of both with Philoxenus' dithyrambic poem *Cyclops or Galatea* (*PMG* 815-24, esp. 822: Μούσαι εὐφωνοὶς ἵμμενη τὸν ἔρωτα). I would like to consider this poem here in a different light, and would start with one of its lexical oddities, here
the _eramenos_ of line 2. While the translation "one in love" is clearly correct, I wonder whether the term at the same time is not meant to evoke _eromenos_, for the text then turns to the solution for the object of the "boy-loving disease". Theocritus 11 is concerned with Polyphemus' unrequited love for Galatea, and, we can assume from the testimonia and fragmentary evidence, so was Philoxenus' poem. Callimachus' epigram is different; it opens with a nod (an intertextual gesture, hence surely the Doric color of the poem, as scholars have long noted), to Theocritus, but then changes direction—whatever else may have figured in earlier treatment of Polyphemus and Galatea, homoerotic love, surely, did not. And the oath ναί Γάν is a markedly Socratic one.

In what follows, it's necessary to bear a couple of things in mind about Plato's erotic dialogues, the _Lysis_, the _Symposium_ and the _Phaedrus_. These are didactic erotic prose treatments that seek to define the nature of _Eros_; as literary models, they are themselves in turn available to later artists seeking to characterize Love and its pathology. Evocation of any one of these may be partial, and may be limited to discrete echo (i.e., it may well not be the entire dialogue, or even whole passage that is at play in the later recollection). As is the case with philosophical treatment of poetry, so here philosophy has taken a topic, namely erotic pathology, long the subject of (especially lyric) poetry and appropriated it, and definitions of it, to philosophical discourse. The echoes of this discourse in later poetry appear to be doing something very similar to what we observed in the case of poetic imagery—namely appropriating the philosophical discourse on Eros back into poetry.

Some striking parallels. At _Phaedrus_ 251c-252c Socrates describes the erotic pathology of the soul on beholding the object of its desire. This is described in markedly medical terminology. The culmination of this passage is worth our attention:

> πρὸς γὰρ τὸ σέβεσθαι τὸν τὸ κάλλος ἔχοντα ιατρὸν ἦμηκε μόνον τῶν μεγίστων πόνων. τούτο δὲ τὸ πάθος, ὃ παί καλέ, πρὸς ὅν δὴ μοι ὁ λόγος, ἀνθρωποὶ μὲν ἔρωτα ὀνομάζουσιν, θεοὶ δὲ ὃ καλόστιν εἰκότως διὰ νεότητα γελάση. Λέγουσι δὲ οἴμαι
In addition to revering the one who has beauty it [sc. the soul] has found in him the sole doctor of its greatest ills. This is the experience, beautiful boy, to whom my speech is directed, men name love, but the gods call it something that you, for your youth, would likely find funny. Some of the Homeridai say two lines to Love from some of the less known poems, of which one is indecent and one does not exactly scan. They hymn Love thus:

**Mortals, you know, call him winged Love,**

**Immortals Winged, for his wing-growing compulsion.**

One can believe this or not; nonetheless this is the reason and experience of those in love.

Socrates addresses this speech to a fictive eromenos; the eromenos, or beautiful boy, is the sole "doctor" for one in love. If we assume (as surely we may) that Plato (or in this instance "Socrates"), is in fact the author of these two lines of poetry, this is a vivid evocation of the same winged figure whose feathers may be shorn in Callimachus' poem.

I would add here the observation that Phaedrus himself, in the "role" of eromenos in this dialogue, has led Socrates (who is φιλομαθής 230d3, whereas "our" Polyphemus is οὐκ ἄμαθῆς) out of town for this discussion, having "discovered" the φάρμακον for doing so (230d5-6: σὺ μέντοι δοκείς μοι τῆς ἐμῆς ἔξοδου τὸ φάρμακον ηὕρεκέναι).
This is not the only one of Callimachus' erotic epigrams that appears to echo moments in Plato's *Phaedrus*. A second is 4 GP (41 Pf.), Callimachus' epigrammatic evocation of Plato on the divided soul:

"Ἡμισὺ μεῦ ψυξῆς ἐτὶ τὸ πνέον, Ἡμισὺ δ᾽ οὐκ οἶδ᾽

εἰτ Ἡρος εἰτ Ἀίδης ἠρπασέ, πλὴν ἄφανὲς.

ἡ ἣ τὶν ἐς παιδίων πάλιν ὁχέτο καί μὲν ἀπείπον

πολλάκι "τὴν δρήστιν μὴ ἥπεχεσθε, νέοι.

τούκισνυφησον ἐκεῖσε γὰρ ἡ λιθόλευστος

καὶ δύσερως οἶδ᾽ ὃτι που στρέφεται.

*Half my soul is yet breathing, as to the other half, I know not whether Love or Hades has snatched it away, only that it's gone. To one of the boys? And though I often forbade them, saying "don't [take in] the runaway, young men." (...) For I know that one, deserving to be stoned and miserable in love, tarries somewhere.*

First a couple of textual notes.

1. Line 6, στρέφεται is also a wrestling term, which may be the point here, the evocation of a palaestra seems intentional. Further Catulus appears to recall this in *teneamur* of his rendition of this poem.

2. Line 4, Page in his *OCT* text suggests νυ δέχεσθε, Courtney 1993: 76: ποδέχεσθε, but the point is fairly clear, the young men are enjoined not to hide/receive the runaway. This language of slavery of the soul in love is also present in the *Phaedrus* e.g. 252a5-6: [of the soul in love] πάντα καταφρονήσασα δουλεύειν ἐτοιμή, "disregarding all else it is ready to be a slave".
3. Rather more intriguing is the textual crux at line 5, which has resisted convincing conjectural restoration;\textsuperscript{23} those conjectures that have been forwarded here largely assume that Catulus' Latin rendition of this poem is a close translation, an assumption that is clearly erroneous.\textsuperscript{24} Jacob's δίφησεν assumes both a search (cf. Catulus' \textit{quaesitum}) and an addressee (which is awkward). Gow's suggestion (1952: 159) that we read διήφησεν here may receive some support from \textit{Iambus} 3.39: δεεί[πν]ήσω (so a similar tone of resignation concluding an erotic poem), but I'm unsure, and the resultant hiatus is unwelcome. Schneider's transcription of Catulus' Theotimus (Θεώτιμον) seems less likely. The referent throughout the poem is the speaker's soul, introducing a proper name here would only disrupt the train of the poem. And I would note that the logic of the poem suggests disobedience on the part of the νέοι; an expression of refusal (perhaps from e.g. σύμφησι might come closer to the original text).\textsuperscript{25} There is further a chiastic structure to the Callimachus poem of soul/young men/young men/soul, a structure the introduction of e.g. Theotimus uncomfortably interrupts; more significantly, the indefinite of line 3 is surely meant to remain. Catulus may well, in the manner of Roman comedy, be introducing a Greek name for 'authenticity'; we should note that Catulus' version lacks the Platonic resonance (the soul is a whole entity), and the love in this version is personalized. Catulus' version puts greater emphasis on the soul as runaway,\textsuperscript{26} and with the introduction of Venus moves away from the metaphorical to the literal.

\textsuperscript{23} I thank my friend and colleague Andrej Petrovic for generously reading the ms. of this poem at Heidelberg for me.

\textsuperscript{24} Lutatus Catulus fr. 1 Courtney:
\begin{verbatim}
aufugit mi animus; credo, ut solet, ad Theotimum
devenit. sic est; perfugium illud habet. quid si non interdixem ne illunc fugitivum mitteret ad se intro, sed magis eiceret? ibimus quaesitum. verum, ne ipsi teneamur, formido. quid ego? da, Venus, consilium.
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{25} Cf. οὐχί at Callim. Frr. 43.61, 194.37, 203.43, 228.67, 260.11, \textit{Ep}. 29.3; not wanting to yield too much to circular reasoning here, but σύμφησι is frequent Platonic idiom.

\textsuperscript{26} For Callimachus this is a part of his occasional wry self-deprecation [as in frr. 75, 193 esp.].
Rather we have an ironically self-reflective poem that partially apes some of the outline of Platonic erotic dialogue: verbal interaction with young men (in what role is the speaker imagined addressing the *neoi*?), discussion of the soul and death (there is a play here on different conceptions of the soul's experience), language of knowing and not knowing, and even pseudo-etymology (*eros/dyseros*).

A third erotic epigram that is worth considering here is 8 GP (42 Pf.)

\[
\text{εἰ μὲν ἐκὼν, Ἄρχῖν', ἐπεκώμασα, μυρία μέμφου,}
\text{εἰ δ' ἄκων ἧκω, τὴν προπέτειαν ἔα.}
\text{ἀκρήτος καὶ ἔρως μ' ἡνάγκασαν, ὧν ὁ μὲν αὐτὸν}
\text{εἶλκεν, ὦ δ' οὐκ εἴα τὴν προπέτειαν ἔαν}
\text{ἐλθὼν δ' οὐκ ἐβόησα τίς ἦ τίνος, ἀλλ' ἐφίλησα}
\text{τὴν φλιήν. Εἰ τούτ' ἔστ' ἀδίκημ', ἀδικέω.}
\]

*If willingly, Archinus, I overdid my suit, blame me a thousand times, but if I came against my will, forgive my indiscretion. Unmixed wine and love compelled me, of which the one dragged me here, the other would not let my indiscretion go. For on coming I did not cry out who or whose son I was, but kissed your doorpost. If this is wrongdoing, I do wrong.*

The sentiment that love and wine overcome reason is, as Gow notes in his commentary to this poem, a commonplace in ancient literature; what is more intriguing here is the play on ἐκὼν and ἄκων and the definition of ἀδίκημα. The issue of intentional vs. unintentional wrongdoing is at the center of a number of Platonic dialogues; I'm not sure whether this epigram is meant to evoke any one of them specifically, or whether the general Platonic essence is what is at issue here. The epigram consists of a series of oppositions (several of these involving complex word play), with in the final lines the apparent juxtaposition of a false etymology (φιλέω and φλιη) and an "erroneous" definition (unintentional wrongdoing does not equal wrongdoing).

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\[27\] I wonder whether even the choice of οἶχομαι at line 3 is not a play on Platonic immortality of the soul – this is, after all, the verb that in tragedy is so often used of dying. ἀφανές raises the same question.

I close with a further epigram (58 GP=8 Pf.), one that tantalizes us with both with the wealth of its possible allusions to Plato and the enigma the whole provides.

μικρή τις, Διόνυσε, καλὰ πρήσσοντι ποιητή

ρήσις: ο μὲν "νικῶ" φησί τὸ μακρότατον.

ό δὲ σὺ μὴ πνεύσῃς ἐνδέξιος, ἢν τις ἔρηται

"πῶς ἔβαλες"; φησί "σκληρὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα."

τῷ μερμηριζάντι τὰ μὴ ἐνδίκα τούτο γένοιτο

τόυπος, ἐμοὶ δ', ὅναξ, ἡ βραχυσυλλαβίη.

*Short, Dionysus, is the speech of a poet who succeeds. With "I win" he speaks at length. But on him whom you don't breathe favorably, if someone says, "how did it turn out?, he says "it was hard". May this be the word of one who thinks on what's unfair, but may mine, lord, be the shorter syllabled.*

A traditional take on this piece, one I am not going to pursue here, is to assess its value as a testimonium on Callimachus' dramatic works;29 and the wit of the poem's conclusion, the term for brevity that occupies a full hemiepes and is the longest word in the poem, has also drawn critical attention.30 The point that I would rather highlight here is the apparent play in the first and last words of the epigram on Platonic terms for shortness of speech; two obvious passages are Socrates' words at Protagoras 335b 7-8: καὶ ἐν μακρολογίᾳ καὶ ἐν βραχύλογίᾳ—σοφὸς γὰρ ἐι—ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ μακρὰ ἀδύνατος, ἐβουλόμην ἂν οἶός τ' εἶναι, "you are able to hold discussions in either long or short speeches, for you're clever, but I am unable to do the long ones, though I might wish that I could", and Laws X 887b 3: προτιμᾶν βραχύλογίαν μᾶλλον ἢ μήκος, "to prefer short speech to length". My colleague Susan Stephens addresses the issue of Callimachus and Plato's *brachylogia* at some length in her paper, so I limit myself here to noting the preference for short speech

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29 So e.g. Gow ad loc in *HE*. the proximate cause of this line of inquiry is the observation in the *Suda* life that Callimachus composed both comedies and tragedies.

30 I.e. in a poem that consists of a series of definitions, the term that is "short" (μικρη) turns out to be the longest (βραχυσυλλαβίη).
(there is a further play on terms for speech in the epigram in the use of both ρήσις and ἔπος). In addition to the series of definitions, the term σκληρός calls our attention; this fairly common Platonic term for hardness of character or material does not seem accidental in an epigram that prefers, as does the Cretan Cleinias at Laws X 887b, shortness of speech to length.

No single instance of Platonic allusion in these epigrams is particularly surprising, though a few are quite striking; the aggregate, though, suggests a fairly frequent recourse to a prose model, and an on-going engagement with Plato as both text and literary critic. And this suggests re-assessment. Most of us who read Hellenistic poetry are not frequent readers of Plato; the limitation of our own disciplines and a lack of easy communication in different academic discourses may well be obscuring our vision of the Greek intellectual world that was our poets'. Misled in part by Roman readings of Callimachus that are selective and also pointed themselves to variation, we are choosing to read philologoi for philosophoi and not recognizing our own preference and possible misjudgement.

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LITERARY QUARRELS

Let me begin by expressing my gratitude to the organizers of this Seminar for giving me the opportunity to test these ideas. My paper builds on that of Professor Acosta-Hughes, who has sketched out the complicated relationship between poets and Muses that is found in Plato and he has suggested that Callimachus' own poetics does not avoid but is committed to and implicated in wider discourses about truth, truth-telling, and the cultural status of poets. I wish to build on his work in this volume, and turn to the so-called quarrel with his critics that seemingly occupies Callimachus in both the Aetia prologue and the 13th iambus. Plato will again provide us with the principal intertexts though the focus will shift to the Ion and the Protogoras.

The literary quarrel is a key component of Callimachus’ poetic self-presentation. It features in the Aetia prologue, the end of the Hymn to Apollo, and in the 13th iambus, in all cases, where Callimachus sets his own poetic practice against his anonymous critics.

One impetus for these quarrels is surely to be found in cultural practice: competitive performance was commonplace in the civic and religious festivals of the Greek-speaking world from at least the sixth century BC. We can also look to Pindar as a poet who positions himself against the phthonos of his contemporaries or to the rich tradition of the Contest of Homer and Hesiod.¹ In Aristophanes’ Frogs, however, the quarrel takes on an explicitly civic dimension. The central agon of that play was a contest to decide which dramatist has the better claim to address the state as a sophos—Aeschylus or Euripides.

In the *Frogs* the term, *sophia*, is not a simple synonym for poetry, but encompasses the idea of the poet who is wise in a moral sense and is most capable of articulating his values to the benefit of the state.\(^2\) Dionysus’ decision to bring Aeschylus back to Athens, therefore, was a choice of whose poetry was best able to instill courageous behavior in the citizen soldier at a time of crisis. The play also contains a large component of stylistic critique in such a way that poetic style and moral values are intertwined.\(^3\) Plato’s literary quarrels, like Aristophanes’, are about the moral impact of poetry, but now constructed not as a choice of which poet, but as a more fundamental struggle between poetry *tout court* and philosophy. Plato projects this quarrel into the past in *Republic* 10: πάλαια μέν τις διαφορά φιλοσοφία τε καὶ ποιητικὴ (607b5-6). Certainly, older figures like Xenophanes did critique the truth-value of poetry, but the evidence Plato adduces for an ‘ancient quarrel’ is the attack on philosophy or philosophers found in Old Comedy. The limited source of the attacks and Plato's own quarrel with Aristophanes' portrait of Socrates in the *Clouds* has led many critics to understand the quarrel as a Platonic fiction designed to undercut comic caricatures of philosophers on the one hand, and to enhance the status of the philosophy he is trying to promote, on the other.\(^4\)

Plato's claim for a full-blown quarrel between these two different modes is explicit in only in the *Republic*, where poets are to be banished from the ideal state. But at many

\(^2\) See especially lines 766 and 1519 (where the term is applied to Sophocles) and Goldhill’s discussion in *The Poet’s Voice* (1991: 211-22).

\(^3\) It is significant that Callimachus alludes to the decisive *agon* of the play in his delineation of his own literary quarrel in the *Aetia* (fr. 1.9-10). In Aristophanes the heavier language of Aeschylus weighs down the scale (καθέλκειν) and thus Aeschylus 'wins'; in Callimachus the lighter, more slender poetry draws down the scale. Sophia is the designation for good poetry at *Aetia* fr. 1.18 Massimilla.

other places throughout the course of his writing, Plato seems to be testing poetic discourse against philosophical discourse (in the same way that he tests rhetorical and sophistic argument), and always he finds poetry lacking in some essential way. In the *Ion*, for example, the rhapsode (and the poet to whom he is explicitly connected as a link on a chain) can only operate via inspiration and lacks true understanding. In the *Protagoras*, the poet Simonides subverts the truth of one of the seven sages for gain. In fact, whenever Plato sets poetry against the practice of philosophy, it is found to be only capable of imitating appearances, without true understanding, and pandering to the baser elements in both the soul and society.5

Plato’s positioning of philosophy must be seen as part of a wider picture: in the fifth century poets by far enjoyed a greater standing than philosophers. Poets (and Attic comedy is an excellent example) were publicly engaged in a range of discourses that were closed to philosophers, and which philosophers could only envy. But also in the fifth century the relationship of the poet to his society began to change. In the archaic period poets claimed divine inspiration as authority for their performance and as a guarantee of the truth of poetic utterance. Poets were speakers of wisdom (*sophia*) and many of the figures later appropriated for philosophy were also poets. But, as Margalit Finkelberg outlines in her study of literary fiction, during the fifth century poetry had come to be regarded as less the product of inspiration or divine possession than of craftsmanship or *technê*.6 As poetry moved away from the realm of the possessed speaker

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6 Finkelberg (1998) 174-76. The term *technê* seems to have ranged in meaning from simple skill to the complete intellectual mastery of a subject (as Socrates uses the term in
and came to be conceived of as a craft, it also became liable to rules, rules that Plato, and especially Aristotle and the members of his school sought to articulate and then deploy as critique. The transition from inspiration to craft was marked by a change from the terms “singer” (aoidos) and “to sing” (aeidein) to the terms “maker” (poiêtes) and “to make” (poiein) to describe the poet and his creative act. In the latter case, as in Aristophanes, style and poetic meaning simply converge, and a critic of one may be a critic of the other. By Callimachus’ time philosophers often indulged in criticism, as debates centered on the moral implications of poetic mimesis, and the technical effects of composition (language and word arrangement, genre, and sound)—or how the mimetic effect was produced—became subject to ever increasing analysis and rules. For example, Peripatetic writings attributed to Aristotle and his successors, Theophrastus, and Praxiphanes, have titles like “On Poets and Poetry”, though none has been transmitted intact. However important these works may have been in the evolution of critical thought in the Hellenistic period (Aristotle, for example, does surface in Callimachus) their mode of exposition appears to have been rather different. Later Academics like Heraclides Ponticus and Crantor of Soli are known to have imitated Platonic dialogue, and in the latter case to have written poetry, which makes them, at least theoretically, potential models for Callimachus. Diogenes Laertius tells us the Heraclides wrote dialogues in which philosophers, generals

the Ion). By Callimachus’ time, it may be important that ‘techne’ marked the higher technical skills associated with professional performance. They even called themselves ‘technitai’.

7 Note that Callimachus always styles himself an aoidos (fr. 1.23 Pf) and see Acosta Hughes-Stephens (2002) 243-4.
8 See Weineck (1998) for a thoughtful discussion of the role of ‘criticism’ in Plato’s Ion.
11 See Dillon (2003) 204-231 on these figures.
and statesmen converse, and Crantor wrote similar types of discourse, though these
would seem closer in style to Cicero’s works than Callimachus’. Callimachus was writing at a period when poets and philosophers engaged in similar
discourses about truth and who could tell it, but before Plato the poet was free to engage
in his craft without reference to another discursive mode. But Plato's critiques of poetry
and Aristotle's attempt to systematize it significantly altered the dynamic. Plato inserts
himself rather deliberately into a contest with poetry as a rival or competitor, and that
tradition of a competition between the two discursive modes continues into later writing.
Callimachus appears to have been fully aware of the tensions between philosophical
systems (as they evolved and strove for status and cultural authority) and the role of the
poet. His own work on a reductive level can be understood as a response to this
philosophical challenge. But more important, I believe, he was asserting the value of
poetry (not philosophy, not a philosophically driven criticism) as dominant voice in
emerging Ptolemaic society. In so doing, he transforms philosophical and specifically
Platonic discussion of poetry into a vehicle for his own poetics. To test this hypothesis I
want to focus on Callimachus’ *Iambi*, a collection of at least thirteen poems in various

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13 The hierarchies are clear in the very public venues of New Comedy, where
philosophers are sometimes pilloried (as in Aristophanes’ *Clouds*), but no commensurate
public venue exists for a philosophical rebuttal.
meters (including choliambics) that are generally taken to be the first poetry collection we have arranged by the author himself.\footnote{The debate about the number of \textit{iambi}—13 or 17 continues to flourish. I follow Acosta-Hughes (2002) Kerkhecker (1999) in thinking there were originally 13. My argument does not depend on any particular number, though it does tend to reinforce the case for 13.}

It has long been acknowledged that Callimachus’ \textit{Iambi} are focused on moral issues,\footnote{As Kerkhecker (1999) 294 puts it: “a concern for personal morality, and manners.” Clayman (1980) 70 summarizes: “Callimachus’ \textit{Iambi} seem at home in the general context if Hellenistic moralizing literature.”} and the numerous Platonic echoes have also been acknowledged, though never consistently analyzed. Today most of the \textit{iambi} are quite fragmentary and cannot be much reconstructed beyond the outlines of the scholarly synopsis (\textit{diegesis}), if that is available, but within the surviving iambic fragments at least five poems still have easily identifiable Platonic allusions.\footnote{Kerkhecker adds one more that I am inclined to accept, but it is not clear cut enough to aid the discussion (1999) 84 n.6 (\textit{iambus} 4).} The third \textit{iambus} (fr. 193 Pf.) deplores the current age’s preference for wealth over virtue (\textit{arête}), and features a young man named Euthydemus, who has apparently been pimped to a rich old man by his own mother. Now Euthydemus gives his name to a Platonic dialogue. Within the dialogue he is one of two brothers deft at sophistic argument; they ‘prove' among other things that bad is good, that gods are animals, and that money is a good thing, while more money is even better. The name then would not be inappropriate for a boy selling himself to an older man.

Euthydemus’ jilted lover speaks one of the few surviving lines of the poem: "I was properly educated, I thought to see the good." (fr. 193.30-31: \textit{κοηγύως ἐπαιδεύθην} / \[..... \varepsilon]φρόνησα τῶγαθὸν βλέψα\[i]). The betrayed man alludes to the ladder of love that...
Diotima advocates in the *Symposium*: the love of one beautiful body, when understood properly, can lead the lover to "see" the form of the good itself. The surrounding context guarantees that this recognizably Platonic sentiment must be understood ironically or as a failed behavioral paradigm.

The fifth *iambus* (fr. 195Pf) chastises a schoolmaster for the sexual abuse of his students. Again we find a lofty Platonic sentiment turned upside down: instead of Socrates who can control his impulses, we find the schoolmaster, who cannot, exhorted to:

Hold from their racing | your raving horses, and do not take the return course, | lest around the turning post they shatter your chariot | and you tumble out headlong. (fr. 195.26-9 Pf.).

The reference to the *Phaedrus* is unmistakable. In that dialogue Socrates, in an eroticized setting, discourses on love to a beautiful boy (Phaedrus), allegorizing the passions as being like runaway horses (254). The simile of the passions to an out-of-control chariot was quite familiar in ancient texts, but in the *Phaedrus* the allegory is within the specific context of a man controlling (or not controlling) his passion for a young boy—as in the *iambus*. There is a further nudge in the Platonic direction: Callimachus' charioteer is in danger of falling out of his vehicle like a tumbler (κυβιστήρης). The word is not common, but Aristophanes, in his unforgettable speech about *eros* in the *Symposium* describes original humans as possessing four arms and four legs and being able to move hand-over-hand, just like tumblers (190a6-7: κυβιστώντες, κυβιστώσι κύκλοι).

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17 210c7-d1: βλέπων πρὸς...καλὸν and also 211c1-4. The thought is frequent in Plato; other parallels are provided in Kerkhecker (1999) 76 n. 66.

18 Parallels are provided by Kerkhecker (1999) 136 n.87.
Iambus 10 (fr. 200a Pf.) is almost completely lost but the diegesis gives us a first line, "The Aphrodites—for the goddess is not one" (τὰς Ἀφροδίτας-ή θεός γὰρ οὖ μά). We are in the vicinity of Pausanias' speech in the Symposium, in which he asserted that there were two Erotes because there were two Aphrodites—heavenly and common—and again a Platonic erotic context. The 12th iambus articulates the superiority of song, as the gods compete in giving a gift for a newborn daughter. Apollo's gift of song will surpass all, he claims: “so long as my chin is innocent of hair, and so long as rapacious wolves delight in kids” (69-70, at this point the lines break off). On one level these lines are a sly reprise of the Lycian Apollo of the Aetia prologue (fr. 1.22-4 Pf.), who instructs the still beardless poet to “cultivate fat sheep, but slender Muses”, but there is also a connection to the Phaedrus (241c6-d1), where Socrates reminds Phaedrus that a lover’s affections “do not derive from goodwill, but is in the nature of food, for the sake of satiety, just as wolves love lambs, so lovers love a boy.”

The most significant and well-analyzed Platonic influence is to be found in the 13th iambus. A number of scholars including Mary Depew, Richard Hunter, and Arnd Kerkhecker have identified several points of contact. Iambus 13 is now very fragmentary but according to the diegesis:

εν τούτω πρὸς τοὺς καταμεμφομένους αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πολυειδείᾳ ὄν
γράφει ποιημάτων ἀπαντῶν φησιν ὅτι Ἰωνα μιμεῖται τὸν τραγικὸν· ἄλλον
οὐδὲ τὸν τέτοιον τις μέμφεται πολυειδὴ σκέψη τεκταυνόμενον.

19 180c5-e5. Note particularly 180c6-7: [ἐρωτέος] νῦν δέ οὖ γὰρ ἔστιν εἰς.
In this poem in response to those censuring him for the variety of the poems he writes, he (sc. Callimachus) responds that he is imitating Ion the tragic poet, and that no one would censure a carpenter for building a variety of objects.

We can reconstruct the poetic narrative as follows: Callimachus is apparently attacked for writing unskilled (ἀμαθῶς) iambics because he has never gone to Hipponax’s Ephesus and steeped himself in the local culture, the fons et origo of Hipponax’s vituperative art, and, as a result, he has made mistakes of some sort in his own iambics (lines 9-15). He mixes his dialects (line 18) either within the same poem or within the same poetry book. This habit of stylistic impurity is described as madness from which his friends are enjoined to rescue him (lines 19-22). Callimachus responds by asking who promulgated the rule that poets were assigned to one genre only (lines 30-34), answering his own question: ‘no one, I think’ (line 34). Next he turns the tables by adducing as a counter example, first a carpenter, who makes more than one type of object (lines 35-37), then a fifth-century poet (Ion of Chios), who wrote successfully in a number of genres including the dialectically ‘mixed’ tragedy (lines 43-49). Callimachus caps his argument with the claim that those who would restrict creativity to a one-genre rule are the truly mad. In their limitations they are like those who would scratch out only starvation rations (λυμηρά) with the tips of their fingernails when they could be enjoying a richer feast (lines 60-2). The iambic concludes with a reiteration of the opening lines, though now with altered force and meaning: originally they were placed in the mouth of his critics, but now have been turned into a statement of Callimachus’ own poetic intent. Despite the very fragmentary nature of the poem, its central argument seems to play off of Plato's Ion.
In opening (lines 12-13) and closing (lines 65-6) of the poem we read that in Ephesus, “those intending to produce the limping feet (choliambics) took fire not without learning (μὴ ἄμαθῶς ἔναυόνται).”\(^{22}\) The phrase juxtaposes learning or skill (μὴ ἄμαθῶς) with inspiration (ἔναυόνται). These are close to the terms that Socrates uses in the Ion when he claims that a poet cannot be informed by both knowledge (technē) and inspiration (enthousiasmos). In the subsequent section Callimachus asks:

\[
\text{τίς εἶπεν αὐτῷ[...], ἔριδι[...].}
\]
\[
\text{κύ πεντάμετρα συντίθει, κύ δὲ ἤ[ρῳ]ν,}
\]
\[
\text{κύ δὲ τραγῳδία[ῖν] ἐκ θεῶν ἐκληρώσω;}
\]
\[
\text{δοκέω μὲν οὐδείς,}
\]

‘who said…you compose pentameters, you the heroic, you are allotted tragedy by the gods?’ (lines 30-32). At least one person who made this claim was Socrates, who observed in the Ion that the Muse inspires in one genre only:

\[
\text{ἄλλα θεία μοίρα, τοῦτο μόνον οἶός τε ἔκαστος ποιεῖν καλῶς ἐφ’ ὁ ἦ}
\]
\[
\text{Μοῦσα αὐτὸν ὁρμησεν, ὁ μὲν διθυράμβος, ὁ δὲ ἐγκώμια, ὁ δὲ}
\]
\[
\text{ὑπορχήματα, ὁ δὲ ἐπη, ὁ δὲ ἱάμβον.}
\]

…By divine allotment, this alone each can do well in accordance with which the Muse has moved him: one to dithyrambs, another to encomium, to hyporchemata, to epic, to iambic” (534c2-5).

Callimachus next introduces the counter example of the carpenter who makes more than one type of object successfully. The analogy has parallels in earlier poetry\(^{23}\) but it was also closely identified with Socratic argument in contemporary comedy, a circumstance

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\(^{22}\) Scholars have pointed out that ἔναυόνται means ‘take fire’ and must refer both to poetic inspiration as well as to the fiery quality of the Hipponactean choliambic. See Russo (1999) 107-112.

\(^{23}\) Kerkhecker (1999) 263 and n. 75.
that suggests that by employing the τεκτῶν Callimachus might have been capitalizing on an all too familiar caricature.24 And perhaps with malice aforethought: Plato's particular bête noir (as we saw above) seems to have been Old Comedy.

Callimachus next introduces the example of Ion of Chios, who could do what Socrates doubted—write poetry in more than one genre. Callimachus has not so coincidentally chosen as his exemplum a poet, who shares a name with Plato's rhapsode, whom we could style, Ion of Ephesus. Both Ions (the Ephesian and the Chian) were international artists, whose inspired compositions and/or performances were not limited to their regional origins or local customs. The Ion-Ion link is strengthened by the reiteration of Ἐφεσοῦς at the closing of the poem: when Ἐφεσοῦς occurs in the opening lines, of course, it can only suggest Hipponax, but after the introduction of Ion of Chios and a series of near quotations from the Platonic dialogue, in the final lines, Ion of Ephesus becomes a ghostly presence. When at the end of the poem Callimachus throws his critics’ condemnation back at them: “I sing, although I have not gone to Ephesus nor Ἰων συμμετέχας (lines 64-66), Richard Hunter makes the attractive suggestion that this might be a sly reference not only to mixing with Ionians (whether people or dialect), but mixing Ions.25

13th iambus, of course, is a poem that depends for its full meaning on the 1st iambus, for it is in that opening poem where Callimachus invokes Hipponax (without going to Ephesus). It begins with the archaic iambicist returns from the underworld and speaking

24 For the tectôn see Republic 10 (595a-598d). Kerkhecker (1999) 263 n. 76.
in his ‘own’ voice: "listen to Hipponax!" He materializes specifically to chastise the squabbling critics of Alexandria.\textsuperscript{26} According to the \textit{diegesis} on the poem, these men were φιλόσοφοι, which on the papyrus was subsequently corrected to φιλόλογοι. But Euhemerus, the seven sages, and Thales make an odd company with φιλόλογοι unless the two are seen as part of an intellectual continuum as sketched above. The \textit{diegesis} also tells us that Hipponax first summoned them into the Sarapeion, singling out Euhemerus for his 'unrighteous books' (ἀδικα βιβλία, fr.191.11Pf.). This new Hipponax teaches by example, telling the quibblers a pointed tale about the seven sages: when he lay dying, Bathycles\textsuperscript{27} gave a cup to his son with instructions to give it to the wisest man. The son duly sought out the philosopher, Thales, who in turn sent the cup to Bias, who for his part sent it to Periander, who sent it to Solon, Solon to Chilon, Chilon to Pittacus, Pittacus to Cleobulus, who finally completed the circle, returning it to Thales. Thales then dedicated it in the Didymaion at the temple of Apollo in Miletus. The moral for the critics is clear—the truly wise do not boast of their own excellence, they value their fellows, and are pious towards the gods.

\textsuperscript{26} In fact the two poems are near mirror images: in \textit{iambus} 1 Callimachus ventriloquizes Hipponax to chastise contemporary critics; in \textit{iambus} 13 the critics chastise Callimachus for ventriloquizing Hipponax.

\textsuperscript{27} Bathycles may have been a sculptor who worked on the Amyclaen throne of Apollo. If so, a nice choice for Hipponax to demonstrate that he has put aside his archaic vitriol. His poetry (in the fine tradition of the iambic persona) was said to have driven the sculptor Boupalos to commit suicide. I am indebted to an unpublished paper of Stephen White's for this observation.
Diogenes Laertius devotes the first book in his *Lives of the Philosophers* to the various men identified as sages, so their position as first philosophers or proto-philosophers was well established. Two of them (Bias and Myson) are mentioned in Hipponax, though whether he knew or related the story of the cup is moot. The first extant occurrence of the seven as a group is in Plato's *Protagoras* that begins with Socrates and the Sophist, Protagoras, spurred on by their attendant young men, including Hippias and Alcibiades, engaging in a competitive exchange. Protagoras starts off with a *muthos*—the creation of men and the bestowing of skills (*technai*) upon them, but not universal virtue (*arête*).

The question then becomes who best can teach virtue, as Socrates and Protagoras agree to interrogate each other in turn. Protagoras sets as the topic the meaning of a poem of Simonides. The poet, it seems, has 'corrected' an aphorism of Pittacus (one of the seven sages). Socrates has already informed us about the seven in the context of Spartan speech habits. We are told that the Lacedaemonian is the most naturally philosophical of men, because of brevity of speech (*brachylogia*):

[The Lacedaemonian] darts out some notable saying, terse and full of meaning, and the person with whom he is talking is like a child in his hands….and many of our own age and of former ages have noted that the true Lacedaemonian type of character has the love of philosophy even stronger than the love of gymnastics;

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28 Diogenes (1.13) lists twelve, but the number varies with the source. See Martin (1993) 108-115.

29 Because this first example so late Fehling wondered if Plato had invented it for the dialogue (1985) 9-18. Callimachus' list of sages matches that of Demetrius of Phaleron, but Diogenes Laertius tells us that Callimachus' version came from one Maenandrius (or Laenandrius) of Miletus, which would account for the prominence of the Milesian Thales. Alan Cameron (1995) 222 has pointed out the dedication of the cup in the Didymaion at Miletus coincides with the rebuilding of that sanctuary paid for by Ptolemy II in the 270s and 260s. This is very much in keeping with Callimachus' other poetry on the Ptolemies, and should not surprise.
they are conscious that only a perfectly educated man is capable of uttering such expressions. Such were Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mytilene, and Bias of Priene, and our own Solon, and Cleobulus the Lindian, and Myson the Chenian. And seventh in the catalogue was the Lacedaemonian Chilon. All of these were lovers and emulators and disciples of the culture of the Lacedaemonians, and anyone may perceive that their wisdom was of this character, consisting of short, memorable sentences that they severally uttered. And they met together and dedicated in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, as the first fruits of their wisdom, the famous inscriptions in all men's mouths: 'know thyself' and 'nothing in excess'. Why do I say this? Because Lacedaemonian brevity was the style of primitive philosophy (342e-343a. The translation is from Jowett).

As the argument continues the esoteric model of laconic speech figures as an alternative to the education under the public gaze (exoteric), favored by the sophists, who taught for profit.

Pittacus' saying that "it is hard to be good" illustrates the brachylogia of a first-generation philosopher. But the poet Simonides in his ambition to acquire a reputation for wisdom (according to Socrates) attempts via his poem to discredit Pittacus' words. This section of the dialogue foreshadows the clash between poetry and philosophy that is overt in the Republic and projects it back into an earlier age. Socrates, as we see in the above passage, identifies Pittacus and his fellow 'wise men' as philosophers because of the wisdom contained within their laconic utterances, even going so far as to make them collectively responsible for dedicating the 'first fruits' of their wisdom at the Delphic oracle. Should
we wish to plot a mini-history of philosophy as adumbrated in the *Protagoras* the aphorisms of the seven, enshrined at Delphi, stimulate Socrates to the next stage, namely to proceed beyond the folk wisdom of "know thyself" and "nothing in excess" to attempt to define and articulate the nature of justice or goodness, not definitively, but via elenchic debate. His principal rivals are the sophists, who deny absolutes and claim to be able to teach virtue to anyone (who can pay). Poetry is a non-starter in this competition. Pittacus’ attempt to grapple with a difficult question—is it possible for a man to be good—is irrelevant to Simonides. Simonides was reputed to have been the first poet to be paid for his work, and Socrates turns this against him, remarking that Simonides felt obliged to attack Pittacus because: "he was often required to praise and magnify a tyrant or the like, much against his will" (346). The poet thus not only attacks an earlier proto-philosopher for gain, in the process he deliberately contorts a seminal message about the nature of goodness. How (so the implicit message goes) can we trust such poets to educate our sons?\(^{30}\) The dialogue continues with Socrates himself explicating Simonides' poem in terms of sentence structure (the placement of *men* is introduced into the discussion), language, and concordance, presumably to illustrate why philosophers are more competent than poets to utter on meaningful matters like justice or goodness.\(^{31}\) The dialogue concludes with a discussion of pleasure and the good (351b-358d) and by praising the art of measurement—an exact science—as a means of neutralizing the deceptiveness of appearances (356c-357c). By any estimate this is a very odd dialogue, full of contradictions, reversals of position, and arguments verging on the absurd.

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\(^{30}\) Though to be fair the poet and the sophist tend to merge together in the dialogue, so one could easily argue that the principal target was the latter not the former.

\(^{31}\) For a fine discussion of Socrates as a literary critic, see Carson (1992) 110-130.
(Socrates' syntactical analysis of the poem, for example, and his extolling the virtues of measurement). \(^{32}\)

Incommensurate length and differing styles of the dialogue and the *iambus* requires that any comparison must be done with caution, still there is much that the two share: in addition to the embedded tale of the sages the *iambus*, like the dialogue, positions the teaching of moral excellence within the context of literary quarrels. The *Protagoras* features a quarrel between philosophers, sophists, and poets with Socrates as ostensibly the narrating voice of truth; the *iambus* between various philosophers and/or critics, with a stern, moralizing poet—the resurrected Hipponax—as the narrator and moral arbiter. The dialogue ends with the dubious proposal that measure is the 'solution' to moral ambiguity; near its close the *iambus* gives us the victorious sage, Thales, sketching out geometric figures of Phrygian Euphorbus in the dirt.

Socrates characterizes the earliest philosophers as laconic, speaking few but dense and morally charged words, what he names *brachylogia*. The concept coincides with Callimachus' expressed views on how good poetry should work. In the *Aetia* prologue Apollo's instructions to the fledgling poet are a model of concision and wit: grow fat sheep but slender Muses (fr. 1.22-4 Pf.). There Callimachus also praises an *oligostichos*, or a man of few poetic lines (fr. 1.9 Pf.), and in an epigram (AP 9.566) Callimachus extols the brief utterance: "a short speech befits the good poet, Dionysus. His longest

\(^{32}\) See Coby (1987). I am indebted to Kathyrn Morgan for allowing me to see “Philosophy at Delphi: Socrates, Sages, and the Circulation of Wisdom” in advance of publication.
speech is 'I win'. His language throughout the *Aetia* and the *Iambi* is dense and thought-provoking, full of ironic duplicity that requires his audience to reevaluate meanings, as we saw, for example, in the Ion mixing of the 13th *iambus*. Callimachus also introduces Plato's principal sage, Pittacus, in what Kathryn Gutzwiller argues was the first epigram of an authorial collection. In that epigram, when approached by a stranger wishing advice on whom to marry, either a woman of his own station or one above him, in an admirable demonstration of Platonic (or laconic) *brachylogia*, Pittacus responds by pointing with his staff to children at play, saying only: "these will tell you the whole story" (κείνοι σοι πᾶν ἐρωτοῖν ἔπος). The children, laconic in their turn, are playing with a spinning top, and call out: "keep it in its track." The epigram capitalizes on the oracular aspect of the advice and, what Richard Martin has called "the unique and pungent eloquence, verbal or gestural," that characterized the sages.

Callimachus does not speak in *properia persona* in this opening *iambus* but ventriloquizes the older poet, a creative decision that provided the bone of contention for his critics in the 13th *iambus*. Callimachus brings back Hipponax not as a character in a narrative but by an act of mimesis, permitting him speak in his own voice. Callimachus' speaking through Hipponax bears some resemblance to Socrates' ventriloquizing Simonides in the *Protagoras*, because in both the older figure is quoted and adapted for new narrative

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33 Lines 1-2: Μυρῷ τις, Διόνυσος, καλὰ πρὸσοσσοντι ποιητή | ὁμῆς ὡ μὲν νικῶ φῆμι τὸ μαχρότατον.
34 AP 7.89 and DL 1.79 = Pf. ep. 1. See Gutzwiller (1999) 226, who remarks that Callimachus "begins his epigram collection…not with the announcement of any one theme, but with the suggestion that his philosophy of restraint, of refined choice, will be the glue that holds together the [collection]." For the correspondence of this epigram with the *Aetia* prologue see Acosta-Hughes and Stephens (2001) 214-6.
goals; another intriguing parallel is that of Plato ventriloquizing Socrates within the dialogues. Resemblances between the two texts proliferate: the *Protagoras* ends with praise of mathematics and exact sciences. Although we are lacking the last lines of Callimachus' poem the story of the sages clearly ends with Thales, praised as an astronomer, sketching a mathematical theorem in the dirt. The theorem is said to be that of the Homeric hero, Euphorbus. Pythagoras believed he had been Euphorbus in a former life, and Callimachus is happy to expand on the Pythagorean aspect of what should be a straightforward compliment. The poem makes three points about Pythagoras: he was a moral philosopher as well as a mathematician, he also set up a polis (in Italy), and he held a belief in reincarnation (fr. 191. 58-63 Pf.) (Plato, we should note, turned to mathematics at the end of his life, tried to instruct Dion of Syracuse about proper government—unsuccessfully, and to judge from the *Republic* believed in reincarnation.) Thales imitating Euphorbus (who has returned from the dead as Pythagoras) bears a certain resemblance to Callimachus imitating Hipponax in that both recall and transmit the past. Hipponax, though, makes no claims to reincarnation: he may have come back from the dead but he cannot stay. His is a textual rather than a literal rebirth.

Callimachus' mimesis of Hipponax is also akin to Ion the rhapsode (in Plato's dialogue) performing Homer or Archilochus—Callimachus' Hipponax comes alive again and speaks through the mouth of Callimachus. Callimachus' inspired speech act thus blurs the distinction between himself and Hipponax as he is filled with (in Socratic terms) the

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36 By Plato's own definition his revenant Socrates is a product of mimesis. Why is the prose form of mimesis acceptable (if it is) when the poetic is not?

37 I accept Lloyd-Jones’ reading: Ἱταλοὶ δ’ ὑπῆκοος for line 62, on which see D’Alessio (1996) 2.584-6.
dianoia of the poet. Speaking in the persona of an iambic poet is not quite the same thing as merely alluding to or even borrowing from his text. Archaic poets were not always separable from their biographies, and iambicists like Archilochus and Hipponax even less so. They were not just names of poets whose works will have been available for reading in Alexandria, they came with specific personal voices and attached performance practices. Their names alone evoked or were coincident with the poetry of praise or blame.38 We might go so far as to say that the medium (the choliambic meter) and the associations of the name were the message quite apart from the content of a specific poem.39 This surely is part of the complaint in the 13th iambus—Callimachus cannot be Hipponax without in effect being Hipponax—living in Ephesus and experiencing the same stimuli to invective that the poet did. Callimachus' approach to the problem is twofold: (in the 1st iambus) a mimesis similar Plato's of Socrates and (in the 13th iambus) a claim for mimesis that is aligned with poetic inspiration and the performance of poetry (via the interplay with Plato’s Ion). As part of that claim in the latter poem he locates learning and inspiration in his own poetic persona, against the critics’ strictures, and against the need for external experience: ἀείδω | οὔτ’ Ἐφεσον ἐλθὼν (I sing, without having gone to Ephesus (lines 63-4).

The reconstituted Hipponax sets the tone for the whole collection as poems of “pungent critique”. The archaic Hipponax attacked personal enemies and invective is still to be felt

38 Whether we should think of iambic as a genre is not entirely clear. Similar invective already belonged to Old Comedy.
39 Hence the choice of the title Iambic Ideas for a recent collection. See Cavarzere, Aloni, and Barchiesi (2001) xii. "We have decided to promote this well-known problem of generic analysis to a major theme of our discussion, by naively foregrounding it in the title, Iambic Ideas, not Idea."
in the *iambi*, but now he announces that he has set aside the “Boupalian battle”—the personal nastiness—to emphasize the stern, moralizing aspect. Even in the fragmentary text the contemporary world of Alexandria is set in contrast to the archaic world and their respective vices and virtues instantiated by Euhemerus and his ‘unrighteous books’ on the one hand and Thales’ austere geometry on the other. Euhemerus was somewhat older than Callimachus, and he wrote the *Ierai Anagraphai*, in which he claimed that the Olympian gods were not originally divinities but culture heroes, venerated after death and subsequently divinized. His writings were called atheistic, and in the first *iambus* his books are stigmatized as ἂδικα Euhemerus\(^40\) scratching out his books in the temple precinct of the Sarapeium\(^41\) is parallel to Thales in the temple precinct of Apollo at the end of the poem scratching out geometric figures in the dirt. But it is difficult to rank one as the moral superior to the other if we unpack the many parallels with Platonic dialogue:

(1) Hipponax summons his prey to "a shrine in front of the wall," that is, the city wall.

Two of Plato's dialogues begin "outside of the wall"—the *Phaedrus* (227a3), which is a

\(^40\)Is he a living man or a statue? If he is supposed to be physically present then the event of the poem cannot be much beyond 270, and probably should be earlier (and the Sarapeium cannot be the Great Sarapeium built in 246). B. R. Rees suggested a way out of the problem, namely, that Hipponax refers to a statue rather like the statues of poets and philosophers found in an exhedra along the dromos of the Memphite Sarapeum. Why Euhemerus should be honored with a statue is not immediately apparent. (Those in the Memphite Sarapeum were of Homer, Pindar, Hesiod, Thales, Protagoras, Plato, Heraclitus and several others of doubtful attribution. See Lauer 1955: 153). The exhedra seems to have been constructed under the first Ptolemies and thus provides a fine example of how poets and philosophers were 'canonized' in statuary.

\(^41\)The Sarapeium is an interesting feature—we are told that it was Parmenio’s the *diegesis*, which suggests that it must have been named somewhere in the text. The Sarapeium is known from a Ptolemaic document (PCZ 59355.102-3, which records a pledge in the Sarapeium of Parmeniscus from 243 BC. The choice of the Sarapeium suggests a certain irony. Sarapis was a divinity specifically created by and for the Ptolemies, as an amalgam of Egyptian Osiris and Greek Dionysus. The distance between Sarapis, Euhemerus' human Zeus, and the divinized Ptolemies was not far.
model text for Callimachus in the *Aetia* prologue, and the *Lysis*: "outside the wall under the wall itself" (203a1-5). Callimachus' Cleombrotus leaps to his literary suicide from a "high wall",42 (2) The gathering of quibblers has its closest parallel in the Socratic dialogues, where Socrates and his friends meet in the wrestling schools or in private houses. Poetic competitions (which certainly had rules) seem not at all to be the model in play; (3) foremost among previous thinkers charged with atheism would be Socrates, who was accused by the Athenians, condemned, and forced to drink hemlock; and (4) according to Aristophanes' portrayal of Socrates in the *Clouds*, Socrates spent his time (like Thales) in astronomical observations. The addition to the mix of Pythagoras channeling Euphorbus and preaching vegetarianism to the Italians suggests that Callimachus’ real target was not the vices of modernity in contrast to the wholesomeness of the past, but that philosophers of every age cannot sustain claims to moral superiority or understanding. In contrast the poet is the judicious critic and he teaches via his poetry, which contains an exemplum of the seven sages that even a philosopher (namely, Plato in the *Protagoras*) could find useful.43 Even better, if Hipponax did include the seven sages in his own poetry,44 then Callimachus’ audience might well have recognized that Plato himself was relying on the old poet as the source for his own exemplum.

Who speaks in these *iambi* is not always clear, but we can identify two distinct themes: erotic behavior gone wrong within the context of *paideusis* and the value of poetry.

Socrates was, of course, the great teacher of moral virtue, whose particular engagement

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42 Epigram 23 Pf. = AP 7.471.
43 Imitation of the good man is the one type that is always valorized in the Platonic dialogues. See especially *Laws* 659b.
44 There is one fragment that mentions Myson, whom Apollo said to be the wisest of all men (fr. 63. West).
with the *jeunesse doré* of Athens was (supposedly) misunderstood by the *demos* that condemned him for "corrupting" the city's youth, and he was an easy target for the comedians. But Callimachus’ exposure of dubious sexual mores is implicated in a wider agenda: the real focus of the *iambi* is who should best teach virtue—the question that recurs constantly in the Platonic dialogues. Hipponax is held up in the first *iambus*, and Socrates’ claims about the limitations of poetry are apparently refuted in the 13th.

Various incidents and verbal reminiscences of Plato’s texts throughout the *iambi* subvert the philosopher's claim to unique moral authority, just as many of the examples that Plato placed in Socrates’ mouth were aimed at undercutting the poet's authority. It would be simplistic though to read the *iambi* as a send-up of Plato. Callimachus' relationship to Platonic writing has many facets, including the recognition of the richness of Plato’s literary imagination. Callimachus' own elevation of *brachylogia* to a poetic principle and his stress on avoidance of the common show considerable affinities with Plato's rejection of the many in favor of the knowledgeable few, and some aspects of Callimachus’ poetic persona like not traveling may be a Socratic affectation. Plato’s dialogues would seem to have been a significant set of pre-texts for Callimachus’ own theory and practice of poetry. Read against Plato, Callimachus’ critical assertions appear not as an articulation of a poetry of exclusiveness, but as a response to a much broader discourse about poetry, its value, and those would critique it.
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