2nd Workshop on Physical-layer Methods for Wireless Security

The workshop features two keynotes given by world leading researchers in the field:

Eduard Jorswieck

Eduard Jorswieck 

Title: Wireless Cognitive Interference and Multi-Way Relay Channels with private Messages

Abstract: The information theoretic security of confidential communication over single wireless links can be established by wiretap coding or secret key generation from source (fading wireless channels) or channel models. In relay interference networks, the multiuser and relaying coding schemes have a significant impact on the information leakage to potential eavesdroppers. This talk provides a characterization of multiuser coding schemes that are used in multi-way relay and interference channels and their impact on information leakage. In particular we show that nested structured lattice codes which are applied for compute-and-forward bi-directional relaying can be combined with wiretap codes to achieve confidential data transmission over untrusted multi-way relay channels. For interference channels with degraded message sets, we show that there is an information leakage if Gelfand-Pinsker coding is applied. A multi-phase transmission protocol is proposed that incorporates learning the message, clean relaying, and cooperative jamming, to assure confidential primary transmission and maximum secondary rates. An adaptive secondary link can adopt its relaying and cooperative jamming to guarantee primary secrecy rates and transmit its own data at the same time from relevant geometric positions.

Biography: Eduard A. Jorswieck was born in 1975 in Berlin, Germany. He received his Diplom-Ingenieur (M.S.) degree and Doktor-Ingenieur (Ph.D.) degree, both in electrical engineering and computer science from the Technische Universität Berlin, Germany, in 2000 and 2004, respectively. He has been with the Fraunhofer Institute for Telecommunications, Heinrich-Hertz-Institut (HHI) Berlin, in the Broadband Mobile Communication Networks Department since 2001. Since 2005, he is Lecturer at Technische Universität Berlin. He joined the Department of Signals, Sensors and Systems at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Stockholm, Sweden in 2006 as Post-Doc and in 2007 as Assistant Professor. In 2008, he accepted a position as the head of the Chair for Communications Theory and Full Professor at Dresden University of Technology (TUD), Germany. Dr. Jorswieck was visiting professor at Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée/ESIEE during fall 2010.

His research interests are in the area of multi-user communication theory, applied information theory, and signal processing for wireless communications. Dr. Jorswieck is Senior-Member of IEEE. He is member of the IEEE SPCOM Technical Committee. He serves as an Associate Editor for IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing (2011-2013) and IEEE Signal Processing Letters (2008-2011). In 2006, he received the IEEE Signal Processing Society Best Paper.

Paul Cuff

Paul Cuff 

Title: Semantic security using a stronger soft-covering lemma

Abstract: In 1975, Wyner published two very different papers that are unexpectedly connected. One introduced the wiretap channel, showing that information-theoretic secrecy is possible without a secret key by taking advantage of channel noise. This is the foundation for much of physical-layer security. The other paper introduced a notion of common information relevant to generating random variables at different terminals. In that work he introduced a soft-covering tool for proving achievability. Coincidently, soft-covering (a.k.a. resolvability) has now become the tool of choice for proving strong secrecy in settings such as wiretap channels, although Wyner didn't appear to make any connection between the two results.

We present a sharpening of the soft-covering tool by showing that the soft-covering phenomenon happens with doubly-exponential certainty with respect to a randomly generated codebook. Through the union bound, this enables security proofs in settings where many security constraints must be satisfied simultaneously. The type II wiretap channel is a great example of this, where the eavesdropper can choose at which times to make observations. We demonstrate the effectiveness of this tool by deriving the secrecy capacity of wiretap channels of type II with a noisy main channel — previously an open problem. Additionally, this stronger soft-covering allows information-theoretic security proofs using soft-covering to be easily upgraded to semantic security, which is a gold standard in cryptography.

Biography: Paul Cuff received the B.S. degree in electrical engineering from Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, in 2004 and the M.S. and Ph. D. degrees in electrical engineering from Stanford University in 2006 and 2009. Since 2009 he has been an Assistant Professor of Electrical Engineering at Princeton University.

As a graduate student, Dr. Cuff was awarded the ISIT 2008 Student Paper Award for his work titled “Communication Requirements for Generating Correlated Random Variables” and was a recipient of the National Defense Science and Engineering Graduate Fellowship and the Numerical Technologies Fellowship. As faculty, he received the NSF Career Award in 2014 and the AFOSR Young Investigator Program Award in 2015.