Conclusion: Anti-Americanisms and the Polyvalence of America (12/28/05)

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In this brief conclusion we make two arguments. First, broad general explanations of anti-Americanism offer inadequate accounts for the variety of anti-Americanisms that this book has uncovered. In particular, we discuss three popular explanations, focusing on power imbalances, globalization backlash and conflicting identities. All of these arguments seem to resonate with expressions of anti-Americanism in some parts of the world at some times, but are insufficient for understanding anti-Americanism in other places and at other times. This book amply documents that anti-American views are simply too heterogeneous to be explained by one or a few broad factors.

Our second general argument begins with reframing the problem of anti-Americanism in world politics in light of the various analyses this book offers. When we think about the varieties of anti-American views that we have uncovered and the changes in them experienced over time, two puzzles are readily apparent. First, why does such a rich variety of anti-American views persist? And why do persistent and adaptable anti-American views have so little direct impact on policy and political practice? Anti-Americanism reflects opinion and distrust. Often it generates expressive activity: demonstrating, marching, waving banners, even symbolically smashing the windows of a McDonald’s restaurant in France. But it is not a political force that frequently overturns governments, leads American multinational firms to disguise their origins, or propels the United States government to make major policy changes.
We suggest a single answer to both puzzles. In a phrase, the symbolism generated by America is so polyvalent that it continually generates and diffuses anti-American views. The polyvalence of America embodies a rich variety of values. And different values associated with America resonate differently with the cognitive schemas held by individuals and reinforced by groups. Which schemas predominate varies cross-nationally. Furthermore, these schemas are internally complex and may contain elements that are in tension or contradiction with one another. When polyvalent American symbols connect with varied, shifting and complex cognitive schemas, the resulting reactions refract like a prism in sunlight. Many colors appear in the prism, just as America elicits many different reactions around the world. Often, different components of what is refracted will simultaneously attract and repel.

Three Perspectives on Anti-Americanism

The study of anti-Americanism is a specific application of the analysis of different types of beliefs in world politics. One could imagine a world in which only material resources count. Stalin once famously asked: “How many divisions has the Pope?” In such an imaginary world, national interests would be assessed by elites who calculate only on the basis of material interests. Influence would be exerted only through the use or threat of force and material resources. Since states and the elites who control them use their material resources to achieve their preferred outcomes, positive or negative attitudes towards or beliefs about the United States would have no impact either on policies or on

outcomes. But the Catholic Church is still around, while Soviet communism can be found only in the dustbin of History. The premise of Stalin’s rhetorical question was plainly wrong: attitudes and beliefs matter greatly in world politics.

In our analysis of anti-Americanism we assume that different analytical traditions can be complementary and compatible. Rationalism focuses our attention on how interests can affect attitudes and beliefs and their strategic use in politics. It emphasizes that anti-American schemas often persist because they serve the political interests of elites as well as the psychological needs of mass publics. Constructivism highlights the importance of identities and the social and subjective processes by which they are created. Finally, both rationalism and constructivism contribute much to our understanding of norms. Anti-American attitudes and beliefs, expressing schemas, identities, and norms, are always contested or at least contestable. They are objects of political struggle. Our analysis of anti-Americanism thus is fundamentally about politics.

Political observers typically frame their understanding of anti-Americanism in three explanatory sketches that focus on power imbalances, globalization backlash, or conflicting identities. Although these sketches can not be applied easily to specific instances of anti-Americanism, they often seem to be useful starting-points as one thinks about the sources of anti-Americanism in world politics.

Generations of balance of power theorists have argued that imbalances of power lead to the formation of balancing coalitions: “secondary states, if they are free to choose,

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flock to the weaker side.”  

This set of arguments suggests that we may now simply be observing the predictable effects of extraordinary US dominance. Conservative analysts point out that “Mr. Big” is never liked. Their critics stress the lack of subtlety or restraint in the exercise of power by the United States. Both views provide a basis for understanding why traditionally powerful and prestigious states such as China, France and Russia feel offended or threatened by U.S. power and its exercise.

Since the end of the Cold War the United States has been by far the most powerful state in the world system, without any serious rivals. The collapse of the Soviet bloc means that countries formerly requiring American protection from the Soviet Union no longer need such support. This change may have enabled leaders and publics in countries such as Germany to be more critical of the United States. Furthermore, U.S. political hegemony makes the United States a focal point for opposition. U.S. political hegemony is not a necessary condition for Anti-Americanism – anti-Americanism in Europe dates back further than the American revolution in the late 18th century – but it may be conducive to it. Otherwise it would seem difficult to explain the expressive intensity of anti-Americanism, as compared, for example, to the opposition to European states, in Africa, Latin America, or the Islamic world. Acting in its own interest, or in accordance with its own values, the United States can have enormous impact on other societies. When it fails, the costs of failure are often imposed on others more than on itself: one aspect of power is that the costs of adjustment are forced onto the relatively powerless. In this view, it is no accident that American political power is at its zenith

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3 Waltz 1979, 127.
while American standing is at its nadir. Resentment at the negative effects of others’ exercise of power is hardly surprising.

A second overarching explanation focuses on *globalization backlash*. The expansion of capitalism -- often labeled globalization -- generates what Joseph Schumpeter called “creative destruction.” Those adversely affected can be expected to resist such change. The classic statement of this argument is by Karl Polanyi, who claimed that networks of social support in pre-capitalist societies were destroyed by the effects of the market. “A civilization was being disrupted by the blind action of soulless institutions the only purpose of which was the automatic increase of material welfare.”⁵ Polanyi argued that the unregulated market violates deep-seated social values, and thus supports political movements, such as fascism in the 1920s and 1930s, that demanded closure. In Benjamin Barber’s clever phrase, the spread of American practices and popular culture creates “McWorld,” which is widely resented even by people who find some aspects of it very attractive.⁶ The anti-Americanism generated by McWorld is diffuse and widely distributed in world politics. It does not generate suicide bombings or demands for the overthrow of capitalism. Jacques Bové may wield an axe against a McDonald’s restaurant for the sake of the television cameras, but he does not drive a truck loaded with explosives into a restaurant full of people. Applied to contemporary globalization, Polanyi’s argument has implications that could be empirically observed. Hostility to the United States should follow in the wake of market changes that displace

⁵ Polanyi 1957 (1944), 219.
⁶ Barber 1995.
people from their locales and livelihoods, as has been true in East Asia in 1997-98. In this view, rapid economic change and the uncertainty deriving from dependence on distant markets and sources of capital would generate resentment at the United States, the center of pressures for such changes. Hostility in this view should therefore emanate from those areas of the world. An influx of capital and the opening of markets to the world should be associated with anti-Americanism.

A third argument ascribes anti-Americanism to conflicting identities in America and elsewhere. In this view, anti-Americanism is generated by cultural and religious identities that are antithetical to the values being generated and exported by American culture – from Christianity to the commercialization of sex. The globalization of the media has made sexual images not only available to but also unavoidable for people around the world. One reaction is admiration and emulation, captured by the concept of soft power. But another reaction is antipathy and resistance. The products of secular mass culture, as Seyla Benhabib notes, are a source of international value conflict. They are bringing images of sexual freedom and decadence, female emancipation, and equality among the sexes into the homes of patriarchal and authoritarian communities, Muslim and otherwise.

Yet at the same time, religion has become a “very important” fact in the lives of 59 percent of Americans, about twice as many as in Britain and Canada and about five times as many as in France and Japan. In the words of Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, this “represents an important divide...”

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between the United States and our traditional allies” on issues such as abortion, the death penalty, and the use of new biological technologies. Christian missionaries are deeply grating to Leninist capitalism in China, to Hindu radicalism in South Asia, and to Muslim fundamentalism throughout the Islamic world. Americans export sex and the Gospel, both of which are resented by many people abroad. Secular states, as in Western Europe or East Asia, will object more to the rise of religiosity in American life and foreign policy, and less to the effects of the spread of American popular culture. Religious states in the Middle East and South Asia will object to their exposure to the products of American popular culture and, in the case of Christian missionaries, to the rise of American religiosity.

Although each of the three macro-perspectives contributes some insights, the taxonomy of different types of anti-American views that we developed in chapter 1 suggest that anti-Americanism is not well explained by any of them. The richly documented case studies by Sophie Meunier, Marc Lynch and Iain Johnston and Dani Stockmann in Part II of this book support that conclusion. Sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism could be activated by power imbalances, generating threats; social anti-Americanism may be heightened by the contrasts between European and American values highlighted by the incursions of MacWorld; and jihadist anti-Americanism can be generated by clashes of identity. However, liberal, legacy, and elitist anti-American views do not fit well within any of these broad themes; and even the other types of anti-

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8 Benhabib 2002, 251-52.
Americanism that we outlined in the introduction are only partially congruent with the broad themes of power imbalances, globalization, and identity clashes.

The Chinese case study, by Johnston and Stockmann, provides the best illustration of the impact of power imbalances. Johnston and Stockmann show that contemporary Chinese discussions of the United States revolve around what they call a “hegemony discourse,” which implies that the United States is not only powerful but also overbearing, unjust, hypocritical, and illegitimate. It is supplemented by a “century of humiliation” discourse, which reflects China’s terrible experiences with western and Japanese imperialism. The combination of these discourses with American power -- and support for Taiwan -- helps to explain both the deep Chinese distrust of the United States that Johnston and Stockmann found in the Beijing public, and the periodic outbursts of at times violent anti-American riots in response to perceived threats, such as the bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade or the flight of a spy plane over or near Chinese territory.

Meunier’s analysis of French distrust of the United States shows the value of the globalization explanation. The French public, Meunier argues, reacts particularly strongly against the Americanization of globalization -- whether by Google or as expressed in the Bush administration’s disdain for multilateral regulations of globalization. The French do not boycott McDonald’s. But the golden arches are a ready symbol of what many people in France dislike about globalization. It is striking that French attitudes toward the United States started declining during the 1990s, the “decade of globalization,” whereas attitudes of publics in other major European countries remained very favorably disposed toward the United States until the run-up to the war in Iraq.
France and China are in this respect a study in contrasts. Both publics distrust the United States. But the French public does not worry about American military actions -- France has been quite ready to use military force itself -- but rather about American-led globalization. The Chinese, in contrast, are in favor of those aspects of globalization that make them richer. The government, however, fears the global spread of democratic ideas, and Chinese nationalists fear American hegemony. Chinese students thus can throw rocks at the American embassy, then repair to McDonald’s for refreshments and to discuss their strategy.

The conflicting identities argument may have some purchase in both China and France, but the contrasts are muted by perceived similarities between these publics and the Americans. Indeed, Meunier argues that the French distrust America partly because the societies -- carriers of universalistic democratic ideologies -- are so similar. In contrast, Chinese differentiate themselves quite sharply from Americans, but even more sharply from the Japanese, contradicting all those who believe in the existence of a “clash of civilizations.” In the Middle East, however, the conflicting identities argument, in a moderate form, may offer more explanatory power. In chapter 6 Lynch holds that Arab anti-Americanism is not driven by an essentialist, civilizational conflict; he does, however, argue that there is widespread concern and fear that the United States is seeking to use its power fundamentally to alter Arab and Muslim identity. Insecurity about Arab identity combines with assertive American power to make a potent brew.

These illustrations suggest that in many instances distinctive combinations of different explanatory factors will help us best in accounting for varieties of anti-
Americanisms. These varieties do not so much compete with one another as interact, picking up on different aspects of American society that are resented by different people outside of the United States, or by the same people at different times. Each form of anti-Americanism waxes and wanes in response to changing situations. Figure 2 in Chapter 1 tried to capture this flux by distinguishing between latent and intense anti-Americanism, depending on the degree of perceived threat that the United States poses.

Furthermore, anti-Americanism can take different forms, depending on the climate of opinions and ideological sentiments as well as on power politics. Radical anti-Americanism took a largely Marxist-Leninist form between 1918 and the 1980s. As the Soviet Union weakened and collapsed, Islam and its radical fringes grew. Marxist-Leninist anti-Americanism, unquestionably was the most prominent form radical anti-Americanism in the Third World in the early 1980s; by 2005 it had been eclipsed by radical Islamic anti-Americanism. To complicate matters further, the four scaled types of anti-Americanism -- from liberal to radical -- do not exhaust our typology of anti-American views. Those views are further enriched by elitist and legacy anti-Americanism. As Meunier shows in Chapter 5, French elitism is both deeply embedded and remarkably flexible, adapting its forever skeptical view on the dynamic changes in American society. John Bowen writes in chapter 9 about the “diacritical” function that anti-Americanism plays for French but not Indonesian elites. This enables French elites to identify and justify desirable features of their own society by contrasting them with the “Anglo-Saxons.” In April 2005, for instance, French President Jacques Chirac defended

10 Katzenstein and Sil 2004.
the proposed European Constitutional Treaty by declaring, “What is the interest of the Anglo-Saxon countries and particularly the US? It is naturally to stop Europe’s construction, which risks creating a much stronger Europe tomorrow.” Doug McAdam demonstrates in Chapter 8 that legacy anti-Americanism can become more strongly institutionalized as part of a discourse, as in Spain or Greece, but that it can also reverse itself, as in the Philippines and Japan. Much depends on who wins the political struggle not only to control state institutions but also to frame the dominant political discourse in society. Focusing closely on only one of the three explanatory conjectures -- power imbalances, globalization backlash and conflicting identities -- is unlikely to advance our understanding much when confronting the complex array of anti-American views in contemporary world politics.

**Polyvalent America and Anti-Americanism**

What accounts for the persistence of heterogeneous anti-American views, which appear to have relatively small effects on government policy? This conundrum, we argue here, becomes less puzzling in light of the fact that American symbols are polyvalent. They embody a variety of values with different meanings to different people and indeed even to the same individual. Elites and ordinary folks abroad, in the words of Mark Hersgaard, “feel both admiring and uneasy about America, envious and appalled, enchanted but dismissive. It is this complex catalogue of impressions – good, bad, but

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never indifferent – that Americans must confront.”

As David Laitin has noted, the World Trade Center was a symbol not only of capitalism and America but of New York’s cosmopolitan culture, so often scorned by middle America. The Statue of Liberty symbolizes not only America, and its conception of freedom. A gift of France, it has become an American symbol of welcome to the world’s “huddled masses” that expresses a basic belief in America as a land of unlimited opportunity. The potential stream of immigrants into the United States is unending. And as we have documented in the introductory chapter, many people who hold very negative views about the United States also have very positive assessments of the lives that people who leave their countries can make in the United States. Here we follow up on Kennedy’s discussion in chapter 2 and explore further this line of thought. The disjunction between anti-American views and action prompts us to analyze America’s symbolic projection abroad.

The United States has a vigorous and expressive popular culture, which is enormously appealing both to Americans and to many people elsewhere in the world. This popular culture is quite hedonistic, oriented toward material possessions and sensual pleasure. At the same time, however, the U.S. is today much more religious than most other societies and in the words of two well-informed observers, “has a much more traditional value system than any other advanced industrial society.” One important root of America’s polyvalence is the tension between these two characteristics.

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12 Hertsgaard 2002, 8.
13 We are extremely grateful for David Laitin’s trenchant and helpful comments at a conference on anti-Americanism, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California, April 8, 2005.
Furthermore, both American popular culture and religious practices are subject to rapid change, expanding further the varieties of expression in the society, and continually opening new options. The dynamism and heterogeneity of American society create a vast set of choices: of values, institutions and practices.

Part of the dynamism of American culture results from its openness to the rest of the world. The American fast-food industry has imported its products from France (fries), Germany (hamburgers and frankfurters) and Italy (pizza). What it added was brilliant marketing and efficient distribution. In many ways the same is true also for the American movie industry, especially in the last two decades. Hollywood is a brand-name held by Americans and non-Americans alike. In the 1990s only three of the seven major Hollywood studios were controlled by U.S. corporations. Many of Hollywood’s most celebrated directors and actors are non-American. And many of Hollywood’s movies about America, both admiring and critical, are made by non-Americans. Like the United Nations, Hollywood is both in America, and of the world. And so is America itself -- product of the rest of the world as well as of its own internal characteristics.

“Americanization,” therefore, does not describe a simple extension of American products and processes to other parts of the world. On the contrary, it refers to the selective appropriation of American symbols and values by individuals and groups in other societies -- symbols and values that may well have had their origins elsewhere.
Americanization thus is a profoundly interactive process between America and all parts of the world. And, we argue here, it is deeply intertwined with anti-American views.\textsuperscript{15}

Americanization and anti-Americanism interact and occur through a variety of venues.\textsuperscript{16} Through its distinctive combination of territorial and non-territorial power, the United States has affected most corners of the world since 1945. The Middle East, Latin America, and east and southeast Asia have experienced American military might first-hand. By contrast, western Europe has been exposed only to the peaceful, emporium face of American hegemony, from shopping malls to artistic and intellectual trends.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, European avant-garde and American popular culture often co-exist in a complicated symbiosis. On questions of popular culture, for example, cross-fertilization of different innovations bypasses most politics as conventionally understood. American popular culture is sometimes viewed as undermining local cultures, a charge that nationalist political entrepreneurs often seek to exploit to create a political backlash against processes of Americanization. However, just as often Americanization reinvigorates and enriches local cultures, as has been true of a Caribbean musical import into the United States, that eventually was re-exported to other societies, such as France. It has provided France’s African immigrants with a new cultural medium with which to write and sing in French, and thus to become part of France in ways that previously were simply not available.

\textsuperscript{15} The close coupling of anti-Americanism and Americanization in the case of Germany is analyzed in Stephan 2005.
\textsuperscript{17} Hare 2005. Grazia 2005.
The interactions that generate Americanization may involve markets, informal networks, or the exercise of corporate or governmental power -- often in various combinations. They reflect and reinforce the polyvalent nature of American society, as expressed in the activities of Americans, who freely export and import products and practices. But they also reflect the variations in attitudes and interests of people in other societies, seeking to use, resist, and recast symbols that are associated with the United States. Similar patterns of interaction generate pro-Americanism and anti-Americanism, since both pro- and anti-Americanism provide an idiom to debate American and local concerns. Where that idiom is exceptionally well developed, it can crystallize into a diacritical form that makes sense of the “self” in juxtaposition to the “other.” Such diacritics are characteristic, according to Bowen’s argument in chapter 8, of France, but not of Indonesia. In any event, the receptivity of other societies for American culture varies greatly, as these societies interact with a complex, diverse and dynamic America.

The open and interactive character of American society is also much in evidence on questions of technology. In the second half of the 20th century the United States has been in a position of technological leadership not rivaled by any other polity. In particular decades and for specific product ranges, some countries like Japan or Germany, may have been able to hold their own when put in direct competition with the United States. But across the full range of technologies, the United States has not relinquished the lead that it has held for more than half a century. The annual parade of American Nobel prize winners in various fields of basic scientific research gives testimony to the international

18 See Katzenstein 2005, 198-207.
strength of American research universities and research institutes. American higher education attracts outstanding foreign students and scholars in the early stages of their careers, and many of them decide to make a life in the United States rather than returning home. Furthermore, American corporations are especially apt in transforming basic advances in science and technology into marketable products.

Yet Americanization does not create a norm of best practice to which others simply adjust. Rather, as Jonathan Zeitlin and Gary Herriguel and their colleagues have discovered, more typical are innovative hybrids that incorporate piecemeal borrowing and selective adaptation. Americanization is as much about the learning capacity of local actors as about the diffusion of standardized American practices. The global automobile industry was revolutionized by Henry Ford in the first third of the 20th century, just as Detroit was remade by the Japanese automobile industry in the last third. And the growing complexity of modern weapon systems means that the center of the American military-industrial complex, like Hollywood, is both in America and of the world. Stephen Brooks has documented the deep inroads that sourcing with foreign suppliers has made in a policy domain strongly geared to U.S. national autarky. With technological insularity no longer an option even on matters of national security, the transnational extension of American technological values has only increased.

Anti- and pro-Americanism have as much to do with the conceptual lenses through which individuals living in very different societies view America, as with America itself. Iain Johnston and Dani Stockmann report that when residents of Beijing

19 Zeitlin and Herriguel 2000.
in 1999 were asked simply to compare on an identity difference scale their perceptions of Americans with their views of Chinese, they placed them very far apart. But when, in the following year, Japanese, the antithesis of the Chinese, were added to the comparison, respondents reduced the perceived identity difference between Americans and Chinese. 21 In other parts of the world, bilateral perceptions of regional enemies can also displace, to some extent, negative evaluations of the United States. For instance, in sharp contrast to the European continent the British press and public continue to view Germany and Germans primarily through the lens of German militarism, Nazi Germany, and World War II. 22

Because there is so much in America to dislike as well as to admire, polyvalence makes anti-Americanism persistent. American society is both extremely secular and deeply religious. This is played out in the tensions between blue “metro” and red “retro” America and the strong overtones of self-righteousness and moralism that conflict helps generate. If a society veers toward secularism, as much of Europe has, American religiosiity is likely to become salient -- odd, disturbing, and due to American power, vaguely threatening. How can a people who believe more strongly in the Virgin Birth than in the theory of evolution be trusted to lead an alliance of liberal societies? If a society adopts more fervently Islamic religious doctrine and practices, as has occurred throughout much of the Islamic world during the past quarter-century, the prominence of

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21 Comment at a workshop on anti-Americanism, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, June 11, 2005.
women in American society and the vulgarity and emphasis on sexuality that pervades much of American popular culture are likely to evoke loathing, even fear. Thus anti-Americanism is closely linked to the polyvalence of American society.

**Conclusion**

Kennedy’s historical survey of “imagined America” in chapter 2 and Chiozza’s analysis of the individual attitudes of anti-Americanism approach their material with very different methods. Yet both highlight the importance of multidimensionality, heterogeneity, and polyvalence in all manifestations of anti-Americanism. So did Hannah Arendt when she wrote in 1954 “America has been both the dream and the nightmare of Europe.” The tropes of anti-Americanism, Kennedy argues, date back to a dialogue about the American character that started in the aftermath of Columbus’s discovery and Thomas More’s invention of America in the 15th and 16th centuries. That dialogue is structured by two still to be resolved questions. Are Americans natural men in a Garden of Eden, operating in an imaginary space not bounded by geography or time? Or are they barbarians, uncivilized, and unrestrained in appetites and aspirations that both repudiate and challenge human reason and experience? Tocqueville and those who have followed his trail have vacillated between hope and fear. A constant theme, Kennedy argues, is that America is seen as an unconstrained place, with great potential for good or ill.

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22 Negative evaluations of one society may, however, reinforce negative evaluations of another. French anti-Americanism, with deep historical roots, has contributed to negative American attitudes toward France. See Roger 2005.
23 Arendt 1994, 410.
Kennedy’s argument raises a more general theme that runs through this volume. Societies often have constitutive narratives, which explain their history to themselves. For the United States, Kennedy argues, the narrative revolves around breaking new ground by going beyond the frontier: it is a story of human progress. Meunier discusses the conceptions that define France’s distinctive culture, embedded in a historical narrative of intellectual and aesthetic accomplishment. Lynch argues that the emergence of a common Arab narrative has focused attention on the United States, as a common denominator in the experiences of highly varied Arab societies. Johnston and Stockmann emphasize the Chinese narrative of the century of humiliation, as a way in which Chinese organize their views toward the United States and Japan in particular. And Bowen stresses that Indonesian narratives that connect to the United States are much thinner than French narratives about America.

We began this book by citing Henry Luce’s prescient statement about the American Century, made during World War II. We return to Luce at the end. The second half of the 20th century indeed inaugurated the American Century, which still continues today. In 1941 the United States was about to step onto center stage in world politics, sometimes acting multilaterally, sometimes unilaterally, always powerfully. During the next 65 years the United States profoundly shaped the world. Others, wherever they were, had to react, positively or negatively, to America’s impact. Yet during this time, the United States itself changed fundamentally. In 1941, exports and imports were both near all-time lows. For twenty years its borders had been virtually closed to immigration, except from Europe. The South was legally segregated, with African-Americans in an
inferior position; and the North was in fact segregated in many respects. Racism was wide-spread in both North and South. Hence, American soft power was slight -- but so was its salience to most potentially hostile groups and governments abroad. By 2006 both American soft power and hard power had expanded enormously, and so had its salience to publics around the world. The American Century created enormous changes, some sought by the United States and others unsought and unanticipated. Resentment, and anti-Americanism, were among the undesired results of American power and engagement with the world. Anti-Americanism is as important for what it tells us about America as for its impact on world politics and American foreign policy. It poses a threat to America’s collective self-esteem. This is no small matter, as Toqueville observed in the remark we quoted in our introduction to this book: Americans “appear impatient of the smallest censure, and insatiable of praise.”

The United States is both an open and a critical society. It is also deeply divided. Our own cacophony projects itself onto others, and can be amplified as it reverberates, via other societies, around the world. When Americans are polled, they express high levels of dissatisfaction with many aspects of American society and government policy. But these expressions of unfavorable opinion are typically not interpreted as anti-American. When non-Americans are polled, similar views are interpreted as anti-American. Studying anti-Americanism should not lead us to pose the question “why do they hate us?” To the contrary, studying anti-Americanism should remind us of the old Pogo cartoon caption: “We have met the enemy, and he is us.”
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