

# Yuliy Sannikov

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## Professional Experience

July 2008-present	Professor, Economics Department, Princeton University
Fall 2011	Visiting Professor, Economics Department, Harvard
July 2007 – June 2008	Assistant Professor, Finance Department, NYU
Fall 2007	Visiting Associate Professor, Economics Department, MIT
July 2006 – June 2007	Visiting Assistant Professor, Finance Department, NYU
July 2004 – June 2008	Assistant Professor, Economics Department, UC Berkeley
Fall 2003	Lecturer, Economics Department, Stanford University

## Education

2004	Ph.D. in Business Administration <b>Stanford Graduate School of Business</b> , Stanford, California
2000	A. B. in Mathematics, Highest Honors, Minor in Applied Mathematics <b>Princeton University</b> , Princeton, New Jersey

## Research Interests

Game Theory, Contract Theory, Corporate Finance, Security Design, Incentives, Macroeconomics and Finance, Computation

## Honors and Awards

Sloan Fellowship (2010)  
Invited panel speaker at the World Congress (Shanghai 2010), East Asian (2009), Latin American (2008) and North American (2006) meetings of the Econometric Society  
Annual Schultz Lecture, University of Chicago (2008)  
Review of Economic Studies Tour (2004)  
Jaedicke Merit Award for Outstanding Academic Performance (Stanford GSB, 2000-03)  
Three Gold Medals in International Mathematical Olympiads (1994 – 1996)  
Graduated with High Honors from Sevastopol Visual Arts School (1994)

## Teaching

Corporate Finance (undergraduate and 2<sup>nd</sup>-year graduate), Repeated Games and Dynamic Contracts (2<sup>nd</sup>-year graduate), Continuous-Time Methods in Economics (2<sup>nd</sup>-year graduate), Microeconomics (1<sup>st</sup>-year graduate)

## Invited Seminar and Conference Presentation

- **2012:** AEA Meetings, Institute for Advanced Studies, Philadelphia Fed, ECB, SED Meetings, Banque de France conference
- **2011:** ASU, University of Maryland, NYU, Kellogg Finance, Cowles Foundation, Princeton, LSE, LBS, Microsoft Research, UCLA, Harvard University, Higher Economic School
- **2010:** NYU, NBER, Univ. of Wisconsin, IMF, Yale SOM, Minnesota Corporate Finance, WFA, SED, Gersensee, Minnesota Macro, Yonsei University, World Congress (Shanghai), Seoul National University, European Central Bank, Johns Hopkins University, New York Fed, University of Texas in Austin, Renmin University, Columbia University
- **2009:** The University of Hong Kong, Far East Meetings of the Econometric Society, University of Tokyo, Toulouse, UPF, UAB
- **2008:** Paris School of Economics, University of Minnesota, Conference in honor of John Hash, Schultz Lecture at the University of Chicago, Cowles Foundation, Yonsei University, University of Texas Austin, Cambridge, University of Toronto, Imperial College London, Washington University St. Louis, ETH Zurich, Northwestern University, Harvard, SUNY Albany, PUC, Latin-American Econometric Society, Hebrew University
- **2007:** Columbia Finance, Columbia Economics, Stanford, MIT Finance, NYU Finance, Brown, Chicago Economics, UCLA, SITE, Harvard/MIT, HBS, Chicago GSB, Princeton, UCL
- **2006:** AEA Meetings, NYU Finance, UCL, Harvard, UIUC, Washington University in St. Louis, Princeton, Banff Workshop, Meetings of Econometric Society, Cambridge, Yale, Wharton Finance, NYU Economics, Georgetown, Institute for Advanced Studies, Northwestern Finance, Duke/UNC
- **2005:** UCLA, ASU, Caltech, SCE, SITE, NSF/CEME Mathematical Economics Conference, Harvard/MIT, UC Berkeley, Stanford
- **2004:** Iowa, Rochester, University of Pennsylvania, University of Michigan, UC Berkeley, Northwestern Finance, Humboldt University, Oxford University, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, UCSD, Chicago GSB, Minnesota Macro Conference, Yale University, University of Minnesota, NYU, Princeton, Chicago, MIT, Harvard, Northwestern Economics
- **2003:** Stanford, UC Berkeley

## Research

“Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model,” with Peter DeMarzo, *Journal of Finance*, December 2006

“Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time,” *Econometrica*, September 2007

“Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production,” with Andy Skrzypacz, *AER*, December 2007.

“A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal-Agent Problem” *Review of Economic Studies*, July 2008.

“The Role of Information in Repeated Games with Frequent Actions,” with Andy Skrzypacz, *Econometrica*, 2010

“Reputation Effects and Degenerate Equilibria in Continuous-Time Games,” with Eduardo Faingold, *Econometrica*, 2011

“Dynamic Incentive Accounts,” with Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix and Tomasz Sadzik, forthcoming in *Journal of Finance*

“A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial Sector,” with Markus Brunnermeier

“Moral Hazard and Long-Run Incentives.”

“The I-Theory of Money,” with Markus Brunnermeier

“Learning, Termination and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts” with Peter DeMarzo

“An Algorithm for Two-Player Games with Perfect Monitoring,” with Dilip Abreu

“Efficiency in a Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring,” with Kyna Fong, Olivier Gossner and Johannes Horner

“Dynamic Contracts: Approximate Efficiency and Flexibility,” with Kyna Fong

“Agency problems, Screening and Increasing Credit Lines.”

“Financial Development, IPOs and Business Risk” with Thomas Philippon

“Competitive Contracting and Employment Dynamics,” with Day Manoli

“Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: Connection between Discrete and Continuous Time.”

### **Survey Articles**

“Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions” with Markus K. Brunnermeier and Thomas Eisenbach

“Dynamic Security Design and Corporate Financing,” *Handbook of Economics and Finance*, Volume 2

“Contracts: The Theory of Dynamic Principal-Agent Relationships and the Continuous-Time Approach”