Satoru Takahashi

 


Department of Economics
Fisher Hall 201
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544

 

Contact Information:
(609) 258-7919 (office)
(617) 710-1119 (cell)

 

Email Address:
satorut@princeton.edu

 

Research Interests:
Microeconomic theory, game theory.

 

CV

 

Working Papers:

·         “Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ->1 and a Folk Theorem” (with Johannes Hörner, Takuo Sugaya, and Nicolas Vieille)

·         “Robustness to Incomplete Information in Repeated Games” (with Sylvain Chassang)

·         “Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring” (with Takuo Sugaya)

 

Publications:

 

·         “Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play” (with Drew Fudenberg). Forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.

·         “Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners' Past Play.” Journal of Economic Theory 145 (1), January 2010, pp. 42-62.

·         “Monotone and Local Potential Maximizers in Symmetric 3x3 Games” (with Daisuke Oyama). Economics Bulletin 29 (3), August 2009, pp. 2096-2108.

·         “p-Dominance and Perfect Foresight Dynamic” (with Fuhito Kojima). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 67 (3-4), September 2008, pp. 689-701.

·         “Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics” (with Daisuke Oyama and Josef Hofbauer). Theoretical Economics 3 (2), June 2008, pp. 155-192.

·         “The Number of Pure Nash Equilibria in a Random Game with Nondecreasing Best Responses.” Games and Economic Behavior 63 (1), May 2008, pp. 328-340.

·         “Perfect Foresight Dynamics in Games with Linear Incentives and Time Symmetry.” International Journal of Game Theory 37 (1), April 2008, pp. 15-38.

·          “Multi-Sender Cheap Talk with Restricted State Spaces” (with Attila Ambrus). Theoretical Economics 3 (1), March 2008, pp. 1-27.

·         “Anti-Coordination Games and Dynamic Stability” (with Fuhito Kojima). International Game Theory Review 9 (4), December 2007, pp. 667-688.

·         “Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players are Patient” (with Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine). Games and Economic Behavior 61 (1), October 2007, pp. 27-49.

·         “Infinite Horizon Common Interest Games with Perfect Information.” Games and Economic Behavior 53 (2), November 2005, pp. 231-247.

·         “Improvement Dynamics in Games with Strategic Complementarities” (with Nikolai S. Kukushkin and Tetsuo Yamamori). International Journal of Game Theory 33 (2), June 2005, pp. 229-238.

·         “On Asynchronously Repeated Games” (with Quan Wen). Economics Letters 79 (2), May 2003, pp. 239-245.

·         “The Pure Nash Equilibrium Property and the Quasi-Acyclic Condition” (with Tetsuo Yamamori). Economics Bulletin 3 (22), 2002, pp. 1-6.