Satoru Takahashi

Department of Economics
Fisher Hall 201
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544

Contact Information:
(609) 258-7919 (office)
(617) 710-1119 (cell)

Email Address:
satorut@princeton.edu

Research Interests:
Microeconomic theory, game theory.

CV

Working Papers:

· “A Note on the Equilibrium Payoff Set in Stochastic Games” (with Johannes Hörner and Nicolas Vieille)

· “Contagion and Uninvadability in Social Networks with Bilingual Option” (with Daisuke Oyama)

· “Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring” (with Takuo Sugaya)

· “Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability” (with Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris)

· “Common Certainty of Rationality Revisited” (with Stephen Morris)

Publications:

· “Robust Rationalizability under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs” (with Stephen Morris and Olivier Tercieux). Forthcoming in Japanese Economic Review.

· “On the Relationship between Robustness to Incomplete Information and Noise-Independent Selection in Global Games” (with Daisuke Oyama). Journal of Mathematical Economics 47 (6), December 2011, pp. 683-688.

· “Perfect Foresight Dynamics in Binary Supermodular Games” (with Daisuke Oyama and Josef Hofbauer). International Journal of Economic Theory 7 (3), September 2011, pp. 251-267.

· “Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm for δ->1 and a Folk Theorem” (with Johannes Hörner, Takuo Sugaya, and Nicolas Vieille). Econometrica 79 (4), July 2011, pp. 1277-1318.

· “Robustness to Incomplete Information in Repeated Games” (with Sylvain Chassang). Theoretical Economics 6 (1), January 2011, pp. 49-93.

· “Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play” (with Drew Fudenberg). Games and Economic Behavior 71 (1), January 2011, pp. 100-120.

· “Community Enforcement when Players Observe Partners' Past Play.” Journal of Economic Theory 145 (1), January 2010, pp. 42-62.

· “Monotone and Local Potential Maximizers in Symmetric 3x3 Games” (with Daisuke Oyama). Economics Bulletin 29 (3), August 2009, pp. 2096-2108.

· “p-Dominance and Perfect Foresight Dynamic” (with Fuhito Kojima). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 67 (3-4), September 2008, pp. 689-701.

· “Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics” (with Daisuke Oyama and Josef Hofbauer). Theoretical Economics 3 (2), June 2008, pp. 155-192.

· “The Number of Pure Nash Equilibria in a Random Game with Nondecreasing Best Responses.” Games and Economic Behavior 63 (1), May 2008, pp. 328-340.

· “Perfect Foresight Dynamics in Games with Linear Incentives and Time Symmetry.” International Journal of Game Theory 37 (1), April 2008, pp. 15-38.

· “Multi-Sender Cheap Talk with Restricted State Spaces” (with Attila Ambrus). Theoretical Economics 3 (1), March 2008, pp. 1-27.

· “Anti-Coordination Games and Dynamic Stability” (with Fuhito Kojima). International Game Theory Review 9 (4), December 2007, pp. 667-688.

· “Perfect Public Equilibrium when Players are Patient” (with Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine). Games and Economic Behavior 61 (1), October 2007, pp. 27-49.

· “Infinite Horizon Common Interest Games with Perfect Information.” Games and Economic Behavior 53 (2), November 2005, pp. 231-247.

· “Improvement Dynamics in Games with Strategic Complementarities” (with Nikolai S. Kukushkin and Tetsuo Yamamori). International Journal of Game Theory 33 (2), June 2005, pp. 229-238.

· “On Asynchronously Repeated Games” (with Quan Wen). Economics Letters 79 (2), May 2003, pp. 239-245.

· “The Pure Nash Equilibrium Property and the Quasi-Acyclic Condition” (with Tetsuo Yamamori). Economics Bulletin 3 (22), 2002, pp. 1-6.