PhD students for whom Stephen Morris was dissertation committee member / advisor / external reader
* Primary advisor / chairman of dissertation committee

Name Current Job Title of PhD Year of PhD First Job
Illtae Ahn      Three Essays on Repeated Games without Perfect Information Penn 1996 Chung-Ahn University 
Salman Ali          Islamic Research and Training Institute Social Norms and Trade Institutions Penn 1995 International Islamic University
Rossella Argenziano* Essex  Network Markets and Coordination Games Yale 2005 Essex
Rupa Athreya* J.P.Morgan Modelling Beliefs in Games with Generalized Preferences   Yale 2002 McKinsey
Talia Bar Cornell Patent Races and Disclosure: Theory and Testable Implications Yale 2003 Cornell
Maharukh Bhiladwalla  Baruch College Dynamic Bilateral Trading: Rational Learning and Ex Post Efficiency     Penn 1995 Economy.com
Anat Bracha* Tel Aviv Multiple Selves and Endogenous Beliefs        Yale 2005 Tel Aviv
Caterina Calsamiglia* Autonoma Barcelona Decentralizing Equality of Opportunity Yale 2005 Autonoma Barcelona
Ying Chen Arizona Behavioral Types and Partially Informed Decision Makers in Communication Games Yale 2005 Arizona
Sadiq Currimbhoy
Pricing Labor in an Uncertain World       Penn 1995 Merrill Lynch
Amil Dasgupta*  LSE Dynamic Coordination Games: Theory and Applications Yale 2001 LSE
David Dillenberger Pennsylvania Essays on Decision Theory Princeton 2008 Pennsylvania
Bernardo Guimaraes* LSE Expectations and Crises: Theory, Empirics and Policy Yale 2004 LSE
Richard Hynes* University of Virginia Law School Three Essays on Consumer Bankruptcy and Exemptions Penn 1997 William and Mary Law School
Anna Ilyina IMF Three Essays on Bargaining and Cheap Talk Penn 2000 IMF
Matthias Kahl  UNC Kenan-Flagler Three Essays on Financial Distress and Liquidation  Penn 1997 UCLA Anderson
Kimberly Katz   Three Applications of Game Theory  Penn 1996 Mount Holyoke
Ricky Lam McKinsey Learning Through Stories and Other Essays Yale 2000 Northwestern
Stephanie Lau* Washington Asymmetric Information in the Hold-Up Problem  Yale 2003 Washington
Andrew Lemon  Lexecon Reputational Concerns in Political Agency Models Yale 2005 Lexecon
Marcos Lisboa* Unibanco Three Essays on General Equilibrium Models with Imperfect Financial Markets Penn 1996  Stanford
Pei-Yu Lo* Hong Kong Common Knowledge of Language and Iterated Admissability in Cheap Talk Games Yale 2006 Hong Kong
Dunia Lopez UAB Diffusion, Networks and Games: Theory and Experiments Alicante 2004 Caltech
Luis Madrazo*   The Political Economy of Ideology Yale 2003 Mexican Finance Ministry
Michael McBride UC Irvine Collective Action under Uncertainty Yale 2002 UC Irvine
Daniel Monte Simon Fraser Bounded Memory, Reputation and Learning Yale 2007 Simon Fraser
Andrea Moro Vanderbilt University Statistical Discrimination in the Labor Market  Penn 1997 Minnesota
Ayse Mumcu Bogazici Organizational Forms and Incentives Penn 1997 Bogazici
Peter Norman University of North Carolina A Game Theoretic Approach to Economic Policy Analysis  Penn 1997 Wisconsin
Deran Ozmen BCG Information Transmission and Recommender Systems Yale 2005  BCG
Lily Qiu  Brown Three Essays in Financial Economics  Yale 2004   Brown
Charles Roddie Nuffield College, Oxford Essays in Economic Theory Princeton 2008 Nuffield College, Oxford
Marzena Rostek Wisconsin Reasoning in Strategic and Non-Strategic Interactions Yale 2006 Wisconsin
Alvaro Sandroni Pennsylvania Essays on Asset Pricing and Learning Foundations of Equilibrium Penn 1996 Northwestern - MEDS
Yiannis Sarafidis Charles River Associates Release of Information with Imperfect Memory  Yale 2001 INSEAD
Stefania Scandizzo Corporacion Andina de Fomento International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Penn 1997 Texas A&M 
Dmitri Shapiro* UNC Charlotte Essays on Evolution, Reputation and Rationality Yale 2006 UNC Charlotte
Xianwen Shi Toronto Mechanism Design with Endogenous Information Acquisition, Status, and Participation Yale 2007 Toronto
Ylva Sovik   Speculation and Models of Rational Beliefs Oslo 2002  
Jakub Steiner Northwestern - MEDS
Essays on Coordination Problems
CERGE 2006 Edinburgh
Colin Stewart Toronto

Coordination in Dynamic Environments

Yale 2006 Toronto
Matti Suominen Helsinki School of Economics Information Transmission and Incentives in Markets Penn 1997 INSEAD
Fumiko Takeda Tokyo Three Essays on Twin Crises  Yale 2001 Yokohama City
Nilson Teixeira   Three Essays on Asymmetric Information and Hedging in Financial Markets  Penn 1996  
Vinayak Tripathi  Highbridge Capital Management Essays on Strategic Voting and Mechanism Design Princeton 2008  Highbridge Capital Management
Sergio Turner Brown Welfare Impact of Policy in Incomplete Markets Yale 2004

Brown

Juuso Valimaki Helsinki Three Essays on Learning and Strategic Interactions Penn 1996 Northwestern
Adel Varghese Texas A&M Formal and Informal Credit Markets: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis  Penn 1995 St. Louis University
Katsutoshi Wakai* Kyoto Linking Behavioral Economics, Axiomatic Decision Theory and General Equilibrium Yale 2002 SUNY Buffalo