PhD students for whom Stephen Morris was dissertation committee member / advisor / external reader
* Primary advisor / chairman of dissertation committee




Name Current Job Title of PhD Year of PhD First Job
Salman Ali          Islamic Research and Training Institute Social Norms and Trade Institutions Penn 1995 International Islamic University
Maharukh Bhiladwalla NYU Dynamic Bilateral Trading: Rational Learning and Ex Post Efficiency     Penn 1995 Economy.com
Sadiq Currimbhoy NewSmith
Pricing Labor in an Uncertain World       Penn 1995 Merrill Lynch
Nilson Teixeira Credit Suisse Three Essays on Asymmetric Information and Hedging in Financial Markets  Penn 1995  
Illtae Ahn    Chung-Ahn
Three Essays on Repeated Games without Perfect Information Penn 1996 Chung-Ahn 
Kimberly Katz   Three Applications of Game Theory  Penn 1996 Mount Holyoke
Marcos Lisboa* Unibanco Three Essays on General Equilibrium Models with Imperfect Financial Markets Penn 1996  Stanford
Alvaro Sandroni Northwestern - MEDS
Essays on Asset Pricing and Learning Foundations of Equilibrium Penn 1996 Northwestern - MEDS
Juuso Všlimški Aalto University - Helsinki Three Essays on Learning and Strategic Interactions Penn 1996 Northwestern
Adel Varghese Texas A&M & IFMR Formal and Informal Credit Markets: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis  Penn 1996 St. Louis University
Matthias Kahl  Colorado, Leeds School of Business Three Essays on Financial Distress and Liquidation  Penn 1997 UCLA Anderson
Ayse Mumcu Bogazici Organizational Forms and Incentives Penn 1997 Bogazici
Peter Norman North Carolina A Game Theoretic Approach to Economic Policy Analysis  Penn 1997 Wisconsin
Stefania Scandizzo Maryland International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Penn 1997 Texas A&M 
Matti Suominen Aalto University - Helsinki Information Transmission and Incentives in Markets Penn 1997 INSEAD
Richard Hynes* Virginia Law School Three Essays on Consumer Bankruptcy and Exemptions Penn 1998 William and Mary Law School
Andrea Moro Vanderbilt Statistical Discrimination in the Labor Market  Penn 1998 Minnesota
Anna Ilyina IMF Three Essays on Bargaining and Cheap Talk Penn 2000 IMF
Ricky Lam Ribbons and Bows Cakes Learning Through Stories and Other Essays Yale 2000 Northwestern
Amil Dasgupta* LSE Dynamic Coordination Games: Theory and Applications Yale 2001 LSE
Yiannis Sarafidis Charles River Associates Release of Information with Imperfect Memory  Yale 2001 INSEAD
Fumiko Takeda Tokyo Three Essays on Twin Crises  Yale 2001 Yokohama City
Rupa Athreya* JPMorgan Chase Modelling Beliefs in Games with Generalized Preferences   Yale 2002 McKinsey
Michael McBride UC Irvine Collective Action under Uncertainty Yale 2002 UC Irvine
Ylva SÝvik Norwegian Central Bank Speculation and Models of Rational Beliefs Oslo 2002  
Katsutoshi Wakai* Kyoto Linking Behavioral Economics, Axiomatic Decision Theory and General Equilibrium Yale 2002 SUNY Buffalo 
Talia Bar
Binghamton Patent Races and Disclosure: Theory and Testable Implications Yale 2003 Cornell
Stephanie Lau* U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Asymmetric Information in the Hold-Up Problem  Yale 2003 Washington at St. Louis
Luis Madrazo* Mexican Finance Ministry The Political Economy of Ideology Yale 2003 Mexican Finance Ministry
Bernardo Guimaraes* Sao Paulo School of Economics, FGV/SP Expectations and Crises: Theory, Empirics and Policy Yale 2004 LSE
Dunia Lopez Louvain Diffusion, Networks and Games: Theory and Experiments Alicante 2004 Caltech postdoc
Lily Qiu  Brown Three Essays in Financial Economics  Yale 2004   Brown
Sergio Turner
Welfare Impact of Policy in Incomplete Markets Yale 2004

Brown

Rossella Argenziano* Essex  Network Markets and Coordination Games Yale 2005 Essex
Anat Bracha* Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Multiple Selves and Endogenous Beliefs        Yale 2005 MIT postdoc / Tel Aviv
Caterina Calsamiglia* Autonoma Barcelona Decentralizing Equality of Opportunity Yale 2005 Autonoma Barcelona
Ying Chen Southampton Behavioral Types and Partially Informed Decision Makers in Communication Games Yale 2005 Arizona
Andrew Lemon Lexecon Reputational Concerns in Political Agency Models Yale 2005 Lexecon
Deran ÷zmen Taskiran BCG Information Transmission and Recommender Systems Yale 2005  BCG
Pei-Yu Melody Lo* Hong Kong Common Knowledge of Language and Iterated Admissability in Cheap Talk Games Yale 2006 Hong Kong
Marzena Rostek Wisconsin Reasoning in Strategic and Non-Strategic Interactions Yale 2006 Wisconsin
Dmitri Shapiro* UNC Charlotte - Belk Essays on Evolution, Reputation and Rationality Yale 2006 UNC Charlotte
Jakub Steiner Northwestern - MEDS
Essays on Coordination Problems
CERGE 2006 Edinburgh
Colin Stewart Toronto

Coordination in Dynamic Environments

Yale 2006 Toronto
Daniel Monte Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV-EESP Bounded Memory, Reputation and Learning Yale 2007 Simon Fraser
Xianwen Shi Toronto Mechanism Design with Endogenous Information Acquisition, Status, and Participation Yale 2007 Toronto
David Dillenberger Pennsylvania Essays on Decision Theory Princeton 2008 Pennsylvania
Charles Roddie Cambridge Essays in Economic Theory Princeton 2008 Oxford postdoc
Vinayak Tripathi Highbridge Capital Management Essays on Strategic Voting and Mechanism Design Princeton 2008 Highbridge Capital Management
Sambuddha Ghosh Boston Reputation with Multiple Opponents,
and Commitment Bias in Voting

Princeton 2009 Boston
Shivani Nayyar United Nations Development Program Essays on Repeated Games Princeton 2009 United Nations Development Program
Alice Hsiaw Holy Cross Essays on the Economics of
Self-Control and Lifestyle Brands
Princeton 2010 Harvard postdoc
Rainer Schwabe Banco de Mexico Essays on the Quality of Government Princeton 2010 MEDS postdoc
Thomas Eisenbach New York Fed Essays on Microeconomics Princeton 2011 New York Fed
Uliana Popova Makarov Moody's analytics Essays in the Theory of Communication Princeton 2011 Moody's analytics
Jose Azar Charles River Associates  A New Look at Oligopoly: Implicit Collusion through Portfolio Diversification Princeton 2012 Charles River Associates
Adriano Basso  Competition Commission Essays on Microeconomic Theory Princeton 2012  Ofcom
Edoardo Grillo* Collegio Carlo Alberto - Turin Essays on Strategic Information Tranmission Princeton 2012 Collegio Carlo Alberto - Turin
Andrei Rackhov* McKinsey Three Essays in Mechanism Design Princeton 2012 McKinsey
Martin Schonger* ETF Zurich Vouchers, Inequality and Competition Princeton 2012 Lancaster
Takuo Sugaya* Stanford GSB The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring Princeton 2012 Stanford GSB
Ming Yang* Duke Fuqua Flexible Information Acquisition in Strategic Situations Princeton 2012 Duke Fuqua
Gonzalo CisternasMIT SloanEssays on Continuous Time Games with LearningPrinceton 2013MIT Sloan
Leandro GornoFGV RioEssays on Economic Behavior Uncer UncertaintyPrinceton 2013FGV Rio
Vadim IaralovBank of America Merrill LynchEssays in Political Economy and Mechanism DesignPrinceton 2013Bank of America Merrill Lynch
Giri Parameswaran*HaverfordIncentive And Efficiency Implications Of Institutional Rules In Three Political SettingsPrinceton 2013Haverford