Stephen Morris Research

SOME RECENT RESEARCH


 Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and The Comparison of Information Structures in Games (with Dirk Bergemann),  DETC working paper 054-2013, revised October 2014.
 Extremal Information Structures in First Price Auctions (with Dirk Bergemann and Benjamin Brooks),  DETC working paper 055-2013, revised November 2013. 
Games In Preference Form and Preference Rationalizability (with Satoru Takahashi), DETC working paper 043-2012, revised September 2012.  
Illiquidity Component of Credit Risk (with Hyun Song Shin), revised February 2010.
Information and Volatility (with Dirk Bergemann and Tibor Heumann), DETC working paper 056-2013, revised October 2014.
Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability (with Dirk Bergemann and Satoru Takahashi),  DETC working paper 008-2010, revised July 2014.


BOOK

Robust Mechanism Design (with Dirk Bergemann).  World Scientific Press (2012).

PUBLISHED PAPERS 

Fiscal Stabilization and Exchange Rate Instability: A Theoretical Approach and Some Policy Conclusions using Mexican Data  (with Andrew Feltenstein), Journal of Public Economics 42 (1990), 329-356.
Finite Bubbles with Short Sales Constraints and Asymmetric Information (with Franklin Allen and Andrew Postlewaite), Journal of Economic Theory 61 (1993), 206-229.  [correction]
Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information, Econometrica 62 (1994), 1327-1347. 
 Revising Knowledge: A Hierarchical Approach, in Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, Proceedings of the Fifth Conference, edited by R. Fagin.  Morgan Kaufman (1994), 160-174.  
p-Dominance and Belief Potential (with Rafael Rob and Hyun Song Shin), Econometrica 63 (1995), 145-157.
Inflation Dynamics and the Parallel Market for Foreign Exchange, Journal of Development Economics 46 (1995), 295-316.
The Common Prior Assumption in Economic Theory, Economics and Philosophy 11 (1995),  227-253; reprinted in Recent Developments in Economic Methodology Volume II,  edited by  J. DavisEdward Elgar (2006).
On the Form of Transfers to Special Interests (with Stephen Coate), Journal of Political Economy 103 (1995), 1210-1235; reprinted in Rational Choice Politics: Volume 2 Voting, Elections and Pressure Politics, edited by T. Dewan, K. Dowding and K. ShepsleSage Publications (2009).  
Depth of Knowledge and the Effect of Higher Order Uncertainty (with Andrew Postlewaite and Hyun Song Shin), Economic Theory 6 (1995), 453-467.
The Logic of Belief and Belief Change: A Decision Theoretic Approach, Journal of Economic Theory 69 (1996), 1-23.
Speculative Investor Behavior and Learning, Quarterly Journal of Economics 111 (1996), 1111-1133. 
Common p-Belief: The General Case (with Atsushi Kajii), Games and Economic Behavior 18 (1997), 73-82.
The Revelation of Information and Self-Fulfilling Beliefs (with Jayasri Dutta), Journal of Economic Theory 73 (1997), 231-244.
Rationality and Efficacy of Decisions under Uncertainty (with Hyun Song Shin), Economic Theory 9 (1997), 309-324.
Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory (with Hyun Song Shin), Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (1997), 171-190.
Risk, Uncertainty and Hidden Information, Theory and Decision 42 (1997), 235-269.
Alternative Notions of Knowledge, in Epistemic Logic and the Theory of Games and Decisions, edited by M. Bacharach, L.-A. Gérard-Varet, Ph. Mongin and  H.S. Shin, 217-234; Kluwer Academic Press (1997).
The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information (with Atsushi Kajii), Econometrica 65 (1997), 1283-1309.
Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Attacks (with Hyun Song Shin), American Economic Review 88 (1998), 587-597; reprinted in New Research in Financial Markets, edited by B. Biais and M. Pagano, Oxford University Press (2002); Credit, Intermediation and the Macroeconomy, edited by S. Bhattacharya, A. Boot and A. Thakor, Oxford University Press (2004); Financial Crises, edited by F. Allen and D. Gale, Edward Elgar (2008).  [correction]
Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games (with Atsushi Kajii), Journal of Economic Theory 82 (1998), 267-276. [correction]
Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited, International Journal of Game Theory 28 (1999), 385-408.
Risk Management with Interdependent Choice (with Hyun Song Shin), Oxford Review of Economic Policy 15-3 (1999), 52-62; reprinted in the Bank of England's Financial Stability Review 7, 141-150.
Policy Persistence (with Stephen Coate), American Economic Review 89 (1999), 1327-1336.
A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks (with Hyun Song Shin) in Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Contagion and Consequences, edited by P.-R.  Agénor, M. Miller, D. Vines and A. WeberCambridge University Press (1999).
Contagion, Review of  Economic Studies 67 (2000), 57-78.
Rationalizable Trade (with Costis Skiadas), Games and Economic Behavior 31 (2000), 311-323.
Political Correctness, Journal of Political Economy 109 (2001), 231-265.
Game Theory and Finance Applications (with Franklin Allen), in Game Theory and Business Applications, edited by K. Chatterjee and W. Samuelson. Kluwer Academic Press (2001).
Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomics (with Hyun Song Shin), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, 139-161; M.I.T. Press (2001).
Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring (with George Mailath), Journal of Economic Theory 102 (2002), 189-228; reviewed in NAJ: Not a Journal 2. 
Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game, Advances in Theoretical Economics 1-1 (2002), Article 5
Coordination, Spillovers and Cheap Talk (with Sandeep Baliga), Journal of Economic Theory 105 (2002), 450-468.
 The Social Value of Public Information (with Hyun Song Shin), American Economic Review 92 (2002), 1521-1534; online appendix.
Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic-Mail Game, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 18 (2002), 433-445.
Communication and Monetary Policy (with Jeffery Amato and Hyun Song Shin), Oxford Review of Economic Policy 18 (2002), 495-503.
Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities (with David Frankel and Ady Pauzner), Journal of Economic Theory 108 (2003), 1-44.   [correction]
Global Games: Theory and Applications (with Hyun Song Shin), in Advances in Economics and Econometrics (Proceedings of the Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society), edited by M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S. Turnovsky; Cambridge University Press (2003).
Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt (with Hyun Song Shin), European Economic Review 48 (2004), 133-153. 
Does One Soros Make a Difference? The Role of a Large Trader in Currency Crises (with Giancarlo Corsetti, Amil Dasgupta and Hyun Song Shin), Review of  Economic Studies 71 (2004), 87-114.
Liquidity Black Holes (with Hyun Song Shin), Review of Finance 8 (2004), 1-18.
Best Response Equivalence (with Takashi Ui), Games and Economic Behavior 49 (2004), 260-287.
Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria (with Takashi Ui), Journal of Economic Theory 124 (2005), 45-78.
 Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games (with Hyun Song Shin), in The Economy as an Evolving Complex System III, edited by L. Blume and S. DurlaufOxford University PressSanta Fe Institute Studies in the Sciences of Complexity (2005).
Robust Mechanism Design (with Dirk Bergemann), Econometrica 73 (2005), 1521-1534; reviewed in NAJ: Not a Journal 8. 
 Policy Conditionality (with Stephen Coate), in Globalization and the Nation State: the Impact of the IMF and World Bank, edited by J. Vreeland, G. Ranis and S. KosackRoutledge (2005). 
Central Bank Transparency and the Signal Value of Prices (with Hyun Song Shin), Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (2005), 1-66.
Multidimensional Private Value Auctions (with Hanming Fang), Journal of Economic Theory 126 (2006), 1-30.  
 Social Value of Information: Morris and Shin (2002) is Actually Pro Transparency, Not Con: Reply (with Hyun Song Shin and Hui Tong), American Economic Review 96 (2006), 453-455.
Inertia of Forward Looking Expectations (with Hyun Song Shin), American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 96 (2006), 152-157.
Beauty Contests and Iterated Expectations (with Franklin Allen and Hyun Song Shin), Review of Financial Studies 19 (2006), 161-177; reviewed in NAJ: Not a Journal 5. 
Catalytic Finance: When Does it Work? (with Hyun Song Shin), Journal of International Economics 70 (2006), 161-177.
Topologies on Types (with Eddie Dekel and Drew Fudenberg), Theoretical Economics 1 (2006), 275-309.  [correction]
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (with George Mailath), Theoretical Economics 1 (2006), 311-340. 
Interim Correlated Rationalizability (with Eddie Dekel and Drew Fudenberg), Theoretical Economics 2 (2007), 15-40.  [correction
Optimal Communication (with Hyun Song Shin), Journal of the European Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 5 (2007), 594-602.  
An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty (with Dirk Bergemann), American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 97 (2007), 125-130.
Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks (with Bernardo Guimaraes), Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (2007), 2205-2230. 
The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation (with Dirk Bergemann), Journal of the European Economic Association 6 (2008), 551-559.
Ex Post Implementation (with Dirk Bergemann), Games and Economic Behavior 63 (2008), 527-566.
Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (with V Bhaskar and George Mailath), Review of Economic Dynamics 11 (2008), 515-528.  
Global Games, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by S. Durlauf and L. BlumePalgrave Macmillan (2008).
Purification, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by S. Durlauf and L. BlumePalgrave Macmillan (2008).  
Coordinating Expectations in Monetary Policy (with Hyun Song Shin), in Central Banks as Economic Institutions, edited by J.-P. TouffutEdward Elgar (2008).
Financial Regulation in a System Context (with Hyun Song Shin), Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Fall  2008),  229-261.
 Robust Virtual Implementation (with Dirk Bergemann), Theoretical Economics 4 (2009), 45-88.
Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms (with Dirk Bergemann), Review of  Economic Studies 76 (2009), 1175-1204.
Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms (with Dirk Bergemann), Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011), 261-281.
Rationalizable Implementation (with Dirk Bergemann and Olivier Tercieux), Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011), 1253-1274.
The Robustness of Robust Implementation (with Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn), Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011), 2093-2104.
 Contagious Adverse Selection (with Hyun Song Shin), American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4 (2012), 1-21.  
Robust Rationalizability under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs (with Satoru Takahashi and Olivier Tercieux), Japanese Economic Review 63 (2012), 57-67. 
Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types (with Dirk Bergemann and Satoru Takahashi), American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 102 (2012), 319-324.
An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design (with Dirk Bergemann), Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics 8 (2012), 169-230.
Robust Predictions in Games of Incomplete Information (with Dirk Bergemann), Fisher-Schultz lectureEconometrica  81 (2013), 1251-1308.  
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Sequential Games with Finite Social Memory (with V Bhaskar and George Mailath), Review of  Economic Studies 80 (2013), 925-948.   

FORTHCOMING

Coordination, Timing and Common KnowledgeDETC working paper 061-2013, forthcoming in Research in Economics
The Limits of Price Discrimination (with Dirk Bergemann and Benjamin Brooks), DETC working paper 052-2013, forthcoming in American Economic Review

UNPUBLISHED PAPERS

Justifying Rational Expectations, March 1995. 
Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching, revised August 1997.
Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey (with Atsushi Kajii), revised October 1997.
Observational Implications of Nonexponential Discounting (with Andrew Postlewaite), November 1997.
Laws and Authority (with George Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite), revised April 2001.
Continuous Consumption Rules with Non-Exponential Discounting, January 2002.
Higher Order Expectations, February 2002.
Typical Types, February 2002.
Measuring Strategic Uncertainty, (with Hyun Song Shin), July 2002
Notes on Strategic Substitutes and Complements in Global Games (with Hyun Song Shin), January 2005.
Regime Change Global Games with Heterogeneous Players and Continuous Actions (with Bernardo Guimaraes), November 2005.
Endogenous Public Signals and Coordination (with Hyun Song Shin), revised January 2006.
Maintaining Authority (with George Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite), September 2007.
Belief Free Incomplete Information Games (with Dirk Bergemann), September 2007.
Common Belief Foundations of Global Games (with Hyun Song Shin), revised October 2007.

WORKING PAPERS PARTIALLY (BUT NOT FULLY) INCORPORATED IN LATER WORK

Risk Dominance and Stochastic Potential (with Rafael Rob and Hyun Song Shin), April 1993.
Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games and Almost Uniform Convergence of Beliefs (with Atsushi Kajii), September 1994.
Cooperation and Timing, April 1995.
Informational Events that Trigger Currency Attacks (with Hyun Song Shin), October 1995.
The Reputational Cost of Truthful Informational Transmission, June 1997.
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (with George Mailath), July 1998.
Private versus Public Information in Coordination Problems (with Hyun Song Shin), March 1999.
Potential Methods in Interaction Games, June 1999.
Market Risk with Interdependent Choice (with Hyun Song Shin), May 2000.
Robust Mechanism Design (with Dirk Bergemann), December 2001.
Robust Mechanism Design (with Dirk Bergemann), May 2003.
Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets (with Hyun Song Shin), March 2003.
Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces (with Dirk Bergemann), December 2003.
Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces (with Dirk Bergemann), June 2005.
Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms (with Dirk Bergemann), March 2006.
Strategic Distinguishability with an Application to Virtual Robust Implementation (with Dirk Bergemann), May 2007.
A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games (with V Bhaskar and George Mailath), August 2009.
Common Certainty of Rationality Revisited (with Satoru Takahashi), Princeton ETC working paper 010-2011, February 2011. 
Robust Predictions in Games of Incomplete Information (with Dirk Bergemann), Princeton ETC working paper 023-2011, September 2011.
Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures (with Dirk Bergemann), February 2013.

WORKING PAPER LISTINGS
University of Pennsylvania CARESS Working Papers
Yale University Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Social Science Research Network Working Papers
Princeton Economic Theory Center Working Papers

CITATIONS
Google Scholar Page

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updated by SM March 2013