Co-ops, Communes & Collectives

Experiments in Social Change in the 1960s and 1970s

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The Phantom Community

by Paul Starr

The 1960s breathed life into a new generation of what came to be known as "counterinstitutions"—communes, cooperatives, free clinics, free schools, free universities, counseling centers, day-care centers, encounter groups and other forms of collective therapy and "consciousness-raising," "underground" newspapers, grass-roots community organizations, publicinterest law firms, and peace, environmental, women's, civilrights, and consumer groups.

These organizations were by no means without antecedents: America has a long history of utopian communities, cooperatives, reform groups, and other organizations attempting by example and protest to change the society. But the counterinstitutions of the sixties share a cluster of cultural and political features that identify them as special products of their time. Just as the movements of the era had a distinctive style in personal appearance and behavior, in thought, language, and collective action, so they had a distinctive ideal of organizational life. It was a romantic ideal of the organization as a community, in which social relations were to be direct and personal, open and spontaneous, in contrast to the rigid, remote, and artificial relations of bureaucratic organization. The organizational community, moreover, was to be participatory and egalitarian. It would make decisions collectively and democratically and would eliminate or at least reduce hierarchy by keeping to a minimum distinctions of status and power between leaders and members, or professionals and nonprofessionals. Radicals wanted no other basis for organization than consent: People
should have the right, they said, to participate in the decisions that affect their lives.

As a movement, the counterinstitutions unquestionably failed. Many died at a tender age. Others have scrapped along like malnourished children constantly begging for handouts. Some have grown sturdy and respectable, only to lose whatever oppositional force they had. A few have established a position for themselves, more or less on their own terms, that may well outlast the movements of cultural and political dissent which originally gave rise to them; even these, however, do no more than occupy niches in the economy and political system. Yet their greatest disappointment was not their failure to go forth and multiply and gain a position of dominance. It was rather the growing realization that even on their own ground, the communal ideal could not be realized, and that insofar as the sought-after forms of organizational life had value, the gains were more modest than their participants had hoped or their theorists had imagined.

It seems useful at this point to assess the whole phenomenon. What gave the counterinstitutions their distinctive character? In what ways have they evolved in orientation and structure from their original form? Why did some survive and others collapse? What has the movement left behind? These are the sort of questions I want to take up here.*

Two Forms of Counterorganization

“Counterinstitutions,” as a general sociological category, may be divided into two types. I will call them exemplary and adversary.

An exemplary institution, such as a utopian community or a consumers’ cooperative, seeks, as the term suggests, to exemplify in its own structure and conduct an alternative set of ideals

*If I often use the past tense in regard to counterinstitutions, when many of the organizations still live and breathe, it is because the movement they once constituted no longer exists, and there now seems no other way to think of them as a whole, except as a historical phenomenon.
ward convergence with at least certain aspects of the prevailing institutional system.\(^1\)

In other words, counterinstitutions face a trade-off between exemplifying ideals and waging conflict. They cannot fully commit themselves to both (unless, of course, their ideals make the accumulation of power a primary value in itself). They can strike different balances between model-oriented and conflict-oriented action, but there is a strong tendency for them to adopt either exemplary organization, without engaging in conflict, or adversary organization, without immediately attempting to realize ultimate values.\(^2\)

The separate development of exemplary and adversary institutions frequently produces a dual structure in radical social movements. Under colonial or repressive regimes, an "underground" organization may be engaged in terrorism or guerrilla violence, while "above-ground" organizations—ostensibly unrelated, but tacitly or secretly affiliated—run schools, distribute food, house refugees, etc. Wherever adversary organizations are by definition illegal, such a dual structure is likely to emerge. In the United States, the opposite circumstances produce the same result—that is, the availability of subsidies rather than the fear of repression causes the separation of exemplary from adversary organizations. Exemplary organizations, such as experimental schools, can often secure resources from the government and private foundations that would not be made available to adversary organizations. The Internal Revenue Code reinforces the split by granting tax-exempt status to nonprofit organizations so long as they do not engage in certain kinds of adversarial activities, such as lobbying or supporting candidates in elections.\(^3\) So even in the absence of repression, creating separate organization maximizes the total resources available to counterinstitutions.

In other societies, the connections between adversary and exemplary activities may be formal and explicit. Adversary organizations such as the established socialist and Communist parties of Western Europe support educational, recreational, and other programs whose purpose is to provide a model alternative to established institutions, as well as to enhance solidarity. In America no left-wing party of comparable strength has emerged; and even if one had, political parties in America do not generally take on the sort of auxiliary functions they do elsewhere.

The relationship between exemplary and adversary institutions is by no means always amicable and collaborative. Quite often they are mutually suspicious. The leaders of utopian communities and cooperatives frequently assert that socialists, communists, and other opposition groups are really "no different" from the dominant parties and institutions—no less bureaucratic, no less power-hungry, no less repressive, etc. Correspondingly, the classic "Leninist" view of utopian communities and cooperatives is that they are destined to fail so long as capitalism endures; they are capable (say the Leninists) only of diverting revolutionary movements from their real tasks. The utopian community and the Leninist party are, in this regard, exact antitheses. In the interests of realizing on a small scale the moral values of communism (in the original sense of the word), the committed utopian withdraws from political opposition. In the interests of gaining the political victory of Communism on a large scale, the committed Leninist defers realizing its values indefinitely and supports a hierarchical, secretive, and centrally directed party organization.

Exemplary and adversary organizations are instances of the contrast between what Albert Hirschman has called "exit" and "voice."\(^4\) By "exit," Hirschman means any form of unilateral departure from an economic or political entity—for example, ceasing to buy a company's product, shifting one's allegiance to another party, resigning from office, deserting from an army, or emigrating to another country. By "voice," Hirschman means any attempt to exert influence on an organization or government by directly complaining to it, grumbling, demonstrating, or even committing violence against it. Exemplary institutions, like utopian communities, are a form of organized exit from a dominant institutional system, whereas adversary institutions are a form of organized voice. The advocates of one alternative quite naturally feel threatened by the other. Many of those who want to change a society by protest—by voice—see the advo-
icates of exit as subverting their movement ("copping out"). Both revolutionaries and reformers often prefer a no-exit situation where those who are dissatisfied are forced to participate in adversarial activities.

In America during the 1960s, the support for exemplary institutions came primarily from the "cultural" wing of the movement, whose members tended to be the advocates of exit, while adversary organizations drew their support from its "political" wing, whose members tended to be the advocates of voice. Their debate over "dropping out" versus protest reflected the exemplary-adversary, exit-voice or, as the psychologists would put it, flight-fight dilemma. The lines between the two camps, however, were not sharply marked. Many political radicals took part in communal, cooperative organizations, partly because of their own need to find arrangements for living and work that made sense to them. Some tried out one organizational alternative and then another. Moreover, nearly all adversary groups attempted to exemplify at least some alternative ideals as they protested against dominant institutions; and some organizations, like the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), engaged in extremes of participatory democracy, egalitarianism and, in their later stages, self-disclosure and interpersonal confrontation. Just as the radical culture of the sixties rejected the deferral of gratification, so it rejected the deferral of egalitarian and communal ideals. This was partly what distinguished the new left from more traditional communists and socialists. Most counterinstitutions experience some tension about how exemplary or how adversarial they can afford to be, and make the necessary trade-offs and compromises. A few counterorganizations of the sixties attempted to push both to their limits, and burned themselves out in a brief incandescent glare.

Consciousness and Counterorganization in the Sixties

The counterinstitutions that developed in the sixties bore the mark of their era, especially its prosperity and the sense of limitless possibility that it encouraged. Radicals, as well as liberals, had become convinced that Americans lived in an affluent, "post-scarcity" society, and this belief promoted an extraordinary confidence in the benign effects of a complete release of impulses. By its own example and in its criticism of society, the left was continually urging people to abandon constraints of every kind—in language, belief, behavior, sexual relations, family organization, work—on the assumption that America, with its enormous wealth, could afford a degree of human liberation unsurpassed in history. The same spirit infused counterinstitutions, where radicals were similarly unwilling to make cost and constraint a guiding concern. In their exemplary organizations, they put little emphasis on efficiency; and in their adversary organizations, they put little emphasis on discipline. In this regard, the utopian mood of the new left involved two equally important negations: it was not only a revolt against liberal practicality and compromise, but also a repudiation of the "realism" of the old left.

Recent history has seen a transition between two styles of radicalism—one "classical," the other "romantic." The old left, whether social-democratic or communist, exemplified the classical style in its emphasis on reason, its view of science and technology as instruments of human progress, its belief in planning, and its promise of a more rational, orderly and balanced society. In their personal behavior, its supporters upheld the standards of "civilized" conduct, controlling their impulses and observing the conventional boundaries between public and private life. Some radicals continued to uphold the classical style in the sixties, but the predominant temper of the movement was romantic: witness its emphasis on the importance of feeling, its distrust of science and technology, its rejection of bureaucracy and professionalism, its suspicion of conventional roles, its promise of emotional liberation.5

The elements of romanticism were ubiquitous in the radical culture of the period. It celebrated the passions and abhorred routine; it explored every route available to "higher," "altered" states of consciousness. Yet in keeping with its fundamental romanticism, its vision of the good life was dis-
tinctly pastoral. It idealized the "natural" and "organic," the primitive and the childlike. The fashions of the time—beards for men, long hair for women—spoke of a return to the past, as did the Old Testament names that became popular for children. Thus the movement was simultaneously radical and old-fashioned. It wanted change, but it no longer believed in "progress." The left had always looked to the future for a vision of a better society; now it was looking backward for much of what it wanted.

One aspect of this mixture of radical and traditional sentiment was the concern for "community" and the way community was conceived. Here the left broke with its own past. Of the three themes enshrined in the trinity of the French Revolution—liberty, equality, fraternity—fraternity has historically been the least prominent among the left's concerns. And when the left has alluded to fraternity, it has typically been the human fraternity, conceived as an all-inclusive, international brotherhood. Localism of any kind has been anathema in the socialist tradition. Community and nation were, if anything, the rallying cries of conservatives. But all this changed in the 1960s. The ideal of community (in deference to feminists, the term "fraternity" was dropped) assumed a new priority, and it was now conceived on a small, local scale. The communities that radicals envisioned were immediate and personal. Without even taking note of the change, the left had quietly reduced the scale of life it envisioned in a good society.

Had middle-class youth not emerged as the largest base of support for radicalism in the sixties, "community" would probably not have become the most resonant word in its political vocabulary. For working-class people, still rooted in family life, the ideal of community would not have held the same attraction. It responded to a widely felt sense of homelessness and personal isolation among the young, many of whom were in the midst of a long hiatus in their lives between the families of their parents and the families they would subsequently establish on their own. The ranks of this group, as is well known, had been swollen by the baby boom, the growth of universities, and the postponement of adulthood brought about by extended education and delayed entry into the labor force. Its personal dilem-

mas were those of alienation and commitment, rather than exploitation and poverty, and it projected these concerns into radical politics, creating a distinct form of socialism whose vocabulary was partly political and partly therapeutic.

The psychological concerns of young radicals were a point of tension in the movement. Blacks and other poor people who were the objects of their sympathy were often wary of the motives that turned affluent youth toward radicalism. As early as 1964, black organizers in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) were denouncing the "bourgeois sentimentality" of middle-class whites who had stayed behind in the South after "Mississippi Summer" to continue their civil-rights work. "Some of the good brothers and sisters," declared a memo circulated at a SNCC staff meeting that October,

think that our business is the spreading of "the redemptive warmth of personal confrontation," "emotional enrichment," "compassionate and sympathetic personal relationships," and other varieties of mouth-to-mouth resuscitation derived from the vocabulary of group therapy and progressive liberal witch doctors. But we ain't got enough redemptive compassion and cultural enrichment to go around.

Or to put the same point in our terms: An adversary organization ain't an exemplary community.

Against this view, radicals argued that the two spheres of psyche and politics could not be separated. "The personal is political," they insisted. It was to their own forms of distress that exemplary institutions primarily addressed themselves.

The Exemplary Organization

Exemplary organizations took several distinct forms. The main types were communes (rural and urban), cooperatives, restructured businesses (from bookstores and restaurants to a few sizable corporations), and alternative human-service institutions, such as counseling centers and experimental schools. In all of these, the quality of human relationships was a principal concern.
The orientation of communal experiments is a case in point. In her comparative study of nineteenth- and twentieth-century communes in America, Rosabeth Kanter observes that over time there has been a change in their ideological foundation. The earliest utopian communities were religious; then increasingly in the nineteenth century they were politico-economic; and finally in the most recent period they have been predominantly psychosocial. Communes with religious and political orientations still continued to be formed through the last decade, but the prevailing ideology among the communes of the sixties criticized the society not so much for being sinful or unjust as for being “sick.”

The new psychosocial conception of community—the desire simultaneously for intimacy and liberation—may not have been “functionally equivalent” to the old religious or politico-economic axes of solidarity. Many of the nineteenth-century utopian communities had substantial achievements to their names; not all were quixotic ventures that ended in penury and disaster. Many of them, on the contrary, proved extremely prosperous and gained a reputation for their industriousness, the quality of their craftsmanship, and their honesty in trade. Moreover, they succeeded in realizing many of their ideals, such as sexual and ethnic equality and the abolition of private property, including property in people through slavery or marriage. Although they were ultimately abandoned in the face of declining membership and an advancing industrial society, some lasted throughout the lifetimes of their founders and into a second or third generation. But as Kanter makes clear in her study, the long-lasting nineteenth-century communities had little in common with the communes of the 1960s. They made exacting demands on their members to sacrifice their wealth to the community, to abstain from sexual and other pleasures, to endure mortification and criticism, and to work long and hard under a strict plan. Kanter calls these practices “commitment mechanisms,” on the theory that they were responsible for binding members to the community, and the evidence she has compiled indicates that successful communities were indeed more likely to employ these mechanisms than the communities that failed.

The new rural communes, while also seeking a refuge from society, abhorred such practices, which would have contradicted their ethos of personal liberation. The new communities were looking, in Judson Jerome’s well-chosen image, for Eden rather than Utopia, for a garden of pleasure rather than a planned and orderly society. The assumptions that cultural radicals brought to communes ruled out the kind of demands that helped nineteenth-century communities not only cohere but prosper. As a result, the new communes were rarely economically self-sufficient and depended for their survival on inherited wealth or welfare payments. Their life span was typically short, and even in those that lasted for some time, turnover in membership was high. Community proved ephemeral.

Urban communes, after an initial euphoric period of grandiose expectations, manifested the same pattern. They have become, as Kanter calls them, “group households of convenience . . . with the life cycle of an affair rather than a marriage.” Many of them have succeeded in redistributing the responsibilities of men and women in the household and substituting negotiation and consent for adult-male authority. Since members of communal houses continue to work in regular jobs, they are not necessarily plagued by the continual economic difficulties of rural communes. For many people, they provide a familylike environment, without encumbering them with family obligations. A communal household then becomes, not something more than a family, but something less—a home that can be left without guilt or grief.

If the history of nineteenth-and twentieth-century communes is a study in contrasts, the history of cooperatives is a study in continuity. The most recent cooperative enterprises have met the same problems as their forerunners, and the ones that have survived show the same tendency toward convergence with established institutions.

The basic features of cooperative organization are democratic participation on a one-member-one-vote basis and refunds to members of any profits. Without these, an organization
cannot legitimately call itself a cooperative. Open membership and political neutrality are common among cooperatives, but not universal. Communes and cooperatives share a similar relation to capitalism (indeed, producers' cooperatives have sometimes been organized communally). Both are attempts to transcend capitalism without confronting it in an open conflict. Communes are more concerned with changing the relations of the household; cooperatives, with changing the relations of the market. Whereas communes are typically a retreat from the larger economy, cooperatives can survive only by competing successfully in it. For nineteenth-century communes, the enclaves to which they retreated became indefensible as they were overtaken and encompassed by American society. Cooperatives, on the other hand, have been drawn into capitalism by competing against it. The two forms of exemplary organization have followed different routes to collapse or convergence, but they have generally arrived there just the same.

In the United States, some early resistance to industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century took the form of cooperative enterprises among threatened skilled craftsmen. Their ventures proved noncompetitive and short-lived, but American farmers succeeded where urban workers had failed. Cooperative organization was a central part of the Populists' program in the late 1800s, and it became an enduring part of America's rural economy after Populism faded. Through marketing and purchasing cooperatives, American farmers today sell about one quarter of their products and buy much of their equipment, supplies, electricity, insurance, and other goods and services. Some agricultural cooperatives have grown into enormous enterprises—several appear on Fortune's annual list of the five hundred largest American corporations. One such cooperative, Farmland Industries, owns oil fields, refineries, sulphur and phosphate mines, fertilizer plants, slaughtering houses, warehouses, a fleet of trucks—in short, it manages a vertically and horizontally integrated organization that supplies its 750,000 member-farmers with all manner of goods and services. Such cooperatives are not easily distinguished from capitalist firms in their structure and behavior, but they do generate savings for their members.

Essentially, cooperatives have become the functional equivalent of the oligopolistic corporation for family farmers, giving them some countervailing leverage and market power. Consumer cooperatives have been more faithful to the original spirit of the cooperative movement, but they too have moved toward convergence with capitalist firms. While the farmers' cooperatives emerged from the Populist movement, consumers' cooperatives came from two other sources—Jewish democratic socialists in eastern cities and Scandinavian, especially Finnish, socialists and communists in the northern Midwest. In 1916, these groups, plus assorted other cooperativists, formed the Cooperative League of the United States of America, still in existence today. In 1930, after an unsuccessful effort to take control, the communist faction walked out of the league, which thereafter continued to voice the lame and pious hope that cooperatives would peacefully supersede capitalism. But even rhetorical gestures to an alternative society diminished in the 1940s, as managerial influence rose in the cooperatives and increased emphasis was placed on business competence in the struggle for survival. "It is not so important," wrote the editor of the Cooperative League's journal in 1943,

to explain the relationship of cooperative food store service to the parable of Jesus and the loaves and fishes as it is to describe the proper ways of buying and stocking and displaying loaves and fishes in the co-op store, and then get every possible Mrs. Consumer to buy and buy—and become an owner, too.\footnote{The 1960s brought a revival of interest in cooperatives, but the new ones may well be following the same path. Radicals started cooperatives with the hope, as one proponent of food cooperatives wrote, of substituting community for private ownership, paying workers decent wages, holding open meetings and making decisions collectively, and abolishing all forms of discrimination.\footnote{The food cooperatives also wanted to encourage people to eat nutritious food, and they initially refused to stock "junk" foods and other products they regarded as unhealthy. At the same time, they expected to be able to offer cheaper prices by eliminating the profits made by food stores.}}
The reality proved somewhat different, as Daniel Zwerdling pointed out in a report on food cooperatives in Washington, D.C., in 1975. Most of the new cooperatives were too small to buy in sufficient quantity to get prices as low as those paid by supermarket chains. Inadequate floor space led them to employ additional manpower to restock shelves. Consequently, in spite of eliminating profits, their prices were in some cases actually higher than those of supermarkets, and their wages were uniformly lower. The cooperatives at that time (1975) could not afford to pay more than $2.50 an hour, while checkers at the regular supermarket began at $4.81.

Unable to attract as much business as they expected, the cooperatives were forced to make compromises. They began carrying “everything the community wants,” including junk food. To build up sufficient volume to get lower prices, one co-op leader explained to Zwerdling, they would have to concentrate on building “supermarket-sized stores.” But of course, with increases in size, they would lose their distinctive personal atmosphere and any chance of community participation in decision-making. In fact, the relationship of member-consumers to the cooperatives was not much different from their relationships to other stores. True, the co-ops would warn them of bad buys and unhealthy products, but most seemed to develop no special loyalty. They came to shop at the co-op only for those items they could buy at lower prices there. “The nonprofit food cooperatives, far from their vision of becoming community resources, have become specialty stores,” Zwerdling wrote.17

The organizers of the cooperatives did not anticipate the managerial complexities or consumer resistance they would meet. Much the same difficulties were awaiting the alternative human-service institutions seeking to deprofessionalize education and medicine. Dispensing with professional authority meant acquiring some other means of achieving compliance. As Ann Swidler has shown, teachers in free schools who could not rely on authority were forced to draw on their own personal resources. Some “courted” students, hoping to win their loyalty and affection by being intimate with them. Emotionally ex-

busted, these teachers eventually “burned out” and quit.18 And in the free clinics, as Rosemary Taylor reports, some patients believed in professionalism more than the professionals did. They wanted to be seen by doctors, not paramedics, no matter what they were told (in itself, ironically, an assertion of lay judgment).19 By their nature, the clinics had a limited appeal; they could not be much more than outpatient departments for the counterculture and the underclass.

One of the ways in which exemplary organizations sought to be exemplary was in the representation of the community in their decision-making. By “the community” radicals often had in mind blacks, Hispanics, or low-income white ethnics—the groups they wanted their organizations to serve. But who actually represented “the community” and what were its true interests? Many of the people the radicals wanted to see represented had no communal consciousness or organization. Their representatives often had to be invented; their interests often had to be imputed. The community—so palpable in its misfortune—became elusive whenever its presence was sought.

Just as the food cooperatives became “specialty stores,” so the free clinics and schools and counseling centers met the needs of special groups rather than whole communities. Supported by only a fragment of society, they had a tenuous grasp on survival. They were easily vulnerable to encroachment by more powerful, established institutions that had only to adopt enough of their ideas to cut the ground from under them. Some found a narrow niche to support their work, but even where in the late seventies they continue to function, they no longer embody the hopes of a movement.

Adversary Organization
After the Movement

The radical movement of the sixties had no unified organizational structure, no central committee, not even a guiding or coordinating coalition. It was an agglomeration of small, independent movements that more or less felt some kinship with
one another. But they were never joined together because they
could attract more support separately than if they had been
obliged to settle on a common ideology and program. The
predominant feeling was also hostile to any central bureauc-
cracy. Radicals built organizations, but then easily abandoned
them. No one was more mistaken than those left-wing sectari-
ans or right-wing police agents who thought they could capture
the movement if they controlled or destroyed its organizations.

The new radicalism was also distinctive in the forms of adver-
sary organization it created. Political parties and unions, usu-
ally prominent in left-wing movements, played almost no part
in the left of the sixties. Many radicals longed to establish such
organizations, but they had too little support to challenge the
parties and unions in power.

Four other types of adversary organization, with substan-
tially different structures, stand out in the period. These were
movement organizations, community organizations, public-
interest lobbies, and the "advocacy" or "alternative" media.
The structural differences among them help explain which
kinds of organization were best able to survive the end of the
era that gave them life.

1. By *movement organizations* I mean those groups, like SDS,
the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), Environmental Ac-
tion, and the National Organization for Women (NOW), that
have sought to mobilize protest, often including forms of "di-
rect action," as part of a broader struggle for change. The
typical movement organization is, or tries to be, national in
scope, with a network of local chapters and periodic conven-
tions to elect its leaders and resolve major questions of policy.
It has a staff of organizers, and its leadership usually rotates
annually. It does not put up candidates for political office,
although it may lend some its backing and attempt to defeat
others. It calls on members and supporters for funds and partic-
ipation in protests. To adopt the vocabulary of Peter Clark and
James Q. Wilson, the incentives for membership tend to be
more "purposive" than "material"—that is, members join pri-
marily to achieve goals like ending racial discrimination or
changing foreign policy, which may or may not benefit them
directly.

2. *Community organizations*, like those that Saul Alinsky
established in Chicago and Rochester, are local groups con-
cerned with bread-and-butter issues. Typically, they have a
strong staff of organizers, often middle-class in origin and more
radical than the members, and an elected leadership drawn
from the community. Members pay dues, which represent the
main source of financing, and they are called on, as in move-
ment organizations, to take part in protests. The incentives for
membership, however, tend to be primarily "material" rather
than "purposive": members are attracted explicitly by the
promise of direct benefits. The Alinsky organizers like to dis-
tinguish this "organization" approach from that of a "move-
ment":

As Ed Chambers [an Alinsky organizer] explains it, a movement
relies on charismatic leaders, other people's money, indiscrimi-
nate recruitment, amateur devotion, and "flash, image, con-
sciousness-raising." An organization [i.e., a community organi-
zation] is built on dues, collective leadership, army-like
regularity, systematic daily work, professionalism and playing
to win. Movements are ideological. In the Alinsky model of an
organization, people act democratically in their own self-inter-
est, and ideology is irrelevant.22

In other words, community organization aims to be the
"business unionism" of the radical movement.

3. *Public-interest lobbies*, like Ralph Nader's various organi-
zations, have yet a third structure. The two largest, Nader's
Public Citizen and Common Cause, have, at one time or an-
other, attracted several hundred thousand "members," drawn
—as in movement organizations—primarily by commitment to
the group's objectives rather than any hope of direct gain.
Membership, however, typically entails no more than financial
support, in the form of a small annual contribution. Members
are not asked to take part in any protests more demanding than
letter-writing, and they have no role in electing or controlling
the organization's leadership. The public-interest lobby typi-
cally consists of a staff of professionals, mainly lawyers, who
have successfully established themselves as advocates of a pub-
lic otherwise unrepresented. Usually they are based in a single
office in Washington or a state capital. Compared to movement and community organizations, whose leaders must be able to mobilize supporters for action, public-interest lobbies are relatively distant from the people they claim to represent. 23

4. Finally, the alternative media—local weekly papers, national monthly magazines and quarterly journals, a few radio stations, and even news services—vary in structure. Some have exemplary features—they are run by “editorial collectives” with a minimum of hierarchy; others are profit-making enterprises not much different from regular businesses, except that they necessarily allow a looser style of work than most firms would tolerate. Like some of the public-interest lobbies, they have a constituency—their readers or listeners—who, in subscribing, provide financial support. 24

Nearly all these adversary organizations are inherently unstable, for want of any reliable flow of income. Only the alternative media, of the four types, can regularly obtain most of their resources by sale of a product. The others acquire their means of support from a combination of “voluntary” sources—from their staff in the form of underpaid labor; from their membership in the form of dues or volunteer services; and from outside sources in the form of money from individual contributors, donated services from performers and others (as at benefit concerts), or grants for specific projects from private foundations and public agencies. Adversary organizations are often in competition with one another to obtain this support; each tries to stir up enthusiasm for its own particular cause (peace, civil rights, environmental safety, tax reform) and get “out front” on issues likely to win it recognition. In this process, charismatic leadership and media attention play a critical role. For it is through the media that movement, community, and public-interest organizations are able simultaneously to reach large numbers of people, gain leverage on government and private officials, and persuade their own supporters (and perhaps themselves) that the organization is accomplishing great things. Thus the dependence on irregular contributions puts them at the mercy of ebbs and flows in sentiment and changing perceptions of their newsworthiness.

The Vietnam War and the crisis that accompanied it set in motion countless adversary organizations, brought them support and resources, and helped them make the kind of “news” that the press and television were likely to report. But as the crisis died down, for historical reasons beyond their control, the organizations had to adapt to less propitious circumstances. The media paid less attention, and the spontaneous support and readiness for mobilization dwindled.

The change in political conditions did not affect adversary organizations equally: some stood up better than others. Of the four types, movement organizations were the hardest hit. Lacking any firm base of support, they declined the most rapidly as the sense of crisis abated. Some peaked early, some late; the antiwar organizations were already in decline as the environmental and women’s groups emerged. But none of them had much capacity to sustain themselves as movement organizations over the long run. On the other hand, public-interest organizations seem to have held up rather well. Some have put themselves on a relatively firm foundation by mastering sophisticated direct-mail techniques that enable them to appeal to thousands of small contributors instead of depending on a few “financial angels.”

Why did movement and public interest organizations fare differently? The people who had been active in the protests of the sixties did not turn conservative. They turned inward, becoming preoccupied with their private lives, and it became harder to mobilize them for protest. Whereas movement organizations require a high level of involvement from their supporters, public-interest lobbies require very little and are perhaps for that reason better suited to a quieter time. Furthermore, while radical activism has waned, Americans have also become, according to studies of public opinion, more “issue-oriented” and less “party-oriented” in their politics. 25 As a result, issue-oriented organizations have been able to raise large sums of money when the established political parties have found it difficult. 26 Furthermore, the public-interest organizations do not challenge any fundamental premises of the public, whereas some of the movement organizations did. So long as the public-interest
groups work on issues that are concrete, specific, and "nonideological" (i.e., not based on any ideology other than the prevailing one), their lease on public approval and support has been renewed.

Movement organizations were also particularly susceptible to escalating demands for "exemplary" conduct that undermined their effectiveness. Radicals tended to oppose as "elitist" strong leadership and professionalism, and frequently insisted that privileged whites subordinate their concerns to those of blacks and other "third world" groups. Male dominance of organizational politics also came under attack. The result, especially in the early seventies, was a competition in piety, a kind of radical perfectionism, that directed attention to the purification of organizational structure—a purification from which some movement organizations never recovered.

Like public-interest groups, community organizations also seem to have withstood the ebb of radical sentiment in the seventies more successfully than movement organizations. They too have avoided diffuse "ideological" issues. By concentrating on problems like property taxes and utility rates, low-income community groups—such as ACORN in Arkansas and Fair Share in Massachusetts—have been able to grow stronger at a time when most poor people's organizations have grown weaker. ACORN, in fact, expanded in 1976 and 1977 into ten new states from its original base in Arkansas, opening up door-to-door organizing programs as far away as Philadelphia.

The Black Panther party exemplifies this change in political direction. Although it emerged in the late sixties as a movement organization with revolutionary aims—and thereby brought down upon itself the wrath of the police and the FBI—it shifted in the seventies to a community organization concerned with local, bread-and-butter issues. In Oakland, California, its political base, the party became an acknowledged power in city affairs. Like an old-fashioned ethnic machine, it traded support for a highway project that would cut through the city in return for a guaranteed number of jobs for blacks. In 1977 the Panthers conducted a voter-registration drive in minority districts, helping to elect the city's first black mayor and sending one of their own members, Erika Huggins, to the county school board

—examples that Huey Newton, the party's founder, cited as evidence of its growing "maturity." 28

The alternative media have been showing signs of "maturity" too. Most of the "underground" papers of the sixties have disappeared. Left in their wake are a number of what Andrew Kopkind calls "sea-level" publications, which have much of the style and some of the politics of radicalism but are run on a commercial basis and aimed at an audience of hip young professionals. Boston's Real Paper was for a time cooperatively owned, until its writers sold it to a group including David Rockefeller, Jr. The general tendency in the alternative press has been toward convergence and accommodation. In pursuit of respectability and wider audiences, publications like Rolling Stone and New York's Village Voice have toned down their language, diversified their reporting, and tried to bring moderate views into their pages. 29

As such publications have grown older and more successful, the low pay and poor working conditions that their writers had been willing to endure at first have become increasingly anomalous. In the early 1970s, writers at the Village Voice, including people as well known as Nat Hentoff, were typically earning less than $100 a week, according to Ellen Frankfort, a former Voice columnist. Those who were not on the staff—and that included most of the columnists and regular contributors—had, besides low pay, no health insurance or other benefits commonly associated with employment. "The Voice was a place of integrity," Frankfort later wrote. "If writers were earning very little, I assumed it was because there was very little to give us." But in 1974, the two founders of the paper sold it for $3 million, and it became obvious that the paper was making more money than its writers had dreamed. They finally summoned the courage to ask for a raise of $25 a week. As he turned them down, their editor explained that hundreds of journalists would be eager to take their places if they were so unhappy that they wanted to leave. 30

Such scenes were not uncommon. At a number of leading alternative publications, like San Francisco's Bay Guardian and the Boston Phoenix, meager pay and job insecurity led to prolonged, bitter struggles over unionization, which put the
think the process of political and cultural incorporation inevitable. In an analysis of social movements of the poor, two theorists of the welfare-rights struggle, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, argue that poor people can improve their condition only by spontaneous mass defiance; any kind of organization will prove useless. It will, they say, "blunt" the momentum of protest in moments of insurgency and usually collapse in the aftermath.

As for the few organizations which survive, it is because they become more useful to those who control the resources on which they depend than to the lower-class groups which the organizations claim to represent. Organizations endure, in short, by abandoning their oppositional politics.39

This argument rests on the proposition that the poor cannot sustain organization on their own. But even if this were true, the poor could still gain allies from other classes or win the support of institutions like the church, as revolutionary movements have often done. In any event, the counterorganizations of the sixties generally enjoyed support from the middle classes, which had the resources to build effective and lasting counterorganizations.40

The lesson of the sixties is not that counterorganizations of all kinds necessarily fail, but that in the absence of a general social transformation, they can survive only in certain limited forms. In the "political ecology" of American society, there are niches where counterinstitutions can sustain themselves. Community and public-interest organization are examples of relatively "defensible" niches, as are highly structured communal and cooperative organization. Some groups in the sixties started out in unstable positions; they either collapsed or, like the Panthers, moved into one of the more secure niches (in their case, community organization). Organizations do not have to survive by "abandoning their oppositional politics" (Piven and Cloward's iron law of accommodation); they can adjust their opposition to the structure of opportunities for furthering their interests that the society offers.

In at least some cities and regions of America, counterinstitutions of both kinds, exemplary and adversary, have grown suffi-
ciently strong to reinforce each other and constitute a new cultural enclave. As Catholics have their own schools and hospitals, their churches and welfare organizations, so the radical culture has developed its own schools, its own press, its food cooperatives, even restaurants and shops. Some Americans now live almost entirely within these enclaves. They are not likely to spread over the whole middle class, much less the whole society. But in the long run, they may represent, if not a counterculture, then another “subculture,” concentrated in particular neighborhoods of cities and in the rural areas of states like California, Oregon, Colorado, and Vermont.

Many more people pass through the counterorganizations that hover around these areas than remain. They come in search of community, but most stay for only a short time. Most of the counterinstitutions—the cooperatives, clinics and schools, the alternative media, the movement, community, and public-interest organizations—experience high turnover in staff for the simple reason they cannot offer much of a career. Since the organizations have few rungs in their hierarchy, a staff member “peaks” within a few years. Salaries that might be adequate for young professionals who are still used to student living become unacceptable as the staff members grow older and develop higher expectations and heavier commitments.

In a sense, these organizations resemble the urban communes in that both provide way stations for middle-class young people who are not yet established in regular families and professions. For many, the organizations offer a point of entry into careers. As a haven for the disillusioned, more acceptable than a conventional bureaucracy, they help people figure out what to do with their lives. Ironically, the counterinstitutions play a part in adjustment to adulthood, and thus have a function in the life cycle of their participants. The counterinstitutions tend to be high-intensity, low-commitment organizations: those who work for them or live within them often oscillate between moments of exhilaration and depression, before they burn out and go on to something else.

But radical organizations, like radicals themselves, are not immune to age, and as we have seen, many of them turn toward “maturity” and “respectability.” They move from an almost religious enthusiasm to an almost bureaucratic routine. Some of the characteristics that radicals liked about counterinstitutions, such as flexibility and informality in the definition of roles and functions, may have been due as much to the youth of the organizations as to the radicalism of their ideology.

The routinization of community was hardly what radicals of the sixties expected. In politics, as in our private lives, we generally set out to do one thing, and end up doing another. It may be painful to look back at what illusions we once held, but the results, even if not up to expectations, are not necessarily so terrible. Such has been the fate of the counterinstitutions of the 1960s. That they failed in their grand design is no secret, nor should it have been a surprise. At no time have they been more than an epiphenomenon in American society. They have accounted for a negligible fraction of the gross national product, and they never attracted enough support to pose much of a threat to any of the core institutions of America. But however marginal to the larger world of money and power, they occupy a historical position of some importance for the experiments they conducted in the reform of human attachments. In their effort to restore the bonds of community that modern society has broken, they gave expression to a widely felt need. No one should take any satisfaction from their failure.

Notes

1. The two terms “accommodation” and “convergence” are complementary. By “accommodation” I mean compromise in an organization’s adversarial stance; by “convergence” I mean a narrowing of the distance between exemplary features and the norm. An adversary organization loses its oppositional character through accommodation; an exemplary organization loses its oppositional character through convergence.

2. An adversary organization, however, cannot freely disregard its putative values; otherwise, it lays itself open to charges of betrayal. It can often realize some values more easily than others, and at least take symbolic measures to retain the semblance of consistency. For example, a union may retain the formal apparatus of consent when decisions are made hierarchically, and a radical political party may elevate some working-
class members into prominent positions to affirm its commitment to represent the oppressed.

3. A qualification needs to be entered here. The narrow IRS definition of impermissible political activity enables many nonprofit organizations to carry on what are in fact adversarial activities. Thus while there is a dual structure to counterorganizations, the dividing line is not drawn precisely on the exemplary/adversary distinction. Some legally acceptable adversary organizations are grouped with the exemplary. An analogous point can be made about the earlier example of movements under repressive regimes, where some legally acceptable adversary organizations may be "above" ground if tolerated by the state.


5. I don't wish to suggest that affluence alone brought about the shift from a "classical" to a "romantic" style in the left. The new radicalism reflected more general changes in American culture: the declining confidence in science and reason, the pervasive preoccupation with personality and the self, the relaxation of traditional standards of conduct and restraint.


8. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Commitment and Community: Communes and Utopias in Sociological Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 3–8. By "psychosocial," Kanter means that the critique of society of these latest communes stresses "alienation and loneliness" and their utopian visions look toward "liberating situations that are conducive to intimacy and psychological health, enabling people to 'grow' or 'do their own thing.'"


10. Kanter, Commitment and Community, pp. 75–125. Whether the "commitment mechanisms" were the causes of success, or merely correlated with it, is unclear. The communities that did not demand sacrifices may not have been able to because their members were too weakly committed to begin with for them to be sure such demands would not simply drive them away. The willingness to adopt the practices may be a result of commitment as well as a "mechanism" for reinforcing it. Since Kanter's analysis gives little sense of the historical development of communes, either singly or as a movement, we have no way of knowing whether adopting the mechanisms produced stronger commitment in communities where it was initially weak.

11. Personal communication to Kanter, Commitment and Community, p. 168.


17. Zwerdling, "Shopping Around," pp. 21–31. Zwerdling makes most of the same points in this volume. I should emphasize that despite their problems, cooperatives remain a useful institutional form and could play a larger part in the American economy, as they do in northern Europe.


22. David Moberg, "Chicago's Organizers Learn the Lessons of CAP,"
Co-ops, Communes & Collectives


24. As a group, the alternative media are not easily classified as exemplary or adversarial. Some are as much as one as the other, and some have passed through an exemplary phase on their way to becoming more hierarchical and bureaucratic. I put them here because, while they differ in the degree of exemplary structure, they share a style of “advocacy” reporting that rejects the ideal of objectivity and gives them an identifiably adversarial character.

The case of Liberation News Service (LNS) vividly illustrates how some counterinstitutions were split over the relationship between exemplary and adversary action. LNS was founded in Washington, D.C., in the fall of 1967 by two former college-newspaper editors, Marshall Bloom and Ray Mungo. It was a shoestring operation, “run as an anarchic free-for-all, until it moved to New York the following year, when revolutionary Marxists began to assume greater influence. The original staff, as Mungo later wrote, wanted to live the “post-revolutionary” life immediately; they wanted LNS to exemplify their ideals of a “free” community. In a fairly typical statement of countercultural radicalism, Mungo wrote, “A free community does not have meetings, and your attendance is never required in a free community. You are welcome to do whatever comes to mind so long as it does not actively harm others, in a free community. Nothing is expected of you, nothing is delivered. Everything springs from natural and uncoerced energy.” Needless to say, the Marxists found this style of organization unacceptable, and their influence increased. To keep control, Bloom and his followers early one Sunday morning loaded all the contents of their office, including a press, on trucks and in cars and moved by caravan to a farm in western Massachusetts. When the other side awoke to find the equipment gone, it dispatched a second caravan in much larger numbers. Brandishing knives and rods, the hard-liners beat up the anarchists, wrecked their new house, and took as much back as they could. The result was more devastating than any injuries to the body; the violent encounter was the end of innocence. Mungo wrote in his memoir of the struggle, “We took from them the machinery with which they planned to voice their politics, and their politics are their identities; they took from us our blood, our energy, and whatever vision we had left of a ‘revolution.”’ See Raymond Mungo, Famous Long Ago: My Life and Hard Times with Liberation News Service (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), pp. 56–57, 153 ff.


It might be argued that the fate of organizations is better explained by their politics than by their structure. The two are clearly related, but my argument would be that given an organization’s politics, its chances of survival are better in the community or public-interest forms than as a movement organization, during a period when radical sentiment is ebbing. Indeed, some of the movement groups of the sixties, particularly in civil rights and environmental and women’s issues, have shifted toward a structure more like that of public-interest groups by pulling back from direct action and concentrating their efforts on research, lobbying, and litigation.


32. Hodgson, America in Our Time, p. 348.

33. Piven and Cloward, Poor People’s Movements, p. xi.

34. For a detailed critique of Piven and Cloward, see my review in Working Papers for a New Society 6 (Mar.–Apr. 1978): 70–73.