Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
Supplemental Material 1: Overview of the Supplemental Materials
Supplemental Material 2: General Two-Player Game with Cheap Talk
Supplemental Material 3: General More-Than-Two-Player Game with Cheap Talk
Supplemental Material 4: General Two-Player Game without Cheap Talk
Supplemental Material 5: General More-Than-Two-Player Game without Cheap Talk

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
(with Satoru Takahashi, October 2011), Submitted.

Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium without Conditional Independence
Revision requested from Theoretical Economics.

Folk Theorem in the Two-Player Prisoners' Dilemma without Conditional Independence
(Coming Soon)

Characterizing the Limit Set of PPE Payoffs with Unequal Discounting
(This version; February 2010. First draft; August 2008)

Asynchronous Revision Games with Deadline: Unique Equilibrium in Coordination Games
(with Yuichiro Kamada), Revision requested from Theoretical Economics together with an independent paper by Calcagno and Lovo.

A Corrigendum to "Buying Supermajorities in Finite Legislatures"
(June 2009)

Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Platforms in Policy Announcement Games
(with Yuichiro Kamada, September 2011)
(This paper was previously circulated as “Policy Announcement Game: Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Policies”).

The Real Indeterminacy of the Unemployment Rate in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model
(This version; November 2008. First draft; June 2006)
Online Appendix
Matlab Code I
Matlab Code II