

# Executive's Influence Over Legislative Behavior in Uruguay\*

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The Uruguayan party system is consistently ranked among the most institutionalized in the regions, with two of the three main parties existing for most of the 20th century, and the third, currently in office, having gradually emerged since the late 1960s (Mainwaring & Scully 1995, Buquet, Chasquetti & Moraes 1998, González 1991). It has also been widely documented that because of their factional organization, the country's political system has functioned during much of the past twenty years a *de facto* more extreme multiparty system, despite its two-to-three party nominal structure. Moreover, the president's faction typically lacked a majority, thus being forced to negotiate alliances with other factions in the same party as well as with factions in other parties (Altman 2000) in ways that are not completely different than what happens, say, in Brazil, a country with much more fluid party affiliations and discipline.

Several studies of Uruguayan politics have analyzed both the patterns of coalition formation that characterized the first two decades after re-democratization, and patterns of legislative behavior. This eminently empirical paper is at the intersection of both of these discussions and contributes to the literature by showing, in a systematic fashion, the effects of executive-legislative bargaining on legislative behavior. None of the substance of this paper is particularly

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new, as the literature before has already established several facts about both topics, but it presents new data and applies a framework of analysis not yet used in the Uruguayan case.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I discuss the literature on coalitions and legislative behavior in Uruguay, and provide some qualitative evidence of the importance executive appointments in executive and legislative relations. The subsequent section presents the framework that was originally used to analyze executive-legislative relations in Brazil to the Uruguayan case. Section 3 presents a newly augmented data set of roll calls in the Uruguayan Senate and describes the general patterns of legislative behavior found in this legislative body. The following section estimates the effects of cabinet membership on legislative behavior, and is followed by a brief conclusion.

## 1 Coalitions and Legislative Behavior

Students of legislative behavior in Uruguay have shown beyond reasonable doubt that the Uruguayan party factions are very disciplined and stable entities (Buquet, Chasquetti & Moraes 1998). In fact, it has been shown idea that differently than what happens in other multiparty presidential systems, factions are the relevant agents in the Uruguayan legislature (Morgenstern 2004).

If one accepts that factions are the main players, then governments from 1985 though 2005 were akin to coalitions in multiparty systems. In this respect, Altman (2000) has shown that ideological distance, membership in the president's party, fairness of the coalitional arrangement and, especially, timing in the electoral cycle affect the probability that a given faction will be in the government coalition in a single year. As the presidential term progresses and elections approach, the electoral incentives become more important providing incentives for factions to jump ship in order to better position themselves for the next elections.

The literature has advanced beyond the isolated study of legislative behavior and coalition formation and noted that some interesting patterns of behavior can, in fact, be traced back to the *quid-pro-quo* involved in the executive's coalition building efforts. While observing that party discipline was usually lower than faction discipline, Buquet, Chasquetti & Moraes (1998) conjectured that participation in the government's coalition was part of the determinants of voting behavior observed in the legislature. Morgenstern (2001) further elaborated on the topic showing that while the "in" party factions tend to cooperate among each other more at the beginning of the term, the "out" party factions tend to operate together at its end.

Coalition formation is obviously intertwined with legislative behavior in profound ways as cabinet and other appointments are generally made in expectation of legislative support. As in other presidential systems where coalition government is the norm, the Uruguayan executive used the resources at its disposal to attract and maintain legislative support. In their very comprehensive analysis of Uruguayan politics in the 1980's and 1990's, Buquet, Chasquetti & Moraes (1998) identify a packet of more than 300 jobs around which coalitions are built. These are the most visible prizes sought by politicians, and were almost uniformly listed by several former occupants of high profile positions interviewed in Montevideo in 2005. These positions include directing boards of state owned companies, autonomous entities, national commissions, and, above all, ministerial positions.

Besides the capacity to appoint other party members to key posts, to deliver visible goods to the electorate, and to take credit for policies and projects, some of these positions are particularly valuable because they allow hiring of hundreds of low level temporary employees and/or they manage projects funded by multilateral institutions that carry considerable hiring discretion. As a former *blanco* minister bluntly stated,

In politics the large ministries are what is really interesting. The ones with national projection, that act in the whole country, that have many jobs to distribute, that have visibility and that grant the possibility of doing things. But, fundamentally, where one can put reliable people, where there are more jobs to fill, a national scope, for instance, the Health Ministry or the Ministry of Transportation and Public Works, the ones that deal with more resources, because that is power. (*Former Blanco Minister 2005a*)

Ministries are so important for potential allies that even in a country with a very stable administrative structure such as Uruguay, in the rare instance in which a new extra ministry was created, it was done mostly to accommodate political interests.<sup>1</sup> In the word of the same important *blanco* politician, “(...) the Ministry of Sports was created, and was given to a *Herrerista*, and that was a political solution because the *herrerismo* has been left with less ministries than what corresponded to them proportionally.” (*Former Blanco Minister 2005a*)

All accounts indicate that the distribution of these jobs is done behind closed doors, between the president and a handful of faction leaders. In this, the process of allocation cabinet

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<sup>1</sup>In 1995, President Batlle created the Ministry of Youth and Sports to assign an extra seat to former President Lacalle's faction in the National Party.

positions is no different from what happens in Brazil, or even Bolivia, for that matter: it is done *with leaders*, who bargain *as leaders* of their political groups, and never as individual legislators. An important difference, that will be explored later in the text, is that in Uruguay, this “collective” mode of executive-legislative bargaining is not accompanied by other individual level channels.

In retribution for “sharing” state resources with other groups, the government seeks favorable behavior from factions in the legislature. Though being part or not of government appears to have effects on the degree of cohesion of the factions (Morgenstern 2001, Buquet, Chasquetti & Moraes 1998), and although it is widely believe that the government has the capacity to induce legislative behavior, this hypothesis has not been systematically tested, mainly due to lack of proper data.

## 2 Executive-Legislative Exchanges

There is little doubt among politicians and observers alike that coalition formation affects legislative behavior. However, it would be interesting to test whether these effects that are believed to exist can be found in a systematic analysis of legislative voting patterns. Towards this goal, the framework developed by Zucco Jr. (2009) to analyze a similar issue in Brazil could come in handy. The idea is to check the extent to which measures of the inducements provided by the president explain behavior deviations from what would be predicted by ideology.

In Brazil, inducements include not only party participation in the cabinet, but also measures of pork that are dispensed by the executive directly to individual legislators. In this, the uruguayan case should be actually slightly simpler to analyze than the Brazilian one because direct bargaining between the executive and individual legislators is conspicuously absent. In Uruguay, as in other Latin American presidential systems, the president controls most state resources<sup>2</sup> and, until 2005, typically lacked a majority. He was forced to negotiate alliances with other factions in his own party as well as factions in other parties. As in other multiparty presidential system, the political resources controlled by the president are used as a means to obtain and maintain legislative support from *parties*. However, differently from Brazil, the

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<sup>2</sup>As in Brazil, Uruguayan presidents exercise much control over the executive branch. It should be noted, however, that the main state companies are autonomous entities, for which the president can appoint, but not discharge, directors. Additionally, there is a constitutional mandate that grants the opposition representation on the boards these entities. Finally, an important distinction between the two countries is that ministers are, at least in principle, subject to censuring by Parliament. Though all this limits presidential discretion, the constitution also prescribes to the president the power to dissolve congress under very special circumstances.

Uruguayan government has little ability and incentives to exchange resources for support with *individual legislators*.

In Uruguay, exchanges between the executive and faction leaders are usually enough to assure support, at least in the medium term, from the whole faction. Not only factional discipline is very high, but factions can demand the replacement of their appointee; and when factions break with the government, all their members leave the cabinet. In Brazil, in contrast, party discipline is weaker and ministers often remain in office even after their parties formally break with the government, thus effectively splitting the party between pro and anti-government factions. Ministers sometimes even change parties to retain their posts. During Lula's first term, for instance, Helio Costa provides an example of the former, and Ciro Gomes and Miro Teixeira of the latter. Such a move is unheard of in Uruguay.

In Uruguay, according to almost all of my interviewees, high level appointments are the *sole* instrument the president has, besides compromising on policy initiatives, to put together its voting coalition in Congress. In Brazil, the situation is very different, and though parties are relevant legislative players (Figueiredo & Limongi 2002), there is quite a lot of evidence that individual level exchanges are common. There are strong empirical regularities between important votes and implementation of individual amendments (Pereira & Muller 2004, Alston & Mueller 2006), such exchanges are commonly mentioned in the news (Souza 2005), legislators openly complain when the government does not authorize expenditures they expect (Krakovic 2004, for a typical example), and recent studies have found that success in getting their budget amendments appropriated is associated with a more pro-government stance, after controlling for the ideological distance between legislators and the president (Zucco Jr. 2009).

In Uruguay, exchanges at the individual legislator level do not regularly happen. Granted, a few interviewees pointed to the same notorious politician from a small department who has quite a reputation as an avid bargainer. While these exchanges were not entirely on personal grounds, as he was, in fact, leader of a party faction, the fact that several interviewees pointed to this very same case over and over also suggests it is quite exceptional, and was looked down upon by the rest of the political establishment. This is a quite different attitude than the one prevalent in Brazil, where pork and patronage-seeking behavior is generally regarded as a "fact of life." As a general trend, exchanges based on private goods that can be linked to a particular legislator or region are very rare in Uruguay. In fact, any bargaining between the executive and individual legislators is very rare. In the words of a former *Colorado* minister:

This very rarely happens, except if it is a very special legislator, a very important legislator, the only one holding off, that the leader of the other party requests “talk to this guy, he is a bit reluctant,” but this is not a usual thing. (*Former Colorado Legislator & Minister 2005a*)

While a study of the reasons for this difference extrapolate the scope of this paper, they can surely be traced back to specific institutional arrangements. For instance, the Brazilian case shows that much of the provision of individual benefits to legislators is done through the political use of the budget. In this, Brazil and Uruguay are very different. In Uruguay each budget spans five years, and is passed during the first year of each presidency. There are yearly *rendición de cuentas* bills, where expenditures can be added, removed, or rearranged, and which sometimes function as *de facto* yearly budgets. Both the five year budget bill and these yearly revision bills are great opportunities for congress to attempt to extract more resources from the government.<sup>3</sup> Through logrolling within Congress, legislators do manage to include matters that interest them, as one important *Colorado* leader commented on the inclusion of budgetary matters of interest to individual legislators:

It exists, and they are legitimate interests of each department. However, it is not normal that it be used as a type of blackmail. It is not as explicit, nor as public as it is in the United States. Usually, parties handle this sort of thing internally. (*Former Colorado Legislator & Minister 2005b*)

But, in Uruguay, there is no such thing as an individual amendment to the budget, and most legislators could not claim direct credit for particular budget items even if they could prove they had been responsible for their inclusion. With half of the lower house elected from a single electoral district where 40% of the population resides, and with all Senators elected in the country at-large in a closed list PR electoral system, the great majority of the legislators are not accountable to any specific geographic location. Hence, it is not typically expected that the legislator will lobby the executive for local expenditures nor seek to include narrow local measures in the budget. In comparison, legislators, in Brazil, are also elected in large districts, but the open list system guarantees that congressmen know where their votes came

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<sup>3</sup>Moraes, Chasquetti & Bergara (2005) have shown that the congress in Uruguay greatly affects the final composition of the budget, while Morgenstern (2004) wrote that legislators commonly combined requests for certain expenditures with threats to make cuts in parts of the budget that are dear to the executive (p.178).

from. Many have relatively concentrated constituencies, and much time and effort is spend with local politics.

In this context, it makes sense that Uruguayan legislators do not pay attention to the execution the budget at all, and do not generally seek to guarantee that particular pieces of pork are implemented.<sup>4</sup> Curiously, this is not because the government executes the budget exactly as approved by the legislature. Most legislators seem very much aware of the budget cuts made by the executive, and most former ministers had stories about their budget being withheld by the economic and planning ministries. As a former *blanco* minister described:

There is what the [budget] law says, there is what the [Economy] Ministry authorizes me to spend and that eventually is appropriated by decree, and there is what the [Economy] Ministry effectively hands me. It [the Economy Ministry] can say “yes, yes, I will give it to you, but now we do not have it, next month we will give it to you.” This way, it is the Economy Ministry that decides it all. (*Former Blanco Minister 2005b*)

Though it is clear that “the Economy Minister controls the tap,” (*Former Blanco Minister 2005a*) most interviewees thought determining priorities in the budget was the exclusive right of the executive branch, that it was not done on political grounds, and that the economic/fiscal situation was the most important determinant of this decision.

### 3 Legislative Behavior in Uruguay

Part of the problem in testing the inducing effects of the President’s coalition strategy, surely, is to obtain appropriate data. Comparing behavior with ideology and participation in the cabinet requires, respectively, roll call data, some measure of ideology, and cabinet membership. In the case of Uruguay, the first of these is particularly problematic.

Uruguayan scholars and specialists have used votes taken in the legislature to analyze the behavior of parties and factions in Congress. Data on a relatively large number of significant projects was compiled and analyzed, for instance, by Buquet, Chasquetti & Moraes (1998). From these data it was possible to compile cohesion scores for factions and parties, but given

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<sup>4</sup>Some legislators, in fact, were surprised to find out that this is an important part of what legislators do in neighboring Brazil. One *Colorado* legislator even took note of it, and commented that he thought it was a good suggestion and something to be pursued.

the way the data was recorded in the legislative journals it is not really possible to determine exactly which legislators voted, and consequently, exactly how each in every legislator voted.

Complete roll calls for the Uruguayan legislature were originally only available for veto override votes, which have become increasingly rarer. These votes have been presented and analyzed using spacial models similar to the ones I use in this paper (Morgenstern 2004), but the small numbers of votes limited any inference attempt to the first two legislative periods after redemocratiation.

Table 1: Complete Roll Calls in the Uruguayan Senate 1985–2005

	Original Data-Set	“New” Votes	Total
1985	44	7	51
1990	22	14	36
1995	0	21	21
2000	0	16	16
Total	66	58	124

Since then, improvements in the indexation of the Uruguayan Parliament’s legislative records have allowed me to expand the existing set considerably. I collected data for two more legislative periods, but was also able to find roll calls in votes other than veto overrides (Table 1). While numbers are still small, the data set was considerably expanded and the use of bayesian methods of ideal point estimation (IDEAL) instead of the maximum likelihood framework (WNOMINATE) provides a slightly more reliable for method of estimation under these circumstances.

New roll calls were found both in the Senate and in the lower Chamber. In this paper, however, I concentrate only on the Senate. This should not pose too many problems, as electoral rules are extremely proportional in both chambers, and faction unity is very strong. Hence, positions in the Senate should correspond very closely to positions in the lower house. Figure 1 reports estimates of Senator’s ideal points in a single dimension. There estimates are, in themselves, one of the contributions of this paper.

Though Sanguinetti appointed two ministers that were nominally *blancos* in his first term as president, they both served as personal nominations and the government was never really characterized as a cross party “coalition.” Not surprisingly, legislators are clearly clustered in two separate blocks, with all the *colorados* pitted against the *blancos* and the *frentamplistas*.




Figure 1: Ideal Point Estimates for Uruguayan Senators

Notes: Figure reports ideal points estimates of Uruguayan Senators with their respective 95% confidence interval, obtained by estimating a one dimensional item response model using IDEAL for R ((Clinton, Jackman & Rivers 2004)). There are 31 seats in the Uruguayan Senate. Estimates are only presented for Senators that voted more than 8 times in any period, which in some cases includes alternates.

While these two groups are clearly different, legislators cannot be distinguished in terms of their voting patterns within groups.

This results might seem predictable to the point of almost being boring, except that the do not correspond precisely to the left-right ordering of factions and parties. All sources indicate that for the period studied, there existed a considerable ideological overlap between *blancos* and *colorados*, but legislative behavior is clearly structured around a government vs. opposition cleavage.

Table 2: Ideology Ordering of Factions

(a) Legislature 1985–1990											
PC	PGP E90	MNR PLP	CBI BU VB	Herr UNH	UCB						
(b) Legislature 1995–2000											
MPP	PC	E90 VA	ER AU	NE	PGP	MNR	FB PN MO	Renovi	L15	H	UCB C94
(c) Legislature 2000–2005											
		E90 Vázquez	AP VA	AU	NE	AN PN	CW	FB Batlle L15	H		

*Notes:* Ideology data were obtained from legislator surveys provided by three different sources (González, Altman, ICP), described in greater detail in the next section.

The other three legislatures studied include considerable periods under formal coalition government. During Lacalle’s government and Sanguinetti’s second term in office, factions of the PC and the PN united in post-electoral coalitions and shared government responsibilities during considerable periods. In Batlle’s government, the coalition was arguable stronger, as it was assembled before the final electoral round.

As has been already documented, factions were typically shed as time progressed Altman (2000). For instance there were at least three “governments” under Lacalle, one from 1990–1991, another in 1992, and the last one covering the last two years of his term. Ideally, one would have a different set of ideal point estimates for each of these periods, but the total number of roll calls is already small. Still, the degree of “governmentness” shown in Figure 1(b) roughly matches the order in which factions “jumped ship.” The main *colorado* factions (Foro *Batllista* and Lista 15) were the first to leave, along with the PLP. The *blanco* MNR left an year later and the *colorados* from UCB stuck with the *herrerista* government until the end. In general, the legislators in the middle of the behavioral scale reported in Figure 1 were not strictly

“moderates” in the ideological sense, but rather members of factions that were in government for part of the term in and then continued in opposition. The more systematic empirical tests carried out in the next section intend precisely to show that along with a left-right cleavage a government vs. dynamic is central to Uruguayan politics.

## 4 Explaining Legislative Behavior, Systematically

In this section I attempt to systematically test how being part of the government coalition affects legislative behavior. One could conceivably carry such an analysis using legislator data, as behavior is measured at the level of the legislator. However, not only behavior of different legislators in the same faction is very similar, but more importantly, ideology data is not available at the individual level and cabinet participation is, necessarily, a faction level variable. Hence, the unit of observation is the faction/legislature and the complete data set consists of 47 observations, spanning the four legislative periods previously discussed.

The dependent variable is legislative behavior, and for each legislative faction the main independent variables are an exogenous estimate of its average ideological distance to the president and the share of roll calls — if any — in which the faction held a ministerial post. These variables merit some more detailed explanation.

Legislative behavior is simply the average absolute difference between the ideal points in one-dimension of faction members and that of the president. The president’s ideal point is assumed to coincide with that of the vice-president, who is also the president of the Senate.

As mentioned above, ideally one would estimate different sets of ideal points for each different “cabinet.” However, there is hardly enough data to estimate one set of ideal points for the whole legislative period, so this option is not viable. As an alternative, instead of simply using a dummy to indicate which factions held positions, I used the duration of each faction’s membership in the cabinet, computed as the share of roll calls taken in which each faction held at least one ministerial position.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables

	Min	Max	Mean	St.Dev
Behavior	0.03	2.42	1.26	0.87
Ideology	0.00	5.41	2.09	1.76
Cabinet	0.00	1.00	0.31	0.44

Ideological distance from the president was constructed from data obtained from three different sources. David Altman shared his legislator survey data collected in 1997, and Daniel Buquet shared the data from four waves of the ICP’s Elite Survey, conducted between 2000 and 2004.<sup>5</sup> In both of these surveys legislators were asked to place themselves and the most important factions in a same comon left-right scales, which I rescaled to obtain estimates of the factions’ positions (Power & Zucco Jr. 2009). These were then simply differenced with respect to the president’s faction to obtain a measure of ideological distance to the president. I used Altman’s data for the 1990-1995 period as well: no survey was available for that period and relevant factions were essentially the same.<sup>6</sup> For the first period (1985–1990) Luis E. González had compiled very similar data from personal interviews with legislators. However, the original individual codings were since then lost<sup>7</sup>, and all that remains are the aggregate tables reported in his book (González 1991, p.76). I matched the 11 faction in my behavior and cabinet data to the six position groupings he reported, and used that as the basis to calculate the ideological position of each faction relative to the president.<sup>8</sup> While not perfect, the use of different data sources is not fatal because the analysis that follows is based on *relative* distances that require no direct comparison across periods and includes controls for period specific effects.

One additional complication to the empirical the analysis is that as the dependent variable is bounded at zero, the linear models will be predicting lower than observed values when the dependent variable is close to its lower bound. One alternative is to estimate tobit models instead of traditional OLS. Tobit allows for data censored from below at the expense of slightly harder to interpret coefficients. Table 4 reports the actual regression results, but I subsequently present figures to aid in their interpretation. For those interested, I also report the OLS estimation results of the same models, in which the results are basically unaltered.

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<sup>5</sup>For 2000-2005, the ideology data was collected in four waves, each of which interviewed one fourth of the legislature. The first three waves had a category for *Nacionales non Herreristas* which was then subdivided *Alianza Nacional*, *Propuesta* and *Correntada Wilsonista*. Before the rescaling, I used the *Nacionales non Herreristas* placements to complete the series for both *Alianza* and *Propuesta*, the latter of which has no effect as that faction was not present in the behavior data-set for that period. I kept the CW separate (hence, without a placement for the first three waves), because it was significantly more to the right than *Alianza*, *Propuesta* and the *non-Herreristas* taken as a group. In the behavior data for that period I considered Gallinal as the sole representative of CW, even though he was elected on an *Herrerista* list.

<sup>6</sup>The PLP was not in Altman’s data, but I assigned it the same value as MNR because they had been allied, and because Zumaran voted similar to Pereyra.

<sup>7</sup>Personal communication with the author, in April 2009.

<sup>8</sup>Though it would probably be indifferent, I used the ratings based in the average faction placements computed from all respondents. Following information given in the book, I assigned the values reported in Table 5.1 (p.76) as follows: “PC right wing” was assigned to Pacheco’s UCB; the “PC left wing” score was attributed to BU, CBI and VB; the “PN right wing” score was attributed to *Herrerismo* and the *Unión Nacionalista Herrerista*; the “PN left wing” was attributed to MNR and PLP; the “FA right wing” score was attributed to PGP and E90; and the “FA left wing” score was attributed to the *Partido Comunista*.

Table 4: Determinants of Legislative Behavior: 1985–2005

Tobit Estimates	Mod. 1	Mod. 2	Mod. 3	Mod. 4	Mod. 5
Cabinet	-0.534	-0.534	-0.554	-0.452	-0.606
SE	0.187	0.187	0.246	0.152	0.215
p-value	0.004	0.004	0.024	0.003	0.005
Cabinet × PresParty					0.299
					0.298
					0.317
PresParty				-0.695	-0.838
				0.138	0.198
				<0.01	0
Ideology	0.321	0.321	0.319	0.248	0.233
	0.047	0.047	0.048	0.04	0.043
	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Cabinet × Ideology			0.023		
			0.189		
			0.901		
Intercept	0.771	0.771	0.774	1.135	1.187
	0.172	0.172	0.173	0.156	0.163
	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Log.scale.	-0.795	-0.795	-0.796	-1.011	-1.021
	0.103	0.103	0.103	0.103	0.103
	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01	<0.01
Period Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chi <sup>2</sup>	60.79	60.79	60.81	81.06	82.05
Loglik (model)	-29.31	-29.31	-29.3	-19.18	-18.68
N	47	47	47	47	47

Model 1 and Model 2 are versions of the basic model, without and with period fixed effects. Simple inspection of the coefficients show that estimates are all but identical, which is evidence that there are little, if any, period specific effects left to explain, and that the main explanatory variables are doing most of the work.<sup>9</sup> As both models (and all others) show, while greater ideological distance between factions and the president is associated with greater “behavioral” distance, being in the cabinet and staying in for longer significantly reduces the latter. In short, factions that hold cabinet positions follow the president much more than would be predicted solely in terms of ideology. Substantive interpretation of these results will follow.

Zucco Jr. (2009) found that in Brazil, ideology ceases to matter for legislative behavior once parties are included in the cabinet. Model 3, tests this by including an interaction term between cabinet membership and ideology. A negative effect here would counteract the effect of ideology, and would suggest that when a party is in the cabinet the ideological effect is smaller.

<sup>9</sup>The Chi-square statistic reported is that of a likelihood ratio test between the complete model, and a model with only the intercept term. In both of these cases, and in all of the models reported, the significance level of the reported Chi-square statistic is considerably below the 0.01 level.

A coefficient of about the same size, but with opposite sign as the one found in the ideology would indicate that ideology has no effect for parties in the cabinet. However, the small and insignificant coefficient actually observed on the interaction term shows that, differently than what was found for Brazil, the ideology effect cannot be said to differ for parties in or out of the cabinet. In this sense, Uruguayan legislators behave more ideologically than in Brazil.

Models 4 explores the effect of partisanship in the peculiar Uruguayan party system. It shows that even after controlling for ideological distance, factions from the same party as the president act more in line with the executive than their ideology would predict when compared to other factions. So while Uruguay exhibits “organized factions and disorganized parties” (Morgenstern 2001), parties still have an independent effect, which is likely to have increased after electoral reforms eliminated the possibility of multiple presidential candidates per party. This finding complement’s Altman’s (2000), who showed that co-partisanship factions were more likely to enter the cabinet.

But what do these numbers mean? Because both scales — ideological and behavioral — are arbitrary, and because the models are not linear, grasping the actual magnitude of these effects is not too intuitive. In all models, greater ideological distance is associated with greater behavioral distance, which basically implies that ideology is part of the story in explaining behavior. However, it is clearly the case that other factors matter.

Table 5: Estimated Changes in Behavior: First Differences Based on Model 4 and 5

		Ideological Distance			
		Average		Extreme	
		Pred. (Var= 0)	Change	Pred. (Var= 0)	Change
Mod. 4	Cabinet 0→1	1.41	-0.45*	2.24	-1.28*
	Cabinet 0→0.5	1.39	-0.23*	2.20	-1.06*
	Pres. Party 0→1	1.26	-0.70*		
Mod. 5	Cabinet 0→1 (“In” Party)	0.63	-0.32		
	Cabinet 0→1 (“Out” Party)	1.46	-0.62*		

*Notes:* \*Indicates that change is significant at the 0.05 level. Table reports the predicted behavioral distance to the president of moderate and radical factions, and the changes caused by changes in variables indicating cabinet membership and belonging to the president’s party. Quantities of interest were computed based on Models 4 and 5, reported in Table 4.

Awarding any given faction a cabinet position *reduces* its distance to the president in the behavioral scale. Moreover, this reduction is statistically significant and substantively large. The first row in Table 5 reports the changes in behavior associated with full inclusion in the cabinet<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>10</sup>Recall that the variable Incab can vary from 0 to 1 depending one the fraction of the time of the term each

For a faction with average ideological distance to the president (a “moderate” faction), being included in the cabinet for the full term reduces its predicted behavioral distance by about 1/3. For an extreme faction, inclusion in the cabinet causes greater attraction, reducing the predicted behavioral distance to by almost 60%. Maintaining these factions in the cabinet for half the term reduces the effect in terms of behavior in about one half for the moderate faction, but produces only a small reduction in the effect for the more extreme faction. In concrete terms, these difference are quite substantial. For 1995 under Sanguinetti, for instance, a change from 1.4 to 0.95 in the behavioral scale — reported in Table 5 — would imply moving the *Herrerristas* more or less to the position of the Lista 15.

Similarly, being part of the president’s faction can lead to behavior substantially closer to the president than what would be predicted for a faction not in the president’s party, but with similar ideological distance. In the case describe in Table 5, the predicted reduction in the behavioral distance is of about 55%.

Finally, Model 5 includes an interaction term between a dummy indicating that the faction is affiliated to the same party as the president and cabinet participation variable. The positive sign on this interaction term indicates that the “power of attraction” of cabinet positions is smaller for factions in the same party as the present than for the factions of other parties. Granted, this is not too surprising given that the average ideological distance for factions in the president’s party is also smaller, but it suggests that president’s might have greater gains by attracting factions from competing parties, than from his own. As Table 5 shows, while inclusion in the cabinet has a substantial effect on the behavior of parties that are not in the party, the effect for factions in the president’s party is smaller, and we cannot really discard the hypothesis that there is not effect at all.

## 5 Conclusion

This paper presented a simple attempt to systematically test the executive’s capacity to shape legislative behavior. Though in Uruguay direct bargaining between the president and the individual legislators does not happen as in Brazil and in other countries where presidents are requires to assemble coalitions, the executive can use the vast resources at its disposal to induce behavior. The paper shows that in Uruguay, membership in the cabinet does bring legislative

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faction held a ministerial position.

factions closer to the president in terms of behavior than what would be expected solely in terms of ideological preferences. Moreover this effect is stronger for factions that are farther away in ideological terms from the president, and for factions of other parties.

In more general terms, these results reinforce the use of caution in the interpretation of the output of ideal point estimation techniques when applied to multiparty presidential systems. As is the case in Brazil (Zucco Jr. 2009), actual behavioral patterns in the legislature are shaped by the executive, and hence, reflect a government vs. opposition cleavage at least as much as the underlying ideological structure of preferences. To assume that ideal points estimated from roll calls reveal the ideology disposition of parties is to ignore other crucial political processes that are at work.

The paper is still very preliminary, and some empirical improvements can be made immediately. Some effort should also be devoted to refine the search for more roll calls, and it might be interesting to weight cabinet participation by the importance of each ministry — data for which is already available — to yield a more definite estimate of the trade off between “policy” and “office” for the different factions. Conceptually, it would be interesting examine hard data on budget execution to examine whether, as is perceived by most political operators, the government does not, in fact, carry out politically motivated impounding of resources. Some initial work has been done on the subject (Moraes, Chasquetti & Bergara 2005), but more could potentially be done. Finally, one needs to consider the endogeneity issues in the selection of parties that integrate the cabinet. While this paper finds that the effects of cabinet membership are stronger for parties that are ideologically distant from the president and members of other parties, Altman (2000) found that these precise characteristics increase the likelihood of being in the cabinet in the first place. These two processes can be modeled together, to provide a better understanding of the political process at work.

**A OLS Estimates**

Table 6: Determinants of Legislative Behavior: 1985–2005

ind	type	model1	model2	model3	model4	model5
incab	Coef	-0.53	-0.53	-0.55	-0.45	-0.61
incab	cSE	0.19	0.20	0.27	0.16	0.24
incab	p-value	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.01
relideo	Coef	0.33	0.32	0.32	0.25	0.23
relideo	cSE	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.05
relideo	p-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
relideo.incab	Coef			0.02		
relideo.incab	cSE			0.20		
relideo.incab	p-value			0.91		
presptyTRUE	Coef				-0.69	-0.84
presptyTRUE	cSE				0.15	0.22
presptyTRUE	p-value				0.00	0.00
incab.presptyTRUE	Coef					0.30
incab.presptyTRUE	cSE					0.33
incab.presptyTRUE	p-value					0.37
X.Intercept.	Coef	0.74	0.77	0.77	1.14	1.19
X.Intercept.	cSE	0.16	0.18	0.19	0.17	0.18
X.Intercept.	p-value	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Period Fixed-Effects		No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Adj R2	0.69	0.69	0.68	0.80	0.79
	N	47.00	47.00	47.00	47.00	47.00

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