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Chapter breakdown
Introduction		Revised Draft July 07
1. The Mechanics of Legislative Politics	This chapter presents a brief literature review, and a framework with which to analyze legislative behavior in presidential multiparty settings in general, and more specifically in Brazil. It is based on the idea that preferences revealed by legislative behavior are not the same thing as ideology. Behavior, on the contrary, is a function of ideology but also of the handouts both parties and individual legislators receive from the president.	Revised Draft July 07
2. Ideology or what?	This chapter present novel estimates from party ideology in the Brazilian legislature, and attempts to pin down precisely how legislative behavior departs from ideology. I show that the relative ideological positioning of parties in Brazil has been quite stable over the past two decades, but based that behavior in the legislature has become markedly less ideological over the years.	Revised Draft July 07
3. A model of spoil distribution	This chapter presents a single-good and a two-good version of a detailed, and generalizable formal model of the president's decision problem of how and to whom to allocate resources. The main results is that it is cost saving from the president's perspective to negotiate both with parties and with individual legislators simultaneously, but the chapter also discusses some other comparative statics results from the model using the cases of Brazil and Uruguay. This chapter includes material co-authored with Paulo Melo, Ph.D. Candidate in the Economics Department.	Revised Draft July 07
4. To whom go the spoils? (Model meets data)	This chapter uses data from Brazil to analyze the specific predictions of the model, namely which parties will receive cabinet posts, how much pork legislators will of each party will receive, and how much support the president receives from each party.	Revised Draft July 07
5. Legislative Capitalism	An informal extension of the model previously presented, this chapter explores the rationale behind using bribes (as opposed to pork and patronage) to obtain support in the legislature. As reforms create a tougher budget constrain on the president, it becomes rational to resort to outright bribes to obtain legislative support. Empirical evidence focuses on the cases of Brazil and Bolivia, but some cross national evidence as well as the cases of Peru and Argentina are also briefly discussed.	Revised Draft Aug 07
Conclusion		Revised Draft Jul 07