Economics 510: Mechanism Design
Spring 2009
Eric Maskin and Stephen Morris
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Syllabus

Fisher Hall B06
Fridays 1:30pm - 4:30pm

Maskin will teach the first six weeks (until spring break) and cover some or all of topics 1-6 (listed below); Morris will teach the second six weeks (after spring break) and cover some or all of topics 7-10 and topics 1-6 not covered in first half.

Students taking the course for credit must write a term paper. A research paper is preferred.

Class of April 3 will probably need to be re-scheduled; details later.

SURVEY / TEXTBOOK TREATMENTS

Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green. *Microeconomic Theory*, chapter 23
Osborne and Rubinstein. *A Course in Game Theory*, chapter 10

TOPICS.

1. General Environments


2. Quasi-linear Environments

Crémer and McLean (1985). “Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent,” *Econometrica*

3. Interdependent Values


4. Renegotiation and Contracts


5. Hard Evidence

6. Costly Communication


7. Virtual Implementation


8. Dynamic Mechanism Design


9. Robust Mechanism Design

Hartline and Karlin (2007). “Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design” In Algorithmic Game Theory (eds.: Nisan, Roughgarden, Tardo and Vazirani), Blackboard
10. *Multidimensional Types*

