An Arts Injustice?
State Funding and Public Participation in the Arts*

by
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Introduction

Even before the inception of the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) in 1965, the role of government in support of the arts had been a hotly contested one. Nevertheless, the past twenty years have seen a steady increase in support for the arts by state governments: from 1983 to 2002, funding for state arts agencies (SAAs) has increased nearly four-fold to $419 million, while federal appropriations to the National Endowment for the Arts have dwindled from their height of $176 million in 1992 to $115 million more recently (Cohen, 2002). Clearly, although the NEA has remained an important figurehead, state and local governments now bear the brunt of public support.

Advocates and critics of government support alike have built their arguments on moral, economic and social grounds, though most of these claims have gone untested. A particularly prominent argument holds that the government has a duty to support the arts in order to widen access to cultural activities for the general public. The first of the
NEA’s objectives is “to make the arts more widely available to millions of Americans” (Netzer, 1978). Many SAAs have a similar clause in their mission statements; Virginia’s SAA, for instance, begins its list of mandates with the “encouragement [of] growth in artistic quality, public participation in the arts, and access to the arts for all Virginians.” The “high arts”—classical music, dance, theater, and the visual arts—are especially criticized for their elite, highly educated and fairly homogeneous audiences. In this view, equality and justice necessitate government support of the arts.

Does governmental support actually serve to increase participation in the arts by Americans? The concurrent rise in state support and public participation in the arts suggests that a relationship exists between the two. Participation in the arts through attendance at cultural events rose in the past two decades as shown by the Survey of Public Participation in the Arts (SPPA), a nation-wide survey collected four times between 1982 and 1997. In both total numbers and percentages, American participation in the arts is up for every art category measured: attendance at art museums, classical music, opera, jazz, musicals, plays and ballet (NEA, 1998). However, increases in participation may be attributed to two possible explanations: demographic groups inclined to participate even without state funding—those with high income and high education—may be attending in even higher number; or, groups that formerly attended in lower rates—for instance, low socio-economic and certain ethnic groups—may be participating more given the upsurge in public support. So, if government support truly makes the arts more available and accessible, one would expect a more evenly distributed picture of participation in states that provide more funding. This paper will test the
argument that governmental support for the arts can be justified on the grounds of cultural equity by examining the relationship between public participation and state funding. More specifically, I will compare the strength of the correlations between demographic characteristics and participation rates among states with various levels of per capita funding.

Lack of previous research as well as a general concern for public allocations and the vitality of arts in the United States merit analysis in this area. In addition, budgetary crises now facing states—the worst in 50 years—mean that support for the arts, which always occupies a precarious position, may face significant cutbacks. If a relationship does exist between participation and funding, and if funding can be shown to lessen the traditional demographic barriers to participation, arts advocates will have a stronger case for pursuing state funding. On the other hand, if this relationship is not present, it may signal the need for a different strategy by funding advocates or else an alternate approach to cultural support altogether.

I will begin by exploring the theoretical and empirical literature on participation in the arts and will show that significant disparities in participation rates exist among various demographic groups. In the following section I will sketch a variety of economic and sociological justifications for state support of the arts, focusing particularly on the argument for cultural equity. Using participation data from the 1997 SPPA (SPPA97) and state funding levels as reported to the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies (NASAA), I will analyze the relationship between funding and participation and assess my hypotheses based on the literature. Finally, I will discuss possible explanations for
the results, indicate several implications for cultural policy, and offer suggestions for further study.

**Literature and Background**

*Participation in the Arts*

Much research on artistic activities in the United States utilizes data from the Survey of Public Participation in the Arts, conducted four times between 1982 and 1997 by the NEA. Inequalities in arts participation appear on several levels in SPPA results, including education, income, race, and geographic location. The SPPA97, the results of which are used in this paper, will be discussed in greater detail when outlining methodology.

An individual’s income is a strong predictor of his or her participation in the arts. In the 1992 and 1997 SPPAs, those in higher income brackets consistently reported attending arts events more often in every category (NEA, 1998). One means of explaining differences in participation by income is found in the economic literature, in which individuals are portrayed as rational utility maximizers. Individuals have a limited amount of resources, primarily time and money. The resources that are available to expend on leisure activities such as attending arts events will be used according to an individual’s preferences and characteristics of supply. Demand is determined predominantly by price, including cost of admission and other related expenses for ancillary services (O’Hagan and Duffy, 1987). Thus, as prices decline and income increases, participation should rise, and vice versa. In addition, participation rates are affected by ease of access to events, so individuals living in or near areas with more arts
organizations should have the opportunity to participate more frequently. Preferences or tastes are generally taken to be givens and are necessary to determine to what extent an individual will give up leisure alternatives in order to participate. The economic approach also assumes that consumers have complete knowledge of availability and prices in order to make informed decisions.

Kolb studied the effect of pricing on the participation of young adults, aged 19-24, whose lower participation rates are assumed to be a consequence of high ticket prices. Students at the University of Westminster were interviewed about their attendance and attitudes toward the performing arts. In cases where students did not attend an event, 31% attributed their non-attendance to cost. But 29% said they did not participate in a given event because they thought it would be boring, and one in five said they lacked information on availability. In addition, 12% cited an “inability to understand the arts” as their reason for non-attendance, with another 12% responding that they did not participate because of social pressure (Kolb, 1997). While price appeared to be a barrier to participation for concerts by high-profile stars or groups, when asked how to make concerts more appealing, students expressed an equal interest in enhancing the social content of an event, for instance by offering food before or after a performance. Finally, Kolb found that there was no significant difference in the amount of money spent on leisure activities between attenders and non-attenders, indicating that lack of money could not explain the difference in participation (Kolb, 1997). So we see that while price explains some degree of non-attendance, preferences and adequate information are necessary ingredients for a satisfactory rational choice model.
More than income, education has repeatedly been shown to relate strongly to arts participation. In both the U.S. and Ireland, O’Hagan shows that a “huge variation” in attendance exists at high arts activities when people are divided by educational level (1996). In every arts activity measured (jazz, classical music, opera, musicals, plays, ballet, dance, and art museum attendance), adults who attended graduate school had the highest attendance rates while adults who only attended grade school had the lowest. Using 1992 SPPA data, Bergonzi and Smith indicate that an even better predictor of attendance is arts education, shown to be four times stronger than socio-economic status, gender or race in predicting participation (Bergonzi and Smith, 1996). Arts education is distinct from the more general education variable in that it includes sources outside of the public school system such as art or music lessons. Since many of these outside sources require supplementary payment, another economic advantage is clear.

Schools are a prime venue in which children are exposed to and learn about the arts. Exposure to the arts in school can affect an individual’s preferences: one becomes more familiar with and accustomed to the arts through exposure, and can also gain an appreciation for cultural activities through experiences in school—what might be called exposure effects. Assuming that school is a pleasant atmosphere, the arts may also come to be associated with positive experiences, again increasing preferences towards participating. A different explanation of the link between arts participation and education focuses on the cognitive abilities needed to understand the arts. Ganzeboom argues that the high culture, including the art forms being considered in this research, contains more complicated information than popular culture (1982). The process of deciphering and interpreting the arts is assumed to be a pleasurable one, so that those people with greater
education attainment are more likely to understand and, in the process, appreciate high culture. People will seek out activities that correspond with their cognitive ability, meaning that those at higher levels of education are more likely to understand the arts and desire to participate in them (Ganzeboom, 1982).

Factors such as race and ethnicity also play a significant role in public participation in the arts. DiMaggio and Ostrower demonstrate that even with controls for income and education, “blacks participate at somewhat lower rates than whites…[and] differences are greatest for public consumption” (1990). Using SPPA82 data, they show that differences between blacks and whites in public arts participation (as opposed to participating at home through media or by personal arts production) are persistent across age cohorts, with whites participating more than blacks in almost all art forms. The one exception is jazz, an historically black art form, in which blacks participate at rates over 70% higher than whites. This difference in participation could seemingly be attributed to racial differences in tastes. However, DiMaggio and Ostrower show that blacks and whites are equally likely to view most art forms on television—privately—suggesting that “subtle forms of exclusion” from other, non-traditionally black art venues are to blame for differences in public arts consumption. Still, they conclude that “effects of race on [arts] activities, however, are dwarfed by those of educational attainment and are often less than those of income, gender, or place of residence” (DiMaggio and Ostrower, 1990).

In addition to individual’s social group, where an individual lives affects his or her likelihood to participate for a variety of reasons. Recently, Schuster analyzed results of the SPPA97, focusing on geographic differences in arts participation. Certain states,
including New York, Massachusetts and New Jersey, as well as particular regions, including New England, the Middle Atlantic and the Pacific, stand above the rest in terms of arts participation (Schuster, 2000). To explain the variation in participation across states and regions, Schuster mentions several possible factors, including education, income, and race. Population density, as measured by persons per square mile and percentage metropolitan, closely relates to participation, though the metropolitan variable correlates more highly with participation at the regional level, while the straight density coefficient is a better predictor at the state level (Schuster, 2000). In general, we see that location matters, with urban residents more likely to attend arts events than rural residents.

In all, theories from literature in economics, psychology and sociology predict that people will participate in the arts at unequal levels, and empirical evidence confirms that arts participation differs by various demographic groups. Although income alone may not predict participation at the individual level, a more complete picture emerges when economic rational choice theory is combined with social and individual background characteristics that help determine preferences. Sociological literature and results of the four SPPAs in particular validate the expectation that arts participation is not uniform in American society. Education, race, income, and geographic location, to varying degrees, predict differences in attendance at arts events. Thus, participation inequalities arise not only because of variations of individual taste in the strictest sense, but also because of socio-structural influences on the choice and ability to participate.
Cultural Equity: A Theoretical Justification for Public Funding for the Arts

Perhaps the most common argument for government support, which I will refer to as the cultural equity argument, centers on the problem of unequal access. This argument rests upon the fact that factors beyond individuals’ immediate control inhibit their opportunity and likelihood to participate in the arts. While several other arguments for state funding exist, this paper will focus on the cultural equity argument because of the substantial role that the issue of equality of opportunity and accessibility plays in the cultural policy sphere. The cultural equity argument connects to demonstrated variations in participation as outlined above and evokes a central operation of government, the redistribution of wealth. To the extent that income and other barriers are prohibitive of high culture consumption for some, the argument goes, government, as a democratizing force, should take steps to widen the availability of the arts.

Unequal access results because of financial, physical, and psychological barriers. Supplementary costs from parking and cab fares to appropriate concert attire and audio tour guides accompany often high ticket prices in forming strictly monetary barriers to participation (Netzer, 1978). But other characteristics of the arts prohibit equal access. Since artists tend to concentrate in large cities, those people who do not live near such centers of high art must literally go out of their way to attend a concert, show or exhibit. Also, since the market naturally caters to the most widely share tastes, specific genres within the arts may not be available in most places, and rarely at a high level of quality and low price (O’Hagan and Duffy, 1987). Even for those who live in large cities, psychological barriers exist: the arts are often located in magnificent but daunting buildings that can discourage attendance by those unfamiliar or uncomfortable with such
settings. Psychological barriers reach much further than the buildings in which high arts are housed; the stereotypical homogeneity of high arts audiences can dissuade one who is not an archetypal arts-goer from entering a foreign and potentially unfriendly environment.

Equal access can be divided into three concepts: equality of rights, equality of opportunity, and equality of participation (O’Hagan, 1996). Equality of rights refers to the minimum level of fairness in which legal and institutionalized barriers to participation such as discrimination do not exist. The more relevant concept is equality of opportunity, which concerns encouragement and actual facilitation of groups to participate on equal levels with others. Equality of participation refers to rates of attendance itself. Though it may not be safe to assume that the U.S. has achieved perfect equality of rights, public funding primarily addresses the issue of equality of opportunity. Direct measurement of opportunity, however, proves very difficult: opportunity to attend involves the cost of an event, its proximity, and possible participants’ knowledge of an event’s existence, among others factors. Measuring these at the individual level may not be possible. For this reason, opportunity is commonly approximated by measuring participation. This operationalization can be problematic: low participation rates may belie actual opportunity if those groups who participate at lower rates do so because of their preferences, not because they lack the opportunity. As O’Hagan puts it, “it could be argued that people with low educational attainment/low incomes have little preference for, and hence wish to attend, the so-called high arts, but that they do appreciate and participate in art forms other than the high arts, in particular cinema and traditional music/arts events” (O’Hagan, 1996).
The cultural equity argument is not without its critiques. One assessment focuses on the condescension and injustice inherent in calls for equal access. At the most basic level, use of government funding to correct for unequal access is a form of redistribution. Brighouse describes that the government has the responsibility—the “constraint”—to use its powers in a neutral manner, without favoring one group over another (1995). One form of this constraint is distributive justice, the principle that governs the redistribution of wealth as a means of correcting the injustice of a free-market economy. Redistribution through arts funding is flawed, however, since it “favors those to whom art and the aesthetic are more important over those to whom it is less important” (Brighouse, 1995). Accordingly, the most neutral and most effective form of redistribution is direct transfers to the poor, with no strings attached. Brighouse’s case elucidates the fact that the cultural equity argument is not judgment free: it assumes not only that “the arts are good for you”—not an objective fact—but also that some people should be taught, “the arts are good for you.” The next section reviews the history of government support of the arts in light of the cultural equity argument and its critiques.

Public Funding in Practice: A Brief Review of the NEA and State Arts Agencies

Public funding of the arts in the United States is primarily a phenomenon of the last 40 years. A significant degree of indirect support for the arts existed, however, long before this: non-profit arts organizations have been exempt from all levels of property taxes for over a century. As a form of support, however, this mainly encouraged investment in physical capital, particularly land holdings, and as a result supported large and established arts organizations. Noteworthy, too, is the indirect public support offered by way of income tax exemptions on private gifts to non-profit organizations, a form of
cultural support rare to places other than the U.S. Measured by the cost to the government in terms of lost tax revenues, in 1978 it was estimated that over $400 million went to arts organizations by this indirect means, more than twice the amount of direct support given through the NEA and SAAs combined\(^1\) (Netzer, 1978).

Absenting the short-lived New Deal’s Federal Project Number One, which employed tens of thousands of artists, musicians and actors during the Great Depression, government arts support began on a large scale in 1960 with the creation of the New York State Council on the Arts (NYSCA). The Council was created under the auspices of then Governor Nelson Rockefeller, and it provided a model that several other states as well as the National Endowment itself would follow. The NYSCA and subsequent arts agencies followed the British approach to public support: a line-item appropriation to a government arts foundation that independently disperses it. This stands in contrast to continental European governments, which as a rule have Ministries of Culture that provide direct patronage to specific artists and organizations (Netzer, 1978).

In creating the NEA, policymakers were aware of the success of the NYSCA as well as several commonly held fears regarding federal support of the arts. Many worried that a state-determined culture would result if the hand of government became too involved with the creative process. To insulate the Endowment from political interference, an independent advisory board of experts from various art domains was established to guide the agency’s grant-making decisions (Mulcahy, 2002).

Appropriations to the NEA started out small and grew slowly at first, in part because of the concern that public funding would crowd out arts support from the private sector.

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\(^1\) This is not a precise measure of government support, since it is impossible to know how the tax exemptions affect the size of individuals’ private donations.
The NEA’s founding structure and goals were also shaped by philosophical and economic arguments, some of which are outlined above. Central among these is the aim to widen the availability of the arts, which stems from the argument for cultural equity. Soon after the NEA’s inception in 1965, concerns for accessibility led the federal government to enact the Federal-State Partnership Program in 1967, a process of decentralization that gave “block grants” of up to $50,000 from the NEA to all the states if they agreed to establish state arts agencies (SAAs) and “guarantee a continuing financial commitment to furnish adequate programs, facilities, and services in the arts to all people and communities” (U.S. House of Representatives, 1967). SAAs, it is argued, are more acutely aware of the needs of their respective states and are more likely and able to promote equality of participation (Love, 1991).

Initially, SAAs functioned as “little NEAs,” in close connection with the goals of the Endowment (Mulcahy, 1992), leading Netzer to comment acerbically that SAAs “may be regarded as costly sops for congressmen determined to spread federal largesse widely and thinly, and as a means of creating a nationwide corps of lobbyists for the NEA” (1978). Netzer is accurate insofar that most SAAs arose to take advantage of the federal money being dangled in front of the states: though a trend had begun with the formation of the NYSCA, a full 49 of 56 SAAs (Washington, D.C. as well as five territories have arts agencies) were established after the block-grants began being offered. But in the decade that followed, SAAs became a funding source in their own right; they were more than a “corps of lobbyists for the NEA.” In 1979, the NEA budget crested in real dollars and dollars relative to total SAA appropriations, and by 1985, state spending on the arts had outstripped the Endowment. The SAAs have continued to pull away in
dollar terms ever since. Controlling for inflation, there was a 52% rise in state legislative appropriations to SAAs between 1992 and 2001, with significant additional state funding for arts and culture directed to state humanities councils, public broadcasting, and state universities. Still, SAAs receive an average of 5-10% of their total funds from the NEA in the form of block grants, and for some states, the NEA block grant is a much higher percentage of total arts funding (Mulcahy, 2002).

One tension that arose for both the NEA and SAAs has commonly become known as excellence versus access. In short, public funding seeks to provide availability to wider audiences in part by increasing the number of performances, but without sacrificing the quality of such events. Stereotypes that emerged of the NEA and SAAs seemingly resolve this tension, holding that the NEA traditionally supports excellence through major Western cultural institutions, while the states tend to promote diversity and increased accessibility by supporting smaller organizations and young or emerging artists (DiMaggio, 1991). However, it appears to be true instead that, actually in line with Netzer’s remark, SAAs policies are similar to those of the NEA, though not because SAAs play second fiddle to the Endowment. In an analysis of 1980s and early 90s grant-making patterns of both state agencies and the Endowment, DiMaggio concludes that for political purposes, the NEA and SAAs alike must uphold principles of both excellence and access; interested in self-preservation, by endorsing seemingly competing objectives, sources of public funding appeal to varied constituency (DiMaggio, 1991).

State arts agencies promote accessibility in a number of ways. Like the NEA in its relationship to the SAAs, many SAAs are required to give a certain minimum block grant to each local arts agency (LAA) or are required to give a minimum per capita
amount to each county. SAA grants often go to arts organizations that tour, bringing the performances and exhibits to various, underserved areas of a state. Also common are grants for technical support to start-up groups and museums as well as the sponsoring of performances and exhibits in schools (Mulcahy, 2002). The NEA, though it does not hold the relative financial strength that it once did, remains the largest single public source of funding for the arts. In this respect, the NEA provides direction for the states, and its grants carry an added level of prestige; like it or not, an Endowment grant bestows a seal of approval, drawing attention to and indicating the worthiness of its recipients (Mulcahy, 1992).

**State Funding and Participation: Hypotheses**

I am aware of only two previous studies that consider the relationship between state arts funding and participation in the arts. Schuster’s recent analysis of participation by geographic area includes a section on the correlation between funding by SAAs and participation by state and region. State arts agencies’ expenditures range from weakly to moderately correlated in the positive direction with participation. The correlations are highest for participation in jazz, classical music and non-musical plays (Schuster, 2000). In an earlier work, Schuster uses participation data from 1982 and 1985 SPPAs, focusing on state arts support in more detail. He finds that, again, SAA funding and public participation are positively correlated, though the relationship is weak (Schuster, 1990). A simple economic model would also predict that funding for arts organizations would lead to increases in arts events and decreases in prices: if supply increases, a product should be produced in higher quantities and at a lower price. The expectation of greater
availability of arts activities for all citizens along with Schuster’s empirical findings leads to the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1* – There will be a positive correlation between the level of per capita arts funding a state provides and the amount of participation in various arts activities.

This correlation is predicted to be stronger than the weakly positive correlation in Schuster’s work because of considerable increases in state funds over the last decade.

Based on arguments put forth earlier, differences in participation by income can be accounted for by the generally high price of arts events. State funding should reduce the price of tickets, making the arts less costly. In addition, funding can reduce costs other than ticket prices; for instance, funding for touring reduces a participant’s transportation costs. Thus, the next hypothesis suggests the following:

*Hypothesis 2* – In states with higher levels of per capita arts funding, the relationship between participation in the arts and income will be weaker. Income will be a better predictor of arts participation in states with less funding for the arts.

The strong differences in participation by education should also be alleviated by state funding for the arts. Public funding leads to more exposure to the arts and cultural sources in schools and public places, which in turn stimulates stronger preferences for arts participation. In terms of more immediate effects, SAAs also support cultural initiatives to inform and expose the general public to the arts through programs in libraries and other public places. Thus, a third hypothesis can be stated as follows:

*Hypothesis 3* – In states with higher levels of per capita funding, the relationship between arts participation and education will be weaker. Education will be a better predictor of participation in states with lower levels of funding.

Finally, race and ethnicity generally are somewhat related to levels of arts participation. As DiMaggio and Ostrower have shown, blacks are just as likely to participate in the arts privately. Possibly, public participation may be less attractive
because of psychological barriers. Arts funding often supports performances in public places such as parks or plazas, where such psychological barriers are less severe. In addition, state funding provides assistance to art genres specific to particular ethnic backgrounds, such as black theater or modern dance by African American dance ensembles. Subtle discrimination that may surround the more mainstream arts is less likely around such cultural events. Funding also increases the diversity of presentations and exhibits within these traditional genres. These factors lead to a fourth hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4 – Black and Hispanic individuals are more likely to publicly participate in the arts in states with higher per capita levels of funding. Non-white race/ethnicity and participation will tend to be more weakly or inversely related in states with lower levels of funding.

Methods and Measures

Data Sources

To test these hypotheses, I use data on arts participation from the Survey of Public Participation in the Arts 1997, collected for the NEA in June to October 1997 by Westat Corporation. The NEA conducts the SPPA every five years, and SPPA97 data represent the most current and extensive nationwide information available on public arts participation. Respondents were asked questions regarding their participation in jazz, classical music, opera, musicals, plays, ballet, dance, and arts museums through live arts events, recorded and broadcast media, and personal creation and performance. List-assisted random digit dialing was used to contact a random national sample of 12,349 American adults for structured, 15-minute telephone interviews. The overall response rate for the survey was 55%. Most numbers that were abandoned had been called back
12 or more times over a several week period (NEA, 1998). This paper uses restricted-use data from the SPPA97 to identify the states in which respondents lived.

To determine the level of arts support provided by each state, data were used from the State Arts Agency Public Funding Sourcebook, collected from the NEA and SAAs by the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies (NASAA). The NASAA collects and publishes data on state and federal government appropriations to SAAs twice annually. The Sourcebook includes funding data from 1969, providing a comprehensive history of the financial contributions of state and special jurisdictional governments in the time since the NEA began providing block grants to SAAs. Also included is the history of the block grants, or Basic State Grants given by the National Endowment. In addition, the Sourcebook provides data from the Census Bureau on state resident populations since 1969, allowing per capita spending to be calculated (NASAA, 2001).

**Dependent Variables**

Behind the cultural equity argument is the assumption that state funding can affect public participation in the arts. Thus, the ten dependent variables are measures of arts participation from the SPPA97. All respondents were asked the same question regarding eight art forms: “With the exception of elementary, middle, or high school performances, did you go to a(n) [ X ] during the last 12 months?” These eight art forms are listed below. Note that “during the last 12 months,” depending on when the survey was conducted, refers to the time period of June 1996 through October 1997.

**Dependent Variables: Attendance at …**

1) “live jazz performance”
2) “live classical music performance such as symphony, chamber, or choral music”
3) “live opera”
4) “live **musical** stage play or an operetta”
5) “live performance of a non-musical stage **play**”
6) “live **ballet**”
7) “live **dance** performance other than ballet”
8) “**art museum** or gallery”
9) any of the above
10) more than one of the above

The last two dependent variables are composites, whether the respondent attended any of the high arts events and if so, how many. All variables were coded such that 0 = no and 1 = yes.

**Independent Variables**

Five independent variables were drawn from the SPPA97, one in conjunction with funding data from the NASAA *Sourcebook*. The first four are basic demographic variables. Income is measured in total household income over the past year, in eight levels, and is treated as a continuous variable (1 = $10,000 or less; 2 = $10,001 to $20,000; 3 = $20,001 to $30,000; 4 = $30,001 to $40,000; 5 = $40,001 to $50,000; 6 = $50,001 to $75,000; 7 = $75,001 to $100,000; 8 = Over $100,000). For ease of analysis, education is measured according to whether the individual received a bachelor’s degree (0 = No college degree; 1 = College degree). Race/ethnicity is split into two variables, Black and Hispanic. Those who identified themselves as Black or Hispanic received a “1” for the respective variable, all others received a “0”.

The final independent variable is the level of per capita spending of their state’s SAA. Restricted SPPA97 data provided ZIP codes as geographical identifiers, and these were translated into states. Previous analysis of SPPA97 data (Schuster, 2000) looked at only a sample of the states, those with a large enough number of responses. By grouping states together by per capita funding level, all states could be included in the analysis.
Total funding was calculated by combining state appropriations to SAAs for fiscal year 1996 with the basic state grants for that time that the NEA provided to the SAAs. In turn, per capita spending figures were calculated using Census Bureau population data for 1996. These were the closest figures available, though small changes in resident populations are unavoidable. States were divided into five per capita funding levels, as specified below:

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<tr>
<th>Low Funding: $0.55 per capita or less (9 states, 4733 cases)</th>
<th>Low-Mid Funding: $0.56 - $0.80 per capita (14 states, 2352 cases)</th>
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<th>Middle Funding: $0.81 - $1.10 per capita (11 states, 1210 cases)</th>
<th>Mid-High Funding: $1.11 - $1.70 per capita (9 states, 731 cases)</th>
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<th>High Funding: Over $1.70 per capita (8 states, 3063 cases)</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Methods

A cross-sectional analysis of arts participation was performed. First, to test whether a positive relationship between per capita funding and arts participation exists (hypothesis 1), bivariate correlations between funding level and the dependent variables were calculated. Next, respondents were separated into five groups according to level of per capita funding of the state in which they resided. To test the hypothesis (2) that higher levels of per capita state funding should weaken the relationship between income and participation, bivariate logistic regressions were run. Ceteris paribus, the relationships between income and various forms of participation were compared at the five levels of funding. The remaining hypotheses (3 and 4) were tested in the same way, by comparing b-coefficients of education and race/ethnicity, respectively, and participation at various levels of per capita funding. The regression equation used may be stated as follows:

\[
\text{Participation} = \text{constant} + b_1(\text{income}) + b_2(\text{education}) + b_3(\text{race}) + b_4(\text{ethnicity})
\]

A second test of hypotheses 2 and 3 was performed using the 17 states with 150 or more respondents to the SPPA97. For reasons explained in the discussion section, these states were not grouped. Instead, the exact per capita funding for each state was used in place of the five levels. Scatterplots were made using the b-coefficients for each state, again based on the regression equation above. A best-fit line was calculated for the scatterplots of the income and education variables. In these cases, the dependent variable used was the first composite variable (whether a respondent attended any events of the eight art forms).
Results

State Funding and General Public Participation in the Arts

Bivariate correlations between dependent participation variables and levels of per capita SAA funding are generally very weakly positive, and statistically significant in only some cases (see Table 1). For individual art forms, the highest correlations with the level of per capita state funding appears for attendance at musicals (.035), plays (.024), ballets (.024) and classical music performances (.021). Correlations for attendance at jazz, opera, and art museums or galleries are extremely weak, and attendance at live dance is actually very weakly negatively correlated with higher levels of funding, though the relationship is not statistically significant. For composite variables, the association with funding remains very weak, though notably, the relationships between per capita spending on the arts and attending any arts events as well as attending multiple arts events are significant. Thus, hypothesis 1 receives some support from these results.

Table 1. Correlations between arts participation and the level of per capita state funding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Art form</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jazz</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classical Music</td>
<td>.021*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opera</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musical</td>
<td>.035***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Play</td>
<td>.024**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballet</td>
<td>.024**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dance</td>
<td>-.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art Museum/Gallery</td>
<td>.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any</td>
<td>.016*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>.021*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.
State Funding and Demographic Barriers to Participation

To test hypotheses 2, 3 and 4, I calculated b-coefficients for participation with education, income, and race/ethnicity for each of the five levels of per capita SAA funding. If higher levels of arts funding serve to alleviate these demographic barriers to participation, then the strength of the relationship should decrease when moving from the low funding to the high funding. Table 2 includes the b-coefficients without the funding level divisions and Table 3 includes results grouped by demographic characteristic, and within each, ordered from low to high per capita funding (see Appendix).

As expected, there is a significant relationship between education and arts participation and between income and arts participation consistently across every art form and at nearly every funding level. The relationships between participating in all art forms and education are particularly robust. The strength of the relationships between individuals’ race or ethnicity and their likelihood to participate in the arts are mixed. Blacks are significantly more likely to attend live jazz performances and dance events but nearly as less likely to attend classical music and opera performances. For the composite variables, being Black was surprising as strongly related to participation as income level, all else being equal. Being Hispanic was more consistently related to not participating in the arts, though the relationships were generally not significant.

When regressions were run at each level of per capita state arts funding, however, no repeated patterns could be discerned by way of comparison in any demographic variable. In several instances, the high funding level coefficients were lower than the low funding level coefficients, such as the relationship between attending a play and education (1.009 for individuals in low funding states versus .723 for those in high
funding states) or that between visiting an art museum and income (.196 at the low level versus .157 at the high level). These cases proved to be the exception. In nearly all cases, there was no perceivable trend in coefficients from low level funding to high level funding. Even in the cases mentioned above, coefficients for the intervening levels of funding did not follow the trend expected. And in many instances, relationships between demographic variables and participation rates were actually stronger for high level funding than low.

Thus, the general hypothesis that states with higher levels of per capita SAA expenditures will have more equal levels of arts participation is not supported by these results. Results of the second test for hypotheses 2 and 3, which used the 17 states with the largest sample populations, can be found in Figures 1 and 2 (see Appendix). Controlling for the other independent variables, there was a small relationship between the b-coefficients for income predicting participation and per capita state funding. Among these 17 states, as funding increased, the relationship between income and participation tended to decrease. This does provide a small amount of support for Hypothesis 2, though the distribution around the regression line was very imprecise.

Hypothesis 3 received no support from the state-level test. As funding increased, there was actually a slight strengthening of the relationship between participation in the arts and education. Again, the fit of the regression line was not exact. This result provides some internal validity to the model that used all of the states and incorporated per capita funding into five distinct levels.

---

2 Bivariate regressions were also run using the same model but excluding states whose participation rates made them outliers within their funding level. Reasons for this analysis are given in the discussion section. Briefly, this analysis corroborated results in Table 3: coefficients changed very little from the approach reported. For this reason, this alternative approach will not be discussed.
Discussion

Possible Explanations of the Results

Aspects of the methods employed in this research may have led to the general lack of a relationship between funding and access in the results. Foremost among the methodological problems is the use of per capita funding as a measure of state support. Because this research was done at the individual level of analysis, it was necessary to consider the effects of funding at the individual level. However, per capita funding is not equivalent to the effects of the total amount of funding transferred to the individual level. The problem of per capita funding becomes clear if we think of current levels of state funding in terms the most direct form of arts funding, vouchers. In a voucher system, residents of a state would receive a coupon to reduce the price of an arts event by a given amount, in this case the per capita amount of funding. In 1997, the average level of per capita state funding was a little over 98 cents (NASAA, 2001). It is unlikely that a voucher for less than a dollar would have any effect whatsoever on an individual’s arts attendance. As will become clear, it is the leverage and targeting of funding in any given state that primarily determines its efficacy.

The grouping of disparate states in the first place into the five funding levels is a related possible source of error. While states may share the same approximate level of per capita arts funding, they usually differ in a multitude of characteristics that affect the impact that state funding has on public participation in the arts. I have tried to account for this problem by comparing the effect of individual states’ funding on the correlation of education and income with participation (see Figures 1 and 2). Still, since per capita spending for all states is so small, its effect on participation depends heavily on the
leverage available through the existing infrastructure of arts organizations. By leverage, I mean the effect that any dollar of funding will have: funding in a state with more well-established arts organizations that have experience attracting new participants will have a greater effect than funding in a state with few arts organizations or whose arts organizations are, on the whole, less attune to improving arts attendance. Other aspects of a state’s infrastructure that affect leverage include the availability of arts facilities, the existence and reach of local arts agencies, and, at the individual level, the number of artists.

Another problem of grouping states into funding categories is that it ignores the effect that rates of participation themselves will have on the impact of state funding. In a state like West Virginia, where only 36% of residents participated in any of the arts measured in this research, funding may go farther to increase participation than in a state like Connecticut, where 71% of residents participated in at least one of the arts. In West Virginia, it may be the case that groups predisposed to arts participation are not yet fully participating in the arts, and that a small incentive provided by state funding will sway those already inclined to participate. Connecticut, on the other hand, may have passed a “participation threshold,” beyond which most of those in groups likely to attend arts events already are. In such a case, the same amount of funding will attract fewer new participants because each new participant is not a member of a predisposed group. I attempted to account for this problem by running separate analyses that excluded states in each funding group whose participation rates were considerably different from the average for each group (see footnote 2, p.24). While this technique transformed the groups so that they were more homogeneous in themselves, some disparities remained in
participation rates from one group to the next. For those groups of states for which participation is relatively low, the effects of funding may be stronger than otherwise predicted.

It may also be the case that state funding does make the arts more accessible, but in terms of variables not measured here. For instance, the SPPA97 data did not include a variable to distinguish people living in an urban or suburban area from those living in a rural area. Just as the NEA is required to give basic state grants to every state, many SAAs are required to give a certain amount of money to every county in the state, in an attempt to counteract the lack of major cultural opportunities in rural areas.

A likely explanation for the failure of the hypotheses takes into account the very small role that SAAs actually play in supporting the arts. For non-profit arts organizations as a whole, 91% of their revenue comes from earned income or private sector contributions. And of the remaining 9% provided by public sources, state funding accounts for slightly more than a third (Cohen and Wyszomirski, 2002). Variations in this small fraction are unlikely to produce noticeable differences in participation.

Lastly, the system through which SAA funds are dispersed does not guarantee a strong affect on participation because only some grants are targeted explicitly for the widening of accessibility. By targeting, I am referring to the specific organizations and programs within organizations that arts funding supports. Funding for a free art exhibit in a public plaza is more likely to diminish discrepancies in attendance by income than funding for a community arts center in a predominantly black neighborhood. Conversely, the latter is more likely to reduce inequities in attendance by race. Still other grants are bestowed with no strings attached. For example, if the Buffalo Philharmonic Orchestra
receives a grant from the NYSCA, it may be spent in a variety of ways. Some of these possibilities could encourage more participation, such as educational outreach programs or a free concert series in the city park. But a grant may also be used to pay musicians more or to add a row of luxury boxes to Kleinhans’s Music Hall, options that do little to increase attendance. In the last scenario and others instances where subsidies support capital expansion, prices may actually rise to cover high building costs. Hypothesis 2 assumes that, in part, public funding will reduce prices when in fact, I am aware of no direct evidence that subsidies will have this effect.

**Implications for Participation Literature**

The cultural equity argument for public funding of the arts depends heavily on the belief that price is a principal factor in attracting individuals to attend arts events. A primary goal of public funding that emerges from this belief is the reduction of prices of arts events. The results of this paper suggest that while income is moderately correlated with arts participation (see Table 2), public funding may not lead to higher arts attendance by those with lower incomes. Other literature suggests that state support of the arts should also compensate for exposure effects of education, yet the results of this research also indicate that disparities in participation by educational attainment also persist. What can explain the persistence of unequal access? Psychological and sociological arguments point to the deficiencies of price as a predictor of public participation and call attention to possible long-term effects of public funding.

To better account for tastes and preferences as well as factors such as social pressure, McCarthy and Jinnett suggest a behavioral model of participation that includes four key steps to decision-making: an individual’s background, personal beliefs and
perceptions of norms, the decision itself, and reaction to the subsequent participation (2001). In the second step, a general “attitude toward arts participation” is generated based on private beliefs and perceived public norms regarding cultural involvement. This all-important “inclination” leads to the practical stage, in which the decision to participate or not is actually made based on that inclination in addition to factors such as time, convenience, and price (McCarthy and Jinnett, 2001). McCarthy and Jinnett’s model is advantageous in its focus on the decision-making process, critical to arts organizations or public agencies seeking to “diversify, broaden, or deepen” participation through targeted tactics like programming and advertising. A focus on price as espoused by economic models, on the other hand, fails to take into account social norms and values about arts participation that affect one’s inclination to attend an arts event. This behavioral model is built around the need to stimulate participation, and it implies that public funding can assist in this goal so long as arts groups know how to focus their energies. For example, McCarthy and Jinnett advocate that arts organizations develop a “brand image” to improve their visibility and clarify their message to the public; they also recommend that organizations “lighten” that image to reduce psychological barriers to participation (2001).

Sociological theories go a step beyond this, suggesting that some inequalities in participation are unlikely to be decreased by public funding in the short run. Various forms of socialization lead to differences in the tendency to participate in the arts. For instance, Tepper shows that patterns of childhood socialization account for some of the gender gap in fiction reading (Tepper, 1996). Reading fictional literature is seen as a more appropriate pastime for girls than for boys, and encouragement by parents reflect
and recreate this gender-role stereotype: women are more likely to have been encouraged to read when they were children than men. Socialization would also predict that women should participate in other traditionally “female” arts activities such as dance. In fact, SPPA97 data show that women are over 70% more likely to attend ballet performances than men—the largest gender difference of any art form (5.1% of men report having attended ballet versus 8.8% of women). If behaviors and preferences toward the arts are determined by early levels of socialization (and socialization differs by race, income and education), then public funding that aims to diversify participation will make little headway by supporting less expensive or more frequent performances and events. Though people’s preferences are largely established by the time they reach adulthood, public funding as it stands has minimal effects on early socialization, which seemingly determines later preferences for the arts and public participation.

In addition to socialization, other barriers to participation exist that funding cannot overcome in the short run. DiMaggio and Useem indicate that arts participation is partially determined by an individual’s cultural capital (1978). They point out that arts appreciation is both trained and contextual: “appreciation of and familiarity with the high arts is a trained capacity…[and] is related to the context in which they are presented” (DiMaggio and Useem, 1978). In both of these respects, the upper and upper-middle classes have an inherent advantage, given that their children are more likely to be exposed to high arts at an early age, in art classes and at home. Their subsequent knowledge of and comfort with the high arts leads to increased appreciation of the arts and, hence, a long-term preference and disposition toward arts participation later in life. In this way, disparities in attendance manifest themselves along socio-economic lines.
DiMaggio and Useem point out that participation in the arts tends to “enhance class cohesion,” and, one can infer, highlight class differences (1978). In a related vein, cultural capital is a means of creating group identity, through which networks can be formed. These networks have many functions, one of which is the dispersal of information. Thus, the people of higher classes tend to talk about art more: they are more likely to be aware of the existence of arts events, and—in line with McCarthy and Jinnett’s model—their preferences for high-status arts are reinforced by knowledge of similar others’ positive experiences. Direct public funding of the arts cannot immediately and effectively counteract the inequities that flow from the accumulation of cultural capital by the wealthy and well educated.

Some forms of state support are geared toward arts education, especially in the schools. For example, a company of artists and performers may receive a grant from an SAA to travel from school to school, exposing children to the arts at an early age through performances and workshops. This form of funding can work to equalize arts preferences that were imbalanced as a result of socialization and the inheritance of cultural capital. In cases such as this, however, we would expect a lag effect in the relationship between funding and participation. Funding would take at least a generation to have a measurable effect on arts participation: if exposure to the arts did in fact lead to additional socialization in which gender-role and other stereotypes were reduced, new cultural capital and the reduction of gender-role and other stereotypes stemming from socialization would not appear as increased attendance until the school children became adults. Long-term change through increased arts education is supported by Kracman’s work on the relationship between school arts instruction and adult participation in the
high arts (1996). Controlling for family background and other demographic variables, she finds that arts education in school increases the likelihood of performing arts and museum attendance, effectively “lessening differences in cultural resources” (Kracman, 1996).

Thus, psychological and sociological theories help account for the lack of a relationship between state funding and arts participation found in this study. On the one hand, McCarthy and Jinnett’s behavioral model explains that price and availability are not the only factors that influence an individual’s decision of whether or not to participate. In addition, socialization and cultural capital theories point to barriers to participation that public funding is unlikely to remove in the short run. Together, these suggest that funding for the purposes of public equity should be targeted carefully, and that funding may have a long-term effect on participation. The literature underscores the complexity of participation and the difficulties in predicting it. While patterns of participation do emerge, we have seen that there are many obstacles to identifying the effects of public funding when viewed from the aggregate level.

Implications for Public Funding

The allocation of public support for the arts is equally complex. Though the cultural equity argument is not supported by the results reported, the lack of a clear relationship between arts funding and arts participation is by no means a death knell for public funding. Several important arguments that do not require a strong relationship between funding and participation remain and merit discussion here. Netzer outlines several economic approaches in a seminal book on public funding of the arts. Foremost among these is the efficiency argument, rooted in the problem of public goods. The arts
in some respects are public goods, producing social benefits that the market, as the sum of individual choices and private interests, does not take into account. Specifically, the arts produce positive externalities, unpaid-for benefits enjoyed by members of a society. In economic terms, externalities cause an inefficiently small quantity of a good to be produced. Like other cases of positive externalities, the arts are subsidized by the government to support production at an efficient level that takes into account the value of the social benefits.

These social benefits are dependent on the arts’ ability to reach a wide audience, lending greater support to the call for increased participation (O’Hagan and Duffy, 1987). Among them is the claim that the arts are a base for national pride and identity: in a country as diverse as the United States, the arts also maintain the cultural variety that defines this melting pot of peoples. Second, for some cities, the arts are a tourist attraction and thereby improve local businesses as well as provide employment and attract businesses themselves. Richard Florida makes the case in *The Rise of the Creative Class* that businesses follow creative people, not vice versa, and that creative people are attracted to cities that are diverse and inspiring. One measure of a city’s attractiveness is Florida’s “Bohemian index,” which measures the number of musicians, dancers, actors, writers, and other artists in a city. The Bohemian index correlates highly with the American cities’ economic success (Florida, 2002). Third, since much artwork is collaborative or to some degree depends on the previous work of the field, the arts lead to improvements in creativity. Government support of artists allows for experimentation that would otherwise be too risky, preventing artists and art organizations from being tied to the generally conservative tastes of the market.
A final externality cited in justifications of public support is the arts’ role in the
cultivation of democracy. Cornwell applies Carol Pateman’s theory of participatory
democracy to arts participation: one of Pateman’s major hypotheses states “to maximize
[civic] participation, social training for democracy must take place in other
spheres” (Pateman, in Cornwell, 1990). The arts are a prime example of a sphere where
public participation can take place. Cornwell emphasizes active rather than passive
participation in the arts as a more engaged form of public participation and encourages
arts education as a “necessary ingredient” (Cornwell, 1990). Additionally, the arts can
inspire controversy. While controversy may seem negative, Doss indicates that
controversy over public artwork can lead to civic involvement: it moves individuals to
take a stand on an issue and, in the process, participate in public life (Doss, 1995).

Another argument cited commonly in defense of public arts support is the
Baumol-Bowen thesis. Baumol and Bowen suggest that performing arts organizations
suffer from a cost disease, where technological innovation does not lead to efficiency
gains and lower costs per unit produced. In other areas of the economy, productivity
continues to rise because of technological improvement; machinery and other forms of
capital enhancement reduce costs. The performing arts, being inherently labor-intensive,
do not increase in productivity, but necessary wage increases raise the cost of production,
which in turn forces the price for the arts up. Hence, the thesis holds, given that demand
for the arts is not completely inelastic (i.e., quantity demanded will change when price
changes), over time the supply of arts will steadily decline. One response to the predicted
arts decline is, of course, government subsidy of the arts to make up for the so-called
“wage gap.” Indeed, given this view, public support is necessary to maintain, let alone
expand, artistic production (Netzer, 1978). This response, however, becomes
problematic in itself when the wage gap becomes so large that government subsidy alone
cannot make up the difference.

A third broad economic argument to justify public funding is the problem of
preference distortion, that is, a lack of information by consumers of the arts that leads the
market to an improper level of output. One means of negotiating asymmetric information
is advertising. Since arts organizations are limited in their funds in the first place,
however, advertising is often difficult. The government can help promote the arts,
especially in areas where much of the public is unaware of existing arts opportunities.
Another way of combating preference distortion is through arts education, both in and out
school: an educated individual is likely to have greater understanding and knowledge
about theater, dance, classical music and other important art forms in America. Whereas
advertisements can help spread the word about the arts in the first place, education may
help people think about the arts in a new light (O’Hagan and Duffy, 1987).

Conclusion

The cultural equity argument is commonly used to advocate public funding for the
arts. According to the argument, Americans participate in the arts at vastly different rates
depending on their socio-economic status and other demographic characteristics. This
much is true. The argument advocates public funding in order to level the playing field—to
remove barriers to participation. But does public funding achieve this sort of goal?
The findings of this study do not lend support to the hypothesis that funding improves
access to the arts. In states with the highest levels of per capita funding for the arts,
differences income, education, race, and ethnicity are as strongly related to participation disparities as in states with the lowest level of funding.

These results do not mean that public funding of the arts cannot lead to cultural equity. To the contrary, in some instances, it is likely that public funding already has made the arts more accessible and available to groups that are not predisposed toward arts attendance. Focusing on a more specific level of analysis may be a better test of the cultural equity argument. On the one hand, research can continue to focus on the relationship between funding and participation, though at a more local level. Differences from county to county are more easily controlled for than differences from state to state, and as funding data from local arts agencies becomes available, research can test the equity argument more effectively. Research that involves time analysis will have an advantage in its ability to test the direction of causation. Schuster’s work in funding and participation suggests that funding is dependent on the level of participation as well as the number of artists and arts organizations in a state (Schuster, 1990). Still, it is unclear whether legislatures appropriate greater sums of money to the arts as a tool to promote increased cultural activities and participation, or if increased funding is, as Schuster supposes, driven by high levels of demand.

Also needed is a focus on the arts organizations themselves. In this study, the organizations have, in some ways, been skipped over, a middleman between the government that provides the funding and the individual who is to benefit from it. This middleman, of course, determines to a large extent how grant money is spent. If cultural equity is to be increased, arts organizations must be heavily involved in the process of attracting new participants, targeting money and energies toward access-based goals. In
assessing arts organizations’ impact on participation, two main forms of research are available (Netzer, 1978). First, a large number of organizations could be studied through an organizational survey. Second, a small number could be researched in one or multiple case studies. Depending on the availability of data, a focus on the practices of a few arts organizations may be more fruitful.

In addition to calls for cultural equity, other arguments for public funding of the arts need to be tested. Do the positive externalities implicit in the efficiency argument exist to a greater degree in states with higher funding? Does funding increase people’s awareness of the arts, combating preference distortion? Public funding is unlikely to persist based on philosophical arguments (“the arts are good for you”) without some sense that it has its effects, no matter what they may be. State governments currently face their largest budget shortfalls since World War II, and everything from school janitorial staffs to medication coverage is being cut (Egan, 2003). The arts are a likely target in this fiscal crisis. If direct state support of the arts is actually an inefficient means of support cultural institutions, then other methods need to be considered as well—through private funding, corporate sponsorship, and tax incentives.

Analysis of per capita state funding of the arts did not show a significant relationship with individual arts participation in the high-status arts. Funding may not overcome certain sociological barriers to participation such as those shaped by cultural capital, though in the long-term, a focus on supporting education and exposure to the arts is likely to improve cultural equity. Findings also point to the importance of a state’s arts infrastructure and the specific targeting of its support, to organizations and through programs within organizations. I have offered one analysis of funding’s effect on
participation on the arts. Further study is required to understand the picture more clearly, especially through research at the county level and organizational level. With greater knowledge of participation in the arts and the government’s role in that participation will come a more complete understanding of the arts and culture of our society as well as people’s relationship to them.
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Appendix

Figure 1. Income b-coefficients by Per Capita Funding

\[ \text{Income} = 0.22 - 0.02 \times \text{funding} \]

Figure 2. Education b-coefficients by Per Capita Funding

\[ \text{educat} = 1.23 + 0.04 \times \text{funding} \]
Table 2. Participation by Art Form and Demographics: b-coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jazz</th>
<th>Classical</th>
<th>Opera</th>
<th>Musical</th>
<th>Play</th>
<th>Ballet</th>
<th>Dance</th>
<th>Art Museum</th>
<th>Any</th>
<th>Multiple</th>
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<td>.188**</td>
<td>.151**</td>
<td>.164**</td>
<td>.205**</td>
<td>.136**</td>
<td>.143**</td>
<td>.104**</td>
<td>.198**</td>
<td>.237**</td>
<td>.215**</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>1.187**</td>
<td>.856**</td>
<td>.947**</td>
<td>.825**</td>
<td>.669**</td>
<td>1.132**</td>
<td>1.220**</td>
<td>1.218**</td>
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<td>-.536**</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>.223*</td>
<td>-.226</td>
<td>.437**</td>
<td>.153*</td>
<td>.202**</td>
<td>.272**</td>
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<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.430**</td>
<td>-.095</td>
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<td>-.125</td>
<td>.410**</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>-.085</td>
<td>-.055</td>
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** Significant at the 0.01 level.
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
Table 3. Participation by Art Form, Funding Group and Demographics: b-coefficients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incomes</th>
<th>Jazz</th>
<th>Classical</th>
<th>Opera</th>
<th>Musical</th>
<th>Play</th>
<th>Ballet</th>
<th>Dance</th>
<th>Art Museum</th>
<th>Any</th>
<th>Multiple</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Funding</strong></td>
<td>.162**</td>
<td>.116**</td>
<td>.187**</td>
<td>.205**</td>
<td>.141**</td>
<td>.139**</td>
<td>.104**</td>
<td>.196**</td>
<td>.239**</td>
<td>.208**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low-Mid</strong></td>
<td>.249**</td>
<td>.199**</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.228**</td>
<td>.163**</td>
<td>.114*</td>
<td>.092*</td>
<td>.229**</td>
<td>.258**</td>
<td>.266**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle Funding</strong></td>
<td>.259**</td>
<td>.168**</td>
<td>.168*</td>
<td>.163**</td>
<td>.196**</td>
<td>.078</td>
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** Significant at the 0.01 level.
* Significant at the 0.05 level.