A COMPACT

between

THE UNITED STATES

and EUROPE

PRESS COVERAGE
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Mr. Bush in Europe

PRESIDENT BUSH'S visit to Europe beginning today has a different character from those of his first term. He goes not to attend obligatory summit meetings or to confer with governments that have been supportive of his policies but in an effort to refurbish the broader transatlantic relationship and to urge Europeans to join in his ambitious effort to spread democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere. The fact that Mr. Bush perceives the need for partnership with Europe on what he has described as a generational project to address the causes of Islamic extremism is encouraging; even more so is his greater willingness to treat European governments as independent allies who must be coaxed and listened to.

Mr. Bush will flatter the European Union by spending three nights in Brussels and holding a formal meeting with the European Council. He will sup not only with friends such as Britain's Tony Blair but with French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who led European opposition to the Iraq war. An encounter with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Slovakia will conclude the trip. In his meetings and in an address in Brussels, Mr. Bush will press his neo-Wilsonian agenda of fostering democracies -- in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the Palestinian Authority and, perhaps most controversially, in Iran. The idea is not so much to reach agreement about the details of strategy as to confirm the idea that there should be a common approach to these challenges, as there was to those of the Cold War.

The president's job will be harder than it might sound. Though anxious to mend relations with the United States, European governments remain broadly skeptical about a Middle East strategy centered on "spreading freedom." Many don't entirely accept Mr. Bush's premise that a Cold War-like struggle against a global enemy is getting underway. They may be willing to help a little more with Iraq and Afghanistan and will support Palestinian state building. But they are less interested in elections than in prodding Israel for steps toward a peace settlement. They also are committed to a strategy of negotiating with Iran's existing regime about the country's nuclear program and are pressing for U.S. participation in an eventual bargain. And they have priorities not on Mr. Bush's list: global warming, aid for African development and U.S. acceptance of a lifting of Europe's embargo on arms sales to China.

It's possible to find common ground. A collaboration by more than 50 former senior officials and policy experts from both sides of the Atlantic organized by the Brookings Institution issued a paper last week spelling out potential compromise positions on almost every big issue. Europeans would offer not troops but far more aid and training to Iraq; the United States would
agree not to the Kyoto Protocol but to separate limits on greenhouse gas emissions. Neither Mr. Bush nor his European counterparts are likely to be so pragmatic. Yet the president would be wise to make concessions to the Europeans on such issues as the environment and the international criminal court, if the result is greater receptivity to his own overarching agenda of "spreading freedom." If he can, with time, persuade Europeans to embrace that principle as a foundation for Western collaboration in the Middle East, Eurasia and beyond, his second term will be remembered for rescuing the alliances that nearly ruptured during his first.
Q  Yes. Earlier the Brookings Institution just released a large study called "The Compact with Europe," and both signed and endorsed by world leaders, some in retirement. Has the secretary had time to review that study? And what is your reaction?

MR. BOUCHER: There was -- I think it was released yesterday.

Q  Yes.

MR. BOUCHER: There was also a Herald Tribune -- the short executive summary version. She's certainly aware of it, looked at it. We'll, I'm sure, look at it and take it seriously. As you know, many of the issues that are discussed in there she's already been working during her trip to Europe. The president will work them further. But I'm sure the views of these -- what is it? -- 40-some people who signed it will be taken into account.

...
International Herald Tribune

A Concrete Strategy for Mending Fences

By Philip H. Gordon and Charles Grant
February 17, 2005

The trans-Atlantic partnership

WASHINGTON For the past several years, the conventional wisdom has been that the United States and Europe have grown apart, that the end of the cold war and 9/11 have produced a strategic divergence that is impossible to overcome. Tensions over Iraq, Iran, Israel, the environment and other issues purportedly demonstrated that Americans and Europeans were going their separate ways.

On Thursday in Washington and London, a document is being published that refutes this claim. The "Compact between the United States and Europe," signed by 55 prominent foreign policy and national security experts from both sides of the Atlantic and drafted in the form of a diplomatic agreement between the two sides, offers specific policy recommendations for dealing with most of the key strategic challenges of the day.

The Compact does not demonstrate that trans-Atlantic differences do not exist, nor that agreement is easy; it does, however, show that agreement on a comprehensive trans-Atlantic strategy is possible, even on the hardest issues we face. Those who signed the Compact believe that trans-Atlantic partnership must endure, not because of what it has achieved in the past, but because our common future depends on it.

The divide between Europe and the United States did not arise because of poor atmospherics or miscommunication. It arose because each side took actions the other strongly opposed, or declined to join in actions the other strongly favored. Moreover, these disputes have become self-perpetuating: American policies spark hostility among Europeans and vice versa. That hostility, in turn, convinces leaders on both sides that they have no choice but to go it alone. This vicious cycle benefits no one and must end.

As President George W. Bush sets off on his first trip to Europe since his reelection, both sides are proclaiming a desire for better relations. That is to be welcomed. But words alone will not restore a productive partnership. Each side will have to take steps that address the legitimate concerns of the other.

Every signatory of the Compact did not agree with every specific proposal. They all, however, agreed that the benefits of the overall agreement far outweigh whatever specific compromises they have made. These are some of the specific proposals in the Compact:

Iraq: The United States shall start a strategic dialogue with European allies on Iraq's future
through a new contact group. The EU will commit itself to train 5,000 senior civil servants and 25,000 Iraqi security and police forces per year. The EU will grant $1 billion in reconstruction funds and write off 50 percent of Iraqi debt.

Iran: The United States and the EU insist that Iran permanently and verifiably end its fuel cycle program. The United States declares its support for the EU's nuclear dialogue with Iran. EU countries declare their readiness to impose meaningful penalties on Iran if it refuses to end its nuclear fuel recycling programs or withdraws from the Nonproliferation Treaty.

China: The EU declares that if it lifts its arms embargo against China, it will replace it with a reinforced code of conduct on arms sales. The EU will invite the United States, Japan and others to provide a specific list of weapons and technologies that they consider would negatively affect security and stability in the region. The United States reiterates its opposition to a lifting of the arms embargo but refrains from taking action so long as these measures are not violated. The EU expects China to ratify the UN convention on civil and political rights.

The International Criminal Court: The United States reaffirms its concerns about the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court but will not impose punitive measures on nations that support it. The United States shall not oppose a resolution by the Security Council referring the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC.

The Geneva Conventions: The United States and EU countries will apply the Geneva Conventions to all battlefield combatants they capture in the war against terrorism.

Middle East: The United States and EU members affirm that encouraging the peaceful development of democratic societies that respect human rights in the broader Middle East is a central strategic aim of their foreign policies. They will establish an Independent Foundation for Democracy in the Middle East and jointly contribute $100 million a year over the next five years to its activities.

In recent weeks, optimism has grown that the U.S.-European partnership can find new vitality. But renewal requires more than hope; it requires action. The Compact shows that a way forward exists. With bold steps, we believe the partnership can survive and thrive in a way that benefits Americans and Europeans alike.

The full text of the Compact will be published on the Web sites of the Brookings Institution (www.brookings.edu) and the Center for European Reform (www.cer.org.uk).

Discussing Document That Will Be Released That Discusses Principal Differences Between United States And Europe

CHLARIE ROSE, HOST: Welcome to the broadcast. Tomorrow, there will be a document released called a compact between the United States and Europe that addresses the principal issues that divide Europe and the United States. Philip Gordon was part of that effort and he talks about the document this evening.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

PHILIP GORDON, DIRECTOR, CENTER ON THE UNITED STATES & EUROPE: The sort of conventional wisdom that has been out there for years now that Americans and Europeans just see the world too differently, and we are going our separate ways and we can t do this, it s too hard. What we did in this compact, by pulling these people together, is show that, no, it s not too hard. It is hard, and there are differences, but the overall outcome is worth making specific compromises on some of these hard things.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

[...]

(COMMERCIAL BREAK)

CHARLIE ROSE: We begin this evening with the transatlantic alliance. Next week, President Bush will leave for a three-day trip to Europe. The visit will address the tensions that resulted from strategic disagreements over issues such as Iraq, Iran, the Middle East and the environment.

Joining me now from Washington is Philip Gordon. He is the director of the Center on the United States and Europe, and senior fellow at the Brooking Institution. He is also the author of this book, "Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq." He is one of the 55 prominent foreign policy experts from both sides of the Atlantic who signed a document being published
this Thursday. It is a diplomatic agreement between the two sides that offers policy recommendations for dealing with the challenges of transatlantic alliance. I m pleased to have Philip Gordon back on this program. Welcome back.

PHILIP GORDON: Thanks. Nice to be here.

CHARLIE ROSE: Tell me how this compact. A, how did it come into being? What needs does it address, and what s in it?

PHILIP GORDON: Well, it s actually a rather remarkable document. It is a detailed and specific agreement, as you said, signed by 55 prominent experts on both sides of the Atlantic, almost equally distributed, which goes through all of the key challenges of the day -- Iran, Iraq, China, the International Criminal Court, global warning, many others, the United Nations, the European Union. And it shows, it demonstrates that Americans and Europeans can indeed agree on these very difficult strategic challenges that we face.

In other words, the sort of conventional wisdom that has been out there for years now that Americans and Europeans just see the world too differently, and we are going our separate ways and we can t do this, it s too hard. What we did in this compact, by pulling these people together, is show that, no, it s not too hard. It is hard, and there are differences, but the overall outcome is worth making specific compromises on some of these hard things.

CHARLIE ROSE: Did the people who come together to hammer this out, they didn t come representing any particular point of view, except their own, looking for a way to get at these difficult issues.

PHILIP GORDON: That s right. And you ll notice there are no institutional affiliations of this. These are individuals. Most of them have played some governmental role. On the U.S. side, we have two former national security advisers, a former deputy secretary of state, a former deputy national security adviser, some prominent columnists, a lot of other senior officials, and it s also bipartisan. We have people who have worked for Reagan, Bush I, Clinton and the current President Bush, and similarly on the European side, former defense ministers, prominent analysts, a range of views.

And again, the point is I don t think any of us 55 agree with every single word in this thing. But what we do agree is that the United States- European relationship is very important, and we have to somehow find a way of getting out of this vicious circle that we have been in, where each side resents the other and therefore we are unable to work with each other on some of these key challenges, and put a more positive circle in place so that we actually start working constructively together.

You asked how it came about. It might be just worth a quick word on that. And like many initiatives, it has different origins. But Tom Malinowski, with whom I worked in the Clinton administration, and I often said we thought it would be possible to do such a thing. We ve been talking about it for months, through last year s Iraq s crisis and all the rest.

And we said, you know, why don t we give this a try. Let s just see if we can start drafting it and get people to agree.

And similarly, there was another one of these -- there are many of these transatlantic meetings among people like this, and we put it to the test. And it looked among that group that there was
enough agreement that we would give it a try. So that’s what we did.

We started to draft it, we circulated it around, took in lots of comments. And the remarkable thing was, rather than showing no way, issues are too sensitive, Iraq, Israel, the environment, it actually showed the opposite. It showed constructive people being able to say, you know what? It’s worth it to start putting a more positive dynamic together.

CHARLIE ROSE: Tell me what’s wrong with transatlantic relationships today.

PHILIP GORDON: Well, there is lots wrong with transatlantic relationships today. We lost the feeling that we were all in this together, the notion of we, we are on the same side, we’re facing common challenges. We have differences but we are together. That has really seriously eroded over the past couple of years.

It wasn’t just Iraq, although Iraq was a major blow. But you know, already starting with the end of the Cold War, we started to lose this notion that we were in it together. And then even more after 9/11, the impact that it had on the United States and our strategic views really gave Americans and Europeans the sense that they just saw the world too differently. And I think that was unfortunate. And it almost led to the point that the mutual perceptions were so bad -- in other words Europeans were so hostile to us and our administration and our policies, and Americans were so resentful of their lack of support on issues like Iraq, that there was this feeling that we were going our separate ways.

And I think both sides are actually starting to learn that we can’t let that happen. On the U.S. side, there was a view, dating back a few years, that, you know what? It didn’t even matter that much. We were very powerful. We had interests in the world. The Europeans were inward-looking and they didn’t agree with us on these things, and therefore we should just go about our business. And I think personally that that’s what we did a bit too much of during the Iraq crisis. Just took this view that we don’t need you. We’re strong, rich, powerful. And we are just going to do it, and we expect you to follow. And it turned out they didn’t follow.

CHARLIE ROSE: Part of that came -- part of that came about, it seems to me, and I’m asking a question really rather than suggesting what I think, because the United States came out of Kosovo and came out of Afghanistan with some sense that its military was so far superior, that it was better off just doing it itself.

PHILIP GORDON: No question about it. And that’s almost true on the military side. You know, what happened during the 1990s is that we got so powerful that we got confident enough to believe we could do all of these things. You know, the irony was -- is that just about less than 15 years ago, Americans were debating decline. We thought we were in big trouble. We had deficits and debts. And the Germans and the Japanese were going to surpass us. And then we have this decade in which we grow fantastically economically, our technology grows, our military grows, we do Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and we really prove that we have this incredible military. By the year 2000, we are spending more than the next 10 countries put together. And all of that led to this great feeling of American power.

And the Bush administration came to office thinking that the Clinton administration was far too deferential to allies. You mentioned Kosovo. The Bush view was that during Kosovo, the Clinton administration, it wrung its hands and it tried to get the allies on board, and it waited too long, and their view was, the way to lead is to be decisive. We’re powerful, we are right, we are going to act, and the others will follow.
And that was a natural consequence of the great power that America had at the beginning of this current century. And when you put on top of that the feeling of vulnerability that we had after 9/11, it just led to this view that these things are too important. We need to just go about our business.

But as I say, I think we are starting to realize that there are limits to that. It is certainly right that America has to lead and be decisive in the world. But I think in Iraq and generally, we are starting to discover, and I think this explains why the administration is pursuing this diplomatic charm offensive right now. I think we started to discover that it’s not so simple, and actually Europeans, for all their flaws and inability to help, we actually do need the burden sharing and the legitimacy and so on.

So I think we are starting to rethink this attitude now that we no longer have the biggest surpluses in history but the biggest deficits in history. And now I think when the president goes over there, it is a little bit less the attitude that we are right and we are just going to do it and a little bit more, hey, can we get you guys to help.

CHARLIE ROSE: And how responsive are the Europeans -- we’ll come to the compact’s point of view about some of these issues in a moment -- but how responsive do you think the Europeans will be when the president comes to Brussels on the 21st?

PHILIP GORDON: Well, I think they’re going to be cautious. They’re still skeptical, frankly. And that is indeed where the compact comes in, because I think that the administration is going over there, as I say, sincere in its desire to reach out diplomatically and put the past behind them, but not necessarily ready to do the hard things that would really make a difference.

In other words, President Bush will go over there and he will give a great speech and he will reach out and he will say nice things. It’s not clear, though, that he is going to be able to go over there with the policy initiatives that say, you know what, we take your concerns seriously and that’s why we want you to help us on what we take seriously.

And that’s where, as I say, the compact comes in, because what we did, those of us who signed that, is we took the interests of the other side seriously. And there are all sorts of tradeoffs in this thing. But just to name one: We in the compact go a long way towards recognizing the challenge of global warming and the environmental challenge and say that the United States should be ready to do something about that. And in return, for example, we expect Europeans to do more and contribute more in Iraq.

See, that way, I think the president could really wake the Europeans up. Because they are so skeptical, a speech isn’t going to do it. A set of policy initiatives, though, might get them to say, you know what, the Americans are thinking things differently here. We should respond and step up. And that’s the sort of tradeoffs we have in the compact, and that I think the administration needs to be thinking about.

CHARLIE ROSE: And now you’ve got other voices being added to the conversation. I think Senator Clinton was in Munich saying that perhaps NATO should be more involved in other parts of the world, especially in Africa.

PHILIP GORDON: NATO is one of the things that Americans do expect from Europeans. And that would be part of this tradeoff. There is a big debate, and I think one of the things the
administration is debating within itself is to what degree they should take the European Union seriously. And that’s one of the things we have in the compact, where we think the United States should recognize that even though we want to preserve NATO and we think it is important, the European Union, on the challenges we face today, promoting democracy in the Middle East, delivering humanitarian assistance and even some military things, the European Union, whether we like it or not, is actually in a position to deliver on a lot of those things.

You know, this isn’t the Cold War anymore where we needed NATO to defend Europe against the Soviets. Now we are dealing with sanctions, trade, humanitarian assistance, homeland security, democracy promotion, and the Union increasingly is dealing with that stuff. So that’s another element of our bargain, where the United States agrees to take the E.U. seriously in exchange for some things from the Europeans, and I think the president is thinking about this. You know, he is going to the E.U., not just Brussels and NATO, but he is actually having dinner with his E.U. counterparts as well. I think they’re starting to think about this part of the bargain.

CHARLIE ROSE: And that brings us to Iran. So what happens to Iran?

PHILIP GORDON: Well, Iran is the hardest thing, I’ll say it right upfront. Iran is the hardest bargain to strike, and the greatest -- the issue with the greatest potential to blow all the rest of this out of the water.

I do think there is a potential deal on Iran that’s in our mutual benefit. It’s in our mutual benefit, because at present what Americans and Europeans are doing in Iran isn’t working. Americans are trying sticks and sanctions and military threats, and Europeans are trying carrots in the form of trade and diplomatic dialogue. And it is not working, and the Iranians are on course to build a nuclear weapon.

CHARLIE ROSE: Stop there for a second.

PHILIP GORDON: Sure.

CHARLIE ROSE: Why do they continue to argue otherwise? Why don’t they simply say, well, we are preparing a way to get to that point, if we decide to cross that line. But they deny even the possibility that that’s what they want to do.

PHILIP GORDON: That’s right. They do that for the same reason other threshold nuclear powers have done it. You know, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has a great flaw in it, which is that it allows countries to pretend not to be building nuclear weapons, which enables them to have all of the technology for the nuclear fuel cycle, and to have uranium and to enrich it and to do reprocessing, and go right up to the threshold of having a nuclear weapon.

So if the Iranians said, we are actually interested in nukes, we may not cross the threshold but are actually interested in getting -- going through that process, the rest of the world would say, hold one a minute, we are not going to cooperate with you. See, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obliges us to cooperate with them on civilian nuclear energy as part of the original deal. We give you the civilian nuclear energy so that you don’t build a bomb. And the flaw in the treaty is that it allows them to go -- so long as they don’t admit they are trying to get a bomb, it allows them to get right up to the threshold, and then they can withdraw from the treaty and have the bomb.

And the problem with our mutual approach is, the Europeans don’t have anymore carrots to
offer and we don't have anymore sticks. Because we already sanction Iran, we don't talk to Iran, we don't trade with Iran. So our sticks are pretty minimal, and the military option is enormously complicated. And on the European side, they don't have many more carrots to offer, because they already trade with Iran, they already talk to Iran.

So the only possible deal if you really want to change the way Iran is looking at this issue, their structure of incentives or disincentives, then we and the Europeans have to do it together. The Americans have to get in the game of carrots and the Europeans have to get in the game of sticks, and that's what we propose in the compact, where we tell the Iranians that we do not accept them getting a nuclear weapon. We insist they abide by their Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments. We insist that they abandon the nuclear fuel cycle. But if they do that, there's something in it from them, which is support from the European on civil nuclear energy, better trade relations with Europeans, and an openness from the United States to address some of the other issues that we have with them. We really need to get on with this together, because what we are doing now just isn't working.

CHARLIE ROSE: Speaking of the E.U., is the United States and the European Union looking at terrorism with a different assumption? As to causes and ways to engage?

PHILIP GORDON: Yes, and that's been one of the problems in the relationship, frankly. Both sides obviously take terrorism seriously. Europeans have a long history with terrorism. But there's definitely a difference in explanations of what is really going on and what the root causes of terrorism are, and there is also a difference in the degree to which you need to deal with it.

And by that I mean Americans tolerance for threats in general and terrorism in specific is very low. And it goes back to the point we were talking about with American power -- because Americans aren't used to being vulnerable and Europeans are much more, they are just not prepared to sit back and try to manage this threat and say, well, terrorism is a problem, but we just sort of have to curb it a little bit. And that's what led to this sort of American war on terror. And the president said, we are dealing with this. If that means invading Iraq and spending hundreds of billions of dollars, we are going to eradicate and win this war on terror, whereas the European attitude is, look, we have been dealing with terrorism for a long time, it has complex political motivations. You can't simply eradicate it by throwing your means at it with military force. You do need to manage it and try to deal with those root causes.

So there is a real difference in emphasis both on what is going on and on how to deal with it. But just to add, I think that we are coming around towards a similar view. It is interesting that in the president's State of the Union address...

CHARLIE ROSE: Exactly, that's what I was going to say.

PHILIP GORDON: Go ahead. I mean. CHARLIE ROSE: No, go ahead. I mean, basically -- the idea of democratic reform is that that somehow will address basic causes of terrorism.

PHILIP GORDON: That's right. The irony of it is that it is sort of the Americans coming around to the root cause argument, whereas the first phase was, you know, we are going to whack the terrorists and we are going to arrest them and kill them and defend ourselves.

But the speech was really a recognition that until you dry up the source of the problem, the resentment that these terrorists feel that leads them to do the sorts of things that they do, you still have to fight the war and kill and capture and arrest terrorists, but the president's speech
was a recognition that you also have to deal with the causes.

And the other core thing where we are coming together that s really important here is the Middle East, where, until Yasser Arafat died, the Europeans were screaming at the Americans, get engaged with the Middle East, you have to deal with Palestine, which is one of the causes of terrorism. And the Americans would respond, we are not dealing with Arafat, and that problem has little to do with it, it has to do with other things. Now we can put that debate aside. No one is dealing with Arafat. He is not on the scene anymore. And that is actually, Charlie, the one thing I think the administration is going to be able to deliver in Brussels next week.

In our compact, there are 13 others that they are not going to do, I m afraid. But that is the one thing, getting engaged in the Middle East, inviting Mahmoud Abbas to the White House, giving money to the Palestinian Authority, encouraging the Israelis to stick with the road map, encouraging the Palestinians to crack down on terror. When we do all of that, that s the best thing going in transatlantic relations right now and possibly even in the war on terrorism.

CHARLIE ROSE: Philip, thank you very much.

PHILIP GORDON: Nice to talk to you. CHARLIE ROSE: Philip Gordon, one of the creators of a compact between the United States and Europe. As I said before, he is also the author of a book about Europe and America called "Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq." The compact will be introduced tomorrow. Philip has a piece in "The International Herald Tribune" as well.
What Kind of Europe does America want — a real partner or a lapdog? The answer may determine whether Bush's visit gets the alliance back on track

BY JAMES GRAFF

Like any savvy traveler who finds himself in hostile territory, George W. Bush tends to seek out safe havens when he comes to Europe. In November 2003, as the insurgents' reign of terror was taking hold in Iraq, the President ventured as far as Britain, where Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Queen greeted him warmly; Bush never went near the streets full of protesters, let alone the Continent. Last June, before visiting Normandy for the 60th anniversary of D-day, he dropped in on his ally Silvio Berlusconi in Rome — and the demonstrations were no less virulent. But this week, Bush is meeting the stroppiest of America's allies head on. In Brussels — the heart of the European Union and refusenik central for Washington's aggressive plan to rein in terrorists and bring democracy to the Middle East — he meets all 25 leaders of the E.U. member states, and dines with the refusenik in chief, French President Jacques Chirac. He promenades along the Rhine with German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, then moves on to Bratislava to exchange views, and perhaps a few soulful glances, with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The smiles are sure to be broad, the backslapping hearty and, after the surprising success of Iraq's election, the leaders share more common ground than they have in years. Germany is training 500 Iraqi soldiers in the United Arab Emirates, and France says it is ready to train gendarmes. European soldiers are keeping the peace in Afghanistan, and even a Bush critic like Schröder knows that transatlantic cooperation is essential. "Most problems we are grappling with today can and will be solved only through real partnership with the U.S.," the German Chancellor told Time (see interview).

But no one has forgotten that deep differences remain. Last week, the Kyoto protocol on climate change came into effect without the support of America, the world's largest producer of greenhouse gases. The International Criminal Court, which the E.U. considers an ideal forum to deal with the slaughter in Darfur, is opposed by the U.S. And major disagreements persist over how best to stymie Iran's apparent intention to develop nuclear weapons, whether to lift the arms embargo on China, whether to sanction Syria for occupying Lebanon and aiding Iraqi insurgents and Hezbollah terrorists, and whether Europe should brand Hezbollah itself a terrorist organization. At the core of many of these issue is a basic bone of contention: whether foreign policy should be conducted with a carrot or a stick. But with the U.S. feeling the need for allies and the E.U. feeling its oats as a global player, European leaders have an even simpler question: Is America ready to treat the E.U. as more than an inconvenient obstacle? "It has to be a balanced relationship," European Commission President José Manuel Barroso told the Wall Street Journal. "We need to be an equal partner."

Some Bush allies argue that American interests are best served when Europe is divided, and that the U.S. is well advised to cherry-pick the European states that support it — and ignore the rest. "We should be agnostic, not cheerleaders, about the faith-based project of European integration," says John Hulsman, a neoconservative analyst for the Heritage
Foundation in Washington. But that's a stingy view of what the E.U.'s projection of soft power has achieved. The goal of E.U. membership has compelled Turkey to abolish the death penalty, rein in its military and grant cultural rights to the Kurds. That same prospect has moved Croatia to give up eight war-crimes suspects, although failure to deliver another key suspect, General Ante Gotovina, will likely lead to postponement of E.U. talks. Even Serbia recently turned over General Vladimir Lazarevic, suspected of war crimes in Kosovo. And the lure of E.U. membership is also casting its spell over former Soviet satellites such as Ukraine, where President Viktor Yushchenko is pushing a reform agenda meant to win candidate status as soon as possible. The E.U.'s power doesn't come across with shock and awe, but it is a potent force just the same.

The E.U. and the U.S. agree that promoting democracy and combatting tyranny are goals best achieved by working together. But the means to those ends often seem to come from completely different universes. Will President Bush gain a new appreciation for the E.U.'s way of doing things from his four-day stay on Planet Europe? Here's a look at three issues on which the U.S. and E.U. could actually learn something from each other.

IRAQ The Bush Administration used to think that nation building was beneath it; now it's clear that the creation of a civil society is crucial to stability in Iraq. That happens to be a European speciality. In Slovakia, Bosnia and the Caucasus, the E.U. has created civil, judicial and political institutions, from agricultural advice bureaus to customs inspectors. Can it work in Iraq? Germany and France, among others, have now promised to forgive some of the country's debt, and the E.U. is launching a training program for some 800 top Iraqi law-enforcement and justice officials. Good things happen when soft and hard power — carrot and stick — are used in tandem. That's what some 50 foreign-policy experts from both sides of the Atlantic proposed last week. They fashioned a "compact" of compromises on the most recalcitrant issues dividing the U.S. and the E.U., starting with Iraq. As part of a grand barter, the Europeans would step up training, increase spending on reconstruction from $300 million to $1 billion for 2005, and write off half the country's debt; in exchange, the U.S. would give Europe a role in determining Iraq's economic and political future. Artful compromises were proposed for everything from the International Criminal Court to the China arms embargo to negotiations with Iran. Yet the American signatories to the compact, many of whom were advisers to Democrats Bill Clinton or John Kerry, say the White House isn't interested. "Bush is really working on the Middle East, but otherwise he's not addressing the central policy differences with Europe," says Philip Gordon of the Brookings Institution, who coordinated the initiative. "The core belief of this Administration is, 'What we could get from the Europeans is so minor that it's not worth it to compromise.'"

IRAN That may not be true of Iran, where the transatlantic divide is perhaps less deep than it seems. On this issue, Gordon's policy mavenes suggested the U.S. should openly support the European negotiations with Tehran — if the Europeans commit to imposing penalties if Iran doesn't end its efforts to complete the nuclear fuel cycle. There's room for collaboration here since Washington is not gearing up for war. "I think the Germans are persuaded that the U.S. is not going to bomb Iran," says Elizabeth Pond, editor of IP, an English-language quarterly published by the German Council on Foreign Relations. "It's not like before the Iraq war, when there was a plan to go to war and Washington was marching toward it." That allows for a coordinated diplomatic effort, where a good cop–bad cop routine could get results.

THE BALKANS The former Yugoslavia is one place where E.U. power is starting to come into
its own. It took American resolve to rout the Serbs in Bosnia in 1995, and American planes
to bomb them out of Kosovo in 1999, but NATO's formerly 60,000-strong security force in
Bosnia is long gone. In its place is a peacekeeping operation of 7,000 European troops
under E.U. control. "The Balkans are divided into two groups: those who will become E.U.
members soon and those who won't," says Gerald Knaus, head of the European Stability
Initiative, a Berlin think tank. The prospect of membership "gives a big boost to reform. For
Albania, Bosnia and Serbia, the incentive is much weaker as long as membership remains
vague."

Bush clearly wants to make a fresh start with the E.U., and many Europeans hope this visit
sets a new tone. But the second Bush Administration "hasn't had its first crisis yet,"
observes a senior British official. The atmosphere Bush establishes this week will help
determine how both sides react when it does.

With reporting by Dejan Anastasijevic/Belgrade, Leo Cendrowicz/Brussels, J.F.O. McAllister/
London, Jan Stojaspal/Prague and Charles P. Wallace/Berlin
Soixante experts demandent de "l'action" et des compromis

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New York de notre correspondante

Climat, Iran, ventes d'armes à la Chine, Cour pénale internationale : où sont les possibilités de compromis quand les positions de départ entre les rives de l'Atlantique paraissent si éloignées ? Soucieux de voir un accord sur la substance accompagner le changement d'atmosphère entre Washington et l'Europe, une soixantaine de spécialistes des relations internationales originaires des deux continents viennent de publier un manifeste qui pourrait servir de base, espèrent-ils, à l'élaboration de positions communes sur les sujets de contentieux.


"Ces dernières semaines, l'optimisme a grandi de voir le partenariat -Europe-Etats-Unis- trouver une nouvelle vitalité, constatent les signataires. Mais le renouvellement nécessite davantage que de l'espoir ; il demande de l'action." Les auteurs estiment que chacun doit faire des pas. "Les Européens ne peuvent pas simplement demander aux Américains de reconnaître leurs erreurs et de renverser le cours des politiques suivies depuis quatre ans. Les Américains ne peuvent pas seulement expliquer la justesse de leurs actes et inviter les Européens à se joindre à eux."

"LÉGITIMES INQUIÉTUDES DE L'AUTRE"

Sur chaque dossier, les signataires appellent les parties à "prendre en compte les légitimes inquiétudes de l'autre". Premier sujet examiné : le nucléaire iranien. Ils proposent que les Etats-Unis déclarent leur soutien au dialogue entrepris par les Européens. Ils reconnaissent le droit de Téhéran d'importer la technologie nécessaire à son programme énergétique civil si l'Iran abandonne de manière permanente et vérifiable son programme d'enrichissement d'uranium. Les Européens devraient, eux, s'engager à imposer des conséquences significatives si l'Iran refuse ou se retire du traité de non-prolifération : porter le dossier au Conseil de sécurité ; poser à l'Iran l'ultimatum de suspendre l'enrichissement ; en cas de refus d'obtempérer, imposer des sanctions économiques, dont une interdiction de l'investissement étranger dans le secteur énergétique. L'Union européenne s'engagerait à passer outre tout veto russe et chinois à l'ONU et à imposer ces sanctions de manière unilatérale si nécessaire.
En ce qui concerne la levée de l'embargo sur les armes destinées à la Chine, les 60 chercheurs proposent une formule selon laquelle l'Europe obtiendrait des garanties avant de prendre cette mesure (signature par Pékin de la Convention sur les droits civils et politiques de l'ONU ; engagement des Européens rappelant leur opposition à tout changement du statu quo sur Taiwan). Les Etats-Unis et le Japon fourniraient la liste des technologies dont la livraison à la Chine serait dommageable, selon eux, pour la sécurité de la région. Les Etats-Unis garderaient le droit d'imposer des sanctions aux compagnies européennes ou aux Etats qui violeraient les accords conclus.

Sur la Cour pénale internationale, le compromis verrait l'Europe passer avec les Etats-Unis des accords octroyant l'immunité aux troupes américaines (art. 98). Mais Washington cesserait de s'opposer à ce que les crimes au Darfour soient déférés à la cour de La Haye.

**Corine Lesnes**

• ARTICLE PARU DANS L'EDITION DU 22.02.05
Terrorismo, clima e nucleare “Nuovo patto Usa-Europa”

Dal nostro corrispondente Alberto Flores D’arcais

New York. Un “Contratto tra gli Stati Uniti e l’Europa.” Alla vigilia del viaggio di Bush una cinquantina di « esperti » (politici, storici, economisti e intellettuali) delle due sponde dell’Atlantico, con diverse posizioni politiche e differenti vedute sui destini del mondo, hanno steso un vero e proprio manifesto programmatico in cui chiedono alla Casa Bianca e ai leader europei di mettere da parte in modo definitivo le recenti dispute per trovare un impegno comune sulle grandi sfide del momento.

Il *Compact between the United States and Europe* si compone di undici pagine scritte come se si trattasse di un documento ufficiale, un accordo firmato da governi.


Una sfida a tutto campo, che rocca tutti I punti salienti della politica internazionale del nuovo secolo, dall’Iran all’Iraq, dalla Cina all’Afghanistan, passando per la democrazia, il cambiamento climatico, le Nazioni Unite, la Convenzione di Ginevra, la Corte Penale Internazionale, il mondo in via di sviluppo.

Come in tutti i documenti che si rispettino, c’è una dichiarazione iniziale – « la partnership tra Europa e Stati Uniti deve rafforzarsi perché nostro commune futuro dipende da questo » --e un preambolo, « Nelle scorse settimane è cresciuto l’ottimismo che questa partnership possa trovare nuova vitalità. Ma non basta la speranza, occorre anche l’azione. Questo « contratto » dimostra che una strada in avanti esiste, si leader delle due sponde dell’Atlantico la sapranno prendere. »

Per gli autori del Contratto –che verrà presentato questa mattina a Washington nella sese della *Brookings* – le differenza tra gli Stati Uniti e l’Europa non sono cresciute per via di « condizione atmosferiche o mancanza di comunicazione » ma perché ambedue le parti in causa hanno « compiuto azioni cui l’altra parte si duramente opposta o si sono rifiutate di prendere parte ad azioni che gli altri vedevano invece con favore. »
Queste differenze iniziali – la più evidente delle quali riguarda la guerra in Iraq – si sono però via via « autoalimentate » tanto da convincere i leader di ogni parte che era meglio proseguire da soli. « Un circolo vizioso che non porta benefici a nessuno e che deve finire. »

Iraq. E ovviamente uno dei punti principali affrontati nel « Contratto. » Secondo i firmatari (gli americani sono in maggioranza democratici) gli Stati Uniti devono far partire un dialogo strategico con gli alleati europei sul futuro dell'Iraq attraverso un nuovo « Gruppo di contatto. » Da parte sua l'Europa si deve impegnare ad addestrare cinque mila funzionari de Bagdad e 25 mila addetti alle forze di sicurezza di polizia irachene per almeno un anno. Inoltre l'Unione europea dovrà destinare un miliardo di dollari per la ricostruzione del paese del Golfo e cancellare il 50 percento del debito iracheno. Europa e nato dovranno inoltre fornire 5 mila truppe aggiuntive a quelle che già hanno in Afghanistan.

Iran. Il nucleare iraniano è al secondo posto nelle preoccupazioni dei firmatari. L'Iran dovrà in modo permanente e verificabile mettere fine al suo programma nucleare, gli Stati Uniti dovranno appoggiare il “dialogo” tra Teheran e l’Unione Europea ma l’Europa dovrà impegnarsi a imporre severe sanzioni qualroa il regime degli ayatollah rifiutasse di sospendere il programma o si ritirasse dal Trattato di non proliferazione.

Cina. Il punto che sta più a cuore agli estensori del Contratto è quello che riguarda l’embargo sulle armi, che l’Europa dovrà concordare con Stati Uniti, Giappone e altri « rilevanti attori » dell’area. Ed in ogni caso prima di « ammorbidire » l’embargo l’europa dovrà aspettare che la Cina ratifichi la Convenzione delle Nazioni Unite sui diritti civili e politici. La Ue dovrà poi dichiarare pubblicamente e con un documento scritto che non intende cambiare lo status quo a Taiwan.

Democrazia e Medio Oriente. Si tratta forse del “punto dei punti”, in quanto risolvendo l’annosa questione della pace e della democrazia nella regione mediorientale meta dei problemi del mondo sarebbero probabilmente risolti. Gli Stati Uniti e paesi membri dell’Ue devono quindi impegnarsi per « lo sviluppo pacifico di società democratiche » che rispettino i diritti umani « nel grande Medio Oriente » e che ne facciano la strategia centrale della propria politica estera. « Respingiamo la nozione che uomini di qualsiasi società siano considerati culturalmente o storicamente inadatti a partecipare al proprio governo o a godere delle libertà sancite dalla Dichiarazione Universale dei Diritti dell’Uomo. »

Corte Internazionale. Gli Stati Uniti riaffermano i propri dubbi sulla creazione della Corte penale internazionale ma non imporranno misure punitive a nessuna nazione che invece l’appogia. L’Europa e l’Usa dovranno però trovare un accordo su quell’articolo che prevede l’immunità per funzionari e militari americani che siano esercitando le proprie funzioni.

Convenzione de Ginevra. Gli Stati Uniti e i paesi dell’Unione Europea dovranno applicare la Convenzione de Ginevra a tutti i « combattenti » che vengano catturati nella guerra contro il terrorismo, compresi quelli fatti prigionieri in Afghanistan e che si trovano adesso a Guantanamo.

Clima. Sono gli stessi punti di cui si sta discutendo in questi giorni e il « Contratto » prevede sopratutto una volontà di ridiscutere nel future la diminuzione dei gas.

Come si vede sono tutti temi di stretta attualità su cui le posizioni tra Usa ed Europa (ma anche all’interno della stessa Unione europea) sono spesso divergenti. E se alcune proposte sono facilmente accettabili da entrambe le parti dell’Atlantico (vedi il maggiore impegno europeo nell’addestramento iracheno) su altre è necessaria una fiducia reciproca che al momento non
c’è (Iran) e su altre ancora – come nel caso del clima o della Corte internazionale – le distanze sono ancora troppo distanti.

Aldila dei singoli punti resta il valore altamente simbolico di una iniziativa « bipartisan » e « biatlantica » di cui sia l’Europa che gli Stati Uniti sentono al bisogno. Vedremo fra una settimana se George W. Bush da una parte e i leader europei che incontrerà a Bruxelles e Magionza (più Putin a Bratislava) dall’altra terranno conto di quanto cinquanta uomini e donne di buona volontà hanno scritto nel « Contratto. »
Mas de 50 politicos y diplomaticos piden un nuevo pacto entre EE UU y Europa

J. M. CALVO

"Europa necesita a America", afirma el manifiesto, porque fue el poder norteamericano el que contribuyo a la creacion y expansion de la UE. Pero "tambien America necesita a Europa", porque sin la ayuda de los aliados, EE UU "pagara en solitario los costes, con vidas y con dinero, del mantenimiento de la estabilidad global". Los firmantes del manifiesto creen que "los europeos no pueden limitarse a pedir a los estadounidenses que reconozcan sus errores y rectifiquen sus politicas de los ultimos cuatro anos. Los norteamericanos no pueden limitarse a explicar lo adecuadas que son esas politicas e invitar a los europeos a sumarse a ellas".

Entre los norteamericanos estan dos consejeros de Seguridad Nacional de Clinton, Samuel Berger y Anthony Lake; Robert Hutchings, ex presidente del Consejo Nacional de Inteligencia de la actual Casa Blanca; diplomaticos como Strobe Talbott, ex numero dos del Departamento de Estado, y expertos como Joseph S. Nye y Robert Kagan. Entre los europeos estan Douglas Hurd, ex ministro britanico de Exteriores; Michael Mertes, ex asesor de Helmut Kohl; Timothy Garton Ash, director del Centro de Estudios Europeos de Londres; Pierre Hassner, del Instituto de Estudios Politicos de Paris, y Narcis Serra, ex ministro de Defensa espanol.

Estados Unidos y la UE, senalan, deberian "superar desacuerdos y compartir riesgos y costes" en, entre otros, los siguientes capitulos:

- Iran. Estados Unidos y la Union Europea reafirman que quieren parar la proliferacion nuclear y que Iran cumpla con sus obligaciones. Estados Unidos respalda el dialogo de la UE con Teheran y apoyaria, en caso de que Iran frenara su programa atomico, su derecho a importar tecnologia para uso civil nuclear. Estados Unidos, sin descartar otras opciones, reitera que quiere resolver el problema diplomaticamente. La UE se declara dispuesta a sancionar a Iran si no frena su programa.

- Irak. Apertura de un dialogo EE UU-UE sobre el futuro del pais con un nuevo grupo de contacto que aborde asuntos de desarrollo economico y asistencia financiera. Una vez ratificada la nueva Constitucion, Estados Unidos y Europa contribuirian, si lo piden los iraquies, a formar una nueva fuerza de estabilizacion que podria funcionar bajo mando de la OTAN.

- Oriente Proximo. Se reafirma el compromiso con la Hoja de Ruta como marco hacia la solucion de los dos Estados cuyas fronteras se basarian en las de 1967. El acuerdo final deberia incluir una solucion justa y realista al problema de los refugiados y un acuerdo sobre
El documento no parece ser un negocio o inversión. Aquí está el texto en español:

- China. En caso de anular su embargo de armas, la UE se compromete a sustituirlo con un régimen provisional y vigilar un código de conducta sobre venta de armas y tecnología de doble uso. China debería ratificar la convención de la ONU sobre derechos democráticos y la UE se comprometería a que no haya ningún cambio unilateral en el estatus de Taiwan.

- Cambio climático. Estados Unidos acepta limitar sus emisiones de gases. La UE acepta que haya Estados de EE UU que participen en el sistema europeo de intercambio de emisiones. Estados Unidos acepta participar en los debates en la ONU sobre el acuerdo internacional que sustituiría al Tratado de Kioto cuando este expire, en 2012.

- Corte Penal Internacional. Estados Unidos reitera su preocupación por la jurisdicción de la CPI sobre los ciudadanos de países no firmantes y su intención de alcanzar acuerdos bilaterales que garanticen la inmunidad para sus funcionarios y militares.

- Convención de Ginebra. Estados Unidos y la UE afirman que ninguno detenido está más allá del protección de la ley. Nadie debe ser torturado. La UE y EE UU aplicarían la Convención a todos los detenidos, incluyendo a los de Guantánamo, y desarrollarían un criterio común sobre los sospechosos de terrorismo.
ENTREVISTA: PHILIP GORDON, Politologo
"Recuperar la confianza no es suficiente; hay que ir mas lejos"

J. M. CALVO

Philip Gordon, director del Centro de EE UU y Europa de la Brookings Institution, es el impulsor del manifiesto por un nuevo pacto transatlántico.

Pregunta. Recuperar la confianza es suficiente como objetivo de la visita de Bush?

Respuesta. Yo creo que deberíamos ir más lejos. Es bueno que haya diplomacia y que la reunión salga bien, pero eso solo no es lo que va a revitalizar la relación. Necesitamos un acuerdo para hacer cosas concretas.

P. La relación ya no volverá a ser lo que ha sido hasta ahora?

R. Tenemos que asumir que ya no volverá a ser lo mismo. Al mismo tiempo, esa relación EE UU-Europa va a seguir siendo vitalmente importante; sería un error suponer lo contrario. Nos necesitamos el uno al otro.

P. Irán va a ser el banco de pruebas de la nueva fase?

R. Sí, ahora es lo más importante, porque encierra la posibilidad de convertirse en otra gran divergencia transatlántica. Creo que a corto plazo, todos queremos lo mismo. Pero si fracasamos al controlar el programa nuclear iraní, existe el riesgo de que EE UU se lo tome más en serio que Europa y no veo ninguna circunstancia bajo la que los europeos apoyarían el uso de la fuerza. Corremos el riesgo de otra gran divergencia.

P. Cree que la crisis de Irak precipitó un alejamiento que ya existía entre Europa y EE UU y que habría surgido de todas maneras?

R. Yo creo que no es excluyente, que ocurrieron las dos cosas: la guerra fue la causa de una gran crisis transatlántica, pero no fue la única causa. Había, y hay, muchas otras cosas que pasaban y que pasan. Lo que ocurrió con Irak es que empeoró todo, complica todo mucho más.

P. Están los europeos unidos sobre su relación con Washington?

R. No están perfectamente unidos, pero tampoco lo están los norteamericanos. Y conviene tomar nota de que en la mayoría de las cuestiones importantes están bastante unidos.
Beängstigend feste Umarmung;
Am Ende der denkwürdigen Reise von US-Präsident Bush in die alte Welt könnten die Europäer mit leeren Händen dastehen

VON D. OSTERMANN (WASHINGTON)


Gipfel der Charmeoffensive


beängstigend feste Umarmung. Allerdings: Wer sich dieser Tage in Washingtons
Denkstuben umhört, erlebt im dezimierten Lager der Atlantiker viel Erleichterung - aber
wenig echten Optimismus. An den großen Durchbruch glaubt hier keiner. Ivo Daalder,
Brookings-Mann und "Compact"-Unterzeichner, sagt über die Aussichten der Bush-Reise:
"Die Erwartungen sind extrem hoch. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass etwas ganz Neues und
Positives herauskommt, ist extrem niedrig."

Da sind nicht schöne Bilder gemeint, die es gewiss geben wird. Auch nicht der neue Ton,
von dem Daalder meint, er sei schon wichtig. Nur spüren eben alle, dass die
"Charmeoffensive" mit dem dramaturgischen Gipfel der Versöhnungsreise Bushs nun auch
Ergebnisse zeitigen muss: "Der ultimative Test wird sein, ob jetzt in Sachfragen ein Geben
und Nehmen beginnt."

Im Weißen Haus ist man da diplomatischer. Aber zwischen den Zeilen ließ
Sicherheitsberater Stephen Hadley schon durchblicken, dass auch die Bush-Regierung
jetzt inhaltlich Bewegung erwartet. Vor allem von den Europäern. Hadley rollt die Agenda
aus: Zu den gemeinsamen Herausforderungen gehöre es, Wege zu finden, die
Regierungen in Irak und Afghanistan zu unterstützen, eine Lösung des israelisch-
palästinensischen Konflikts zu forcieren und Freiheit und Demokratie in jene Erdenwinkel
to verbreiten, die davon zu wenig hätten.

Kein Zufall: das erste Stichwort lautet Irak. Ob und wie weit sich die Europäer hier zu mehr
Engagement einbinden lassen, wird nicht nur für die Bush-Regierung, sondern vor allem
für das US-Publikum zum Gradmesser des neuen Verhältnisses. Damit die Reise daheim
als Erfolg gilt, heißt es, müsse die Nato schon "deutlich erkennbar" ihr Engagement in Irak
steigern.

Wo aber ist Bush bereit, auf die Europäer zuzugehen? Er besucht in Brüssel neben der
Nato zum ersten Mal gleichberechtigt die Institutionen der EU - immerhin ein Signal, dass
man in Washington die wachsende Bedeutung der EU verstanden hat. Er will etwas zum
Klimaschutz sagen. Nette Gesten. Und sonst? Bleibt es bei dem, was Sicherheitsberater
Hadley vorab verlautbarte, könnten es die Europäer sein, die mit leeren Händen dastehen.
Bei Iran, wo sie von Washington am dringlichsten Bewegung erhoffen, bewegte sich bei
Hadley nichts: Zunächst müsse man "etwas von den Iranern sehen", bremste der das
europäische Drängen aus, Amerika möge sich in die Verhandlungen der Europäer aktiver
einschalten.
Bush visit to EU headquarters is of symbolic importance

World View: NATO, its secretary-general, Lord Ismay, said in 1947, was founded "to keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the US in" Europe. It was a useful piece of geopolitical shorthand to describe the objectives and power system involved in the post-war settlement.

Fifty-six years later Dr Condoleezza Rice, then US national security adviser and now Secretary of State, said after NATO allies refused to participate in the invasion of Iraq, that in retaliation the US should "punish France, ignore Germany, and forgive Russia".

Between those two remarks came a third, from Georgi Arbatov, one of Gorbachev's foreign policy advisers. In 1988 he told a US audience: "We are going to do a terrible thing to you. We are going to deprive you of an enemy." It is one of the cardinal assumptions of the realist school of international relations to which Rice adheres, that alliances do not survive the disappearance of the threat against which they are directed.

Bush's important visit to Europe next week will put such theories to the test and help determine if NATO can survive the post-Cold War era as the principal forum for transatlantic relations, or if they must be reconstructed to take account of new realities. Such a major change deserves close attention, since stable relations between these two blocs set much of the agenda for the rest of the world - Ireland certainly included, as John Bruton, the EU ambassador in Washington, points out in these pages today.

On the concluding page of her excellent 1995 book (written with Philip Zelikow) on German unification and the fall of the Soviet Union, Rice recalled that at the Moscow signing of the final settlement on Germany the East German prime minister, Lothar de Maiziere, reminded Gorbachev about his reputed warning to his predecessor, Erich Honecker, that "those who come too late are punished by life". Gorbachev "laughed somewhat bitterly and said with resignation, 'Yes, but do you know whether we have all come much too late?'"

Rice argues that while history is littered with missed chances, Western leaders such as Bush's father, James Baker, Francois Mitterrand, Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher acted with "skill, speed, and regard for the dignity of the Soviet Union. As a result, Europe bears scars but no open wounds from German unification. That is a testimony to statecraft."

The choices before the US and EU now are no less historic. Just to list the discussion items for Bush's meetings with NATO and EU leaders in Brussels, and with Gerhard Schroder, Jacques Chirac and Vladimir Putin, is to rehearse an agenda on which there is considerably more
disagreement than agreement, which will be reinforced if it is not skilfully addressed.

The issues are set out in a suggested compact between the US and EU this week written by Charles Grant and Philip Gordon, centre-ground analysts close to Tony Blair and Bill Clinton, and signed by 55 prominent academics, diplomats and ex-security officials from both sides of the Atlantic (www.cer.org.uk).

They call for: a new strategic dialogue on Iraq; US support for EU efforts to get Iran verifiably to end its nuclear programme; EU agreement to soften its arms embargo on China; US agreement not to penalise states supporting the International Criminal Court and to refer the Darfur issue there; agreement to apply the Geneva Conventions to all battlefield fighters captured in the war on terrorism; joint reactivation of the Israeli-Palestinian road map and backing for democratic change in the region; a renewed joint commitment to the Millennium Development Goals on world poverty and to UN reform. Not to mention Kyoto, Russia, Syria or the dollar.

The paper proposes that US-EU summits should become "a genuine forum for strategic dialogue on the full range of issues of concern to transatlantic relations". This should be based on a US commitment to European integration and enlargement and an assurance that any EU defence organisation will only complement NATO. Whatever happens next week, Bush's visit to the EU headquarters, the first by a US president, is of great symbolic importance.

Rice used a new catchphrase during her preparatory tour - "transformational diplomacy". It is intended to combine neo-conservative ends with realist means. Reports from Washington say there is a real opportunity for the Europeans to influence US policy-makers, who realise they need help to achieve their objectives.

A rude reminder of the need for new political structures to shape such a large agenda was delivered by Schroder to the annual Munich security conference. He said NATO is "no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and co-ordinate strategies". He called for a high-level panel to propose NATO reforms and new US-EU structures. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal he said "we have to discuss political questions more deeply than in the past before decisions are made", and that his initiative was a response to Rice's call to open a new chapter in the transatlantic relationship.

His speech was frostily received by US and NATO participants and a WSJ editorial, but it crystallised the issues. NATO does not discuss such a broad agenda in public and its relations with the EU are paralysed. Normally it is a vehicle for pre-cooked US policy. The Europeans demand a more equal relationship, which Schroder believes should be through the EU.

This may require a US-EU treaty to create new structures. If Washington does not have the statecraft to recognise this it will be too late to mend the relationship.
KELEMEN: The tone in trans-Atlantic ties has clearly changed, says Ivo Daalder of The Brookings Institution.

Mr. IVO DAALDER (The Brookings Institution): I mean, remember what the first term was about. It was about old vs. new Europe. It was about comparing Germany to Cuba and Libya. It was about serving freedom fries on Air Force One. It was, as Condoleezza Rice was reported to have said, about forgiving Russia but ignoring Germany and punishing France. That kind of rhetoric appears to be gone for the moment. That's important.

KELEMEN: But his colleague, Philip Gordon, says it's time to get beyond nice rhetoric. He outlined what he calls a **new compact for Europe and the US**, a list of compromises on issues from arms sales to China to Iraq and the International Criminal Court. Gordon sees Iran's nuclear policy as one of the toughest issues in the basket.

Mr. PHILIP GORDON: Because the fact of the matter is on Iran right now, our policies are all failing. The European approach which puts the emphasis on carrots and incentives is not working, and our emphasis on sticks and sanctions and possible military threats is not working either.

KELEMEN: He argues the US would have to get actively involved in European negotiations and offer Iran some incentives for diplomacy to work, but judging from recent comments from administration officials, Europe should not expect much movement on this front. President Bush told German television that Iran is trying to divide the US and Europe.
21 février 2005

Nouveau Bush et vieille Europe; Diplomatie

AUTEUR: Coste Philippe

ENCART:

Le président américain fait le voyage pour rencontrer Chirac, Schröder et Poutine. De part et d'autre de l'Atlantique, l'heure est à la reprise du dialogue. Mais les approches restent différentes

TEXTE-ARTICLE:


Rassuré par les tournées de ses "éclaireurs", le "nouveau Bush" ira, lui, le 21 février à la rencontre de Jacques Chirac, Gerhard Schröder et Vladimir Poutine, bien décidé, sinon au dialogue, au moins à... "mieux expliquer le pourquoi de [ses] décisions". Nul ne sait pourtant encore si ce voyage annonce une profonde réconciliation de l'Amérique avec ses alliés, ou le simple adoubement d'une Europe vassale.

Après que 55 personnalités américaines et européennes ont signé et publié, le 17 février, un "accord amiable" destiné à "sauver l'entente transatlantique", le voyage de George Bush en Europe prend toute son importance symbolique. Elle clôt plus de deux ans d'agressions ou de hautaine indifférence américaines à l'égard des opinions et des gouvernements européens, et réduit un peu la crainte, exprimée par Philip Gordon, chercheur à la Brookings Institution et coauteur du fameux accord, que "le dommage fait à la relation transatlantique ne devienne permanent, et ne débouche sur un nouvel ordre mondial où le concept d' "Occident" n'existerait plus".

Une meilleure image internationale Face à ce risque, les durs et les idéologues américains sont, curieusement, les premiers à relativiser aujourd'hui l'impact de leurs vilaines manières. "Les insultes n'ont plus cours, et c'est un progrès considérable, admet Danielle Pletka, chargée des
études de défense et de politique étrangère à l'American Enterprise Institute, un bastion des fameux néoconservateurs. Mais il ne faut pas exagérer le divorce atlantique. Derrière la violence apparente, les États-Unis et l'Europe n'ont jamais cessé de travailler ensemble, tant en Afghanistan qu'en matière de lutte contre le terrorisme ainsi que sur bien des dossiers diplomatiques comme l'Iran et la Syrie."

Car cette duplicité perdure. Certes, Colin Powell, réputé voix de la raison dans l'administration républicaine, a dû partir. Mais en lui succédant au Département d'État, Condoleezza Rice a pris soin de s'entourer d'atlantistes et de multilatéralistes comme Robert Zoellick, son n° 2, ou Nicholas Burns, ancien ambassadeur auprès de l'Otan. La nomination de John Negroponte, un diplomate de carrière respecté, ancien ambassadeur des États-Unis à l'ONU puis à Bagdad, au poste de directeur national du Renseignement américain, chargé de 15 agences dont la CIA, devrait contribuer à rétablir la crédibilité des espions de Washington, discrédités auprès de leurs alliés par l'"intox" sur les armes de destruction massive de Saddam Hussein.

Dans le reste du gouvernement, les rangs des idéologues néoconservateurs se sont à peine dégarnis. Le plus mal aimé de tous, le docte Douglas Feith, ancien directeur du bureau des plans spéciaux du Pentagone, chargé initialement de collecter les "preuves" des armes de destruction massive irakiennes, puis de superviser la reconstruction de l'Irak, a été vite remercié. Mais Paul Wolfowitz, affable n° 2 de Rumsfeld et instigateur de la guerre d'Irak, a gardé son emploi, comme beaucoup des "idéalistes" et néo-reaganiens qui entourent le vice-président, Dick Cheney, et le secrétaire à la Défense.

En prononçant, lors de son discours sur l'état de l'Union, à 21 reprises le mot "liberté", George Bush a confirmé sinon l'influence des néoconservateurs, du moins son attachement personnel aux idéaux de la démocratisation forcée. Mais, de son côté, Condoleezza Rice s'est sentie autorisée à préciser la tactique: "Le temps de la diplomatie a commencé", annonçait-elle lors de sa nomination, au début de janvier.

"Je ne vois pas de grand changement idéologique, reconnaît Charles Kupchan, directeur des études européennes au Council on Foreign Relations. Seulement une nouvelle tendance au pragmatisme. La réalité de l'Irak, la pression de bon nombre de républicains inquiets des coûts financiers et politiques de ces deux dernières années de guerre ont conduit Bush à un semblant d'ouverture diplomatique, au moment où ce dernier a besoin d'aide concrète et tangible en Irak: d'argent, et de soldats."

La France et l'Allemagne refusent toujours d'envoyer des troupes en renfort de la coalition d'occupation en Irak, mais leur engagement à assurer la formation, hors du pays, d'une police irakienne ainsi que leur accord pour éponger la dette de Bagdad sont, aux yeux des Américains, de bons augures pour une collaboration future. "Après avoir assisté aux élections en Irak, un événement légitime et moral, les Européens ont dû mettre un bémol à leurs critiques de l'occupation américaine, constate Philip Gordon. Plus profondément, ils admettent qu'ils n'ont aucun intérêt à voir l'Amérique s'affaiblir et abandonner l'Irak au chaos."

A entendre Danielle Pletka, les Européens n'ont pas attendu le voyage de Bush pour emboîter le pas à Washington sur de nombreux autres dossiers: "L'ouverture du débat sur l'intégration de la Turquie dans l'Union européenne constitue une concession; la levée de boucliers contre les élections frauduleuses en Ukraine; les pressions diplomatiques contre la nucléarisation de l'Iran; le travail conjoint de la France avec les États-Unis pour le retrait de la Syrie du Liban; l'appel de Jacques Chirac à une enquête internationale sur l'assassinat de Rafic Hariri. Tout cela met du baume au cœur à l'Amérique."
En échange, les États-Unis offrent leur... reconnaissance. Un engagement à admettre l'intégration européenne comme un projet louable, et Bruxelles comme un interlocuteur prioritaire et respecté. Pour le reste? L'engagement de l'équipe Bush dans la résolution du conflit israélo-palestinien, fort apprécié par les Européens, participe aussi du simple retour au réel pour une administration longtemps persuadée que la paix à Jérusalem passait par l'annihilation du régime de Saddam Hussein à Bagdad. Un arrêt des hostilités entre Israéliens et Palestiniens et le début d'un processus de paix offriraient aux États-Unis, réputés belliqueux, une meilleure image internationale; et une plus grande déférence à l'égard de la légalité internationale ne pourrait qu'améliorer leur crédibilité.

Au moment où le protocole de Kyoto, brutalement rejeté par son gouvernement il y a quatre ans, entre en vigueur dans 141 pays, Bush promet aujourd'hui de réduire lui-même, hors traité, les émissions américaines de gaz à effet de serre. De même, l'offensive contre l'ONU semble se calmer, et Washington paraît même prêt à faire des efforts en vue de la réforme du Conseil de sécurité. La rencontre officielle du président de la Croix-Rouge internationale avec George Bush, Condoleezza Rice et Donald Rumsfeld, le 21 février, s'explique par la gêne grandissante des autorités américaines face au vide juridique de la prison de Guantanamo et aux sévices commis sur ses détenus.

Le véritable test de la possible entente transatlantique pourrait avoir lieu en Iran, au moment où le duo rodé des "gentils policiers" - joués par les diplomatie françaises, allemande et britannique - et du "méchant flic" incarné par la puissance militaire américaine accuse de sérieux tirailllements. Bush laissera-t-il les négociations aller jusqu'à leur terme ultime? "La Maison-Blanche préférerait une issue diplomatique, assure Charles Peña, analyste sur les questions de défense au Cato Institute, un think tank conservateur. Mais elle ne tolérera pas l'existence d'un armement nucléaire iranien."
Die Tageszeitung

(Berlin), February 21, 2005.

US-Rechte gegen ein vereintes Europa

Rechte Kreise in den USA reagieren mit Argwohn und Angst auf die transatlantischen Wiederbelebungsversuche der Bush-Regierung. Sie bevorzugen eine Politik, die von einem Europa der Nationalstaaten ausgeht

AUS WASHINGTON

MICHAEL STRECK


Rechts- und neokonservative Kreise hingegen reagieren auf die transatlantischen Wiederbelebungsversuche der US-Regierung mit einer Mischung aus Argwohn, Skepsis und Angst. Radikale Haltungen wie die von Thomas Donnelly von der konservativen Denkfabrik
"American Enterprise Institute", die USA sollten das impotente und widerspenstige Europa in Zukunft einfach links liegen lassen, gehören zwar zu einer Minderheitsmeinung. Dennoch dominieren die bekannten Reflexe, dass Amerika alle Versuche Europas zurückweisen sollte, die seine Hegemonie untergraben könnten. Das Verhältnis sollte vorrangig so gestaltet werden, dass es den strategischen Interessen der USA dient.


So wundert es nicht, dass Gerhard Schröders Reformvorschläge zur Nato auf wenig Gegenliebe stoßen. Sie werden als Versuch gewertet, das Militärbündnis mit den USA zu marginalisieren und eine EU-Verteidigungsgemeinschaft zu schaffen. "Dies ist eine gefährliche Haltung", sagt Hulsman.


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His father went to Germany to topple a wall - now George Bush arrives to mend fences

Julian Borger in Washington and Nicholas Watt in Brussels

Saturday February 19, 2005

The Guardian

[...]

The White House has also sent signals that the president will have something conciliatory to say about global warming, although no one is expecting him to embrace the Kyoto pact.

If any progress is made next week, it is much more likely to be in atmospherics than on hard issues, even though that would be a step forward in the current climate. Ivo Daalder, a former US national security council staffer, was one of more than 50 American and European foreign policy experts - including the former foreign secretary Douglas Hurd - to draw up a US-European "compact" suggesting some possible compromises on a range of divisive issues. He has little hope those suggestions will be adopted. "The expectations for this trip are extraordinarily high," Mr Daalder said. "And I think the likelihood of something new and positive coming out of it is extraordinarily low."
George W. Bush macht einen Umweg ums Inselreich–und Tony Blair ist das recht

Der Standard

(Austria) February 19/20, 2005

Von Frank Herrmann aus London


Rein reisetechnisch gesehen, fällt es schon aus dem Rahmen, dass Tony Blair extra nach Brüssel fahren muss, um George W. Bush zu sehen. Die beiden geben sich gern als Brüder im Geiste, sozusagen die siamesischen Zwillinge der Weltbühne, und wenn sie einander treffen, dann am liebsten auf heimischem Terrain, in trauter Runde vor prasselndem Kaminfeuer.


Es ist den Strategen in London durchaus recht, dass sich Bush auf Brüssel, die EU-Kapitale, konzentriert und allein damit ein Zeichen des Einlenkens setzt. Mag die "Daily Mail", das Zentralorgan hartgesottener Insulaner, auch noch so sehr auf den Brüsseler "Superstaat" und Blairs Kniefall schimpfen. Die seriöse "Times" findet den Fahrplan in Ordnung, weniger seine Einzelstationen, mehr das Gesamtkunstwerk: "Gute Neuigkeiten für Blair, so was ist selten".

Der Mann habe ja seine gesamte Außenpolitik auf die Annahme gebaut, dass Amerika und Europa für eine bessere Welt zusammenarbeiten könnten, schreibt das Blatt. Und dass Britannien in dieser Partnerschaft die Rolle des Brückenbauers spiele.


Zwei Denkfabriken, das Centre for European Reform (CER) in London und die Brookings Institution in Washington, haben aufgelistet, was Europäer und Amerikaner konkret tun müssten, um den Riss zu reparieren. Irak: Die USA hören in einem "strategischen Dialog", organisiert durch eine neuartige Kontaktgruppe, auf die Einwände der EU. Die bildet dafür pro Jahr 5 000
irakische Beamte sowie 25 000 Polizisten und Sicherheitskräfte aus. Iran: Washington unterstützt die Gespräche, die Briten, Deutsche und Franzosen mit Teheran führen, um den Bau einer Atombombe zu verhindern. Im Gegenzug erklärt sich die Europa-Union bereit, die Islamische Republik zu bestrafen, falls man dort doch Uran zu militärischen Zwecken anreichert.

Bush wirbt um Sympathien und Geld in Europa


Olivia Schoeller


Einige meinen jedoch, dass dieser Besuch nur eine PR-Tour ist, mit vielen schönen Worten aber wenig Substanz. Man befürchtet, dass die transatlantischen Partner in so vielen Fragen so weit auseinandergerückt sind, dass eine gemeinsame Strategie nur sehr schwer möglich ist. Vor seiner Abreise jedenfalls erhielt Bush aus vielen Instituten und von einer Armee politischer Experten gute Ratschläge, was er in Europa machen und sagen sollte, damit die transatlantischen Beziehungen wieder genesen.

Eine Milliarde Dollar für Irak


Andererseits aber erwarten die Experten von den Amerikanern ein Bekenntnis zum europäischen Dialog mit Iran und mehr Eigeninitiative im Umgang mit dem Regime in Teheran. Ein europäischer Diplomat in Washington meinte, es sei gut, dass die Amerikaner militärisch die Peitsche schwingen, allerdings müssten sie auch das Zuckerbrot ein wenig süßer machen - also den Iranern mehr Anreize für einen Verzicht auf nukleare Ambitionen bieten. Bislang seien
die Amerikaner den Europäer noch keinen Zentimeter entgegen gekommen.


Tauschgeschäfte

Es steht in Washington außer Frage, dass die USA und Europa ein Interesse am Nahost-Friedensprozess haben und gemeinsam dafür arbeiten müssen. Doch während die Liberalen vorschlagen, gemeinsame Stiftungen zu gründen, sind die Konservativen der Meinung, dass Europa und vor allem Frankreich eine härtere Haltung zum Beispiel gegenüber der libanesischen Hisbollah einnehmen und sie auf die Liste der terroristischen Vereinigungen setzen müssten.


Ob Bush diesen Vorschlägen folgt? Klar ist auf europäischer und amerikanischer Seite nur eines: Führt die Reise erneut nur zu einer atmosphärischen Verbesserung der Beziehungen und kommt man sich substantiell nicht näher, werden die transatlantischen Beziehungen dauerhaften Schaden erleiden.
Bush to cajole wary Europeans

By Paul Reynolds
World Affairs correspondent, BBC News website

On his visit to Europe this week, US President George W Bush will seek to make friends, but will have trouble influencing people.

Despite his charm offensive, there are too many issues dividing the US from much of Europe to enable peace to be declared on all fronts.

Nevertheless, there will be efforts towards finding a way forward on some of these problems, though some of this is papering over the differences.

[...]

Call for compromise

An indication as to how seriously divisions between the US and Europe must be taken has come in a document issued by a US think-tank in advance of the visit.

Signed by 50 foreign policy professionals from both sides, the Brookings Institute's document, called "A Compact between The United States and Europe", goes beyond the usual waffle in these kinds of papers.

It offers specific proposals for the various policy issues of the day and calls for compromise all round.

It declares: "American policies spark hostility among Europeans, or vice-versa. That hostility, in turn, convinces leaders on both sides that they have no choice but to go it alone. This vicious cycle benefits no one and must stop."

The "compact" adds: "In recent weeks, optimism has grown that the partnership can find new vitality. But renewal requires more than hope; it requires action".
Expert group tells U.S., Europe to get busy fixing their partnership

Fifty foreign policy and national security experts from the United States and Europe think they have come up with a way to restore vigor to the struggling trans-Atlantic partnership.

Actions on both sides caused the problem, they say, and only action will repair it.

The 50, who include former government ministers, high-ranking diplomats and U.S. national security advisers, were releasing on Thursday an 11-page trans-Atlantic compact they have negotiated that lays out the actions they consider to be necessary.

"The partnership between Europe and the United States must endure, because our common future depends on it," the compact says.

"In recent weeks, optimism has grown that the partnership can find new vitality. But renewal requires more than hope; it requires action. This Compact shows that a way forward exists."

The experts have been meeting at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank, to negotiate the compact and present it in the form of an agreement between governments, a "Compact Between the United States and Europe." It was drafted in connection with President George W. Bush's visit to Europe next week.

The experts include Douglas Hurd, British foreign secretary in the early 1990s; Sandy Berger and Anthony Lake, both national security advisers under President Bill Clinton, and former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and Narcis Serra, a former Spanish defense minister.

Problems with the trans-Atlantic relationship since Bush took office have been blamed by some on "atmospherics or miscommunication," the compact said, but that's not so.

Instead, it blames both sides, and because no one has acted to reverse the damage, the disputes have become self-perpetuating.

"American policies spark hostility among Europeans, or vice versa," it said. "That hostility, in turn, convinces leaders on both sides that they have no choice but to go it alone.

"This vicious cycle benefits no one and must end."
In its specific proposals, the compact suggests reciprocal actions on a list of contentious problems, starting with Iraq and including renewed military arms sales to China, which Europe is considering; spreading democracy through the Middle East, a linchpin of Bush's policy that Europe thinks should yield to solving the Israeli-Palestinian problem first; and the Geneva conventions, which Europe contends the United States has largely ignored for many prisoners from the Iraq and Afghanistan combat zones.
Philip Gordon, director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, acknowledged that European arms sales to China would be “intolerable” to many here and “really does have the potential to blow up into another U.S.-European crisis.”

China arms sales was one of the items on a proposed "compact" that Gordon circulated, with the signatures of 61 foreign policy specialists and former officials from the United States and Europe. Under the proposal, the United States would acquiesce in lifting the arms embargo; Europe would commit to tough safeguards. Comparable compromises are proposed for bridging U.S.-European differences on Iran, global warming and the International Criminal Court.

The goal "is to go beyond words and diplomacy and actually make policy commitments," Gordon said.
EU-US "Compact" offers concrete strategy steps

Background:
US President George Bush’s visit to Europe next week is widely expected to close a chapter marked with bitter rifts between America and Europe.

Issues:
Timed for the run-up to US President George Bush’s visit to Europe on 21-22 February, an ad-hoc panel of over fifty European and American foreign policy and national security experts have signed and published an 11-page “Compact Between the United State and Europe”. The document is aimed to be a “demonstration that a comprehensive strategy can be forged to deal with the full range of key challenges we face”.

The document, written in the form of a diplomatic agreement between governments, was released in Washington DC on 17 February. It tackles most of the key strategic challenges of the day based on the shared understanding that a comprehensive transatlantic strategy is possible to forge even on the toughest issues. It says that the partnership between Europe and the US “must endure” and is possible to renew, “but renewal requires more than hope; it requires action”.

The Compact includes the following proposals:

- **Iran**: The EU and the US jointly reaffirm their determination to stop nuclear proliferation and insist that Tehran permanently and verifiably terminates its fuel cycle programme. Both the EU and the US declare readiness to co-operate to this end.

- **Iraq**: Through a new international contact group, the US is opening a strategic dialogue with the EU on Iraq’s future. The EU commits to launch a major training programme for Iraqi civil servants and also to increase its financial contributions for Iraqi reconstruction. Following the ratification of a new Iraqi constitution, both sides will support UN Security Council authorisation of a new multinational stabilisation force for Iraq, which could be placed under NATO command.

- **Middle East**: Both sides will commit to the Roadmap as the framework toward a two-state solution. The borders of Israel and Palestine would be based on the 1967 lines with mutual and agreed modifications to take into account security and demographic
concerns.

• China: Should it lift the arms embargo against China, the EU commits to replacing it with a reinforced code of conduct on arms sales. The United States reiterates its opposition to a lifting of the arms embargo but welcomes the EU’s related commitments.

• The Geneva Conventions: The EU and the US commit to apply the Geneva Conventions to all battlefield combatants they capture in the war on terrorism.