CRITICISM AS PHILOSOPHY: CONCEPTUAL CHANGE
IN CHING DYNASTY EVIDENTIAL RESEARCH

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批判的哲學: 清代考證學與
「仁」的新解釋
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1. INTRODUCTION

Among those who have evaluated Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1911) intellectual history, it has been common to blame Confucian scholars of that period for creating a climate of textual criticism that was primarily destructive. Such detractors, for the most part, deny Ch'ing Confucians the status of philosophers concerned with larger social and political issues and overlook the significance of their discoveries.

The general view is that Confucianism since the Sung dynasty (960-1279), that is, Neo-Confucianism, was a synecdochic set of philosophical concepts and interpretations. Although it showed signs of change (or "unfolding" as the conventional wisdom has it), the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy during the Ming (1368-1644) and Ch'ing periods, according to this view, essentially was a reworking of themes and concepts set in place originally by Chu Hsi (1130-1200) and Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529). 

In a powerful indictment of Ch'ing dynasty scholarship, Ts'ang Chün-i 通雲毅 has contended that the intellectual triumph of Marxism-Leninism in contemporary China grew out of the rejection of Sung dynasty humanistic philosophy by bookish and empirically oriented Ch'ing philosophers. 

In Ch'ing dynasty philosophy, the aim was to have everyone stress practical aspects of human life. Although this was not a bad idea, [Ch'ing Confucians] erred by using this [stress on practice] to oppose Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism. (It, "studies of moral principles" fu-hsin 理學). 

During an earlier era, Fang Tung-shu 方東樹 (1728-1852), a staunch advocate of the Ch'eng-Chu (Ch'eng I 程頤, 1033-1107, and Chu Hsi) Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, condemned the intellectual currents of the Ch'ien-lung (1736-95) and Chia-ch'ing (1796-1820) reign periods in ringing fashion: 

(1) See, for example, Hsu Fa-kuan's 徐敷昆's attack on Ch'ing dynasty Han Learning entitled "Ch'ing-tai Han-chen heng-ta" 清代漢學大評 購本 1977, 1-22. For rebuttal, see Yamanoi Yu 山本雄 "Neo-Confucian Confucian and Confucian" 1954, 82-83. For discussion, see Wm. T. de Bussy, "Introduction," in The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism (N.Y., 1975), pp. 1-32.


(3) Fang Tung-shu, Han-chen shang-tai 漢學尚古 (Taipei reprint, 1977), 2A. 16b.
The Han Learning scholars all have evidence to back up every statement and research to support every word. However, they are only debating on paper with the ancients over glosses, phonetic elements [in Chinese characters], scholia, and textual corruptions. They adduce from various books ancillary evidence by the hundreds and thousands of items. Yet, if they were to apply to themselves their attitudes and activities, or extend them to the people and the country, it is of no benefit whatsoever. It only causes people to become deluded and inconstant so that they are good for nothing.

Much is at stake in these critiques. From the point of view of the Neo-Confucian humanist tradition, the Ch'ing dynasty evidential research movement (P'ao-ch'eng-hsueh 浮證學) represented a decisive break with the ethical values and humanistic ideals of the state orthodoxy based on the Ch'eng-Chu tradition. From another perspective, however, this seeming betrayal of the Confucian philosophical tradition by Ch'ing evidential research scholars can be turned inside out.

The debilitating aspects of the imperial orthodoxy, which by the late Ming had degenerated into a powerful formalism dedicated to enhance the prestige and power of autocratic rulers, was first described by Huang Tsung-hsi 黃宗羲 (1610–95):

In antiquity, the people of the realm were considered the hosts and regarded the ruler the guest. Everything that a ruler managed to accomplish in his lifetime reverted to the realm. Today the ruler is host and those in the realm his guests....

In antiquity, the people of the realm loved and supported their ruler. They compared him to their father. They emulated him as they do heaven and could not go far enough to demonstrate their sincerity. Today, the people of the realm harbor nothing but hatred for their ruler. They view him as an enemy....

Can it be that the greatness of the realm, with all its millions of people and myriads of lineages is to be enjoyed privately by one man, by one lineage?

Tai Chen 戴震 (1724–77), polymath and philosopher, continued, from a historical perspective, Huang's exposé. Using the text of the Mencius as a foil to criticize the creeping autocracy since Sung times, Tai contended that in the final analysis the fundamental problem lay within the ideological nature of the Neo-

(4) Huang Tsung-hsi, Míng-tai fang保 in 保氏方略, pp. 1b-2a, in Li chou i chh hai-hsun 彼厚 審浩 (Taipei, 1969). See also the discussion of Sung-Ming enhancement of the imperial institution and the corresponding rise in autocracy in my forthcoming study entitled To Interpret the Past and Reform the Present: The Rise and Development of New Text Confucianism in Late Imperial China (Ann Arbor, forthcoming), Part 1, Chapter 2.
Confucian orthodoxy and its support for an autocratic state that dominated Chinese political culture:

The high and mighty use \( \text{li} \) [moral principles] to blame the lowly. The old use \( \text{li} \) to blame the young. The exalted use \( \text{li} \) to blame the downtrodden. Even if they are mistaken, [the ruling groups] call [what they have done] proper. If the lowly, the young, and the downtrodden use \( \text{li} \) to struggle, even if they are right they are labelled rebellious. As a result, the people on the bottom cannot make their shared emotions and desires [in all persons] in the world understood by those on top. Those on top use \( \text{li} \) to blame them for their lowly position. For these uncountable throngs of people, their only crime is their lowly position. When a person dies under the law, there are those who pity him. Who pities those who die under [the aegis] of \( \text{li} \)?

Later, Fang Tung-shu, outraged by the audacity of Tai's remarks, retorted:

[To say] that the principles of heaven are not dependable and that one should rely on the emotions and desires of the people, that they should have an outlet and be allowed to follow their desires, implies that \( \text{li} \) [read "moral ideals"] is attained at the expense of \( \text{ch'i} \) [read "human desires"] and brings disorder to the Tao. However, [Tai Chen] is merely trying to make it difficult for the Ch'eng-Chu [school] without realizing that his is the way of great disorder.

In the twentieth century, the impact of Tai Chen's political critique was acknowledged by erstwhile radicals such as Chang Ping-hsun 東坡鏡 (1868-1926) and Liu Shih-p'ei 劉師培 (1884-1929). Before his infatuation with anarchism in 1907, Liu Shih-p'ei, for example, admired Tai's criticism of oppressive aspects of the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. Liu contended that Tai had effectively liberate himself from the autocratic aspects of the Ch'eng-Chu imperial ideology (see further below).

Were Ch'ing k'ao-ch'eng scholars sterile philologists? Or were they liberators? Did they commit the crime of overturning Confucian ethical values, leaving a moral vacuum in their wake? Or did they deconstruct an ideological tradition that had provided theoretical support for the increasingly autocratic nature of the Confucian Imperium since the Sung dynasty?

(5) Tai Chen, Meng-tsu ts'ui shu-ch'eng 孟子學術論 (Peking, 196). P. 10. We might note that Ming Tai-tsu 子大儒 (r. 1286-96) wanted to have the text of the Meng-tsu removed from the official examination system because it placed the people over the ruler. His objections were met by Confucian scholars who removed the offending passages from the official text.


(7) See Kawata Teischi, "Shimotsue no Tai Shin" 茅門的數學師, in Toyoda ho ronshū, compiled by the Committee in Commemoration of Moris Mikiaburu (Kyoto, 1979), pp. 1815-34.
In the discussion that follows, we will evaluate these different interpretations by examining the content and methodology of Ch’ing dynasty evidential research studies. In particular, the empirical methodology and philological deconstructionism of the k’uo-un ch’eng movement will be analyzed from the standpoint of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Han Learning versus Sung Learning debate, which dominated philosophic discussion in China before the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864).

2. THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

Michel Foucault has noted that periodically a society suddenly stops thinking the way it did and its leading voices strike out in new and different directions.¹⁰

Thus, in place of the continuous chronology of reason, which was invariably traced back to some inaccessible origin, there have appeared scales that are sometimes very brief, distinct from one another, irreducible to a single law, scales that bear a type of history peculiar to each one, and which cannot be reduced to the general model of consciousness that acquires, progresses, and remembers.

In European intellectual history, such discontinuities in discourse reveal how the formation of concepts and their modes of connection and coexistence can change dramatically from one epoch to another. More often than not, what we frequently refer to as a zeitgeist or "spirit of an age" is a shorthand method for discerning the modes of thinking peculiar to a particular historical epoch. Such a "map of the mental universe" of an age presents us with its predominant concerns and new directions. In Foucault’s terms, an "archaeological" analysis of knowledge reveals that at any given moment there are discernable prerequisites that define epistemologically the conditions for acceptable knowledge and inference, whether expressed in theory or "silently invested" in practice.¹¹

The seventeenth century in Europe marked such a discontinuity in the history of western philosophy. The "great grid of empirical knowledge" that emerged three centuries ago represented a fundamental shift in the common codes of knowledge through which the world was perceived. Mental vocabulary of Europeans during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment in turn reinforced this shift from Christian rationalism to skeptical and secular empiricism.¹²

After the great British empiricists John Locke (1695-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753), and David Hume (1711-1776) set up the principle that prior to all other philosophic considerations it must be determined how far human reason extends,

(10) Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 76-77.
epistemology, the theory of knowledge, was raised to the highest level of philosophical priority. Until then, with exceptions, the philosophic outlook or program that stressed the power of a priori reason to grasp substantial truths about the world, that is rationalism, had dominated Scholastic and Renaissance thought.\(^{11}\)

By making experience rather than reason the source of acceptable knowledge, empiricists contended that the legitimate reach of human ideas should be evaluated by the manner in which they arise. This program was possible only by exact delineation of the sources from which knowledge derived, and of the course of development which brought it about. An epistemological position that stressed that valid knowledge must be corroborated by external facts and impartial observations in turn added impetus to study of the natural world and the concomitant emergence of the scientific revolution.

I have argued at length elsewhere that a similar epistemological turn occurred in seventeenth-century China.\(^{12}\) For reasons quite different from the European case, there occurred in Confucian discourse a remarkable turn from Neo-Confucian rationalism, typified by the philosophy of Chu Hsi, to a commitment to empirically based philological inquiry.

In sharp contrast to their Neo-Confucian predecessors, Ch'ing  k'ao-ch'eng scholars stressed exacting research, rigorous analysis, and the collection of impartial evidence drawn from ancient artifacts and historical documents and texts. Abstract ideas and a priori rational argumentation gave way as the primary objects of discussion among Confucians to concrete facts, verifiable institutions, and historical events.\(^{13}\)

Although their position was not as clearly articulated as by their European contemporaries, Ch'ing evidential scholars also made verification a central concern for the emerging empirical theory of knowledge they advocated.\(^{14}\) This program involved the placing of  ch'eng  (proof) and  cheng  (verification) at the center of the organization and analysis of the classical tradition. A full-blown scientific revolution did not ensue, but it is interesting that  k'ao-ch'eng scholars made

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\(^{12}\) See my *From Philosophy To Philology: Social and Intellectual Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge, 1984), passim. For discussion of social and political factors, see pp. 88-169.


\(^{14}\) By "empirical" I mean an epistemological position that stresses that valid knowledge must be corroborated by external (textual and otherwise) facts and impartial observations. Ch'ing evidential scholars were not "empiricists" in the strict philosophic sense, although they were in favor of knowledge based on experience, that is,  wen-chien chih  chih  (empirical experience).
astronomy, mathematics, and geography high priorities in their research programs.\(^{15}\)

Animated by a concern to restore native traditions in the precise sciences to their proper place of eminence, after receiving ridicule and little attention during the Ming dynasty, evidential scholars such as Tai Chen, Ch’ien Ta-hsin 錫大訥 (1728-1804), and Juan Yuan 韓元 (1764-1849) successfully incorporated technical aspects of western astronomy and mathematics into the Confucian framework. Ch’ien Ta-hsin, in particular, acknowledged this broadening of the Confucian tradition, which he saw as the reversal of centuries of focus on moral and philosophic problems.\(^{16}\)

In ancient times, no one could be a Confucian who did not know mathematics... Chinese methods [now] lag behind Europe’s because Confucians do not know mathematics.

In contrast to their Neo-Confucian predecessors, Ch’ing evidential research scholars inhabited a climate of criticism stimulated by their discovery of precise empirical methods to verify and evaluate knowledge drawn from a wide variety of sources. In general, they took Sung and Ming Neo-Confucian discourse to be an obstacle to verifiable truth because it seemed to discourage further inquiry along empirical lines. During this time, scholars and critics had begun to apply historical analysis to the Confucian Classics. Classical commentary by now had yielded to textual criticism.

As Foucault perceptively has noted, “commentary halts before the precipice of the original text, and assumes the impossible and endless task of repeating its own birth within itself: it sacralizes language.”\(^{17}\) Criticism, on the other hand, can analyze a text, however sacred, only in light of truth, accuracy, or expressive value. It desacralizes or, in more recent parlance, “deconstructs” language so that the textual monuments of classical traditions are reduced to their vocabularies, their syntaxes, or the sounds of their languages.

In the late seventeenth century, Yen Jo-chü 顏鶴齡 (1636-1704) dramatically demonstrated that the Old Text chapters of the Documents Classic were a later forgery and not the original chapters discovered in the second century B.C. Hu Weijun 胡維庸 (1692-1714), Yen’s friend and colleague, exposed the heterodox origins of Neo-Confucian cosmograms. Such studies brought in their wake corrosive implications that would not end in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A


\(^{16}\) Ch’ien Ta-hsin, CH’ien-t’ai-fung wen-chi 趙域堂文集 (Taipei, 1968), III. pp. 94-95.

\(^{17}\) Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 80-81.
form of criticism emerged that would one day exceed the Confucian boundaries Ch'ing scholars attempted to impose.\(^{19}\)

Language itself became an object of investigation. So much so, that the foundations of contemporary Chinese linguistics and phonology were laid during this period.\(^{19}\) Tai Chen described such investigation as follows:\(^{19}\)

The Classics provide the route to the Tao. What illuminates the Tao is the words [of the Classics]. How words are formed can be grasped only through [a knowledge of] philology and paleography. From [the study of] primary and derived characters we can master the language. Through the language we can penetrate the mind and will of the ancient sages and worthies.

The distinguished classicist and historian Wang Ming-cheng 王鸣盛 (1722-68) echoed Tai's words:\(^{21}\)

The Classics are employed to understand the Tao. But those who seek the Tao should not cling vacuously to "meanings and principles" [\(t\-li\ 義理\)] in order to find it. If only they will correct primary and derived characters, discern their pronunciation, read the explanations and glosses, and master the commentaries and notes, the "meanings and principles" will appear on their own, and the Tao within them.

Their program was taken quite literally by thousands of Confucian scholars trained in \(k'ao-ch'eng\) methods during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this way, students of evidential research were determined to pierce what they considered the thick veil of Sung and Ming metaphysical and cosmological systems of thought (known popularly as \(Tao-kueh\ 諸學 [studies of the Tao, that is, Neo-Confucianism]). They hoped thereby to recapture the pristine meaning formulated by the sage-kings of antiquity in the Confucian Classics. They were in effect calling into question the dominant imperial ideology, the Ch'eng-Chu tradition, which Manchu rulers had enshrined as the proper norm in imperial examinations and official ideology.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the prestige of the Classics, though outwardly unchanged, had actually diminished appreciably. Using the phrase "\(liu-ching chieh shih\ 六經皆史 [the Six Classics are all Histories]," Chang Hsueh-ch'eng 姜學誠 (1738-1801) placed the timeless Classics within the framework


\(^{19}\) See my "From Value to Fact: The Emergence of Phonology as a Precise Discipline in Late Imperial China," \textit{Journal of the American Oriental Society} 102, 3 (July-October 1982): 493-500.

\(^{20}\) Tai Chen wen chi 識見文集 (Hong Kong, 1974), p. 166.

of the endless flux of history, but even in the eighteenth century Chang was not unique in his appraisal.\(^{(23)}\)

Philosophic concepts were not immune to this sort of empirical analysis either. Though most k'ao-ch'eng scholars preferred the comfortable confines of an empirical program for research that left little room for theoretical discussion, a few led by Tai Chen raw in linguistic analysis (hsun-k'ao 詩教 [glossing of terms]) a key for a new and more precise etymological approach to traditional philosophic questions. Important Confucian concepts and ideals, as a result of Tai Chen's influence, were subjected to philological study. A methodology that had proven fruitful in textual criticism it was hoped would prove equally productive in moral philosophy.

3. THE REVALUATION OF JEN

One of the most telling classical passages, associated with Confucius himself, was the master's response to his disciple Yen Yuan's 聞閑 query concerning jen 仁 [benevolence].\(^{(24)}\) According to D.C. Lau's translation, Confucius responded:\(^{(24)}\)

"To return to the observance of the rites through overcoming the self constitutes benevolence. If for a single day a man could return to the observance of the rites through overcoming himself, then the whole Empire would consider benevolence to be his. However, the practice of benevolence depends on oneself alone, and not on others."

The keys to this passage in the Analects were the two phrases k'ye-ch'i fu-li wei-jen 己克己而力為仁 and wei-jen yu-chi 勿仁由己 卒合法ized in the translation above.

In his commentary to this passage, Chu Hsi gave the following glosses for the phrase k'ye-ch'i 己克己: "It means to conquer [sheng 生]. Chi 己 refers to the selfish desires of the self [shen chih shun-yü 身之氣欲]." According to Chu Hsi, this meant that "to practice jen [wei-jen 巡仁], one must conquer the selfish desires of the self and return to the observance of the rites." In this manner, the "perfect virtue of the original mind" (jen-hsin chih ch'wan-te 木心之全德), which Chu equated with heavenly principle (tien-li 天理), could be attained.\(^{(24)}\)

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(23) Ta Wei-yun 杜威源, Ch'ing Chien Chia t'ao T'ai chih shih lu-chh yu shih chia 清乾隆代之變變筆墨 (Taipei, 1962), passim.
It was precisely Chu Hsi's gloss "to conquer the selfish desires of the self" for *k'ei-chi* 克己 to which Ch'ing critics objected. As Mizoguchi Yūzō 水口雄三 has pointed out, Tai Chen saw in this gloss confirmation of Chu Hsi's bifurcation of human desires from heavenly principle. Chu was in effect reading into this passage from the *Analects* has own bifurcation between *li* 理 [morals principles] and *chi* 氣 [variously rendered as "material force," "ether", "stuff"]; to encompass all these meanings we will use the Chinese term].(26)

Tai's critique of Chu Hsi's latent dualism drew on his philological training. He contended that if Chu Hsi's gloss of *chi* 己 as "selfish desires of the self" were correct, then it made the following phrase in the text *wei-ji īn yu-chi* 誠仁由己 incomprehensible. How could the "practice of *jen*" (wei-ji 信仁) proceed from the "selfish desires of the self" (yu-chi 由己)? This is what followed if Chu Hsi's gloss were used for both the *chi* 己 in *k'ei-chi* 克己 and in *yu-chi* 由己. Accordingly, Chu Hsi's interpretation, Tai argued, was contradictory.(27)

Chu Hsi's definition of human desires (yū 譲) was the key issue for Tai Chen. In his discussion of the *k'ei-chi* 克己 passage, Tai noted:(28)

Lao-tzu, Chuang-tzu, and the Buddha [spoke of] "having no desires" [wuyū 無欲], not of "having no selfishness" [wu-tsu 無私]. The way of the sages and worthies was "to have no selfishness" and not "to have no desires." To equate [the self] with selfish desires is therefore a notion the sages totally lacked.

The theoretical debate was drawn over the affirmation or negation of human desires. For Tai Chen, the Chu Hsi line of inquiry had scorned the essential characteristics of humanity in favor of attention to heavenly principles;(29) The sages ordered the world by giving an outlet to people's feelings [ch'ing 情] and by making it possible for them to realize their desires [yū 譲]. In this way, the Tao of the sages was brought to completion…

With regard to the Sung Confucians, however, [the people] believe in them, thinking that they are the equivalent of the sages. Everyone can talk about the distinction between moral principles [*li* 理] and human desires. Therefore, those who control the people today pay no attention.

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(28) Ibid.

(29) Ibid., pp. 9–16.
to the sages giving an outlet to people’s feelings and making it possible for them to realize their desires.

Tai’s political stance, presented briefly in introductory remarks, was a direct result of his revaluation of the Chu Hsi interpretation of classical terms such as Jen仁.

Tai Chen’s followers, as we shall soon see, picked up where he had left off. We should recognize, however, that Tai’s critique was not altogether unique. Although it is hard to demonstrate any direct link to Tai Chen, both Yen Yuan彦元 (1633-1704) and Li Kung李侃 (1659-1733) had already taken Chu Hsi to task for his interpretation of the Ke-chie fu-li wei-chen敬鬼神而依仁 passage. Yen Yuan had said:309

The ancient glosses for Ke鬼 were “able” [meng能] and “overcome” [sheng胜]. I have never heard of the interpretation “to get rid of” [ch‘u出] for Ke鬼. The ancient gloss for chi己 was “self” [shen身]... I have never heard of the interpretation “selfishness” [ssu私] for chi己. Probably Sung Confucianists took material form [ch‘i-chih氣質] as containing evil. Therefore, they saw the self [chi己] as selfish desires. Li Kung also noted before Tai Chen the problem of the passage wei-chen yu-chi為仁由己;310

Question: [Chu Hsi’s] Collected Notes [To the Analects] uses “selfish desires” [ssu-ssu私欲] to gloss chi己. Why can’t this be used?

My reply is: Never before was this gloss of “selfish desires” used for interpreting chi己. Moreover, in the following phrase wei-chen yu-chi為仁由己, is it permissible to gloss the former [use of chi己] as “selfish desires” and gloss the latter as “my self” [see ch‘en兼], thereby giving different glosses [for the same word]? Followers of the sages emphasized the study of rituals. This was called “to use rituals to control the self” [yu-chih ch‘i-i約之以禮]. Sung Confucianists stressed “getting rid of selfishness and studying rituals” [ch‘i-chih kung-li去私存禮].

Like Tai Chen, Yen Yuan had earlier linked Chu Hsi’s mistaken interpretation to his tendency to view human desires in light of the bifurcation between li理 and chi己. In remarks entitled “To Refute That the Nature of Material Form Is Evil,” Yen said:311


(32) Yen Yuan, T‘ien-hsing pien存性篇, “Po ch‘i-chih-chung o”存性篇存性. L.II, in Yen-Li
If one claims that ch'i 氣 is evil, then li 理 is too. If one claims that li is good, then so is ch'i. In all likelihood, ch'i is the ch'i of li [理之氣], and li is the li of ch'i [気之理]. How can one argue that li alone is good and that material form on the other extreme is evil?

In addition, Yen Yuan accused Chu Hsi of bringing in Hsuan-tzu's 荀子 theory that human nature was evil through the back door, thus compromising Mencius' correct view that human nature was good.(34) Tai Chen, several decades later, did much the same. Affirming that material form (ch'i-chih 氣質) was inherent in the nature of man, Tai wrote:(35)

Sung Confucians in establishing their theories appear the same as Mencius, but in reality they differ. They appear different from Hsuan-tzu, but in reality they are the same.

Then Tai added:(36)

Today we see that Mencius was the same as Confucius and that Ch'eng [I] and Chu [Hsi] were the same as Hsuan-[tsu] and Yang [Chu]... What the latter called nature [hsing 性] was not what Confucius and Mencius had called nature. What [Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi] called the nature of material form [ch'i-chih chih hsing 氣質之性], isn't this what Hsuan-[tsu] and Yang [Chu] called nature?

From a discussion of the meaning of jen 仁, the debate with Chu Hsi had carried over into the nature of man and the problem of human desires. That was not where it was to end, however. Mizoguchi Yōshō has pointed out that Tai and his followers were reevaluating and continuing, in historical terms, a major philosophical debate that had animated into Ming Confucianism as well. In the process, k'wao-ch'eng scholars like Tai Chen, Juan Yuan, and Chiao Huan 祁濬 (1768-1820) were throwing their weight behind a rejection of what they perceived as the pernicious influence of Ch'eng-Chu dualism in favor of a more practical and down-to-earth interpretation of classical values and ideals.(37)

4. FROM TAI CHEN TO JUAN YUAN

The emergence of k'wao-ch'eng philosophy took a while before it was accepted

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(33) Yen Yuan, Ts'ung-hsiing yüan, 1.11a (Vol. 1, p. 161).
(34) Tai Chen, Meng-tzu ts'ai-shu-cheng, p. 34.
(35) Ibid., p. 37.
(36) Mizoguchi Yōshō, pp. 171-76, 181-207. See also Yamano Yu, "Min-Shinjidai ni okeru ki no tetsugaku" 明清時代における気の哲學, Tetsugaku zasshi 質學雑誌 56, 711 (1951): 82-103.
by more empirically minded scholars. In addition, more orthodox contemporaries of Tai Chen, such as Chang Hsueh-ch'eng, were troubled by attacks on Chu Hsi. Chang thought it permissible "to correct the flagrant errors of Sung Confucians," but Tai was going too far in his dismissal of Sung moral teachings. Chang accused Tai of "forgetting where his ideas ultimately came from."(37)

The popularity of moral philosophy and practical statecraft in the nineteenth century has usually been explained as a revival of Sung and Ming Neo-Confucianism. By opposing the earlier turn to philology, nineteenth-century Confucians are said to have initiated a reaffirmation of Neo-Confucian forms of moral cultivation. The reappearance of philosophical concerns among Ch'ing literati, however, was also the result in part of an important turn in the evidential research movement in the late eighteenth century.

Initially, the K'ao-ch'eng program for research was sharply biased by its powerful methodology. Its ostensibly goal of philosophic reconstruction based on meticulous philological analysis was ignored. With Tai Chen, however, a viewpoint began to emerge from the philological results that had accumulated. In a discussion of Hui Tung 周叔 (1697-1758), the Soochow founder of the Han Learning movement, Tai stated the credo for a philosophy based on the K'ao-ch'eng theory of knowledge:(38)

Thus, if ancient glosses are clear, the ancient Classics will be clear. If the ancient Classics are clear, the meanings and principles [i-li 資理] of the worthies and sages will be clear. Moreover, what suits my mind [with these meanings and principles] will accordingly also be clear. Meanings and principles of the worthies and sages refer to nothing else but the fact that they reside in the statutes and institutions [set up by the worthies and sages].

For Tai Chen, the role of philological deconstruction was only preliminary. If it did not serve as a first step to philosophical reconstruction, then its agenda was bankrupt: "If ancient glosses are not used to illuminate meanings and principles, what function do they serve?"(39) Philosophical rebellion added impetus to a philosophic rebellion against the Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy.

In his philosophic works, Tai was writing for a limited audience in the late eighteenth century. Attacked for their views by orthodox Sung Learning scholars


(39) Tai Chen chu, p. 214. Yi Ying-shih 余英時 in his 【Tai Chen yu Chu Hsiu-ch'eng 風起之辨】 舊學匯言 (Hong Kong, 1970), pp. 82-123, has thoughtfully discussed this aspect of Tai Chen's thought. See also Chang Yung Ch'eng, "Introduction," in 【Tai Chen's Inquiry Into Goodness】 (Honoulu, 1971), pp. 3-53.
on the one hand, evidential research scholars who took an interest in philosophic problems were criticized by their colleagues for dealing with unverifiable issues usually associated with Tao-huaeh 耆華。Chu Yün 朱雲 (1729-81), an influential patron of Han Learning, ridiculed Tai Chen’s excursion into theoretical issues: "[Tai] need not have written this sort of thing. What he will be known for has nothing to do with such writing."

In the nineteenth century, however, the academic climate changed. Scholars were increasingly receptive to philosophic issues, and once again they stressed the theoretical aspects of Confucian discourse. Nor could the k’ao-chung agenda remain untouched by the political and social tremors that began to affect the society at large. The revival of Sung Learning and New Text studies was paralleled and in part provoked by an intense moral concern for the state of the country and involvement with administrative problems growing out of the social and political pressures of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Juen Yuan, a distinguished Han Learning scholar from Yangchow, composed three major essays on Confucian philosophy between 1801 and 1823. Modelled after Tai Chen’s etymological approach to philosophic terms, Juen’s best known treatises included philological examination of the graph jen 仁 in the Analects and Mencius.

In his examination of the meaning of jen 仁 in the Analects, Juen reconstructed Han dynasty glosses of its meaning at the same time that he deconstructed the later overlay of what he considered mistaken interpretations that had begun after the fall of the Han dynasty in the third century A.D. According to Juen, later scholars had read into the meaning of jen 仁 metaphysical notions that were theoretically disembodied from practical reality that they misrepresented the concrete social aspects of Confucius’ use of jen 仁.

Juen based his reconstruction on the gloss for jen 仁 first given by the Later Han dynasty classicist Cheng Hsuan 鄭玄 (127-200), who had defined it as “people mutually concerned for each other” (hsiang-jen 休相人倫, lit., “people living together”). Juen noted:

(40) For Chu Yün’s remarks, see Chiang Fān 蔣凡, Kao-chung Han-huaeh shih ch’eng chi 漢學考征記 (Shanghái, 1927-35), 66a.
(42) Tai Chen lived and taught in Yangchow from 1756 to 1762. The city became one of the leading centers of evidential research in the Ch’ing period. See my Ch’ing Dynasty Schools of Scholarship, Ch’ing-shih wen-p’ien 4, 6 (December 1981): 12-14.
In all cases, *jen* 忍 must first be exhibited in personal actions before it can be observed. In addition there must be two people involved before *jen* can be seen. If a person shuts his door and lives peacefully alone, clsoes his eyes and sits still with a peaceful attitude, although his mind contains virtue and principles, in the end this cannot be counted for what the sagely gate called *jen*.

To buttress this rejection of quietism and private meditation, which he associated with Sung Learning, Juan Yuan cited the explanation of the graph *jen* 忍 given in the *Shao-yen chieh-ten* 說文解字 *Analysis of Characters as an Explanation of Writing* dictionary, compiled in the Later Han by Hsu Shen 許慎 (38-147). In the latter, a primary source for the paleographical reconstruction of over nine thousand different graphs arranged according to 530 radicals, it was noted that the graph *jen* 忍 was written in two parts, *jen* 人 [person] and *erh* 二 [two], a combination meaning "two people" that literally represented the social dimensions of *jen* 忍.\(^{(40)}\)

Like Tai Chen, Juan focused on the *Ke-chi fu-li wei-jen* 克己復慮為仁 passage. Taking the opposite tack from Chu Hsi, Juan argued that what Confucius had meant by *jen* 忍 was the fulfillment of human desires, not their denial:\(^{(41)}\)

If for a single day one controls the self and returns to the observance of the rituals, then the whole empire would consider *jen* 忍 his. This is the way whereby maintaining one's personal desires one maintains others, whereby developing one's personal desires one develops others.

For his gloss of *Ke-chi* 克己, Juan cited the definition *yueh-shen* 約身 [to control the self] given by Ma Jung 馬融 (73-166), who along with Cheng Hsun and Hau Shen, was one of the most important Later Han classical scholars.

After discussing the occurrence of the *Ke-chi fu-li* 克己復慮 passage in the *Tao chuan* 道傳, which he compared to its meaning in the *Analects*, Juan Yuan then turned to a direct attack on the Ch'eng-Chu reading of *chi* 己 [self] as *ssu* 孝 [selfishness], which was the accepted gloss for the imperial examination system. To do this, Juan cited Mao Ch'i-ling 毛奇齡 (1629-1716), an earlier critic of the Ch'eng-Chu school, who had written:\(^{(42)}\)

As a result of [Ch'eng I's and Chu Hsi's glosses], all writings after the Sung annotated *chi* 己 as *ssu* 孝. They then cited the *Ke-chi fu-li* 克己

\(^{(40)}\) Ibid. p. 159. See also, Chan, "The Erosion," p. 311.

\(^{(41)}\) Juan, p. 131, paraphrasing the *Analects*. See Lao-yu pien-ye, 11.6/59.

\(^{(42)}\) Juan, p. 162. For the occurrence of the *Ke-chi fu-li* passage in the *Tao chuan*, see Ch'ung-chi chung-chien yin te 聲洪約傳字 (Taipei, 1965), 379/Chiao 鄭 19/9 Tao Chieh, where Confucius refers to the earlier origins of this maxim. For discussion of Juan’s decision to use "control" to gloss *ke*, see Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton, 1960), p. 38 note 128. See also the analysis of this issue by Wei-ming Tu, "The Creative Tension," p. 30, especially note 3. Tu notes that the typical meaning of *ke* in the *Tao chuan* is "conquer."
By restating Yen Yuan's and Tai Chen's earlier analysis of this issue, Juan in his citation demonstrated how a questionable gloss had become the orthodox interpretation. If this veil of interpretation could be lifted, then more accurate definitions given by Han dynasty classicists could be revived. The deconstruction process revealed the pernicious influence of Ch'an Buddhism on Sung and Ming Confucians. The latter had coopted the *sw-yih* 未得 (*having no desires*) doctrine from the former and read it into the teachings of Confucius. The process of reconstruction demonstrated that Cheng Hsuan had been right in his down-to-earth gloss of *jen* 仁 as *hsiang-jen ou* 信人偶 (*people mutually concerned for each other*). The key to this virtue was not its metaphysical status but the manner in which one man governed his relations with another.\(^{(43)}\)

In his discussion of the meaning of *jen*仁 in the *Mencius*, Juan turned to the relation of the mind (*hsin 心*) and *jen*仁. Mencius had given two significant glosses for *jen*. In one he had said: “*jen* is [the distinguishing characteristic of] man” (*jen yeh che jen yeh 仁者者人也*). In the second he claimed: “*jen* is the human mind” (*jen-jen hsin yeh 仁人心也*).\(^{(43)}\)

In Sung commentaries to these passages, commentators saw in Mencius' linkage of *jen*仁 and mind justification for the metaphysical claim that identified *jen*仁 with a human nature (*hsing 性*) endowed by heaven. Chu Hsi had noted: \(^{(49)}\)

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_jen_仁 is the virtue of the mind. Ch'eng I had been correct when he said the mind is like the seed for grain and *jen*仁 is the nature of its growth. If one only spoke of *jen*, however, people would not know that it is in close contact with the self [*ch'ieh yü chi 如於己*]. To contrast *[jen* from *chi* 己], one therefore calls *jen* “the human mind.” Accordingly, one can see that the mind is the ruler of the self’s [*shen 神*] social relations and myriad transformations.
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Wang Yang-ming and his followers had stressed the link between *jen*仁 and the mind because this gloss confirmed them in their claim that the mind was the key to Confucius' teachings. Taking the Sung Confucians' metaphysical interpretation to its logical end, Wang Yang-ming, when discussing the *k'e-chi fu-li wei-

\(^{(48)}\) Juan Yuan, p. 172.
\(^{(49)}\) *Meng-tzu yen-ia* 孟子箋義 (Peking, 1941), 56/78/16 and 45/64/11.
The man of *jen* 仁 regards all things as one body. If one fails to achieve this unity, it is because his selfishness has not been eliminated. If the true nature of *jen* is preserved, then all under heaven will come under this *jen*, or "the whole universe is inside my room."

Juan Yuan objected to such metaphysical interpretations. Instead he appealed to a more concrete and limited understanding of the relation between *jen* and the human mind: (52)

*Jen* 仁 is complete in the mind, but what is complete in the mind is [only] the beginning of *jen*. It must be enlarged and filled so that it will be manifested in actions and human affairs, before it can be called *jen*...

Mencius spoke of innate moral potential [liang-neng 良能] and innate moral knowledge [liang-chih 良知], but these are only the beginnings of *jen*. Innate moral potential refers to practical human affairs. To put aside practical affairs and speak only of the mind is not Mencius' original lesson.

The gloss "*jen* 仁 is [the distinguishing characteristic of] man" (*jen* yeh che *jen* yeh 仁者者人也) also appeared in the *Doctrine of the Mean* (Ch’eng-yung 中庸). Juan Yuan noted that Cheng Hsun’s Han dynasty gloss for this passage again defined *jen* 仁 as k’hsiang-jen on 稽人倫 [people mutually concerned for each other]. As before, Juan appealed to a more down-to-earth reading, one more in line with Han dynasty commentators who were closer to the time of Confucius and Mencius and thus more likely to have transmitted the ancient meanings of classical texts intact. (53)

Juan then dismissed the doctrine of *liang-chih* 良知 [innate moral knowledge], which Wang Yang-ming and his school had made a central tenet in their "studies of the mind" (k’ai-hsueh 心學), as an unimportant term that appeared very few times in the Mencius text. Because it was not a very important term in the Mencius, it was odd that Wang Yang-ming would single out *liang-chih* as the "secret for the sages' and worthies' transmission of the mind." Juan concluded that Wang Yang-ming, although he was not the first, was guilty of reading Buddhist doctrine into this term and turning it into a key moral and metaphysical doctrine. After the fall of the Han dynasty, native traditions of "mysterious teachings" (hsuan-hsueh 文學) had been mixed together with Buddhism. Later

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Confucianism had fallen under the spell of such otherworldly teachings and mistakenly incorporated them into Confucianism.\(^{(54)}\)

Juan Yuan's best known treatise, entitled "Hsing-ming ku-hsun" (Ancient Glosses on "Nature" and "External Necessity"), made use of etymology and phonology to analyze the key concepts of hsing [nature, human and otherwise] and ming [external necessity, predeterminated forces, etc.]. Going through what he considered the earliest references to these terms, Juan discovered that hsing unlike ming did not become an important concept until relatively late in the classical period. When it did appear with its meaning of "nature," it was invariably coupled with ming as complementary and mutually related concepts.\(^{(60)}\)

Nature was what heaven imparted to all living and inanimate things in the world. The Doctrine of the Mean had made this clear when it stated: "What is called nature is the external necessity imposed by heaven" (tien-ming chih wei-hsing, 天命之為性). According to Juan Yuan, this meant that "external necessity is that by which nature is formed, and nature is that by which external necessity is formed."\(^{(60)}\)

Chu Hsi, when commenting on this passage in the Doctrine of the Mean, placed particular stress on hsing 順 and mentioned ming 悅 only in passing. The gloss Chu Hsi gave for hsing was his famous hsing chi li 性原理 [nature equals principle] equation, which raised the formulation for hsing to equal status with li 理. The problem of nature in turn became an important element in Chu's bifurcation of li 理 from chi 氣.\(^{(65)}\) Chu Hsi went on to assimilate this gloss into his discussion of human nature.\(^{(65)}\)

...[T]he reason for making a distinction between the human and moral mind is that some [perceptions] arise from personal concerns, which derive from material form; others have their origin in the correct ways of nature [hsing] and predeterminated forces [ming]. The way perceptions are formed are thus different.\(^{(65)}\)

Tai Chen, as we have seen, took Chu Hsi to task for this dualistic reading of human nature. Chu had distinguished between chi-chih chih hsing 氣質之性

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\(^{(54)}\) Juan Yuan, pp. 182-84. We might note that Chu Hsi had also stressed Mencius' use of heng hsin 興心. See his Meng-tsu chi chu, 11.5a.


\(^{(56)}\) Juan Yuan, p. 291. See Wei-ming Tsu's discussion in Centrality and Commonality, pp. 39-40, and Shih-shan chuang chu chu, 51.1n.

\(^{(57)}\) Chu Hsi, Chung-yung chang-chih 小補遺句 (Taipei reprint of Ming edition), p. 1a. For discussion, see my "Philosophy Versus Philology: The Jen-hsin Tao-hsin Debate," 2'oung

\(^{(58)}\) Chu Hsi, "Hsu" (ax. in Chung-yung chang-chih, pp. 1a-1b.)
[nature of material form] and innately good nature (li-i chih hsing 理義之性) drawn from heavenly principle (li-yü 天理). Evil derived from the former via selfish emotions (ch'ing 情) and human desires (jen-yü 人欲), according to Chu Hsi. Tai rejected Chu’s reading as untrue to the teachings of Confucius and Mencius. Instead, he replaced Chu Hsi’s gloss with the formulation “nature is formed by [the action of] yin and yang and the five phases. Principles and meanings derive from nature.” This reading meant that ch’i 氣 had priority over li 理 and that the latter was subordinate to the workings of ch’i via yin and yang and the five phases. Human desires and emotions were endowed by heaven and thus were the most important constituents of human nature. To label them as evil was contrary to sagely teachings.\(^{(39)}\)

While agreeing on all counts with Tai Chen’s analysis, it is interesting that Juan Yuan used Li Ao 李翱 (d. ca. 844), not Chu Hsi, as the foil for his critique of post-Han interpretations of hsing 性 and ming 程:\(^{(40)}\)

When people of the Chin [265-420] and Tang [618-907] mentioned hsing and ming, they wanted to infer from these [terms] the most metaphysical aspects of the self [shen 神] and the mind [hsin 心]. Shang [1766-1122] and Chou [1122-221] persons, when they spoke of hsing and ming, saw their scope limited to features closest at hand.

Li Ao’s doctrine of “recovering nature” (fu-hsing 復性), according to Juan, had overturned the concrete teachings of Confucius and Mencius. In the process, Taoist and Buddhist speculations had been incorporated into the heritage of the sages and worthies.

In his “Fu-hsing shu 復性書 [Treatise on the Recovery of Nature], Li Ao had explicitly blamed human feelings (ch’ing 情) for betraying man’s innately good nature. Only through quiescence and purification of the mind (lit., “fasting of the mind”) could evil feelings be overcome:\(^{(41)}\)

**Man’s feelings are the evil aspect of his nature. If one realizes that they are evil, then this evil will not exist in the first place. If the mind is in the state of absolute quiet and inactivity, depraved thoughts will cease of themselves.**

Juan Yuan used Li Ao’s formulations to lash out at the Buddhist penetration of Confucian teachings:\(^{(42)}\)

Heaven gave birth to humans, endowing them with flesh and blood, and mind and knowledge. Thus it is impossible to have no desires [wu-yü

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\(^{(40)}\) Juan Yuan, p. 197.

\(^{(41)}\) Li Ao, Li Hsi-chih hsien-sheng wen-chi 孫景元先生文集 (Shanghai, 1920), 1.4b, translated by Wing-tsit Chan in *A Source Book*, p. 457.

\(^{(42)}\) Juan Yuan, p. 206.
Only Buddhist teachings first spoke of "cutting off desires" (*chüeh-* 虛欲). If all persons in the Empire were to cut off their desires like the Buddhists, then in all the world there would be no births of humans, birds and animals would proliferate.

In contrast to the ancients who only spoke of concrete affairs, Li Ao and those who followed had reached the point where it was no longer possible to distinguish any difference between Confucianism and Buddhism.\(^{63}\)

Such overlay had to be removed in order to realize the practical teachings from which the Confucian meanings for *hsing* 性 and *ming* 稟 derived. Taoists and Buddhists had been so adept at citing passages in the *Changes Classic* and *Doctrine of the Mean* to justify their heterodox doctrines that Confucians had been swindled of their birthright. Li Ao had been the first in a long line of Confucians who had "preached Buddhism under the guise that it was Confucianism" (*yin-shih yang-ju* 隱時陽儒).\(^{64}\)

5. FROM JUAN YUAN TO CHIAO HSUN

Juan Yuan’s fellow townsman (Yangchow), Chiao Hsun added very little new to the theoretical debate in his discussion of the *Analects* and *Mencius*. He did, however, make it clear that Tai Chen had opened a new path to understanding classical teachings, which went beyond the limits that philologically minded Han Learning scholars had imposed. Refuting the claim that Tai Chen was simply continuing the Neo-Confucian tradition of learning, so-called "studies of meanings and principles" (*i-li chih hsüeh* 義理之學), Chiao held that Tai had struck out in new directions: \(^{65}\)

Of the works that Tai Tung-yuan [Chen] wrote during his lifetime, his *Evidential Analysis of Meanings of Terms in the Mencius* in three chapters and his *Inquiry Into Goodness*, [also] in three chapters, were the most outstanding. Seeing that he had especially investigated these issues, then his achievements [in this area] were bound to be profound. Thus, just before he died, [these issues] were always on his mind. Hence, what Tai called "studies of meanings and principles" were a means to cultivate the mind. The meanings and principles that Tai managed to grasp on his own, accordingly, were not the meanings and principles of the "Western Inscription" or "Supreme Ultimate" of discursive *chiang-hsüeh* 議學 scholars [such as Chang Tsai 鄭樵, 1020-77].

\(^{63}\) Ibid., pp. 194, 295, 211.

\(^{64}\) Ibid., pp. 213-14.

\(^{65}\) Chiao Hsun, *Tiao-ku chi* 僕異集 (Shanghai, 1935-37), Vol. 2, p. 95. Chang Hsieh-ch’eng, as we have seen above, linked Tai Chen to Chu Hsi, a position that Yu Ying-shih accepts. See note 37 above.
China was creating distance between Tai Chen and Sung Neo-Confucians, even those like Chang Tsai who had advocated a monistic philosophy based on the priority of 先氣 over LI. Tai's philosophy, according to Chiao, was based on precise classical scholarship, which drew its methodology from such tools as the six rules for graph formation (liu-shu 六書), investigation of institutions, and analysis of ancient texts and artifacts (wen-wu 文物). Sung and Ming Neo-Confucians had merely argued discursively, giving little or no justification based on concrete evidence for their theoretical positions. For Chiao, Tai was a hua-cheng philosopher, not a Tao-hsueh scholar.\(^{(66)}\)

On the other hand, Chiao Hsun was equally dissatisfied with the lack of philosophical discussion among Han Learning scholars. The latter "preserved the sayings of the ancients intact but missed the thought-world hsin 心 of the ancients." Members of the Han Learning camp had lost sight of what their program for research was supposed to achieve.\(^{(67)}\)

When I say that I learn from Confucius, how shall I say I do it? "By means of Han Learning" is the reply. Unfortunately, the Han is many years after Confucius. Moreover, the Han is many years before today. Scholars learn from Confucius. Those scholars who study Han [Confucians] use the latter to discuss Confucius. Then they shunt Confucius aside and discuss [only] Han Confucians. Are the teachings of Han Confucians in fact equivalent to those of Confucius?

Clearly the answer was "No!" As Sakade Yoshinobu has pointed out, Chiao Hsun was unhappy with both sides in the Han Learning debate. Both sides were more concerned with loyalties to their respective schools than with the fundamental issues themselves. On this level, Tai Chen had surpassed both sides in his efforts to work out the theoretical implications of hua-cheng inquiry.\(^{(68)}\)

In addition to carrying on Tai Chen's interest in mathematics and astronomy, Chiao Hsun compiled a detailed commentary to the Mencius, which he entitled Meng-tzu cheng-i 孟子正義 [Orthodox Meanings in the Mencius]. A careful philological analysis of the text of the Mencius, the Meng-tzu cheng-i represented the culmination of years of painstaking research based on the fruits of Han dynasty sources and Ch'ing dynasty evidential research.

On technical matters, Chiao relied heavily on Juan Yuan's famous Shih-san-ching chiao-k'un-chi 十三經校勘記 [Collation Notes to the Thirteen Classics], which was based on Juan's private Sung dynasty edition of the Shih-san-ching chu-shu 十三經注疏 [Notes and Annotations to the Thirteen Classics]. For geographical terms, Chiao, Tiao-hua chi, Vol. 2, p. 95.\(^{(66)}\)

Hid., Vol. 2, pp. 104-105, 106.\(^{(67)}\)

Chiao frequently cited Yen Jo-chih's definitive Shu-shu shih-ti 四書釋地 [Explanations of Geography in the Four Books]. Others cited included Tuan Yu-te's T'ai-shih-shu (1735-1815). Tai Chen's disciple, and Wang Nien-sun 王念孫 (1744-1832), who were quoted as experts in the fields of paleography and etymology respectively.39

On questions of theory, however, it was Tai Chen who provided the evidence for the "orthodox meanings" in the Mencius. Over and over again, quotations from Tai's Meng-tzu tou-i shu-cheng 孟子字義疏證 [Evidential Analysis of Meanings of Terms in the Mencius] were given in full to overturn heterodox Sung interpretations of the text. With regard to definitions of fen 仁, the nature of man (hsing 性), and the role of human desires (fen-yu 人欲) Sung interpretations were rejected in favor of Tai Chen's formulations.40

Using Tai Chen as a weapon to refute Sung and Ming interpretations, Chiao himself rarely cited any Neo-Confucian sources in his voluminous notes. He let Tai do the talking for him. He was, however, more meticulous in his use of Han dynasty sources than Tai Chen had been. For an example we might note that he agreed with Cheng Hao's definition for fen 仁 as hsiaung-jei 休人偶 [people mutually concerned for each other], which Juan Yuan had cited as the correct gloss for the passage fen yeh che fen yeh 仁也者人也 (see above).41 As we shall see, this particular gloss took on added importance in the late nineteenth century.

When he turned to the Analects, Chiao gave his fullest statement for the affirmation of desires in human life. In the Analects, Confucius had been asked about shame (chih 羞) by one of his disciples:42

"If a man refrain from ambition, boasting, resentment, and desire, it may, I suppose, be counted to him for fen 仁?" The master said: "It may be counted as difficult, but whether for fen I do not know."

To elucidate this reply, Chiao quoted from the Mencius and then concluded with a remarkably strident affirmation of human desires:43

Mencius said of King Liu that he loved wealth, and of King T'ai that he loved feminine beauty, and that yet by allowing the common people also to gratify these feelings, they were able to maintain their ricks and granaries, while there were no dissatisfied women or unmarried men.44

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(39) Chiao, Meng-tzu cheng-i (Taipei, 1979), passim, especially 30.6a-6b.
(40) Ibid., 7.4b, 15.1a-1b, 15.4a-4b, 23.5a-5a, 22.11a-12a, 22.13a-13b, 22.15a-15b, 22.19a-23b, 23.12a-12b, 20.2a, 28.21b-22a, for a sample of citations from Tai's Meng-tzu tou-i shu-cheng.
(41) Ibid., 28.14a.
(44) Meng-tzu yeh-te, 7/1B/5.
In his learning, Mencius succeeded in fully comprehending the doctrine of Confucius, and his idea in this statement is: "Developing oneself one develops others, and maintaining oneself one maintains others."[5]

To insist on having no desire oneself, and at the same time to be indifferent to the desires of others, is to be nothing more than a "dried-up guard."[6] Therefore, men who refrain from ambition, boasting, resentment, and desire are ascetics whom Confucius did not like. Such men are not equal to those who through their own desires come to know the desires of others, and who through their own dislikes come to know the dislikes of others. To make analogies [in this way] is not difficult, and yet fen 仁 already consists in this. But if one cuts off one's own desires, he will be unable to comprehend the hopes of others, and such is not to be considered fen.

Desires were the bedrock of human nature. As Chiao noted, "nature is nothing but eating and passion, and that's all. Drinking and eating, male and female, [in these] people and things are all the same."[7] The sages had brought order to these innate conditions in man. Through their wisdom (chih 智), human values (jen-lun 仁論, lit., "human relations") had been realized and correct rituals (li 理) established.[8]

At the time of our human predecessors, they knew they had a mother but did not know they had a father. Hence, there was no distinction between male and female. They ate birds and beasts uncooked. They did not know of the efficacy of fire. Thus, there was no etiquette for drinking and eating. Sages appeared and demonstrated to the people the ritual of marriage. Accordingly, people realized there were [indeed] human values.

Rituals were contrasted sharply with the moral principles (li 理) of Sung Learning. In a phenomenal genealogical analysis of the origins and evolution of li 理 and li 理, Chiao sharpened the edge of his powerful historicist deconstruction. The sage-kings had used rituals (li 理) to bring order to the empire, by basing rituals on human feelings (xin jen-ch'ing 心人情). Later ages abandoned rituals, and people spoke only of li 理.[9]

According to Chiao Hsun, the logicians (ming-chia 名家) of the late classical period had emerged from earlier court officials in charge of ritual (li-kuan 禮官).

[8] Ibid. One can see a good deal of Hsun-tzu, who was then being revived by Ch'ing Confucians, as well as Han Fei in these words. For discussion, see Saisuke Yoshinobu, pp. 460–47.
Legalists (fa-chieh 法家), on the other hand, had been court officials in charge of criminal law (li-kuan 理官). Thus in its origins, li 理 had been associated with kung [criminal law] and contrasted sharply with ritual, which was used to give expression to human desires.\(^{(80)}\) Over the centuries, legal punishments had taken precedence over ritual in dealing with the people. The triumph of li 理 (read "law") over li 理 [ritual], Chiao contended, had been disguised in the association of li 理 with "moral principle" by later Confucians. But if one saw through the disguise, then it was clear that the anticonsensual metaphysics of the Sung Neo-Confucians was in part derived from earlier legal institutions that had imparted a tradition of criminal punishments to control the people and keep them in line.\(^{(81)}\)

Let us recall what Tai Chen had said: "When a person dies under the law, there are those who pity him. Who pities those who die under [the aegis] of moral principle?" Chiao Hsun's deconstructions echo ominously Tai Chen's picture of an imperial orthodoxy that had betrayed its roots in the humanism of Confucius and Mencius.

6. OUTRAGE: FANG TUNG-SHU

Perhaps, as a result of seeing the extremes to which K'ung-ch'eng philosophers such as Tai Chen, Juan Yuan, and Chiao Hsun were willing to go to deconstruct the teachings of the Ch'eng-Chu school, we can better understand the threat they posed to their more orthodox contemporaries. Neither Weng Fang-k'ang 王方簡 (1733-1818) nor Yao Nai 高彥 (1732-1815), for instance, felt comfortable with the K'ung-ch'eng agenda.

Weng and Yao correctly perceived that the fundamentalist thrust behind Han Learning threatened the Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy, without satisfying the need for moral order and certainty. Chiao Hsun and Wang Chung 顏子 (1745-94), a Yang-chow partisan of Han Learning, had long been involved in reviving nonorthodox texts, including the long-neglected Mo-tzu 莫子 and Hsun-tzu 許子. Wang Chung, in particular, blamed Mencius for the eclipse of Mo-tzu's writings. Although Weng Fang-k'ang was sophisticated enough to recognize the importance of ancient sources for historical reconstruction (during the initial stages he had been involved in the collation of the Mo-tzu text), he was infuriated by Wang Chung's attack on

\(^{(80)}\) Ibid. Chiao's analysis is not so farfetched. We might note that the institution known as Ta li hsü 大理寺, whose function was the general supervision of criminal law administration, had existed by tradition since the Three Dynasties (Hsia, Shang, and Chou), and remained part of the imperial bureaucratic structure through the late empire. See Li-tai chih-huaan ping 詫代昏平 (Hong Kong, n. d.), p. 107, and H.S. Brunnert and V.V. Hagestrom, _Present Day Political Organization of China_ (Taipei reprint, 1971), pp. 79-80.


\(^{(82)}\) See note 5 above.
Mencius. Such audacity forced Weng to label Wang Chung "a criminal" who went against orthodox teachings.(83)

It was not until Fang Tung-shu, a follower of Yao Nai and the Tung-ch'eng school, first published his Han-kueh sheng-tui 漢學尚偽 [Assessment of Han Learning] in 1833, however, that moral outrage translated into a point-by-point rebuttal of the case Tai Chen, et al., had raised against the Ch'eng-Chu school. In the process, Fang accused those who called themselves Han Learning scholars of serious mistakes and woeful ignorance,(84)

Although he was willing to grant the importance of Han dynasty Confucians for their role in maintaining intact the classical tradition, Fang Tung-shu regarded this effort only as preliminary. It had not been until the Sung dynasty when Confucians had harvested the fruits of their Han predecessors and successfully reconstructed the thought-world (hsin 言) of the sages:(85)

If not for Han Confucians nurturing [the classical tradition], Sung Confucians would not have been able to draw sustenance from it. If Sung Confucians had not removed the husk and drawn sustenance, the grains still on the stalk would have remained unrevealed and useless.

Fang Tung-shu invoked Mencius in his defense of Sung Learning. Han Learning k'ao-cheng scholars had "in the name of ordering the Classics actually brought chaos to them, in the name of defending the Tao actually betrayed it." To end slanderous talk and rectify human minds, Fang, like Mencius before him, struck out at those responsible: "Do I do so because I am fond of disputing? I am compelled to do it."(86)

As Fang noted, Han Learning scholars invariably appealed to their methodology of shih-shih ch'iu-shih 實事求是 [to seek the truth from actual facts] to justify their stress on concrete studies (shih-kueh 實學). Juan Yuan and others used this approach to denigrate Sung Confucians for their efforts "to fathom principles by means of empty talk" (k'ung-yen ch'ing-li 空言竊理). Seeing this stress on "actual facts" as the "first principle of Han Learning," Fang Tung-shu launched into an impassioned defense of the Ch'eng-Chu methodology for "the investigation of things" (ko-wu 優勢). (87)

According to Fang, principles (li 理) were equivalent to facts (shih 言). To get at the truth (shih 言) of facts meant that one had to get at the principles as well.(88)

(83) Weng Fang-tang, Fu ch'iao ch'uan shih 儂初鄮文 (1877 edition), 15a.
(84) Fang Tung-shu, "Ch'ung hsii 首序 in Han-kueh sheng-tui, pp. 2b-3a.
(85) Ibid., p. 3a.
(87) Fang Tung-shu, 2A.39a.
(88) Ibid., 2A.39a. It is worth noting that Tseng Kuo-fan 曾國藩 (1811-72), a Hunanese partisan of the Tung-ch'eng school of Sung Learning, defended the Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy
If one does not fathom principles, then how can one know where the truth one is seeking resides? Master Chu [Hsi] therefore said: "It resides in fathoming principles on the basis of phenomena" [chi-en chi'ang-li (物窮理)]. Isn't this [statement] the equivalent of "seeking truth from actual facts?"

To fathom principles meant to apply all knowledge obtained to practical affairs. There was nothing "empty" or esoteric about this approach, Fang contended. If one were to "seek the truth" (ch'iu-shih 求是) without first orienting oneself by "fathoming principles," then the resulting knowledge would diverge from the teachings of the sages and worthies. Han Learning scholars like Juan Yuan thus were guilty of gathering heaps of facts with no direction or purpose. A purposeless mass of facts could only lead to moral depravity.\(^{(9)}\)

Tai Chen, Fang thought, was to blame for the methodological attacks on the Sung Learning approach to knowledge. By stressing etymology (ku-hsuan 敬訓, lit., "ancient glosses") and phonology (yin-sheng 聲韻, lit., "pronunciation and tones"), Han Learning scholars had marched down a mindless road of empirical research, divorced from the "meanings and principles" inherent in the Classics. This approach had led Tai Chen and others to their second great principle: Sung Learning had fallen into the grips of Ch'an Buddhism.

From this view, all "meanings and principles" were merely Confucian disguises for Ch'an doctrine. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth, Fang argued. Han Learning scholars "had no intent to seek the truth. All they wanted to do was to establish their own theories, and through disputation overthrow [the teachings of] Sung Confucians." The path of Sung Learning was correct: to honor moral nature (tsun-te-hsing 德性) had priority over following the path of inquiry and study (tou wen-hsueh 研究學).\(^{(9)}\)

From methodological issues, Feng Tung-shu then turned to the reevaluation of jen (仁) that Juan Yuan had proposed. Juan's stress on concrete practice, Fang maintained, was only one side of the coin. Moral principles were a wedding of practice (yung 用) and essence (ri 體). The definition of jen that Juan Yuan subscribed to, namely "people mutually concerned for each other" (hsiang-chen on 相人間), was acceptable in practice, but it was insufficient to describe the essential characteristics of jen that made it one of Confucius' central teachings.\(^{(9)}\)

Chu Hsi had accepted Mencius' linkage of the mind and jen in his formulation that the mind was the container of jen. According to Fang, Chu's formulation thus gave the essential characteristics of jen: the virtue of the mind (hsin chih te 心之德) and the principle of love (ai chih li 愛之理). Juan Yuan, by stressing only


\(^{(9)}\) Fang Tung-shu, 2A.39b-40b.

\(^{(9)}\) Ibid., 2A.41a-42b.

\(^{(9)}\) Ibid., 2A.45a.
the external practice of Jen, had missed the point of Mencius' criticism of Yang Chu, who had insisted that morality was simply an external manifestation of human nature. Mencius deemed it necessary to demonstrate that the essential elements of moral values, including Jen, were internal to human nature. Why else would he have argued that human nature was innately good in the face of Kao T'su's 告子 claim that nature was neither good nor evil? (92)

In defense of Chu Hsi's gloss of shun 禿 for chi 己 in the K'ci-fu-li 知知二列 passage in the Analects, Fang Tung-shu took Juan Yuan to task for claiming that the graph chi 己 must have the same meaning in the two expressions K'ci-fu-li 知知二列 and wai-jen yu-chi 動仁由己. One of the common meanings for K'ci 知 was indeed sheng 疊 [conquer], for example. Why should Juan, therefore, choose instead to follow Ma Jung's gloss of yuen 焦 [control]? Fang thought this position contradictory. Why could K'ci 知 have two glosses and chi 己 only one? Fang argued that partisanship in favor of Han Learning was not the proper way to arrive at correct glosses of ancient texts. (93)

Yet, even if Juan's gloss of yuen 焦 for K'ci 知 were granted, this still did not refute Chu Hsi's gloss of shun 禿 for chi 己. After all, what was it that needed to be controlled, if not the selfish aspects of the self? In the end, "to conquer the self" or "to control the self" amounted to the same thing. (94)

As we noted in our preliminary remarks, Fang Tung-shu was appalled by the unqualified affirmation of human desires championed by Tai Chen. The Ch'eng-Chu position, Fang retorted, was not based on partiality the way Han Learning was. Because Ch'eng's and Chu Hsi's views accorded with heavenly principle (ko yi 皆以 合乎天理), it was patently absurd for Tai Chen to say that Ch'eng and Chu had used personal views to kill others (i-tchiou sha-jen 以黨殺人). Such statements were pure vituperation. (95)

Fang Tung-shu also found Tai Chen's comparison of the Ch'eng-Chu tradition with the Legalists offensive. Like Chiao Hsun, Tai had noted similarities between the manner Sung Confucians sought after principles (ch'ou-ri 求理) and the way the Legalists Shang Yang 商鞅 and Han Fei 謀非 had used laws (yung-fa 用法). Sung Confucians had never advocated cutting off desires, Fang argued. They had followed the sages in directing desires toward moral ends. Natural desires (sheng-yü 生欲), if left without proper direction would end in depravity (yeh-yü 嫉欲). (96)

Today there are those who say that one should not use meanings and principles as teachings. Instead, they advocate that one should follow the

(92) Ibid., 2A.43b-47a.
(93) Ibid., 2A.48a-49a.
(94) Ibid., 2A.49b.
(95) Ibid., 2A.10a-19b.
(96) Ibid., 2A.26a-26b.
desires of the people. If one accords with [this doctrine] and leads the empire [in this manner], then chaos will reign.

In the seventeenth century, Ku Yen-wu 喻彥武 (1613-82) had singled out Li Chih 李贇 (1527-1603) as the most outrageous and unabashed anti-Confucian to have appeared in Chinese history. Li Chih, Ku argued, had deluded his age and helped to bring on the decadent intellectual trends that had precipitated the fall of the Ming dynasty. It is interesting that Fang Tung-shu’s conclusion about Tai Chen was the same: 

To use principles to seek principles is seen as using personal views to kill people. Such talk is a level of heterodoxy and depravity that since ancient times has never been equalled.

It is equally intriguing, as Mizoguchi Yūzō and others have pointed out, that Tai Chen’s position on human desires was indeed remarkably similar in content, if not in manner of argumentation, to Li Chih’s. In concluding remarks, we will explore some of the implications of this convergence of views.

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS: POLITICS AND PRECEDENTS

Debates between Han Learning and Sung Learning were not simply over textual issues. Different interpretations of the same key Confucian terms, based on different sources and inspiration, could yield different ideas about the nature of man and his relation to his world. Enough so that Han Learning scholars accused Sung Learning of Buddhism, and Sung Learning scholars accused Han Learning of depravity and mindlessness. Such extreme views often were more rhetorical than accurate, but they do reveal how eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Confucians evaluated the debates.

The realm of politics was not immune from this theoretical altercation. Let me give a concrete example of how the debate affected public policy. Fang Tung-shu’s Assessment of Han Learning, first published in Canton in 1831 and revised in 1838, was closely associated with the growing recognition of weakness in the Ch’ing bureaucratic structure before the Opium War (1839-42). In an 1824 letter to Juan Yuan, Fang made it clear that his opposition to Han Learning was tied to the chaotic situation in Canton. Moral passivity and useless erudition fostered by Han Learning, Fang contended, had come home to roost in the opium policy in Canton.

As the foreign threat in Canton mounted in intensity during the 1820s, Juan Yuan, the governor-general in Canton, and members of the Huch-hui-t’ang 學會堂 as (97) Ku Yen-wu, Jhē-chih hsiao (Taipei, 1974), pp. 540-41.
(98) Fang Tung-shu, T’āo-lin.
(100) Haseguchi Fujio, “Ho Tōšū no Kangaku hibun ni tsuite” in Fukubun, 30 (1978): 165-78.
academy, which Juan had helped to finance, were drawn into foreign affairs and the problem of opium trafficking in Southeast China. Juan adopted what seemed at the time a strict policy toward opium in 1821, arresting sixteen opium dealers in Macao and temporarily forcing the opium trade out of the Pearl River.

Although Juan's policy marked the end of the first phase of the trade, in reality the prohibitions meant very little. Opium trading continued uninterrupted at Linch Island. At most the crackdown was a face-saving device for Juan Yuan after attention had been directed to the opium problem by the Tao-kung Emperor (r. 1821-50). The latter had just ascended the throne in a reformist frame of mind, and the opium evil was one of his chief concerns. (10)

Having had a firsthand view of Juan Yuan's opium policies in the 1820s, Fang Tung-shu recommended in the 1830s that the policies which for a decade had been proven a failure be rescinded. Han Learning scholars, when appointed to office, had proven themselves morally bankrupt, according to Fang. He became associated in the 1830s with the policy for the complete eradication of opium in Southeast China. In Canton, the teachers and students at the Yueh-hua Academy were leaders of the anti-opium movement.

Hsu Nai-chi's famous 1835 memorial, recommending legalization of opium for all except civil servants, scholars, and soldiers was connected with earlier proposals by a number of directors at the Hsueh-hai-t'ang that opium restrictions be relaxed. Juan Yuan himself leaned toward the legalization of the trade. These apparent capitulations by the Han Learning group at the Hsueh-hai-t'ang angered Fang and others in Canton who took a hard line on the opium question. It was no accident that when Lin Tse-hsu 林則徐 (1785-1850) took office in Canton as plenipotentiary to deal with the opium issue, he established his headquarters at the Yueh-hua Academy where Sung Learning hardliners were the majority.

The "legalizers" versus the "moralists" in the Canton opium debate reflected in many ways the rift between Han Learning and Sung Learning. We should not be surprised that Juan Yuan's group favored legalization. This decision was a realistic appraisal of the practical solutions then available. In part, Juan's stance reflects the more liberal view of human desires and needs that Han Learning scholars advocated. Nor should we be puzzled that the Sung Learning group, to which Fang Tung-shu was connected, favored total prohibition and confiscation of opium, no matter how hard this policy would be to implement. Moral principles were moral principles, after all. The evils of opium were only adding fuel to the selfish desires of those who indulged in or profited from the addicting drug. Too often we overlook the theoretical presuppositions, however tacit, that determine how political problems will be dealt with.

Earlier we have described the influence Tai Chen's views had on late Ch'ing radicals such as Liu Shih-p'ei, Chang Ping-lin, and others. Mizoguchi Yuco suggests that the strains of liberalization, which had begun in late Ming reactions by Li Chih and other members of the T'ai-ch'ou Neo-Conformalist school against Neo-Confucian formalism, were continued by Peo-ch'ing scholars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Call for recognition of individual desires and needs in institutions that would grant self-interest (tsao-shu tao-li 自私自利) as a basic premise of human aspirations was not fully articulated in China until the late nineteenth century. The roots of this position, however, lay not only in the adoption of western notions (via Japan) of "rights" (ch'iao 権) but also in the social commonality of Jen 仁 were used to define notions of "rights" and "self-interest" by late nineteenth-century reformers.

In his influential Jen-hsueh 仁學 [A Study of Jen], T'an Sau-t'ung 譚嗣同 (1865-98), martyred during the abortive 1898 Reform Movement, made clear from the outset that he accepted Cheng Huan's gloss for Jen: "people mutually concerned for each other" (hsiaung-ou 相倫). 102 According to Takeuchi Hirojuku's recent findings, T'an Sau-t'ung's affirmations of Cheng Huan's reading indicated that T'an opposed Chu Hsi's gloss of "virtue of the mind" (hsien chi 心之德) for Jen. Thus, in T'an's analysis we can see the influence of the Han Learning revaluation of Jen. Discussing human lust, T'an had the temerity to write: 103

Ordinary women, deluded by moral principles [mei 亦必經典], revere the absurd platitudes of corrupt scholars as if they were infallible truths. If they ever take a wrong step in life, or are suspected of having an affair with someone, then, because of this, they are seized, and even die saying nothing. In the end, they become the playthings of others; they are forced to flee; they are sold as goods; they are forced to work as maidservants; they sink into prostitution; and they even cut their

102 Following Mizoguchi Yuco's influential thesis presented mostly fully in his Ch'ingku sen kindai shi no katei to tenkai 中國近代思想的起源と展開 (Tokyo, 1980), passim, but especially 3-48. Mizoguchi is of course continuing from Shimada Kenji's 鑲田甚二 provocative thesis concerning "modernism" in late Ming thought in the latter's Ch'ingoku ni okera kindai shi no sakusetsu 中國における近代思想の発展 (Tokyo, 1949).


104 T'an's discussion of sexual gratification is an interesting mix of Buddhism and liberal views on sexual relationships. See T'an Sau-t'ung chü'nan-ch'i, pp. 384-95. Cf. the translation by Chan Sin-wai, pp. 86-87, which I have modified. See also Takeuchi Hirojuku, "T'an Shido Ningtso to Shimatsu no nin shi" 譚嗣同思想と清末の仁思想, Tōkyō gaikō 詩界 (July 1964): 100. Takeuchi also stressed the impact of Wang Fu-ch'i's 王夫之 (1619-92) ideas on T'an's metaphysical articulation of Jen.
threats out of shame and anger. They do not realize that sexual intercourse between men and women is just the turning of two mechanisms; there is absolutely nothing to be ashamed of, let alone to lose one's life for. Practitioners of Chinese medicine have a theory that men have three climaxes in sexual intercourse and women have five. This theory is so excellent that it ought to be known by everybody.

Moreover, T'an Su-tung's reading of equality (p'ing-tung 平等) into the meaning of jen, according to Takeuchi, draws in some ways on the notion of commonality, which Juan Yuan had stressed in his use of hsiang-jen ou 相人偶 to discuss the social characteristics of jen. T'an's use of the gloss hsiang-ou 相偶 apparently was mediated by his links to K'ang Yu-wei 廉有為 (1857-1927), who was indirectly influenced by Juan Yuan.(105)

K'ang Yu-wei, in his Ch'ang-hsing hsueh-chi 張興學記 [Notes on Studies at Ch'ang-hsing], a collection of notes for lectures K'ang gave in 1891 to his students in Canton, forcefully equated jen 仁 with hsiang-jen ou 相人偶. K'ang then pushed this gloss further to include a notion of "human community" (ch'ên 族, lit. "social grouping"). Jen in concrete social terms was the manner in which humans associated with each other and formed communities.(106)

Yeh Te-hui 許德輝 (1864-1927), a staunch advocate of Sung Learning and opponent of K'ang Yu-wei's reform initiative, linked K'ang's formulations back to Juan Yuan.(107)

In the Doctrine of the Mean, jen 仁 is [the distinguishing characteristic of] man. Cheng [Hsuan] noted that jen 仁 should be read hsiang-jen ou 相人偶. Neither in T'ang annotations nor in works on the Classics from the Sung and later was this meaning grasped. Recently, Ch'en Tung-pi [Li Ch'eng 敗 (1816-82)], basing himself on the theories of his teacher Juan Wen-ta [Yuan], said that the graph jen 仁 is composed of erh 二 [two] and jen 人 [person], which means "people who are mutually concerned for each other" [hsiang-jen ou]. The author [that is, K'ang Yu-wei and his Ch'ang-hsing hsueh-chi] has changed and brought chaos to this line of interpretation by saying that jen 仁 means "forming communities" [ho-ch'ên 合群]. His intent is not to broadly propagate or teach [the truth].

All he selfishly wants to do is to establish his own party.

Yeh connected K'ang's gloss to the ideas that were popping up among reformers in Huan, who were under the influence of K'ang Yu-wei's ideas via

his disciple Liang Ch'i-ch'ao 梁啓超 (1873-1929), then teaching in Changsha in the 1890s. Among those under Liang's influence was of course T'ang Sau-tung.

Accordingly, the gloss of 箴明理 in the late nineteenth century, Ch'en became one of the most respected scholars in Canton. Forward the gloss could be carried to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and T'ang Sau-tung, who both incorporated a notion of community as the distinctive feature of 恆仁 into their own evolving ideas.\(^{(108)}\)

For his part, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao made K'ang Yu-yi's formulation of 恆 in community a centerpiece for his own stress on political renovation. In an essay entitled "On Community" (Shuo-ch'\(\text{\footnotesize\text{\textit{ch\(\text{\footnotesize\text{\textit{ün}}}}}\)), Liang, as Hao Chang perceptively has noted, placed less stress on the moral aspects of 恆 and analyzed instead "the vital problems of political legitimation and legitimation, the scope of the political community."\(^{(109)}\) With Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Confucian discourse yielded its own gloss in Han dynasty glosses of 恆 in confirmation of a notion of equality in the Confucian tradition. Seeing 恆 as the heart of public ethics in China, Liu reiterated the importance of the notion of "people mutually concerned for each other" (hsiang-fen ou 相人偶).\(^{(110)}\)

Westerners see ethics in light of the individual vis-\(\text{\footnotesize\text{\textit{à-vis}}}\) the common group. In China, we view ethics in light of the individual vis-\(\text{\footnotesize\text{\textit{à-vis}}}\) another individual... Individual ethics are extended to be part of family and lineage ethics... Family and lineage ethics are then extended to social and national ethics. Confucians, however, in their statements on ethics stressed private conduct and de-emphasized public morality. Social and national ethics were always extended from the family and lineage. That is why [social ethics in China] differs from western learning.

After locating the notion of "equality" (p'ing-teng 平等) in classical social ethics in China, Liu Shih-p'ei blamed Sung Confucians and their stress on "empty principles" (K'ang-li 官理) for the loss of this classical ideal. Sung Confucians so exalted the imperial institution that traditional egalitarian ideals that had operated in relations between rulers and their subjects in ancient times were overturned. Liu noted: "This is the reason why Tai Chung-yuan [Chen] pointed to the horrors of empty principle, and why he took such notions as a crime [t'ai 帥] exceeding..."\(^{(110)}\)
[even the Legalists] Shen [Pu-hai] and Han [Fei].

Sung Confucians, in contrast to Han Confucians, spoke only of absolute principles derived from heaven, according to Liu Shih-p’ei. This absolutist (chueh-lai) stance caused Chu Hsi and others to see human desires in direct conflict with moral principles. Such mistaken views manifested themselves in Sung interpretations of jen. Han Confucians defined jen simply as "people mutually concerned for each other" (hsiang-jen ou 惠人倫), which Liu took to be very close to "reciprocity" (shu 謝) in meaning. Sung Confucians overturned this view and defined jen as "conquering desires" (k’o-yü 克欲). Liu preferred, instead, Tai’s position, which is worth repeating: "The sages ordered the world by giving an outlet to people’s feelings and by making it possible for them to realize their desires."

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Traitors of liberators? This was the dichotomy I posed in opening remarks. In closing, let me return to the relation between Ch’ing dynasty k’ao-cheng studies and Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism.

It seems to me that there is an important misunderstanding at the heart of our usual evaluations of the reaction against Neo-Confucianism by k’ao-cheng philosophers such as Tai Chen, Juan Yuan, and Chiao Hsan. When we speak of the Ch’eng-Chu school, for instance, we normally mean both the Ch’eng-Chu school of philosophy, based on the writings of Ch’eng I and Chu Hsi, and the state orthodoxy entrenched in public life and the examination system, which drew from Ch’eng-Chu annotations of the Classics and Four Books.

Although related, these two aspects of Neo-Confucianism are analytically distinct. When Sung Learning is treated strictly as a philosophy, a collection of theories about the nature of man and his relation to the cosmos, its standing as a humanistic set of ideas is readily apparent. When, however, we look at Sung Learning as the ideological bulwark for the Confucian imperial, then we cannot help but note how often humanistic ideals contained in the Ch’eng-Chu tradition were compromised to the tactics and goals of political opportunism and preservation of imperial power and prestige.

We can dismiss Tai Chen’s charges against Chu Hsi as a flagrant

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(111) Ibid., p. 22b. For discussion, see Donald Munro, The Concept of Man in Early China, pp. 1-22.

(112) Liu Shih-p’ei, t’ieh 思, “Han Sung I-li-hanch i’t’ung lun” 漢宋伊禮遠論, pp. 3a-3b. In his discussion, Liu described the differences and similarities between Han Learning and Sung Learning. He was critical of Tai Chen for stressing only the differences. See p. 3a. See also t’ieh 思, p. 29b, for Liu’s citation of Tai’s remarks, and note 29 above for the original.

misrepresentation of Chu Hsi’s philosophy. But can we so easily dismiss his charges in light of the ideological uses to which Chu Hsi’s ideas were applied? I think not. At this level of analysis, Tai Chen’s critique, which was driven home by Juan Yuan and Chiao Hsun, certainly was liberating. As we have seen, reformers at the end of the Ch’ing were so impressed with the critical ideas developed by Tai Chen, as well as Ku Yen-wu, Huang Tsung-hsi, and Wang Fuchih 伍牧之 (1619-92), that they used many of their predecessors’ formulations to interpret and adapt western ideas and theories.

That Han Learning scholars were partisan cannot be denied. Sung Learning scholars, however, were equally partisan. Can we agree with Fang Tung-shu that Tai Chen was a traitor to the Confucian cause? From a philosophical point of view, Tai misrepresented many subtle aspects of Chu Hsi’s thought, but in view of the willful political manipulation of the Ch’eng-Chu tradition by formalistic political hacks in the imperial bureaucratic state, Tai’s outcry “who pities those who die under [the aegis] of moral principles” is more than just poignant. It points to the inevitable manipulation of philosophic doctrine when it enters the political arena.

Kao-cheng philosophers were not simply attacking Neo-Confucian philosophy. They were deconstructing a powerful imperial ideology that even in their own day continued to dominate Chinese political culture. We can readily see now the preliminary contributions Ch’ing scholar, building on late Ming currents of criticism described so well by Shimada Kenji 齋田薰次, made to the ultimate rejection of the Confucian imperium in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
批判的哲學：清代考證學與「仁」的新解釋

艾爾曼

根據一般人的看法，中國傳統中最重要的哲學以宋明理學為主，尤其以朱熹的學說為重心。因此，研究中國思想史的東西方學者，大多以為清代在哲學方面沒有什麼重要的貢獻。

在這篇文章裏，我將分析清代考證學的哲學意義。一般而言，雖然考證學的主流在研究古書的真偽，古音和文字的來源，及古訓的定義，但是這種的研究精神也反映了它的哲學背景和思想支的發展方向。

考證學家，例如戴震、阮元、及焦循，一方面批判宋明理學家的「仁」的解讀；另一方面，他們也回復先秦儒者的舊面目。他們以為，宋明理學家與心學家因受禪學的影響太大，而有「陰陽偏儒」的結果。根據戴震的孫子學者張鼎而言，朱熹完全誤解孔孟的「仁」的意義，而造成了新儒學絕對性的「以理救人」的正統。

阮元在他分析論語與孟子書的「仁」的學說時，否定「仁」是形而上的觀念。他指出宋明理學家將「仁」的古訓為證據，說明宋明以前的「仁」是具體的，表示人類之間的道德關懷。焦循繼續戴震及阮元的論述，指出了孔孟「仁」的意義，否定一般人的私欲。阮元與焦循可以說是以「良之學術」來批判理學學派的「理之哲學」。從這個角度來看，清代考證學家的方法與儒家的根本觀念有一個新的解釋。他們批判的觀念態度有它的哲學內涵。無論考證學家的新解說是否比宋明理學家的解釋可靠，但就思想史而言，至少可看出清代考證學與宋明之不同處。

在清代學派的文獻中，我們發現儒學的正統，是完全違反了儒家道德的精神。因此，在方氏的學說研究中，他誦賞考證學家的知識方法和思想內容的意義，忽視現代學術的價值。

清代時期，儒學思想的動搖，不只是與西方思想的衝突而發生的。考證學家的批判態度是儒家思想動搖的初步。從劉師培至焦循的著作內容，可發現他們對清代考證學的影響也不小。劉、焦強調「仁」與「真」的關係，也是考證學家表以理學為主的正統。

總而言之，考證學家的看法有它的哲學意義，也在思想史上發生了不小的影响，所以應承認考證學有其思想價值所在，而不只是為學問而學問的學術現象。