Online Appendix to “Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin”

by Thomas Fujiwara and Leonard Wantchekon

1. List of Sample Villages

Table A1 provides a list of sample villages, with their experimental and dominant candidates.

2. Results by Commune/Stratum

Table A2.1-A2.3 presents the results by individual commune/stratum.

3. Survey Questions and the Clientelism Index

Table A3.1 provides the estimates for each individual component of the clientelism index, while Table A3.2 details the questions used in the index.

4. Treatment Effects on Candidate Vote Shares

Table A4 provides the treatment effect on each individual candidate vote share.

5. Estimates Excluding Communes where Yayi is the EC

Table A5 reports results from estimations that drop the six communes where Yayi is the EC. Panel A provides estimates analogous from those of Table 2, while Panels B and C report estimates that are similar to those of Table 3. The point estimates are remarkably similar to the original ones, even though half the sample has been dropped (which explains why some have a slight reduction in significance).
6. Estimates Including the Commune of Toffo

Due to missing survey data, all the estimates presented in the main paper exclude the commune of Toffo, the only one where Amoussou is the EC. However, electoral data for this commune is available. This allows us to re-estimate the electoral data-based treatment effects including the commune. Table A6.1 re-estimates the results presented on Panel B of Table 2. The qualitative results remain the same. Most point estimates are slightly attenuated, with some of them losing significance. This is likely explained by the fact that Amoussou did not receive many votes in this commune (his vote share in control villages is 14%). In line with the results presented in the main paper, including the commune in the subsample where the EC is not dominant does not change the qualitative results (Table A6.2). The large and significant effect of treatment on EC vote share in this subsample remains, and the effect on vote share of top candidates continues to be insignificant.
Table A1: List of Participating Villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commune</th>
<th>Exper.</th>
<th>Dom.</th>
<th>Treated Village</th>
<th>Surveyed</th>
<th>Not Surveyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abomey-Calavi</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Tokan</td>
<td>Djigbo</td>
<td>Ahouato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bembereke</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Mani</td>
<td>Gando-Borou</td>
<td>Goua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Gadome^</td>
<td>Sivame</td>
<td>Kpodji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangbo I</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Lake</td>
<td>Djigbe</td>
<td>Hozin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangbo II</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Mitro</td>
<td>Agbonou</td>
<td>Dame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangbo III</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Mondotokpa</td>
<td>Glahounsa</td>
<td>Hetin sota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandi</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Thya</td>
<td>Koutakroukou</td>
<td>Pade*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kouande</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Orou-Kayo</td>
<td>Papatia</td>
<td>Tikou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouesse</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Yaou</td>
<td>Kemon-Ado</td>
<td>Challa-Ogoi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So-Ava</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Lokpodji</td>
<td>Ahomey-Gblon</td>
<td>Gbegodo^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangueta</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Taiacou^</td>
<td>Batia</td>
<td>Tora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagnanado</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Tohoue^</td>
<td>Sowe</td>
<td>Dove^</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Missing data on electoral results. Legend: A=Amoussou, H=Houngbedji, S=Soglo, Y=Yayi. The dominant candidate in the commune is the top candidate in all villages, except for those marked with a ^.
### Table A2.1: Vote Share of Top Candidate – Treatment and Control Averages by Strata

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Surveyed Controls (1)</th>
<th>Treated Village (2)</th>
<th>All Controls (3)</th>
<th>(1) - (2)</th>
<th>(1) - (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abomey-Calavi</td>
<td>Soglo</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.533</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bembereke</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td>0.678</td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.551</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>0.605</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangbo I</td>
<td>Houngbedji</td>
<td>0.759</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangbo II</td>
<td>Houngbedji</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>-0.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangbo III</td>
<td>Houngbedji</td>
<td>0.620</td>
<td>0.801</td>
<td>0.720</td>
<td>-0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandi</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.748</td>
<td>0.810</td>
<td>0.810</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kouande</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.562</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>0.816</td>
<td>-0.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouesse</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So-Ava</td>
<td>Soglo</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>0.442</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangueta</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.567</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagnanado</td>
<td>Soglo</td>
<td>0.317</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.373</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average (Treat. Effect)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A2.2: Vote Share of Exp. Candidate – Treatment and Control Averages by Strata

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Surveyed Controls (1)</th>
<th>Treated Village (2)</th>
<th>All Controls (3)</th>
<th>(1) - (2)</th>
<th>(1) - (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abomey-Calavi</td>
<td>Soglo</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bembereke</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td>0.678</td>
<td>0.728</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.551</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangbo I</td>
<td>Houngbedji</td>
<td>0.759</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangbo II</td>
<td>Houngbedji</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td>0.827</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>-0.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangbo III</td>
<td>Houngbedji</td>
<td>0.620</td>
<td>0.801</td>
<td>0.720</td>
<td>-0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandi</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.748</td>
<td>0.810</td>
<td>0.810</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kouande</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.562</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>0.816</td>
<td>-0.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouesse</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So-Ava</td>
<td>Soglo</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangueta</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>-0.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagnanado</td>
<td>Soglo</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>-0.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average (Treat. Effect)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table A2.3: Clientelism Index – Treatment and Control Averages by Strata

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Surveyed Controls (1)</th>
<th>Treated Village (2)</th>
<th>All Controls (3)</th>
<th>(1) - (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abomey-Calavi</td>
<td>Soglo</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bembereke</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>-0.715</td>
<td>-0.741</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Come</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.329</td>
<td>0.896</td>
<td>-0.568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangbo I</td>
<td>Houngbedji</td>
<td>-0.838</td>
<td>-0.449</td>
<td>-0.389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangbo II</td>
<td>Houngbedji</td>
<td>-0.513</td>
<td>-0.627</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dangbo III</td>
<td>Houngbedji</td>
<td>-0.283</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>-0.420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandi</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>-0.486</td>
<td>-0.170</td>
<td>-0.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kouande</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>-0.246</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>-0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ouesse</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>-0.482</td>
<td>-0.791</td>
<td>0.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So-Ava</td>
<td>Soglo</td>
<td>-0.448</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>-0.582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangueta</td>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td>-0.291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagnanado</td>
<td>Soglo</td>
<td>0.477</td>
<td>0.837</td>
<td>-0.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average (Treat. Effect)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix Table A3.1. Treatment Effects on Components of Clientelism Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control Mean (1)</th>
<th>Treat. - Control (2)</th>
<th>Std. Error (3)</th>
<th>Randomization Inference p-value (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discuss Politics with Someone</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss Politics with Members of Other Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Candidates Known</td>
<td>4.869</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>(0.227)</td>
<td>0.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knows Platform of One Candidate</td>
<td>0.631</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>0.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found Platform Convincing</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>0.464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found Campaign Informative</td>
<td>0.572</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Informed of Candidate Qualifications</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>(0.026)**</td>
<td>0.020**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Informed of Country's Problems</td>
<td>0.344</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received Cash from Campaign</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>0.166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Column (1) reports the mean of the corresponding variable for the control group. Column (2) reports the difference in means between treatment and control group (β from equation 1). Column (3) reports its robust standard error. Randomization strata dummies are included in all regressions. Column (4) reports the p-values based on a two-sided randomization inference test statistic that the placebo coefficients are larger than the actual. The p-values were computed based on 1000 random draws.

Sample includes only surveyed villages (n=24).

See text and Table A3.2 for more information on the variables.

* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Formula</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discuss Politics with Someone</td>
<td>A series of five questions: “Do you discuss politics with… i) household members, ii) people in their community, iii) people outside their neighborhood, iv) people from their own ethnicity, and v) people from outside their ethnicity.”</td>
<td>=1 if answer is &quot;yes&quot; to any question.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss Politics with Members of Other Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>=1 if answer is &quot;yes&quot; to (v).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Candidates Known</td>
<td>&quot;In the last presidential election, which candidates did you know?&quot; Followed by a list of the 26 candidates and &quot;yes&quot; or &quot;no&quot; question.</td>
<td>Number of “yes” answers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knows Platform of One Candidate</td>
<td>&quot;Do you know the political platform of one of the candidates listed above?&quot;</td>
<td>=1 if answer is &quot;yes.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found Platform Convincing</td>
<td>&quot;This platform convinced you to the point of influencing your choice of candidate?&quot;</td>
<td>=1 if answer is &quot;yes.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received Cash from Candidate</td>
<td>“During the campaign, did you receive any gifts or cash transfers? If so, did you receive it in the form of cash?”</td>
<td>=1 if answer is &quot;yes.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Found Campaign Informative</td>
<td>&quot;What did you think about the last presidential campaign? Was it informative, not informative, or neither?&quot;</td>
<td>=1 if answer is &quot;informative.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Informed of Candidate Qualifications</td>
<td>&quot;Did the campaign bring you information about the candidate qualifications?&quot;</td>
<td>=1 if answer is &quot;yes.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Informed of Country's Problems</td>
<td>&quot;Did the campaign bring you information about the country's problems?&quot;</td>
<td>=1 if answer is &quot;yes.&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unless specified, possible answers to questions were "yes" or "no." Non-responses were discarded from computations, but had a negligible frequency in all cases. All variables enter negatively in the clientelism index, with the exception of "received some gift" and "received cash" from candidates.
## Appendix Table A4: Treatment Effects on Candidate Vote Shares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Control Mean</th>
<th>Treat. - Control Mean</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Randomization Inference p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boni Yayi</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>0.464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adrien Houngbedji</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>0.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruno Amoussou</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>0.979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lehady Soglo</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>0.856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antoine Dayori</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>0.951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K Antoine Idji</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>0.204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lazare Sehoueto</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>0.947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janvier Yahouedehou</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luc Gnacadja</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>0.522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severin Adjovi</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>0.433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamarou Fassassi</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Senou</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Tawema</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>0.471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lionel Agbo</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>0.516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zul Kif Salami</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>0.397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soule Dankoro</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idrissou Ibrahim</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>0.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatien Houngbedji</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>0.809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Adjaho</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>0.897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adolphe D Hodonou</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie Elise Gbedo</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>(0.0009)*</td>
<td>0.060*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcel Gbaguidi</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>0.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Celestine Zanou</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>0.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leandre Djagoue</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>0.899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raphiou Toukourou</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>0.835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galiou Soglo</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>(0.0004)</td>
<td>0.754</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Column (1) reports the mean of the corresponding variable for the control group. Column (2) reports the difference in means between treatment and control group (β from equation 1). Column (3) reports its robust standard error. Randomization strata dummies are included in all regressions. Column (4) reports the p-values based on a two-sided randomization inference test statistic that the placebo coefficients are larger than the actual. The p-values were computed based on 1000 random draws. Number of observations is 45. Variables are the village-level vote shares of each of the 26 presidential candidates. * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Table A5. Treatment Effects, Excluding Communes where Yayi is EC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control Mean (1)</th>
<th>Treat. - Control (2)</th>
<th>Std. Error (3)</th>
<th>Randomization Inference p-value (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panel A: Entire Sample (excludes communes where EC is Yayi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout/Registered Voters</td>
<td>0.832</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>0.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Votes/Turnout</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>0.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Share – Experimental Candidate</td>
<td>0.430</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>0.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Shares, by candidate position in the village</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Place</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td>-0.081</td>
<td>(0.044)*</td>
<td>0.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Place</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>0.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Place</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>(0.022)**</td>
<td>0.024**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Place</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>0.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th and lower placed</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>0.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herfindahl-Hirschman Index</td>
<td>0.479</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>0.121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel B: Subsample where EC is dominant (excludes communes where EC is Yayi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Share – 1st Place</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>-0.105</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Share – Experimental Candidate</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
<td>(0.062)*</td>
<td>0.090*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel C: Subsample where EC is not dominant (excludes communes where EC is Yayi)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Share – 1st Place</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>0.745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Share – Experimental Candidate</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>(0.036)**</td>
<td>0.064*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Column (1) reports the mean of the corresponding variable for the control group. Column (2) reports the difference in means between treatment and control group (β from equation 1). Column (3) reports its robust standard error. Randomization strata dummies are included in all regressions. Column (4) reports the p-values based on a two-sided randomization inference test statistic that the placebo coefficients are larger than the actual. The p-values were computed based on 1000 random draws.

Number of observations is 24 (Panel A), 16 (Panel B), and 8 (Panel C).
See text for more information on the variables.

* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control Mean (1)</th>
<th>Treat. - Control (2)</th>
<th>Std. Error (3)</th>
<th>Randomization Inference p-value (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turnout/Registered Voters</td>
<td>0.814</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>0.775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Votes/Turnout</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>0.568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Share – Experimental Candidate</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>0.329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Vote Shares, by candidate position in the village

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control Mean (1)</th>
<th>Treat. - Control (2)</th>
<th>Std. Error (3)</th>
<th>Randomization Inference p-value (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Place</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Place</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>(0.014)**</td>
<td>0.081*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Place</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>(0.015)*</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Place</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>0.422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th and lower placed</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>0.259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herfindahl-Hirschman Index</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>(0.038)*</td>
<td>0.079*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Column (1) reports the mean of the corresponding variable for the control group. Column (2) reports the difference in means between treatment and control group ($\beta$ from equation 1). Column (3) reports its robust standard error. Randomization strata dummies are included in all regressions. Column (4) reports the p-values based on a two-sided randomization inference test statistic that the placebo coefficients are larger than the actual. The p-values were computed based on 1000 random draws.
Number of observations is 49.
See text for more information on the variables.

* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Table A6.2. Treatment Effects by Dominance of Candidates, Including Toffo (Amoussou EC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Control Mean</th>
<th>Treat. Control</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Randomization Inference p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subsample where experimental candidate is not dominant</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Share – 1st Place</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>0.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Share – Experimental Candidate</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>(0.046)**</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vote Share of EC, by candidate</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yayi</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>(0.075)**</td>
<td>0.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soglo</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>(0.038)**</td>
<td>0.069*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amoussou</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>(0.014)**</td>
<td>0.254</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Column (1) reports the mean of the corresponding variable for the control group. Column (2) reports the difference in means between treatment and control group (β from equation 1). Column (3) reports its robust standard error. Randomization strata dummies are included in all regressions. Column (4) reports the p-values based on a two-sided randomization inference test statistic that the placebo coefficients are larger than the actual. The p-values were computed based on 1000 random draws. Number of observations is 16.
See text for more information on the variables.
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.