CHAPTER IV
ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE SECOND PERSON

In this chapter and the next, I begin to put forward my main arguments for the claim that moral obligation is essentially second-personal. At this point, this will primarily be a thesis about the form of moral obligation: that moral demands are essentially tied to second-personal accountability. (Ultimately, it will include a claim about moral obligation’s content: that it at least partly derives from our equal dignity as free and rational persons.) This chapter will focus on the second-personal character of moral accountability. In the next, I shall discuss the connection between accountability and moral obligation.

In his famous essay, “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson argued influentially against consequentialist compatibilist views that hold that determinism poses no threat to practices of moral responsibility since these can be fully justified by their “efficacy . . . in regulating behaviour in socially desirable ways.” (1968: 72).\(^1\) (Strawson 1968) Punishment is justified by its incentive and deterrence effects, and, although standard excuses can be given a similar rationale, there is no corresponding warrant for excusing an act just because it was caused. Wrongs done in utter ignorance or under extreme duress are appropriately excused, since punishment under those conditions cannot deter. But there is obviously no consequentialist justification for treating determinism as an excuse generally.

Against these approaches, Strawson argued that social desirability cannot provide a justification of “the right sort” for practices of moral responsibility “as we understand them.” (1968: 74) When we seek to hold people accountable, what matters is not whether punishment is pragmatically desirable, either in a particular case or in general, but whether it is deserved and we have the authority to mete it out. Desirability is a reason of the wrong
kind to warrant the attitudes and actions in which holding someone responsible consists in their own terms. This is Strawson’s Point.

As we noted in Chapter I, Strawson’s Point is an instance of the wrong kind of reason problem. Pragmatic considerations for belief do not make a believed proposition credible; moral reasons against being amused do not undermine a joke’s humor; and considerations of the desirability—whether personal, social, or even moral—of holding someone responsible do not make him culpable for what he did. In each case, the right kind of reasons for warranting the relevant attitude in its own terms must derive from distinctive norms for attitudes of that kind: for belief, for amusement, and for the attitudes and actions that are distinctively involved in holding people responsible. It must be a fact about or feature of an object, appropriate consideration of which could provide the basis (someone’s reason) for a warranted attitude of that kind towards the object. It is impossible to come to believe some proposition \( p \) by reflecting on the fact that it would be desirable to believe \( p \), (devilishly) impossible to find something unfunny (though possible to have one’s sense of humor stilled) by considering the moral offensiveness of finding it so, and impossible also to feel guilty or to resent a wrong by reflecting on the desirability (personal, social, or moral) of having these feelings.

We can see these points by reflecting on the class of responses that Strawson famously termed “reactive attitudes,” which he held to be essential to human practices of moral responsibility. Strawson distinguishes two kinds—“participant” and “impersonal”—both of which respond to “transactions” between individuals. (1968: 74) Participant (or personal) reactive attitudes are those, in the first instance, of individuals in the transactions themselves—the transagents—although participant attitudes can also be had by relevant others “on their behalf” as if from their point of view. Strawson’s examples include
gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings. (1968: 72) Impersonal reactive attitudes are “impersonal or disinterested or generalized analogues” of these, including moral indignation, disapprobation, and, when the object is oneself, feelings of obligation, guilt, compunction, and remorse. (1968: 84-85) Impersonal reactive attitudes are felt, not as if from the transagents’ standpoints, but as from an impartial standpoint: the moral point of view. For example, resentment is felt as from the perspective of a wronged or injured individual, but indignation is felt as from the standpoint of the moral community.

I claim that reactive attitudes are always implicitly second-personal, and I shall argue that they therefore invariably carry presuppositions of second-personal address about the competence and authority of the individuals who are their targets, as well as about those who have them. 4 Personal reactive attitudes are felt as if from the second-person standpoint of a relevant transagent, and impersonal reactive attitudes are felt as from the standpoint of members of the moral community. It will follow that reasons that can warrant these attitudes—can be reasons of the right kind—must be second-personal reasons.

Consider indignation, for example. To feel indignation towards someone is to feel that he is to blame for wrongful conduct and therefore appropriately held accountable for what he has done, even if only by being subject to reactive attitudes from himself and others. Moreover, and this is part of Strawson’s Point, indignation differs from its seeming that a sanction would be desirable, or even that some evil’s befalling him would make for a more valuable or fitting whole (poetic justice). The feeling of indignation invariably includes a sense of authoritative demand that may be absent from the feeling that something would be desirable or fitting. Consider what beliefs moderate or undermine indignation. If we come to believe that someone does not deserve blame, say, because he could not possibly have known the true character of what he was doing or because he was under extreme duress,
then this will reduce or even defeat our indignation towards him. But if we learn that attempting to hold him accountable would be undesirable, say, because it will provoke him further, this will hardly undermine indignation.

Similar points hold for personal reactive attitudes. Resentment, for instance, is felt in response to apparent injustice, as if from the victim’s point of view. We resent what we take to be violations against ourselves or those with whom we identify. If you resent someone’s treading on your foot or, even more, his rejecting your request or demand that he stop doing so, you feel as if he has violated a valid claim or demand and as if some claim-exacting or responsibility-seeking response by you, or on your behalf, is justified. What you feel is not just (or even) that this response would be justified as an effective or desirable means to desirable relief. And although you might think that some such response would make for a more morally fitting whole, that thought is not itself part of resentment. Resentment seems rather to be warranted simply by the other’s conduct and by what you and he can validly, that is, authoritatively, claim and demand of one another. “You can’t do that to me,” you might think, referring, not to your respective power, but to your authority.

Strawson argues that appreciating the role of reactive attitudes in moral responsibility is of central relevance to the problem of free will. The question of whether, and how, to hold others responsible is one that arises within human relationships (that is, relatings) in which we are disposed, through reactive attitudes, to presume an authority to hold others to expectations that we take to define those relations. In a slogan: the moral sense of ‘responsible for’ is conceptually tied to ‘responsible to’ (whether to individuals or to one another as members of the moral community). Responsibility distinctively concerns how, in light of what someone has done, she is to be related to, that is, regarded and addressed (including by herself) within the second-personal relationships we stand in as members of
the moral community. To keep this point before us, I will usually use the term ‘accountable’ rather than ‘responsible’, since there are senses of ‘responsible’ that differ from the sense that I have in mind. For example, ‘responsible’ can refer to causal responsibility regardless of moral implications, and there are broader senses even of moral responsibility, for example what is sometimes called “responsibility as attributability” that differ from the distinctive kind of moral responsibility, “responsibility as accountability,” with which we are concerned. My point will be that holding someone responsible in this latter sense is ineliminably second-personal.

Strawson contrasts “the attitude (or range of attitudes) of involvement or participation in a human relationship,” that is, a second-person stance, with “the objective attitudes (or range of attitudes) to another human being, on the other.” (1968: 79) We take an “objective” attitude toward those we see as unfit for “ordinary adult human relationships,” such as very young children and those with “deep-rooted psychological abnormality,” and regard them as appropriately subject to “treatment” or “management” rather than to reactive attitudes and forms of interpersonal address that involve them. (1968: 81) Consequently, the real issue that determinism poses is whether accepting it “could, or should . . . lead us always to look on everyone exclusively in this [objective] way.” (1968: 81) Strawson famously holds that it could not.

Our interest in this chapter is not so much free will as the nature of moral accountability, specifically, its second-personal character. Nonetheless, it is worth noting the connection between these. If Strawson is right, it is only because we view one another in the distinctive second-personal ways we do when we relate to each other that the questions of responsibility (as accountability), freedom of the will, and what might undermine these even arise. The issue of free will gets its grip, therefore, because we view and address one another (and
ourselves) second-personally. Again: we can be morally responsible (accountable) for what we do in a way that makes free will an issue only because we are morally responsible to one another, that is, because we have the authority to address demands to one another as members of the moral community. It is second-personal address (as in reactive attitudes) that commits us to assuming the freedom of addresser and addressee alike.

**Reactive Responses as a Form of Address**

In the next four sections, I shall seek to show that reactive attitudes invariably involve:

(a) a form of (second-personal) address,

(b) which presupposes an other’s competence and standing to be thus addressed (second-personal competence and authority), and which

(c) responds to the person’s conduct

(d) with respect to persons (at least).

In this section, we are concerned with (a), hence with continuing our consideration of the second-personal character of reactive attitudes themselves. Strawson explicitly says that both personal reactive attitudes and their generalized or vicarious analogues invariably involve “an expectation of, and demand for, the manifestation of a certain degree of goodwill.” (1968: 85) Moreover, Strawson’s examples can be shown to involve the (at least, implicit) addressing of these demands.

Consider, for example, the difference between guilt and shame. Guilt is a reactive attitude. To feel guilty is to feel as if one is appropriately blamed and held responsible for something one has done. Guilt feels like the appropriate (second-personal) response to blame: an acknowledgment of one’s blameworthiness that recognizes both the grounds of blame and, more importantly for us, the authority to level it (even if only “to God”). To feel
guilt, consequently, is to feel as if one has the requisite capacity and standing to be addressed as responsible, and this puts it in tension with a purely “objective” view of oneself in Strawson’s sense. Finally, guilt’s natural expressions are themselves second-personal—confession, apology, making amends, and self-addressed reproach.

Like guilt, shame feels as if one is rightly regarded or seen in a certain way. But here the relevant regard is not second-personal; it is third-personal. One sees oneself as an object of the other’s regard or “gaze”—of her disdain, perhaps, or of her just seeing through one’s public persona to something one is ashamed to have seen. Sartre famously remarked that “I can be ashamed only as my freedom escapes me in order to become a given object” for the other. (Sartre 1957: 260) To feel guilt, by contrast, is to feel oneself authoritatively addressed as free. The “view from guilt,” as we might call it, is incompatible with a purely “objective” view of oneself in Strawson’s sense. One feels that one should and could have done what one didn’t do, and feels appropriately blamed for that reason. And whereas guilt’s characteristic expression is second-personal, shame inhibits second-personal engagement—one feels like escaping from view.

Shame and guilt both give an imagined other’s regard authority. But the authority shame accords is fundamentally epistemic and third-personal. One sees the other as having standing to see one in a certain way (and oneself as correctly thus seen). Guilt, on the other hand, recognizes an irreducibly second-personal practical authority of the sort we noted at the outset. It acknowledges the authority to make a demand, that is, to address a second-personal reason for acting.

Consider now the rest of Strawson’s examples. His exemplary participant or personal reactive responses are, again, gratitude, resentment, love, forgiveness, and hurt feelings. Resentment and forgiveness are perhaps the easiest cases. Resentment is felt as if in
response to a violation of a legitimate claim or expectation, and not simply as directed toward the violator, but as implicitly addressing her. This is what makes resentment “reactive” rather than “objective.” It is a form of “holding responsible,” an address of the other as a person with the capacity and standing to be addressed in this way and charged. If it turns out, for example, that someone’s foot has been forced on top of yours by the shifting of a heavy package on a careening bus on which you both are traveling, knowing that might not change your desire to get his foot off of yours, but it will lessen your resentment or perhaps redirect it to a new object (the driver).

Forgiveness’s second-personal character is most easily understood in relation to resentment. To forgive is, roughly, to forbear or withdraw resentment. Forgiveness acknowledges the other’s responsibility for wronging one, but refrains from pressing claims or “holding it against” him. Of course, one can forgive or feel forgiveness without communicating it. But forgiveness nevertheless functions within the second-personal space of holding responsible. If there were no such thing as resentment, indignation, and their kin, there would be no such thing as forgiveness.

Gratitude is like forgiveness in being parasitic on legitimate claims or expectations. We are appropriately grateful when people benefit us or act as we wish when we lack any relevant claim or expectation of them. Gratitude is felt, moreover, as if in response to an action by a responsible agent. It is true that we speak of being grateful for good weather, for example, but this evidently involves the conceit that the weather is a free gift, as if from God. And gratitude’s natural expression is also second-personal, a grateful addressing of the benefactor that reciprocally recognizes that he has benefited us beyond what we had any claim to expect. “You shouldn’t have done that,” we say, and clearly don’t mean to be
finding fault. Finally, unaddressed (or, more certainly, unexperienced) feelings of gratitude can themselves be ungrateful.

Strawson’s examples of “love” and “hurt feelings” may seem less straightforwardly second-personal. Surely there are forms of love that are not second-personal at all. One can care deeply for nonpersons, and caring for persons need not show itself in even imagined address nor be seen as essentially responsive to their conduct. Most love may not be entirely unconditional, but it needn’t be second-personally conditional. Pretty clearly what Strawson has in mind, however, are loving or other friendly relations that are maintained by reciprocally recognizing mutual address. And hurt feelings must be understood within that same framework. Feelings are hurt when people act in ways that seem contrary to expected personal regard, which expectations one takes the other reciprocally to have recognized or takes it that he should have recognized. One need not see oneself as having a claim to the other’s regard that would warrant resentment. But one feels as if some issue of rejection and mutual trust has been raised.

That leaves us with Strawson’s examples of impersonal reactive feelings, both the other-addressed ones—moral indignation and disapprobation—and those that are self-addressed: guilt, compunction, and remorse. Here we can be brief. Moral indignation is a feeling that someone is rightly held responsible for some conduct and is itself part of holding him thus accountable. As Strawson points out, we feel indignation and disapprobation when we feel we can demand, as members of the moral community, that people act in certain ways. Indeed, Strawson says, “the making of the demand is the proneness to such attitudes.” (1968: 92-93) This is an important point that we shall need to bear in mind: we address moral demands partly by its being common knowledge that we are prone to
impersonal (but still second-personal) “demanding” attitudes and to more explicit ways of holding one another responsible.

These same points hold also with reflexive impersonal reactive attitudes. In these cases, however, the demands are self-addressed, as has been illustrated already by guilt. Compunction and remorse seem relevantly similar, if more muted or qualified. As Jonathan Bennett points out, “self-reactive attitudes” involve a kind of “interpersonal relation . . . between one’s present self and some past self.” (Bennett 1980: 44)

**Presupposing Second-Personal Competence and Authority**

What gives Strawson’s discussion of reactive attitudes its special relevance to the issue of free will is that reactive attitudes invariably address demands, and, as Gary Watson notes, there are “constraints on moral address” that must be presupposed as normative felicity conditions of addressing a demand. (Watson 1987: 263,264) “To be intelligible,” Watson points out, “demanding requires understanding on the part of the object of the demand.” (Watson 1987: 264) The point is not that making a demand is unlikely to be effective unless its object has the capacity to understand it. It is rather that reactive attitudes are “forms of communication” that are simply unintelligible in their own terms without the presupposition that their objects can understand what is being said and act on this understanding. (1987: 265) The point is an Austinian one about the felicity conditions of a speech or quasi-speech act (transposed, albeit to a normative key). Even if expressing reactive attitudes to those who lack the requisite capacity, like very young children or the insane, causes them to behave desirably, reactive attitudes there “lose their point as forms of moral address.” (1987: 265) The effectiveness of moral address is a matter of perlocutionary force, whereas addressees’ having (and being assumed to have) the capacity to recognize and act on second-personal reasons is, I am claiming, a felicity condition of its distinctive (normative)
illocutionary force. More precisely relevant to our point, it is a normative felicity condition of the relevant second-personal reasons’ existing and being successfully given through address.

Again, one need not believe that someone one addresses has the requisite capacity and standing. The point is rather that moral address presupposes these things. Watson is saying that we address others on the assumption that they can understand and be guided by what we are saying. And I am adding that what we presuppose in second-personal address is *second-personal competence*,\(^{24}\) that those we address can guide themselves by a reciprocal recognition of the second-personal reasons we address and our authority to address them, that they can take a second-personal perspective on themselves and act on reasons they accept from that point of view (by making the relevant demands of themselves).

It will be important to our main constructive argument that addressing any second-personal reason through a claim or demand invariably presupposes that the addressee can recognize its validly and (freely) act on the reason through this recognition. If you express resentment to someone for not moving his foot from on top of yours, you implicitly demand that he do so. And any second-personal reason you implicitly address presupposes, first, that he can recognize the validity of your demand and, second, that he can move his foot simply by recognizing a conclusive reason for acting deriving from your authoritative demand (whether or not, it is worth noting, you have his sympathy). And if I express indignation as a disinterested bystander, I too must make these assumptions. A putatively authoritative demand whose validity someone cannot possibly recognize and act on is guaranteed to be infelicitous. The point is not, again, that such a demand cannot achieve compliance. It may well, but that is a matter of its perlocutionary force. It is that the address is guaranteed to fail in (normative) illocutionary terms, that is, as an addressing of an
authoritative demand or second-personal reason. The second-personal competence of the addressee is a normative felicity condition of second-personal address in general.

Claiming or demanding is not just calling some claim or demand to someone’s attention. It is addressing a distinctively second-personal kind of reason to another person that aims to direct his will, but in a way that recognizes his authority and independent practical reasoning. As Strawson emphasizes, to respond to another’s conduct with a reactive attitude is “to view him as a member of the moral community; only as one who offended against its demands.” (Strawson 1968: 93) Reactive attitudes are thus unlike critical attitudes of other forms, disdain, for example, that presuppose no authority on the part of their objects. I believe that the role of second-personal attitudes and the second-person stance in mediating (mutual) accountability in Kantian and contractualist ethical conceptions marks a deep difference with the ethical views (frequently ethics of virtue) of thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Hume, and Nietzsche (to give four prominent examples), for whom evaluation of conduct and character does not take a fundamentally second-personal form.

We should be clear about the kind of freedom that second-personal address presupposes. Beings may be capable of other varieties of free choice but still lack the distinctively second-personal moral freedom we presuppose in reactive attitudes. When we respond reactively to someone who fails to respect a moral demand, we attribute to her the capacity to act on the distinctive kind of reason, as I will argue, second-personal reason, that is connected to the authoritative demand.

Imagine, for example, a being with what the Cambridge Platonist, Ralph Cudworth, called “animal free will.” (Cudworth ~1670) Such a being, Cudworth thought, might have the ability critically to revise its desires, make an assessment of what is likeliest to satisfy informed desires in the long run, and act on this assessment. Cudworth agrees that
incentives could be devised so that a being with animal free will could conform its conduct to a law of conduct. But he holds that such beings could not be under genuine moral obligation, that is, be authentically subject to a moral demand, if they are unable to recognize these demands as intrinsically reason-giving (and so lack “moral free will”). To be genuinely morally responsible, and therefore capable of being morally obligated, a being must be capable of holding itself responsible, and it can do that only if it can take a second-personal perspective on itself and recognize and act on authoritative demands. Were beings only to have animal free will, “laws could no otherwise operate or seize upon them than by taking hold of their animal selfish passions . . . and that . . . utterly destroys all morality.” (Cudworth ~1670: 4980, 9)

Reactive attitudes presuppose the capacity to take moral demands as conclusive reasons for acting. And this involves the capacity to hold oneself responsible and, I shall be arguing, determine oneself by a second-personal reason, that is, an agent-relative reason whose validity is grounded in presupposed normative relations between persons and that is therefore independent of the value of any outcome or state. Reactive attitudes therefore implicitly presuppose motivational capacities that are irreducible to evaluations (and associated desires) whose objects are outcomes or states (like those implicated in sympathy). At the minimum, they involve the acceptance of (agent-relative) norms of action, which is an essentially action-regarding state of mind that cannot be reduced to a favorable regard for any state of the world or outcome. But it follows further from Strawson’s Point that even presupposing just this much is insufficient for second-personal responsibility to be fully intelligible in its own terms. We must also presuppose a distinctively second-personal competence, the ability to take the second-person stance of the moral community on oneself
and be motivated by demands that one would sensibly address to anyone from that perspective.

*Pufendorf’s Point* amounts to roughly the same thing, as I shall show at greater length in the next chapter. The pure second-personal address that is involved in moral obligation—as Pufendorf sees it, in God’s addressing valid demands to us—requires the assumption that we can hold ourselves responsible through our own acceptance of the requisite authority, rather than just by fear of any sanctions someone with such authority might impose. For actions to be imputable to us as accountable agents, the person to whom we are accountable and we must both assume that we can be moved, not simply by a fear of sanctions that might coerce compliance, but by “acknowledge[ing] of [ourselves] that the evil, which has been pointed out to the person who deviates from an announced rule, falls upon him justly.” (Pufendorf 1934: 91) We must be able to blame ourselves as we do in feeling guilt.

A consequence of all this is that we can intelligibly address demands through reactive attitudes only to those we assume able to take the very same attitudes toward themselves. Addressees must be assumed to be able to take a second-person perspective on, and make the same demands of, themselves through acknowledging their validity as in self-reactive attitudes like guilt, and, of course, by appropriately regulating their own practical reasoning. In doing this, they take up the very same point of view that an addressee takes up in holding them responsible. They hold themselves responsible through blaming themselves. In seeing themselves as to blame, they must regard themselves as warrantedly blamed from the perspective of a member of the moral community.

**IN RESPONSE TO HIS CONDUCT (AS A PERSON)**

It follows that reactive attitudes respond to an individual’s exercise of the very capacities they presuppose: conduct as a person in respecting the demands they address. The
object of a reactive attitude is always some individual conceived as free and rational in the
sense of one who can recognize, freely accept, and act on the distinctive second-personal
reasons the demand addresses. And what the attitude responds to is precisely the individual’s
exercise of these capacities, how she conducts herself in light of the relevant second-personal
reasons. Since these reasons themselves structure second-personal relations, we might say
that reactive attitudes respond to how an individual conducts herself as a second person. They
respond to how she relates to and conducts herself (second-personally) toward those with
the authority to make claims and demands of her. Since, as I shall argue in Chapters VI and
X, both respect for someone’s dignity as a person and, indeed, the dignity itself, are
essentially second-personal phenomena, it will follow that the very concept of person is itself a
second-personal concept.33

(At Least Partly) With Respect to Persons

Reactive attitudes thus concern themselves not with a person’s overall agency, but
specifically with his conduct with respect to claims or demands that other persons have
standing to make of him.34 They respond, that is, not simply to how he regards, or acts
regarding, others, but to how he respects others in the sense of recognizing their valid claims
and demands along with their authority to make them. They respond to how he conducts
himself second-personally.

In this way, reactive attitudes always concern a form of respect that we realize when
we relate to someone second-personally and acknowledge a second-personal reason and the
authority relations that ground it, whether through the reactive attitudes themselves or by
regulating our practical reasoning in the ways they call for. I will return to the relation
between respect and second-personal reasons in Chapter VI.

(At Least, Apparently) Nonmoral Cases
To this point, we have been considering reactive attitudes in distinctively moral contexts. One might think, however, that reactive attitudes, at least personal ones, can figure also in nonmoral cases. If the sergeant’s troops refuse to fall in when she orders them to, she is apt to resent this, and although her resentment will presuppose a demand that her charges can recognize and act on, it may seem a distortion to view her authority as moral. Nonetheless, it is clear enough that she must presuppose *de jure* authority of some kind. Resentment doesn’t represent its object as simply contravening one’s will, but as contravening some justified demand. Moreover, if she feels impersonal reactive attitudes like indignation or blame, these will come as from a point of view she shares with them as members of the moral community. In feeling that they are to blame, she must think that they would rightly blame themselves and hold themselves responsible from the same point of view from which she blames them.

Of course, it is possible to think there are justified relations of authority that are not derivable from the mutual accountability of free and rational persons. For most of human history, in fact, it has seemed to most people that any justified order is quite incompatible with the kind of moral equality that many readers of this book, at least, might be willing to take for granted. Pufendorf himself probably thought this. I shall be arguing, however, that the address of second-personal reasons of any kind carries presuppositions that, when fully worked clear, commit addresser and addressee alike to their second personal competence and to an equal second-personal authority rooted in that, hence to the equal dignity of persons and to morality as a form of mutual accountability. Here, however, I simply wish to point out that any addressing of demands carries presuppositions of second-personality, just as it does in the moral case.
Consider the demands that a king or emperor makes of his subjects, for example, the Edict of Milan, which the Roman emperors Constantine and Licinius promulgated to stop Christian persecution in the Roman Empire. If Constantine and Licinius resented violations of this demand and blamed violators when they lacked adequate excuse, then in interpreting them as addressing (and so guiding) their subjects by second-personal reasons and not goading them, even by rational coercion, we must see them as having been committed thereby to regarding their subjects as capable of recognizing the Edict’s \textit{(de jure)} authoritative backing and of guiding themselves by it. The normative felicity conditions of a command that can generate genuine second-personal reasons include the addressees’ capacity for such a practically effective recognition. \textit{Qua} second-personal address, the Edict presupposed subjects’ aptitude for this second-personal relation, specifically, their capacity for a reciprocal recognition and acceptance of their responsibilities to the emperor and, as well, their capacity to discharge their responsibility through this recognition.

I believe that the situation is the same with any reactive attitude, like blame, resentment, or indignation, that addresses a second-personal reason. In every such case, the addresser is committed to presuppositions that parallel what Watson calls the “constraints of moral address,” namely, that the addressee is capable of the requisite second-personal reciprocal recognition, mediated through his own reactive attitudes and practical reasoning.

\textbf{Respect, Dignity, and Reactive Sanctions}

I have been stressing reactive attitudes’ tie to presuppositions of freedom and equality. But aren’t reactive attitudes, well, reactionary? Retribution can be difficult to separate from revenge and retaliation. Like Nietzsche, we may feel that attitudes like indignation and resentment are really a cover for cruelty or sado-masochism, a desire to see others or ourselves suffer, to extract a pound of flesh, or worse.\textsuperscript{35} Even Mill, who maintains
that the idea of moral wrong is essentially related to reactive attitudes, nonetheless claims
that these are not intrinsically moral responses. They only become moral when they are
appropriately regulated by sympathy and directed toward the public good.36 Granted, Mill
says, we wouldn’t have the idea of justice or moral wrong if we didn’t have emotions like
resentment and the “natural feeling of retaliation or vengeance,” but such a “sentiment, in
itself, has nothing moral in it;” “what is moral is, the exclusive subordination of it to the
social sympathies.” (Mill 1998: Ch. V)

So why don’t reactive attitudes involve the desire to get back? Don’t “retributive”
sentiments invariably bring in hostility and animosity, or at least some desire to balance a
harming evil with some proportionate harm? Two ideas seem to be utterly essential to
reactive attitudes. The first is that of a claim or demand, and the second is that of the
corresponding statuses of addressee and addressee: the authority to address the demand and
the standing to be thus addressed and, consequently, to have to answer to the addresser, to
be accountable or responsible to her for acknowledging and discharging the demand.
Beyond these two essential elements, however, everything else seems, in principle, up for
normative discussion and debate.37

It is a familiar idea that a theory of punishment can be retributive in spirit but still
reject any thesis of strict proportionality—an eye for an eye, or whatever. Moreover, as
Lawrence Stern has pointed out, examples like Gandhi and King show that it is possible to
distinguish between accountability and reactive attitudes, on the one hand, and retaliation
and revenge, on the other. (Stern 1974; see also Watson 1987: 286) Gandhi, King, and, we
could add, Mandela certainly addressed demands, expressed attitudes that addressed
demands, and explicitly and implicitly held others accountable for respecting them. But they
did these in ways that enhanced (or made more visible) their own dignity and that respected that of their addressees precisely because they rejected retaliation.

Moral accountability does not have to be tied to any specific reactive attitude or even, in principle, to specifically human reactive attitudes at all. And even reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation can be distinguished from the desire to retaliate or gain vengeance, as we shall see presently. What is central, rather, is simply reciprocal recognition of the standing to make certain demands of one another, that is, in the moral case, mutual respect of the equal dignity of free and rational persons, or so I shall argue. Persons are accountable to each other for respecting their equal dignity, and reactive attitudes demand, and mediate accountability for, this form of respect. Exactly what can be required of individuals who violate these demands is a normative issue that should presumably turn on what sanctions would best realize the ideal of equal respect.

When someone uses your foot as his footrest, this is an injury, not just to your foot, but to your person. It is a failure to respect your standing or dignity as someone who may not be so treated and who has the standing as one among others to hold others to this. Adam Smith observes that we are apt to resent disrespect for our person as much or more than any physical or psychic injury. What most “enrages us against the man who injures or insults us,” Smith writes, “is the little account which he seems to make of us”—“that absurd self-love, by which he seems to imagine, that other people may be sacrificed at any time, to his conveniency.” (Smith 1982: 96)

It is consistent with the object of reactive attitudes’ invariably being disrespect, of course, that what they seek is still retaliation of some form, to hurt back, to give as good as we have gotten. On reflection, however, that cannot be right, as Smith himself saw. If reactive attitudes were retaliatory, then they would seek to return disrespect for disrespect.
But as Strawson pointed out, moral reactive attitudes are themselves a form of respect. They view their targets as, like those who feel them, “member(s) of the moral community,” and thus address them on terms of mutual respect. (Strawson 1968: 93) They seek reciprocal recognition of the (equal) dignity that they both claim (of the addressee) and presuppose (of the addressee). Smith writes insightfully that when we resent injuries, what our resentment is “chiefly intent upon, is not so much to make our enemy feel pain in his turn, as . . . to make him sensible that the person whom he injured did not deserve to be treated in that manner.” (Smith 1982: 95-96) The implicit aim of reactive attitudes is to make others feel our dignity (and, less obviously, their own).

If this is right, reactive attitudes, and the practices of moral accountability they mediate, actually seek the reverse of what retaliation is after. Whereas to retaliate is to return disrespect for disrespect, holding someone accountable respectfully demands respect. Reactive attitudes “continue to view [their object] as a member of the moral community.” (Strawson 1968: 93)

Laura Blumenfeld provides a vivid illustration of this phenomenon in a fascinating description of her attempts to find the man, Omar Khatib, who had shot her father, David Blumenfeld, in order to hold Khatib responsible in some appropriate way. (Blumenfeld 2002) David had visited Jerusalem in 1986 during a period in which Omar and other members of a rebel faction of the PLO made several attacks on tourists in the Old City. David was such a tourist, and he narrowly escaped death when Omar’s bullet only grazed his scalp. In her journey, Laura spends several years in Israel trying to get close to Omar, who is still in jail. Presenting herself to Omar’s family as a journalist, she gets to know them and begins to correspond with Omar in letters the family smuggles to him in jail. Through these letters, Laura and Omar strike up a relationship without Omar or his family knowing Laura’s
true identity. Omar remains unrepentant throughout, seeing what he has done, not as an attack against another person, but as an impersonal political action. Likewise, Omar’s family sees the shooting as “nothing personal,” a form of “public relations, a way to get people to look at us.”

Blumenfeld finally hits upon a strategy for accountability and the circumstances to pursue it. A psychologist at Hebrew University, Hanoch Yerushalmi, convinces her that “the only substitute for revenge is acknowledgment.” “Acknowledgment,” he says, “is . . . accepting responsibility. It’s when you ‘own your own guilt.’” (Blumenfeld 2002: 292)

Laura sees her chance the first time she and Omar lay eyes on each other at a legal proceeding to hear Omar’s request to be released from prison because of deteriorating health. At a crucial point in the proceedings, Laura stands up and demands to speak. When the perplexed Israeli judges ask why, she begins by saying she has gotten to know the Khatib family and that she believes that Omar is sorry for what he has done. She says also that she has spoken to David Blumenfeld and that he agrees that Omar’s request should be granted. When the justices challenge her right to speak, she replies to the hushed courtroom that she indeed has a right since she is David Blumenfeld’s daughter. Shocked by this development, Omar and his family begin to weep. Blumenfeld writes: “Omar’s mother, who did not understand my Hebrew, looked around the room, bewildered and said, ‘Why are my children in tears?’” Asked by a judge why she has made this intervention, Laura says that she wanted Omar to know that “we’re people. Not ‘targets.’ We’re people with families. And you can’t just kill us.” Afterwards, Omar writes to Laura, apologizing for being “the cause of your and your kind mother’s pain.” (Laura’s mother had also been at the proceeding.) For the first time, he acknowledges the personality of his victim, calling him “David.” He also writes to
David, expressing his “deep pain and sorrow for what I caused you.” (Blumenfeld 2002: 265-267)

Blumenfeld’s story confirms Smith’s diagnosis. Reactive attitudes seek respect. They seek to engage the other second-personally, and they succeed when the other takes up the address, acknowledges its terms, and thereby respects the dignity of the addresser, both the demand she addresses and her standing to address it. Respect thus enters into reactive attitudes in three distinct places: (a) their object, more precisely described, is always some form of apparent disrespect, (b) their aim is to demand respect, and (c) their mode involves respect for the person to whom they are held—they respectfully demand respect.

**ACCOUNTABILITY, FREEDOM, AND NON-CENTRAL CASES**

But this may raise another worry. If reactive attitudes necessarily presuppose that those we seek to hold accountable have the ability to recognize the validity of the second-personal reasons we address and to act on that recognition, might this not raise the bar too high? What gives us confidence that others actually have this ability, or that we do ourselves?

It is unnecessary to establish independently that we do have moral freedom (second-personal competence) in order to hold one another accountable justifiably. As Kant’s “fact of reason” shows, it can be enough that we have no particular reason to think we do not that would defeat the inescapable assumption that we do to which second-personal address commits us. But that doesn’t mean that this hypothesis cannot be defeated. After all, the whole point of Strawson’s distinction between objective and reactive attitudes is that there are beings we appropriately do view “objectively” precisely because they lack the requisite freedom to intelligibly be held accountable. And there are also cases, as Strawson points out, when people whom we generally are prepared to hold accountable fall into conditions,
severe mental illness, for example, during which we appropriately withhold reactive attitudes. There is no reason, indeed, why this cannot also happen in one’s own case. In an early stage of schizophrenia say, someone might make moral judgments of herself that have a presupposition of moral freedom that, regrettably, no longer holds.

So even if we are entitled to a defeasible presumption of moral freedom, this can be rebutted by the facts on the ground.47 And thus a version of the worry reemerges. Even if we exclude the uncontroversially “objective” cases Strawson mentions, including very young children and those suffering from delusional insanity, there seem to be many cases where we wish to hold others accountable though we seem to have very good evidence that they are not free to act on moral reasons in the way our practices of holding someone fully responsible evidently presuppose.

We can hardly deal with this worry with any thoroughness here. In general, I believe that to do so systematically, we would have to think of what I have said so far as applying to a central ideal case (what we might call the case of “full responsibility”) and see other cases as departures that must be understood in one way or another by reference to the central second-personal case. In some instances, for example with children, we seem simultaneously to move on two tracks in the process of inducting them into full second-personal responsibility, sometimes treating them proleptically as though they were apt for second-personal address as a way of developing moral competence while nonetheless realizing (“objectively”) that this is an illusion that must also be recognized.48

Something similar may be true where there are deficits that rule out full responsibility, such as people with Alzheimer’s or Down’s syndrome, but where there is no such forward-looking process. Here we may work along two tracks as well, perhaps a fully, at least putatively, second-personal track in relatively limited areas along with continuous
negotiation about the limits. ⁴⁹ And there may be cases, which we will consider further presently, where we seem to hold someone fully responsible even in the face of the conviction that he really couldn’t have been expected to determine himself by the demands we make in holding him responsible. Such cases must always create some discomfort, I think, since we treat them as though they were a central second-personal case, perhaps to affirm to ourselves and to one another the demands we make on the person we hold accountable, in the belief that the necessary presuppositions of doing so may very likely not be satisfied. ⁵⁰

That all said, I would like to say something briefly about two quite different kinds of cases. One is that of people we attempt to hold accountable for forms of abuse and violence that they attempt to excuse as due to uncontrollable emotion. In these cases, as I see it, we are generally right to suppose that the assumption of freedom is not defeated. The second, which really may pose a challenge to the presupposition is that of an extreme psychopath, like Robert Alton Harris, who was convicted in 1978 of the horrific killing of two teenage boys, whom Gary Watson discusses in just these terms. ⁵¹

Cases of the first kind are well exemplified by varieties of domestic violence, road rage, and the like. On analysis, it is often clear enough that the acts of abuse or violence were freely chosen, that the principals could have done otherwise but indulged themselves in thoughts and feelings that rationalized their actions in one way or another. One sign that this is so is when victimizers do not consistently stick to the claim that what they did was an excusable wrong, but lapse also into purported justifications of their actions as deserved or as a kind of “correction” that really was for the good for the victim. In unguarded moments, the emotions and attitudes they express are not grief and regret for what they have done along with disquieting confusion about how they could have acted in this way, but some
sense of justification. What seems to be going on here is something like what Kant called
“self-conceit,” frequently tied to some legitimating ideology, like male sovereignty or
whatever.\(^{52}\) It is not that the person is dead to moral categories; rather he distorts them for
his own purposes.

The case of psychopaths like Robert Harris, however, seems very different. Although
at points in his life Harris may have been more like the kind of person just discussed, by the
time of his most grisly murders he manifested a coldness and utter imperviousness to moral
demands, even in the corrupted form of self-conceit, suggesting he was inapt for moral
address, a moral outlaw who was outside the moral community. Despite this, there may be
reasons for holding people like Harris accountable even so.

As Watson describes it, Harris’s coldness resulted from prior willful choices to
repudiate the moral community, born partly of a history of being a victim of terrible abuse
himself—not exactly a Kantian timeless choice of evil, but more like a series of repudiating
choices.\(^{53}\) It may be that at later points Harris was unable to do other than continue on the
“road to hell” he had chosen before.\(^{54}\) Treating him as accountable now, however,
respectfully repudiates the repudiation. Even if it carries a presupposition that is now literally
false, it can have an important expressive function for the community nonetheless:
upholding the dignity of the person. Moreover, there may simply be no publicly reliable way
of distinguishing cases where there is literal incapacity from those where people are still
capable of moral redemption, but freely choose not to redeem themselves (perhaps Harris at
some earlier point, or even later—who knows?). So even when we are confronted with cases
like that of Robert Harris, a presupposition of moral freedom may be a justified form of
“practical faith,” which we may lack sufficient evidence to defeat.\(^{55}\)
On the other hand, if we come to the view that this presupposition is in fact defeated in particular cases, this need put no significant pressure on the presupposition as it operates in our ordinary practices of accountability.\textsuperscript{56} We can still find an appropriate justification for limiting a genuinely non-second-personally-competent psychopath’s liberty in self-protection. And the very fact that we will have to think of our justification in other terms, that is, as not genuinely holding the psychopath responsible, will be evidence for the second-personal character of our practices of moral responsibility as they normally function.\textsuperscript{57}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Strawson’s example of such a view was Nowell-Smith 1948. A classic statement is Schlick 1939.
\item See Chapter I, note 33.
\item Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen put essentially the same point by saying reasons of the right kind also appear in the content of the attitude for which they are reasons: the attitude is toward something “on account of” these reasons. (Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen 2004: 414). As W. D. Falk pointed out, a favoring that is relevant to value is “by way of true comprehension of what [the object] is like.” (Falk 1986: 117) See also Derek Parfit’s distinction between “object-given” and “state-given” reasons in Parfit 2001.
\item Michelle Mason makes what I take to be a similar claim, saying that there is a sense in “which it is true that all the reactive attitudes are in fact moral attitudes: namely, the sense in which it is true that to regard one as within the scope of the particular reactive attitude is to regard one as answerable to an expectation or demand that forms part of a system of expectations, demands and rights the regulation in accordance with which it is necessary for aspiring to moral community with us.” (Mason 2003: 244) Mason makes a persuasive case that at least a form of contempt should also be understood as a reactive attitude. It is a
\end{enumerate}
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particularly interesting case, since, as Mason argues, although it presupposes a background
demand on its object as a person, it may not seem to address the demand, since its natural
expression is a form of withdrawal. I think, however, that contempt of the sort she is
discussing must, if it is to be a reactive attitude as she claims, presuppose that the withdrawal
is a way of holding its object accountable and not a non-“reactive” response like, say,
disgust, or, indeed, as other forms of contempt, seem to be.

5 This is also a theme that Scanlon sounds in Scanlon 1995.

6 More cautiously, as far as the concept of moral responsibility is concerned, it is tied to
responsibility to those with the authority to hold morally responsible (the moral community).
In the next chapter, I shall argue that theological voluntarism and Kantian views provide
competing conceptions of the moral community, respectively, as God and as all free and
rational agents (the realm of ends).

7 On the distinction, see Watson 1996. The former sense concerns what we can credit
someone with in a way that is relevant to broader forms of evaluation that need not be
second-personal at all. For example, warranted pride may depend upon whether I am
responsible for something concerning me in this sense, and this need involve no warranted
claim or demand. See also, Scanlon 1998: 248f. Scanlon calls the sense I have in mind
“substantive responsibility.” I am indebted here to discussion with Andrew Eshelman, Lei
Zhong, Jim Staihar, and Susan Wolf.

8 Obviously, this raises many issues about matters of degree, responsibility and disability, and
respect and treatment of those we are not prepared to hold fully responsible. I cannot begin
to deal adequately with these here. For most of these purposes of this chapter, all we need to
focus on are clear cases in both categories (i.e., those apt for second-personal accountability
and those who are not). I return to this issue, again inadequately, at the end of this chapter.
Note, again, the caveat in the preceding footnote.

See the short discussion of this issue in Chapter II.

Except for shame. Strawson lists “the more complicated phenomenon of shame” as reactive, although he doesn’t say why. (1968: 86) For the reasons given in the next paragraph, I think this may be a mistake (at least for non-second-personal forms of shame). Nothing hangs on this for my purposes, however. If Strawson is right and I am wrong, then either there are second-personal aspects of shame I am not appreciating, or there are not, in which case my claims in this chapter can be interpreted as about reactive attitudes other than shame. Of course, shame can figure in reactive attitudes and emotions without itself being reactive. We say, “you ought to be ashamed” in a reactive vein, but here we mean not just that, were the person to feel shame she would be accurately representing his shameful state, but that experiencing shame is a psychic state that it would fitting for her to undergo in light of what she has done. In such contexts, shame is functioning as a sanction. Moreover, there is such a thing as moral shame, namely shame at one’s conduct or character. But although moral shame is essentially concerned with persons, as objects it is not reactive in the sense of being characteristically addressed second-personally. I have been helped here by discussion with John Deigh, and by Deigh 1983. See also Mason unpublished.

On this point, see Greenspan 1992. For other elements of the contrast between guilt and shame, see Williams 1993: 89-90; also Morris 1976, Wollheim 1984, Rawls 1971, secs. 67, 70-75, and Gibbard 1990, ch. 7. For a contrasting view, see Stocker, forthcoming. An especially interesting discussion of guilt can be found in Buber 1965. I am indebted to David Levy for this reference.

For a fascinating discussion of shame that stresses the latter element, see Velleman 2001. Another example of a reaction that isn’t a reactive attitude is disgust. See Miller 1997.
As Paul Hoffman has pointed out to me, at least some kinds of shame (certainly moral shame, and perhaps others), involve a feeling, not just of recognizing a third-person regard, say, disdain, but also struggling against it agentially. Arguably this is involved in the kind of shame Sartre is discussing. The point remains that even shame of this kind responds as if to a third-person view rather a second-person address.

Again, excluding shame.

The classic statement of this position is by Bishop Butler. See Butler 1900: VIII, IX. See also Murphy 1988.

Above we noted that resentment can be felt for injuries to those with whom one identifies. Similarly, it is possible to forgive injuries to those with whom one identifies.

It may, however, be beneficial to live with this conceit. On this point, see Emmons and McCullough 2003. Is this more evidence of second-personal psychological mechanisms? On this, see Chapter VII.

Although this obviously can happen also, as with Medea’s response to Jason’s leaving her for the Princess of Corinth or, as in the lyrics of Alanis Morisette’s “You Oughta Know”:

“And I’m here to remind you, Of the mess you left when you went away. It’s not fair to deny me, Of the cross I bear that you gave to me, You, you, you... oughta know.” Or Bob Dylan’s “Desolation Row” “Yes, I received your letter yesterday/(About the time the door knob broke)/When you asked how I was doing/Was that some kind of joke?/..../Don’t send me no more letters no/Not unless you mail them/From Desolation Row.” (Dylan 1965)

Compare Hart on Bentham on “quasi-commands” in law. (See Chapter I, note 19.)

I am grateful to Daniel Keen for this reference.
Note also, R. Jay Wallace: “My main contention is that there is an essential connection between the reactive attitudes and a distinctive form of evaluation . . . that I refer to as holding a person to an expectation (or demand).” (Wallace 1994: 19) See also Bennett 1980.

Note should also be taken of similar points in Scanlon (1998: 272-290), since they will have a special relevance to our consideration of the way the second-person standpoint can ground a contractualist approach to morality in Chapter XII.

Watson remarks, as we noted above, that the communicative (second-personal) character of reactive attitudes does not mean that they are “usually communicated; very often, in fact, they are not. Rather the most appropriate and direct expression of resentment is to address the other with a complaint and a demand.” (1987: 265)

The moral competence requisite for (equal) membership in the moral community (second-personal competence) is what Rawls calls a “range property.” In this sense, people are not more or less competent members of the moral community, since everyone who is within the range is equally within the range. On this point, see Rawls 1971: 508.

At this point, I am not so much arguing for this as claiming it. Part of the argument for the claim, of course, is the claim’s role in an overall picture of second-personal address and reasons that I will hope will seem compelling and able to explain significant ethical phenomena. More focused argument will come, however, with the presentation of Fichte’s Point in Chapter X.

This is also, I believe, the grain of truth in Hegel’s famous of idea or a “right to punishment,” that failure to hold someone accountable can be a failure to respect his dignity as a rational person. (Hegel 1991: 126-127)

See Korsgaard 1996e for an excellent discussion of this aspect of the Kantian framework.
In his unpublished manuscripts on freedom of the will, held in the British Library. I discuss these in Darwall 1995b: 109-148.

This is roughly the kind of self-determination that Locke defends in the *Essay.* (Locke 1975) I discuss Locke’s conception in relation to his theory of moral obligation in Darwall 1995b: 149-175.

Cudworth calls this “moral free will.” Compare Kant: “I can recognize that I am under obligation to others only insofar as I at the same time put myself under obligation.” (Kant 1996e: 417-418)

See note 18 of Chapter I. I note there that it is consistent with the idea of second-personal reason that its formulation is actually agent-neutral. What matters is that the reason derives from something fundamentally agent-relative, viz., the agent’s place in a network of relations of authoritative claim and demand. It is consistent with this that the reason itself is agent-neutral. Thus, one might argue from the fundamental proposition that every person has an equal claim to happiness, say, that we can reasonably demand that persons follow the principle of utility, which is agent-neutral. Thus nothing said so far rules out act-consequentialist theories of right. I am indebted here to discussion with Allan Gibbard and Jim Staihar.

See the discussion in Chapter II and, especially, in Chapter VII. See also Gibbard 1990 on the mental state of norm acceptance.

Compare here Locke’s idea, discussed in the next chapter, that ‘person’ is a “forensick term,” that is, one essentially connected to imputing legal or moral responsibility. (Locke 1975: 386)

It is consistent with this, again, that some such demands we make of one another as members of the moral community concern how persons are to conduct themselves also
toward non-persons, whether infants, the incapacitated, other animals, or even other aspects of the environment, beyond even anything that would be required by demands or claims of individual persons.

35 Think of Abu Ghraib and also the Zimbardo prison experiments, in which ordinary undergraduates pretending to be prison guards sadistically abused the “prisoners.” (Zimbardo, et al: 1977) See also Nietzsche 1994, especially the Second Essay (“Guilt,” “Bad Conscience,” and the Like”). For a recent critique along somewhat similar lines, see Baier 1993. For a good contrast, however, see an interview of Nigerian human rights activist, Ayesha Imam, by Terry Gross that discusses the phenomenon of Muslim men attacking Muslim women on the street as “punishment” for gender or sexual assertiveness, but within the context of a strong defense of accountability and rights:

http://freshair.npr.org/day_fa.jhtml?display=day&todayDate=12/05/2002.

36 In this, I believe, he fails to appreciate Strawson’s Point.

37 It follows from Strawson’s Point, however, that this discussion must take place within the second-person standpoint. I shall argue in Chapter XII that we should think of the contractualist framework in precisely this way. In that same spirit we might here say that the question of precisely what form practices of mutual accountability should take is itself appropriately addressed as a substantive problem of normative theory within contractualism.

38 For example, if one thinks of blame as necessarily involving the expression of anger or some form of hostility, it need not involve blame in this sense. It must however involve blame in the formal sense of holding culpable.

39 It is interesting in this connection to compare ancient Greek forms of responsibility. Drakon’s homicide code mandated exile for someone who killed a fellow Athenian unless the killer was pardoned by all of the males of the victim’s immediate family. However, if
anyone retaliated against the killer in exile, so long as the killer stayed clear of public spaces on the frontier, such as markets and sacrifices, then that person was subject to a like sentence as well. Here we see a beginning of a distinction between justified and unjustified retaliation that moves in the direction of moral responsibility as we understand it. The desire to retaliate is here disciplined externally and procedurally, rather than by an internal distinction from resentment whose object is injustice. See Stroud 1979. I am indebted to Randall Curren for this reference and for very helpful discussion.

40 For example, within a contractualist framework.

41 Again, I defend this conception of dignity in Chapter X.

42 Cf. Strawson’s remark that in “much of our behaviour the benefit or injury resides mainly or entirely in the manifestation of the attitude itself.” (Strawson 1968: 76)

43 In their introduction, Raphael and Macfie point out that Smith wrote, in his ‘Letter to the Editors of the Edinburgh Review’ of July, 1775, that he could “describe, from his own reading, . . . Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality.” (Smith 1982: 10)

44 Blumenfeld’s book is titled Revenge: A Story of Hope. Like some reviewers of the book, I think Blumenfeld’s term “constructive revenge” is actually a misnomer for the mutually respecting, or reciprocally recognizing, accountability that Blumenfeld actually describes (and achieves).

45 Another poignant example can be found in the Very Reverend James Whyte’s remarks at the memorial service for the victims of Pan Am 103 in Lockerbie, Scotland, in December, 1988: “We may be tempted, indeed urged by some, to flex our muscles in response, to show that we are men. To show that we are what?” Quoting now from Whyte’s obituary in The Scotsman of June 27, 2005 (p. 39): “His calm and balanced reasoning seemed to strike a chord with all in the church and those watching on television. To see more young die, more rescue
workers labour in more wreckage, he argued, was a sign, not of virility, but of inhumanity.

“That is what retaliation means,” Whyte concluded. ‘I, for one, will have none of it, and I hope you will not either. Justice yes, retaliation no.”

46 Of course, the normative presuppositions of any specific form second-personal address can be defeated also. In Chapters X and XI, I argue that morality’s authority can be vindicated by an appreciation of their role in second-personal address in general and of the distinctive form of practical freedom we have by virtue of our capacity for second-personal relations.

47 Of course, another version of the worry could be expressed by, “what do you mean, ‘we’”? 48 I am indebted here to Schapiro 1999 and 2003b. Also see Dewey 1998a: 343, which reference I owe to Elizabeth Anderson.

49 I have been helped here by discussion with Christie Hartley and by her work on how the disabled should be represented within contractualism. (Hartley 2005)

50 I am indebted to Charles Griswold and Richard Kraut for discussion here.

51 Harris was executed in 1992, the first California execution in twenty-five years. Watson gives many of the details of Harris’s life (Watson 1987: 268–271), quoting from Corwin 1982. See also an article by Harris’s lawyer in his appeals of the death sentence (Laurence 1997).

52 I discuss Kant on self-conceit in Chapter VI.

53 Watson suggests this at Watson 1987: 271. Meno Myejes’s screenplay, Max (Myejes 2002), implies something similar about Hitler. Discussing it, Myejes says, “Hitler, like Osama and Saddam and Milosevic, obliges us by representing an uncomplicated picture of evil. But nobody wakes up one day and slaughters thousands. They make choices, one at a time . . . .” “The movie isn’t about Hitler’s great crimes. The audience knows all about them already.
This is about his small sins—his emotional cowardice, his relentless self-pity, his envy, his frustration, the way he collects and nurtures offenses . . .” (Malanowski 2002: 1,36)

54 Harris’s sister was quoted as saying “He told me he had his chance, he took the road to hell and there’s nothing more to say.” Watson: 1987: 270. Even at this point, however, if Harris was still capable of resenting injuries done to him, he was still a participant in the second-person standpoint, only highly selectively. I am grateful to Arthur Ripstein here.

55 The allusion, of course, is to Kant’s postulates of the existence of God and immortality of the soul in *The Critique of Practical Reason*.

56 See R. D. Hare 1993 for a pessimistic view of the possibilities of overlap between psychopathology and emotional mechanisms, like empathy, that are necessary for second-personal competence.

57 I’ve been helped here by discussion with Vanessa Carbonell.