CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT

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CHAPTER VI

RESPECT AND THE SECOND PERSON

[f. L. respect-, ppl. stem of respicère to look (back) at, regard, consider, or ad.
the frequentative of this, respectāre. Cf. F. respecter (16th c.), Sp. respecto, Pg.
respectar, It. rispettare.] ¹

“A human being regarded as a person, that is as the subject of a morally
practical reason, . . . possesses a dignity . . . by which he exacts respect for
himself from all other rational beings in the world.” (Kant 1996e: 434-435)

Morality as equal accountability conceives of moral relations in terms of equal respect.²

In seeing ourselves as mutually accountable, we accord one another the standing to demand
certain conduct of each other as equal members of the moral community. In this chapter, I
argue that recognition of this authority is an irreducibly second-personal form of respect.
Conceived in Kantian terms as “common laws” for a “kingdom of ends” (1996c: 433), moral
requirements structure and give expression to the distinctive value that persons equally have:
dignity, a “worth that has no price.” (1996e: 462) This chapter argues that both the dignity of
persons and the respect that is its fitting response have an irreducibly second-personal
character. Our dignity includes the standing to hold one another to our moral obligations
toward each other, and respect for this second-personal standing is itself second-personal.

Dignity enters in two distinct places in morality as equal accountability. First, in
holding ourselves accountable to one another at all, we give each other an authority to
address demands to us as equal members of the moral community, even when the content of
those demands extends beyond the treatment of persons. And second, we respect our
dignity as persons more specifically when the demands concern how we must treat one another.

My method in this chapter will be analytical. I shall simply be drawing out consequences I take to be implicit in our going moral conception. Later I shall attempt to vindicate these aspects of our conception, arguing in Chapter X that we are committed to the common dignity (second-personal authority) of free and rational agents as a presupposition (normative felicity condition) of the address of any second-personal reason at all. Then in Chapter XI, I shall attempt to locate second-personal reasons in an overall theory of practical reasons.

**Attitudes and Objects**

Respect is the fitting response to dignity, as esteem is to the estimable, desire is to the desirable, and so on.\(^3\) Just as reasons of the right kind for desire and esteem must be drawn from the distinctive ways these attitudes relate to their characteristic objects, the desirable and the estimable, respectively, so also with respect. The distinctive object of the kind of respect with which we shall be concerned, recognition respect, is dignity or authority.\(^4\) Recognition respect differs from other attitudes, however, in that it can be mandated and not just warranted by its object. Someone who fails to esteem your estimable qualities does not give them the response they deserve, but esteem is nothing you or anyone else can expect or demand. Not so with respect of your dignity.

The dignity of persons, Kant says, is that “by which” we “exac[t] respect,” that is, claim or, as Kant also says, “demand” it from one another as rational beings. (1996e: 434-35, 557)\(^5\) But what is it to demand respect as a person, and what enables us to make this demand? And what is respect for this dignity that it may be thus demanded? I maintain that the key to answering these questions is the irreducibly second-personal character of both our
dignity and the respect that is its fitting response. The dignity of persons, I contend, is the
second-personal authority of an equal: the standing to make claims and demands of one
another as equal free and rational agents, including as a member of a community of mutually
accountable equals. And respect for this dignity is an acknowledgment of this authority that
is also second-personal.\(^6\) It is always implicitly reciprocal, if only in imagination. As
‘respect’\(^*\)’s root ‘\textit{respecēre}’ suggests, it is a “looking back” that reciprocates a real or imagined
second-personal address, even if only from oneself.

To say that the dignity of persons is second-personal is to say that it cannot be
wholly summed into (non-second-personal) values or norms, say, a set of requirements on
conduct that are rooted in our common nature as persons, or even there being certain ways
that persons must and must not be treated. (Kamm 1989 and 1992; Nagel 1995) It also
involves an equal authority as persons to claim or demand compliance with such
requirements. It is worth recalling here Rawls’s expression of this idea when he says that
persons are “self-originating sources of valid claims.” (Rawls 1980: 546) Joel Feinberg makes
a companion point, which I shall develop in this chapter, when he says that it is “the activity
of claiming” that “makes for self-respect and respect for others.” (Feinberg 1980: 155)

I believe, indeed, that it is our equal second-personal authority that is most
fundamental and that substantive constraints on conduct derive from this authority. In my
view, what we “owe to each other” as equal moral persons is best accounted for within a
contractualist framework that, as I argue in Chapter XII, is itself grounded in the equal
second-personal authority to which we are committed in the second-person standpoint.

\textbf{APPRAISAL VS. RECOGNITION RESPECT}

It will help to begin by distinguishing the distinctive kind of respect we shall be
concerned with, recognition respect, from other attitudes to which ‘respect’ can also refer,
and from other responses in the neighborhood. Consider, for example, the sense in which one can be said to have more or less respect for someone, either as a person or in some specific capacity (as a philosopher, say), or be said to have gained or lost respect for someone. In these contexts, ‘respect’ refers to a kind of esteem.

Of course, esteem can also take forms we would never dream of calling “respect.” Pimples and unpopularity can wreak havoc with adolescent self-esteem, for example, without necessarily threatening self-respect. Esteem concerns what we admire, look up to, envy, or wish to acquire or emulate. Many such excellences cannot intelligibly be objects of respect of any sort, at least, not without some long and unobvious story. If the popular kids’ imagined unblemished faces are seen to result from differences in conduct (hygiene, say) or seem an expression of their more sterling characters, then this can support a sense of differential respect. But without some such connection, it cannot.

The esteem we call “respect”—henceforth, appraisal respect—is an assessment of someone’s conduct or character or of something that somehow involves these. Appraisal respect for someone as a person is moral esteem: approbation for her as a moral agent. We can have appraisal respect for people in more specific capacities as well, but even though this differs from moral esteem, it still concerns the person’s conduct in the relevant capacity. Thus although appraisal respect for someone as a tennis player differs from respect for her as a person, neither is it the same thing as esteem for her tennis playing skills or achievements. If one thoroughly objects to how she conducts herself on the court, say, because she seeks to gain unfair advantage by manipulating the rules, this will tend to undermine respect for her as a tennis player. It will tarnish, even if it does not otherwise diminish, her victories and achievements.
Appraisal respect is esteem that is merited or earned by conduct or character. By contrast, the respect we can demand as persons regardless of our merit is no form of esteem at all. When we think that even scoundrels have a dignity that entitles them to respectful forms of treatment (say, in holding them accountable, as Strawson says (Strawson 1968: 93)), we clearly have something other than esteem in mind. The idea is not that personhood is somehow an admirable quality: “Granted, he stole hard-working people’s pension funds, but at least he’s a person.” What is in play here is not appraisal but recognition.

The object of recognition respect is not excellence or merit; it is dignity or authority. Recognition respect concerns, not how something is to be evaluated or appraised, but how our relations to it are to be regulated or governed. Broadly speaking, we respect something in the recognition sense when we give it standing (authority) in our relations to it. Since, I shall be arguing, the authority that persons have as such is fundamentally second-personal, respect for it must be second-personal also; it must involve acknowledgment.

There are forms of recognition respect, however, that are not fundamentally second-personal at all, namely, whenever the authority respect recognizes is not. In these cases, the relevant authority can be recognized without having to be acknowledged. In many of these instances, moreover, the authority can be merited or earned. But even when that is so, respect for the authority differs from esteem for any form of merit.

We saw in Chapter III, for example, how when one person attempts to give another reasons to believe something through testimony, his (second-personal) standing to do so can depend upon or be defeated by his epistemic authority, by how reliable a witness he is or can be taken to be. To be sure, the standing we accord one another in collaborative theoretical reasoning is itself second-personal. (Pettit and Smith 1996) But the epistemic authority that can defeat it is not. And my current point is that it is possible fully to recognize epistemic
authority without any form of second-personal acknowledgment. One can respect the
knowledge or wisdom one overhears in another person’s solitary musings and regulate one’s
own private reasoning by them. Here one respects the other’s epistemic authority without
acknowledging any second-personal claim he makes, even implicitly.

Even so, respect for someone’s epistemic authority differs from esteem for his
episemic virtues. The latter shows itself in and partly just is a positive appraisal of him as a
cognizer or of his contributions to collaborative inquiry. The former, however, is realized in
our epistemic conduct in relation to him, for example, giving his views weight or authority in
deciding what to believe ourselves.¹⁰

Or consider the authority that we give trusted advisors. This also can be merited or
earned. We have recognition respect for an advisor when we give him standing in our
deliberations about what to do or, at least, about what to believe we should do. The situation
here is on all fours with the theoretical case. Even if there is a kind of second-personal
authority involved in the giving and receiving of advice, especially when the advisor simply
recommends a course of action without giving reasons, this authority is nonetheless taken to
rest on and be defeasible by an authority that is not second-personal at all—the advisor’s
practical wisdom. If I come to believe that someone I had trusted is no longer a particularly
good judge of reasons that bear on my practical situation, or that he is but that he can no
longer be trusted to tell me what he really thinks, then I will no longer have any reason to
treat his advice with recognition respect. But here again, my disesteem for his advising
abilities is not the same thing as my resulting recognition contempt. The former shows itself
in and partly just is a negative appraisal of him as an advisor. The latter is shown in how I
conduct my own deliberations in relation to him and his advice, giving his views little weight
in deciding what to do or in forming my beliefs about what reasons there are to decide one way or another.

Yet another example is the kind of implicit respect that, as Sarah Buss has pointed out, is typically involved in the experience of shame. (Buss 1999a) We experience shame, as we noted in Chapter IV, when we are brought to see ourselves as others see (or might see) us and this view is problematic for us in certain ways—say, because it involves disdain or something like it, or because it reveals an aspect of ourselves that we would prefer to keep private. 11 Shame is not the fear of disdain; neither is it an awareness of being viewed with it or in a way that unvels. Rather, shame is feeling as if a view of oneself as shameful is to be credited. It is the experience of seeming to be correctly seen in some disturbing way by recognizing (though not necessarily acknowledging) the view of oneself one gets from the other’s perspective. This is why Buss says that shame involves respect. Shame feels as if the other can see one as one really is—as if she has this competence and authority. So far, however, the authority seems entirely epistemic (in a sufficiently broad sense); it is like the authority one recognizes in taking another’s epistemic attitudes seriously.

What makes respect for these different forms of authority structurally similar to, but still importantly different from, that for an authority to claim or demand, is that they concern non-second-personal reasons. Respect for epistemic authority need involve no (even implicit) acknowledgment of any (even implicit) claim. To be sure, the contexts in which we normally show recognition respect for theoretical knowledge, practical wisdom, and similar forms of authority, are frequently second-personal. Testimony, advice, mutual inquiry, and addressed criticisms all make a kind of claim on an addressee’s attention, judgment, or reasoning. But in these cases, the relevant second-personal standing flows directly from a more basic epistemic or epistemic-like authority that is not itself essentially
second-personal, one that can be respected in contexts that do not involve (even an imagined) acknowledgment of any (even imagined) claim or demand for respect.

Any standing to address second-personal reasons, however, is fundamentally second-personal. When a sergeant orders her platoon to fall in, her troops take it that the reason she thereby gives them derives entirely from their normative relations, from her authority to give them orders. That, again, is the point of Hobbes’s famous distinction between “command” and “counsel.” (Hobbes 1983: XIV.1) The sergeant addresses reasons that would not have existed but for her authority to address them in this way. And the only way that one can fully respect such a second-personal authority is second-personally.

Similarly, I believe that recognition respect for someone as a person is also second-personal. It is an acknowledgment of someone’s standing to address and be addressed second-personal reasons rooted in the dignity of persons, where this standing is also second-personal all the way down. ‘Person’ is a “forensic term,” as Locke said; it is conceptually related to accountability. (Locke 1975: 346) According to morality as equal accountability, to be a person just is to have the competence and standing to address demands as persons to other persons, and to be addressed by them, within a community of mutually accountable equals. This second-personal competence gives all persons an equal dignity, irrespectively of their merit. We therefore respect another as a person when we accord him this standing in our relations to him.

**Respect vs. Care**

Recognition respect thus involves no evaluation or appraisal of excellence or merit, even of someone’s merits as a person. It is, rather, a way of valuing someone intrinsically, in and for himself. In respecting someone’s dignity, we respect and value him. But respect is not the only way of valuing someone in himself or for his own sake. Caring or benevolent
concern is another.\textsuperscript{12} It is important, therefore, to be clear about the differences between respect and care, since these ground importantly different moral philosophical ideas.

Like respect, care takes individuals as its object. But whereas respecting someone entails relating to her as a being with a dignity, caring for someone involves viewing her as a being with a welfare. In caring for someone, we want certain states—whichever will benefit her.\textsuperscript{13} Respect, however, is attitude- or conduct-, rather than state-regarding. In respecting someone, we are disposed to regulate our conduct in relation to her—to do what is called for by her dignity.

Reasons for acting that are rooted in respect are \textit{second-personal}, \textit{agent-regarding}, and \textit{agent-relative}. Respect for persons is a responsiveness to what someone can claim by virtue of being an agent with the second-personal competence. What we attend to here is not (at least, not primarily) what is for someone’s welfare or good, but, among other things, what she herself values and holds good from her point of view as an equal independent agent. In so doing, we acknowledge her (and her authority) as free and equal. We may rightly think, for example, that unhealthy habits are harmful for someone and thus contrary to her welfare, but think as well that respect tells against exerting undue pressure to induce her to change. Concern for her and her welfare may lead us to want her to change, and to want to help her do so, even while respect for her dignity restrains us. A person’s values and preferences can give others reasons of respect to permit her to promote them (and, I have elsewhere argued, give her reasons to pursue them herself), whether or not the resulting states would be beneficial or good in some other way from an agent-neutral point of view, or indeed, whether she has any other reason to promote them at all. (Darwall 2001) And, because they are second-personal, respect’s reasons are also fundamentally agent-relative.\textsuperscript{14} They concern how others must relate to us and our authority to demand this.
Reasons of care, on the other hand, are *third-personal, welfare-regarding* and *agent-neutral*. From the perspective of sympathetic concern, the cared-for’s own values are regulative only to the extent they are represented in his welfare. If, for example, the person for whom one cares is sufficiently depressed, he may not value his own welfare or what would further it very much at all. In feeling sympathetic concern for him, one is regulated, not by what he values or prefers (as in respect), but by what (one believes) would really benefit him. Of course, a person’s welfare is bound up with his preferences and values, but the latter generate reasons of care only to the extent that this is so. And to one who cares, considerations of welfare present themselves as agent-neutral, rather than agent-relative, reasons. It seems a good thing agent-neutrally that the cared-for benefit and, therefore, that there is a reason for anyone who can to bring that state about, and not just a reason for those who have some particular relation to the cared-for or happen to care for her. \(^{15}\) Finally, respect of one’s dignity is something anyone can demand; not so with sympathetic concern for oneself and one’s welfare.

These differences between benevolent concern and respect can be brought out by reflecting on the relations between parents and children. Parents may legitimately give relatively little intrinsic weight to a sufficiently young child’s protest against eating a healthful food, although they should take account of its bearing on the child’s welfare, for example, the likelihood that eating it will be an unpleasant experience, the long-term effects on the child’s psychic well-being of insisting that she eat it, and so on. At this stage, the parents may properly be guided by the child’s welfare alone. When, however, their daughter returns to her former home in middle age, to take an extreme case, the situation is much changed. For parents not to take a middle-aged daughter’s will as having intrinsic weight, indeed, as governing, would clearly be disrespectful, paternalism in the pejorative sense. \(^{16}\) Now she has
a second-personal standing she simply did not have near the beginning of her life. And were
her parents to attempt to pressure her to eat “her broccoli” at this point, they would rightly
be subject to reproach. Their failure of respect would invite a second-personal response
calling for respect, second-personally, from them to her.17

Or think again of being in pain because someone is stepping on your foot. To
someone who cares for you, it will seem as if relief of your pain would be a good state of the
world and as if, therefore, there is a reason for anyone who can to try to realize it. Of course,
since the person who is stepping on your foot likely has the best position in the causal
network to do this, this will seem to be a particularly good reason for him to move his foot.
But it will nonetheless be an agent-neutral reason. Your foot treader’s relation to you is just
part of the causal structure that makes the agent-neutral normative fact that your being free
of pain is desirable distinctively relevant to his deliberative situation. If, however, you see his
taking his foot off yours to be dictated by mutual respect, you will see him as having a reason
that is grounded in your authority to demand that he move his foot (indeed, to demand that
he not have stepped on yours in the first place). This reason will be second-personal and
agent-relative.18 You will see his relation to you (his gratuitously causing you pain) as
intrinsically relevant to how he should conduct himself toward you. Moreover, I shall argue
in Chapters X and XI that the relevance of this agent-relative relation (in the logical sense)
can be seen to flow from what it is to relate to one another in the second-personal sense. It
is second-personal relating that is primary. Agent-relative norms, like “one should not cause
gratuitous pain to others,” can be explicated within a contractualist framework that is
grounded in what we are committed to in relating to one another second-personally at all.

Respect concerns how we are to conduct ourselves in relating to others, whereas care
is sensitive to how things go for others, whether that involves relating to them or not. In
itself, care neither is defined by nor necessarily involves any distinctive conduct towards or relating to its object. Insofar as we care for someone, our interest in our own conduct towards him is instrumental. Benevolent concern leads us to want to act in whichever ways are most conducive to his welfare. Recognition respect for someone, on the other hand, involves distinctive ways of conducting oneself towards or relating to him as a person, namely, those that are mandated by his dignity.

Given all this, it is entirely expectable that philosophical conceptions of morality as rooted in universal benevolence should take agent-neutral consequentialist forms and that conceptions like morality as equal accountability should spawn deontological moral theories with agent-relative constraints. If morality is grounded in care or concern, then it has a final agent-neutral aim, the welfare of all human or sentient beings, and moral evaluation of actions and social practices is therefore ultimately instrumental. Of course, it is possible to hold such a conception and maintain, as Mill did, that the evaluation of conduct as wrong is, not itself instrumental, but dependent on accountability-structuring norms that are justified instrumentally themselves. (Mill 1998: Ch. V) But such evaluations are still instrumental at one remove; they treat private attitudes and public practices of responsibility as instruments for public good. And since they derive from a more fundamental agent-neutral aim, their normativity must ultimately be agent-neutral.

This last is, in effect, Strawson’s Point about consequentialist approaches to moral responsibility extended to moral obligation. Conduciveness to an external goal differs from standards we are committed to within the second-person standpoint we take up when we address moral demands. By contrast, moral conceptions rooted in equal respect understand morality to concern most fundamentally how we should relate to one another—what demands we have standing to address and what standing we have to address them. This
makes morality fundamentally a second-personal matter and, as a consequence, moral norms must be grounded from within the agent-relative/self-other standpoint of mutual respect. It is of course consistent with this framework (without further argument) that what we can demand from one another might include equal consideration of our welfare and, therefore, that respect for one another requires complying with, say, the agent-neutral principle of utility. This would be something like the reverse of Mill’s position—getting an agent-neutral moral norm out of a fundamentally agent-relative conception of morality. And the parallel point would seem to apply, namely, that according to such a conception, the normativity of such an agent-neutral norm would itself be fundamentally agent-relative (albeit, at one remove).

**KANT ON RESPECT**

We shall consider respect’s second-personal character in more detail presently. This can easily be missed. I missed it, for example, in my 1977 article, when I identified recognition respect for persons with “taking seriously and weighing appropriately the fact that they are persons in deliberating about what to do.” (Darwall 1977: 38) This makes respect something one can realize outside of a second-personal relation; one need only adequately register a fact about or feature of someone: that she is a person. In a similar vein, Iris Murdoch complains against Kant’s view that it makes the object of respect, not individual persons, but “universal reason in their breasts.” (Murdoch 1999: 215) In this section, we shall consider Kant’s views on respect. These have great interest in their own right, and they include a number of important points on which we shall continue to draw throughout the rest of the book. In what remains of this chapter, I shall argue that the key to seeing how recognition respect for persons actually is an attitude towards individuals, and not just towards a fact about or a quality in them, is to appreciate respect’s role in mediating
second-personal relations (that is, relatings) between individuals. And I shall suggest that the seeds of this view are in what Kant himself says about respect.

Respect (\textit{Achtung}) figures in three distinct places in Kant’s ethical writings.\footnote{Respect (\textit{Achtung}) figures in three distinct places in Kant’s ethical writings. First, in Section I of the \textit{Groundwork}, Kant argues that “respect for law” characterizes morally worthy conduct and that “duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law.” (Kant 1996c: 400) Second, in the \textit{Critique of Practical Reason}, Kant provides an empirical psychology of moral action and, within it, an account of the psychology of respect. (Kant 1996d: 71-89) Third, in \textit{The Metaphysics of Morals}, Kant discusses duties of respect, both to oneself and to others. (Kant 1996e: 434-437, 462-468)

Kant does not explicitly distinguish between appraisal and recognition respect. Most of the time he is concerned with recognition respect for persons and their distinctive dignity, but there are places where what he has in mind is fairly clearly a form of appraisal respect, namely, comparative moral esteem: “before a humble common man in whom I perceive uprightness of character in a higher degree than I am aware of in myself my spirit bows.”\footnote{Just after this, Kant adds that “\textit{respect is a tribute} that we cannot refuse to pay to merit.” (Kant 1996d: 77) In our terms, respect that responds to merit and “uprightness of character” is appraisal respect.}

Why Kant should be concerned to mark off instances of appraisal respect where another appears to have greater merit is somewhat unclear. Kant believes that the experience of respect invariably involves feelings of humiliation, as we shall see, and he may be thinking that this element would be lost unless we saw the other as having greater merit.\footnote{However, as we shall also see, Kant believes that recognition respect of the dignity of persons always involves a humbling acknowledgment of the moral law, which, according to his analysis, unavoidably “strikes down self-conceit.” (5:73) He repeats that analysis here, saying that the}
common person’s example “holds before me a law that strikes down my self conceit.” (5:77)

But this will be true whether or not one sees the other as adhering more closely to this law.

The only distinction Kant explicitly draws within respect is that between reverentia, by which he invariably means a feeling of respect, and observantia or “respect in the practical sense,” which he identifies with “the maxim of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person.” (1996e: 402, 449) Obviously, reverentia is what is involved in the comparative appraisal respect just discussed. But it is important to Kant’s empirical moral psychology that recognition respect for the moral law and the dignity of persons (observantia) also gives rise to reverentia. Thus, in discussing the duty of self-respect, Kant remarks that a person has a worth that is “above any price,” “an inalienable dignity (dignitas interna) which instills in him respect for himself (reverentia).” (1996e: 436)

There is no duty directly to feel reverentia. (1996e: 402) We can’t have a duty to experience a feeling, Kant thinks. Rather, we have a duty of observantia to respect the dignity of humanity within ourselves and others, and the phenomenal experience or feeling of doing so is reverentia. Similarly, when Kant says that feelings of love and respect “accompany the carrying out” of the duties of love and respect, respectively, he is distinguishing simultaneously between pathological and practical forms of love and respect. (1996e: 448) Pathological love is what we feel when carry out the duties of (practical) benevolence, and reverentia is what we feel when we carry out the duties of observantia or “respect in the practical sense.” (1996e: 448-468)

This brings us to Kant’s explanation of how observantia gives rise to reverentia, how, that is, practical respect for the moral law and the dignity of persons involves distinctive feelings of respect. The framework for Kant’s speculative psychology of respect is his transcendental idealism and “two standpoints” doctrine—Kant’s distinction between the
point of view we take on ourselves and our actions when we experience them as part of the causal structure of the “phenomenal” world of sense experience, on the one hand, and the intelligible perspective we adopt when deliberating about what to do, on the other. (See 1996c: 451-462) From the deliberative standpoint (and, importantly, from the second-person perspective involved in holding one another accountable), our concern is not primarily to figure out what will happen or has happened. We are concerned rather with what we should do, with what we or someone else should have done, and with how appropriately to hold people accountable in light of what they actually did. From these perspectives, the phenomenal feeling of respect in us, *reverentia*, is not on the radar screen.

In deliberating about what to do, for example, we don’t usually consider how, as a matter of psychology, we actually will, or will be able to, act on the reasons we come ultimately to accept. Nor, in the course of deliberation, do we ordinarily contemplate how we feel in deliberating or acting. To deliberate intelligibly at all we must simply presuppose that we can act on good and conclusive reasons as we will come to see them. Similarly, in holding someone accountable, we must proceed on the assumption that, without defeating evidence to the contrary, he could have acted as he was obligated. In addition to these practical needs, however, we also have the theoretical need to understand ourselves, one another, and our actions as part of the causal structure of the world we experience. This is where *reverentia*, the feeling a person has when she acts on the moral law and respects the dignity of persons in the “practical sense,” enters the picture.

According to Kant, *reverentia* is a feeling that operates as a cause within our phenomenal psychology. Kant thinks that we can know *a priori* that we are subject to the feeling of respect, indeed, that any finite rational being must be. Assuming, as Kant believes, that recognition of the moral law is a condition of the possibility of pure practical reason,
then so also is it a presupposition of the possibility of practical respect. This is the “fact of reason.” (1996d: 30-31) In taking ourselves to be bound by the moral law, we perforce assume that we can comply with it. But morally obligatory action can be realized in the phenomenal realm only if its phenomenal counterpart has a phenomenal cause, and Kant takes it that this must be a feeling. So any finite rational being subject to moral imperatives must also be characterized by a psychology having something whose role, as the phenomenal counterpart of practical respect, is to cause the phenomenal counterpart of moral action. 

Reverentia is the feeling that plays this role.

We, however, are interested less in respect’s functional role than in what Kant says about its distinctive phenomenology. Respect for the moral law, Kant says, “thwart[s]” and “restricts” self-love, but, more importantly, “humiliates” and “strikes down self-conceit.” (Kant 1996d: 73) By “self-love,” Kant refers to a “natural” “propensity” to take merely “subjective determining grounds” of the will to have objective normative significance. Like a naïve experiencer who takes an apparently bent stick in water to be really bent, a naïve agent may take his desire’s object to be a source of reasons, oblivious to peculiarities of the perspective that his desire gives him. Things that are important to him seem to be important period. Self-love in this sense poses no deep threat to morality, however; in principle, it need be no more dangerous than the innocent mistakes of perspective that can be corrected once we are able to draw a subjective/objective distinction within our experience and accept some as mere appearances. Self-love, Kant thinks, needs only to be curbed by the moral law.

Self-conceit, on the other hand, assaults the moral law directly, and so it must be “humiliated.” It is a form of arrogance (arrogantia): the presumption that one has a kind of worth or dignity oneself, independently of the moral law, through which self-love is made “lawgiving and the unconditional practical principle.” (1996d: 73, 74) This is not just a naïve
tendency to mistake seeming normative relevance from one’s perspective with objective normative weight. It is rather the radical idea that something has objective normative significance because it is what one wills subjectively—first, that one has a unique standing to create reasons for acting independently of and unconstrained by the moral law, but also, second, that one can address these reasons to others and expect compliance, in other words, that one has a unique authority to address second-personal reasons: “lack of modesty in one’s claims to be respected by others is self-conceit (arrogantia).” (1996e: 462)  

A person with “self-love” confuses what she desires with the objectively desirable. In desiring that her thirst be relieved, she takes it that there are reasons, in principle for anyone, to desire this state and bring it about. But she doesn’t think that others should do this because this is what she wants or wills. Rather, in wanting it, it just seems to her that such reasons exist. Self-conceit, on the other hand, is the idea that one’s own will is a source of normative reasons (and is so uniquely). A thirsty person with self-conceit will take it that others have reasons to relieve his thirst because this is what he wills or wants (though he would have no such reasons if roles were reversed).

*Self-conceit is thus a fantasy about second-personal status.*  

It is the conceit that one has a normative standing that others don’t have to dictate reasons just because of who or what one is. The idea is not that one has the kind of authority that an especially good advisor does, that one sees better than others reasons that are there anyway. (Although it might involve this thought, if one took it to justify a special second-personal status.) It is rather the fantasy that one has a fundamental “lawgiving” standing that others simply don’t have—as if one were King or God. This is far from an innocent illusion, although Kant follows Rousseau in thinking that it is depressingly expectable whenever social comparison engenders *amour propre*.  

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It follows that the moral law cannot simply curtail self-conceit or keep it in its place; it must “strike it down.” It must declare “null and quite unwarranted” any “claims to esteem for oneself that precede accord with the moral law.” (1996d: 73) We shouldn’t be thrown off by Kant’s use of ‘esteem’ here. The moral law must supplant self-conceit’s presumptuous second-personal authority, the standing it presumes to demand recognition of the claims and demands it purports to address. Kant uses ‘esteem’ in a similar way when he defines *observantia* or “respect in the practical sense” as “the *maxim* of limiting our self-esteem by the dignity of humanity in another person.” Obviously, in this context, ‘esteem’ must refer to recognition rather than to appraisal respect. Self-conceit is the fantasy that one has a claim to others’ recognition respect that they do not have against one.

The moral law substitutes the equal dignity of persons—the mutual accountable of the kingdom of ends—for the fantasized despotism of self-conceit. The respect-creating encounter with a “humble common” person gives rise to a response to the common dignity that all persons share. This is no esteem (appraisal respect) that persons might differentially deserve, but a form of respect that any individual can demand simply by virtue of being a person. (1996e: 434-35) And we recognize each other’s equal authority to make demands as a free and rational agent, by acknowledging our mutually accountability (for example, through reactive attitudes) and holding ourselves responsible to one another for complying with these. Respect for others thus involves making oneself accountable to others as equal persons, rather than simply taking account of any fact, norm, or value about one another as persons in our own private deliberations.

Kant divides “duties to others merely as human beings” into duties of love and duties of respect. Performance of duties of love is “meritorious” and therefore “puts others under obligation.” Discharging duties of respect, on the other hand, gives rise to no
reciprocating obligations since here we only do for others what is already “owed” them in
the first place. (1996e: 448) “No one is wronged if duties of love are neglected; but a failure in
the duty of respect infringes upon one’s lawful claim.” (1996e: 464) “Every human being
has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings and is in turn bound to respect
every other.” (1996e: 462) Thus “recognition [Anerkennung] of a dignity (dignitas) in other
human beings, that is, of a worth that has no price,” is something others can “require from
me.” 36 (1996e: 462, emphasis added)

It follows that the duty of respect includes any specific duty, compliance with which
persons have the authority to demand. Respecting others as equal persons requires that we
discharge these duties. But it requires also that we recognize others’ “legitimate claim” to our
doing so, and this we can do only by recognizing their authority to claim or demand it. This
is what brings in accountability and the second-person stance. In holding that the dignity of
persons is that by which we can “demand,” “exact,” or “require” respect from others, that
each thereby has a “legitimate claim” to respect, Kant is committed to the idea that the
dignity of persons includes a second-personal authority to address demands for compliance
with the first-order duties of respect. To respect that authority it is insufficient simply to
comply with the first-order duties, even for the reason that duty requires it. 37 The standing
to address demands can only be recognized second-personally, by making ourselves
accountable to one another as equal free and rational agents for complying with the relevant
first-order requirements. As Feinberg says, it is “the activity of claiming” that makes for self-
respect and the equal dignity of persons. (Feinberg 1980) The kingdom of ends is a
community of mutually accountable persons. (Korsgaard 1996e)

Self-Conceit and Morality: The Case of Stalin

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In Chapter X, I shall be arguing that the fantasy of self-conceit is ultimately self-undermining since second-personal address commits us, quite generally, to an authority that anyone has just by virtue of second-personal competence. Briefly: addressing second-personal reasons always presupposes, not just the addressee’s authority and competence to hold the addressee responsible for compliance, but also the addressee’s authority and competence to hold himself responsible. It is committed, therefore, to the authority of a perspective that addresser and addressee can occupy in common: the second-person standpoint of mutually accountable persons. Even when someone addresses reasons he takes to derive from an unreciprocated authority over his addressee, he can blame his addressee for not complying only from the very same standpoint from which his addressee can blame himself, a standpoint they share in common as free and rational persons. As Strawson noted, therefore, reactive attitudes involve a form of respect for their objects as persons with the very same authority to hold themselves and others responsible as well. (Strawson 1968: 93)

A natural response to this argument may be to agree that if the presupposition that addresses can freely acknowledge and make authoritative demands of themselves from such a common standpoint addressers is part of the very idea of second-personal address, then perhaps it does commit us to the equal dignity of free and rational persons, but then to deny that second-personal address, so understood, is either very common or anything anyone must have a stake in. Surely people can presume authority without having to think anything about whether those over whom they think they have it can be expected freely to accept it and comply on that basis. Alternatively, it seems that someone might be content with simply having power over others without any kind of authorizing narrative at all.

I agree that even Kantian self-conceit, the idea that one has an authority that no one else has, is coherent as an abstract proposition, and nothing I shall be arguing will assume
otherwise. What I shall argue is that taking up a second-person standpoint toward others and addressing second-personal reasons to them commits us to mutual accountability and, therefore, to denying self-conceit (however intelligible that proposition might otherwise be). Neither do I claim or assume that it is impossible to have or want power over others irrespective of any authority requiring second-personal reasons—would that it were so! Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that neither self-conceit, at least in a pure form that excludes an underlying moralizing rationalization, nor the desire for power pure and simple, exclusive of an authorizing rationale, is at all common among human beings as we find them.

Consider Stalin, for example. Stalin would seem to have been as hungry for power or as liable to self-conceit as they come, but at least in Edvard Radzinsky’s riveting biography, he also appears to have been someone who was motivated by richly elaborated reactive attitudes, which, to be sure, he marshaled for his own ends. (Radzinsky 1997) As Radzinsky describes him, Stalin’s self-conceit was not pure. His emotional life was replete with episodes, frequently staged, in which a justified authority over others seemed manifest to him, justified in ways that, as it seemed to him, others should be able to appreciate. And even his cruelest murders were accompanied, indeed fueled, by self-justifying emotions and narratives. It seems no exaggeration to say, in fact, that Stalin’s distinctive form of evil essentially employed a cynical and distorted form of moral self-justification that he manipulated for his own purposes. Thus Radzinsky tells us that a standard ploy of Stalin’s was to catch someone he wished to “eliminate” in a lie after which Stalin “felt entitled to feel a moral hatred for the liar and traitor.” (Radzinsky 1997: 237) Radzinsky describes a poignant scene from Stalin’s boyhood in which, when fellow students in the Gori Church School “made a back” to enable an elderly teacher to cross a wide and turbulent stream,
Stalin was overheard to say: “What are you then, a donkey? I wouldn’t make a back for the Lord God himself.” To which Radzinsky adds, “he was morbidly proud, like many people who have been humiliated too often.” (Radzinsky 1997: 29)

I, for one, find it impossible to read Radzinsky’s accounts of Stalin’s fury-fueled, but coldly calculated, in-fighting, purges, murders, and willing sacrifice of his own innocent citizens without seeing in it a form of *resentment* that takes itself to be seizing and wielding power, not nakedly, but righteously. In my view, this sort of distorted self-serving moralizing is actually quite common, although not, thankfully on Stalin’s scale. People frequently manipulate aspects of the moral framework in narratives that rationalize their special exemptions and departures. It is actually quite rare, I think, for human beings to reject the second-person standpoint outright since, for one thing, our emotional lives are full of reactive feelings and attitudes that essentially involve it. Although “hypocrite” is perhaps not the first epithet one would use, even Stalin seems to instantiate Rochefoucauld’s dictum that “hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue.” (Rochefoucauld 1973: 79)

**Respect as Second-Personal**

We are now in a position to see that respect for persons is second-personal in two distinct, but related, senses: it involves recognition of a second-personal authority and the recognition itself comes from a second-person standpoint. Consider the former aspect first. Someone might accept the first-order norms that structure the dignity of persons and regulate himself scrupulously by them without yet accepting anyone’s authority to demand that he do so. He might even accept these as mandatory norms without accepting any claim to his compliance. I hope it is now clear that although such a person would thereby respect the duties with which persons can demand compliance, in failing to respect their authority to demand this, he would also fail, in an important sense, to respect them. He would fail to
acknowledge their equal authority as free and rational and so fail to relate to them on terms of equal respect.

In *The Realm of Rights*, Judith Thomson says that respect for persons can have no foundational role in morality if “respect for persons just is respect for their rights.” (Thomson 1990: 210-211) But is respect for someone simply respect for her rights? If we think of respecting someone’s rights as according her the specific things that Thomson maintains we have a right to—forbearing trespass, coercion, and causing undue harm and distress, keeping promises, and so on, then respect for her as a person cannot consist just in that. For we could respect persons’ rights in this sense without respecting these as their right, as anything they have the authority to claim or demand from us.

This is the first way in which respect is second-personal; a fundamentally second-personal authority. But this form of authority is itself something that is appropriately recognized second-personally also, through relating to others in a way that acknowledges this authority. And this is the second way in which respect is second-personal. Not only is the authority it recognizes second-personal, but its distinctive form of recognition is second-personal also. We accord authority within the second-personal relations that structure mutual accountability by relating to one another in ways that acknowledge each other’s standing to demand, remonstrate, resist, charge, blame, resent, feel indignant, excuse, forgive, and so on. Since accountability is, in its nature, second-personal in both senses, respect for persons is as well.

It seems possible to respect the fact that someone has second-personal authority—for example, that she can claim certain conduct as her right—without relating to her in the way that genuine respect for her as a person involves. To see this, consider, first, an analogous case in theoretical reasoning. Suppose you are disinclined to trust someone’s
judgment in forming your own beliefs, but that, on reflection, you reject your distrust and think you should take his testimony as evidence. When he says, “p,” this does not increase your inclination to believe p or to give his testimony evidential weight until you recall your considered view about his reliability, which corrects your distrust. Here it seems natural to say that although you respect the fact that he is a reliable witness and so the fact that he has a claim on your beliefs, you do not, yet anyway, fully trust and respect him and his judgment.

Consider now a fully second-personal case. Suppose it is a parent who is not yet disposed to regard his college-age daughter as a fully independent person with full second-personal authority, at least, not to do so wholeheartedly. We can well imagine that he believes, on reflection, that he should so regard her, that is, that she has the same claim to respect that he does. But parental habits die hard. When she says she doesn’t want to do something within her discretion that he believes to be for her greater good, he is disinclined to defer to her in his own reasoning about what to do and feel with respect to her until he reminds himself of his considered conviction. When she calls him on his paternalism, he is neither naturally nor second-naturally disposed to see and hold himself responsible as from her authoritative perspective (for example, by feeling guilt or shame) but defends himself until he recalls that she is right; she really is no less entitled to respect than he is. Here again, it seems that although the parent respects the fact that his daughter has the same dignity he does, he does not yet relate to her on terms of equal respect; he does not yet accord her full second-personal authority in relating to her. Respect of this kind is an irreducibly second-personal way of relating to someone de re. It is the relation to individual persons that is primary. Indeed, the fact that someone has second-personal authority just is their having the standing to claim to be related to in this way.
To respect someone as a person is not just to regulate one’s conduct by the fact that one is accountable to him, or even just to acknowledge the truth of this fact to him, it is also to make oneself or be accountable to him, and this is impossible outside of a second-personal relation. This, I believe, is what most deeply underlies the sense of ‘respect’ s root ‘respecēre’ (to look back). To return someone’s address and look back at him is to establish second-personal relationship and acknowledge the other’s second-personal authority. To look someone in the eye is to make oneself and one’s eyes, the “windows” of one’s soul, vulnerable to him, and in both directions. One gives the other a window on one’s responses to him but also makes oneself vulnerable to his attitudes and responses by empathy. When the address is an attempt to hold one responsible, returning the other’s address, being open to his claims, including by giving him this window, is itself part of holding oneself accountable to him.

MANNERS, HONOR, AND PUBLIC SPACE

We respect someone as a person when we acknowledge her dignity. Of course, this acknowledgment need not always be explicit. Part of what we claim from one another is a space of personal privacy or discretion within which we can be left more or less alone if we want. If respect for persons always called for explicit acknowledgment, it would be impossible for this claim ever to be realized. Moreover, in a social situation in which the demands of personal dignity are sufficiently well established and generally reciprocally recognized, explicit acknowledgment is less commonly called for. But think of situations in which the dignity of persons, say of some group in particular, is under attack, not just in the sense that they are subjected to various forms of injury, but that their claim to dignity, their second-personal status as persons, is threatened or not generally recognized. To maintain in
such a situation that one respects the dignity of members of this group without being willing to acknowledge it publicly will be difficult to support.

Another aspect of the shared public space in which respect figures centrally is etiquette. Sarah Buss argues that “expressing respect is an essential function of good manners.” (Buss 1999b: 795) Her point is not simply that respect frequently calls for politeness. This we learn at our parents’ knee. It is rather that conventions of etiquette are at least partly public rituals of respect in something like the way that religious rituals enact the idea of the sacred. By treating one another cordially and courteously, we give an “outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual” \textit{reverentia} for the dignity of persons that is itself second-personal.

Of course, etiquette can, and perhaps frequently does, also reinforce divisions and hierarchies that are in conflict with equal respect. Even calls for “common courtesy” and “decency” can blunt and subvert challenges to an established unjust order that are necessary genuinely to respect others as equals. Nonetheless, properly conceived, manners are an important supplement to a morality of equal respect.

It is useful to compare the way respect for one another as persons is mediated in a mutually accountable public space with the way a superficially similar, but fundamentally different, kind of recognition respect and disrespect are enacted in a culture of honor. Insults are paradigmatic expressions of disrespect of this latter kind. But although insults are invariably addressed, when they assault someone’s honor the standing they threaten differs from second-personal authority since, unlike the dignity of persons, it is socially constituted. In traditional honor societies, insults like Bolingbroke’s “pale trembling coward” to Mowbray in Shakespeare’s \textit{Richard II} put in question the ability to receive the honor of others’ favorable regard and acceptance as someone of merit. Honor may present
itself as merited, but it is nonetheless “bestowed on people by society,” as Avishai Margalit puts it. (Margalit 1996: 24) Whether Bolingbroke’s insults and charges are groundless or not, Mowbray is right to believe that he will nonetheless be dishonored unless he can successfully defend his good name in a way that convinces people to restore their faith and credit in him.

Sufficiently wide disrespect destroys honor by constituting dishonor. But not even universal disrespect can destroy the dignity of free and rational persons, at least, can do so directly. Equal dignity is nothing anyone can bestow, so neither is it anything any person or group can remove through disrespect. Humiliations that aim to degrade, depersonalize, and dehumanize must work differently. They must seek not simply to lower someone’s standing in others’ eyes, but so to demean someone in his own eyes that he loses self-respect. Even this doesn’t directly destroy the dignity to which respect for persons and self-respect responds. Still, we know that it is possible for domination by violence and threats of violence, and even by relatively nonviolent, disrespecting relations or institutions that are, in Goffman’s term, sufficiently “total,” so to beat down, dispirit, and undermine self-confidence and self-respect that the very second-personal capacities necessary for accountable living can atrophy. (Goffman 1961)

There are important differences between the ways in which attitudes of respect and disrespect support and reinforce a regime of honor and the manner in which reactive attitudes function in a second-personal economy of mutual respect. Disrespect (contempt) that dishonors is disdain—an attitude that is addressed, not so much to its object, as to those with the standing to bestow honor or dishonor upon that person. Disdain does not demand, nor even really invite, response from its object; it is exclusive rather than inclusive. And what a person loses when he is dishonored is no standing within a mutually accountable
community, but “face,” a social place (where one can show one’s face without having to justify oneself to others). 47

Reactive attitudes through which we hold one another accountable, on the other hand, have an inclusiveness that follows from their second-personal character. Blame, indignation, resentment, remonstrance, and so on, are, as it were, reciprocally addressed to their objects. In calling for acknowledgment they have an implicit mutuality or reciprocity. As Strawson says, “the partial withdrawal of goodwill which these attitudes entail . . . is, rather, the consequence of continuing to view [their object] as a member of the moral community.” (Strawson 1968: 93) Reactive attitudes engage their targets second-personally and aim to draw them into an exchange that will constitute their being held accountable. 48 Their address comes with an implicit RSVP.

WHENCE DIGNITY?

Morality as equal accountability thus presupposes that every free and rational agent has a dignity for which he can demand respect. But what can support this idea? I argued in Chapters III and IV that moral obligation is essentially tied to second-personal accountability. This was the thesis of morality as accountability. The very idea of moral obligation presupposes that of a second-personal authority or dignity, whether as in the early modern natural law conception of morality as accountability to God, or as in the Kantian/contractualist conception of morality as equal accountability.

But what can support or vindicate any of these ideas? Much as Kant says of his argument at the end of Section II of the *Groundwork*, our method to this point has been to analyze assumptions and presuppositions of moral obligation as these latter ideas are “generally accepted.” (Kant 1996c: 445) As Kant points out, however, it is entirely consistent with these analytical results that the ideas of morality and moral obligation are nothing but a
“figment of the mind.” (Kant 2002: 445) And if that were so, so also would the ideas of second-personal authority that I have argued are conceptually or analytically contained within them be illusory as well.

To vindicate moral obligation and the dignity of persons and show that they are not mere figments, Kant says that a “critique” of practical reason is necessary. (Kant 1996c: 445) In Chapter IX we will consider how Kant pursues such a critique in *Groundwork III* and in *The Critique of Practical Reason*. Ultimately, Kant abandons the strategy he broached in *Groundwork III* of trying first to secure the idea of freedom or autonomy in a critique of practical reason and then to show how the other central moral ideas can be derived from that. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant is content to treat acceptance of the moral law as a central undeniable aspect of our practical lives and to defend it from that perspective. I shall argue that Kant was right ultimately to reject his *Groundwork* approach. But I shall also argue in Chapter X that Kant was wrong to give up on the attempt to provide a more substantial vindication of morality than is possible with the defensive strategy he was later content to take.

We have already seen that the lesson of Strawson’s Point is that an adequate theory of moral responsibility must invoke standards that are internal to the second-person standpoint. And I have argued that moral obligation’s conceptual tie to accountability yields the further consequence that an adequate theory of moral obligation must also be available within the second-person point of view. But this line of argument has proceeded by analyzing “generally accepted” concepts of moral responsibility and obligation to reveal their irreducibly second-personal character, and so it is impotent by itself to vindicate the very ideas it analyzes. In Chapter X, however, I shall proceed in the opposite direction and argue that the presuppositions of the second-person standpoint, when fully worked clear, include
the dignity of persons and the moral law. For any kind of second-personal reason, based on a second-personal relation of whatever form, I shall argue, both addressee and addressee are committed by the terms of their relation to presupposing that they have a common normative standing simply by virtue of being (second-personally competent) rational persons. This vindicates moral obligation and the dignity of persons on the assumption that second-personal reasons exist at all.

But why suppose that any second-personal reasons are valid? Chapters X and XI also develop Fichte’s Point that second-personal interaction gives us an awareness of the distinctive character of our own agency and of a kind of freedom—autonomy—that distinguishes practical reasoning fundamentally from theoretical reason. In second-personal engagement, we see that we have a kind of freedom we simply could not have if reasoning about what to do were like reasoning about what to believe. And this helps us to locate second-personal reasons within an overall theory of practical reason.

1 The Oxford English Dictionary Online. I am indebted to Peter Railton for impressing on me the relevance of ‘respect’ s etymology, and to Charles Griswold for further etymological wisdom.

2 This chapter draws heavily on Darwall 2004b.

3 Just as in desiring something we see it as desirable, or in esteeming something we see it as estimable, so in respecting something we see it as having dignity or authority. Note that what I have been calling “reasons of the right kind” for an attitude concern whether the attitudes “fits” its object in the sense that things are, evaluatively or normatively, as they seem from the perspective of that attitude. “Fittingness” reasons make it the case that an attitude is fitting to its object in this sense. See D’Arms and Jacobson 2000a and 2000b.

4 For the distinction between recognition and appraisal respect, see the next section.
Stress added to ‘exact’ and removed from ‘respect’. I should note that what I am presenting is only one interpretation of Kant’s writings on dignity and respect. Kant sometimes writes as if dignity is a value that can be realized by rational beings only when they follow the moral law, as opposed to a value or standing they have by virtue of the capacity for moral action. E.g., “the idea of the dignity of a rational being, who obeys no law other than that which he at the same time gives.” (Kant 1996c: Ak. 434) I have been helped here by discussion with Oliver Sensen.

The second-personal character of (recognition) respect for persons has been overlooked by the discussion of respect over the last thirty-five years, including in my own work. See, e.g., Downie and Telfer 1970; Cranor 1975; Darwall 1977; Hudson 1980; Dillon 1995 and 1997; Hill 1997 and 1998; Buss 1999a.

Another possibility is that, without assaulting my esteem for my conduct or character, such things can help undermine one’s sense or feeling of one’s worth or dignity as a person, despite a belief to the contrary. On this point, see Dillon 1997.

I take the terms “appraisal respect” and “recognition respect” from Darwall 1977.

I take it that, unlike recognition, acknowledgment is always to someone, if only implicitly, and if only to oneself.

Here, however, is a problem case at the margins of the distinction between recognition and appraisal respect. Just as one can show recognition respect for something or someone in regulating one’s beliefs, no less than one’s actions, it would seem that one can in regulating one’s esteem as well. So why isn’t appropriately regulating one’s thinking about what to feel by a proper appreciation of someone’s character an instance of recognition respect? And if it is, then what is the difference between that and the resulting esteem (appraisal respect) for
the person’s character? Even here, we might want to distinguish the two, but the difference seems little if any in this case. I am indebted to Mark LeBar for this suggestion.

11 On the importance of the latter, again, see Velleman 2001.

12 By ‘care’ here I mean the sort of “sympathetic concern” I discuss in Darwall 2002a, especially Chapter III. There are other senses, for example, when we are enjoined by the law to take “due care,” where what is involved is a form of respect. I am indebted here to Arthur Ripstein. Also, relationships of mutual concern, at least between those with second-personal competence, such as friendships, reciprocal love relationships, and so on, also involve an element of respect of part of what it is to relate to the other in that distinctive caring way. Here I am indebted to Jospeh Raz and Susan Wolf.

13 This is a central theme of Darwall 2002a.

14 See the discussion of this point in Chapters I, II, and IV. As I note there, the reason may itself be agent-neutral even though it is grounded in something fundamentally second-personal and agent-relative. Thus the principle of utility, which takes an agent-neutral form, might be thought to be based in the more fundamental idea that we must act towards one another (and ourselves) in ways that reflect our equal authority to make claims of one another.

15 For a further defense of these claims, see Darwall 2002a: 49, 69-72.

16 For a very insightful account of paternalism that is especially illuminating in this connection, see Shiffrin 2000.

17 We should note, however, that relations that we frequently call forms of care, like those between friends and loved ones, frequently involve respect as well as benevolent concern and have an ineliminable second-personal aspect. Friends, for example, understand themselves as supporting one another, including in their pursuit of their preferences,
somewhat independently of considerations of each other's welfare. I am indebted here to Joseph Raz and Susan Wolf.

18 Again, what makes this norm agent-relative is that it cannot be stated without making ineliminable reference to the agent. Many moral norms, those sometimes called “deontological constraints,” are agent-relative in this sense: e.g., “a person should keep her promises, other things being equal.” On this point, see McNaughton and Rawling 1993.

19 Utilitarian theories from Hutcheson to Sidgwick are illustrations of the former, and Scanlon’s contractualism nicely illustrates the latter. For excellent discussions of the relation between deontology and agent-relativity, see McNaughton and Rawling 1993 and 1995.

20 I have been helped here by discussion with Allan Gibbard.

21 “Two Kinds of Respect,” p. 38. In Hill 1998, Thomas E. Hill, Jr. takes a similar view, writing that recognition respect for person is a “disposition to give appropriate weight in one’s deliberations to the fact that someone is a person (whether meritorious or not).”

22 For a similar point, see Buss 199b: 797.

23 I am indebted for this reference to Carla Bagnoli. See Bagnoli 2003.

24 I am very much indebted in this section to Peter Vranas’s analysis of Kant on respect in Vranas 2001: 25-39. I follow Vranas in many aspects of his analysis, but not all (for example, his tendency to identify reverence with a form of appraisal respect). I have been helped also by Dillon 2004 and Bernard Reginster’s “The Moral Distinction of Self-Conceit,” presented at the Kantian Ethics Conference, University of San Diego, January 16-18, 2003.

25 See note 6 for some evidence that Kant sometimes runs together dignity as an object of recognition respect and dignity as an object of appraisal respect (moral esteem).

26 Kant doesn't say that we must believe or judge that the other has greater merit, rather, that in experiencing respect of this sort for another person, we see, feel, or experience the other
as better than us. I know my own imperfections at first hand, but the other “appears to me in a purer light.” (1996d: 77)

27 Korsgaard 1996f is especially helpful here.

28 Of course, one may know of certain practical deficiencies and sensibly deliberate in light of these. But these must be relatively local and regulated by the global presupposition that one can act on what one takes to be good and sufficient reasons.

29 Cf. Karen Horney’s discussion of neurotic egocentricity: “a wish or need, in itself quite understandable, turns into a claim. Its nonfulfillment is felt as an unfair frustration, as an offense about which we have a right to feel indignant.” (Horney 1970: 42; quoted in Swanton 2003: 190)

30 Compare here what Dillon says about the relation between self-conceit and “interpersonal respect” (in Dillon 2004). Dillon distinguishes another form of arrogance, “primary arrogance,” that concerns, not primarily interpersonal disrespect, but an arrogation to oneself of rights one doesn’t have. If, however, as I believe, the notion of a right itself involves the irreducibly second-personal authority to lay a claim or make a demand, then primary arrogance may itself be ultimately an interpersonal or second-personal notion also.

31 Cf. Bob Dylan’s “Disease of Conceit”: “Whole lot of people seeing double tonight/From the disease of conceit/Give ya delusions of grandeur/And a evil eye/Give you the idea that/You’re too good to die/Then they bury you from your head to your feet/From the disease of conceit.” (Dylan 1991)

32 “Arrogance (superbia and, as this word expresses it, the inclination to be always on top) is a kind of ambition (ambitio) in which we demand that others think little of themselves in comparison with us.” (1996e: 465) For a fascinating discussion of the role of the “wish to be God” in Kant’s philosophy generally, see Neiman 2002: 57-84.
For an insightful account of Kant’s ethics that stresses the role of self-conceit, see Wood 1999.

I believe this is also provides a useful framework within which to think of other self-serving ideologies, such as those of race and gender.

Although even this is an important idea, as Mill appreciated: “The principle of the modern movement in morals and politics, is that conduct, and conduct alone, entitles to respect: that not what men are, but what they do, constitutes their claim to deference; that, above all, merit, and not birth, is the only rightful claim to power and authority.” (Mill 1988: 88)

Note Kant’s use of ‘Annerkennung’ here. As we shall see in Chapter X, this is the term that looms so large in Fichte’s discussion.

Unless the latter is given a second-personal reading.

I am grateful to Judith Thomson for discussion of these points.

In what follows, I am indebted to Amanda Roth.

Cf. Sarah Buss on “respect in its primitive, prreflective mode.” (Buss 1999a: 539?)

At the most primitive level, by mimicry and contagion, but also by imaginative projection, since one must already be doing that in relating to him second-personally, as we saw in Chapter III.

When I gave an earlier version of this chapter as a Presidential Address to the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association in April, 2004, I preceded it with a video clip from The Blues Brothers in which the character played by Aretha Franklin attempts to hold Matt “Guitar” Murphy accountable with a rendition of “Think (You’d Better Think What You’re Doin’ To Me),” much of which she sings in a wonderful eye-to-eye dance with Matt. The conceit was that the view of respect expressed in my earlier 1977 was like that of Aretha
Franklin’s famous “Respect” and that that expressed in the address (and this book) was (is) like that of her Blues Brothers’ “Think”. The earlier was a first-personal, giving someone “her proper” view; the second took respect for persons to be essentially second-personal.

Bernardo Strozzi’s The Tribute Money (on the cover of this book) illustrates the same point. As Matthew tells the story (in the King James version), the Pharisees attempt to entrap Jesus and ask him whether or not it is lawful to give tribute to Caesar. “But Jesus perceived their wickedness, and said, Why tempt ye me, ye hypocrites?” (Matthew 22:18) I imagine this to be the moment that Strozzi’s painting depicts. Jesus is addressing the Pharisees and attempting to hold them accountable. But look closely at the Pharisee on the right—he is not looking back at Jesus, but past him to another Pharisee on the other side. I like to think that this shows that Strozzi appreciates Pufendorf’s Point: even God must gain our recognition to hold us accountable. I am grateful to Will Darwall for noticing this and to both Julian and Will Darwall for helpful conversation on this point.

43 See also Sherman unpublished.

44 William Chafe gives many compelling illustrations of how “civility” was appealed to by white North Carolinians in resisting attempts to desegregate schools long after the Supreme Court held segregation to be unconstitutional in Brown vs. Board of Education. (Chafe 1980)

45 One can feel insulted and be offended without being addressed, even indirectly, in an insulting way. And it is possible also for someone to express things that are genuinely insulting to one without addressing one, even indirectly. It is not, however, possible to insult someone without addressing her, at least indirectly.

46 And it is also, I would further argue, not fundamentally about accountability at all.

47 Relevant here is the deep connection I noted before (Chapter III, note 31) between honesty and the search for truth, on the one hand, and public accountability, on the other.
By reckoning people at “face value” cultures of honor actually pose an obstacle both to public inquiry and to public accountability and encourage evasion and keeping up appearances. A request for justification is itself an insult in such a social framework.

48 This, I believe, provides a basis for responding to Annette Baier’s criticisms of the Kantian approach in Baier 1993.

49 This is Allen Wood’s translation of “Hirngespinst.”

50 This is the method Rawls refers to as “philosophy as defense.” See Rawls 2000.