

## **Chapter 5**

# **Gas Production Potential**

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## Chapter 5

# Gas Production Potential

There are a variety of alternative approaches to estimating the future gas production potential of the United States, including the use of complex computer programs using econometric, process engineering, or system dynamics approaches to model separately the gas exploration, development, and production processes. Although during the course of this study OTA examined several complex models in detail, we have chosen to use four relatively simple techniques to project future production potential. This approach reflects the high costs of using the complex models and some doubts we entertain about the expected accuracy of these models as forecasting tools. These doubts do not necessarily extend to the usefulness of the models as policy analysis tools; often, these models offer the valuable ability to test alternative policies under carefully controlled conditions.


Of the four approaches used by OTA to project the mid- to long-term (1990 and beyond) production potential for natural gas in the Lower 48 States, three focus specifically on the potential for continued additions to U.S. proved reserves.

**The addition of new reserves to the U.S. gas system is the primary determinant of future gas availability.** The importance of new reserves can be illustrated quite simply by drawing the production that would likely result from the **failure to add to reserve levels and reliance instead on current proved reserves** as the sole "inventory" for production to draw on (see fig. 17). Assuming a constant reserves-to-production (R/P) ratio of 8.0, beginning in 1984, production would immediately begin to drop with shocking rapidity to about 2 trillion cubic feet (TCF) by the end of the century.\*

Of the three approaches focusing on continued additions to U.S. proved reserves, the first projects future reserves by examining historical trends in all components of reserve additions

\*Conceivably, the initial reduction in production could be slowed by drilling additional development wells, effectively lowering the R/P ratio. The end result of this strategy would be, however, an even more rapid production collapse occurring a few years later than that shown in fig. 17.

Figure 17.—Natural Gas Production From 1981  
Lower 48 Proved Reserves



SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

(new field discoveries, extensions, new pool discoveries, and revisions), examining the underlying causes of the trends, and extrapolating into the future based on OTA's expectations of future conditions. In this extrapolation, we have drawn heavily on the insights gained in our examination of gas resource base assessments. The second approach projects only new field discoveries and then applies a "growth factor" to these discoveries based on historical experience with the growth of new fields and OTA's judgment about how the growth rate may have changed. The third approach is based on a geologist's\* region-by-region examination of available gas resources and past exploratory success. In all three cases, production rates are calculated from reserve data by projecting future levels of the R/P ratio.

The fourth approach borrows a method used by M. King Hubbert in 1956,<sup>1</sup> tying future pro-

\*Joseph P. Riva, Jr., of the Congressional Research Service.

<sup>1</sup> Described in M. K. Hubbert, "Techniques of Production as Applied to the Production of Oil and Gas," *Oil and Gas Supply Modeling*, S. I. Gass (ed.), National Bureau of Standards Special Publication 631, May 1982.

duction directly to available resources by drawing freeform plots of the complete natural gas production cycle in such a manner that the cumulative production conforms to existing resource base estimates—in this case, to the estimates of Hubbert, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and the Potential Gas Committee (PGC).

In each of the four approaches, ranges of production potential are estimated based on alternative assumptions about the magnitude of the resource base, efficiency of the exploratory process, and other factors.

OTA's use of four approaches, and alternative assumptions within the approaches, reflects our skepticism of our own and others' ability to project future gas production rates with any precision. A "most likely" or "best" projection was

deliberately avoided because we believe that such a projection, beyond 5 years or so into the future, would be futile. Our purpose in this section is to illustrate the **plausible range** of possible future production rates and the general effects on production estimates of different interpretations of the causes of past trends and different assumptions about future conditions. The first approach is our slight favorite, but only because its level of disaggregation forces the analyst to deal more explicitly with the underlying causes of past events. This approach is discussed in the greatest detail.

At the end of the chapter, a variety of gas production forecasts by public agencies, private companies, and institutions are presented and discussed.

## APPROACH NUMBER 1—PROJECTING TRENDS IN THE INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF RESERVE ADDITIONS

The first approach separately projects trends in reserve additions from new field discoveries, new pool discoveries and extensions, and revisions.

### New Field Discoveries

**The discovery of new gasfields represents the single most important force necessary for building a sustainable natural gas supply** because a new gasfield not only adds to **current** reserves but also provides a source of considerably larger additions to future reserves through field growth after the discovery year. Reserve additions attributable to extensions and new pool discoveries and, to an extent, to revisions, are all, in fact, the inevitable consequence of previous new field discoveries. Therefore, if new field discovery rates increase or decrease, then at some point in the near future, reserve additions from extensions and new pool discoveries will almost certainly increase or decrease in a like manner.

### Factors Affecting New Field Discoveries

**The rate** of annual additions to reserves from new field discoveries depends on a variety of factors, but most importantly on:

- **The undiscovered resource base.**—The physical nature of the resource base—including the amount of resources remaining to be found, the distribution of field sizes, the locations of fields, the distribution of types of geological traps (more or less difficult to pinpoint with available exploration techniques), and other physical attributes—is considered by some to be the single most important determinant of future new field discoveries.
- **Exploration technology .-****The rapid advance** of exploration technology, for example, computer-aided seismic technology, affects drilling success rates and, consequently, overall discovery rates. Also, technological improvements have opened up to commer-

cial exploitation some areas whose complex geology had previously prevented acceptable success rates. Consequently, these improvements have expanded the recoverable resource base. Development of the Western Overthrust Belt is an important example of this effect.

- **Drilling and production technology .-Improvements in production technology create an expanding recoverable resource base and, in turn, an increase** in targets for the drill. For example, massive hydraulic fracturing technologies allow exploitation of fields in sands of low permeability that previously would have been subeconomic. improvements in offshore drilling technology allow exploitation of gasfields in deeper and more hostile waters.
- **Current and perceived future gas prices and other economic variables. -Such variables affect the propensity to drill and determine** where to draw the line between a producible well and a dry hole. In some cases, the higher prices allow the use of well stimulation techniques that would otherwise be too expensive, allowing successful production to be achieved from a well that would otherwise have had too low a flow rate. Additionally, the minimum acceptable reservoir size for production has grown smaller. The **relative** prices of gas and oil are important also because these will determine whether drilling will be preferentially aimed at targets where gas or oil are more likely to be found.
- **Schedules, financial terms, and other aspects of leasing.** -These also determine the number of attractive targets available for exploratory activity.
- **industry willingness to take risks.-All of the above factors and others play a role in determining the propensity of the exploration segment of the industry to assume the risks of wildcat drilling in unproved areas where much of the gas resource potential is thought to exist. Because this type of drilling often involves hostile environments and large capital requirements, much of this drilling is the domain of the major integrated oil companies and the large independents. Consequently, those factors that strongly affect the**

cash flow, capital availability, and economic incentives for this group of companies are particularly likely to affect the industry's propensity for risk-taking.

- **Historic prices and exploratory experience.** -There always exists an inventory of new field prospects known to explorers through past exploratory activities but undrilled or (in the case of "dry holes") uncompleted because of economic conditions or the availability of more promising prospects elsewhere. The key determinants of the size and character of this inventory are past exploratory experience and price profiles. The nature of the inventory is, in turn, an important determinant of new field discovery rates in the short term, especially during the period following a change in price levels or regulatory controls.


### Historical Variation of New Field Discoveries

During the 14 years of American Gas Association (AGA) data availability, \* the annual additions of new field discoveries in the Lower 48 States remained fairly steady, if somewhat cyclic, varying between a high of 2.9 TCF and a low of 1.3 TCF. (See fig. 18, which also shows the Energy Information Administration (EIA) data for 1977 to 1983.) From 1967, the last year in which AGA estimated that total reserve additions exceeded production, until 1979, the average of new field discoveries was 2.0 TCF. Similarly, nonassociated new field discoveries were equally steady, with a 14-year average of 1.7 TCF. Consequently, new field discoveries played a surprisingly small direct role in annual reserve additions during this period; \* \* they averaged less than 20 percent of all annual additions from new discoveries and extensions and never exceeded 25 percent in any year.

Although the reserve additions reported as new field discoveries remained steady during this period, the size distribution of the fields discovered did not. As shown earlier in table 12, the

\*Actually, AGA compiled reserve additions data since 1947, but only began separately estimating new field discoveries in 1967.

\*\*Clearly they did not play a small indirect role since many of the new pool discoveries and extensions in this period represented development of the fields discovered earlier in the period.

**Figure 18.—Additions to Lower 48 Natural Gas Proved Reserves: New Field Wildcat Discoveries, 1966-83 (BCF)**

SOURCES: Office of Technology Assessment, based on data from Energy Information Administration, U.S. Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids Reserves—1983 Annual Report, DOE/EIA-0216 (83), October 1984, and American Petroleum Institute, American Gas Association, and Canadian Petroleum Association, Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquids, and Natural Gas in the United States and Canada as of December 31, 1979, vol. 34, June 1980.

average size of new gasfields became considerably smaller (reported year-of-discovery reserves of 1.85 billion cubic feet [BCF] per successful new field wildcat in 1979 v. 18.56 BCF per successful new field wildcat in 1966). Furthermore, the lower average did not imply only a reduction in discoveries of giant fields; although this did occur, another change involved a very large increase in the number of very small class E fields\* brought into production.

Because of the smaller size of newly discovered fields, a steady expansion of successful exploratory wells was required just to maintain the rather low annual discovery rate of the period. For example, completions of new field (gas) wildcats in the onshore Lower 48 increased from 126 in 1968 to 671 in 1979. Because of the substantial improvements in success rates (see fig. 14) for all new field wildcat drilling (from 8.5 percent in 1968 to 19.0 percent in 1980), however, actual drilling rates did not have to increase in proportion to the rate of completion. From a low of 4,463 wildcat wells in 1971, drilling reached 6,413 wells in 1979 and 8,052 in 1981.

\*Class E fields contain less than 6 billion cubic feet of recoverable gas.

The more recent (1977 to 1983) EIA new field discovery data (fig. 18) show considerable year-to-year variation with no apparent trend aside from the recent drop associated with the current poor market, and are made even more difficult to interpret because of the break with the AGA data series. However, the EIA estimates of new field discoveries were higher during 4 of the first 5 years of record than **any** AGA-recorded discovery rate from 1966 to 1979. Of interest is the source of these discoveries. Although areas like the Western Overthrust Belt and deep Anadarko Basin have been in the forefront of media coverage, most new field discoveries continued to come from more traditional gas-producing areas—onshore and offshore (Gulf of Mexico) Louisiana and Texas. For example, during both 1980 and 1981 these two States provided two-thirds of the total magnitude of reserve additions from new field discoveries in the Lower 48.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>EIA, (J. S. Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids Reserves, 1980 and 1981 Annual Reports, DOE/EIA-0216 (80) and (81), October 1981 and August 1982.

## Implications

The following key issues pertaining to new field discoveries remain essentially unresolved:

- Can the 1968-79 trend in new field discoveries—essentially a steady cycling around an average of 2 TCF/yr or so—be continued well into the future? If optimists about the gas resource potential of small fields are correct, a continuing strong exploratory drilling effort should be able to maintain this level for a number of years. If the pessimists about small fields—and about the remaining resource base in general—are correct, reserve additions from new field discoveries might drop within a few years.
- Do the higher EIA estimates of 1977-82 new field discoveries represent an actual increase, or are they the result of the change in reporting methodology? Does the EIA methodology place more of a newly discovered field's **ultimate** reserves into the first year reserve estimate, leaving less room for secondary (extension and new pool wildcat) discoveries? If the EIA values represent a true increase in new field discovery rates, the sustainability of a high rate (perhaps 3.5 TCF/yr) of new field discoveries would seem to depend either on the availability of new giant fields or on extremely high rates of exploratory drilling and the availability of massive numbers of small fields, supported by either or both strong price incentives and continued improvements in exploration technologies (especially in terms of lowering the cost of detailed geological surveys).

The comparison of the three overlapping years of EIA and AGA data in figure 18 is tantalizing because the difference between the two data sets is considerably smaller in 1979 than in 1977 and 1978, and the EIA methodology changed in 1979. Some analysts have chosen to use AGA data until either 1978 or 1979, and EIA data thereafter, assuring that the two series are essentially continuous. However, the coincidence between the 1979 EIA and AGA estimates for new field discoveries may be an accident; the two data sets differ considerably for all of the other reserve addition categories in 1979.

The failure to resolve the above issues implies that a credible range for future new field discovery rates would be quite wide. Although defining the range is a matter for subjective judgment, OTA would put the range at about 1.5 to 3.5 TCF/yr for the next 10 to 15 years, **assuming that exploratory drilling remains active for the period.** \* **The range** for the next 2 or 3 years should be narrower, however, perhaps 2.0 to 3.5 or 2.5 to 3.5 TCF/yr. The reasoning for these judgments is as follows:

- The high end of the range for the immediate future is based on the distribution of new field sizes. Because the recent high discovery rate did not depend on discovering giant fields—notoriously erratic occurrences—but on employing a very large number of exploration teams to discover many medium-sized and small fields, the physical ability of the system to maintain its recent new field discovery rates should logically be quite high unless the gas “bubble” and the current slump in drilling and all other exploratory activity continues.
- To obtain the lower end of the 10-to 15-year range, we assumed that the 1970s AGA data more accurately reflect the likely future and that continuing resource depletion will lead to poorer prospects and a slump from the average of 2.0 TCF/yr during that period. Also, it was assumed that the major reasons for the higher EIA values are methodological and do not reflect an **actual** increase over discovery rates reported by AGA. Consequently, the 1.5 TCF/yr reflects AGA conventions and probable followup field growth. The discovery levels actually **recorded by EIA would be expected to be higher than this value, but the reserve growth caused by extensions and new pool tests would then be lower than would be predicted by pre-EIA historical experience.**
- The higher end of the 10- to 15-year range assumes that the EIA data accurately reflect a major upward shift in the finding rate (volume

\*Drilling is now in a substantial slump. The ranges of reserve additions discussed here would be unrealistically high if the current “bubble” in gas deliverability and the related difficulties in marketing new gas were to continue.

of gas discovered per unit of exploratory activity). Additionally, it is assumed that continued improvements in exploration and production technologies allow further increases in finding rates and/or that exploratory drilling rates are increased. This end of the range is aligned with a large resource base.

## Extensions and New Pool Discoveries

As already noted, a new field is generally not sufficiently defined in its year of discovery to allow the "new field discoveries" portion of reported reserve additions to represent all or most of the actual recoverable resource in that field. In the years following discovery, additional exploratory wells are drilled to delineate the full extent of the resources present in the field. Wells that probe the boundaries of reservoirs or fields in order to establish their productive area are called extension wells or extension tests. Wells that search for additional reservoirs within already discovered fields are called new pool tests or new pool wildcats. The reserve additions from extension wells and new pool wildcats represent the results of a secondary or followup discovery process for new fields.

### Factors That Affect Extensions and New Pool Discoveries

As with new field discoveries, the major determinants of extensions and new pool discoveries are the magnitude and nature of the "target" (in this case, not the undiscovered recoverable resource base, but only that portion of the remaining resource associated with discovered fields), the technology available to find the gas, and the nature of the incentives to drill:

- **The target.**—The "resource base" for extensions and new pool discoveries is the inventory of discovered but incompletely delineated fields. Limited data from the late 1960s and 1970s indicate that the major part of new field growth has occurred within the first 5 years after discovery. Consequently, unless incentives for gasfield development are lacking, \* the magnitude of extensions and new

pool discoveries should be strongly **and positively** tied to recent new field discoveries. Additionally, measures that increase current new field discoveries should soon lead to increases in extensions and new pool discoveries as the new fields are further developed.

Aside from the total gas volume represented by the "target," that is, the inventory of discovered fields, the geological characteristics of the fields will also play an important role in determining future extensions and new pool discoveries. For example, older fields that were incompletely developed because a substantial portion of their in-ground resource was subeconomic\* at the time of discovery are now good targets for new exploratory efforts. The size and complexity of newly discovered fields will partially determine the relationship between the initial year-of-discovery reported reserves and the later extensions and new pool discoveries that signify further development of the fields. Because the discovery wells of smaller, less complex fields can generally "prove" a high percentage of their total resource, these fields may offer less opportunity for this later development than was the case with the generally large, complex fields of earlier decades.

- **Technology.**—The same technological factors that affect new field discoveries affect extensions and new pool discoveries. Computer-assisted seismic technology is considered especially important in allowing extension wells and new pool tests to be drilled with high success rates. Fracturing technologies, by opening up previously uneconomic reservoir margins and tight reservoirs in already discovered fields, expand the target resource available.

Advancements in exploratory technology have other, varied effects, however. For example, advanced seismic techniques, by offering a highly accurate picture of the potential of new fields shortly after discovery, may encourage a larger proportion of the ultimate recoverable gas to be drilled and "proved"

\*The current gas "bubble" provides a disincentive for field development.

\*Because of the small size or low permeability of the reservoirs or the low quality of the gas.



in the initial year-of-discovery, leaving less room for followup discoveries. Advanced seismic techniques also may help compress the remaining field delineation into a shorter span of time, leading to increases over expected levels in extensions and new pool discoveries\* for a few years after discovery of the field, followed by a later decrease in expected levels of these reserve additions.

### Historical Variation of Extensions and New Pool Discoveries

Figure 19 and table 17 illustrate the variation of extensions and new pool discoveries\*\* in the Lower 48 States from 1966 to 1983. Extensions

\*That is, increases over the discovery rates projected by using historical data.


\*\*As noted previously, new pool discoveries are reported as "new reservoir discoveries in old fields" in the AGA and EIA reserve reports.

have consistently played the major role in total reserve additions. After declining in the mid to late 1960s, they remained stable around 6,000 BCF/yr from 1969 to 1976 and began to move upwards thereafter. As with the other categories of reserve additions, the shift to EIA data complicates an interpretation of the past few years. According to that data, however, extensions **by themselves** produced reserve additions of 10 TCF in 1981, equaling or surpassing **total** reserve additions in most years of the **1970s**.

Some of the underlying causes of these trends may be understood by examining the trends in extensions of individual PGC reporting areas.<sup>3</sup> Extensions tend to be concentrated in only a few of these areas. Before 1968, field growth (primarily in relatively deep fields) in the Permian Basin

<sup>3</sup>From R. Nehring, "Problems in Natural Gas Reserve, Drilling, and Discovery Data," contractor report to OTA, 1983.

Figure 19.—Additions to Lower 48 Natural Gas Proved Reserves: Extensions and New Pool Discoveries, 1966-83 (BCF)



SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, based on AGA and EIA data.

**Table 17.—Additions to Lower 48 Natural Gas Proved Reserves: Extensions and New Pool Discoveries 1966-83 (BCF)**

Year	Extensions	New pool discoveries	Total
1966 . . . . .	8,767	3,110	<b>11,877</b>
1967 . . . . .	9,472	2,420	<b>11,892</b>
1968 . . . . .	7,037	1,426	<b>8,463</b>
1969 . . . . .	5,800	2,043	<b>7,843</b>
1970 . . . . .	6,146	3,363	<b>9,509</b>
1971 . . . . .	6,375	3,361	<b>9,736</b>
1972 . . . . .	6,154	3,096	<b>9,250</b>
1973 . . . . .	5,931	1,970	<b>7,901</b>
1974 . . . . .	5,693	1,952	<b>7,645</b>
1975 . . . . .	5,926	1,649	<b>7,575</b>
1976 . . . . .	5,337	1,994	<b>7,331</b>
1977 . . . . .	6,569 (8,056) <sup>a</sup>	2,144 (3,301)	<b>8,713 (11,357)</b>
1978 . . . . .	6,720 (9,582)	1,964 (4,277)	<b>8,684 (13,859)</b>
1979 . . . . .	7,112 (8,949)	1,690 (2,566)	<b>8,802 (11,515)</b>
1980 . . . . .	(9,046)	(2,577)	<b>(11,623)</b>
1981 . . . . .	(10,485)	(2,994)	<b>(13,429)</b>
1982 . . . . .	(8,349)	(3,419)	<b>(11,768)</b>
1983 . . . . .	(6,908)	(2,965)	<b>(9,873)</b>

<sup>a</sup>The values in parentheses are from EIA data; all other values are AGA reserve data.

SOURCES: Office of Technology Assessment, based on data from Energy Information Administration, *U.S. Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids Reserves—1983 Annual Report*, DOE/EIA-0216 (83), October 1984, and American Petroleum Institute, American Gas Association, and Canadian Petroleum Association, *Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquids, and Natural Gas in the United States and Canada as of December 31, 1979*, vol. 34, June 1980.

provided a major fraction of total U.S. extensions—e. g., 43 percent in 1966. A sharp decline in Permian Basin reserve growth in 1968 was the primary reason for the general decline in extensions at the same time. The increase in extensions nationwide, beginning in 1977, resulted primarily from increases in:

- Western Overthrust Belt development;
- development of the deep Anadarko Basin;
- tight gas sand development in Northeast Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana; and
- Texas gulf coast development, including offshore fields, the South Texas Lobo Trend, and tight sands in the Austin Chalk.

## Implications

Although the shift in data collection from AGA to EIA complicates interpretation, the sum of extensions and new pool discoveries has apparently been increasing from about 1976 to the present. In the AGA data, however, the increase only takes these “followup” discoveries back toward the levels achieved during the brief surge in new pool discoveries that occurred in the early 1970s.

The EIA data show a considerably higher level of “followup” discoveries at about the levels that AGA estimated for 1966 and 1967.

In order to understand the recent variations in extensions and new pool discoveries, it is generally necessary to track the new field discoveries that serve as the “inventory” for the secondary exploration process. There is no obvious trend in the **national** new field discovery pattern (fig. 18) that would explain the recent higher level of secondary discoveries; AGA new field discovery data in the period immediately before this apparent surge in secondary discoveries show no similar increase. Consequently, in order to understand fully the causes of the recent surge, it probably is necessary to undertake a detailed examination of data at the level of individual fields. This is beyond the scope of OTA’s study. However, some reasonable hypotheses can be fashioned based on the available data.

One possible explanation for the recent increases in extensions and new pool discoveries is that the increment over “normal” levels represents the delayed development of fields discovered earlier but not developed for economic reasons. The **dip** in new pool discoveries from about 1973-76 (fig. 19), which occurred despite an earlier period of steady new field discoveries that normally should have maintained steady levels of extensions and new pool discoveries, supports this explanation.

Some field-specific data also support a “delayed development” cause for part of the increases. For example, recent extensions in the Austin Chalk fields in southeast Texas appear to be tied to old fields that were marginally economic when discovered and had never undergone major development before recent price increases encouraged a reexamination. Because these fields were not “new,” recent discoveries were probably recorded as extensions and new pool discoveries, even though there was little in the way of previously recorded new field discovery “inventory” to trace as the statistical cause of these secondary discoveries.

Similarly, another of the areas providing a substantial fraction of the increased extensions—the Western over-thrust Belt—probably also followed

a delayed pattern of development. In this area, there was little incentive to delineate immediately the first new fields discovered because there was no means to transport the gas. Consequently, a substantial inventory of new fields could have built up until a point was reached where it became clear that the area contained sufficient reserves to justify a pipeline. Attaining this level of reserves would have introduced an incentive for field delineation, and secondary exploration would have then proceeded to cause a surge in extensions.

An additional cause of the recent higher recorded levels of secondary discoveries could be an acceleration in the pace of field size delineation and development. Such an acceleration would result in the field size growth that in the past might have been spread out over a 60-year span being compressed into a shorter time period, with higher levels of annual reserve additions during this shorter period. Accelerated field size growth would be an expected consequence of higher gas prices, although the recent problems of reduced gas demand would tend to have the reverse effect, that of slowing down the pace of growth.

To summarize, two possible causes for recent increases in extensions and new pool discoveries are an accelerated field development pace and the delayed development of earlier new field discoveries whose development was (at least in part) initially uneconomic. If these are indeed the primary causes of the increases, this has important implications for future reserve additions. First, the faster pace of development means that **fewer** opportunities for field growth will be available in the later years of development; this should tend to decrease future reserve additions unless the rate of new field discoveries increases. Second, unless additional opportunities for growth from older fields are available, this source of "inventory" for extensions and new pool discoveries is unlikely to allow continuation of the currently high reported levels of reserve additions. Although continuing technological advances and future gas price increases could offer some potential for sustaining reserve additions from older fields, the actual potential for reserve additions

from this source is controversial. \* In any case, most of any additional reserve growth from older fields seems likely to be attributed to infill drilling and other causes that will be reported as positive revisions rather than as extensions and new pool discoveries.

Recent and future discoveries of new fields still provide the primary source of inventory for future extensions and new pool discoveries. Consequently, future reserve additions from extensions and new pools depend heavily on the meaning of the sharply higher levels of new **field discoveries reported during 5 of the past 7 years by EIA**. As discussed in the "New Fields" section, OTA suspects that part of the reason why EIA's compilation of new field discoveries is substantially greater in magnitude than the levels shown by AGA is that the EIA data captures some of the reserves that AGA would have reported as second-year extensions, new pool discoveries, or positive revisions. If this is correct, the "growth factor" that should be applied to EIA's new field discovery data to account for field growth after the year of discovery will be smaller than the growth factor applicable to **AGA** data. For this reason, we do **not** believe that continuation of high levels of extensions and new pool discoveries is probable under current conditions.

Aside from the effects of the change in reporting, there are other reasons to believe that future levels of extensions and new pool discoveries may drop. First, much of the field growth in the past has come from the giant fields that took years to develop. A large percentage of recent new field discoveries, however, are small, class E (less than 6 BCF of recoverable gas) fields that will require little additional exploratory drilling past the initial wildcat. Second, the suspected acceleration in the pace of field development implies that some of the development that might in the past have taken place in the second year (and that would have been reported as extensions and new pool discoveries) now takes place in the first and will be reported as part of the "new field discoveries" reserve additions. Finally, the high capital requirements for developing new fields in hos-

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\*As discussed in ch. 4, "New Gas From Old Fields. "

tile environments—an increasing part of the remaining resource—demand a more thorough initial estimate of reserves, possibly leading to lower (statistical) growth later on.

To conclude, OTA does not believe it is likely that recent reserve additions from extensions and new pool discoveries of 12 to 14 TCF/yr will be sustained in the future even if the gas “bubble” ends and its negative effects on drilling cease, instead, we project a range of 6 to 11 TCF/yr as an average over the next 10 to 15 years, except that for 1985-86 we project a range of 8 to 12 TCF/yr. The sole possibility of a higher long-term rate of reserve additions from this source lies with the discovery of several new, complex, super giant gasfields with large growth potentials; however, this possibility appears low.

## Revisions

Revisions indicate changes in the volume of proved reserves that result from new information gained by drilling and production experience and corrections made to earlier estimates during the reporting year.

The AGA and DOE/EIA reporting of revisions is not identical because EIA has a separate category of “adjustments and corrections” that includes adjustments for changes in data samples, corrections of reporting errors, inclusion of late **responses, and other factors. Theoretically**, AGA’s revisions should be equivalent to the sum of EIA’s revisions, adjustments, and corrections. However, the data gathering and analysis methods used by the two surveys are radically different, and their reserve and reserve addition estimates in the 3 years of overlap do not show good agreement. Consequently, they are not equivalent, although in displaying historical trends AGA revisions will be compared to EIA revisions plus adjustments and corrections.

## Factors Affecting Revisions

Generally, revisions occur because of uncertainty associated with estimating the extent of the underground reservoir rock within a trap, the porosity and permeability of that rock, water saturation, pressure, and other physical reservoir characteristics that affect the cumulative volume of

production over the life of the reservoir. Revisions tend to be a “catchall” category of reserve additions and deletions, and the many sources of revisions are difficult to separate out of the data. These sources include:


1. new knowledge gained by normal development drilling and production experience (e.g., changes in reservoir pressure decline trends that indicate that earlier estimates were incorrect);
2. numerical errors in the original compilation of reserve estimates;
3. discoveries for which reporting had been delayed;
4. development drilling on a closer spacing that “discovers” new reserves\*;
5. changes in production economics that lower or raise the abandonment pressure of a reservoir or that allow or prevent the use of well-stimulation techniques that increase recovery efficiency;
6. knowledge gained from extension tests that indicate a decrease in the estimated proved area of a reservoir or field (an **increase** would be recorded as an extension); and
7. miscellaneous statistical corrections and adjustments to the data.

Sources 2, 3, and 7 are considered “Adjustments and Corrections” by EIA and are reported separately.

## Historical Variation of Revisions

From 1966 to 1983, net revisions were easily the most volatile of any of the four types of reserve additions. In the data reported by AGA for the contiguous 48 States, revisions varied from +6,256 BCF in 1967 to -3,546 BCF in 1973. In the EIA data for the same area, revisions plus adjustments and corrections varied from -2,911 BCF in 1977 to +4,346 BCF in 1981. Consequently, the year-to-year changes in revisions were the primary determinant of the year-to-year changes in gross reserve additions during the past 16 years. **As** shown in figure 20, **a** series of sub-

\*New reserves “discovered” by a development well would be recorded as a revision if the gas is located in a pocket within the established boundaries of a reservoir yet is physically isolated from the reservoir’s main drainage system and would not otherwise be produced.

**Figure 20.—Additions to Lower 48 Natural Gas Proved Reserves: Revisions As Reported,<sup>a</sup>1966-83 (BCF)**

aNOTE: EIA plots for revisions + adjustments and Corrections.

SOURCES Office of Technology Assessment, based on data from Energy Information Administration, *U S Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids Reserves—1983 Annual Report, DOE/EIA-0216 (83)*, October 1984, and American Petroleum Institute, American Gas Association, and Canadian Petroleum Association, *Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquids, and Natural Gas in the United States and Canada as of December 31, 1979*, vol 34, June 1980

stantial positive revisions in the mid-1960s changed to net negative revisions in almost every year in the 1970s, particularly in the onshore contiguous 48 States. As discussed later, understanding the role of these revisions is important in interpreting reserve changes during this period.

The largest negative revisions in the 1970s were reported in onshore south Louisiana and Texas Railroad Commission Districts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. Together, they contributed a total of over 30 TCF and proved to be remarkably persistent, continuing throughout the 1970s in both the AGA and EIA data. They were concentrated in older fields that had been producing for one to three decades before the revisions began.

The negative revisions in these six areas appear to be causally related to a situation that encouraged optimism in reserve calculations. During the

1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, **exploration** for natural gas in and adjacent to the gulf coast was highly successful. As a result, much more gas was discovered than could be produced, given the small size of the national natural gas market at the time. The transmission companies, having contracted for reserves with a productive capacity substantially exceeding what they could market, developed a system for prorating production among operators on a basis of remaining reserves (i.e., the larger an operator's reserves, the more gas the transmission companies would buy). This created a strong incentive for the operators to provide the most optimistic estimates of reserves they could justify. By 1970, following years of increasing production and gradual depletion, the operators were beginning to realize that **reserves** were overstated. The size, timing, and geographic distribution of the reported negative revisions that

followed depended primarily on when each major operating company recognized the problem and how they decided to revise their estimates downward, choosing to take them all at once or spreading them out over several years.<sup>4</sup>

### Implications

An argument can be made that the historical record, erratic as it seems, supports the idea of generally positive revisions in the long term. This is based on the view that the large but localized negative revisions of the 1970s appear to have ended. The trends in revisions for the areas **outside** the source area for the negative revisions seem far more positive.<sup>5</sup> For example, if the gulf coast revisions were subtracted from the total Lower 48 revisions, as shown in figure 21, the


"amended revisions" would appear to support a projection of positive future revisions. On the other hand, an examination of the sources of revisions indicates that extreme caution should be used in forecasting the direction of future revisions.

Of the seven sources of revisions listed previously, the second and seventh are essentially random. The others either will always yield positive revisions, will always yield negative revisions, or may have a bias in one direction or the other. The first source, drilling and production experience, would be random if there were no incentives to be either pessimistic or optimistic in reserve calculations. However, the requirement to raise capital for field development or to meet minimum reserve requirements for a new pipeline are powerful incentives for optimistic reserve estimates. A tendency toward optimistic estimates would result in mostly negative revisions from drilling and production experience. The large

<sup>4</sup>Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>T. J. Woods, "On Natural Gas Trends," Gas Research Institute, 1982; R. Nehring, contractor report to OTA, op. cit.

**Figure 21.—Additions to Lower 48 Natural Gas Proved Reserves: Revisions As Amended,<sup>a</sup> 1966-83 (BCF)**



aNOTE: EIA plots are for revisions + adjustments and corrections.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

negative revisions of the 1970s in the gulf coast and adjacent provinces appear to have resulted from just such a tendency.

The fifth source, changes in production economics, also could be random in that gas prices could rise faster (yielding positive revisions) or slower (negative revisions) than the costs of operating fields and enhancing production. Although rigid price controls or the competition of low-priced alternative fuels could conceivably lead to negative revisions from this source, it seems more likely that most such revisions would be positive, especially if gas becomes scarcer. In support of this argument, the growth in reserves attributed to well reworking, infill drilling, and lowered abandonment pressures—growth that would be reported as positive revisions—is seen by some analysts as an extremely important component of future reserve additions (see ch. 4, section on “New Gas From Old Fields”).

Of the remaining sources of revisions, the third and fourth will always yield positive revisions, and the sixth always will yield negative revisions. \*

The confusing mix of “positive,” “negative,” and “random” sources of revision make it extremely difficult to predict how revisions will behave in the future. Also, revisions data do not indicate which previous years’ data are being revised. Consequently, it is difficult to know the causes of past revisions—a necessary prerequisite for intelligent forecasting. For these reasons, some analysts disregard revisions entirely in their trend analyses and implicitly assume they will not be a significant component of future reserve additions.

A reasonable range of average yearly revisions for the next 10 to 15 years appears to be 0 to 2 TCF/yr, with the positive tendency based on OTA’s belief that there may be some significant potential from the growth of older fields due to lowered abandonment pressures, infill drilling, and the like.

\*The sixth, knowledge gained from extension tests, yields only negative revisions because an increase in reserves caused by this source would be reported as an extension.

## Reserves-to-Production Ratio

Because the reserves-to-production ratio, (R/P), measures the rate at which gas is produced from discovered reservoirs, it represents the analytical link between projections of new discoveries and forecasts of gas production.

### Factors Affecting R/P

At the level of the individual production firm, the selection of a production rate—and, consequently, the selection of the R/P—represents an economic tradeoff between the cost of drilling additional wells and installing additional gas gathering and processing facilities (i.e., the cost of increasing production), on the one hand, and the cost of holding reserves in the ground, on the other. Consequently, factors such as exploration and development costs, present and expected future gas prices, and interest rates all affect the R/P. For example, increases in current prices will theoretically lead to faster production, while expectations of real increases in future prices can cause production to be delayed.<sup>6</sup>

In oil production, it is well known that too fast a production rate—too low an R/P—can cause a premature decline in production and a loss of potentially recoverable reserves. For example, in a reservoir whose pressure is supplied mainly by water that displaces the oil as it is produced (a “water-drive” reservoir), an overly rapid rate of production can cause the encroaching water to flow around less permeable sections of the reservoir, leaving behind the oil in these sections. When the water reaches the well, the added costs of water separation and disposal can cause premature abandonment.<sup>7</sup>

Because gas flows more easily than oil, there is far more leeway in gas production, and production rates frequently can vary over a wide range. There are, however, the same kinds of physical limits to gas production as to oil production. Although some loss of ultimately recoverable gas from the well may be acceptable to the

<sup>6</sup>Douglas Bohi and Michael Toman, “Understanding Nonrenewable Resource Supply Behavior,” *Science*, vol. 219, Feb. 25, 1983.

<sup>7</sup>P. A. Stockil (ed.), *Our Industry Petroleum* (London: British Petroleum Co. Ltd., 1977).

producer in exchange for a more rapid payback (from the higher flow rate), the potential for large losses will serve to limit flow rates.

Aside from the obvious economic factors and physical limitations to avoid resource loss, several other factors affect R/P:

- **Technology .—The major technology affecting R/P may be rock-fracturing methods. The use of massive hydraulic fracturing and other fracturing techniques can open** up low-permeability rock and cause marginal wells with low flow rates to become rapid producers. The availability of sophisticated seismic exploratory techniques has reduced overall drilling costs—enhancing the incentive to drill additional wells to expand production—by increasing the success ratio; it also has helped improve the placement of successful wells to maximize production.
- **Geology.**—The rate of gas flow is directly dependent on the permeability of the gas reservoir formation and on its pressure and thickness. Although fracturing can partly compensate for low permeability, wells in tight gas formations generally produce much more slowly than do wells in more permeable rock because the fractures do not reach all of the tight reservoir rock. Similarly, gas in deep over-pressure formations will for short periods of time produce far more rapidly than in shallow, low-pressure formations; \* in fact, the high pressures in such formations have caused severe technical problems in fields such as the Fletcher Field in southwestern Oklahoma, where wells and drilling equipment have been destroyed by failure to control the enormous pressures built up deep undergrounds. Also, field size distributions may affect R/P because smaller fields, which will be of increasing importance in future reserve additions, may be produced faster than large, complex fields.
- **Field Maturity .—Early** in a field's lifetime, R/Ps are typically very high because the ma-

jor focus is on reserve delineation rather than development; during this period, pipeline and gas processing capacity may be nonexistent or minimal and markets may be undeveloped. As pipeline capacity is added and sales contracts signed, the R/P will decrease rapidly. As the field tends toward depletion, the R/P may rise again as gas pressures drop and as drilling gravitates to the marginal, low-permeability formations. However, because the R/P will equal 1.0 in the last year of a field's production, the R/P will decrease during the very last years of the field.

- **Conservation Regulations.**—Some gas-producing States directly regulate production-related variables such as well spacing and flow rates. These regulations are intended to promote efficient development of reserves to prevent loss of ultimate recovery. Their origin lies in the disruption caused by the discovery of the east Texas field in 1930 and the large over supply and resulting wasteful gas production practices that followed.
- **Market Demand.**—When the market is demand-limited (deliverability exceeds demand), as it is today, the R/P no longer provides a measure of gas production capacity. Low demand can raise the R/P.
- **Reserve Requirements.**—The substantial capital requirements of gas transmission and distribution systems has led the transmission and distribution companies as well as Government regulatory agencies to pursue long-term contracts requiring high R/Ps and high reserve requirements for pipeline approvals. These requirements do not apply, however, to mature areas where pipeline capacity is already in place.

### Historical Variation of R/P\*

The early years of gas discovery in this country were marked by lack of a gas distribution network, substantial discoveries of gas as a low-valued or even unwanted byproduct of oil ex-

\*However, once the "propping effect" of the gas under pressure is removed by partial production, the permeability of the reservoir may be reduced to "tight gas" levels, and production will slow.

\*'Fletcher Area Underscores Perils in Deep Gas Reservoirs,' *Oil and Gas Journal*, Feb. 7, 1983, p. 25.

\*R. E. Megill, *An Introduction to Exploration Economics* (Tulsa, OK: Petroleum Publishing Co., 1971).

\*Based on Jensen Associates, inc., *Understanding Natural Gas Supply in the U. S.*, April 1983, contractor report to OTA.



ploration, and the eventual discovery of enormous reserves (e.g., the 1922 discovery of the giant Hugoton field in Kansas) that overwhelmed existing demand. The combination led to very high R/Ps in the 1920-40 period, followed by an era of continued decline.


In the early years of the post-world War II growth, as new pipeline systems were constructed, previously unproductive proved reserves were developed. This activity increased the level of production without adding substantially to the volume of proved reserves, thus lowering the R/P. Later in the 1960s and 1970s, when the natural gas market had become supply constrained, production was again maintained by further development and a lowering of the R/P. At this time, however, the ability to obtain greater production from a given volume of proved reserves was improved by a geographical shift in production to the Gulf of Mexico and encouraged by economic changes that favored more rapid extraction rates.

The decline in the R/P from 1946 to 1983 for the Lower 48 States is shown in figure 22. **The AGA data cover the period 1946 through 1979, while DOE/EIA includes only the 7 years from 1977 through 1983.** \*

The AGA data show strong year-to-year declines in the R/P over virtually the entire 34-year period of available data. Recently, the rate of decline eased from an average of over 0.8 per year between 1966 and 1974, to an average of 0.5 per year during the 1975-79 period. DOE/EIA estimated dry gas data show a further easing of the decline rate to about 0.2 per year between 1977 and 1981, and an actual increase in R/P thereafter due to the weak markets for gas and relatively strong reserve replacements during 1981-83.

Currently, the lowest R/P for the nonassociated gas of a major producing State is 8.4 in Louisiana. The lowest R/P for any geographical subdivision published by the DOE/EIA reserves report was a 5.0 for the State domain of the Texas offshore

**Figure 22.—Reserve-to-Production Ratios for Natural Gas in the Lower 48 States**



SOURCES: Office of Technology Assessment, based on data from Energy Information Administration, U.S. *Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids Reserves—1983 Annual Report, DOE/EI-0216 (63)*, October 1984, and American Petroleum Institute, American Gas Association, and Canadian Petroleum Association, *Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquids, and Natural Gas in the United States and Canada as of December 31, 1979*, vol. 34, June 1980.

(for 1982). The total Texas and Louisiana offshore, representing about one-third of Lower 48 State production, stood at 6.5 in 1981 and 8.4 in 1983. With the Gulf of Mexico excluded, the balance of the Lower 48 States had a 1981 R/P of 9.8 and a 1983 R/P of 11.7. Contrasting strongly with the lower R/Ps of the gulf coast would be that of 26.3 for the heavily depleted reservoirs of Kansas and 23.6 in Wyoming, where field development for newly discovered reserves was incomplete in 1983.

### Implications

These recent examples of R/Ps for different areas of the United States may indicate that the Lower 48 State R/P could move further downward in future years if gas supplies were found in areas with combinations of high reservoir permeabilities and economics that favor extensive field development. \* This is in fact what happened throughout the 1970s as the Gulf of Mexico be-

\* \*These displayed ratios are developed using the year-end reserves estimate for the year prior to the production period. This approach to calculating the R/P stems from a belief that production in a given year is more likely to be representative of reserves that are available at the beginning of the year.

\*Some opinion exists, however, that some of the lower R/Ps are due to underreporting of reserves rather than to extremely rapid production. If true, this might indicate less potential for further lowering the national R/P.

came an increasingly large component of the total supply. Between 1973 and 1981 the Gulf's share of production grew from 20 to 33 percent.

An additional factor that might tend to push the R/P downwards is a continuation of current discovery trends towards smaller field sizes. It is widely believed that smaller fields will be delineated, developed, and produced over shorter periods of time than was historically the case with the mix of field sizes discovered until now.

On the other hand, some factors could cause the R/P to climb upward. Future production trends may tend to increase the shares of gas from tighter, lower permeability reservoirs and other sources more expensive to develop, which could lead to slow rates of production from proved reserves. For example, both the deep Tuscaloosa trend and the Western Overthrust Belt are expected to have relatively high R/Ps; field development and gas processing costs for these areas are too high to allow rapid depletion at current gas prices.<sup>10</sup> In addition, the R/P might tend to increase if future reserve additions were below annual production rates because the production capability (as a percentage of remaining reserves) of reservoirs tends to decline with their age, \* and a rate of reserve additions that is below replacement levels will lead to an increasing average age for U.S. gas reservoirs.<sup>11</sup>

It is important to note that the balance between demand and supply will also play a critical role in determining the R/P. Because the purpose of

this evaluation is to examine the potential for gas supply **if gas is highly sought after, gas production—and, consequently R/P**—is assumed to be based on a supply-limited situation. \* \* This situation would tend to intensify the incentives to develop fields rapidly and to maximize production (minimize R/P). Rapid field development should not be expected, however, if the current gas "bubble" of oversupply continues. In this case, field development and production are likely to be slowed.

In conclusion, expected R/Ps in 15 to 20 years may range from values below recent (pre-bubble) levels—perhaps 7.0, or even somewhat lower—to levels slightly higher—perhaps 9.5. Part of the future trend will be caused by the geologic nature of new discoveries and their geographic environment. These factors can be manipulated somewhat but are more likely to be imposed by the random success of future exploration. Because the R/P is also strongly affected by the willingness to drill development wells and to take other (expensive) production-enhancing measures, large increases in gas prices would tend to drive the R/P down to its lower limit. The lower value obviously can occur only with high gas demand, an assumption of this study. If gas demand were poor, the R/P could exceed 9.5 for a while. Eventually, however, the lack of exploration incentives would move proved reserves back into balance with production requirements.

## Production Scenarios

Table 18 summarizes the ranges of reserve additions and R/Ps projected for Lower 48 natural

<sup>10</sup> F. Hardy and C. P. Neill, testimony to the Subcommittee on Fossil and Synthetic Fuels, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, June 1, 1981.

\* Up to a point. During the last few years of a reservoir's life, its R/P must decrease because, in the last year, it will be 1.0. The last year's production will use up the entire remaining reserve.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

\* \* That is, a situation where additional supplies at prevailing prices would be easily absorbed,

**Table 18.-Summary of Projections of Components of Reserve Additions and R/Ps**

New field discoveries. . . . .	1985-86	2.0-3.5 TCF/yr
	1987-2000	1.5-3.5 TCF/yr
Extensions and new pool discoveries. . . . .	1985-86	8.0-12 TCF/yr
	1987-2000	6.0-11 TCF/yr
Revisions. . . . .	1985-2000	0-2.0 TCF/yr
R/P. . . . .	<b>2000</b>	<b>7.0-9.5</b>
Scenario 1A: reserve additions. . . . .	1985-86	17.5 TCF/yr
	1987-2000	16.5 TCF/yr
R/P. . . . .	2000	7.0
Scenario 1 B: reserve additions. . . . .	1985-86	10.5 TCF/yr
	1987-2000	7.5 TCF/yr
R/P. . . . .	2000	9.5

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment.

gas development. Tables 19 and 20 present production and reserves projections that represent the two extremes of the ranges in table 18. The first projection assumes an optimistic exploration future and rapid production of newly found reserves—predicated upon high gas prices, high demand, and an avoidance of large reserve additions in low permeability areas that are hard to develop rapidly. The second projection assumes low finding rates and an increase in low perme-

bility reserves where production rates are limited. Because each projection represents a convergence of events of relatively low probability—e.g., the lowest rates of new field discoveries, extensions and new pool discoveries, zero revisions, and an upturn in R/P—the projections should be viewed as approximately bounding the range of production and proved reserve levels, rather than as identifying likely values.

**Table 19.—Lower 48 States Natural Gas Production and Reserves 1981.2000 (in TCF)**  
**SCENARIO 1A: Optimistic Exploration, Rapid Production**

Year	Production	Reserve additions	Proved reserves	R/P <sup>a</sup>
1981 (actual) . . . . .	18.5	21.5	168.6	9.0
1982 (actual) . . . . .	17.2	15.1	166.5	9.8
1983 (actual) . . . . .	15.5	15.0	166.0	10.7
1984 . . . . .	16.0	15.0	165.0	10.4
1985 . . . . .	18.0	17.5	164.5	9.2
1986 . . . . .	18.3	17.5	163.7	9.0
1987 . . . . .	18.6	16.5	161.6	8.8
1988 . . . . .	18.8	16.5	159.3	8.6
1989 . . . . .	19.0	16.5	156.8	8.4
1990 . . . . .	18.9	16.5	154.4	8.3
1991 . . . . .	18.8	16.5	152.1	8.2
1992 . . . . .	18.8	16.5	149.8	8.1
1993 . . . . .	18.7	16.5	147.6	8.0
1994 . . . . .	18.9	16.5	145.2	7.8
1995 . . . . .	18.9	16.5	142.8	7.7
1996 . . . . .	18.8	16.5	140.5	7.6
1997 . . . . .	18.7	16.5	138.3	7.5
1998 . . . . .	18.7	16.5	136.1	7.4
1999 . . . . .	18.6	16.5	134.0	7.3
2000 . . . . .	18.6	16.5	131.9	7.2

Cumulative production after 1982 = 330.6 = 42% of USGS remaining resource.

aR/P calculated by dividing previous year's (year end) reserves by production in the listed Year

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment.

**Table 20.— Lower 48 States Natural Gas Production and Reserves 1981.2000 (in TCF)**  
**SCENARIO 1 B: Pessimistic Exploration, Slowed Production**

Year	Production	Reserve additions	Proved reserves	R/P <sup>a</sup>
1981 (actual) . . . . .	18.5	21.5	168.6	<b>9.0</b>
1982 (actual) . . . . .	17.2	15.1	166.5	<b>9.8</b>
1983 (actual) . . . . .	15.5	15.0	166.0	<b>10.7</b>
1984 . . . . .	16.0	15.0	165.0	<b>10.4</b>
1985 . . . . .	18.0	10.5	157.5	<b>9.2</b>
1986 . . . . .	17.3	10.5	150.7	<b>9.1</b>
1987 . . . . .	16.6	7.5	141.6	<b>9.1</b>
1988 . . . . .	15.6	7.5	133.5	<b>9.1</b>
1989 . . . . .	14.5	7.5	126.0	<b>9.2</b>
1990 . . . . .	13.7	7.5	119.8	<b>9.2</b>
1991 . . . . .	13.0	7.5	114.3	<b>9.2</b>
1992 . . . . .	12.3	7.5	109.5	<b>9.3</b>
1993 . . . . .	11.8	7.5	105.2	<b>9.3</b>
1994 . . . . .	11.3	7.5	101.4	<b>9.3</b>
1995 . . . . .	10.8	7.5	98.1	
1996 . . . . .	10.4	7.5	95.2	<b>9.4</b>
1997 . . . . .	10.1	7.5	92.6	<b>9.4</b>
1998 . . . . .	9.8	7.5	90.3	<b>9.5</b>
1999 . . . . .	9.5	7.5	88.3	<b>9.5</b>
2000 . . . . .	9.3	7.5	86.5	<b>9.5</b>

Cumulative production after 1982 = 236TCF = 31% of USGS remaining resource.

aR/P calculated by dividing previous year's (year end) reserves by production in the listed Year

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment


## APPROACH NUMBER 2—PROJECTING NEW POOL DISCOVERIES, EXTENSIONS, AND REVISIONS AS A SINGLE GROWTH FACTOR

The preceding approach is designed to allow a projection of future gas reserves based on separate estimates of new field discoveries, extensions, new pool discoveries, and revisions. An alternative method is to project only new field discoveries and apply a "growth factor" to these discoveries that combines the effects of the three categories of reserve additions.

USGS has used a field growth approach to calculate the amount of gas remaining to be discovered in the inventory of identified fields. In that application, a curve was constructed that describes the reserve growth in initial discoveries that occurs after the year of discovery, averaged over all discovered fields nationwide and over 9 of the 14 discovery years where appropriate data were available (1966-79). This curve, illustrated in figure 23, shows a 60-year growth in reserves to about four times the initial (discovery year) estimate of gas volumes discovered. The curve shows that most of this growth occurs in the first 5 years after the discovery year. In the USGS calculation, the curve was applied to the initial discoveries reported in every discovery year, assuming that reserve growth patterns of recently discovered fields would be the same as the patterns of much older discoveries. The gas volumes calculated in this manner—gas that is difficult to classify as discovered or undiscovered—are called "inferred reserves" by USGS.

This method may be extended to project how the first-year estimates of reserve additions from future new field discoveries will grow in the years following the discovery year. However, certain adjustments have to be made. First, a growth factor calculated by tracking "initial discoveries" data must be increased if it is to apply directly to new field discovery data. This is because the discovery data<sup>13</sup> includes not only new field discoveries, but also "certain hydrocarbon accumulations which are significant from the standpoint

**Figure 23.—The Growth of Year-of-Discovery Estimates of the Amount of Recoverable Natural Gas Discovered in the Lower 48 States**



SOURCE: D. H. Root, "Estimation of Inferred Plus Indicated Reserves for the United States," app. F in *Estimates of Undiscovered Recoverable Conventional Resources of Oil and Gas in the United States*, U.S. Geological Survey Circular 860, 1981.

that advances in exploration technology resulted in the discovery of such reservoirs.<sup>14</sup> Consequently, the year-of-discovery values are larger than those of "new field discoveries," and the later expansion is lower because some technology-based expansions are excluded. Adjusting the calculated growth factor to account only for growth of new fields may raise the factor by about 20 percent.<sup>15</sup>

Second, for the method to be credible, the assumption that the historical growth curve will continue to be valid must be relaxed somewhat. Many of the factors affecting the growth of recoverable reserves in newly discovered fields have changed; consequently, it appears likely that the growth curve has changed as well. The development of a credible forecasting procedure depends on defining a new curve or family of curves that logically fit these changed conditions.

Table 21 lists the arguments—some speculative—that support an increase or decrease (over historical levels of field growth) in the ultimate magnitude of reserve growth in new fields. \*

<sup>12</sup>U.S. Geological Survey Circular 860, app. F.

<sup>13</sup>The data came from table XIV of *Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquids, and Natural Gas in the United States and Canada*, vols. 21-34, 1966 through 1979, American Gas Association/American Petroleum Institute/Canadian Petroleum Association.

<sup>14</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup>Robert Paszkiewicz, Jensen Associates, personal communication.

\*These conditions are the same as those affecting revisions, extensions, and new pool discoveries.

**Table 21.—Arguments<sup>a</sup> for the Question,  
“Will the Reserve Growth in New Fields Be  
Larger or Smaller Than the Growth Recorded  
in Previously Discovered Fields?”**

**A. New fields will grow more:**

1. Recent increases in real gas prices are leading to greater recovery factors for gasfields—from closer spacing of development wells, extensions into less-permeable margins of reservoirs, exploitation of smaller pools, lowering of abandonment pressures, and reworking of older wells. Together, they increase the ultimate recovery (reported cumulative production at field abandonment).
2. The historical growth factor does not accurately reflect the actual field growth. The large negative revisions in onshore south Louisiana and Texas have artificially depressed reported field-growth rates. Because these revisions were due to a unique set of circumstances, they are unlikely to recur, and reported growth rates should increase.

**B. New fields will grow less:**

1. Part of the reason that the levels of new field discoveries reported by EIA were higher than those reported by AGA during the 3 years the two reports overlapped is probably that EIA reported reserve additions during the discovery year that AGA did not report until the second year. Therefore, when EIA-reported trends are used to project future new field discoveries, the growth factor used should be smaller than the historical average, which was derived from AGA data.
2. The historical growth factor was derived from data developed during a time when giant gasfields dominated gas reserves. Giant fields with multiple pools take many years to develop and are generally believed to have greater relative growth than small fields. Present and future field sizes will be smaller and should be expected to have smaller growth factors and faster development.
3. Improvements in seismic and other exploration technology, as well as in reservoir engineering, allow clearer initial delineation of field boundaries and other field characteristics and more accurate first-year reserve estimates. This should leave less room for growth.
4. Increased gas prices have led to acceleration of field development. Some of the development that might previously have taken place in the second year now takes place in the first year and is reported as part of the initial new field discovery reserve data.
5. High capital requirements to develop new fields in hostile environments—an increasing feature of today's resource base—require a more accurate first-year estimate of reserves, leading to lower “growth” later on.

<sup>a</sup>Some of these arguments are speculative. For example, in B.1., OTA has not determined the cause of the AGA/EIA differences in reported new field discoveries.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

USGS's estimate is not the only available estimate of field growth. Table 22 presents three other estimates, with ultimate growth ranging from 3.5 to 6.3 times the initial year-of-discovery estimate.

In order to use the “growth factor” approach to project future gas production, Jensen Associates, Inc., an OTA contractor, constructed a simple model that applied growth curves similar to that in figure 23 to both known fields and to projected levels of new field discoveries. A growth curve that reached a factor of 4.0 in 60 years was applied to all pre-1982 discoveries, while curves with 30-year growth periods were applied to discoveries from 1982 on. The period of 30 years was selected to reflect OTA's belief that the pace of field development has quickened. The choice is a guess because data sufficient to calculate a new timetable are not available. The uncertainty in the ultimate value for the growth factor is reflected in a range of values from **3.0 to 5.0**. In OTA's opinion, 5.0 represents an optimistic upper-bound on future growth in new fields.

Tables 23 through 25 present the results of three scenarios representing the search for reasonable upper- and lower-bounds on future gas

**Table 22.—Alternative Estimates of Growth Factors  
for Initial Reserve Estimates for Gasfields**

Author	Suggested growth factors
1. USGS (Root) (1981) , .	4.0, all fields
2. Haun (1981) . . . . .	4.0, fields younger than 48 years 5.0, fields older than 48 years
3. Hubbert (1974) . . . . .	3.5, all fields
4. Marsh (1971) . . . . .	5.0, fields younger than 28 years 6.3, fields older than 28 years

1. D. H. Root, “Estimation of Inferred Plus Indicated Reserves for the United States,” app. F in G. L. Dolton, et al., *Estimates of Undiscovered Recoverable Conventional Resources of Oil and Gas in the United States*, U S Geological Survey Circular 660, 1981.
2. J. D. Haun, “Future of Petroleum Exploration in the United States,” *AAPG Bulletin* 656(10), 1981.
3. M. K. Hubbert, “U S, Energy Resources, A Review as of 1972,” S Res 45, ser. No. 93-40 (92-75), Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U S Senate, 1974, cited in Haun, *ibid*.
4. G. R. Marsh, “How Much Oil Are We Really Finding,” *Oil and Gas Journal*, Apr 5, 1971, cited in Haun, *op cit*.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment

production. \* For each scenario, the "growth curve" methodology was applied only to non-associated gas. Associated gas was projected

separately by applying a gas-to-oil production ratio of 1.3 MCF per barrel of crude oil to the EIA's 1981 oil production forecast.<sup>16</sup>

\*The production projections in the three tables should be viewed as slightly pessimistic. This is because they were based on projected — — — 1982 nonassociated reserve additions of 8.7-10.2 TCF, whereas actual 1982 additions were about 14 TCF.

<sup>16</sup>U.S. Department of Energy, 1981 *Annual Report to Congress*, vol. 3, p. 62.

**Table 23.—Lower 48 States Natural Gas Production and Reserves, 1982-2000 (in TCF)-  
Scenario 2A: Very Optimistic<sup>a</sup>**

Year	Total gas production	Nonassociated gas			R/P	Assoc./dissolved gas <sup>b</sup> production
		Production	Reserve additions	Proved reserve		
1982 .....	18.7	15.7	10.2	132.8	8.8	3.0
1983 .....	18.2	15.3	11.7	129.2	8.7	2.9
1984 .....	18.0	15.2	13.0	127.0	8.5	2.9
1985 .....	18.0	15.2	14.8	126.6	8.3	2.8
1986 .....	18.3	15.5	15.5	126.7	8.2	2.8
1987 .....	18.6	15.8	15.8	126.6	8.0	2.7
1988 .....	18.9	16.2	15.9	126.3	7.8	2.7
1989 .....	19.3	16.5	16.0	125.7	7.6	2.7
1990 .....	19.5	16.8	16.0	124.9	7.5	2.7
1991 .....	19.7	17.1	16.1	123.9	7.3	
1992 .....	19.8	17.3	16.2	122.8	7.2	2.6
1993 .....	19.8	17.3	16.2	121.7	7.1	2.5
1994 .....	19.7	17.2	16.3	120.8	7.1	2.5
1995 .....	19.6	17.2	15.3	119.0	7.0	2.4
1996 .....	19.3	16.9	15.4	117.4	7.0	2.4
1997 .....	19.1	16.8	15.4	116.0	7.0	2.4
1998 .....	19.0	16.6	15.4	114.8	7.0	2.3
1999 .....	18.8	16.5	15.5	113.8	7.0	2.3
2000 .....	18.7	16.4	15.5	112.9	6.9	2.3

Cumulative production after 1982 = 342.4 TCF = 44% USGS remaining resource.

Note: Rows and columns may not add exactly due to rounding.

aAssumptions: Nonassociated gas new field discovery rate <sup>a</sup>3,000 BCF/yr

Growth factor = 5.0

Additional growth from price rises for old gas = 1000 BCF/yr from 1985 to 1995.

bAssociated/dissolved gas—gas found in the same reservoir with oil.

SOURCE: Jensen Associates, Inc., contract submission to the Office of Technology Assessment, 1983.

## APPROACH NUMBER 3—REGION-BY-REGION REVIEW OF RESOURCES AND EXPLORATORY SUCCESS\*\*

Using a region-by-region review to project future gas production involves a geologist's examination of a variety of factors affecting production in 10 individual regions of the Lower 48

States and his subjective evaluation of their future production potential.

For this approach, the gas resource base was assumed to be a compromise between the assessments of USGS and PGC. For each region, a resource value was selected by examining the field size and number implications of the two assessments and choosing the value that seemed more

\*\*The analysis described in this section was performed by Joseph P. Riva, Jr., Specialist in Earth Sciences, Congressional Research Service (CRS).

**Table 24.—Lower 48 States Natural Gas Production and Reserves, 1982.2000 (in TCF)—  
Scenario 2B: Pessimistic<sup>a</sup>**

Year	Total gas Production	Nonassociated gas			R/P	Assoc./dissolved gas <sup>b</sup> production
		Production	Reserve additions	Proved reserve		
1982 .....	18.7	15.7	8.7	131.3	8.8	<b>3.0</b>
1983 .....	18.0	15.1	8.4	124.6	8.7	<b>2.9</b>
1984 .....	17.4	14.6	8.3	118.4	8.5	<b>3.0</b>
1985 .....	16.9	14.1	8.3	112.6	8.4	<b>2.8</b>
1986 .....	16.4	13.6	8.2	107.2	8.3	<b>2.8</b>
1987 .....	15.9	13.2	7.6	101.7	8.1	<b>2.7</b>
1988 .....	15.4	12.7	7.6	96.6	8.0	<b>2.7</b>
1989 .....	15.0	12.3	7.7	92.0	7.9	<b>2.7</b>
1990 .....	14.6	11.9	7.7	87.7	7.7	<b>2.7</b>
1991 .....	14.2	11.6	7.7	83.8	7.6	<b>2.6</b>
1992 .....	13.8	11.2	7.7	80.3	7.5	<b>2.6</b>
1993 .....	13.4	10.9	7.7	77.1	7.4	<b>2.5</b>
1994 .....	13.0	10.5	7.7	74.4	7.3	<b>2.5</b>
1995 .....	12.6	10.2	7.2	71.4	7.3	<b>2.4</b>
1996 .....	12.2	9.8	7.2	68.8	7.3	2.4
1997 .....	11.8	9.5	7.1	66.5	7.3	2.4
1998 .....	11.5	9.2	7.1	64.4	7.2	2.3
1999 .....	11.2	8.9	7.1	62.6	7.2	2.3
2000 .....	11.0	8.7	7.1	61.0	7.2	2.3

Cumulative production after 1982 = 254 TCF = 330/0 USGS remaining resource.

Note Rows and columns may not add exactly due to rounding.

aAssumptions: Nonassociated gas new field discovery rate = 1500 BCF/yr

Growth factor = 4.0

Additional growth from price rises for old gas = 500 BCF/yr from 1985 to 1995.

bAssociated/dissolved gas—gas found in the same reservoir with oil

SOURCE: Jensen Associates, Inc, contract submission to the Office of Technology Assessment, 1983

**Table 25.—Lower 48 States Natural Gas Production and Reserves, 1982.2000 (in TCF)—  
Scenario 2C: Very Pessimistic<sup>a</sup>**

Year	Total gas production	Nonassociated gas			R/P	Assoc./dissolved gas <sup>b</sup> production
		Production	Reserve additions	Proved reserve		
1982 .....	18.5	15.5	8.7	131.3	8.9	<b>3.0</b>
1983 .....	17.7	14.8	8.0	124.7	8.9	<b>2.9</b>
1984 .....	16.9	14.0	7.5	118.1	8.9	<b>2.9</b>
1985 .....	16.1	13.3	6.4	111.2	8.9	<b>2.8</b>
1986 .....	15.3	12.5	6.1	104.9	8.9	<b>2.8</b>
1987 .....	14.5	11.8	5.4	98.5	8.9	<b>2.7</b>
1988 .....	13.8	11.1	5.4	92.8	8.9	<b>2.7</b>
1989 .....	13.1	10.4	5.4	87.9	8.9	<b>2.7</b>
1990 .....	12.5	9.9	5.5	84.4	8.9	<b>2.7</b>
1991 .....	12.0	9.4	5.5	79.6	8.9	<b>2.6</b>
1992 .....	11.5	8.9	5.5	76.1	8.9	<b>2.6</b>
1993 .....	11.1	8.6	5.5	73.1	8.9	<b>2.5</b>
1994 .....	10.7	8.2	5.6	70.5	8.9	<b>2.5</b>
1995 .....	10.4	7.9	5.6	68.1	8.9	<b>2.4</b>
1996 .....	10.1	7.7	5.5	66.0	8.9	<b>2.4</b>
1997 .....	9.8	7.4	5.5	64.1	8.9	2.4
1998 .....		7.2	5.5	62.4	8.9	2.3
1999 .....	9.3	7.0	5.5	60.9	8.9	2.3
2000 .....	9.1	6.8	5.5	59.6	8.9	2.3

Cumulative production after 1982 = 223.4 TCF = 29% USGS remaining resource.

Note Rows and columns may not add exactly due to rounding

aAssumptions: Nonassociated gas new field discovery rate = 1,500 BCF/yr

Growth factor = 3.0

No additional growth from price rises for old gas

bAssociated/dissolved gas—gas found in the same reservoir with oil

SOURCE: Jensen Associates, Inc, contract submission to the Office of Technology Assessment, 1983

realistic. Then, future additions to proved reserves were estimated, based on a subjective evaluation of the following factors:

- **Difficulty and expense of development.**—Based on expected field sizes, depths, known geology.
- Announced leasing schedules.
- “Maturity” of province.—The percent of total expected resources that have already been developed.
- Recent development history.—Especially, the rates of entry into proved reserves of the remaining resources.

For each region, it was generally considered unlikely that a very high percentage of the remaining undiscovered resource—say, 50 percent or greater—could be transferred into proved reserves by 2000, and this situation acted as a strict limit on production in some regions, for example, in the “west Texas and eastern New Mexico” region. \* \*

Tables 26 and 27 present two scenarios of future gas production and reserve additions based on the above approach. Scenario 3A projects that one-quarter of the gas estimated to be available in undiscovered fields at the end of 1981 will be discovered by 2000. This compares to 55 percent of the undiscovered gas being discovered between 1945 and 1981, a period when larger prospects were available, but also when gas discovery rates may have been hampered by low regulated prices. In this scenario, gas production is projected to increase in the Rocky Mountains and Great Plains region, the Eastern Interior region, and the Appalachian region; in addition, production begins in Oregon-Washington and on the Atlantic continental shelf. However, major production decreases are projected for west Texas and eastern New Mexico, the midcontinent, and the gulf coast, all critical gas producers today.

Scenario 3B assumes that exploration becomes more efficient and that 35 percent of the resources in undiscovered fields can be discovered

\* \*To stabilize current gas production to the end of the century in this region, 96 percent of the estimated undiscovered gas in the region would have to be discovered by 2000. From 1970 to 1981, 23 percent of the inferred reserves plus undiscovered resources were added to reserves.

by 2000. Even under this more optimistic scenario, however, gas production will decline to 13.3 TCF by 2000.

**Table 26.—Lower 48 States Natural Gas Production and Reserves, 1982-2000 (in TCF)—Scenario 3A**

Year	Production	Reserve additions	Proved reserves	R/P
1981 .....	18.5	21.6	168.6	9
1982 .....	18.6	10.9	160.9	9
1983 .....	17.6	10.9	154.2	9
1984 .....	16.8	11.2	148.5	9
1985 .....	16.1	11.2	143.5	9
1986 .....	15.7	11.2	139.0	9
1987 .....	15.3	11.2	135.0	9
1988 .....	15.1	11.2	131.0	9
1989 .....	14.7	11.2	127.4	9
1990 .....	14.5	11.2	124.1	9
1991 .....	14.3	11.2	121.0	8
1992 .....	14.2	11.2	118.0	8
1993 .....	14.0	11.2	115.2	8
1994 .....	13.7	10.1	111.6	8
1995 .....	13.5	10.1	108.2	8
1996 .....	13.4	10.3	105.1	8
1997 .....	13.3	10.3	102.1	8
1998 .....	13.0	10.3	99.4	8
1999 .....	12.8	10.3	97.0	8
2000 .....	12.6	10.3	94.6	8
Cumulative production after 1982 = 260.6 = 34% USGS remaining resource.				

SOURCE: J. P. Riva, Jr., *A Projection of Conventional/Natural Gas Production in the Lower 48 States to the Year 2000*, Congressional Research Service/Library of Congress, June 10, 1983

**Table 27.—Lower 48 States Natural Gas Production and Reserves, 1982-2000 (in TCF)—Scenario 3B**

Year	Production	Reserve additions	Proved reserves	R/P
1981 .....	18.5	21.6	168.6	9
1982 .....	18.7	12.1	161.9	9
1983 .....	18.0	12.1	156.0	9
1984 .....	17.3	12.1	150.8	9
1985 .....	16.8	12.1	146.1	9
1986 .....	16.2	12.1	142.0	9
1987 .....	15.8	12.1	138.3	9
1988 .....	15.4	12.1	135.0	9
1989 .....	15.0	12.1	132.1	9
1990 .....	15.1	12.1	129.1	8.5
1991 .....	15.6	12.1	125.5	8
1992 .....	15.7	12.1	121.9	8
1993 .....	15.2	12.1	118.8	8
1994 .....	14.8	12.1	116.0	8
1995 .....	14.5	12.1	113.6	8
1996 .....	14.2	12.1	111.5	8
1997 .....	13.9	12.1	109.7	8
1998 .....	13.7	12.1	108.0	8
1999 .....	13.5	12.1	106.6	8
2000 .....	13.3	12.1	105.4	8
Cumulative production after 1982 = 274 = 35% USGS remaining resource.				

SOURCE: J. P. Riva, Jr., *A Projection of Conventional Natural Gas Production in the Lower 48 States to the Year 2000*, Congressional Research Service/Library of Congress, June 10, 1983.



## APPROACH NUMBER 4—GRAPHING THE COMPLETE PRODUCTION CYCLE

Projecting future gas production by graphing the complete production cycle is based on the expectation of M. King Hubbert that the complete cycle of production will somewhat resemble a bell-shaped curve and that knowing the area under the curve—the total recoverable resource—allows a reasonable facsimile of the entire curve to be drawn, once about a third or more of the production cycle has been completed. Hubbert used this approach in 1956<sup>17</sup> to show that then-


current estimates of the remaining oil resource base implied that oil production was on the verge of peaking and then declining.

In this application, gas production values for 1900-82 were plotted, and three freeform curves were extended from the 1982 production rate such that the area under the curves equalled the remaining gas resources estimated by, respectively, Hubbert, USGS, and PGC (see table 6). These curves are shown in figure 24.

The curves show that Hubbert's assessment implies an extraordinarily sharp decline in production, so that by 2000 the total Lower 48 production rate would be about 3 TCF. Since there is little flexibility in drawing this curve, it appears

<sup>17</sup>M.K.Hubbert, "Nuclear Energy and Fossil Fuels," in American Petroleum Institute, *Drilling and Production Practice* (1956), cited in M. K. Hubbert, "Techniques of Prediction as Applied to the Production of Oil and Gas," *Oil and Gas Supply Modeling*, S. I. Gass (CD.), National Bureau of Standards Special Report 631, May 1982.

Figure 24.—Future Production Curves for Conventional Natural Gas in the Lower 48 States




SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

unlikely that the range of uncertainty due to the selection of the curve's shape is greater than about **2 to 5 TCF in 2000**.

The curves representing the USGS and PGC gas resource assessments were drawn so that the declining portion of the curve resembles a mirror image of the ascending portion. Both curves show production rates staying steady at least until 2000. A plausible physical interpretation of the curves is that they represent a resource base that still retains a substantial number of large fields amenable to rapid rates of production. Furthermore, the shape of the curves is clearly aligned with high demand for gas and prices that encourage substantial development drilling as well as vigorous exploratory efforts.

The USGS and PGC curves obviously can be redrawn to reflect different conceptions of how the production cycle might unfold. However, the necessity of maintaining existing production trends in the early years and of tapering off gradually as the resource is depleted limits the options. Figure 25 shows the original USGS curve and a second curve that reflects a different conception, that of a production decline that commences earlier but proceeds at a more gradual rate. This second curve might reflect a future where industrial demand for gas declines and exploratory activity and development drilling proceed at a lower level. It might also reflect a resource base whose fields are smaller, in more difficult to develop locations, and of lower average permeability.

**Figure 25.—Two Production Futures, One Resource Base: Alternative Representations of Future Production of Conventional Natural Gas in the Lower 48 States, Based on the USGS (1981) Resource Assessment (mean estimate)**



SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

## A RANGE FOR FUTURE GAS PRODUCTION

In comparing figures 24 and 25 to the production projections produced by the alternative methods, some interesting conclusions can be drawn. First, the higher **end of the production ranges, which shows essentially stable production levels out to 2000**, appears to be quite compatible with the USGS and PGC **curves**, as drawn in figure 24. It should be remembered, however, that there are interpretations of the detailed physical nature of the gas resource base that, while compatible with the **overall magnitude** and even the regional estimates of USGS or PGC, could be completely **incompatible** with the high year **2000 production projection**. The second curve in figure 25 displays such an alternative interpretation, and there are more radical possibilities as well. \*

A second conclusion is that the lower end of the production range—about 9 TCF by 2000—is really much too optimistic for a believer of the Hubbert or RAND resource estimate. This is because the assumptions of the lower end of the range, while appearing to be pessimistic to a “resource optimist,” may actually appear somewhat optimistic to a “resource pessimist.” This end of the range assumes that the fairly low new field discovery rates of the early 1970s are more realistic as a long-term average than are the higher rates of the last few years, but it ignores the possibility that even these low rates might go **down still farther as resource depletion continues**. Consequently, the true production implication of the range of resource base estimates cited in table 6 is likely to be a year 2000 range of about 4 to

**19 TCF rather than the range of 9 to 19 TCF** expressed by the first three projection approaches. \*

As discussed in chapter 4, OTA believes that the Hubbert and RAND estimates are overly pessimistic and that a more likely lower bound for the remaining recoverable gas resources is about 430 TCF rather than Hubbert’s 244 TCF or RAND’s 283 TCF. This higher value is compatible with a 2000 production rate of 9 TCF. Consequently, in our opinion, a reasonable range for **Lower 48 conventional natural gas production for the year 2000 is 9 to 19 TCF**. Similarly, a **reasonable range for 1990 is 14 to 20 TCF**.

Finally, figure 24 illustrates an important point about the current “optimistic” assessments of the recoverable resource base: that these, too, imply an inevitable decline in conventional gas production, although the date of decline is perhaps 20 or 30 years later than that dictated by a pessimistic (430 TCF) resource base assessment. It must be stressed, however, that the additional 20 years or so of leeway implied by the more optimistic assessments seem likely to yield sufficient changes in prices and technology to allow the entry of nonconventional gas sources to the market and the movement of large amounts of conventional resources from “subeconomic” to “economic.” These potential sources of gas production are outside the boundaries of the resource base assessments and production forecasts discussed in Part I of this report, but they will be extremely important to future U.S. gas production.

\*One such possibility would be a resource base that, while large, had most of its resources in hard-to-find, slow-to-produce fields. The future production “cycle” would then show a significant production drop in the next 20 to 30 years, followed by a very long period of low but stable production.

“It is important to remember that the kind of radical drop in production dictated by the most pessimistic of the resource base estimates will likely violate their baseline assumptions of maintenance of existing cost/price relationships—except for Hubbert’s assessment (Hubbert believes his methodology “captures” future changes in price/cost relationships and technology). Although many present gas customers can switch without extreme difficulty to oil products or to electricity (assuming supplies of these are available), a rapid drop in production would still tend to push gas prices sharply upwards. This in turn would tend to increase the resource base by moving subeconomic resources into the economic, recoverable category.

## PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR FORECASTS OF FUTURE GAS PRODUCTION

Comparisons of alternative gas production forecasts have many of the same problems as comparisons of gas resource base estimates (see ch. 3, table 4). The economic, regulatory, and other "scenario" conditions assumed for the forecasts are not always made clear. Because the range of reasonable future values/assumptions for these conditions are so broad, it is probably safe to assume that there **are** major scenario differences between different forecasts. The resources measured may differ, with some forecasts including only "conventional" gas and others including all methane sources, especially gas from tight sands. The extent to which some of the commonly used resource base estimates (which are important variables in some of the forecasts, directly determining finding rates or defining an upper limit for cumulative discoveries) contain unconventional resources is not always clear. For example, the PGC acknowledges that as much as 20 percent of its estimated "potential resource" is in tight sands,<sup>18</sup> but other estimates do not specify such a percentage. Consequently, even the forecasters, themselves, do not always know how much tight gas is incorporated in their production forecasts. \*

Table 28 presents the results of 21 public and private sector production forecasts of conventional Lower 48 gas production.\*\* All are a few years old. Four of the forecasts explicitly include tight sands and/or Devonian shale; these are noted on the table.

The extent of agreement about future gas production displayed in table 28 is in sharp contrast to the very wide range projected by OTA. For the year 2000, a range of 11 to 15 TCF/yr—an extremely narrow range, given different base

<sup>18</sup>potential Gas Agency, news release, Feb. 26, 1983.

\*Further, there may not be agreement as to what constitutes "tight gas." For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission includes a maximum permeability of 0.1 millidarcies in its definition, while the National Petroleum Council used 1 millidarcy as the limit in its report on unconventional gas sources.

\* "Including associated/dissolved gas (gas colocated with oil), on a dry basis.

assumptions, forecasting methods, etc.—would encompass 13 of the 15 estimates available for that date. In contrast, OTA believes that an appropriate range for year 2000 production is 9 to 19 TCF/yr. Part of this difference may be attributed to the fact that most of the values in the table represent forecasts of "most likely" gas production rates, and there may be a tendency for such estimates to cluster together. In conjunction with this possibility, a lack of documentation for many of the forecasts makes it unclear whether they are all independent, original estimates. Some may simply be averages of other forecasts, reflecting the "conventional wisdom."

Of particular interest is a comparison of AGA's year 2000 estimate—12 to 14 TCF/yr—and the production implications of the AGA-supported PGC's gas resource assessment. PGC's assessment seems most compatible with production levels of 15 or 16 TCF/yr, or higher. If the AGA production forecast is intended to be associated with the PGC resource base, then AGA is using a most pessimistic interpretation of the resource base, at least from the standpoint of maintaining production rates at high levels during the next few decades.

A striking feature of the table is that all but one of the forecasts project substantial declines in gas production, most within 10 years and all but the one "dissenter" by 1995. It is important to recognize that these forecasters include some prominent gas "optimists." Much of the current optimism about gas's future must stem from confidence in supplementary supplies from unconventional sources, from Alaska, from Mexico and Canada, and from LNG imports. (Chapter 6 provides a brief discussion of the potential from all of these sources except unconventional production, which is the subject of Part II of this report.) However, it also seems likely that a resurvey of these forecasts, using the latest 1984-85 results, would show a higher range for the year 2000 production than in the original 1982 and earlier forecasts.

Table 28.—A Comparison of Conventional Lower 48 Natural Gas Supply Forecasts (TCF)

Company	1985	1990	1995	2000
1. Gulf . . . . .	19.4	18.8	16.7	13.8
2. Texaco . . . . .	18.9	16.1	14.0	13.0
3. Chevron . . . . .	18.2	18.0	16.5	14.0
4. Exxon . . . . .	—	14.6	—	14.1
5. Sheila . . . . .	17.0	13.9	11.5	8.9
6. Conoco <sup>b</sup> . . . . .	19.0	18.0	—	14.6
7. Union . . . . .	19.2	18.0	—	—
9. Standard Oil (Indiana) <sup>c</sup> . . . . .	18.5	17.7	16.5	15.5
10. Tenneco . . . . .	18.0	15.4	13.5	11.9
11. AIR . . . . .	15.5	13.6	—	—
12. AGE . . . . .	16.0-18.0	5.0-17.0	3.5-15.5	12.0-14.0
13. GRI . . . . .	17.9	15.1	12.8	11.6
14. DOCK . . . . .	—	—	—	12.8
15. GAO . . . . .	16.5	14.8	14.0	13.5
16. E. Erikson . . . . .	17.4-18.5	—	—	—
17. ERA . . . . .	17.3	14.9	14.0	—
18. ICE . . . . .	16.1	14.3	12.4	—
19. IEA/OECD <sup>b</sup> . . . . .	16.5-18.0	14.0-17.0	—	11-15
20. Chase Bank <sup>c</sup> . . . . .	18.3	17.7	—	—
Average	18.1	16.6	15.3	14.3

aMarketed gas rather than actual total (dry) production Excludes increased production from fields that are "forever controlled" under NGPA and that Shell believes could be obtained with decontrol

bNumbers include tight sands

cAverages include interpolated data.

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