
Appendixes

The “Militarization” Issue at UNISPACE '82

Historical Context

In formal speeches at the UNISPACE '82 Conference, the Secretary General of the United Nations (U. N.) and most of the national delegations attending expressed concern about the “militarization” of outer space. But precisely what constitutes militarization of outer space has long been a matter of debate. In January 1957, before the first Sputnik went up, the United States had proposed at the U.N. that an international inspection system be set up to assure that:

... future developments in outer space would be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes ...¹

In 1958, the Soviet Union proposed:

A ban on the use of cosmic space for military purposes and an undertaking by the States to launch rockets into cosmic space only under an agreed international program.

In voting for the U.N. resolution setting up an ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the United States recognized:

... the common aim that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only.

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 begins with a declaration that:

... it is the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.

The Soviets in this early period identified “peaceful” with “nonmilitary.”² The United States, on the other hand, interpreted “peaceful” as “nonaggressive.” Military activities in space would therefore be permissible as long as they did not involve aggression.

Neither of these definitions proved very helpful in banning specific activities from space. On the one hand, nearly every overtly civilian space activity can have military applications: communications, weather observation, remote imaging, geodetics, and navigation services can all be used directly or indirectly for military purposes. Even had it been technically feasible, to open up national space systems to intense international scrutiny and regulation to assure the absence of military application would have been too much for either the United States or the Soviet Union to accept.

On the other hand, once it is admitted that banning all military activity from space is impractical, where is the line drawn between “aggressive” and “nonaggressive”? Until 1963, the Soviet Union insisted that reconnaissance satellites were illegal violations of national sovereignty, and ought to be banned. From the U.S. point of view, reconnaissance satellites helped maintain peace by providing warning of any preparations for surprise attack; from the Soviet point of view, reconnaissance satellites could make a surprise attack easier by pinpointing the attacker’s targets. With the 1972 treaty limiting antiballistic missile systems, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that reconnaissance satellites—one of the “National Technical Means of Verification” —were legitimate and that, indeed, it would be a violation of the treaty to interfere with their monitoring of treaty compliance.³

The United States and the Soviet Union did agree in 1963 to a U.N. resolution in which they stated their intentions not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of “mass destruction.” This resolution formed the basis for article IV of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 which formalized the agreement.

The parties to that treaty recognized:

... the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

But it did not prohibit the use of space for *other* than “peaceful” purposes. In fact, it provides only that:

The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.

By implication then, the latter activities (except for the testing of weapons of mass destruction, banned by the 1963 limited nuclear test ban treaty) are *not* forbidden elsewhere in outer space.

Recent Context

Antisatellite Weapons

Although the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to keep weapons of mass destruction out

¹U.N. document A C. I 783, Jan. 14, 1957, General Assembly official records, 11th sess., agenda item 22, p. 6.

²Cf. Robert L. Bridge, “International Law and Military Activities in Outer Space,” *Akron Law Review*, vol. 13, No. 4, p. 658. This interpretation would have banned long-range ballistic missiles, which pass through space on their way to target. The Soviets coupled their call for the nonmilitarization of space with a demand for the withdrawal of all forces from foreign bases.

³On the early Soviet and U.S. positions on reconnaissance satellites, cf. Gerald Martin Steinberg, *The Legitimation of Reconnaissance Satellites: An Example of Informal Arms Control Negotiation*, doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1981.

of Earth orbit, they have by no means agreed to keep weapons out of space. Ballistic missiles, when tested, pass into and out of space, as they would if actually armed with nuclear weapons. Between 1967 and 1971, the Soviet Union tested a weapon which appeared to some to be inconsistent with the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty: a fractional orbital bombardment system, or FOBS. Instead of following a ballistic trajectory, the FOBS rockets went into partial orbit, which would have allowed them to avoid the northern radars of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Early Warning Line. *

In the last two decades both sides have tested weapons intended for use in space. Antiballistic missile systems would operate in space (ABM's based in space, however, would be constrained by the 1972 ABM treaty). In fact, U.S. research and development ABM's based at Kwajalein Island in the South Pacific were tested and had some operational capability as antisatellite weapons. In 1964, the United States declared operational a nuclear-armed antisatellite rocket based on Johnston Island, southwest of Hawaii. The system was dismantled in 1975.

Since 1967, the Soviets have tested an antisatellite weapon about 20 times (according to the trade press).⁴ This nonnuclear weapon goes into a partial or full orbit, then approaches the target satellite closely enough to damage it by exploding into a hail of shrapnel. This weapon is based on the ground and launched aboard a large rocket, derived from the old Soviet SS-9 ICBM. The Department of Defense considers the Soviet antisatellite system to be operational.

For its part, the U.S. Air Force has been developing an aircraft-based antisatellite weapon that should be much faster and more flexible than the Soviet system.

The ASAT Talks

In 1978 and 1979, the United States and the Soviet Union held three sets of talks on the possibility of limiting antisatellite weapons. A fourth session had been informally scheduled for February 1980, but, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration declined to meet with the Soviets again. In his statement of space policy, President Reagan mentioned that the possibility of arms control in space would continue to be a matter for "study." ⁵

* Some 18 missile silos at a Soviet test site were considered by U.S. intelligence as likely launch pads for the FOBS; most of these silos would have been dismantled had the United States ratified the SALT II Treaty. In any case, given U.S. early warning satellite capabilities, the FOBS would be of little value to a Soviet surprise attack. The U.S. military has never considered a FOBS to be worth developing.

⁴See "Soviet ASAT Test Called 'Carbon Copy' of One Last Year," *Aerospace Daily*, June 22, 1982, p. 283, and "Soviets Launch Second Satellite Intercept in Nine Months," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, Feb. 9, 1981, pp. 29-30.

⁵"The White House Fact Sheet: National Space Policy" (Washington: Office of the White House Press Secretary, July 4, 1982.)

In September of 1982, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency told a Senate Foreign Relations Committee subcommittee that the issue was very complex and difficult, and that the administration had been unable as yet to prepare a negotiating position.⁶

Soviet Positioning on "Militarization"

The United States, then, has accepted the onus for delaying further talks on the control of antisatellite weapons. In the meanwhile, Soviet propaganda and diplomacy have been working to enhance the international image of the Soviets on the space "militarization" issue while fostering criticism of the United States. In 1981, the Soviets began what one analyst calls "Brezhnev's Peace Offensive." ⁷

The Soviets expressed their willingness to participate in a summit conference, to negotiate a Nordic region nuclear free zone, to have a moratorium on new missile deployments in Europe. They have joined the Western allies in negotiations on long-range nuclear weapons in Europe. They have resumed strategic arms limitation talks (renamed START by the Reagan administration) with the United States despite the U.S. failure to ratify the long-negotiated SALT II Treaty.

In August 1981, the Soviets submitted to the U.N. a "Draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space." In his covering letter to the Secretary-General of the U. N., Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko pointed out that the existing international agreements on space did not preclude the stationing in space of weapons not covered by the definition of weapons of mass destruction. "Consequently," he wrote, "the danger of the militarization of outer space still exists and has recently been increasing." ^a

Soviet propaganda has made it clear that the Soviet Union places the blame for this increasing danger on the United States. The Soviet position is that the Soviet space program has always been purely peaceful in nature: since 1958, according to Gromyko, the Soviet Union:

... invariably stated and continues to state that space should be a sphere of exclusively peaceful co-operation.

A 1981 commentary by a Soviet writer in the Moscow journal *International Affairs* is typical c

⁶Testimony of Eugene V. Rostow before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sept. 20, 1982. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment, Arms *Control and the Militarization of Space Hearing*, 97th Cong., 2d sess., Sept. 20, 1982 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 7-8.

⁷See Joseph G. Whelan, "Brezhnev's Peace Offensive, 1981," Congressional Research Service, report No. 82-96S, May 17, 1982.

^aU.N. General Assembly, Doc. A/36/192, August 1981.

Soviet propaganda on the militarization of Space. The Soviet Union, said the commentary:

. . . is doing everything possible to preclude turning outer space into another sphere of military confrontation, a threat posed by the U.S. dangerous plans for an arms buildup in outer space.⁹

Calling the Soviet proposal for banning weapons from orbit: ". . . a logical extension of the U. S. S.R. 'S sustained efforts for the total demilitarization of outer space." The Soviet author goes on to give the Soviet Union primary credit for all the arms control agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States. The article accuses the United States of attempting to gain control of space in order to win military superiority. "Following this dangerous course, the American side froze the talks on antisatellite systems it had held with the U.S.S.R. in 1978 -79." ¹⁰

Citing speculations in the U.S. press, Soviet propagandists describe the space shuttle as not only a reconnaissance platform and a transport for constructing military space stations, but as a platform for nuclear weapons and laser weapons:

The Pentagon plans to test the laser "cannon" in outer space in April 1982, during the fourth flight of the Shuttle.]'

Because the United States made no official comments on the nature of the military payload on STS-4 (which actually took place in June-July 1982), the Soviets were free to feed any sorts of speculation about it.

The Soviets, going into UNISPACE '82, had positioned themselves very well on the "militarization" issue. Their own military space program, which is larger than that of the United States, receives very little publicity. Even when foreign observers acknowledge that the "militarization" of space is two-sided, it is usually a U.S. event—like the flights of the shuttle—which is the immediate cause for discussion. For example, upon the landing of STS-4 and President Reagan's space policy statement, which appeared to give new emphasis to the military side of space policy, the moderate Tokyo *Shimbun* editorialized:

President Reagan's "national space policy" announcement is a declaration of military expansion in space. We are strongly concerned about the new U.S. policy which encourages the U.S.-Soviet arms race in space . . . ¹²

Soviet propagandists have been quick to exploit envelopments in the United States as indications of the [U.S. "militarization" of space: research on the Prototype Miniature Air Launched System (an antisatellite weapon), the refusal of the United States to resume

ASAT limitation talks, military participation in the Space Transportation System, the budgetary trend away from the civilian space program and toward the military one, the announcement in June of 1982 that the Air Force would create a Space Command in order to better coordinate military space activities, the national security emphasis in President Reagan's space policy statement.

Only tacitly do the Soviets admit that they have a military space program of their own: while decrying the U.S. program, they warn that they will not permit the United States to win superiority. They caution against ". . . underestimation of the U.S.S.R. scientific and technological potential," which has

made itself felt more than once in postwar times America's plans are fraught with a serious danger, since their implementation would sharply escalate the arms race, opening up a new area in this field. ¹³

Given the general perception of the United States as the world's technological leader—a perception reinforced by the success of the space shuttle—the notion that it is the United States that is leading the arms race into space probably falls on fertile ground.

Foreign Perceptions of the Arms Race

The American point of view is that the arms race is a burden imposed on the United States by the inordinate military preparations of the Soviet Union. It seems particularly unfair that we should be saddled with criticism for our military uses of space when the Soviet Union launches many more military satellites each year than we do.

From the point of view of many nonallied governments, as well as important segments of the populations of even our allies, however, the fact that the Soviet Union may be just as big a "sinner" as, or bigger than, the United States does not lessen our responsibility. They view the superpower arms race as a whole as an illegitimate activity, one which absorbs resources which might otherwise be contributed to international development and which endangers international security. ¹⁴ Those who see the superpower arms race as a dangerous process which the protagonists are doing little to halt are likely to see military developments in space as an integral part of that process.

The U.S. position is that our military space programs operate benignly because they have been largely passive gatherers and transmitters of information. We

⁹V. Basmanov, "For a Weapon-Free Space," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No 11, 1981, p. 13

¹⁰Ibid., p. 101

¹¹Ibid., p. 103

¹²Quoted in ICA "Morning Digest: Foreign Media Reaction," International Communication Agency, July 6, 1982, p.3.

¹³Basmanov, op. cit.

¹⁴This point of view on the arms race underlay the report of the "Palme Commission"—the Independent Commission on Security and Disarmament, which consisted of well-known figures in international affairs. See its *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982)

correctly point out that reconnaissance satellites have, in part, had a stabilizing effect on the strategic nuclear arms race by:

- helping to prevent drastic overestimates of military build-ups by the other side, and
- helping to verify compliance with arms control treaties.

But in the final analysis, military satellites are meant to enhance military power, and those on the sidelines of the superpower competition certainly realize this. For them, the "militarization" of space is just another example of superpower arrogance toward "genuine" world interests. The U.S. Government does not have to accept this perception to recognize that it exists and may need to be dealt with.

U.S. foreign policy in the past 2 years may have fed the perception that the Government has no real interest in controlling the arms race. The Reagan administration is widely seen, accurately or not, as having been forced into negotiations over theater nuclear weapons in Europe by a determined West European antinuclear-weapons movement. It has expressed a fundamental dissatisfaction with a SALT II treaty negotiated over 7 years by a Republican and a Democratic Administration, although it continues to abide by its provisions. The suspicion remains that it still hopes, as promised in its 1980 election platform, to regain a military superiority over the Soviet Union (a theme to which Soviet propaganda gives considerable play).

UNISPACE '82

Conference Draft

In 1981, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space reported that several nations had expressed concern over "the growing dangers of the military uses of outer space." Is The "Draft Report of the Conference" (UNISPACE '82) raised the issue in three separate places. The "militarization" paragraphs were placed in brackets in the draft to indicate that they were not unanimously accepted by the preparatory committee. Nonetheless, it was clear that the issue would be raised by many at the conference. *

¹³1981 Report of COPUOS, 36th sess., supplement No.20 (A/36/20).

• The "militarization" paragraphs were as follows:

Paragraph 13: A major concern, a barrier to greater co-operation and a potential obstacle to deriving the full benefits of space technology is the increasing militarization of space. Some military activities—e.g., national technical means of verification (surveillance satellites), navigation aids, communications for search and rescue, dissemination of meteorological data, etc.—have continued for many years and some have been used for civilian purposes also. However, the recent introduction and proposed development of aggressive systems in space have cast a dark shadow over the peaceful and beneficial uses of space. In order for the peaceful uses of space to develop in a cooperative, constructive and unhindered manner, it is necessary to forestall and reverse this unfortunate trend towards the increased militarization of space.

U.S. Position

The U. S. position on the "militarization" issue at UNISPACE '82 was that:

Questions of arms control and militarization are not on the UNISPACE '82 agenda and it would be disruptive to insist that the conference pay special attention to it.^{1b}

But the State Department briefing book for the delegation left the U.S. strategy for dealing with the issue at UNISPACE '82 unclear. It recognized that despite U.S. objections, the question would come up:

Nevertheless, we fully expect a number of governments to express to UNISPACE their serious apprehensions. The draft UNISPACE report itself contains a variety of references to the dangers of militarization. The U.S. delegation, thus, may well have to respond to efforts to make the subject one of special concern to the conference.¹⁷

But it left unclear what "special concern" might mean, and to what extent the United States would oppose discussion or action on the issue.

On the one hand, the delegates were to be prepared to argue that the U.N. Committee on Disarmament was the only proper U.N. forum for the issue and that UNISPACE '82 could contribute "nothing substantive." On the other hand, the delegates were offered counterarguments on the issue itself that:

- "militarization" was a misleading term because international law permits nonaggressive military uses of space;

A more provocative version of this paragraph called the militarization of space a "danger to international peace and security."

Paragraph 205: However, there is another major obstacle to drawing the full benefits from space technology—an obstacle that threatens to grow larger and to make uncertain the prospect of future beneficial applications. Increasing doubts about the inviolability of peaceful space activities will mean a set-back to beneficial applications. Many countries have expressed concern at the dramatic increase in the militarization of space. If space technology is to contribute to man's development as fully as it can, if nations and peoples are not to be denied the fruits of its numerous beneficial applications, this negative trend must be reversed.

Paragraph 419: The increasing militarization of space is a matter that has caused great concern to Member States. While military and disarmament matters are dealt with in other fora of the United Nations, and issues regarding militarization of space have been referred by the General Assembly to the Committee on Disarmament, increasing militarization does directly impinge on peaceful uses of space and on the benefits that nations can derive from space. To this extent, and by the fact that the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies—which banned nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in outer space—was initiated and formulated in COPUOS, such matters are within the legitimate concern of COPUOS also. It is therefore suggested that COPUOS should examine and refer for consideration of the General Assembly how best it can ensure that outer space is used for solely peaceful purposes.

¹⁴UNISPACE 82 Issue Paper: The 'Militarization' of Outer Space, " in U. Delegation to the 22nd United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Vienna-August +21, 1982: *Briefing Book sec. 111-C*, "Issue Papers."

¹⁵Ibid,

the space shuttle is not a weapons system and does not carry weapons into space; *

- U.S. military space systems also provide “vital human services” and help monitor arms control agreements; and
- such systems should not be stigmatized because they function in space.

So the United States was prepared to discuss the issue up to a point, but the State Department did not clearly define what that point was. In the end, the conference arrived at compromise wording for the final “Decisions and Recommendations” which should not raise particular difficulties for the United States. The wording simply acknowledges the international concern about “an arms race in space” (the term “militarization” is avoided) and calls on the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament to heed that concern. * *

Discussion: Dilemmas of the Issue

As costly in international good will as U.S. tactics on the “militarization” issue at UNISPACE '82 may have been, they may have been the best “damage-limiting” approach available. The United States had no easy or obvious course to follow in dealing with the question. The argument that the issue was not on the agenda as called for in the U.N. resolutions establishing the conference was, strictly speaking, correct. The argument that lengthy discussion of the issue would not resolve it, but could distract the conference from more practical issues on the agenda, was also valid.

There were also some fears that did not materialize but might have. Would there be a general condemna-

...
 “The State Department apparently expected attacks along these lines but these did not appear in the country papers or opening statements of the governments that expressed concern about militarization

**The language of the relevant paragraphs is as follows.

Paragraph 13 The extension of an arms race into outer space is a matter of grave concern to the International community It is detrimental to humanity as a whole and therefore should be prevented. All nations, in particular those with major space capabilities, are urged to contribute actively to the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space and to refrain from any action contrary to that aim

Paragraph 14: The maintenance of peace and security in outer space is of great importance for international peace and security The prevention of an arms race and hostilities in outer space is an essential condition for the promotion and continuation of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes In this regard, the Conference urges all States to adhere to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies and strictly to observe its letter and spirit

Paragraph 426: The Conference strongly recommends that the competent organs of the United Nations—in particular the General Assembly and also the Committee on Disarmament—when dealing with measures aimed at a prevention of an arms race in outer space—in particular those mentioned in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly—give appropriate attention and high priority to the grave concern expressed in paragraphs 13 and 14

tion of all military activities in space, which would be completely unacceptable to the United States? * Would the Conference degenerate into a tribunal for the denunciation of the U.S. military space program, focussing on alleged uses of the space shuttle as a weapon? Or would the United States, given recent publicity about its military space programs, bear the brunt of the blame for leading an arms race in space?

Finally, if the United States had agreed to compromise on report wording about the military question earlier in the conference, would further compromises, less acceptable to the United States, have been demanded before the conference was over? In other words, would forthcoming discussion of the issue let the camel's nose into the tent? At the same time, other considerations might have dictated that the United States grant the issue at least some legitimacy for discussion at UNISPACE '82. First, even though the militarization of space was not literally on the formal agenda, the relevant “bracketed” paragraphs of the draft conference report were there and would be discussed, whatever the wishes of the United States.

Second, delegations of every stripe—Communist (Chinese as well as Soviet), Third World, neutralist, and U.S. -allied—expressed concern about the potential for an arms race in space. Most of the formal statements did not single out the United States as the cause of this arms race, but encouraged the two major space powers to negotiate limiting or reversing the race. The State Department briefing book did go so far as to allow the U.S. delegation to admit that the United States, too, was “concerned that there not be an arms race in outer space.” U.S. reluctance to discuss the issue at this conference, particularly in the face of willingness to discuss it by all the other 93 countries there, appeared to many to be an effort to “stifle debate.” Moreover, since the United States did finally agree to compromise language on the dangers of an arms race in space in the final report, its apparent obstructionism on the issue until the very end alienated some delegations. Willingness to discuss the issue, on the other hand, might have won the United States some credit, at least among its allies, for raising the level of the debate instead of stifling it.

The Soviets, for their part, positioned themselves before and during the conference to take maximum advantage of the U.S. refusal to address the “militariza-

- The Algerian delegation raised this spectre when it got the following statement inserted into the conference report's “Summary of the General Debate”:

Numerous delegations denounced the wrongful use of space technology, such as surveillance satellites, in cases of military conflict

The paragraph cited “the aggression committed against Lebanon” and “the assistance provided to the aggressor” as a case in point. U.N. *Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space*, Vienna, Aug. 9-21, 1982 (A/CONF.101/10), p. 126, par. 525.

tion” issue. The sort of Soviet propaganda about the U.S. military space program cited above has gone largely unanswered by the United States.* At UNISPACE '82 itself, however, the Soviet Union had no need to direct charges specifically against the United States. Instead, it could and did merely express its sympathy with the widespread view that steps were needed to prevent the “militarization” of space, and point to its own proposal of August 1981 for a treaty to ban stationing weapons in space as an example of such a step. No accusation naming the United States was necessary, nor **was** any defense of the very large Soviet military space program with its active antisatellite weapons tests.

Had the United States chosen to debate the “militarization” issue, it might have been able to inform other nations of the massive Soviet contribution to the “militarization” of space, perhaps removing some of the wind from Soviet sails on the issue. Informally, some delegates tried to do this. Others wished that the State Department had “unleashed” them to do a more effective job of pointing out that it had been the Soviets, not the United States, who had been testing weapons in space for the last several years.

As tempting as this opportunity to paint the Soviets with their own brush might have been, however, it carried a major risk. Except for those countries that might be categorically opposed to the United States (and their number might not be as large as we sometimes feel), most of the countries concerned about the “militarization” issue are not simply interested in apportioning blame. Instead, they want the United States and the Soviet Union to agree to avert an arms race in space, no matter who “started it.” An exchange of accusations with the Soviet Union over who was doing the most to “militarize” space might score some debating points for the United States, but at the same time would reinforce the general impression that there is indeed a burgeoning arms race in space about which something ought to be done,

Here, again, the Soviets seem to have seized the “high ground” on the issue. True, both sides have agreed that the U.N. Committee on Disarmament should discuss arms control in space. But the Soviets point out that it is the United States, not the Soviet Union, that has discontinued the negotiations on anti-satellite weapon limitations. The United States has indicated a lack of willingness to resume those negotiations at any specific future date. It is the Soviet Union, not the United States, that has proposed (however disingenuously) at the U.N. a treaty to prohibit station-

ing weapons of any kind in orbit. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union can present itself as addressing the concerns of the international community about an arms race in space while the United States belittles those concerns. And further debate about “militarization” at UNISPACE '82 would only have underlined these circumstances.

In other words, if the United States believes that actual negotiation on the question of arms in space is not in its best interests, its best strategy in the international fora may well be to “stonewall” the issue, to avoid debate on it as much as possible.

Conclusions

1. While the logic of the U.S. position at UNISPACE '82 on the question of the “militarization of outer space” may have been sound, the United States paid a diplomatic price for insisting on that position so inflexibly. Support for the United States in future international negotiations on militarization will probably be harder to get.
2. Although there was debate on the “militarization” issue despite U.S. wishes, some of the worst U.S. fears about the consequences of a UNISPACE '82 discussion of the issue did not materialize. The issue did not prevent the other work of the conference from going ahead. The United States was not generally singled out as the “leader” of the space arms race. The recommendations of the conference did not “introduce confusion into the work of expert negotiating bodies such as the CD.” The space shuttle was not condemned as a weapon.
3. Soviet propaganda and diplomacy has positioned the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States very well on the space “militarization” issue. No matter who takes the “blame” for initiating an arms race in space (and Soviet propaganda works hard at saddling the United States with this blame), the United States bears the onus for refusing to negotiate on it (outside the Committee on Disarmament).
4. Given the fact that the United States has no position on further arms control measures for space obstruction of discussion of the issue whenever possible may be the most “damage-limiting” strategy the United States can pursue.
5. Whether the perceived unwillingness of the United States to deal with this issue will interfere with future efforts to win international cooperation in space remains to be seen. Some member of the U.S. delegation to UNISPACE '82 came away with the feeling that the United States dil-

* For a variety of reasons: secrecy on U.S. program, reluctance to reveal knowledge and sources about Soviet program, desires not to have the subject openly debated.

an excellent, if inadvertent, job of uniting the G-77 (developing nations) against the United States. This could have negative effects at later international negotiating fora such as the meetings of the International Telecommunication Union.

Aftermath

The issue of the “militarization” of outer space will continue to be a problem for the United States. Other governments will continue to raise the issue at the U.N. and elsewhere, either because they see the United States as vulnerable to criticism, or because they genuinely fear the prospects of the arms race spreading into space. How other governments perceive the United States on this issue inevitably affects their attitude on other issues as well. Allies and others con-

cerned about the course of the nuclear arms race may see the spread of the arms race into space as a part of the larger arms race problem. Developing countries may see the “militarization” of space as being of a piece with the “first-come first-served” approach to the geosynchronous satellite orbit: that is, the high-technology powers dispose of the “common heritage of mankind” —outer space—as they see fit, saying, “Trust us” to the rest of the world.

More subtly, in most multilateral negotiations there are informal “trade-offs” among issues, nations offering their support and votes on one question in order to get votes in return on another. As long as the United States remains in the international minority in its approach to “militarization of space,” it will have to make diplomatic bargains to sustain its position. The net gains and losses from these bargains remain to be counted.