Chapter 1

Varieties of anti-Americanism: A Framework for Analysis¹

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Anti-Americanism has a long historical pedigree dating back to the 18th century. Since World War II such sentiment has waxed and waned in various parts of the world. American GI’s were welcomed widely in the 1940s as liberators of a Europe occupied by Nazi Germany, and as protectors of a Europe that felt threatened by the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Yet a few years later “the ugly American” became an object of scorn and derision.² In the second half of the 1960s the U.S. war in Vietnam became a rallying cry for a powerful anti-war movement that fueled anti-American sentiments in Europe, Latin America and Asia. In the early 1980s mass protests erupted against NATO’s missile deployment plans and the military build-up of the Reagan administration. Recently, intense expressions of anti-American sentiment – both in public opinion polls and in

¹ During the course of the academic year 2004-05 we gave talks based on ideas in this paper, and presented earlier versions of this paper, repeatedly at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. We thank our colleagues at the Center, and the other authors of chapters in this volume, for their valuable suggestions. We also presented versions of this argument to a conference at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, February 15, 2005; at a meeting of the Princeton Project on National Security, February 17, 2005; at Steven Weber’s graduate seminar at the University of California, Berkeley, on March 23, 2005; and at the University of Southern California on April 28, 2005. Participants at all of those gatherings made cogent and useful comments. We are particularly grateful for focused oral or written comments on this paper to Doug McAdam of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Roger Haydon of Cornell University Press, Stephen Krasner of Stanford University, Vinod Aggarwal and Steven Weber of the University of California, Berkeley, and Yaacov Vertzberger of the East-West Center, University of Hawaii.
political demonstrations – have been evident around the globe. Anti-Americanism is again front page news, and Americans are perplexed by its global spread.

One way of beginning to think about expressions of negative attitudes is to ask whether they are based on views of “what the United States is” – the fundamental values and attitudes of American society – or “what the United States does” – its policies, particularly its foreign policies. Negative views of what the United States is are less likely to change, as American policy changes, than are negative views of what the United States is doing. People who are negative about the United States itself are more likely to be biased, as we define the term below, than those who are only critical of a set of American policies. It is particularly important, therefore, in an investigation of anti-Americanism to distinguish between is and does, and between opinion and bias. Part of the task of this chapter is to explore this distinction.

This book, however, is not merely an analytical exercise in political science. We study politics because we believe that it matters for human life and happiness and because we think that understanding can improve policy. It is therefore important at the outset to point out some policy implications of the findings that we will describe in detail below.

The findings of this volume suggest that the positions on anti-Americanism of both Left and Right are internally inconsistent. Broadly speaking, the American Left holds that anti-Americanism as measured by polls is what we define below as opinion rather than bias. It is largely a reaction to American policy, and indeed, often a justified

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2 Lederer and Burdick 1958. The title of this book was ironic; “the ugly American” was
reaction. The Left also frequently suggests that anti-Americanism poses a serious long-term problem for U.S. diplomacy, and that right-wing policies that induce it therefore need to be changed. But insofar as anti-Americanism reflects ephemeral opinion, changes in policy should be greeted enthusiastically by those who had earlier expressed negative views toward the United States. The long-term effects of anti-Americanism should therefore be small, unless periods of intense negative opinion lead to significant social movements or enduring institutional change. Conversely, the American Right argues that anti-Americanism reflects a deep bias against the United States: people who hate freedom hate us for what we are. Yet the Right also tends to argue that anti-Americanism can be ignored: if the United States follows effective policies, views will follow. But since the essence of bias is the rejection of information inconsistent with one’s prior view, broadly biased foreign publics should not be expected to change their opinions quickly in response to successes scored by a country that they fear and detest. Both Left and Right need to rethink their positions.

The Left is correct that anti-Americanism, as measured by polls, largely reflects opinion and is closely tied to U.S. policy. The Left worries that much anti-Americanism increasingly expresses a deeper form of negative attitude, which we denote as distrust. The Right overestimates resentment toward American power and hatred of American values; and it overlooks the political salience of the distrust that American action can create. If the Right were correct, anti-Americanism would have risen more sharply in the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But as Giacomo Chiozza shows in Chapter
4, except for the Middle East the United States remained broadly popular until 2002. This is not to deny that some expressions of anti-Americanism are so distrustful that they verge on bias rather than opinion or distrust based on opposition to American policy. Such bias may be revealed by the reactions of the Greek and French publics, discussed below, to American efforts at tsunami relief.

If the view of the Left on the sources of anti-Americanism seems better-grounded on the whole than that of the Right, the story is different with regard to consequences. The Right is correct that the consequences of anti-American views are more difficult to detect than one would think on the basis of claims made by the Left. There is much to be said for the view (not limited to the Right) that the United States should concentrate on pursuing ethically justified and practically effective policies rather than focusing on anti-Americanism as such. Superficial manifestations of anti-Americanism seem to have few systematic effects on policy. The Right is therefore broadly on target in its claim that insofar as anti-Americanism reflects short-term and volatile opinion rather than long-term institutionalized bias, it does not pose serious problems for American foreign policy.

The key question is whether negative opinion hardens into distrust or even bias. If opinion hardens into distrust as appears to have happened in recent years in Europe, China, and in secular strata in the Arab Middle East, the political consequences for the medium- and long-term could be severe. If America becomes more associated around the world with human rights abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo than with the Statue of Liberty and rock music, anti-Americanism could in the future become an important impediment to a successful United States foreign policy. Many Mideast specialists think that this hardening of anti-American views has accelerated at an alarming rate. Episodic evidence reported in the press confirms these well-
informed assessments. “For many Muslims,” Somini Sengupta and Salman Masood report, “Guantánamo stands as a confirmation of the low regard in which they believe the United States holds them. For many non-Muslims, regardless of their feelings toward the United States, it has emerged as a symbol of American hypocrisy.”³ For an Indian cartoonist, lampooning the Bush administration, the simple fact is: “people suspect American intentions. It has nothing to do with being Muslim.”⁴ Preposterous as it may seem to most Americans, for many the world over, the United States has built in Guantánamo what the French newspaper *Le Monde* has called a legal monster that undermines trust.

This chapter establishes a framework of concepts and questions that we use throughout this volume to explore the sources and consequences of anti-Americanism. The conceptualization of anti-Americanism that we offer in Section 1 distinguishes among its cognitive, emotional, and normative components. We argue in section 2 that anti-Americanism is heterogeneous and multidimensional. Many of the subsequent papers discuss, in different contexts, the concepts of opinion, distrust and bias that we analyze in Section 3. Indeed, we asked the authors of the chapters on France, Egypt and China to examine reactions to American tsunami relief efforts in January 2005, so that we could compare the public discourses on the American tsunami relief with the comparative polling data that we present in Section 3 of this chapter. The typology of anti-Americanisms in Section 4 is designed, in part, to assist the comparative analyses of France, Egypt, and China in Part III of this book; without accepting it entirely, the authors of those three chapters all make use of it. In our typology, there are four main

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⁴ Ibid.
types, which scale from being less to more deeply experienced. In addition there exist also particularistic and historically sensitive forms of anti-Americanism. In any particular situation we expect anti-Americanism to result from different constellations of the different forms and types that “bleed” into each other in variable constellations that are activated by political entrepreneurs and manipulated through political processes.

**Conceptualizing anti-Americanism**

We begin with a broad definition of anti-Americanism since the term is used so broadly (and often loosely) in ordinary language. As our analysis continues, we will make a number of distinctions, and develop, in this chapter, a typology of anti-Americanism. In the broadest sense, we view anti-Americanism as a psychological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general. Such views draw on cognitive, emotional, and normative elements. Using the language of psychology, anti-Americanism could be viewed as an attitude. On further examination, anti-Americanism becomes much more complex than this broad definition suggests. We distinguish below among opinion, bias and distrust, any of which could be reflected in poll results showing “unfavorable” attitudes toward the United States. Bias is the most fundamental form of anti-Americanism, and as we argue in this chapter, bias can be seen as a form of prejudice and studied in similar ways.

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5 This formulation is indebted to Pierangelo Isernia, chapter 4 below, and to personal communications with Yaacov Vertzberger. He defines an attitude “as an ideational formation having affective and cognitive dimensions that create a disposition for a particular pattern of behavior.” See Vertzberger 1990, 127.
Although we begin by defining anti-Americanism as an attitude and therefore take the social-psychological literature seriously, our approach is resolutely political. This emphasis reflects not only our disciplinary competence, but also our view that anti-Americanism can only be understood fully in its political context, as affected by interests and power. Anti-American views, are always contested or at least contestable. They are objects of political struggle. They are often emphasized or de-emphasized by politicians as a result of calculations about how they fit the appeals of a political party or movement, and how they will resonate, at a particular time, with a particular set of potential supporters. To understand both the sources and consequences of anti-Americanism one has to understand the political context that fosters or discourages negative attitudes toward the United States, and that magnifies or minimizes the effects of these attitudes on policy. Our analysis of anti-Americanism thus is fundamentally about politics.

*Schemas, Identities, and Norms*

Anti-Americanism can have cognitive, emotional, and normative components. A schema is a *cognitive structure* that relies on specific metaphors, analogies, symbols, and narratives of specific events and general historical developments to make sense of the world. A schema performs a number of cognitive functions, including going beyond the information available to fill in missing elements and thus to form a coherent account. Schemas make sense of attitudes so that they fit together. Schemas do not necessarily imply bias: on the contrary, they can be based on a coherent worldview based on a

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reasonable interpretation of available facts. When schemas are well-defined and entrenched, however, they can become hardened. As such, they create enduring distrust or become a systematic bias or prejudice that colors or systematically filters out positive or negative information. John Bowen identifies, in chapter 8, different sorts of schemas operating in France and Indonesia, which vary in their degree of hardness.

Figure 1, which we discuss in section 3 of this chapter, illustrates the relationships we envisage among opinion, distrust, and bias. Systematic bias leads individuals or groups to expect the United States to act perniciously and to interpret the behavior of the U.S. government or of Americans in light of that expectation. But it would be a mistake to infer that unfavorable attitudes about the United States, its policies, Americans and the American way of life are necessarily indicators of a systematic bias or prejudice against the United States that slants all new information in only one, negative direction.

In our conceptualization, the *emotional component* of anti-Americanism chiefly affects the intensity with which negative assessments are held, and may therefore affect behavior. In Figure 2, discussed in Part 3 of this chapter, the horizontal dimension is emotional: it reflects the degree of fear of the United States felt by a subject. However, our data in general do not enable us to distinguish the effect of emotion on negative assessments of the United States. We focus on the politics of anti-Americanism rather than seeking empirically to disentangle its socio-psychological components.

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7 Vertzberger 1990: 157. We are very much indebted to John Bowen who early on convinced us of the central importance of schemas for the analysis of anti-Americanism and whose intellectual lead we are following here.
From a normative standpoint, assessments of the United States can serve as identity markers, or as ways to regulate behavior. As identity markers, they are “double-edged” in that they “bind people to each other and at the same time turn people so bound against others.”\(^8\) Identities are a type of social norm that constitute the very actors whose behaviors they regulate. Identities emerge from interactions. Like nationalism, anti-Americanism contains aspects of both instrumental rationality and social construction.\(^9\)

In situations where positive identities of “self” are hard to come by, the ready availability of a powerful, prosperous, culturally omnipresent “other” can provide a social glue that has broad appeal. Such situations are frequent, for example, in failing states, in societies divided deeply along ethnic, religious, class or other lines, and in polities that are in the process of constructing a new collective identity. In brief, anti-Americanism can be a potent and useful stand-in for otherwise missing symbols of collective identity.

Anti-Americanism also involves norms that regulate behavior. People rationally shape their behavior to fit their expectations of what others will do. What is “normal” is common knowledge in stable societies, and therefore facilitates coordination by independent individuals. These expectations reflect behavioral regularities, which may reflect the effects of events or efforts at persuasion to interpret these events. Over time such behavioral regularities can have powerful conditioning effects that make anti-Americanism no longer open to self-reflection or reasoned dialogue. But norms also constitute the premises of action. They are regulative in prescribing socially appropriate

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\(^9\) Haas 1993.
standards of action, and they can also be evaluative in invoking moral standards. During the massive demonstrations protesting the imminent U.S. attack on Iraq on February 15, 2003, it would have been socially very inappropriate to hoist and salute the American flag. Burning the flag and effigies of President Bush, on the other hand, were appropriate. What matters in this conception of norm is the collectively held standard of proper behavior which the norm regulates rather than the aggregation of individual behavior that make up the norm. Behavioral compliance with a norm is therefore linked to the justifications proffered, be it in social or moral terms. The norms associated with anti-Americanism are components of political processes that generate standards of behavior.

Differentiating among schema, identity, and norm suggests a second distinction. Anti-Americanism can be a matter of individual attitudes as revealed in public opinion polls, as analyzed by Pierangelo Isernia in chapter 3 and Giacomo Chiozza in chapter 4. But it is also a matter of collectively held beliefs with distinctive genealogies. Such beliefs can take the form of narrative collective memories analyzed in different ways by David Kennedy in chapter 2 and Bowen in chapter 8. Whether viewed as individual attitudes or collective beliefs, anti-Americanism can be experienced with different emotional intensity.

Anti-American individual attitudes and collective beliefs are dynamic. They wax and wane over time, as people adapt their behavior to new situations. As attitudes and beliefs change, people become more or less susceptible to specific acts of persuasion,

defined here as the use of argument to influence the actions of others, without using bribes or threatening force. Persuasion can occur through schemas, emotional appeals, or norms. Human beings do not carry in their heads fully developed, consistent and articulated views of the world. As a result, how problems are “framed” is often critical for belief-driven action in politics.\textsuperscript{11} Emotional appeals are often significant, particularly in collective settings. Finally, persuasive appeals can be made on the basis of norms -- of identity, which involves “mutually constructed and evolving images of self and other,” or of standards of appropriate behavior invoked by norms regulating social or moral conduct.\textsuperscript{12}

Anti-American views can exist in politically visible form over periods of decades, even centuries, as in the case of France. In political settings where anti-Americanism has been part of a public discourse, it operates as a collective frame that is readily deployed to mobilize people to take political actions. At other times such views incubate for long periods of time out of sight, only to reappear in new forms to the surprise of everyone. At still other times anti-American views can explode and disappear rapidly without leaving

\textsuperscript{11} Tversky and Kahneman 1986. William R. Riker’s (1996, 9) concept of “heresthetics” gets at the same point. Heresthetics, for Riker, is “the art of setting up situations in such a way that even those who do not wish to do so are compelled by the structure of the situation to support the heresthetcian’s purposes.” Others refer to this strategy less elegantly as agenda setting. The key to heresthetics is the “forced choice” that the strategists create. If Anti-Americanism becomes the basic frame for the analysis of action, the premise is that all forms of action and inaction represent a choice, between America and what it stands for and its opponents. To the Anti-American, the correct choice always has to be: “oppose America.” Mere belief is not sufficient, since those who may dislike America but do not act against it can be accused of weakness or hypocrisy. In his discussion of persuasion, Jeffrey Checkel (2001, 562) refers to this process as “manipulative persuasion.”

any tracks. In all such situations anti-American views are often manipulated by political
entrepreneurs, for their own political benefits, top-down. But they are also validated,
bottom-up, by popular conventions or memories that are not necessarily institutionalized.

Nothing in this discussion of schemas, identities and norms is mean to deprecate
the role of reflection and analysis in people’s views of the United States. We may rely on
schemas which incorporate emotional reactions, individual judgments, or persuasive
arguments. We do not prejudge the complex factors that make particular schemas
compelling. To do so would require careful psychological analysis, applied to particular
individuals and groups. What we do insist on is that anti-Americanism is not an
unintelligible pathology in an otherwise intelligible world. It appears so only if we trap
ourselves into projecting what appears as rational and normal in America onto other
societies or other historical eras.

Multidimensionality and Ambivalence

The simplest way to view anti-Americanism is as a set of attitudes, as measured
by results of public opinion polls, or content analyses of discourses, that express negative
views toward the United States or toward Americans. Three consistent and now-standard
results follow.

First, until shortly before the invasion of Iraq, many more respondents worldwide
had favorable opinions of the United States than unfavorable. As we noted above, in the
Pew 2002 poll, pluralities in 35 of 42 countries expressed favorable views. This changed
dramatically in 2003 and 2004. Second, the societies most hostile to the United States, by
far, are located in the Islamic Middle East and North African, along with Pakistan.
Finally, in both Islamic countries and Europe, attitudes toward Americans are more positive than attitudes toward the United States, and attitudes toward the United States are more positive than attitudes toward American foreign policy or President Bush. In a 2002 Zogby poll conducted in a number of Islamic countries the average of favorable opinions toward U.S. foreign policy across six different policies was 19 percent compared to a 47 percent favorable rating of the American people. Polls that the Pew Foundation conducted in 2002 and 2004 show the same pattern although some of the differences are less pronounced.

In chapters 3 and 4 Isernia and Chiozza analyze these polling results in order to understand the structure and correlates of attitudes toward the United States. They also investigate two other features of attitudes that have been less emphasized, or even ignored, in both popular and scholarly discussions of this subject: multidimensionality and heterogeneity. As is frequently noted, people seem to like and loath the United States and American society, at the same time. There is a perhaps apocryphal story about the Iranian students who participated in the holding of American hostages in 1979, asking how, after the crisis was over, they could obtain visas to the United States. “Yankee, go home -- and take me with you!” Such ambivalence is best interpreted as the result of situationally appropriate, multidimensional perceptions of the United States.

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13 Zogby International 2004, 3. In a poll conducted just in Saudi Arabia rejection of Al-Qaeda’s program and practices was almost unanimous and so was rejection of U.S. policies in Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict. See Zogby 2005.
14 We would like to thank Paul Sniderman in particular for sharpening for us the distinction between multidimensionality and ambivalence.
Someone can have multidimensional attitudes without being ambivalent: that is, she could clearly like and dislike different aspects of American society without being at all uncertain about either her likes or dislikes. Ambivalence is different: Neil Smelser defines it as a “powerful, persistent, unresolvable, volatile, generalizable, and anxiety-provoking feature of the human condition.”¹⁵ Smelser associates ambivalence with situations in which people are dependent on a person or organization that they both respect and resent. In practice, it is often difficult to distinguish multidimensionality from ambivalence. Many people abroad (and many Americans as well) like and dislike specific aspects of America. If their general evaluation of American involves strong elements of both attraction and repulsion, they may feel ambivalent.

The polling data show clearly, as Isernia and Chiozza document, that people value different aspects of the United States, or of American society. That is, attitudes toward the United States are multidimensional rather than ambivalent. Chiozza, for example, documents in chapter 4 that attitudes toward America differ along different dimensions. In eight Islamic countries in 2002 (before the Iraq war dramatically increased negative views of the United States), almost 82 percent of respondents held favorable opinions of U.S. science and technology. About 65 percent thought positively about U.S. education, movies and TV, and commercial products. Only 47 percent held favorable views of U.S. ideas of freedom and democracy or the American people. Those people who admired U.S. science and technology but disliked American conceptions of freedom and democracy were not ambivalent about either feature of the United States; their views

were multidimensional in the sense that they evaluated differently different dimensions associated with the United States. Similarly, Isernia shows in chapter 3 that Europeans in the 1950s could dislike capitalism and associate America with capitalism without disliking America.

Table 1 compares two sets of views by respondents to the Pew Research Center’s polls in 2003. Column (1) shows the difference between the percentage of respondents who express agreement with the statement, “people from our country who move to the U.S. have a better life there,” and the percentage disagreeing with that statement. A positive number indicates that on average respondents have a favorable opinion of the United States as a place to live (relative to the home country). Column (2) records the difference between the percentage of respondents who have a favorable opinion of the United States and the percentage with an unfavorable opinion. A positive number indicates that in the aggregate, respondents have a favorable opinion of the United States. The difference between columns (1) and (2) represents the discrepancy between the net score for a given country on the question about emigrants to the United States having a better life, and the net score for the same country regarding the United States in general. That difference is always positive and in most cases remarkably large, indicating the much higher regard respondents show for the United States as a place to live, than for “the United States” as an abstract entity.16

16 This analysis dovetails with the strong statistical relationship (r-square 0.78) that Isernica reports in chapter 3 between the willingness to move to the United States for a better life and per capita income.
Table 1 shows that people can simultaneously say that they dislike the United States and believe that emigrants from their country to the United States generally have a better life than those who remain. These feelings can be interpreted as ambivalence toward America or as multidimensional views toward various aspects of America. Either way, they suggest the complexity of attitudes that are often described too simply as “anti-American.”

Americans have not reciprocated the sharp decline in esteem shown to the United States by foreign publics. In a series of polls conducted between 1999 and 2004 Americans were asked whether a range of countries were close allies, friendly, unfriendly or enemies. The results indicate a largely positive view of other countries. Even in September 2004, in the midst of the Iraq war and an election campaign drawing attention to criticism of the United States abroad, more Americans identified 22 of the 25 countries listed as allies or friends than as unfriendly or enemies. The only exceptions were China, Colombia, and Pakistan. Table 2 shows responses for six American allies over four time periods. Americans’ attitudes respond to the facts that the UK and Japan supported the American war in Iraq, and that Canada, France, and Germany did not. But despite the drops in their ratings, a majority of the American public viewed these three countries in 2003 and in 2004 as allied or at least friendly to the United States.

--Table 2 about here--

17 Harris Interactive (www.harrisinteractive.com). Accessed 04/12/2005. Poll #62 (September 1, 2004); poll #52 (September 10, 2003); poll #47 (September 11, 2002); poll #54 (October 31, 2001); poll #50 (August 30, 2000); poll #51 (September 1, 1999).
Anti-American views are not only multidimensional but also very heterogeneous. There exists substantial and persistent cross-country variation in Western European attitudes toward the United States. Between 1976 and 1997, on average, respondents in the following countries reported that they had “some trust” or “a lot of trust” in Americans: between 74 and 76 percent in Denmark, West Germany, Great Britain, and Netherlands; between 63 to 70 percent in Portugal, Italy, Belgium, and France; but only 46 percent in Spain (1986-97) and 38 percent in Greece (1980-1997). ¹⁸

Various expressions of anti-Americanism seem to have some common elements, including expressions of resentment of America and charges of hypocrisy leveled against the U. S. government. There exists, however, a great deal of variation. Some expressions of antipathy are linked directly to U.S. policies or capabilities, both past and present. Others are linked to the real or imagined gap between American ideals and the actual conduct of the United States. Still others seem to reflect profound differences between the respondent’s and American values and identity. At every level, there is so much variation by country and region that it is more accurate to speak of anti-Americanisms than of anti-Americanism.

People in different countries have very different evaluations of America and of current American policy. We conjecture that evaluations of current policy may perform a triggering function, shifting what could be pro-Americanism or neutrality to anti-Americanism, or intensifying the level of anti-Americanism. One of the important and to

¹⁸ Chiozza 2004, Eurobarometer polls, various years. See also Free 1976.
date unanswered questions is the extent to which opposition to American foreign policy spills over into more deep-seated antipathy to America that generates a new kind of identity as well as to institutionalized forms of bias. If such a “ratchet effect” exists, the implications for America’s role in the world and its “soft power” would be much greater than if a change in foreign policy would restore positive views of the United States.¹⁹

**Opinion, Distrust, and Bias**

If one probes beneath the surface it becomes clear that polling data may mask much of what is politically significant.²⁰ People who answer polling questions in a way that can reasonably be coded as anti-American may differ greatly both in their causal beliefs and in the intensity of their views. Cross-national public opinion polls are useful for helping us understand some basic distinctions in the political orientation of mass publics—specifically toward the United States government and its policies on the one hand and American society and values on the other. But polls risk imposing a conceptual unity on extremely diverse sets of political processes that mean different things in different contexts. Polls may even create the “attitudes” they report since people wish to provide answers to questions that are posed.²¹

Distinguishing between opinion and bias is particularly difficult. It is also hard -- but crucial for our project -- to identify whether negative attitudes are accompanied by distrust. In this section, we first discuss these issues conceptually. We then describe an

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²⁰ Smelser 1997, 11.
analysis we have conducted, seeking to identify bias in a comparative manner, using public reactions in January 2005 to the tsunami relief effort mounted by the United States in Southeast Asia.

On the whole, the political Left in the United States takes comfort from analyses of public opinion polls. They seem consistent with its general view that anti-Americanism is principally a result of unpopular U.S. policies. Negative attitudes are strongest toward American foreign policy rather than American society; anti-Americanism gets worse during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq; anti-Americanism is highest in areas where American actions are widely opposed, as in the Islamic world; most people in most countries think of the United States as a generally good place to live. For the Left, anti-Americanism is a result of “what we do,” not “who we are.”

But if anti-Americanism is only a matter of opinion -- often transient -- why care about it? The Right takes the view of Polonius: “to thine own self be true.” The United States is hated by many people but this is a mark of respect: they hate what is good about us -- American values of freedom and democracy. Rather than feeling defensive, according to the Right, America should be proud of what it is and what it stands for. If the United States firmly pursues sound policies, favorable opinion will follow. For the Right, anti-Americanism is the result of “who we are” not “what we do.” The Right can point to examples that support its position. For example, anti-Americanism in Japan was intense in 1960, when the Japanese police, reinforced by 25,000 members of the Japanese mob, were unable to secure the route from the airport to downtown Tokyo. President Eisenhower was thus forced to cancel a trip he had planned to attend the ceremonies for
the extension of the US-Japan security treaty. Today, however, anti-Americanism in Japan runs at a low ebb. The United States stuck to its policies successfully. To take another example, anti-Americanism (as measured by polls) rose sharply in Europe during the Euro-missile crisis of the early 1980s. In 1984 a plurality of respondents in France, Great Britain, Italy and West Germany thought that during the past year, American policies had done more to increase the risk of war than to promote peace. In 1982, between 29 and 37 percent of those polled held unfavorable opinions of the United States. Yet by 1987 the range of opinion in the same countries was down to a range of 12 to 28 percent unfavorable.\textsuperscript{22} The United States had not wavered from its policy of placing missiles in Europe to counter Soviet missiles aimed at Europe, even though the result was a temporary increase in anti-American opinion. After the policy had been successfully implemented, the United States once again became popular.

Polls often reflect rather transient attitudes -- what is on top of people’s heads.\textsuperscript{23} When situations change, polling results can change dramatically. A recent poll of Indonesians after the western-led tsunami relief efforts of January 2005 illustrates this point.\textsuperscript{24} Conducted between February 1 and 6, 2005, the poll shows a dramatic drop in support for Osama bin Laden and for such actions as suicide bombing. It also shows a sharp rise in favorable views toward the United States and American efforts to fight terrorism. Table 3 displays a summary of differences between responses to identically worded questions in 2003 and in February 2005.

\textsuperscript{22} Chiozza 2003, based on Eurobarometer polling data; British respondents were most negative.
\textsuperscript{23} Zaller 1992.
Nothing in these data suggests that the United States is very popular in Indonesia, or that Indonesian attitudes toward the United States, and toward the war on terrorism, will not turn more negative in the future. The point is that anti-American opinion is volatile, and subject to sharp changes with new events.

The problem, however, with the view that opinion does not matter is that negative shifts in opinion do not necessarily revert back to favorable or neutral views, or may only do so after adverse political effects have occurred. Political entrepreneurs who seek to pursue policies antagonistic to the United States, or who are opportunistic in their exploitation of expressed anti-American views, may use periods of high antagonism to thwart the United States on important international issues or gain power in domestic politics. Indeed, political practices and discourses hostile to the United States can be institutionalized at a period of high antagonism by elites, who then develop a stake in maintaining negative attitudes and poor relations with the United States. Cuba and Iran both come to mind as examples of countries that had close relationships with the United States, which turned hostile under regimes that, at times, have sought to maintain that hostility for their own purposes. In chapter 9 Doug McAdam emphasizes the possible indirect, long-term, and unanticipated impacts of anti-American opinion. We also address this question in chapter 10.

While opinion may or may not have serious consequences, distrust and bias should be of serious concern to policy-makers, particularly if these negative

\[24\] See Terror Free Tomorrow 2005, 5.
predispositions become deeply entrenched in societies that are important to the United States. For distrust can translate easily into opposition or lack of support of the United States. They are likely to demand more evidence, or more compensation, from the United States before they are willing to support American policies. These demands are costly. People who not only distrust the United States but are also biased will process information differently than unbiased people. A recent report demonstrates that negative attitudes toward the United States made Indonesian and Egyptian members of different focus groups list U.S. aid given to their countries during the last decade erroneously in the millions, rather than as $1 billion and $7.3 billion, respectively.\footnote{Charney and Yakatan 2005, 70. APRIL 2005 DRAFT VERSION ;UPDATE.} They are more likely to attribute bad policies to essential features of the United States, rather than merely to specific situations. Furthermore, they will tend to discount potentially favorable information and make negative information more salient. Social psychology shows that people develop social identities easily, and that they define themselves as group members relative to other groups, responding positively to in-groups and negatively to out-groups.\footnote{Charney and Yakatan 2005, 70. APRIL 2005 DRAFT VERSION ;UPDATE.} If people define the United States as part of an out-group, they are likely to view it negatively. If anti-Americanism were to become deep and endemic it could function like a classic prejudice and become a potent marker of identity that is resistant to disconfirming evidence.

Figure 1 suggests two distinctions, between predispositions and opinion, and, within the broad category of predispositions, between bias and distrust. The figure presents these distinctions as categorical, but they can be seen as placed along a
continuum involving receptivity to new information. The more predisposition someone has against America, the less information is required to view American policies negatively. The strongest predisposition -- bias -- implies attributing negative actions and motives to the United States as an entity, rather than to the situation in which it finds itself. Distrust, on the other hand, can reflect attribution to the essential and inherent characteristics of an actor, or to the situation in which the actor finds himself, or some mixture of the two. The more distrust is based on negative evaluations of American characteristics, viewed as inherent, the deeper it is. Negative opinions by people who are open to new information and do not attribute bad practices of the United States to its essential, inherent characteristics do not qualify as predispositions for us -- either toward distrust or bias.

It is very important to emphasize that our distinction among opinion, distrust and bias represents a continuum, with distrust lying between opinion and bias. Most opinion reflects a mixture of reasoned assessment based on historical judgment and is structured also in some ways by schemas. Bowen acknowledges in chapter 8 how difficult it can be to distinguish between these two in specific instances. Since we focus on anti-Americanism rather than pro-Americanism, we are concerned with schemas that create

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27 The top right cell of the table is empty, since low openness to new information implies that new information about the situation in which the actor was placed, would not change the subject’s view. The bottom left cell of the table is empty, because high openness to new information implies the relevance of situational information, and therefore the rejection of the fundamental attribution fallacy of attributing action solely to essential characteristics of the actor.
some negative predispositions. Some of these may be so mild that they still fit within our
general category of opinion. As the schemas harden, we move into the range of more or
less serious distrust, and, eventually, to bias.

Anti-Semitism is an extreme version of bias, and it has some links to current anti-
Americanism as Bowen analyzes for the case of Indonesia and France in chapter 8.\textsuperscript{28}
Earlier Nazi, Soviet and Pan-Arab versions of anti-Semitism are feeding into
contemporary Islamic forms that are affecting the attitudes of millions of Muslims. The
unconditional support of the United States for the policies of the Israeli government that
contradict a number of long-standing UN resolutions has created a strong political
backlash well beyond the Middle East. And the U.S. assent to the Israeli defiance of the
Road Map for peace (backed by the U.S, the UN ,the European Union, and Russia) has
aggravated a deeply felt sense of injustice by endorsing the Israeli view that core aspects
of the final settlement could be fixed without Palestinian agreement.\textsuperscript{29} In the Middle East
anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism often blend seamlessly into one another. This is true
also in Europe where that fusion is not only restricted to a growing Muslim population.
Although European anti-Semitism and even philo-Semitism without Jews have become
social facts since 1945, traditional anti-Semitism is no longer tolerated in Europe’s public
discourse.\textsuperscript{30} A new anti-Semitism now focuses on Israel’s military strength, religious
vitality, strong nationalism, and predisposition toward unilateral action, all traits that, in

\textsuperscript{29} Lieven 2004, 173-216.
\textsuperscript{30} Smith 2005.
the eyes of many Europeans, also characterize the United States. By contrast, Europeans today value diplomacy, betray a secular outlook, share in a diffuse national identity blending with local and European elements, and reveal an enduring commitment to the principle of multilateralism. Civilian, not military, power is the source for Europe’s claim to great power status in world politics. Since Israel, despite its lack of geographical depth and small population, is widely regarded as the main regional power, in the Middle East its close alliance with the United States creates a preponderance of Israeli over Arab power. And that preponderance reinforces values that, in European eyes, are fundamentally at odds with the European experience of building peacefully a new polity on a continent for centuries divided by ancient hatreds and bloody wars. Anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism converge on the fleeting borderlines that separate serious criticism from distrust and systematic bias.

Some authors distinguish correctly between opinion and bias but then make the error of accepting polling data as “expressions of anti-Americanism.” Clearly we need better evidence than this before concluding that anti-Americanism in the sense of deep distrust or bias is widespread. Andrei S. Markovits of the University of Michigan reports some such evidence, in an analysis of nearly one thousand articles written on the United

31 Professors Edward H. Kaplan (Yale School of Management) and Charles A. Small (Southern Connecticut State University) are analyzing the Anti-Defamation League’s 2004 European survey. Their preliminary results suggest that sharply critical views of Israel are in the single digits, much lower than one might have expected on the basis of newspaper coverage. At the same time there is a clear statistical relationship between strong anti-Israel sentiment and anti-Semitism. We thank Professors Kaplan and Small for sharing with us the preliminary results of their work. See Kaplan and Small 2005 and also Zick and Küpper 2005 and more generally Rabinovici, Speck and Sznайдer 2004.
States in Britain, France, Germany and Italy.  

Focusing on “non-political” topics such as film, theatre and sports, he found pervasive condescension and denigration toward American culture. One of his more telling examples compares European press coverage of the World Cup in the United States (1994) and in Korea and Japan (2002). In the American coverage even unexpected events that would appear to be positive (such as 60,000 people watching a match between Saudi Arabia and Morocco on a weekday afternoon) were reported negatively: such a high turnout only underlined the naivete and ignorance of the American public. In contrast, the South Korean and Japanese hosts received rave reviews.

Without more studies that replicate Markovits’s findings in different countries and empirical domains, it is difficult to know how biased people elsewhere are toward the United States. We and our collaborators have tried in this project to figure out ways to differentiate among these types of sentiments. One such effort is described in the next sub-section.

Attitudes toward the United States are too multidimensional for bias to be an accurate description of most people’s views, as expressed either in public opinion polls or in public discourse. Yet in countries as diverse as China, France, Egypt and Indonesia, attitudes reflect a pervasive and sometimes institutionalized distrust, which creates

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32 Hollander 2004b, 15. Rubin and Rubin 2004 also make the distinction between opinion and bias.
34 For a particularly creative attempt, see Chiozza’s chapter 4. Chapters 5-7 were designed to help answer questions about bias by focusing not only on politically salient
skepticism toward statements by the United States government and a negative predisposition toward American policy. Overall, the findings in this book indicate that attitudes toward the United States are frequently better-characterized in terms of distrust than of either opinion or bias.

_Tsunami Relief as a Quasi-Experiment_

One of the difficulties in using public opinion polls to analyze comparative levels of anti-Americanism by country is that even apparently similar questions are interpreted differently in different places. One may ask people similar questions about how favorable they feel toward the United States. Yet attitudes toward the United States have different salience in different societies and people will therefore give different answers. To Germans, American unilateralism in Iraq may be salient; to Egyptians, U.S. support for Israel against Palestinians; to Chinese, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Sarajevo or the spy-plane incident of spring 2001. Different responses can thus reflect different experiences or reference groups, rather than varying degrees of bias against the United States. If one were able to design an experiment to assess bias against the United States, one would present a single, somewhat ambiguous, scenario of American behavior and ask people in different societies to react to it. The expectation would be that such a situation would create a Rorschach test, responses to which would reveal people’s biases rather than opinion.
Paul Sniderman has conducted highly original research over the last fifteen years on prejudice, which distinguishes bias from opinion. In studying prejudice, researchers need to be aware that respondents sometimes conceal racist views, recognizing that they are not socially acceptable. Sniderman therefore devised computer-aided polling techniques that ask the same questions, except for precisely calibrated variations, to two or more experimentally controlled sets of respondents. In one such experiment, respondents are primed to express judgments on the behavior of a character in a narrative. For the treatment and control groups, everything is the same in the narrative except the ethnic affiliation of the protagonist. In another of Sniderman’s experiments, subjects are given lists of things that make them angry, in such a way that they know that the investigator cannot identify which particular items they reacted to. But for the treatment group, “affirmative action” is included in addition to the items listed for the control group. By computing the mean “angry” responses, the investigator can determine what proportion of the treatment group reacted angrily to affirmative action.\textsuperscript{35} Such an experimental method could be of great value in distinguishing opinion from bias in expressions of anti-Americanism.

Lacking data from such an experiment, the worldwide response to the Asian tsunami of December 26, 2004 at least provides us with a rough quasi-experiment.\textsuperscript{36} The tsunami was an enormous tragedy for millions of people, and it generated an unprecedented outpouring of empathy and generosity worldwide. President Bush’s

\textsuperscript{35} For the experiments on “treatment of various groups,” see Sniderman and Piazza 2002, pp.186-87 and Sniderman et al 2000. For the “list experiment” see Sniderman and Carmines 1997, pp. 43-45.
apparent initial indifference generated much critical commentary. By January 7, 2005, however, the United States government had donated $350 million -- about eight percent of the amount that had been contributed by all governments at that time -- and had deployed its naval vessels in the area in a massive relief operation. The U.S. relief effort was focused on Southeast Asia and was not experienced directly by people in countries outside the region. But the American response was widely publicized.

Fortunately for our analysis, between January 8 and 16, 2005 Global Market Insite (GMI) conducted a poll of 1000 members of the urban publics in each of 20 countries, which included questions about the American tsunami relief effort. By the time of the GMI poll the United States had mounted an impressive and far-reaching logistical relief operation, and the American public had proved its generosity. Since the United States response was sufficiently ambiguous to be interpretable in different ways, it approximates the conditions of a quasi-experiment. That is, had we been able to run an experiment, we would have exposed subjects to an ambiguous response by the United States and asked for evaluations.

For everyone outside the affected area, and for most people in Asia as a whole, reactions to the U.S. response to the tsunami were based not on personal experience but on media reports, filtered through their own prevailing schemas about the United States. Therefore, variations in evaluations of the U.S. response are unlikely to reflect different

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36 See Cook and Campbell 1979.
37 See Mallet 2005. At that time reported figures for U.S. private donations were $200 million, over 35 percent of the U.S. total.
personal experiences, particularly for publics outside of Asia. Admittedly we do not have an Archimedean standard of perfect accuracy in perception against which to judge public reactions to the American aid effort; but we can analyze these reactions comparatively. Variations in the perceptions of the American effort in countries not directly affected by the tsunami or the relief efforts reflect three sorts of bias: on the part of the media, in the schemas held by individuals, and in the collective images of America prevailing in different societies. Individuals biased in favor of the United States could be expected to give positive responses when asked about the reaction of the American government; those biased against the United States could be expected to give more negative responses. Even though there is no way to determine what an “unbiased answer” would be, variation in evaluations should reflect variations in the degree of bias.

The GMI poll asked the following question:

“The American government has donated $350 million to aid nations impacted by the tsunami, has deployed its military to aid the region, and has called on former President Clinton and President Bush Sr. to fundraise more money from the American people. Do you think the American government’s reaction to the tsunami tragedy is adequate?”

38 For the overall results, see http://www.worldpoll.com. Accessed repeatedly, most recently April 15, 2005. GMI states that the poll included representative samples of 1,000 consumers in each of 20 countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, South Korea, United Kingdom and United States. GMI has been extremely generous, giving us individual-level data and answering specific questions, about issues such as the precise dates of the polls, to which answers are not available on its website. We are grateful to Ken Pick of GMI in Seattle, and to Lynn Gale of the Center for
The answers to this question were categorized as “agree,” “disagree,” and “don’t know/neither.” GMI also asked a fairly standard question about the United States: “Overall, how would you describe your feelings towards the United States?” The answers to this question were categorized as “positive,” “negative,” or “don’t know/neither.”

Table 4 arrays the data by indicating the difference between “agree” or “positive,” on the one hand, and “disagree” or “negative” on the other, for each of the twenty countries surveyed on the two questions. Positive answers indicate net favorable views toward the United States or the American tsunami relief efforts. Rank orders for each question are in parentheses. The first two columns of Table 4 seem to suggest that bias -- perhaps both for and against the United States -- had an impact on opinions about the adequacy of American tsunami relief efforts.

There is an enormous range of views on the U.S.-led relief effort, disregarding U.S. respondents, who were overwhelmingly favorable. Sixty-two percent of the Russian public considered American efforts adequate, as compared to 34 percent who did not; at the other extreme, only 17 percent of the Greek public considered American efforts adequate, as compared to 73 percent who did not. None or almost none of these respondents had any personal experience of the operation on which they had opinions; they had to be reacting to media coverage, their own schema, and the nationally prevailing images of the American relief effort.

Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, for providing the data to us in usable form,
There exists a strong correlation between general views of the United States and views of the adequacy of American-led tsunami relief efforts, with a Spearman rank-order coefficient well under the 0.01 level of significance. Three of the five publics most favorably disposed toward the United States in general, rank also among the five most favorable publics toward the U.S. relief effort, and conversely for the least favorable publics. It is particularly instructive to examine the variation in attitudes among the European countries whose publics were polled by GMI. For these countries there is a wide variation in responses to the tsunami; the rank orders in the two columns are almost perfectly correlated. These correlations, for all 20 countries and only for the European ones, provide strong evidence in favor of the proposition that general attitudes toward the United States “bleed over” into attitudes toward its tsunami relief efforts, particularly for publics such as those in France and Greece with strong negative predispositions toward the United States. 39

The third column of Table 4 indicates clearly that, with only a few exceptions, publics rate their own country’s performance highly favorably. Indeed, in about half the countries, publics are almost unanimously supportive of

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39 In chapter 5, Meunier argues on the basis of an analysis of the French media that the French reaction to American tsunami relief efforts should not be interpreted as reflecting anti-American bias, and that the French media were also highly critical of France’s reaction. But the polling data indicate that the French public was overwhelmingly supportive of France’s response and even more overwhelmingly critical of that of the United States.
their own country’s effort. Overall, as Table 4 shows, there exists no significant correlation between how publics view their own country’s efforts and how they evaluate the American effort. It is therefore not the case that some publics are uniformly critical, others uniformly appreciative.

Publics are biased in favor of their own countries’ performance. This generalization applies not only to countries such as Australia, which were generous (over $900 million in reported public and private donations by January 7) but also to countries that gave almost nothing, such as Hungary and Russia. And in every case they rate their own country ahead of the United States which at that time had provided $550 million in reported public and private donations. Individual-level data, as analyzed for us by Giacomo Chiozza, indicate that only in three countries (Russia, Mexico and Japan) did more than ten percent of the public both rate U.S. performance as adequate and their own country’s performance as inadequate. Conversely, in no country did less than twenty percent of the public rate their own country’s performance as adequate and the US performance as inadequate. In Germany, Greece, and Australia more than half the public provided such a rating.

We conclude from this analysis that there exists substantial variation in the bias (positive or negative) toward the United States held by different publics, and that this

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40 Mallet 2005 reports data on donations.
41 We are very grateful to Professor Chiozza for carrying out the individual-level analysis, at our request, and making the results available to us. Taking into account private donations and the size of the economy, Australia ($904 million), Germany ($880
variation is strongly correlated with general attitudes toward the United States. Much more tenatively, we infer that significant cross-national variation in bias exists, with negative bias particularly pronounced in France and Greece.\textsuperscript{42} The evidence is very strong that publics are positively biased toward their own countries’ efforts, in a way that is consistent with widespread nationalism.

**A Typology of "anti-Americanism"**

Figure 2 sketches a typology of four types of anti-Americanism, based on the degree to which the subject identifies with the United States and its practices. The fundamental dimension along which these four types of anti-Americanism vary is the normative one of \textit{identification}.\textsuperscript{43} This concept refers to the degree to which individuals identify with the United States, or on the contrary, identify themselves as in opposition or even hostile to it. Liberals identify with Americans, although they may be very critical of the failure of the United States to pursue actions consistent with its professed values. Social and Christian democrats share democratic principles with the United States but

\textsuperscript{42} We note, however, that Meunier’s analysis of French media coverage in chapter 5 does not support this inference of bias. Her conclusion is that the French media emphasized the unilateralism of the United States response -- unilateralism to which the French take firm and reasoned objection. Whether it was bias for the media to stress features of the American reaction that the French public dislikes, rather than its humanitarian objectives, is, of course, another question.

\textsuperscript{43} In chapter 3 Isernia analyzes the multidimensionality of European views of America in terms of threat and mastery, involving variable degrees of in-group identification, possibly based on modal distributions of opinion in Europe, distrust in East Asia and bias in the Middle East. They yield variable degrees of mastery over one’s environment. Isernia’s two dimensions are conceptually related to, though distinct from, the ones we develop here.
define other values very differently from those of Americans, typically rejecting America’s lack of an extensive welfare state and various of its social policies, including the death penalty. Sovereign-nationalists identify with their nation, which they may or may not perceive as threatened by the United States. Radicals define themselves in opposition to the United States and the values for which it stands.

--- Figure 2 about here ---

The typology is not meant to reify anti-Americanism, as if it were homogeneous within a given society even if heterogeneous worldwide. In their analyses in chapters 8 and 9, Bowen and McAdam show that dynamic processes generate and reproduce positive or negative views toward the United States in different ways, in various countries and social sectors. Instead we seek to identify components of anti-Americanism, which can combine, in some cases, with pro-Americanism, in a variety of configurations. As we have emphasized, individuals evaluate different aspects of the United States differently; and groups can be internally divided on evaluations of the United States and the American people. Indeed, one of the key features of the four different types of anti-Americanism is that they are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, several of them may “bleed into” one another, and some of the most interesting situations are those in which more than one form of anti-Americanism is at work.

**Liberal anti-Americanism**

“Liberal anti-Americanism” seems at first to be an oxymoron, since liberals broadly share many of the ideas that are characteristic of the American creed. But the United States is often criticized bitterly for not living up to its own ideals. A country
dedicated to democracy and self-determination supported dictatorships around the world during the Cold War, and continued to do so in the Middle East after the Cold War had ended. The war against terrorism has led the United States to begin supporting a variety of otherwise unattractive, even repugnant, regimes and political practices. On economic issues, the United States claims to favor freedom of trade, but protects its own agriculture from competition stemming from developing countries, and seeks extensive patent and copyright protection for American drug firms and owners of intellectual property. Such behavior opens the United States to charges of hypocrisy from people who share its professed ideals but lament its actions.44

Liberal anti-Americanism is prevalent in the liberal societies of advanced industrialized countries, especially those colonized or influenced by Great Britain. For a long time it was prominent in the Middle East, among secular, western-educated elites. As the influence of these groups has fallen, it is been replaced by more radical forms of anti-Americanism. No liberal anti-American ever detonated a bomb against Americans or planned an attack on the United States. The potential impact of liberal anti-Americanism would be not to generate attacks on the United States but to reduce support for American policy. The more the United States is seen as a self-interested power parading under the banners of democracy and human rights, rather than a true proponent of those values, the less willing other liberals may be to defend it with words or deeds.

44 One of America’s greatest secretaries of state, John Quincy Adams, was alert to the issue of hypocrisy. Arguing that the United States should not deny its hegemonic aspirations for North America, he declared that “any effort on our part to reason the world out of a belief that we are ambitious will have no other effect than to convince them that we add to our ambition hypocrisy.” Quoted in Gaddis 2004, 27.
Since liberal anti-Americanism feeds on perceptions of hypocrisy, a less hypocritical set of United States policies could presumably reduce it. Hypocrisy, however, is inherent in the situation of a superpower that professes universalistic ideals. It afflicted the Soviet Union even more than the United States. When democracies engage in global political competition, they generally find it necessary, and certainly convenient, to mobilize their people by referring to higher ideals, such as democracy and freedom. Since states involved in power competition often find it useful to resort to measures that undercut democracy and freedom elsewhere, the potential for hypocrisy is inherent in global activism by democracies. Furthermore, a prominent feature of pluralist democracy is that its leaders find it necessary both to claim that they are acting consistently with democratic ideals, while they have to respond to groups seeking to pursue their own self-interests, usually narrowly defined. When the interests of politically strong groups imply policies that do not reflect democratic ideals, the ideals are typically compromised. Hypocrisy routinely results. It is criticized not only in liberal but also in non-liberal states. As Alastair I. Johnston and Dani Stockman note in chapter 6, Chinese public discourse overwhelmingly associates the United States with adherence to a double standard in its foreign policy in general and in its conduct of the war on terror specifically.

Hypocrisy in American foreign policy is not so much the result of the ethical failings of American leaders as a by-product of the role played by the United States in world politics and of democratic politics at home. It will not, therefore, be eradicated.

45 See Grant 1997; Shklar 1984.
As long as political hypocrisy persists, abundant material will be available for liberal anti-Americanism.

Social anti-Americanism

Since democracy comes in many stripes, we are wrong to mistake the American tree for the democratic forest. During the last three decades typologies of advanced industrial states and welfare societies, varieties of capitalism, and different types of electoral democracies have become a staple in the analysis of international political economy, comparative political economy and comparative politics. What we denote as social anti-Americanism derives from a set of political institutions that embed liberal values in a broader set of social and political arrangements that help define market processes and outcomes left more autonomous in the U.S. This variant of liberalism is marked by a more encompassing support for a variety of social programs than those that are politically feasible or socially acceptable in the United States. Social democratic welfare states in Scandinavia, Christian democratic welfare states on the European continent, and developmental industrial states in Asia, such as Japan, are prime examples. Canada is a particularly interesting case of a polity that has moved in two directions simultaneously – toward market liberalism U.S.-style under the impact of NAFTA and toward a more European-style welfare state. In this it mirrors the stance of many smaller capitalist democracies which are market-liberal in the international economy and social or Christian democratic in their domestic arrangements. Furthermore, judging by the experience of recent years, civil liberties in the war on terror are often better protected in
social and Christian democratic regimes (such as European democracies) than in liberal ones (such as the United States).

Social anti-Americanism is based on value conflicts that reflect relevant differences in many spheres of life that are touching on “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” In the absence of the perception of a common external threat, “American conditions” (amerikanische Verhältnisse) which are totally market-driven are resented by many Germans, as they were in times of financial crisis by many Mexicans, Asians and Argentinians in 1984, 1994, 1997, and 2001. While it is not absent, hypocrisy is a smaller part of the resentment than in liberal anti-Americanism. The injustice embedded in American policies that favor the rich over the poor is often decried. The sting is different here than for liberals who resent American hypocrisy. Genuine value conflicts exist, on issues such as the death penalty, the desirability of generous social protections, preference for multilateral approaches over unilateral ones, and the sanctity of international treaties. Still, these value conflicts are smaller than those with radical anti-Americanism, since social anti-Americanism shares in core American values.

Sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism

A third form of anti-Americanism focuses not on correcting domestic market outcomes but on political power. Sovereign-nationalists focus on two values: the importance of not losing control over the terms by which polities are inserted in world politics and the inherent importance and value of collective national identities. These

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identities often embody values that are at odds with America’s. State sovereignty thus becomes a shield against unwanted intrusions from America.

The emphasis placed by different sovereign nationalists can vary in three ways. First, it can be on nationalism: on collective national identities that offer a source of positive identification. National identity is one of the most important political values in contemporary world politics, and there is little evidence suggesting that this is about to change. Such identities create the potential for anti-Americanism, both when they are strong (since they provide positive countervalues) and when they are weak (since anti-Americanism can become a substitute for the absence of positive values).

Second, sovereign nationalists can emphasize sovereignty. In the many parts of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa where state sovereignty came only after hard-fought wars of national liberation, sovereignty is a much-cherished good that is to be defended. And in Latin America with its very different history, the unquestioned preeminence of the U.S. has reinforced the perceived value of sovereignty. Anti-Americanism rooted in sovereignty is less common in Europe than in other parts of the world for one simple reason. European politics over the last half century has been devoted to a common project – the partial pooling of sovereignty in an emerging European polity.

A third variant of sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism appears where people see their states as potential great powers. Such societies may define their own situations partly in opposition to dominant states. Some Germans came to strongly dislike Britain before World War I as blocking what they believed was Germany’s rightful “place in the sun.” The British-German rivalry before the First World War was particularly
striking, in view of the similarities between these highly industrialized and partially
democratic societies, and the fact that their royal families were related by blood ties.
Their political rivalry was systemic, pitting the dominant naval power of the 19th century
against a rapidly rising land power. Rivalry bred animosity rather than *vice versa*.

Sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism resonates well in polities that have
strong state traditions. Encroachments on state sovereignty are particularly resented when
the state has the capacity and a tradition of directing domestic affairs. This is true in
particular of the states of East Asia. The issues of “respect” and saving “face” in
international politics can make anti-Americanism especially virulent, since it stirs
nationalist passions in a way that social anti-Americanism rarely does.

China is particularly interesting for this category, since all three elements of
sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism are present there. The Chinese elites and public
are highly nationalistic and very sensitive to threats to Chinese sovereignty.
Furthermore, China is already a great power, and has aspirations to become more
powerful yet. Yet it is still weaker than the United States. Hence the superior military
capacity of the United States, and its expressed willingness to use that capacity (for
instance, against an attack by China on Taiwan) create latent anti-Americanism. When
the United States attacks China (as it did with the bombing of the Chinese embassy in
Belgrade in 1999) or seems to threaten it (as in the episode of the EC-3 spy plane in
2001), explicit anti-Americanism appears quickly.

*Radical anti-Americanism*
We characterize a fourth form of anti-Americanism as radical. It is built around the belief that America’s identity, as reflected in the internal economic and political power relations and institutional practices of the United States, ensures that its actions will be hostile to the furtherance of good values, practices, and institutions elsewhere in the world. For progress toward a better world to take place, the American economy and society will have to be transformed, either from within or without.

Radical anti-Americanism was characteristic of Marxist-Leninist states such as the Soviet Union until its last few years and is still defining Cuba and North Korea today. When Marxist revolutionary zeal was great, radical anti-Americanism was associated with violent revolution against U.S.-sponsored regimes, if not the United States itself. Its Marxist-Leninist adherents are now so weak, however, that it is mostly confined to the realm of rhetoric. For the United States to satisfy adherents of this brand of radical anti-Americanism, it would need to change the nature of its political-economic system.

Avishai Margalit and Ian Buruma, building on Werner Sombart’s 1915 polemic contrasting Anglo-Saxon “merchants” with German “heroes,” have labeled another contemporary variant of radical anti-Americanism as “Occidentalism.” The most extreme versions of Occidentalism hold that Western civilization entails values that are barbarous to the point of requiring the physical destruction of the people living in these societies. In the most extreme versions of Occidentalism the United States is the leading state of the West and therefore the central source of evil. This perceived evil may take various forms, from equality for women, to public displays of the human body, to belief

in the superiority of Christianity. For those holding extreme versions of Occidentalist ideas the central conclusion is that the West, and the United States in particular, are so incorrigibly bad that they must be destroyed. And since the people who live in these societies have renounced the path of righteousness and truth, they must be attacked and exterminated.

Religiously-inspired and secular radical anti-Americanism argue for the weakening, destruction or transformation of the political and economic institutions of the United States. The distinctive mark of both strands of anti-Americanism is the demand for revolutionary changes in the nature of American society.

It should be clear that these four different types of anti-Americanism are not simply variants of the same schema, emotions, or set of norms, with only slight variations at the margin. On the contrary, adherents of different types of anti-Americanism can express antithetical attitudes. Radical Muslims oppose a popular culture that commercializes sex and portrays women as liberated from the control of men, and are also critical of secular-liberal values. Social and Christian democratic Europeans, by contrast, may love American popular culture but criticize the United States for the death penalty, and for not living up to secular values they share with liberals. Liberal anti-Americanism exists because its proponents regard the United States as failing to live up to its professed values – which are entirely opposed to those of religious radicals and are largely embraced by liberals. Secular radical anti-Americans may oppose the American

48 Chiozza, chapter 4, p. 30.
embrace of capitalism, but may accept scientific rationalism, gender egalitarianism, and secularism – as Marxists have done. Anti-Americanism can be fostered by Islamic fundamentalism, idealistic liberalism, or Marxism. And it can be embraced by people who, not accepting any of these sets of beliefs, fear the practices or deplore the policies of the United States.  

The Role of Fear

Whether these identifications translate into anti-Americanism, or into very active anti-Americanism, depends, we conjecture, on an emotional dimension: the extent to which the United States is feared. Chiozza reports in chapter 4 that fear is stronger than hope, at least as reflected in public opinion polls. Solid majorities in four world regions thought in 2002 that the spread of American customs and ideas was negative for their countries. In general, we expect that fear can make even political liberals have negative views toward the United States, or activate and intensify the latent anti-American views of social, sovereign-nationalist, or radical individuals.

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49 It should also be noted that, except for radical anti-Americans, people who express anti-American attitudes with respect to some aspects of the United States – such as United States foreign policy – can be quite pro-American with respect to other aspects of American society. And at other times, they may be pro-American in policy terms. When the United States acts in ways in which they approve, liberals, social democrats, and sovereign- nationalists may all be supportive of its actions.

50 Surprising to us is therefore the finding that Johnston and Stockman report in chapter 6. Chinese (specifically residents of Beijing) who have very low threat perceptions hold the most negative views of America, no matter what they thought of the identity difference separating Americans and Chinese. This disconfirmation of our expectations illustrates the fact that our conceptualization is very tentative and subject to revision in light of evidence.
In the absence of a fear of bad effects of U.S. action, liberals are pro-American (Figure 2, Box I). But if American actions appear to create bad effects – as the war in Iraq is viewed by many liberals at home and abroad – they may adopt attitudes of antipathy to U.S. policy, if not to the United States as a society (Box II). Social and Christian democrats, in the absence of fear of bad effects of the United States, may display some latent anti-Americanism – at dinner parties or asking questions of visiting scholars from the United States – but this form of anti-Americanism is very mild, indeed passive (Box III). If the United States seems to impinge on their societies – for instance, if international competition from neo-liberal societies is blamed for erosion of the welfare state at home – this anti-Americanism can become more intense (Box IV). Sovereign nationalists may be able to ignore the United States when it does not play a major role in their region or country, or even to welcome its support against rivals. In this case (Box V) their anti-Americanism could be latent, and not readily observable. But when they fear U.S. actions that may damage the interests of their polity, sovereign nationalists respond with intense anti-Americanism, such as one has seen in China, Serbia or Iraq (Box VI). Finally, radicals may find themselves in a situation in which they are politically supported by the United States – as is the case for the Saudi elite – and therefore have to keep their anti-Americanism latent (Box VII). In the absence of such cross-pressures, radicals are found in Box VIII.

The schemas, emotions and norms that provide the basis for anti-American attitudes are as varied as the different types of anti-Americanism. In turn, such attitudes and beliefs do not gain adherents in a political vacuum, on the basis of their intrinsic
merit. On the contrary, they often lie dormant for long periods of time until events, or changes in political conditions, make them relevant and useful to political movements.

We therefore need to differentiate between latent and active anti-Americanism, as McAdam does in chapter 9. Although both types of anti-Americanism will be picked up by public opinion polls, active anti-Americanism, which manifests itself as social movements, government policies, and even as violent action, is much more consequential for human welfare and for U.S. policy.

Figure 2 is cast in terms of the attitudes of individuals. The different types of anti-Americanism can, however, also be manifested at the level of the polity in the form of collective beliefs, reflected, for example, in appropriate discourses, tropes and acceptable rhetorical moves. Anti-Americanism can be studied also at local, regional, transnational and global levels. Furthermore, as we have emphasized, it is often configurations of anti-Americanisms, rather than pure types, whose effects we observe.

Political entrepreneurs and political organizations are very attuned to the different types of anti-Americanism, as they seek to mobilize people to whatever cause they are pursuing.

Historical Dimensions of Anti-Americanism

Figure 2 does not take into account the particular experience of a society with the United States, which may condition the attitudes of its people. Two other forms of anti-Americanism, which do not fit within our general typology, are both historically sensitive and particularistic: elitist anti-Americanism and legacy anti-Americanism.
Elitist anti-Americanism arises in countries in which the elite has a long history of looking down on American culture, as is typically true of France. As Sophie Meunier makes clear in Chapter 5, France’s cultural repertoire is distinctive and differs considerably in a variety of domains from that of the United States. In the words of Michèle Lamont and Laurent Thévenot, evaluations “based on market performance are much more frequent in the United States than in France, while evaluations based on civic solidarity are more salient in France.” French elites take great pride in such differences and their sense of cultural superiority. French intellectuals are the European epicenter of anti-Americanism, and some of their disdain spills over to the public. As Tables 4 and 5 show, in 2005 the French public was particularly unfavorable toward the United States. However, polls of the French public between the 1960s and 2002 indicated majority pro-Americanism in France, with favorable ratings that were only somewhat lower than levels observed elsewhere in Europe. And the implications of French elite coolness toward America for policy were remarkably mild. France kept its distance from the U.S. during the Cold War in some respects. For example, President DeGaulle withdrew France from the military arm of NATO. But France remained in NATO and at times of crisis, such as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, France stood strongly with the United States.

century, when some European writers held that everything in the Americas was
degenerate.\textsuperscript{53} The climate was enervating; plants and animals did not grow to the same
size; people were uncouth. The tradition of disparaging America has continued ever
since. Americans are often seen as uncultured materialists, seeking individual personal
advancement without concern for the arts, music, or other finer things of life. Or they are
viewed as excessively religious, and therefore insufficiently rational.

Since elitist anti-Americanism is rooted in different identities, its adherents
neither expect nor desire that the United States change its practices. On the contrary,
America’s continuing lack of commitment to high culture provides, for French elites, a
much-needed sense of superiority. Indeed, the character of America’s system of
secondary education, and particularly the all-encompassing impact of the commercialized
mass media, ensure that cultural elites everywhere will continue to find many aspects of
American society distasteful. Elitist anti-Americanism does not line up neatly in a
hierarchical ordering of anti-Americanisms. Elitist anti-Americanism extracts one
dimension of attitudes: the sense of superiority that an elite feels to the United States.
Such an elite could have any of the identities summarized in Figure 2, or a combination
of them.

\textit{Legacy anti-Americanism} stems from resentment of past wrongs committed by
the United States toward another society. Mexican anti-Americanism is prompted by the
experiences of US military attack and various forms of imperialism during the last two

\textsuperscript{52} Lamont and Thévenot 2000, 2.
\textsuperscript{53} Roger 2005.
hundred years. The Iranian revolution of 1979, and the subsequent hostage crisis, were fueled by memories of American intervention in Iranian politics especially in the 1950s. Between the late 1960s and the end of the 20th century, the highest levels of anti-Americanism recorded in western Europe were in Spain and especially Greece – both countries that had experienced civil wars; in the case of Spain the United States supported for decades a repressive dictator.54

If not reinforced by a continuation of the wrongs committed by the United States, by another form of anti-Americanism (as is the case in Iran), or by the institutionalization of historical memories of American wrongs, legacy anti-Americanism can be expected to decline over time. While it persists, it is likely to be restricted to specific places, taking the form of support for anti-American policies and tolerance of more radical anti-American movements, rather than being a source of direct attacks on the United States or on Americans. Other forms of anti-Americanism could generate legacy anti-Americanism. For instance, sovereign-nationalists or radicals could be convinced that their societies had been harmed by the United States, while liberals and social democrats, in the same societies, could view the effects of the United States as largely benign. The belief of the former set of people could intensify their anti-American sentiments. Legacy

54 This is not to argue that this type of anti-Americanism is a simple linear extrapolation of the past as Doug McAdam explores in chapter 9. We leave to future work by specialists of particular episodes of anti-Americanism comparisons and counterfactuals to probe this issue. For example, how does anti-Americanism in the Philippines and South Korea compare, as both societies were exposed to brutal Japanese occupation and both ruled in the 1970s by harsh autocratic regimes that enjoyed U.S. support? And how does the subsequent process of democratization affect the divergence in the level of expressed anti-Americanism, especially among the young?
anti-Americanism can be explosive but it is not unalterable. History both creates and
eviscerates the roots that feed it. As McAdam shows in chapter 9, history can ameliorate
or reverse negative views of the United States, as well as reinforce them.

Conclusion

This book is primarily an exercise in descriptive inference and comparative analysis. We
aim to understand variation in what is considered “anti-Americanism,” within an
analytical framework that highlights the complexities of Americanism and distinguishes
cognitive schema, emotions, and norms. We emphasize the multidimensionality and
heterogeneity of anti-Americanism and the distinction we have drawn among opinion,
distrust, and bias.

Our study spans conventional levels of analysis: individual, group, societal,
domestic, transnational, and international. Selecting only one of these levels for
investigation might misleadingly truncate our analysis. The various types of anti-
Americanism here identified can be analyzed in different ways. Some analysts will
emphasize individual attitudes and responses, relying heavily on cross-national public
opinion research and experiments in the field of cultural psychology. Others may give
pride of place to methods of discourse analysis informed by theories of public sphere or
social frames. Still others may adopt a more historical-institutional approach, inquiring
into the interpretation of various practices within their social and institutional context.
We have asked our authors, insofar as practically feasible, to deploy several of these
methods and to take several of these kinds of evidence into account. Indeed, one of the
purposes of this volume is to show that different perspectives on anti-Americanism can
produce a richer understanding of this complex set of phenomena than the use of any single method to the exclusion of others. Methodologically, this volume is self-consciously pluralistic and eclectic.

Theoretical and methodological diversity to the contrary notwithstanding, we keep issues of power, strategy, and legitimacy in the foreground. In Chapter 10 we focus specifically on the political consequences of anti-Americanism, which can only be understood in light of the strategic incentives faced by individuals and organizations. In that chapter, we interrogate conventional assumptions about the effects of anti-Americanism and search for evidence to determine whether anti-Americanism has significant effects on contemporary politics. In the conclusion, we reflect on the implications of anti-Americanism for our understanding of the United States itself, and its role in world politics. We seek intellectual coherence for the whole book by focusing on the politics of anti-Americanism.
Figure 1: Implications of negative views for predispositions, depending on openness to new information and attribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Openness to New information:</th>
<th>Attribution:</th>
<th>Attribution: Situational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Predisposition: <em>bias</em> (Closed-minded)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Predisposition: <em>strong distrust</em> (&quot;Show me you are good&quot;)</td>
<td>Predisposition: <em>moderate distrust.</em> (&quot;Show me you will behave well here&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>No predisposition: <em>opinion.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2. Identification, Fear and Anti-Americanism*

Degree of fear that the United States will adversely affect one’s own society:
Low                      High

Identification with the United States:

Positive: subject associates herself with what she considers to be US practices:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. pro-Americanism</th>
<th>II. Critique of hypocrisy.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Example: liberal Anti-Americanism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>III. Ambivalence.</th>
<th>IV. Severe criticism.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Example: latent social Anti-Americanism</td>
<td>Example: intense social Anti-Americanism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V. Negative feelings but not intense; unlikely to lead to action.</th>
<th>VI. More intense, and more likely to lead to action, than V due to perceived threat.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Example: latent sovereign-nationalist Anti-Americanism</td>
<td>Example: intense sovereign-nationalist Anti-Americanism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VII. Negative and more intense than V but less than VI and VIII due to Lack of perceived threat.</th>
<th>VIII. Very negative and intense; likely to lead to action, violent or non-violent.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Example: latent radical Anti-Americanism.</td>
<td>Example: mobilized radical Anti-Americanism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Negative: subject opposes what she considers to be US practices
*This is a typology, designed as an aid to categorization and comparison. It is possible, for instance, that a combination of negative identification with the United States, and fear of the United States, could cause anti-Americanism. But the reverse causal pathway is also possible: hatred of and anger with America could lead to negative identification and fear. Even if the first causal pathway were valid, an in-depth explanation would require accounting for identification and fear.

Table 1: The contrast between views of whether emigrants to the United States have a better life, and attitudes toward the United States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(1) “better life”</th>
<th>(2) % favorable</th>
<th>(1) – (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>+35 (41-6)</td>
<td>+24 (58-34)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-2 (14-16)</td>
<td>-31 (38-69)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>+12 (24-12)</td>
<td>-25 (37-62)</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>+43 (53-10)</td>
<td>+3 (47-44)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>+2 (30-28)</td>
<td>-50 (21-71)</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>+20 (47-27)</td>
<td>-41 (27-68)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>+31 (50-19)</td>
<td>-33 (30-63)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>+10 (31-21)</td>
<td>-88 (5-93)</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Pew 2004.*
### Table 2. Responses by Americans about Other Countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>9/1/99</th>
<th>10/31/01</th>
<th>9/11/02</th>
<th>9/1/04</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Harris Interactive ([www.harrisinteractive.com](http://www.harrisinteractive.com)). Accessed 04/12/2005. Poll #62 (September 1, 2004); poll #52 (September 10, 2003); poll #47 (September 11, 2002); poll #54 (October 31, 2001); poll #50 (August 30, 2000); poll #51 (September 1, 1999).

**Note:** The figures for September 2003 are very similar to those of September 2004 and are therefore omitted.
Table 3. Indonesian Poll Responses, 2003 and 2005.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is suicide bombing often or sometimes justified? (% yes)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in Osama bin Laden (a lot or some -- % yes)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable toward United States (somewhat or very)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose US efforts to fight terrorism</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Terror Free Tomorrow 2005. We are indebted to Helle Dale of the Heritage Foundation for calling this poll to our attention.
Table 4. Responses by Country: Favorable/unfavorable to U.S. and supportive or not of adequacy of the US relief effort (n=20).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(1) Net favorable to US:</th>
<th>(2) Net supportive of US relief effort:</th>
<th>(3) Net supportive of own-country effort:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>69 (1)</td>
<td>54 (1)</td>
<td>54 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>60 (2)</td>
<td>-19 (13)</td>
<td>34 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>40 (3)</td>
<td>11 (6)</td>
<td>86 (5.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>33 (4)</td>
<td>-1 (8)</td>
<td>88 (3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>25 (5)</td>
<td>28 (2)</td>
<td>67 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>17 (6)</td>
<td>-2 (9)</td>
<td>79 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>16 (7)</td>
<td>-36 (17)</td>
<td>94 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>9 (8)</td>
<td>13 (3.5)</td>
<td>86 (5.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>8 (9)</td>
<td>12 (5)</td>
<td>93 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>-1 (10.5)</td>
<td>9 (7)</td>
<td>84 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>-1 (10.5)</td>
<td>-11 (11)</td>
<td>10 (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-4 (12.5)</td>
<td>13 (3.5)</td>
<td>83 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>-4 (12.5)</td>
<td>-9 (10)</td>
<td>49 (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>-6 (14)</td>
<td>-31 (16)</td>
<td>37 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-8 (15)</td>
<td>-20 (14)</td>
<td>85 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>-10 (16)</td>
<td>-13 (12)</td>
<td>13 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-16 (17)</td>
<td>-21 (15)</td>
<td>88 (3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>-21 (18)</td>
<td>-55 (19)</td>
<td>-14 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-36 (19)</td>
<td>-54 (18)</td>
<td>44 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-60 (20)</td>
<td>-56 (20)</td>
<td>71 (11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GMI 2005.

Notes:
Columns 1 and 2: Spearman’s r: 0.68 (n=20, p< 0.01, from exact table, 2-sided null hypothesis)
Columns 2 and 3: Spearman’s r: 0.27 (not significant)
Table 5. Rank-Order of European Countries Listed in Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country:</th>
<th>(1) Net favorable to US:</th>
<th>(2) Net supportive of US relief effort:</th>
<th>(3) Net supportive of own-country effort:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>60 (1)</td>
<td>-19 (5)</td>
<td>34 (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>33 (2)</td>
<td>-1 (2)</td>
<td>88 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>17 (3)</td>
<td>-2 (3)</td>
<td>79 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>11 (4)</td>
<td>12 (1)</td>
<td>93 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>-4 (5)</td>
<td>-9 (4)</td>
<td>49 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-8 (6)</td>
<td>-20 (6)</td>
<td>85 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-16 (7)</td>
<td>-21 (7)</td>
<td>88 (2.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-36 (8)</td>
<td>-54 (8)</td>
<td>44 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-60 (9)</td>
<td>-56 (9)</td>
<td>71 (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GMI 2005.

Notes:
Columns 1 and 2 Spearman’s r: 0.78 (n=9, p=0.02, from exact table, 2-sided null hypothesis). Columns 2 and 3 Spearman’s r: 0.48 (not significant)
References for Introduction and Chapter 1


Accessed April 12, 2005.


