An examination of select issues at the intersection of philosophy of science and epistemology, with a focus on the theme of ‘evidence’. Recent work on the concept of evidence, with some attention to both informal and formal approaches. Williamson’s conception of evidence as knowledge. Evidence and epistemic diversity. How should we think of evidence which bears on philosophical theories? (Is there some distinctive kind of ‘philosophical’ evidence, e.g., ‘intuitions’, or is such evidence ultimately of a piece with scientific evidence?) In what respects (if any) does common sense provide a kind of data for philosophy? The role of normative ideals for believers who have evidence of their own finitude and fallibility.

1. February 6\textsuperscript{th}. Introduction/Overview

2. February 13\textsuperscript{th}. Evidence: What Is It? Williamson on evidence


3. February 20\textsuperscript{th}. Evidence and Epistemic Diversity (I).


Bas’ voluntarist response.
4. February 27th. Evidence and Epistemic Diversity (II).


5. March 5th. Evidence in Probabilistic Epistemology.


March 19th. No Class; Spring Break

7. March 26th. Evidence for Theories: A Case Study (1)


8. April 2nd. Evidence for Theories: A Case Study (2)


Penelope Maddy *Second Philosophy* (Oxford University Press 2007) [selections]

9. April 9th. Evidence in Philosophy


10. April 16th. Evidence and Idealization in Epistemology


11. April 23rd. TBA

12. April 30th. TBA