A New Electorate? Comparing Preferences and Partisanship between Immigrants and Natives

Rafaela Dancygier  Yale University
Elizabeth N. Saunders  Yale University

As immigrants constitute a large and rising share of both the population and the electorate in many developed democracies, we examine aspects of immigrant political behavior, a vital issue that has gone largely unexplored outside of the U.S. context. We focus on Germany and Great Britain, two countries that provide good leverage to explore both within-country and cross-national variation in Europe. Our overall aim is to assess the impact of the immigration context. As a first step, we investigate whether immigrants and natives have systematically different attitudes on two issues that have dominated postwar European politics: social spending and redistribution. With controls in place, we observe that immigrants are no more likely to support increased social spending or redistributive measures than natives and find support for hypotheses highlighting selection effects and the impact of the immigration regime. Where we do find an opinion gap, immigrants tend to have more conservative preferences than natives. As a second step, we explore the determinants of immigrant partisan identification in Britain and find that the salience of the immigration context helps explain immigrants’ partisan attachment to the Labour Party.

Large-scale immigration is one of the most prominent challenges facing developed countries around the world. Policymakers from the United States to Europe and Australia are struggling to integrate already sizable immigrant populations into the economic, political, and social fabric of the state.¹ Even in a traditionally “immigrant” country like the United States, immigrant populations and destinations are changing and incorporation is an ongoing issue (Marrow 2005), with some commentators warning that Hispanic immigration might cause “cultural bifurcation” (Huntington 2004, 221). The problem is also perceived to be acute in Europe, where publics and their leaders increasingly express alarm at the social and economic dislocation of their immigrant communities, and tensions have spilled over into riots in several European countries, including France in late 2005.

For politicians and political scientists alike, the political incorporation of immigrants is a particularly crucial concern. How does large-scale immigration affect the politics of recipient societies? Long concerned with the question of when and why natives oppose immigration, scholars have only more recently addressed the political behavior of immigrants themselves. But research has concentrated on the United States, with little cross-national study. This gap is especially troubling given that Europe’s immigrant populations constitute rising shares of domestic electorates and are often perceived to cast the decisive vote in electoral contests.

¹Throughout the article, we use the term “immigrant” to mean a person born in a relatively poor country who migrated to either Germany or Britain. These migrants make up the majority of the immigrant population and are usually the subject of debates about immigration policy. Unless stated otherwise, we focus only on first-generation immigrants. Where appropriate, we use the terms “immigrants,” “nonwhites,” and “ethnic minorities” interchangeably.

To gain a complete understanding of the impact of immigration on electoral politics, and in particular, whether immigrant voters represent a distinctly different electoral bloc from their native counterparts, political scientists need to address a number of questions about this electorate. These include a comparison of immigrant and native preferences on major issues; the factors shaping partisan identification among immigrants; whether immigrants tend to vote on different issues than natives; institutional constraints on immigrant voting eligibility and voting strength; and the determinants of immigrant voter turnout. While research has gradually shifted from the politics of immigration to the politics of integration, few studies outside of the U.S. context address the political preferences and partisan identities of immigrants—crucial ingredients of immigrant political behavior. Admittedly, social scientists attempting to address immigrant political behavior face the challenge of limited data.

This article begins to fill this important gap in our knowledge by investigating immigrant political behavior in two European countries that host large migrant populations: Germany and Great Britain. Our overall aim is to assess the impact of the immigration context—both being an immigrant and the characteristics of the immigration experience in the new country. As a first step, we ask whether immigrants have the same distribution of preferences on key issues, such as the welfare state, as comparably situated natives, or whether other factors related to the immigrant experience may result in an “opinion gap.” As a second step, we explore the determinants of immigrant partisan identification, though we are only able to do so for Britain.

These issues will be important in all immigration countries, but we focus our investigation on Europe, and on Germany and Britain in particular, for both theoretical and practical reasons. First, immigrant political behavior is a highly salient topic in Europe and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Second, the existing literature has focused mostly on the United States. But this literature has moved beyond studies that focus only on individual characteristics of immigrants to include a role for structural, institutional, and contextual factors as important mediating variables in immigrant political behavior (Marrow 2005), making this issue ripe for cross-national analysis. By examining multiple European countries (though with separate surveys), we are able to investigate both variation in host country context, since immigration regimes differ within Europe, and to examine within-country variation by studying local context. Finally, immigrant voters in both Germany and Britain have also become important political actors in the run-up to Germany’s hard-fought 2005 general election, the country’s most circulated daily, Bild, asked on its front page: “Will Turks Decide the Election?” The electoral muscle of the Turkish-origin electorate, now 800,000 votes strong, has prompted Germany’s mainstream parties to devise strategies for capturing the “ethnic vote” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2005)—an entirely new phenomenon in postwar German politics. Britain’s one million Muslim voters, thought to be loyal Labour supporters in the past, have recently swung local councils and parliamentary seats away from Labour, including in the 2005 general election (Burns 2005). But politicians and political scientists still lack systematic knowledge about how immigrant constituencies impact the electoral landscape.

Germany and Britain also provide good analytical leverage for studying immigrant political preferences. First, as we elaborate below, both countries share broadly similar immigration histories since World War II and now are home to immigrant groups that constitute sizable shares of the respective populations. While there are differences within these migrant populations, they share roughly similar profiles in relation to their adopted countries: economically disadvantaged and ethnically distinct minorities from less developed countries that generally lack strong welfare state traditions. These similar background conditions allow for a fruitful comparative study, but we also highlight significant variation that distinguishes the British and German immigration regimes. Most importantly for our analysis, immigration proceeded with much greater state involvement and support in Germany than it did in Britain. On a practical level, surveys are available for both countries that afford us a rare opportunity to compare immigrant and native political behavior.

We investigate attitudes toward social spending and redistribution. These issues have defined electoral politics in postwar Europe and are increasingly contested. We develop several hypotheses for the determinants of immigrant preferences on these issues. While we expect that individual-level factors such as socioeconomic status will be important, we also expect that selection, socialization,
and contextual factors may matter and that differences in immigration regimes will be a significant intervening factor. Selection and socialization effects are expected to lead immigrants in Germany to be more supportive of welfare services and redistribution than their counterparts in Britain. Building on this analysis, we also investigate how these preferences relate to partisan identification. Since immigrants have only recently been able to vote in Germany, we are only able to explore the issue of partisan identification in Britain. But the determinants of immigrant partisan identification in Britain seem especially important in light of the recent loosening of the once-solid link between the ethnic minority electorate and the Labour Party.

We use ordered logistic regressions to test whether immigrants have significantly different views on social spending and redistribution than natives. Foreshadowing our main findings, we do not find an opinion gap between natives and immigrants in the German case in our main models. At least as far as their preferences on these important issues are concerned, immigrants in Germany are part of the electoral mainstream. In Great Britain, a different pattern emerges: immigrants here voice consistently more conservative preferences on social spending. No significant difference exists on the issue of redistribution. Thus, none of our models find immigrants to be more liberal than natives in their views on the size of the welfare state. The more conservative bent among British immigrants may result from selection or socialization effects; we do not find substantively significant effects for the number of years spent in the host country, however, suggesting that selection effects, perhaps resulting from the different receiving contexts, may play a role. In Britain the immigrant context does seem to shape partisan identification, a finding consistent with the literature on immigrant partisanship in the United States. We find that ethnic identity and concentration best explain Labour partisanship among immigrants in Great Britain.

The article proceeds as follows. The following two sections relate our study to the relevant literature on immigrant political behavior and present our theoretical arguments and hypotheses. The next section provides a brief overview of German and British postwar immigration histories. We then turn to the data analysis and discuss robustness checks, including a fully interactive specification in which we allow the independent variables to impact immigrants and natives differently. A final section concludes with the implications of our results and suggestions for future research on immigrant political behavior, an area ripe with possibilities.

### Immigrant Political Behavior

The political science literature on the political behavior and incorporation of immigrants remains best-developed in the U.S. context, and comparative scholarship, particularly in Europe, is still in its early stages. In the European context, our knowledge of immigrants’ economic assimilation (see, for example, Brücker et al. 2002) far outstrips our understanding of their political incorporation. Immigration-related European public opinion research has focused almost exclusively on native attitudes. This attention is understandable, given that until recently much of the political debate has been over immigration policy and the xenophobia or native resentment that immigration sometimes engenders. This lack of attention to immigrant opinion is also the result of data limitations. Most surveys, sampling according to population, do not include a high number of immigrant respondents. Even in the U.S.—the quintessential immigration country—representative national surveys of immigrant groups are a rarity.

Nevertheless, scholarship on the political behavior of immigrants in the United States is quite rich. Since the 1960s, social scientists have asked to what extent immigrant status and ethnicity play an independent role in shaping political behavior. While some posited that European immigrants’ political assimilation seamlessly followed their social and economic incorporation (Dahl 1961, 34–36; Gordon 1964), others claimed that ethnic identity had a lasting impact on the political organization and voting behavior of America’s so-called “white ethnics” (Glazer and Moynihan 1963; Wolfinger 1965). Forty years later, this debate has been resolved in favor of assimilation theory. In most studies, “European ethnicity is overshadowed by class and education and rarely proves the most salient factor in political decision-making” (DeSipio 1996, 4). Notwithstanding this consensus, the old controversy has recently been reignited by commentators such as...
Huntington (2004), who claims that the growing Latino population is not likely to incorporate into the American mainstream. However, research shows that in both electoral and nonelectoral political behavior, Latinos generally fall in the mainstream of U.S. politics (de la Garza 2004).

Yet this incorporation does not imply complete or even linear assimilation given the influence of factors specific to the immigrant experience, both at the individual and at the contextual level. Among Latinos, for example, national origin appears to influence partisanship. Even when standard controls are in place, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans tend to identify with the Democratic Party while Cuban Americans are more likely to think of themselves as Republicans (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003). The time that Latino immigrants have spent in the U.S. is important in predicting their acquisition of partisanship (Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991) as well as in explaining turnout rates among first-generation Latino immigrants (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001).

While scholars continue to emphasize the individual characteristics of immigrants, there is also a growing body of evidence suggesting that local and receiving contexts matter. Scholars have shown, for example, that political and demographic differences that immigrants encounter at the state and neighborhood level help explain variation in their political behavior. In the U.S., a state's turnout history has thus been shown to influence immigrant electoral participation (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001). Similarly, the link between national origin and partisanship may have less to do with the politics of the respective home countries, but, as de la Garza (2004) points out, may also reflect local variation in parties' stances towards immigrants. Economists have also shown contextual effects to be important, finding that minorities in the U.S. make more use of welfare if they are embedded in social networks that give them better access to welfare information (Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan 2000). The specific receiving context of immigration may also play a role, since it may affect which immigrants are brought into the host country and shape their early interactions with institutions in the new state (Marrow 2005). In sum, amidst a general trend of assimilation, U.S. scholarship has found that individual and contextual variables relating to the immigration experience are crucial for understanding immigrant political behavior. In the next section, we briefly review the immigration histories of Germany and Britain, highlighting aspects that inform our theoretical expectations and help us form cross-national hypotheses about immigrant political preferences.

### Immigration in Germany and Great Britain

While Germany and Britain provide a similar overall picture of immigration, the specific immigration histories and processes in the two countries yield important contrasts. A large share of immigrants residing in Germany today hail from countries in southern Europe and Turkey as well as North Africa, and were actively recruited by the German government as guestworkers to help fill severe labor shortages and facilitate the country’s postwar economic reconstruction. The state, employers, and labor unions were closely involved in the migration process, which for a time extended into the sending countries themselves through recruitment and training centers and financial assistance for the journey. The German corporatist state integrated these workers into the labor market and welfare state apparatus, providing them with training, employment, housing, and access to social services, and extending national labor agreements on wages and working conditions to cover them. These migrants did not, however, have access to German citizenship or voting rights, although recent laws have relaxed naturalization requirements. While their stay was to be temporary, most guestworkers not only remained in Germany but also had their family members from abroad join them after official immigration ended in 1973. Immigration continued in the 1980s and 1990s amidst increased native resentment, as applications for asylum rose. Additionally, large inflows of migrants from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (so-called Aussiedler, who were foreign-born and generally did not speak German but whose ancestors had lived in German territories) entered the country. Thanks to a law designed to help with their integration and adjustment, these migrants were able to draw on state assistance in the form of financial support, language classes, job training, and housing. Until recently, they were also automatically granted German citizenship.

In contrast to Germany, most immigrants who came to Britain from the 1950s onwards received little aid or encouragement from the state, but were granted citizenship. Thus as a result of the country’s colonial past, large waves

---

8For a more detailed discussion of these contextual effects, see Marrow (2005, 786–89).

9Note that ethnic diversity may also lower expenditures for public goods (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999).

10See, for example, Layton-Henry (1992) and Herbert (2001) for the two countries’ immigration histories.
of migrants from the West Indies and the Indian subcontinent were able to settle in Britain as British citizens. These immigrants were thus able to participate in politics from the moment of their arrival, but the newcomers generally did not receive government assistance to help them settle. Instead, they often found themselves competing with native Britons for scarce resources, such as employment and accommodation, especially in urban areas with chronic housing shortages. Fueled by these resource conflicts, racial tensions in high-immigration working-class communities, along with vocal, anti-immigrant Conservative MPs, gave rise to successive immigration restrictions. Today, asylum seekers and EU migrants from Eastern Europe constitute the latest newcomers.

In both Germany and Great Britain, the majority of immigrants are economically disadvantaged when compared to the native populations. Reflecting their initial employment opportunities as unskilled and semi-skilled labor, the labor market position of immigrants today is less secure and their earnings are lower than the national averages (Brücker et al. 2002). This underinvestment in human capital presents a particular problem for guestworkers who, along with their employers, initially conceived of their participation in the German labor market as temporary. Within this population, the labor market exclusion of Turks has been most persistent (Kogan 2003). In Britain, there is also substantial variation across national-origin groups, with Bangladeshis and Pakistanis facing worse labor market prospects than immigrants originating from India or Africa, for example (Modood and Berthoud 1997).

In light of this variation, there has been an active debate among British politicians and scholars alike as to whether Britain’s nonwhite population constitutes a coherent electoral constituency that endorses a common set of issues, or whether the interests and preferences of nonwhites are too heterogeneous to translate into a nonwhite political agenda (Messina 1998). In the past, Labour has been considered the “minority-friendly” party and the great majority of immigrant-origin politicians belong to the Labour Party. It has introduced several Race Relations Acts that sought to criminalize racial discrimination and has been perceived to be a better guardian of minority interests than the Tories, who produced Britain’s most anti-immigrant MPs in the past. While immigrant-origin voters support the Labour Party in overwhelming numbers, there are signs that upwardly mobile segments of this electorate have warmed up to the Conservatives, who have based their appeals on economic interests (Saggar 2000). The latter approach will, however, only bear fruit if the nonwhite electorate is indeed not wedded to liberal, Labour-friendly policy positions and if, in turn, these issue positions inform their partisan identification—questions that we will address in our statistical analysis.

In Germany, the relaxation of formerly restrictive naturalization and citizenship laws, together with the realization that the already sizable share of immigrants will only rise in the coming years, has made immigrant groups too important to ignore politically. As a result, politicians have been eager to learn more about the political orientations of immigrant voters. A study of the guestworker population shows that only a minority have a party preference at all, but of the ones who do, the majority ally themselves with the Social Democrats (SPD). In terms of their socioeconomic profiles, immigrants should on the whole be expected to identify with the SPD rather than with the more conservative CDU. But recent evidence suggests that national origin serves as a better predictor of partisanship than conventional socioeconomic variables (Wüst 2002). Though our data do not allow us to test for national origin effects, our study aims to go beyond current findings by investigating first whether immigrants and natives of similar socioeconomic standing have systematically different policy preferences; and second whether the translation of policy preferences to partisan identification is the same for both groups, or whether other factors related to the immigration experience mediate the partisan identification of immigrants.

**Theoretical Expectations**

The existing literature and our cross-national scope inform our theoretical framework. In this section, we lay out our hypotheses for assessing the relative importance of individual and contextual factors in determining variation between immigrant and native political preferences, both within and across countries (we discuss our theoretical

---

11 In each general election between 1974 and 1997, the nonwhite Labour vote totaled over 80%, except in the 1987 election when it fell to 72% (Saggar 2000, 122).

12 In 1996, the share of guestworkers who had any party identification ranged only between 19% among Greeks to 30% among Spaniards. Of this small group, the vast majority (up to 86.7% among Italian respondents) prefer the SPD (Diehl and Urbahn 1998).

13 According to Wüst (2002), who studies both guestworkers and additional immigrant groups, Turkish origin is associated with SPD partisanship, while immigrants from the former Soviet Union are linked to the CDU. However, Wüst only considers those respondents who either identify with the SPD or the CDU and as a result drops 33% of respondents who do not have a party preference or who support other parties (2002, 203).
expectations for partisanship in a later section, since it builds on our findings from the preference model).

One might postulate that economic interests are the most important determinants of preferences over social spending or redistribution, irrespective of individuals’ immigration background. In this “human capital frame” (Marrow 2005), since immigrants tend to be poorer than natives, they would be more likely to support social spending and redistribution, but this effect should disappear once socioeconomic controls are introduced. Thus we first hypothesize as follows:

**H1 (socioeconomic factors hypothesis):** Economic interests are the primary determinants of any opinion gap between natives and immigrants. Thus once demographic and socioeconomic controls are included, immigrant political preferences should mirror those of socioeconomically equivalent natives, regardless of contextual factors. Those of lower socioeconomic status are expected to be more supportive of social spending and redistribution.

If, however, we take the immigration experience seriously, different hypotheses emerge. What might be the sources, if any, for attitudinal differences between natives and immigrants? At the individual level, the difficulties associated with migration may be one source. Immigrants represent a self-selected group of people who are willing to uproot themselves to migrate and are often characterized as “valiant and plucky individuals, seeking opportunity abroad” (Freeman 1995, 884). Thus immigrants may constitute a group of highly driven and able people who are more likely to believe in effort and individualism. Economists have argued that such beliefs influence individual preferences about redistribution (Piketty 1995). These arguments lead us to a second hypothesis:

**H2 (immigrant self-selection hypothesis):** Individual-level selection processes result in systematic differences in political preferences between immigrant and native populations, even between socioeconomically equivalent groups. Thus immigrant status would be expected to be statistically significant even after controls are included. Based on arguments about individualism and the effort to migrate, we speculate that it is likely to result in more conservative preferences on social spending and redistribution, irrespective of the immigration regime.

It is theoretically possible, of course, that self-sorting effects might operate to produce the opposite expectation, if the very state structures and services of the destination country are what attract immigrants into European countries in the first place. Some populist rhetoric distorts this idea, claiming that immigrants are “benefit tourists” who migrate only to take advantage of generous welfare policies.  

As individuals adjust to their new destination, the length of time spent in the host country may socialize immigrants to its political culture (as U.S. studies have found) or may expose them to the welfare state or other state institutions. Our next hypothesis thus posits:

**H3 (socialization hypothesis):** The length of time spent in the host country should work to socialize immigrants to their new country’s political culture. Living longer in the host country is expected to diminish any gap in preferences between immigrants and natives.

Immigrants’ local context and contact with coethnics may also shape their political preferences, through network effects that help them adjust to their new environment. As mentioned, economists have found that increased neighborhood contact with coethnics with above-average welfare participation rates raises individual welfare use (Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan 2000; Borjas and Hilton 1996). Since immigrant populations on average make more use of welfare services than do natives (Brücker et al. 2002; see also Borjas and Hilton 1996 for the U.S.), we hypothesize as follows.

**H4 (local context hypothesis):** The environment into which immigrants relocate matters for political preferences. Immigrants who have increased contact with fellow migrants are expected to be more supportive of social spending and redistribution than those who are less exposed to such contacts. These local context effects may also affect any “opinion gap” by socializing immigrants to local welfare practices.

In our robustness checks, we test whether local context variables like church attendance impact natives and  

14It is important to distinguish the theoretical possibility we highlight from a populist claim that migrants are “benefit tourists” who come to western Europe in order to live off the welfare state. Our point is simply that immigrants may prefer to live in a society with a strong social safety net or redistributive policies, for example, regardless of their actual need for welfare services.
immigrants differently through the use of a fully interactive model.

At the country level, it is also possible that the countries’ different immigration regimes will lead to variation in immigrant preferences on social spending and redistribution. As discussed, immigration to Germany was embedded in an institutional context that eased the migration and settlement process by providing various forms of social assistance. In contrast, immigration to Britain occurred without much state planning or support. These differences may result in different immigrant preferences on welfare state or redistribution issues. Two different mechanisms might account for such differences. First, it is possible that the recruitment process itself, which for Germany sometimes even extended into the sending countries, helped select a different mix of immigrants. This selection mechanism would potentially overcome barriers to migration, dampening the selection effects noted above based on individualism or motivation. In contrast, countries with relatively laissez-faire immigration regimes may attract especially individualistic or motivated immigrants. A second mechanism is the experience migrants have with the welfare institutions once in the new country. The relative absence of state help in the settlement process may lead immigrants to develop less support for the welfare state compared to countries where immigrants were able to draw on state aid throughout the immigration process. Regardless of which mechanism operates (or if they work in tandem), we can hypothesize cross-nationally:

\[ H_5 \text{ (receiving context hypothesis): The receiving context affects political preferences, resulting in cross-national differences in immigrant political preferences or opinion gaps between immigrants and natives. Immigrants in countries with more active recruiting and settlement processes are expected to be more supportive of social spending and redistribution than those who migrate to countries with a less active receiving context.} \]

Thus we have countervailing expectations about how immigrant status impacts political preferences. Given data limitations, we cannot discriminate between all of the competing mechanisms directly in this article. We do not have, for example, panel data on immigrants before and after migration, nor do we have data on their socioeconomic characteristics while still in their sending countries. We can, however, take an initial step toward testing our theoretical propositions using available data and hope that this analysis will stimulate future research.

### Data and Empirical Specification

In this section we describe our data and empirical specification. We make use of two surveys, which we analyze separately. For the German case, we use the 1996 German Social Survey, a dataset containing 3,518 German speakers and an oversample of East Germans (ZUMA 1997). The survey contains 306 first-generation immigrants from relatively poor countries (our coding is discussed in the appendix). For Britain, we employ the 1997 British General Election Cross-Section Survey, conducted right after the general elections in May 1997 (Heath and Saggi 2000; Heath et al. 2000). This survey includes oversamples of both Scots and ethnic minorities (yielding 882 Scottish respondents and 705 ethnic minority respondents). Ethnic minorities are “those who considered themselves to be Black, Indian, Pakistani, or Bangladeshi.” The merged sample contains 4,214 respondents, 486 of whom are first-generation immigrants born in a relatively poor country. The analysis weights the data to correct for the East German, Scottish, and ethnic minority oversamples. One limitation common to both surveys is that they were conducted in the language of the receiving country (i.e., German or English), a factor that might affect our test for the socialization hypothesis (H3). Since all respondents in our sample are already to some extent familiar with their new country’s language by the time of our survey, depending on when they acquired these language skills they may have faced reduced language barriers in the socialization process compared to immigrants who do not yet speak the host country language.

For each country, we use two dependent variables, one that examines attitudes on social spending and the other on redistribution. While the exact wording of each question does differ across countries (see Table 1), they are remarkably similar. The social spending questions in both surveys are related to government policies and incorporate the potential costs in terms of taxes and services; the redistribution questions are more ideological in nature and do not highlight possible trade-offs. Both dependent variables are coded so that lower values reflect attitudes in favor of more spending or redistribution. The British data and results must be interpreted with an important caveat: in 1997 Labour won a landslide victory in the wake of years of underinvestment in public services; thus we expect a national consensus that more investment in public services was necessary, particularly for the ailing National Health Service.

Table 1 also presents the (weighted) crosstabulations, which reflect differences in native and immigrant attitudes. Immigrants in both countries appear less willing
### Table 1  Dependent Variables and Crosstabulations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th></th>
<th>Britain</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Spending</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the government had the choice to either reduce taxes or to spend more on social services, what do you think it should choose?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  Spend more on social services, even if this means higher taxes</td>
<td>28.28%</td>
<td>21.51%</td>
<td>72.41%</td>
<td>62.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Can’t say</td>
<td>23.76%</td>
<td>35.83%</td>
<td>24.82%</td>
<td>27.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Reduce taxes, even if this means less spending on social services</td>
<td>47.97%</td>
<td>42.66%</td>
<td>2.77%</td>
<td>10.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Redistribution</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It’s the state’s job to reduce the income gap between those with high and those with low incomes.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1  Strongly agree</td>
<td>19.82%</td>
<td>17.67%</td>
<td>19.54%</td>
<td>22.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Agree</td>
<td>34.76%</td>
<td>39.36%</td>
<td>41.26%</td>
<td>45.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>19.92%</td>
<td>18.27%</td>
<td>17.99%</td>
<td>20.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Disagree</td>
<td>16.15%</td>
<td>16.06%</td>
<td>16.78%</td>
<td>9.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Strongly disagree</td>
<td>9.36%</td>
<td>8.64%</td>
<td>4.43%</td>
<td>2.37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Entries are based on weighted data, adjusted for the East German, Scottish, and ethnic minority oversamples. Question wording taken from ZUMA 1997 (for Germany) and Heath and Saggar 2000 and Heath et al. 2000 (for Britain). Rafaela Dancygier translated the German survey into English.

1 The categories for this question have been reordered to run from liberal to conservative.

to spend more on social services than natives. The national consensus on spending more on social services in Britain is reflected in the overwhelming support (72%) for increased spending among natives, while approximately 63% of immigrants support such increases. With regard to redistribution, attitudes in Germany seem to be similarly distributed across groups, but we observe a slightly more liberal opinion profile among immigrants in Britain when compared to natives.

To assess our hypotheses about how these distributions change with the addition of individual and contextual variables, we estimate ordered logistical regressions, since the dependent variables are categorical and consist of ordered responses. For each country, we estimate a single regression that includes both immigrants and natives to assess any opinion gap; our primary independent variable of interest is thus whether the respondent is a first-generation immigrant from a poor country. This operationalization is intended to capture the major population movements as well as the group on which public debate has focused and to avoid the potentially confounding effects of second-generation immigrants, who (as discussed in the appendix) are excluded from the model. Our first model, Model 1, provides an (almost) unconditional baseline by regressing immigrant on the dependent variables. In Germany, we control for the effect of living in East Germany, as the political attitudes of East Germans, who experienced communist-style welfare provision for decades, are expected to differ substantially from West Germans. In Britain, we control for the effect of living in Scotland, since Scottish politics are distinctive.

To assess H1 (the impact of socioeconomic factors on any opinion gap), Model 2 includes immigrant and socioeconomic characteristics (income, skill, being unemployed, income, skill, being unemployed,
and a measure of job status) as well as demographic controls (age and gender). H2 (the immigrant self-selection hypothesis) is tested through the significance of the immigrant variable itself. The data do not include suitable questions relating to respondents’ belief in effort or individualism, so we are unable to test this effect directly. Model 3 assesses H3 (the socialization hypothesis) and H4 (the local context hypothesis). Years in host country, which applies only to immigrants (and is thus already effectively an interaction term), tests H3. For H4, we include percent minority, a measure of the share of immigrants (in Germany) and immigrants and their descendants (in Britain) in the respondent’s environment. To isolate the network effect for immigrants living in high-immigration areas, we also include an interaction term, immigrant * percent minority.

We also add a measure of church attendance, which may provide an information pathway to social services (thus acting as a network effect) but may also influence preferences on social spending and redistribution directly. At the individual level, attending religious services may foster more charitable feelings toward the poor, thereby raising support for welfare spending or redistribution; in contrast, religiosity may substitute for state-funded services by insuring individuals against adversity, thus decreasing support for these policies, as Scheve and Stasavage (2005) suggest. An additional control is political orientation, which we measure in Germany through self-placement on a 10-point left-right scale (ideology) and with a dummy for partisan identification in Britain, since the left-right scale is not available in the British survey.

We can only test H5 (the receiving context hypothesis) by comparing the results across the two countries. The data do not allow us to control for other characteristics relating to migrants before they leave their home country, information that would be ideal to help isolate the effect of receiving context.

Results

Beginning with the German social spending models, our baseline, Model 1a (Table 2), shows that immigrants are significantly more likely to favor spending on social services even at the cost of higher taxes, but this effect is dwarfed by the immense negative impact of East Germans, who are 21.2 percentage points more likely to support increases in social spending than their neighbors in the West. The magnitude of this effect, which is sizable in all models, suggests that East Germans may have a greater impact on aggregate preferences than immigrants. In Model 2a, which adds socioeconomic variables, the significant immigrant effect disappears; income is associated with more conservative attitudes; while skill and being female correlate with more liberal attitudes. In Model 3a the interpretation of the immigrant effect is not as straightforward, since this model includes interaction terms that involve our immigrant variable. Immigrant is not jointly significant with all its interactions (p < .17). We must also be careful to simulate the effect of interactive variables, however, since the impact of the immigrant variable could depend on varying levels of the interacting variables. Changing immigrant status from 0 to 1 in Model 3a, we find that immigrant exerts no independent effect. When we repeat this simulation and additionally vary years in Germany and percent minority, these results remain largely unchanged, and immigrant is not jointly significant with immigrant * percent minority and years. The other variables that appear to be significant are East Germany, gender, and skill, all related to more liberal opinions, and income and ideology (coded so that higher values are more right-leaning), associated with more conservative views. Church attendance also significantly points in a conservative direction, suggesting an insurance function (we test whether this effect masks differences between natives and immigrants in the fully interactive specification). The results thus suggest support for the socioeconomic hypothesis (H1). There is little support for the socialization or the local context hypotheses (H3 and H4), as simulations show that changing values of years in Germany and percent minority do not alter the

17We employed Clarify software developed by Tomz, Wittenberg, and King (2003; see also King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000) to calculate these simulations. We simulated the hypothetical impact of changing East Germany from zero to one on the probabilities of supporting increases in spending (while setting continuous control variables to their means and dummies to zero). Simulations that follow adopt analogous procedures. When varying continuous variables, we change variables to one standard deviation above and below their means.

18When we change percent minority to one standard deviation above its mean, we observe a one percentage point increase in the probability of observing immigrants in the middle category; this effect just attains statistical significance.

19Indeed, our simulations found no opinion gap at varying levels of income, skill, and status. When we vary these socioeconomic variables for both dependent variables in both countries, we find that our results for the impact of immigrant (i.e., the opinion gap) are unchanged.
### Table 2  Attitudes in Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Social Spending</th>
<th></th>
<th>Redistribution</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1a)</td>
<td>(2a)</td>
<td>(3a)</td>
<td>(1b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigrant</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.217**</td>
<td>-.117</td>
<td>.403</td>
<td>-.254**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.103)</td>
<td>(.125)</td>
<td>(.300)</td>
<td>(.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Germany</strong></td>
<td>-.978**</td>
<td>-.869***</td>
<td>-.586***</td>
<td>1.191***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.071)</td>
<td>(.086)</td>
<td>(.128)</td>
<td>(.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.006**</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>-.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>-.145*</td>
<td>-.159*</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.081)</td>
<td>(.083)</td>
<td>(.082)</td>
<td>(.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>.064***</td>
<td>.063***</td>
<td>.104***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.017)</td>
<td>(.016)</td>
<td>(.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skill</strong></td>
<td>-.076**</td>
<td>-.070**</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.034)</td>
<td>(.032)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unemployed</strong></td>
<td>-.147</td>
<td>-.156</td>
<td>-.184</td>
<td>-.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.169)</td>
<td>(.169)</td>
<td>(.171)</td>
<td>(.174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status</strong></td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.010***</td>
<td>.011***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years in Germany</strong></td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td></td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Church Attendance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>.078**</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.036)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideology</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>.150***</td>
<td></td>
<td>.142***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.025)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent Minority</strong></td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td></td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigrant * Percent Minority</strong></td>
<td>- .081*</td>
<td>- .049</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.043)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint significance of immigrant, years, and immigrant * percent minority</strong></td>
<td>p &lt; 0.17</td>
<td>p &lt; 0.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pseudo-R² .020    .027    .038    .021    .042    .048
Log-Pseudolikelihood -3513.395 -2474.359 -2401.142 -4738.546 -3290.343 -3214.793
N 3396    2414    2371    3180    2276    2240

Note: Ordered logit coefficients with robust standard errors, adjusted for the East German oversample, in parentheses.
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.

effect of immigrant on social spending preferences.20 The mechanisms underlying the effect of being an immigrant (H2) are trickier to evaluate, since self-selection may be dampened by the receiving context (H5), which we cannot test directly but which we evaluate through comparison with the British results.

For redistribution (in the right half of Table 2), we see similar results. Again, we notice that immigrants are significantly more likely than natives to endorse the liberal position in the initial Model (1b), but once socioeconomic and demographic variables are in place (Model 2b) the opinion gap vanishes. By the time all the controls are entered in Model 3b, the effect of immigrant is positive (when interactive terms are set to 0) but still (jointly) insignificant. When we change immigrant from 0 to 1, we

---

20 Since the years variable has a skewed distribution in that native respondents are coded zero and account for the overwhelming majority of the overall samples, we ran separate regressions on the immigrant samples only, for both dependent variables in both countries, and found that years was never significant. We also see this lack of impact in our fully interactive model.
### Table 3  Attitudes in Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Social Spending</th>
<th>Redistribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1a)</td>
<td>(2a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>.514***</td>
<td>.520***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.137)</td>
<td>(.163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>−.120</td>
<td>−.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.099)</td>
<td>(.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−.006*</td>
<td>−.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>−.207**</td>
<td>−.329***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.096)</td>
<td>(.106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>−.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill</td>
<td>−.067**</td>
<td>−.083***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>−.094</td>
<td>−.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.231)</td>
<td>(.260)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>−.001</td>
<td>−.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.004)</td>
<td>(.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in Britain</td>
<td>−.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.020)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Identification</td>
<td>−.946***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.110)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Minority</td>
<td>−.001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.007)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant * Percent Minority</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint significance of immigrant, years, and immigrant * percent minority</td>
<td>p &lt; 0.008***</td>
<td>p &lt; 0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R²</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-Pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>−2718.800</td>
<td>−2172.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3827</td>
<td>3143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Ordered logit coefficients with robust standard errors, adjusted for Scottish and ethnic minority oversamples, in parentheses.

**p < .01; *p < .05; *p < .10.

Observe no gap and simulations confirm that no opinion gap emerges when we vary levels of years and percent minority, which are not jointly significant with immigrant. The only remaining significant variables are East Germany (liberal) and income, status, and ideology (conservative).

Turning to the British results reported in Table 3, Model 1a reveals that the conservative effect for social spending observed in the cross-tabulations remains when we control for Scotland. In contrast to the German case, however, Model 2a yields a significant and conservative immigrant effect event when socioeconomic and demographic controls are included. One curious result is the insignificant effect of income, a finding that may be the result of the broad consensus in 1997 that public services needed more investment. In Model 3a, the positive and significant effect for immigrant remains, based on its joint significance with interactive terms (p < .008). Simulating changes in immigrant status in Model 3a, we observe that immigrants are 17 points less likely to support increases in social spending than similarly situated natives (p < .01). When we change levels of the interaction terms,
we find that the length of time spent in Britain as well as local diversity do not exert substantively meaningful effects on this opinion gap (years and immigrant * percent minority are not jointly significant with immigrant). The only other significant variables are gender and skill, both associated with more liberal views, and partisan identification, which unsurprisingly shows an association between Labour Party support and more liberal views. In sum, for social spending preferences, economic interests (H1) do not trump the immigrant effect (H2). Based on the lack of impact of years or percent minority on the effect of immigrant, we find little support for the socialization (H3) or the local context (H4) hypotheses.

The initial picture for the redistribution variable, reported in Model 1b, is somewhat different. It is important to interpret these results in light of the question wording: respondents were asked whether “income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary working people.” Even more so than the corresponding German question, this wording makes redistribution of wealth very explicit and excludes the role of the state. The baseline Model (1b) indicates that immigrants and Scots are significantly more likely to favor redistribution than other Britons. In the socioeconomic model (2b), immigrant becomes insignificant, though its sign remains negative. Here income does exert a powerful positive effect. However, in Model 3b, with local context variables and other controls in place, the results show a conservative but insignificant effect for immigrant. When we change immigrant from 0 to 1 we do not observe an opinion gap, a finding which holds at varying levels of years and percent minority (years and immigrant * percent minority are not jointly significant with immigrant). The variables that remain significant are Scotland, gender, and partisan identification (liberal) and age, income, skill, status, and church attendance (conservative). Overall, in the British models there seems to be mixed support for the socioeconomic hypothesis (H1) and little support for either the socialization hypothesis (H3) or the local context hypothesis (H4). H2, the effect of being an immigrant, receives some support in Britain, especially for social spending.

Comparing across the German and British models, several empirical and theoretical results are apparent. Empirically, we find that immigrants in both countries are never more likely to support more liberal positions once all the controls are in place, and either fall in the mainstream of similarly situated natives or are more conservative. Socialization (H3) does not seem to be occurring in either country, since the number of years immigrants have spent in their host country does not affect the opinion gap, though the language issue may affect this result.

The local context hypothesis, H4, also does not receive much support.

Comparing across the two countries also helps distinguish among the other hypotheses, though we must be cautious in our comparisons given the separate surveys and the smaller immigrant sample in Germany. We find some support for H1 since in all models, except in the British social spending model, socioeconomic controls immediately negated the effect of being an immigrant. We observe a significant opinion gap in the British social spending case, where immigrants are 17 percentage points less likely to favor increases in social spending. Given the differences in receiving context, this evidence is suggestive that cross-national differences in immigration regimes do matter (H5), though we cannot test for the precise mechanism. In light of the finding that immigrants in Britain tend to have more conservative preferences, but also tend to support the Labour Party, in the next section, we move to a discussion of how individual and contextual factors translate into partisan identification among British immigrants.

Immigrant Partisan Identification

Given that they are no more likely than comparatively situated natives to support left-leaning social spending or redistributive policies and indeed have more conservative preferences on social spending, the overwhelming support that the Labour Party enjoys among Britain’s nonwhite electorate suggests that there is something besides policy preferences that leads to this support. Here scholarship on the United States again proves instructive. A parallel can be found in African Americans’ strong allegiance to the Democratic Party. Many African Americans came to perceive the Republican Party as opposed to black interests, thus truncating the political options for those with such perceptions (though Republicans have recently made inroads in both the African American and the Latino communities). Furthermore, identification with collective group interests and perceptions of “linked fates” serve to bridge class divisions and further strengthen the affiliation with the Democrats (Dawson 1994). We have also seen that the immigrant experience shapes Latino partisanship in the United States, although the underlying mechanisms for these links may be varied. Uhlaner and Garcia (2005) posit that since the conventional channel of parental socialization is less pronounced or missing among immigrants, contact with coethnics helps Latinos find the “right” party. Latinos who are more tied into their national-origin group are thus more
likely to identify with the party that is dominant in that group.\textsuperscript{21}

In short, scholars have found that group membership may impact partisanship through the truncation of the political space, identification with group interests, and group-based learning. We explore these effects in our analysis of partisanship among British immigrants. Given the results above, here we simply test a socioeconomic model (H1) against contextual factors (H4), while we also evaluate the effect of years in Britain (H3) and explore partisanship among natives for comparison to test the effect of being an immigrant (H2). We cannot test receiving context here, since we are not able to run the partisanship model for Germany.

Methodology and Results

Our dependent variable here is partisan identification. We include the same battery of demographic and socioeconomic controls from the previous analysis and add a dummy for homeownership, which tends to be associated with Conservative partisanship in Britain (Heath et al. 1991), a link that Margaret Thatcher tightened when she privatized much of the country’s public housing stock. We estimate logistic regressions, but here we employ separate models for immigrants and natives, since in this case we are interested in the determinants of immigrant partisanship, and since many of the variables of interest apply only to immigrants.

Our initial model for immigrants (Model 1 in Table 4) includes only the socioeconomic variables, including homeownership, to test H1. Moving to contextual factors (Model 2), we proxy the concept of “linked fates” through a measure of the respondent’s group identification, with responses ranging from “British, not [ethnic group]” to “[ethnic group], not British.” While our data do not allow us to discriminate between the mechanisms proposed by Dawson (1994) and Uhlaner and Garcia (2005), our identity variable does gauge the salience of ethnicity and sheds light on the question of whether ethnicity trumps class among Britain’s immigrant electorate. We measure contact with coethnics by percent minority. The model retains church attendance as an additional context variable, as well as years in Britain, which we expect to influence partisan affiliation through learning effects.\textsuperscript{22} We also include the respondents’ preferences on social spending and redistribution as controls.\textsuperscript{23} We operationalize the “truncation hypothesis” with a dummy variable, truncation, which is coded 1 when the respondent thought that during the run-up to the 1997 general election the Conservative Party “campaigned specially in order to win the votes of white people who are prejudiced against black and Asian people.” Since the inclusion of this variable leads to a drop in respondents exceeding 10% of cases, we estimate a separate model (3). Models 4 and 5 report regressions for white natives for comparison, dropping variables that are not relevant to this group.

Immediately apparent from the results in Model 1 is the lack of significance for many of the demographic and socioeconomic variables, including age, gender, income, and homeownership, suggesting that the socioeconomic hypothesis (H1) does not have much purchase in determining the high aggregate immigrant support for Labour. By contrast, for natives in Model 4 income is highly significant (though it drops from significance when other controls are added in Model 5). Turning to Model 2, which includes contextual variables, we do see that identification with one’s ethnic group is strongly associated with Labour partisanship. When we increase (decrease) this variable by one standard deviation above (below) its mean,\textsuperscript{24} we observe a nine (10) point rise (decline) in the probability of observing Labour partisanship (significant at $p < .05$). The significantly negative coefficient for social spending preferences does suggest, however, that immigrants’ partisan identification is not completely divorced from their policy preferences on the welfare state. Attitudes toward redistribution do not, however, have a systematic impact, unlike the result for natives. The number of years spent in Britain and attending church services have no impact, while percent minority proves to be significant and positive. According to simulations, a one standard deviation increase (decrease) in the share of nonwhites in a constituency raises (lowers) the probability of observing Labour partisanship by nine (10) points (significant at $p < .05$). Finally, in Model 3 the truncation hypothesis receives

\textsuperscript{21}Note that this brief discussion taps into the debate about the origins of partisanship. While some argue that partisan identification reflects a stable social attachment that, once formed, is highly resistant to change (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002), others maintain that voters routinely update their party affiliations based on changing information and interests (Fiorina 1981; see Clarke et al. 2004 for the British context).

\textsuperscript{22}Uhlaner and Garcia (2005) and Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner (1991) find that the likelihood of Democratic partisan identification among Latinos rises with length of residence in the United States.

\textsuperscript{23}Alvarez and Bedolla (2003) find that issue positions on similar questions have a strong impact on partisan identification among Latinos.

\textsuperscript{24}This coincides approximately with moving from “equally British and [ethnic group]” to “more [ethnic group] than British” (increase) or “less [ethnic group] than British” (decrease).
little support. Respondents who believe that the Conservatives aim for the white prejudiced vote are statistically no more likely to identify with the Labour Party.

Simply put, and echoing findings about minority and immigrant groups in the United States, we find strong evidence that identification with one’s ethnic group leads immigrants to affiliate with the party that is dominant among the group. Second, ethnic minority concentration—and presumably increased contact with coethnics—is positively related to Labour partisanship, but we hesitate to infer the causal mechanism that produces this effect: learning, or socialization. Note also that ethnic concentration in a constituency is likely to be associated with greater organizational efforts among

| Table 4  Partisan Identification in Britain |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Model** | **Immigrants** | | **Natives** | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| **Age** | .003 | .014 | .018 | −.007** | −.005 |
| | (.014) | (.020) | (.022) | (.003) | (.004) |
| **Gender** | .347 | .304 | .304 | −.077 | −.216** |
| | (.343) | (.384) | (.415) | (.092) | (.107) |
| **Income** | −.045 | −.055 | −.072 | −.042*** | −.023 |
| | (.048) | (.055) | (.064) | (.013) | (.015) |
| **Skill** | −.133 | −.203** | −.255** | −.078*** | −.088*** |
| | (.082) | (.099) | (.116) | (.028) | (.031) |
| **Unemployed** | −.683 | −.760 | −1.067* | .200 | −.287 |
| | (.491) | (.536) | (.572) | (.229) | (.282) |
| **Status** | −.018 | −.010 | −.010 | −.007** | −.002 |
| | (.012) | (.015) | (.017) | (.004) | (.004) |
| **Homeownership** | .214 | .660 | .724 | −.415*** | −.422*** |
| | (.382) | (.428) | (.460) | (.112) | (.128) |
| **Social Spending** | −.466** | −.369 | | −.637*** | |
| | (.234) | (.261) | | (.113) | |
| **Redistribution** | −.196 | −.042 | | −.605*** | |
| | (.186) | (.203) | | (.056) | |
| **Years in Britain** | −.008 | −.018 | | | |
| | (.025) | (.028) | | | |
| **Church Attendance** | −.023 | −.045 | | −.044** | |
| | (.073) | (.085) | | (.021) | |
| **Percent Minority** | .027** | .028** | | .009 | |
| | (.011) | (.012) | | (.007) | |
| **Identity** | .474** | .512** | | | |
| | (.201) | (.220) | | | |
| **Truncation** | | | | .671 | |
| | | | | (.548) | |
| **Scotland** | | | | −.001 | −.125 |
| | | | | (.102) | (.123) |
| **Constant** | 1.938** | .678 | .539 | 1.332*** | 3.381*** |
| | (.787) | (1.289) | (1.543) | (.239) | (.335) |
| **Pseudo-R²** | .059 | .139 | .163 | .037 | .125 |
| **Log-Pseudolikelihood** | −194.459 | −150.304 | −128.984 | −1878.001 | −1468.969 |
| **N** | 330 | 280 | 247 | 2845 | 2445 |

*Note:* Logit coefficients with robust standard errors, adjusted for Scottish and ethnic minority oversamples, in parentheses. Scottish control omitted for immigrants since all Scots are natives. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.
the Labour Party to drum up the immigrant vote. In contrast to these contextual effects, our immigrant-specific individual-level variable—years in Britain—does not seem to influence partisan identification. Finally, issue positions on the size of the welfare state and redistribution have much less explanatory power among immigrants than they do among the native electorate. Overall, for immigrants there is support for the context hypothesis (H4) and for the effect of being an immigrant, through group identification (H2), but little support for socioeconomic factors (H1) or socialization (H3).

Robustness Checks

The models discussed above largely assumed that each independent variable exerted the same effect for natives and immigrants. Here, we relax this assumption to allow for the possibility that the effect of immigrant depends on different levels of any of the independent variables (not simply the ones interacted in our previous models) and that the effects of the independent variables on social spending and redistribution are mediated through immigrant. In our investigation, differential effects may be theoretically important for variables that highlight immigration context. As Franzese (1999) argues, in cases where a variable’s effect is expected to depend on the level of other independent variables, or is itself expected to channel the effects of other variables, it is necessary to interact that variable with all of the other variables. Thus to capture these potential effects, we estimate fully interactive models by including each variable both alone and interacted with immigrant. Especially relevant for our analysis, Kam and Franzese (n.d.) argue that studies that seek to investigate the effects of race or ethnicity on political behavior should employ such interactive specifications. After estimating the fully interactive model, we simulate how this model affects our assessment of the overall impact of immigrant on our dependent variable; we also examine how our control variables impact preferences, perhaps differently, for both immigrants and natives. For brevity we do not report the results here; the results and associated simulations are available upon request.

The fully interactive model yields the same substantive conclusions about the potential “opinion gap” between immigrants and natives. Changing immigrant from 0 to 1 while holding continuous control variables at their means and dummies at 0, we do not find an opinion gap in Germany or in the British redistribution model, but still observe that immigrants in Britain are significantly less likely to support increases in social spending and more likely to opt for tax cuts. Correspondingly, immigrant is jointly significant with all its interactions in the British social spending model (p < .003), but fails to achieve significance in the other models. Turning to the control variables, on the whole, the effects of our covariates are not substantially moderated by immigrant. While the effects of most variables are more robust among natives than they are among immigrants (which is also due to a much larger native sample size), the direction of the significant effects is the same for both. Church attendance does not appear to be a contextual determinant of preferences among immigrants in either country; it does not significantly shape preferences among immigrants and does not operate significantly differently among immigrants than it does among natives. Based on our simulations, we find that in Germany, on social spending, the only variable that appears to affect natives differently than immigrants is percent minority. A one standard deviation increase in population diversity at the county level is associated with more liberal views among immigrants but slightly more conservative views among natives. While these effects are themselves not statistically significant, we find that it is the difference of these effects between these two groups that is significant. This provides some weak support for the local context hypothesis (H4) in Germany (but simulations indicate that percent minority still does not affect the lack of an opinion gap). In Britain, the only variable that has a differential effect on immigrants and natives is partisan identification, where our fully interactive redistribution model shows that the difference between the effect of partisanship on the two groups is significant. Given this differential effect, when we test for an opinion gap among Labour Party supporters only, we do find that immigrants are significantly more likely to support more conservative views on redistribution than natives. While identification with the Labour Party is associated with statistically and substantively very significant liberal effects among natives, such affiliation has a much smaller effect on immigrants’ preferences over redistribution. This finding is consistent with our earlier result that views on redistribution do not inform immigrant partisanship in Britain.

26For these simulations, we simulate first differences for natives and immigrants, respectively, changing continuous control variables one standard deviation above and below their means and dummies from 0 to 1. Having established the first differences for both groups, we next take the difference between the two first differences. We calculate the standard error of this “second difference” to determine the significance of the difference in impact on attitudes across groups.
We perform a number of additional substantive robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our results (a number of robustness checks relating to coding issues are discussed in the appendix). We created a variable to capture how well an immigrant has assimilated to the labor market, operationalized as the degree to which an immigrant’s skill level matches his or her occupational status in the new country. Such labor market assimilation may impact how well immigrants feel their economic expectations have been satisfied. A highly educated but economically “underassimilated” professional who can only find unskilled employment may expect more support from the government than an unskilled but economically “overassimilated” worker who ends up in the same job, because the skilled immigrant has not been able to realize his or her expected income. When we substitute labor market assimilation for our simpler status variable, the substantive results are unchanged for the German dependent variables. For Britain, the addition of labor market assimilation for the social spending question further strengthens the conservative immigrant effect (immigrants are now 20 percentage points less likely to favor increased spending, rather than 17), and immigrant is jointly significant with all its interactions at p < .001. However, labor market assimilation itself does not operate as expected; labor market underassimilation among immigrants tends to widen the opinion gap, resulting in even more conservative preferences, while overassimilation has the opposite effect. In our redistribution model, labor market assimilation is jointly significant with immigrant at p < .08, but we still do not observe an opinion gap.

Social mobility is another variable that might affect attitudes toward the welfare state, by influencing perceived incentive costs of redistribution (Piketty 1995). We constructed social mobility scores based on the difference between a respondent’s class and that of his or her father. We also control for whether a respondent receives income support from the state in the British analyses (this variable is unavailable in the German survey). This variable might be expected to be a significant predictor of any immigrant-native gap in attitudes toward social spending: 25.63% of immigrants are coded as relying on state support, whereas only 8.60% of natives fall into this category. Yet, neither social mobility nor state support achieves significance when added to the full models, and only in the case of redistribution in Germany does the addition of social mobility affect the opinion gap; we now observe that immigrants are nine points less likely to embrace liberal positions, suggesting that individual mobility experiences do inform immigrant political preferences. This result must be interpreted cautiously, however, since adding social mobility results in a sizable drop in the number of immigrants. Differences in trust in the state among natives and immigrants may also lead to variation in their support for state spending (Rudolph and Evans 2005). But when we control for respondents’ level of trust in government (in Britain) or in politicians (in Germany), the results are unchanged, although again in the German case the inclusion of this variable leads to a drop in the number of immigrants.

Turning to our analysis of partisanship, we test whether the effect of group identification holds up when we control for the language spoken at home, English or other. This specification aims to ensure that we truly capture conscious identification with one’s ethnic group, rather than a reduced identification with Britons due to potential language barriers. We also add two variables that account for self-described political interest and actual political knowledge, since more interested or knowledgeable voters may rely on different information to help them make their partisan choice. We also control for state support. The inclusion of these variables, none of which attain significance, in fact strengthens the effect of identity on partisan identification. Finally, in light of the emphasis in U.S. scholarship on the national origin mix of immigrants (Alvarez and Bedolla 2003; Borjas 1994, 1995), we hoped to test for different national and ethnic groups, but the surveys contain too few immigrants in each category to conduct such analyses.

Discussion and Conclusion

Our analysis contributes considerably to our understanding of immigrant political behavior. Building on insights from U.S. scholarship, we assessed whether factors particular to the immigration experience and local and national context impact national and cross-national differences in political preferences and partisan identification between immigrants and natives. Our findings suggest that while factors related to the immigrant experience exert some influence on political behavior, they do not operate as those who fear that immigrants are “benefit tourists” might predict. With regard to political preferences, immigrants in both Germany and Great Britain are no more likely than their comparably situated native counterparts to favor social spending or redistribution. Moreover, in contrast to the human capital frame, immigrants in Britain have more conservative welfare and redistribution preferences than natives, even controlling for socioeconomic variables. We have speculated that the state-intensive German and the hands-off British processes for recruiting and settling immigrants may account for this cross-national variation,
perhaps through selection or socialization effects. Given
the available data, we cannot discern the underlying pref-
erence formation process. However, the interesting result
that years in host country is not significant in either coun-
try suggests that assimilation toward native views is not
occurring over time (with the caveat that language effects
may be masking socialization), so that the impact of the
immigration experience itself may be more important
in socializing immigrants to the host country than the
length of their stay. We do find that the immigrant con-
text strongly influences partisanship in Britain.

Another implication of our research concerns pop-
ulist rhetoric that accuses immigrants of intentionally
abusing the welfare state. Our findings suggest that, ceteris
paribus, immigrants do not prefer higher levels of wel-
fare spending. In fact, according to our German results,
regional differences between East and West Germany are
perhaps more important than differences between natives
and immigrants. German reunification has incorporated
a large population whose preferences on welfare spend-
ing are massively different from both West German na-
tives and immigrants, likely due to years of living under a
communist system. With an expanded EU, it will be inter-
esting to see how these potentially countervailing effects
play out.

Our findings suggest several avenues for expanding
this research. Improved data will be central to further-
ouring our knowledge of immigrant political behavior. Data
limitations forced us to gloss over many important is-
ues, including national origin effects; larger sample sizes
will thus be crucial, as well as surveys that conduct inter-
views in immigrants’ native languages. Ideally, immigrant
oversamples would be included in cross-national surveys
to facilitate direct comparisons between countries. On a
substantive level, future studies should address which is-
ues are most salient for immigrant voters and whether
there are any systematic differences among different im-
migrant populations in different host countries. For ex-
ample, in recent British local and general elections, many
Muslim voters deserted the Labour Party to protest the
Iraq War and thus contributed to the party’s sharp drop in
seats (Burns 2005). Future partisan swings among immi-
grants seem more plausible in light of our analysis, which
has shown that ethnic concentration and identification—
rather than Labour’s social policy positions—accounted
for party choice among immigrants in 1997. In 2005,
opinion leaders within the immigrant community who
shifted their partisan endorsements may have influenced
individual voting decisions through the mechanism of
ethnic identification. Another avenue for future research
would be a closer examination of individualistic beliefs,
which we were unable to explore but may inform immi-
grant preferences and selection effects, as well as social
mobility.

Our theoretical framework and our empirical find-
ings suggest that an understanding of immigrant po-
itical behavior requires several dimensions of analysis.
Our results indicate that immigrants are not the “benefit
tourists” they are often claimed to be; they are not clamor-
ning for larger welfare states than their native counterparts.
Furthermore, their policy preferences leave room for
greater competition for their votes. But the partisanship
results indicate that parties looking to attract immigrant
votes cannot simply appeal to immigrants on economic
interest grounds alone. We hope that these findings will
stimulate future research on cross-national immigrant
political behavior, an area ripe for sustained scholarly and
political attention.

Appendix
Independent Variables

Demographic Variables

Immigrant: This variable is coded 1 if the respondent
was born in a poor country and 0 otherwise. In Ger-
many, the majority of immigrants contained in this sam-
ple originate from countries that sent guest workers as
well as from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union;
most immigrants in the British sample originate from for-
mer colonies in the West Indies and the Indian subcon-
tinent. In the German sample, 41 native-born respon-
dents have parents who were born in a poor country. In
Britain, of the 705 ethnic minorities in the oversample, 214
were born in Britain. For both surveys, we exclude these
native-born ethnic minorities (or second-generation im-
migrants). This coding is intended to make the clearest
possible distinction between an immigrant from a poor
country and a native and to avoid confounding factors
associated with second-generation immigrants. We do
not code second-generation immigrants as natives (but
rather exclude them entirely) because counting them as
natives might obscure our tests for the effect of living in
an ethnic minority enclave. To ensure that this coding
decision does not impact the results, we reran Model 3
with second-generation immigrants coded as natives and
found the main results unchanged. For the German sur-
evay, the following groups are coded as natives: the large
cluster of people who came to Germany during and imme-
diately following the Second World War (up until 1949);
those born in former German territories (e.g., East Prussia
or Silesia) and who immigrated to present-day Germany
before 1950; and immigrants from wealthy nations (i.e.,
Austria, Denmark, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States; numbering 34). For the British survey we similarly code immigrants from wealthy countries as natives (i.e., France, Germany, and the United States; totaling four). We likewise reran Model 3 excluding immigrants from wealthy countries and find no difference.

East Germany/Scotland: Dummies for living in East Germany or Scotland.

Age: The respondent’s age in years.

Gender: A dichotomous variable coded 1 for females and 0 for males.

Socioeconomic Variables

Income: In Germany, income is measured as monthly household income net of all taxes and transfers and recoded into deciles, based on where respondents fell in the income distribution. In Britain, income is measured as total pretax household income, including benefits and savings, in 16 categories. Ideally we would compare pretax income in both surveys, but the German survey only provides after-tax income.

Skill (Educational Attainment): In Germany, a 7-point scale measuring the respondent’s highest degree of qualification ranging from no degree (1) to university degree (7). The British survey asks for both the highest qualification received (degree) and for the terminal age of education, but both measures present problems. Since education systems vary across countries, a given age may represent different levels of attainment. The British minimum age for leaving school has changed several times (notably in 1947 and 1972–73), so terminal age of education is not a consistent variable for natives (Heath, personal communication, August 2003). But the degree variable contains a separate category for “foreign or other,” raising doubts about whether the variable can truly be considered ordinal. We ran Model 3 using terminal year of education, but found no difference.

Unemployed: A dummy, coded 1 if the respondent is unemployed, and 0 otherwise.

Status: We convert the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO 1988) into an ordinal measure of status, the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI), based on the mapping methodology devised by Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996). The resulting set of scores ranges from 16 to 90. The lowest value is shared by a set of manual occupations (farmhands and laborers as well as janitorial positions), and judges receive the highest value. Germany reports four-digit ISCO codes, while Britain reports only three-digit codes, but for most occupations this makes little difference in the ISEI score.

Homeownership: Respondents who owned their home were coded 1, all others 0.

Labor Market Assimilation (included in robustness checks): We operationalize labor market assimilation by first establishing a baseline skill-status relationship for the host country, using the natives in our sample. We regress our status variable on skill for natives only. This regression yields the predicted status level of a native with a given level of educational attainment. We then use the coefficient from this regression to predict status levels for immigrants based on their skills, and then calculate the residuals—i.e., the difference between the predicted and actual status for immigrants. We employ the residuals from this regression as our measure of labor market assimilation. If the residual equals 0, then there is “perfect assimilation”: the respondent’s skill level translates into job status just as it would for a native. If the residual is negative, then there is “underassimilation”: the respondent has a lower-status job than he or she is qualified for. If the residual is positive, then there is “overassimilation”: the respondent gets a higher-status job than he or she is qualified for. We code all natives as 0, since by definition they are “perfectly” assimilated. This new measure captures how well job expectations have been satisfied.

Social, Contextual, and Political Variables

Years in Host Country: The number of years an immigrant has lived in either Germany or Britain, up to the year of the survey. Natives are coded as 0, following Borjas and Hilton (1996, 593).

Church Attendance: An ordinal variable reflecting frequency of attendance at services or meetings related to the respondent’s particular religion for Britain and church attendance for Germany (and thus it may underestimate the effect since it does not include “mosque” attendance).

Ideology (Germany only): Self-placement on a 10-point scale where 1 (10) denotes left (right) placement.

Partisan Identification (Britain only): Respondents were asked: “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, [if Scot: SNP; if Wales: Plaid Cymru] or what?” We recode the resulting variable so that those who replied “Labour” were coded 1, all others 0.

Percent Minority: The British variable reflects the percentage of nonwhite residents in the respondent’s parliamentary constituency (merged from the 1991 Census) and ranges from 0% to 52%. The German survey already includes a similar variable, which indicates the percentage of “foreigners” in a respondent’s county (Kreis). Values range from a category for under 2% to a category for between 30% and 32%, producing a total of 16 categories.
Identity: This question asks, “Some people think of themselves first as British. Others may think of themselves first as [ethnic group of respondent]. Which best describes how you think of yourself?” Response options ranged from (1) “British, not [ethnic group of respondent]” to (5) “[ethnic group of respondent], not British,” including intermediate values.

Truncation: To measure truncation of politics, this variable is coded 1 when the respondent thought that during the run-up to the 1997 general election the Conservative Party “campaigned specially in order to win the votes of white people who are prejudiced against black and Asian people.”

References


