

Woodrow Wilson In The Nation's Service

*Final report of the 2006 Princeton Colloquium on Public and International
Affairs, April 28–29, 2006*

*Office of the Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs,
Princeton University*

Speaking at the 1896 celebration marking Princeton University's Sesquicentennial Anniversary, Woodrow Wilson gave Princeton its informal motto, "In the Nation's Service," and unbeknownst at the time imparted to the school that would take on his name its mission of public service to the nation and to the world. "Of course, when all is said, it is not learning but the spirit of service that will give a college place in the public annals of the nation. It is indispensable, it seems to me, if it is to do its right service, that the air of affairs should be admitted to all its class rooms. I do not mean the air of party politics but the air of the world's transactions, the consciousness of the solidarity of the race, the sense of the duty of man towards man, of the presence of men in every problem, of the significance of truth for guidance as well as for knowledge, of the potency of ideas, of the promise and the hope that shine in the face of all knowledge," Wilson said.

"There is laid upon us the compulsion of the national life. We dare not keep aloof and closet ourselves while a nation comes to its maturity," he continued, "The days of glad expansion are gone. Our life grows tense and difficult; our resource for the future lies in careful thought, providence, and a wise economy; and the school must be of the nation."

As part of the year-long 75th Anniversary celebrations of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and coinciding with the 150th anniversary year of Woodrow Wilson's birth, the 2006 Princeton Colloquium on Public and International Affairs sought to critically examine Woodrow Wilson's accomplishments and failures as a public servant, through an investigation of both his historical record and his legacy that imprints the public and international affairs of the twenty-first century. "[P]art of our point in these two days is to not just honor Woodrow Wilson, not to just mouth great phrases," Woodrow Wilson School Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter '80 noted in her opening remarks, "but to really examine him in the round as a great man, as a complicated man, as a man of his times, as a man whom we honor but perhaps we can learn from his failings as well as his strengths."

The trajectory of Woodrow Wilson's professional life stands as a model of public service to the nation and the world. As president of Princeton University, Wilson left his mark on and fundamentally changed not only Princeton but higher education standards nationwide. He left the academy for the New Jersey governorship and in the process he translated theories about government into actualities that set standards by which future state ex-

SWM

ecutives would govern and be judged. As president of the United States, Wilson worked to use the power of the state to balance national economic interests with regulations meant to curb economic and social ills that were outgrowths of industrialization. He oversaw an administration credited with the creation of the first truly graduated income tax, the passage of the first national child labor law, and the attainment of substantial banking and anti-trust reform. World War I interrupted Wilson's progressive agenda at home, but was the moment in which his ultimately lasting vision for world order and peace came to the fore on the international scene.

Yet in spite of Wilson's contributions to academia, to the office of governor, to the Oval Office, and to conceptualizations for collective global security, his personal and public failings also serve as an instructive caution. While a passionate proponent of democracy and the rights of minority populations abroad, Wilson sanctioned the segregation of federal government jobs by race, used the government to curb civil liberties during wartime, and was a belated and arguably half-hearted supporter of women's suffrage. While a pragmatic politician as well as a steadfast advocate of open dialogue among nations and arbitration to resolve international disputes, Wilson stood intransigent and unwilling to negotiate at pivotal moments in his private and public life that doomed to failure initiatives ranging from locating Princeton's graduate school at the center of the University campus, to U.S. participation in the League of Nations. "In many ways, his failures are as fascinating, troubling, and important as are his successes," observed cultural historian and Colloquium participant, T. J. Jackson Lears, "and evaluating him . . . is not simply a matter of totaling up his strengths and weaknesses in two separate columns."

Indeed, questions about the best ways to "make the world safe for democracy," executive authority, and the ability of the state to be an agent of positive change resonate as clearly today as they did in Wilson's own time. With an overarching goal of understanding a great public servant of the past to better serve the public of the future, the Colloquium brought together leading prac-

tioners, academics and policymakers from a range of disciplines to engage in two days of lively discussions and animated debates about Woodrow Wilson, intersections of his successes and failures, and his legacy.

KEYNOTE PRESENTATION

Promoting Democracy: Fourteen Points for the Twenty-First Century

Madeleine Albright

The Colloquium keynote address was delivered to a capacity audience in McCosh Hall on Friday afternoon by Madeleine Albright, the 64th Secretary of State of the United States and currently principal of the Albright Group. In her introduction of Secretary Albright, Princeton President Shirley Tilghman reflected on Albright's life and career, drawing a parallel between her and Woodrow Wilson. Wilson, Tilghman noted, served as "a model for all who believe in the importance of integrating the study and the practice of government. As a young professor Wilson entertained hopes of becoming an assistant secretary of state. 'I love the stir of the world,' he said," and in this context Tilghman remarked that "it is fitting we welcome a speaker who is as much at home on the campus of Georgetown University as she is on the seventh floor of the State Department," the location of the Office of the Secretary of State.

Tilghman highlighted the story of Albright's childhood, recounting how she was forced to flee from her native Czechoslovakia to America. She described Albright's studies and career in academia, as well as Albright's appointment as U.N. ambassador in 1992 during the Clinton administration. In 1997 Albright was sworn in as the first woman U.S. secretary of state; Tilghman portrayed Albright's tenure as Secretary as combining "the strengths of Wilsonian idealists and geopolitical realists in her search for a flexible and innovative foreign policy" during such diplomatic crises as Kosovo and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Albright began her speech by commenting that as a Czech native, "I will always have a warm spot for Woodrow Wil-

son." Wilson, she noted, "was a towering figure" to the small nations of central Europe, "a champion of self-determination and peace." As such, "practically every small town in [the Czech Republic] has a Woodrow Wilson railroad station," she said.

But a key part of Wilson's legacy, Albright observed, is that he passed down the notion that "government is not only the place a young person of talent can make a difference, but it is one place where excellence and the right kind of ambition matter a great deal." The government must avoid mediocrity and employ the finest minds, she said, and U.S. foreign policy should reflect America's "interests, ideas, and responsibilities." However, she asserted that the administration of President George W. Bush had not crafted such a representative policy.

"In fairness," Albright conceded, "I can see the difficulty of the problem the current administration is facing." Citing the ongoing war in Iraq, the stalled progress of democratic reforms in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and looming instability in Lebanon, such developments she said "have led some to conclude that U.S. support for democracy has been misguided and that we should focus instead on stability." Or, that America should promote democracy abroad but more slowly and cautiously, "not now or not here or not so fast," she remarked. Such attitudes, Albright quipped, "remind me of Saint Augustine's famous prayer to become abstinent and celibate but not quite yet."

Albright argued that for American foreign policy to work "it must reflect the world both as it is and as we would like it to be." American leadership, she said, "must blend practical politics with moral considerations." The Bush administration deserves credit for its policy of democracy promotion abroad, Albright opined; the question, she said, "is whether [the administration] is going about the task in the right way." Albright proceeded to describe how the U.S. could go about promoting democracy in other countries, paying tribute to Woodrow Wilson by making "no less than fourteen points," she said, to which the audience responded with appreciative laughter.

The first of Albright's fourteen points was that despite several setbacks to U.S. foreign policy, "it is both right and smart for America to assist those who want our help in establishing and strengthening democratic institutions." Second, Albright said, American policy makers need to understand that "democracy must grow from within," that the U.S. can provide training and assistance but "we can not create the desire or the discipline to establish a durable basis for democratic rule."

While Albright asserted that America should increase its support for democracy promotion abroad, her third point was prefaced with a cautionary remark: "The invasion of Iraq should not be considered a precedent for anything." Yet she sounded a hopeful note that despite the ongoing conflict in Iraq "democracy still has a chance to grow." In this light, however, Albright expressed surprise, that from her perspective "the Bush administration is on the verge of abandoning democratic institution-building in Iraq." She posited as evidence for this claim a recent funding request by President Bush to support democracy promotion in Iraq for the following year, which had "been reduced to what it would take to support U.S. military operations in Iraq for about six hours." This, Albright argued, "is a gross distortion of priorities."

Albright's fourth point was that "democracy promotion is a team exercise," meaning that the U.S. should work to bolster the democracy programs of such multilateral organizations as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the African Union, and the Organization of American States. And when giving bilateral assistance to states, Albright argued that America "should give primary consideration to the government's commitment to democracy."

As her fifth point Albright highlighted how democracy is a "bottom-up, not a top-down, proposition," in that democracy is based on the principle that "power comes from the people." Establishing a democracy and democratic institutions "takes time to accept that organizing political parties, developing ideas, forging coalitions and establishing an independent legal system are both

possible and meaningful," Albright explained. She criticized President Bush, who in her view during his presidency has portrayed America as having "a calling from beyond the stars to proclaim liberty throughout the world," and said such depictions of America's role in democracy promotion are "a distraction."

Democracy is more than just elections, Albright noted as her sixth point. "A healthy democracy," she asserted, "will offer its citizens the opportunity for free expression, to petition, to organize, to oppose, and to enjoy equal treatment under the law." On top of that "democracy must deliver," Albright urged as her seventh point. She warned that the consensus in support of open politics and free markets is "dissolving and a new generation of populists," especially in Latin America, "is taking center stage." A key reason for this, Albright illustrated, is that "there is a link between poverty and the absence of legal protections for the disadvantaged." The practice of democratic capitalism is being condemned in some countries even though in many states "it has not even been tried," she warned.

Albright expressed stinging criticism of the Bush administration with her eighth point, wherein she highlighted how important it is for U.S. policy makers to understand what democracy can and can not do. She cited recent comments by current Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice who claimed that democratizing the Middle East will prevent future terrorist attacks. But in contrast "last summer's bombings on the London Underground were carried out by British subjects, just as railway attacks in Madrid were conceived by Spanish conspirators," Albright pointed out. "Democracy is a form of government, it's not a ticket to some fantasy land where an evil is vanquished and everyone agrees with us," she insisted. Instead, Albright observed that in democratized societies "ideologies of hatred will surely not vanish, just as they have not vanished in the West, but they become harder to sustain."

On a similar note, Albright acknowledged that some Arab leaders argue that their countries are not ready for freedom and democracy, as recent history has

shown religious authorities and radicals can garner more votes than secularists and moderates. She pointed to the Muslim Brotherhood's rise in Egypt's parliament, albeit through other parties, and the ascent of Hamas in Palestine as key indicators of that concern. Still, Albright articulated as her ninth point that "democracy should be inclusive," and Arab governments should respond not necessarily by banning Islamist or other parties but instead by competing with such groups by "offering the public what it really wants, which is effective and honest government" In Hamas' case, which she said "remains a terrorist group," Albright asserted that "democracy did not create Hamas but it may cause Hamas to either to change or to fail. Either outcome would be an improvement over the status quo," in the Middle East.

When promoting democracy abroad, Albright urged the U.S. to adopt a global approach, as she outlined in her tenth point. "Just as U.S. foreign policy can not be unilateral neither can it be unidimensional. We can not expect democracy to gain ground in the Middle East if it's slipping backward in Latin America, Africa, and the former Soviet Union," she commented. Similarly, Albright expressed concern that the Bush administration has set a poor example by attempting to undermine America's long tradition of respect for international law. As a former U.N. ambassador herself, she expressed dismay that America's current U.N. ambassador "is on record as having said that it is a big mistake to grant any validity to international law." Indeed, she said, "if we do not recognize international standards others will ignore them, as well, and the result will be a world governed not by the rule of law but by no rules at all."

For her eleventh point Albright emphasized the need for the U.S. to support the development of civil society and related groups to promote democratic norms abroad. As an example she noted how in the 1990s networks of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) representing a diverse set of interests flourished in "virtually every corner of every continent," and as a backlash today "insecure and illegitimate leaders have been quick to label NGOs as troublemakers and puppets of the West." Albright said as NGOs and related civil society groups exercise their

freedoms, the U.S. should “speak up for them, and do all we can to protect them.”

If America expects to lead the world toward democracy, Albright insisted in her twelfth point that “we must be ourselves true to democratic values,” she said. “The spectacle of Abu Ghraib, the detentions without charge at Guantanamo, the waffling over torture, and the warrantless surveillance of domestic targets have destroyed [the Bush] administration’s credibility and done great harm to our nation.” She warned, “No region has a longer memory than the Middle East and I fear that we will be paying a price for our failures of accountability in this region for decades, even centuries to come.”

Albright called for a measure of introspection as the U.S. seeks to support democracy as her thirteenth point. “We should always remember that perfect democracy has not yet been invented,” she said, recalling America’s own history with slavery and that “before the American civilization could be built another civilization had to be pushed aside.” She added, “None of us have a standing to claim full possession of virtue or truth.”

As her fourteenth, final, and most important point, Albright asserted that democracy promotion should revolve around the simple and basic idea “that every individual counts and that the fundamental dignity of every human being should be respected.” She continued, “No principle better summarizes what democracy is all about,” she said, or “rebuts more completely the teachings of terror, the callousness of indiscriminate violence or the systematic denial of human rights.” In addition, she explained, “no premise has the greater potential to bring the world together across the boundaries of culture, nationality, gender, and creed.”

Concluding her remarks Albright issued a caution: “It is vital, however, that [we] do not overreact to the mistakes made in Iraq or to the overheated rhetoric President Bush uses.” Instead, America’s new leaders should employ “a combination of Wilsonian ideals and enlightened pragmatism best exemplified in the past by President Harry Truman,” who Albright said “saw America as exceptional,

not because it was exempt from the rules demanded of others but because it was determined to create a world in which rules had a meaning.” And like President Woodrow Wilson, Albright concluded, “Truman was resolute in defining and defending American ideals.”

PANELS

In addition to the keynote by Secretary Albright, the Colloquium offered a variety of panels focusing on Woodrow Wilson’s historical record and legacy in the areas of foreign policy, domestic politics and reform, academia, and public service. The panels challenged participants to understand and reassess the significance of Woodrow Wilson’s ideas, assumptions, and leadership for his own time and for ours.

Opening Plenary ***Neoconservatives vs. Liberals: The Fight Over Woodrow Wilson’s Foreign Policy***

In his opening remarks, panel moderator G. John Ikenberry noted that Woodrow Wilson’s foreign policy ideas and vision have “made their way today in a very interesting way into the American foreign policy debate.” The Bush administration, he noted, which began its term of office reasserting a return to realism and traditionalism for U.S. foreign policy had, by the time of President Bush’s second inaugural address, seemingly shifted from one based on realpolitik to another based on Wilsonian idealism. Within this context, Ikenberry posed four questions to frame the discussion for panelists Thomas Knock *82, Professor of History at Southern Methodist University; Tony Smith, Cornelia M. Jackson Professor of Political Science at Tufts University; and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Bert G. Kerstetter ’66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs and Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School. Ikenberry asked: 1) In the post-9/11 era, has the Wilsonian view of foreign policy triumphed as it relates to today’s American foreign policy and national security; 2) How do liberals and neoconservatives differ in their uses of Wilson’s

ideas and who then are the “proper heirs” of Wilsonianism; 3) Is Wilsonianism dangerous, leading America to make errors in the exercise of power; and 4) What is Wilsonianism?

Thomas Knock, speaking first, most directly addressed Ikenberry's fourth question. Defining what Wilsonianism is, Knock admitted, is a tricky task. He noted that the legacy of Wilson and Wilsonianism have been invoked with such regularity to both rationalize and critique U.S. foreign policy objectives and actions in the post-9/11 era that Wilsonianism is in danger of becoming a term nearly devoid of meaning, or as Knock put it, “a free floating signifier.” Yet through an overview of the historical context in which Wilsonianism developed, he pinpointed the ideas that drove Wilson's vision for America's involvement in the world and continue to underpin what Knock dubbed “Wilsonian Wilsonianism.”

Knock argued that while Woodrow Wilson championed the ideals of democracy and free markets, “an international organization with permanent processes for the peaceful settlement of international disputes” is the idea at the heart of Wilsonianism. Wilson ultimately articulated this idea as a “league of nations” that would be central to a new international system in which the great powers of the world would prosper not through amassing power unbridled, but by exercising control. Through this league, collective security and arbitration would be the tools by which the world could hope to avert aggression and ensure peace. Within this new international system war was the last resort for conflict resolution. In short, Knock concluded, “For [Wilson] international security involved not only responsibilities but also restraints.”

Knock discussed how Wilson was the most visible spokesperson for a worldview embraced by “progressive” internationalists. Competing with this internationalism were those supporting the “conservative” internationalist position, most ardently championed by Henry Cabot Lodge. For Lodge and the conservative internationalists the fundamental problem with

the progressive position was the diminution of national sovereignty that membership in the League of Nations seemed to require. The broader question, Knock emphasized, was not whether the U.S. should be involved in the international system but how. The progressive conservative debate over American participation in League of Nations as mapped out in the Treaty of Versailles was writ large the debate over what kind of internationalism would guide America's foreign policy. According to Knock, while Wilson championed the idea that the U.S. should “willingly relinquish some of its sovereignty for the good of the world,” the conservative internationalist argument that participation in the League of Nations would “consign too many national interests of the will to an international authority” ultimately prevailed. Strains of this debate continue today.

Knock concluded that although the United States' signing of the U.N. Charter in 1945 seemed to have vindicated Wilson, from the realists of the Cold War era to the Bush administration's promulgation of the doctrine of pre-emptive war, the U.S. has since followed an “anti-Wilsonian pattern” to its internationalism. But, he added, the tenets of authentic Wilsonianism still resonate in the 21st century and should be scrutinized anew because from issues of armaments, to unilateralism, to the avoidance of war, “the things that really worried [Wilson] . . . really worry a lot of us.”

Tony Smith continued the panel by addressing the topic of “neoconservatives versus liberals.” Smith explained that through the 1980s, the groups that today are referred to as neoconservatives and neo-Wilsonians were both committed to the ideas of democracy and democratization. Yet significant differences, relating to multilateralism, existed. The driving concept for the proto-neoconservatives was American primacy. They saw the United States not just as a liberal democracy, but as the liberal democracy, and hence the triumph of democracy over totalitarianism rested squarely on the shoulders of the United States. The Wilsonians, while agreeing that the participation of the U.S. in world affairs was necessary, used the examples of Vietnam, Guatemala, Iran, and the Contras in Central America to underscore the dangers of unilateralism.

Where the neoconservatives were for “American hegemony where possible, American imperialism where necessary” Smith noted, the Wilsonians were for American involvement in world affairs but as part of “a collaborative effort through systems of collective security in which the United States would be a first among equals.”

According to Smith, the end of the Cold War introduced a transitional period in which neo-Wilsonian thinking converged around three basic concepts and from which neoconservatives would draw basic elements of their thinking. “What happened in the 1990s in international relations theory, in international jurisprudence, and in comparative politics shocks me” Smith stated at the end of his talk, “I think it was an incorrect development, theoretically, of all three fields.” The first Wilsonian idea was the notion that great ideas in the hands of great leaders could change history. The United States won the Cold War, the Wilsonians argued, because of the idea of liberal democracy. The second, articulated by Wilsonians in the academy, was Democratic Peace Theory which postulated that democracies do not fight one another. The third was the notion of conditional sovereignty and the developments in international law based on the responsibility to protect. But while Wilsonians articulated these ideas and advocated for them within the context of multilateral action, neoconservatives made them their own by adding the caveat that because of America’s leadership role in the world, unilateral responses could be both necessary and appropriate.

At their core, Smith argued, these three ideas were imperialist ideas and, when coupled with rationalizations for unilateral action, made them rife for abuse. Smith postulated that within this context the Bush Doctrine which embodied the neoconservative take on Wilsonian thinking was less about Wilsonianism and more about power. “And it not about power just in Iraq, it’s about power in the Middle East, and it’s not about power just in the Middle East, it’s about power over the entire international system,” he said. The Bush Doctrine, he continued, “is, in short, a major act of moral arrogance and political hubris, in my opinion.” Yet because neoconservatives spoke in the language of Wilsonians, neo-Wilsonians have not

been able to successfully articulate a counter-position to the Bush administration’s overarching foreign policy strategy. For better or worse, he concluded, “In a sense, we’re all Wilsonians now.”

Anne-Marie Slaughter offered a neo-Wilsonian response to Tony Smith’s description of neo-Wilsonianism. Slaughter began by pointing out that the debates among neo-Wilsonians and between neoconservatives and neo-Wilsonians are not just intellectual exercises but are “the debates of American foreign policy right now,” agreeing with Smith that “the stakes couldn’t be higher.” Where Smith took to task the intellectual underpinnings of neo-Wilsonianism—especially Democratic Peace Theory and the sovereignty-related changes in international law—Slaughter saw openings for the gradual implementation of a values-based U.S. foreign policy that stands for American values and democracy as ardently as neoconservative policy purports to but while limiting American power in ways that will in the end achieve American aims in the world.

Slaughter offered a brief counterpoint to Smith’s discussion of Democratic Peace Theory and changes in sovereignty, noting that these, more so than extraordinary leaders acting in extraordinary times, shaped the events of the 1990s. She argued that the intellectual underpinnings of Democratic Peace Theory are sound. But, she added, translating it into policy is fraught with difficulties because while liberal democracies are much less likely to go to war with other liberal democracies, democratizing countries are more likely to go to war with one another in the process of moving from one form of government to democracy. In short, promoting democracy does not ipso facto promote peace. Nevertheless, Slaughter asserted that promoting democracy is the long-term path to U.S. and global security. The real debate, therefore, is not over democratization as a focal point of American foreign policy but the best practices for achieving this end.

On the issue of reifying sovereignty and the emergence of the responsibility to protect doctrine, what Smith saw as a development in international law that inherently

reduced sovereign protection, Slaughter characterized as “one of the landmark developments in international law.” Giving the U.N. the right to collectively take action against U.N. signatory states who perpetrate grave and sustained human rights abuses within their own borders and against their own people, Slaughter stated, addressed the problem that threats to international peace and security were increasingly, as seen in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, occurring within states, while also embedding in international law basic values central to liberal democracy. Reflecting the argument put forward by Smith, Slaughter agreed that by effectively loosening the restraints against non-intervention, the door is left open to abuse by countries cloaking potentially surreptitious goals in a mantle of humanitarian intervention.

Slaughter finished her remarks by bringing the panel full circle to Knock’s presentation and description of “Wilsonian Wilsonianism.” She contended that U.S. foreign policy should focus on promoting abroad the values of liberal democracy—justice, human rights, the rule of law—and as Woodrow Wilson conceived for the full realization of the League of Nations, to do so gradually, and most importantly, multilaterally, even if that requires sacrificing a measure of U.S. sovereignty for the benefit of the wider international community. She added that not only would the world be better off if the U.S. based its foreign policy on the gradual promotion of democracy through true multilateral means, but that the U.S. would gain tremendous leverage and standing among other nations by doing so. In the end, Slaughter asserted that there is a place for the ideas and principles of Wilsonian Wilsonianism in American foreign policy and in the international order. “If we’re willing to do that,” she concluded, “we can in fact find it easy to advance not just American values but global values, to do it in a way that is sufficiently constrained as to honor the necessary limits on the promotion of democracy, on the promotion of human rights, on the promotion of basic humanitarian values.”

Ikenberry closed the panel with two additional points, largely in response to Smith and the question of whether or not there are ideas and principles within Wilsonianism that allow for a distinction between different types of American uses of force and, therefore, make possible an opposition to U.S. actions like the Iraq war. He noted that it is important to remember that the “Wilsonian wrapping” of the Iraq war came late and that it surfaced as a justification for the use of force only after the U.S. went to war. Ikenberry also pointed out that in his view, real Wilsonianism was about the type of order trying to be created and, therefore, Wilsonianism is as much about ends as it is about means. From the end of World War II, the Wilsonian objective of creating a mechanism for international dispute resolution evolved into a broader process of building of a “community of democracy,” Ikenberry said, a liberal world order based on collective security. A fundamental difference between Wilsonians and neoconservatives, therefore, is not in the promotion of democracy but in the larger vision of world order. Whereas democracy promotion for the Wilsonians is part and parcel to the building of a liberal order, democracy promotion for neoconservatives has functioned independently of this larger vision of a liberal order. Ikenberry concluded his comments with the argument the Wilsonian idea of democracy promotion has allowed the U.S. to step back from other international commitments that are about building that liberal order and, in fact, to undermine a broader international agenda.

Woodrow Wilson and Race

Eddie S. Glaude, Jr. *97, Professor of Religion at Princeton and the acting director of the Program in African-American Studies, moderated the panel which included participants Eric Vettel, Executive Director of the Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library; Carmen Twillie Ambar *94, Dean of Douglas College at Rutgers University; and Nicholas Patler, author of *Jim Crow and the Wilson Administration: Protesting Federal Segregation in the Early Twentieth Century*. Glaude opened the panel by asking the audience to consider two fundamental contradictions that run through the history of America: the commitment

to freedom and the commitment to practices of unfreedom, and the commitment to democracy and the commitment to undemocratic practices. Within the context of the colloquium's consideration of Woodrow Wilson and his legacy Glaude queried, "What better figure to begin to think about that tension?"

Eric Vettel began the panel discussion with introductory remarks meant to frame the conversation. He noted that the Woodrow Wilson Library continues to acquire new papers on, about, by, and related to Woodrow Wilson that were previously inaccessible to the public, and that these papers will contribute to an ongoing evolution of the understanding of Wilson and his legacy. He added, however, "we have some pretty powerful historical evidence to confront already," relating to Wilson's views and actions on race.

In his capacity at the Woodrow Wilson Library, Vettel's study of thousands of Wilson's papers has led him to what he called "a pretty powerful but simple historical lesson." This lesson was that in 1912 when Wilson was elected U.S. president, "Jim Crow was strong and powerful." Because of this, Vettel argued, while not excusing Wilson's racial attitudes, any assessment of Wilson and his views on race must be considered in the context of a broader national commitment to Jim Crow. "Jim Crow was exceptional," Vettel noted, "Woodrow Wilson's attitude toward and treatment of African Americans was not." Citing southern historian C. Vann Woodward, Vettel explained how Jim Crow was "born in 1877, matured into a system in 1896, practiced disfranchisement by 1900 and was entrenched by the Wilson administration," with "the North . . . complacent and complicit throughout." He postulated that perhaps it is easier, albeit analytically dangerous, to make individuals like Woodrow Wilson the "face" of Jim Crow and to make the individual culpable rather than confront the failures of an entire nation.

To follow up, Vettel made two additional points. First, that like Wilsonian foreign policy, Wilson's attitude toward and treatment of African Americans has a protean legacy wherein terms like racism, Jim Crow, Southern Democrats, and Woodrow Wilson that are often conflated

should be treated separately while also examining how they interacted. Second, Vettel asserted that "too often we take Wilson's attitudes toward and treatment of African Americans and we extrapolate. Wilson's ideas about African Americans become racism in totality." The crux of the challenge, Vettel said, is to understand and reconcile the contradiction inherent in Wilson's deep commitment to promoting participatory democracy with his belief that it was acceptable and reasonable to deny democracy to a group of people based on their race.

Carmen Twillie Ambar '94 brought the discussion of Woodrow Wilson and race into the present by reflecting on her experience—as an African American woman, an alumnae of the Woodrow Wilson School, and a leader in higher education—of negotiating Woodrow Wilson's complex legacy. "Because in some ways I think that we don't want to always be vested in the past of Woodrow Wilson," she noted, "the question for this institution is how do you embrace what is good about Woodrow Wilson as an individual but also take away the negative and make sure this institution is not carrying that negative legacy forward." She highlighted the relevance of considering Woodrow Wilson and his role as the namesake for the Woodrow Wilson School within the context of current issues relating to students of color, to women, faculty hiring, curriculum, and diversity.

Ambar, reflecting a point made by Glaude in his opening remarks, highlighted that issues of slavery and race are intertwined in the history of America. Wilson's individual legacy of failure related to his attitudes about and treatment toward African-Americans is one specific example of the legacy of failure of the nation. Ambar said that as the namesake of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, this obliges all who are associated with the School to try to "disentangle" Wilson's personal failures on race from his personal successes in the realms of public service and policy in much the same way that many Americans work on a daily basis to separate racist views in this country from what is good and noble. According to Ambar, the question then becomes, "how do you embrace Wood-

row Wilson?" She said Wilson was, "certainly a visionary internationalist and aspirant to peace; also a racist. And how do you make Woodrow Wilson right?"

Ambar asserted that the Woodrow Wilson School as an institution can function to help make the legacy of Woodrow Wilson right. She said part and parcel to this process of righting the legacy of Woodrow Wilson is creating for women and historically underrepresented groups better access to educational and non-traditional career opportunities, and by building real diversity through faculty hiring choices. In this way, she concluded, "you get the Wilson legacy right. . . . so that the namesake is there but the legacy of the negative is pulled to the right side of the spectrum."

Nicholas Patler rounded out the panel presentations with a discussion focused on Woodrow Wilson's tenure as U.S. president and some of the race-based policies of his administration. Patler observed that Wilson's "New Freedom" rhetoric of liberty, justice, free opportunity, and social advancement through merit resonated during his 1912 presidential campaign with groups of Americans that the Wilson administration would in many ways fail. From the segregation of the federal government, to belated support for women seeking the right to vote, to programmatic campaigns against dissent during World War I, for many African-Americans, women, and immigrants especially, Wilson's New Freedom rhetoric failed to become reality.

When looking at the Wilson administration and race, Patler pointed out the importance of remembering that the election of Woodrow Wilson brought the South back into power in Washington for the first time in half a century. A southern-born president was in the White House and southern Democrats held important leadership positions in Congress. He explained that this was the new status quo when the Wilson administration came into power. It was not long after Wilson's inauguration that a fundamental restructuring of the civil service began which effectively resegregated the relatively integrated federal government workforce. Merit-based hiring and placement based on the Civil

Service Exam and on-the-job performance which had largely erased the color line was rapidly undone. Wilson administration appointees and federal bureaucrats reclassified jobs so that African American workers were given the least desirable and lowest paying positions, reorganized work spaces in ways that physically separated white and black workers, and harassed and sometimes fired African American employees from their jobs for minor policy infractions or for no reason at all. By the end of 1914, for the ostensible purpose of identifying and purging black applicants, all seeking civil service jobs were required to submit photographs of themselves as part of their applications. With the sanction of Woodrow Wilson, the segregation of the federal government that existed sporadically by the turn of the century became universal and rigidly enforced. Wilson "used the power of the presidency to officially promote racial discrimination against U.S. citizens," Patler concluded, ". . . [a]nd the negative precedent he set in federal employment, reversing decades of remarkable progress, lasted at least until World War II, and really much longer."

During the question and answer session, one audience member made a comparison between Woodrow Wilson and Thomas Jefferson, noting "I think we understand what they did beyond their heritage but I think we also understand that they really didn't include certain people when they talked about democracy or all men are created equal." This stimulated a broader discussion about seeing leaders as products of the times in which they lived, and about how to determine "greatness."

Ambar commented that both Jefferson and Wilson articulated an ideal that "embraced humanity and essentially transcended the people who spoke them, and essentially eclipsed them." Glaude added that it is "important that we're mindful of what kind of ethical work we're doing when we situate a particular figure in his or her historical moment." He argued that it is an important exercise to consider not only that Wilson was a product of his time but also that he did not try to change, and in fact, how his dedication to participatory democracy was undermined by his socialization and his "commitments to Jim Crow." Ambar continued this line of thought, noting that when

thinking about people who “were really truly great” these are often times people who “moved beyond” their personal situations and backgrounds “to think of something beyond what they were involved in.” She then posed the question about Wilson, “When you start to look at the great men of history, the great women of history, can you put him there, because he could not get out of his box?”

Vettel added an observation to the discussion about analyzing people as products of their times and assessing greatness based on the ability to transcend those times. While time is context he noted that “when you think about the history of the presidents, they’ve had a tough time leaving their time period, the temporal trap, it seems to be.” Patler, later in the question and answer session, brought the discussion back around to this issue of temporal context and understanding Wilson’s racial views as a product of his having been born and raised in the South during and after Reconstruction. He noted that Wilson, especially after his move to the North, “was exposed to other ideas and different things in regards to the race issue” through acquaintances and friends like journalist and author Ray Stannard Baker and Oswald Garrison Villard, chairman of the NAACP. Patler concluded when this is brought into the consideration of Wilson as a product of his time it makes it “hard to let Woodrow Wilson off that easily” for his attitudes and actions.

During the questions and answer session, the issue was raised of whether or not political expediency was a factor in Wilson’s actions, or lack thereof, related to the integration of the federal government and civil rights and to his silence on lynching. On the issue of lynching, Vettel likened the reasons for Wilson’s silence to that of Franklin Roosevelt’s decades later. “It’s almost as if he’s trading [his silence] on policy,” Vettel observed of Wilson who, like FDR, remained silent about lynching to garner and keep support, especially from southern Democrats, for his domestic and foreign policy packages. When asked if Wilson would have been able to win had he pushed for civil rights legislation in Congress, Vettel answered that there really isn’t any way to know, but because Jim Crow was so entrenched “in 1912, in 1916, there’s no way he’s going to win this.” Later in the session Vettel added that there

were opponents to the administration’s policies relating to race, but that often they “were pushing him to be more rigorous in his segregationist policies.”

Patler followed up Vettel’s assertion that Wilson likely could not have made headway with civil rights legislation with the comment that at the beginning of his administration Wilson explicitly told those who challenged him, like William Monroe Trotter and Oswald Garrison Villard, that any action that would interfere with the segregation of African Americans in the federal government would hamper his legislative agenda. “[T]hey weren’t calling on him to come out and support civil rights,” Patler noted, “They were just asking him to stop a policy in the federal government that was new.” This, Patler added, was indicative of Wilson’s larger unwillingness to use the power of the federal government to change the national racial status quo. But, Patler wondered if Wilson’s legislative agenda would indeed have failed if he did “put his foot down” on the issue federal government segregation. He cited the 1914 nomination of Robert Terrill, an African American, for a District of Columbia municipal judgeship. Although southern legislators pushed aggressively for Wilson to rescind the nomination, Wilson stood his ground and Terrill was ultimately confirmed. Based on this, Patler said “I’m not so sure that would have negatively affected his legislative reforms that he was trying to push through.”

A student of the Wilson School voiced a frustration with the panel conversation, noting that “it seems like we’re doing a lot of reconciliation of whether he was a racist, what he said, when he said it, what were his political constraints,” adding, “Wilson was a racist. He was a sexist. Where do we go from here?” Vettel challenged the characterization of Wilson as a “sexist,” citing among other examples Wilson’s support of women’s suffrage at the state level and, eventually, at the national level. Still, Ambar responded that the student’s comments about Wilson’s views relating to race and women were central to the question of “how do you make Woodrow Wilson’s legacy right?” She reiterated that the way to make the legacy right is “by the work we do” so that

“in the context of this institution that’s committed to the mission of diversity and encouraging students in all sorts of ways . . . you change and move that legacy so you can embrace it in a way that you have to in this country if you are a person who loves the Woodrow Wilson School and loves this country.” In a similar vein, in the closing remarks of the panel, Glaude noted that “[o]ne of the interesting things that emerged from a discussion of Woodrow Wilson and race, is how much work we have to do, how much work we have to do as a country,” involving “an understanding of how the history and reality of race and racism is constitutive of this fragile experiment in democracy” and struggling “with the attempt to reconcile what it means to be committed to the ideals of democracy amid the realities of our practice, which denies those ideals at the same time.”

Woodrow Wilson in the State House: Governing in New Jersey

Anthony Shorris MPA '79 of the Wilson School's Policy Research Institute for the Region convened the third Colloquium panel which considered Woodrow Wilson as governor, the mark he left on state governorships in general, and the role of governors today. The panel was moderated by David Broder, columnist for the Washington Post, and featured the participation of Alan Ehrenhalt, executive editor of *Governing* magazine; Jon Corzine, Governor of New Jersey; and Robert Ehrlich, Jr. '79, Governor of Maryland.

Ehrenhalt provided historical context for the panel, and discussed Woodrow Wilson's tenure as governor of New Jersey. He noted that although Wilson's time in the governorship is often viewed as a “interregnum” between his Princeton presidency and his foray into national politics, in fact Wilson's two years in Trenton were crucial to his personal development as a politician and to the evolution of the American governorship.

This was especially true in two ways. First, Wilson led the legislature, through what Ehrenhalt called “a rath-

er radical approach for governors at that time.” Second, Wilson demonstrated the power that could be exerted by directly engaging the public in policy debates. In March 1911, within weeks of his inauguration, Wilson went to a caucus of the state assembly in Trenton. When questioned by a member of the legislature as to what constitutional right he had to “interfere in legislation,” Wilson read the provision in the state constitution that stated, “The governor shall communicate by message to the legislature at the opening of each session . . . and recommend such measures as he may deem expedient.” With this constitutional backing, Wilson's subsequent actions blurred the lines of the traditional separation of powers in state government. Although other progressive era governors were active in trying to implement policy, Wilson was working to implement a philosophy of government meant to, in Ehrenhalt's words, “surmount the curse of fragmentation” of power that Wilson saw at the root of irresponsible and ineffective government.

Ehrenhalt explained how Wilson proposed a coherent legislative agenda, actively engaged with members of the legislature, and publicly stumped for that agenda. Wilson's entire four point legislative package of creating a direct primary for nomination of all major offices in New Jersey, a corrupt practices act, a utility commission with regulatory responsibilities, and a workers' compensation law, passed during his first year in office. In the process, Wilson set standards of activism, agenda setting, political wrangling, and legislative accomplishment by which outstanding governors from his time on would be judged. Ehrenhalt concluded his remarks by noting that the changes brought to the governorship by Woodrow Wilson would have eventually come about but, he argued, “that governors and legislatures and states all over the country are still living in a political world that he helped to create.”

Governor Ehrlich noted that “Woodrow Wilson changed my job description. . . . And when you think about it, there's three phases: prior to Wilson, Wilson, and then modern governorships.” Ehrlich discussed how what was unheard of in the “prior to Wilson” period is now integral in the ways the executive and legislative branches of state

governments interact and in setting expectations of what the governor is expected to do. The executive is now an “active partner” with the legislators of the same party in forwarding a legislative agenda. In fact, the executive policy package is what garners the most press coverage and is the topic that the governor often spends the most amount of time speaking about to the public. This success or failure of this legislative package, moreover, is the yardstick by which a governor is measured.

Ehrlich further discussed changes that have occurred in machine politics. The political machines that dominated the election of politicians in Woodrow Wilson's day, and indeed through much of the twentieth century, have given way to what Ehrlich called the “suburbanization of politics.” Using the example of Maryland, he elaborated on the ways in which party-based machines have been replaced by special interest group machines. What Ehrlich found to be most significant about these machines within the context of suburban politics is that votes cast along issue lines have had the effect of drawing “traditional” Republican or Democratic voters to cast ballots for candidates from the opposing party. This was how, Ehrlich noted, his congressional seat was a “safe” Republican seat even though he represented a blue-collar congressional district where Democrats outnumbered Republicans two to one.

After Ehrlich's comments, Broder posed the question to the panel of how changes in the media and the proliferation of sources of information since Wilson's time as governor have impacted the workings of state politics. Ehrenhalt noted that when Woodrow Wilson was governor, newspapers dominated the political scene and the political community was extremely attuned to newspaper coverage, especially relating to activities of the legislature. He observed that now, in New Jersey in particular, there is very little coverage of state politics in the print and broadcast media unless it is paid media related to campaigns. Ehrlich added that electronic media is crucial to his governorship, as evidenced by the fact that his press secretary is the first in the history of the State of Maryland to have come from the electronic rather than the print media. Editorial endorsements by newspapers, he said,

are not terribly important to voters any more, adding “the internet is changing, bloggers are changing American politics forever. And to the extent you're behind that curve, you may likely miss holding public office if you're in a tight race.”

Governor Corzine joined the discussion by describing how in New Jersey the media market is extremely fragmented with an overall impact on the portrayal of state politics. With the major television markets of New York and Philadelphia, events in New Jersey have to compete for airtime with events occurring in these two major metropolitan areas. This circumscribes a broad reporting of events in Trenton. On the print media, Corzine added that it “plays a constructive role” but with the caveat that “it mostly is about horse races and fights and what's wrong rather than sometimes a presentation of the arguments that I think often need to be heard with respect to public policy choices, public officials, and issues the community needs to work on.” A fundamental problem, Corzine said, is that this limits widespread public debate over real and pressing policy issues.

Broder then posed the question to the panel of what makes reform so difficult to achieve in the states. Corzine answered the question by quoting Woodrow Wilson: “If you want to make enemies, try to change something.” Corzine said that because of this fear of making enemies, few politicians, whether in Trenton or Washington, are willing to put their name to and throw their support behind reforms that may be controversial. He observed that it is often only when conditions reach points of crisis that real change happens. Ehrlich agreed, citing the climate created by the 24-hour media and legislators' perpetual campaigns to keep their seats. He pointed out that when discussing reform and the willingness to reform, there is an important distinction to keep in mind between “two concepts: politician and leader.” Ehrenhalt noted that, nevertheless, reform remains a mainstay of the political discourse in every state in the country. “I don't know of a governor who has ever run for election or reelection supporting the status quo or politics as usual,” he quipped, “So I think we have to separate genuine reforms from the attractiveness of reform as an idea.” Going back to Woodrow Wil-

son's tenure as governor, he pointed out that although progressive reform agitation had been building for nearly a decade before Wilson took office, Wilson had the "shrewdness" to capitalize on it. Taking Wilson's example, Ehrenhalt argued that a key to making real reform a reality is to have the "political brilliance or wisdom to see when that moment occurs and how to package what needs to be done."

Woodrow Wilson at Princeton: Perspectives from University Presidents

Princeton president Shirley Tilghman opened the panel on Woodrow Wilson's legacy at Princeton and in the larger context of American higher education. She observed that from the institution of rigorous academic standards, to the modern departmental structure, to the preceptorial method of instruction, at Princeton Wilson's "influence is inescapable." With his commitment to a broad liberal arts education and an undergraduate program based on upper class concentration and a combination of elective and required courses, he influenced undergraduate curricula at colleges and universities throughout the country. The spirit of one of his greatest failures while at Princeton, the quadrangle plan, is evident in the present system of residential colleges. Wilson's call to national service, Tilghman emphasized, "has inspired our university and generations of Princetonians to pursue a higher purpose in their lives. This is the bedrock on which the Woodrow Wilson School that we celebrate today was founded."

Neil Rudenstine '56, H'91, president of Harvard from 1991–2001 and current chair of the advisory board for ArtSTOR, began the panel presentations, followed by Nannerl Keohane H'04, Laurance S. Rockefeller Distinguished Visiting Professor of Public Affairs and the former president of Duke University (1993–2004) and Wellesley College (1981–1993), and S. Georgia Nugent '73, President of Kenyon College. Rudenstine began by placing Woodrow Wilson and the changes initiated at Princeton within the context of broader

trends in American higher education before and during Wilson's tenure as University president. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, there was what Rudenstine called "an explosion of knowledge" in both traditional and new fields of study. But a gap quickly developed between advances in old and new fields of knowledge. Rudenstine noted that American colleges and universities failed to keep up. Few scientific laboratories of quality existed, research libraries were disorganized or lacking entirely, undergraduate curricula focused in a relatively elementary and cursory way on few subjects, serious graduate programs were virtually non-existent, and few faculty members did serious research. There was also a growing visibility of economic and social distinctions among groups of students on college campuses, Rudenstine said, a stratification some saw as a threat to "the idea of a single university community."

Rudenstine continued that through the 1880s and 1890s, some steps were taken to revamp undergraduate curricula. At Harvard, the "Free Election System" was instituted wherein the college abolished nearly every requirement for undergraduate courses and instead allowed students to choose courses and subjects without concentration requirements. Rudenstine observed that this "cracked open the hopelessly circumscribed and intellectually constraining course of undergraduate study," and allowed for an expansion of the faculty in a growing number of fields. In individualized and uncoordinated ways, faculty too began experimenting with new teaching methods to replace the previous model based on the conception of students as empty vessels to be filled with knowledge. But, on the eve of Woodrow Wilson's Princeton presidency, serious flaws were evident with these changes in curricula and pedagogy. Princeton itself, Rudenstine said, "was in desperate need of reform," and had fallen from its place of prominence among leading universities in the country. When elected University president in 1902, Wilson began moving forward with an agenda for reform meant to return Princeton to a leadership position in American higher education.

Rudenstine elaborated on the successes and failures of Wilson's ambitious agenda, noting that his "achievement

was remarkable, even incomparable by any standard.” Wilson’s ideas for changes in curriculum and pedagogical methods were based on his commitment to make learning “alive” and to help students acquire “the materials needed for a systematic criticism of life.” He did this first by abandoning the Free Elective System. He created academic departments within the University and required students to major in one of those departmental areas and balance major specific courses with electives. “With only some changes,” Rudenstine observed, “that model has been a fundamental one for liberal arts education in American ever since then.” In addition to fundamentally altering the structure of the curriculum, Wilson implemented the preceptorial method of instruction by hiring a cohort of new faculty “preceptors” to lead what Rudenstine said is now “obvious”: small discussion groups of students in “lively, intellectual, give and take.” Within three years, Wilson, convincing the faculty and trustees to support and fund the initiatives throughout, had created new academic departments, created a new curricular structure, recruited about fifty new faculty, and imposed rigorous academic standards on faculty and students alike. In Rudenstine’s words, the “Wilsonian Renaissance” created “a new atmosphere and the sense of intellectual excitement” and was copied by colleges and universities nationwide.

In closing, Rudenstine noted that another of Wilson’s less visible successes at Princeton was the eminence he helped Princeton achieve in the mathematics, sciences, and engineering through strategic faculty hires and the construction of modern research facilities on campus. Wilson’s two greatest failures, he added however, came at the expense of his vision of the University as a democratic institution and as a community. His idea for the construction of quads or colleges for undergraduates was to do away with the eating clubs and thereby create an egalitarianism through common living and socializing quarters. Wilson’s commitment to locate the graduate school in the center of campus was to create a university community where undergraduates, graduate students, and faculty would intermingle and have social and intellectual exchanges with one another on a daily basis. But, in spite of the protracted battles that caused his standing at Princeton to decline and, for Wilson, ended in failure, Rudenstine concluded,

“[n]ationally, however, he became even more admired and was seen as a champion of what was best for American higher education.”

Nannerl Keohane spoke about Woodrow Wilson in the context of his conception of leadership, his strengths and weaknesses as a university president, and the implications these had for his successes and failures as a university president. She noted that if assessing leadership by results, in terms of intellectual quality, national visibility, and institutional sense of purpose and mission, “it’s clear Wilson did a great deal to strengthen Princeton.” Yet she asserted, “I regard him as both a model and a cautionary tale for people in jobs like the one he held.”

Keohane discussed in detail seven of Wilson’s personal traits that contributed to both his achievements and failures as University president. First, Wilson was a man who was “at home in both worlds” of thought and action. He had the ability to both craft an idea and to take on the leadership role to translate that idea into reality. However, Keohane noted that one of the keys to understanding his defeats at Princeton was “that he was clearer about the power part, the action part than he was about the perspective or the thought or the stepping back and the assessing.” Second, Wilson was “a master of both vision and strategy.” Upon assuming the Princeton presidency, he shared his vision for Princeton widely. In his successful campaigns for curricular reform and the implementation of the preceptorial system, he strategically and successfully garnered support for that vision from the faculty and the trustees. Conversely, Keohane said, in his failures with the quad system and the placement of the graduate college, Wilson was too keenly focused on the vision that he “lost a sense of the strategic part” and the best means for achieving his intended ends. Third, Wilson had a “clarity of purpose.” But Wilson’s clarity of purpose often translated into rigidity and narrowness. Because he saw his purposes as both right and good, he was, in Keohane’s words, “obdurate against compromise.” Compromise was for him evidence of weakness and failure. Keohane used the fight over the quad system

to illustrate Wilson's all-or-nothing approach to the fight. Many at the time agreed that the eating clubs were in need of some kind of reform but Wilson saw his vision for the clubs' reform as the right and only one, refused to compromise, with the end result of no reform at all.

Fourth, Keohane cited Wilson's vision of Princeton both "as a singular institution and as a national model." He increasingly linked the fate of his reforms at Princeton to the fate of American higher education. He characterized the quad plan as "a struggle upon which depended the future of higher education in the United States," while Keohane noted that the graduate college fight was "transmuted into a crusade for social democracy." While such conflation shows that Wilson saw that Princeton "mattered" it also impeded his ability and willingness to compromise. Fifth, Wilson exhibited "great stamina and staying power" but he also "pushed himself to extremes." Sixth, Wilson was "a fine judge of talent" but "didn't see those people as partners." His rigidity of purpose meant that he did not utilize the insights of those who worked with him but rather expected them "to fall in line and do what he wanted."

Finally, Wilson was a master speaker and exhibited "rhetorical brilliance." In the case of the quad plan and the graduate college, Keohane said, he overestimated his ability to marshal support from alumnae through his speeches and, then with their anticipated backing, to overcome opposition to his ideas from the faculty and the trustees. Keohane concluded by noting that Wilson's "understanding of this university and its goals were right in many ways" as evidenced by the revival of the quad system idea and the prioritization at many colleges and universities of intergenerational scholarship and the interconnections between graduate and undergraduate students. Still, she observed, there remains from Wilson's failures in his time "a sense of lost opportunities."

S. Georgia Nugent discussed three key aspects of Wilson's thoughts about education: Wilson's continual at-

tempt to define the relationship between the University and the world, his sense of curriculum, and his sense of vocation. In relation to Wilson's conception of the connection between the University and the wider society, Nugent noted that it is in many ways what today's educators would term "holistic understanding," that is that the academy is to provide its students with a "broader unified vision" or a "Platonic conception of knowledge as something that can be seen whole, grasped in an almost mystical way."

Nugent focused on Wilson's preceptorial system to illuminate his sense of curriculum and learning and the placement of the graduate school to highlight his sense of higher education as a vocation. Unlike her copanelists, however, Nugent argued that both the graduate school and preceptorial system were failures, with one failing "flamboyantly" and the other failing "more quietly." She discussed the preceptorial system first, noting that Wilson's ideas were incredibly modern and quite at home within the panoply of today's pedagogical buzzwords of "active" and "student centered" learning. At the heart of Wilson's conceptualization of the precepts was the independent development of thought where a student would in Nugent's words, "get up a subject on his own." Students would come up with their own ideas through discourse while the preceptor would be a guide along a path of study that the student forged independently. But this original concept, she asserted, failed almost immediately and the precept was in practice a discussion section with direct ties to a set syllabus and predefined topics to be considered.

Nugent used Wilson's desire to place the graduate school at the heart of Princeton's campus to illustrate "the full-blown Wilsonian vision of higher education" which for Wilson was "a sacred calling, a vocation." She read from a speech Wilson delivered in 1902 in which he spoke of a community of graduate students "who shall touch the spirit of the undergraduates" wherein "[t]he youngsters shall wonder if there are not visions worth seeing, if there are not tasks in those closeted places that are worth doing, if there is not something immortal bred in the occupations of those men." Nugent added that although Wilson

was the first Princeton president who was not a Presbyterian minister, he was the son of a Presbyterian minister and brought to his position “all the fervor and devotion and faith of ministry.” This sense of vocation, Keohane later agreed, was an important part of how Wilson viewed his job and his life. In conclusion, Nugent broached the question of to what extent Wilson’s educational vision was alive today, noting that although university presidents now have a “certain breadth of vision that takes us beyond the pulpit,” that there has perhaps been lost a “certain intensity of purpose which one finds at the altar.”

Following the presentations, the question and answer session broached a number of subjects including the issue of religion and the academy. Keohane spoke from her experience at Duke which is a United Methodist institution. She noted that the “chapel was very much at the center of the place” and there was “a sense of the relevance of religion to the university.” She observed that the creation of Duke’s Keenan Institute for Ethics was in some ways a reflection of this and the recognition that the four years students spend in college is an essential part of their human development. Within this context, the Institute provides a forum for faculty from varying fields to think about the ways in which they can make ethical issues a central concern in academic pursuits. Nugent noted the difference between discussing spirituality and religion. She referenced a survey of students and faculty, which she also spoke about in her presentation, that was taken at Keynon College and that asked questions about the role of spirituality in higher education. The survey responses to questions that measured traditional religious expression measured low but measured “extremely high” to questions relating to “a more spiritual questioning and searching for ethical or moral grounding.” Nugent concluded that one of the most important challenges in higher education is to broadly interpret religion and its importance in a way that is not exclusionary but rather in ways that address “fundamental human principles.”

The final question from the audience asked the panelists to speculate on what Princeton might have been like if Wilson had won his fights over the graduate school and the quad system. Tilghman said that she wished he would

have won both of the battles “because the vision of the integrated scholarly community is such a compelling one” and something that universities are trying to accomplish today. Rudenstine concurred noting “we would have saved ourselves a tremendous amount of pain . . . had we gone Wilson’s way early,” especially relating to the exclusivity and pronounced divisions among students fostered by the eating clubs. Similarly, the placement of the graduate school could have facilitated “informal educational encounters” that often happen today between undergraduate and graduate students who live and learn in close proximity. Rudenstine had the final word of the panel, noting that the important thing to remember about the impact on Princeton and American higher education generally of Wilsonian curriculum innovations like the preceptorial system remains that “you had these people really in some orderly way being compelled to work together and produce some sort of intellectual excitement which simply wasn’t there before.”

Wilson at Home: Progressive Reforms and Political Battles

T. J. Jackson Lears, Board of Governors Professor of History at Rutgers University, moderated the two-panelist session that considered Woodrow Wilson, progressivism, and domestic politics. John Morton Blum, Sterling Professor Emeritus of History at Yale University, spoke first, followed by John Milton Cooper, Jr. ’61, E. Gordon Fox Professor of American Institutions at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Blum offered his thoughts on Woodrow Wilson’s *New Freedom in the State*. Blum called the *New Freedom* “an expression of the mature progressive movement” of largely middle class Americans who were concerned about the impact on society of unregulated and accumulated power, and immense social and economic inequalities that were an outgrowth of industrialization. Progressives, Blum asserted, “meant to tame capitalism, not to cripple or abandon it,” by mobilizing the power of the state to achieve their ends. But in practice, Blum noted there was a “persistent ambivalence in progressive purpose,

and a resulting ambiguity in progressive political action.”

It was within this context that during the 1912 presidential election, Democratic candidate Woodrow Wilson and Progressive party candidate Theodore Roosevelt articulated two competing versions of progressivism through, respectively, the New Freedom and the New Nationalism platforms. The crux of the principal debate between the progressivism of the New Freedom and the New Nationalism was not if the power of the state should be marshaled for reform, but how and to what degree. Underlying Roosevelt's New Nationalism reform agenda would be a fundamental expansion of the powers of the federal government in enacting legislation, such as a federal minimum wage and a system of regulation for industrial corporations and prices similar to that which regulated the nation's railroad. But where Roosevelt urged a significant empowerment of the federal government, Blum explained, Wilson articulated a platform for reform rooted in a belief in the primacy of the states rights and, therefore, based on a more limited role of federal government oversight and action.

When elected to the presidency, through 1913 and 1914 tenets of Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom became policy as tariff reductions, the creation of the Federal Reserve System, and anti-trust legislation. Yet according to Blum, within each, the ambiguity of the New Freedom, of progressive purpose, and of the efficacy of progressive political action was evident. Wilson's tariff policy, which through the Underwood Act initially lowered tariffs so as to stimulate competition, open avenues for new ventures, and eliminate false protections behind which American corporations could organize monopoly. This tariff policy was changed at the beginning of World War I to protect against the dumping of surplus European goods on the U.S. markets. "Protection had begun to return," Blum summarized, "before the high Republican tariffs of the 1920s."

The Federal Reserve Act, the legislation Blum characterized as "the most significant of Wilson's presidency," was in its final form an act that did more to "democratize banking" than it did to rationalize currency and credit through a central, albeit federalized, banking system. The federal government in practice exercised little real control over the new Federal Reserve System, Blum observed, with the result that "regional banks, especially the New York bank, retained telling financial power." It would only be with the onset of the Great Depression that the flaws of the system were truly evident and not until the Banking Act of 1935 that there would be real public, rather than banker control, of the Federal Reserve System. But at the time, the Federal Reserve Act was a keenly New Freedom-based piece of progressive legislation because it created a central banking system without aggrandizing the power of Washington over Wall Street, or the public over the private in the process.

Finally, Blum noted how in the realm of anti-trust policy, rather than explicitly prohibiting certain enumerated anti-competitive practices, the Clayton Anti-Trust Act made the courts the final arbiter of fair competition by subjecting even the orders of the Federal Trade Commission to broad judicial review. Blum illustrated how the courts became the "final arbiters" of business behavior. "Yet the New Freedom in 1914, though again at best ambiguous, was then complete, so Wilson contended," Blum said, "Representative of the dominant intentions of the American people, his constituents were not, he felt, no more than was he essentially anti-business. They aimed only to expunge the excrescences of capitalism, not to abolish the system, and not to aggrandize the state. To his satisfaction, the New Freedom accomplished just that."

It was clear by the 1916 election, Blum explained, Wilson moved to the left as evidenced by his nomination of Louis Brandeis to the Supreme Court, support for federal legislation prohibiting child labor, and backing of the Adamson Act, which established the eight-hour day for railroad workers. The need the need to attract progressive voters for his reelection campaign pushed Wilson to embrace a more vigorous model of federal government action. And, as Blum noted, World War I drove Wilson to further

expand the authority of the state in ways that exceeded all previous presidents. According to Blum, the progressive movement “expired in the crucible of war” and “left a legacy of disappointment.” In the end, Blum concluded, “the ambiguity that characterized progressivism also marked its legacy,” from Herbert Hoover’s reluctance to use the federal government as an agent for relief during the Great Depression to the deregulation of industries during the late twentieth century to today’s debates over executive power and constitutional liberties.

John Milton Cooper, Jr. provided an assessment of Woodrow Wilson’s presidency in the realm of domestic affairs. Cooper argued that “there are really only two tests of presidential greatness,” the record of accomplishment while holding office and the contribution to the office. He queried why Wilson’s accomplishments are not better celebrated and why he is not better honored. At the root of this, Cooper argued, is the characterization of Wilson as a “reluctant, half-hearted, Johnny-come-lately to reform” that started during his governorship, plagued him during the 1912 election, remained with him through his terms as U.S. president, and that has lived on in the historiography. However, by the measures of accomplishment and contribution, Wilson was in Cooper’s view “a great president” and meets what he characterized as “the Mount Rushmore standard.”

In the realm of domestic policy, Cooper asserted that Wilson, along with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Lyndon B. Johnson “ranks as one of the three great legislative presidents of the twentieth century, indeed, of all American history.” The Wilson administration’s major legislative accomplishments of tariff reform, anti-trust legislation, the creation of the Federal Reserve System, the regulation of maritime shipping, the first federal aid to agriculture, the eight-hour law for railroad workers, the prohibition of child labor, and income and inheritance taxes, in fact Cooper said, places Wilson ahead of Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson. He backed up this argument by noting that Wilson did not enjoy the favorable climate and essentially blank check from Congress for passing legislation that Roosevelt had during the crisis time of the early Great Depression. Wilson, too, did not have the

long background of experience in Congress that Johnson had. In addition, major legislation such as the Keating-Owen Child Labor Act was enacted “in the face of severe obstacles, the most glaring of these . . . was World War I” and opposition to Wilson’s foreign policy from within his own party.

Regarding the assessment of Wilson’s presidential greatness according to his contributions to the office, Cooper asserted that here as well, Wilson stands among the greatest. He brought to the office “a clear mind” and “an ability to think ahead strategically,” an “eloquence among presidents which is matched and perhaps exceeded by only . . . Abraham Lincoln,” and he was the first president to plan a legislative program in advance of taking office. Cooper noted that Wilson contributed to the office an “alternative model” for the strong presidency “of treating cabinet members like responsible adults” in contrast to the model Cooper characterized as “a meddlesome, manipulative bully” personified by Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson. Although this was one of Wilson’s strengths, his tendency to delegate to cabinet members and appointees, Cooper said, also contributed to “two of the worst things that happened under his administration”: the resegregation of the federal government and civil liberties infringements during World War I. And, perhaps most importantly, Wilson contributed to the presidency an academically trained mind. Wilson, Cooper noted, “applied his analyses of the workings of power to inform the way he wielded power,” and “[i]n the political arena . . . applied his thoughts about party responsibility and party government.” In the end, Cooper asserted, “Wilson really succeeded in politics not in spite of his academic background; he succeeded because of it,” adding that “I think that’s why it is so appropriate to have this school named for him.”

Lears contributed his thoughts to the conversation by noting that when discussing the progressive movement in early twentieth-century politics, Social Gospel Protestantism must be kept in mind in order to fully contextualize the progressive movement. “[L]ongings for regeneration—individual, social, national—that ani-

mated not only Wilson but also, more broadly, people who called themselves progressive,” Lears asserted, “and this is the common longing, incidentally I believe, that linked domestic and foreign policy during this period as well.” Lears raised the question of to what extent the liberal tradition in America and the American version of the welfare state is rooted in “a kind of unified vision of national regeneration” that came out of Social Gospel Protestantism of the progressive era, but that was subsequently superseded by a more secular and pragmatic version. “To what extent is this progressive world of moral reform a lost world,” Lears asked, “or to what extent can it be resuscitated for a pluralistic, cosmopolitan, and diverse society such as the one we inhabit today?”

Closing Plenary **Reading and Writing Wilson's Life:** **History and Biography**

The Princeton Colloquium concluded with the plenary session moderated by Harold James, Professor of History and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School. Joining the panel were A. Scott Berg '71, H'03, Pulitzer Prize-winning biographer; Carole Fink, Distinguished Humanities Professor at The Ohio State University; Erez Manela, Assistant Professor of History at Harvard University; and Patrick Cohrs, Research Fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

A. Scott Berg, who is writing a forthcoming biography of Woodrow Wilson, opened the panel and began the session by noting how Wilson left a wealth of primary sources which “include everything” for future researchers. Wilson, Berg commented, was a person “who left no thought unexpressed. And not only did he say it,” Berg quipped, “but then he said it again and again and again. Increasingly eloquently.”

Wilson's letters, which range from his childhood writings to love letters to letters to his Princeton classmates while he was U.S. president, are of particular interest,

Berg noted. “It's interesting to see a man's handwriting,” remarked Berg, and clearly Wilson was “a man who actually loved the physical act of writing. . . . This was a man who, when a Secretary of State would turn in some draft of a policy statement or a treaty or something, there's Woodrow Wilson, taking out his pen and redoing it. Fixing the grammar.” Indeed, Berg said of Wilson, “Ever the schoolmaster was he.”

Berg also addressed Wilson's view that “government is personal,” a recurring theme in Wilson's life in public affairs. For example, Berg noted that when running for governor of New Jersey or after taking office as U.S. president, Wilson “often reverted to the same metaphor.” Wilson would say “there are no corrupt corporations. Corporations are not corrupt; there are corrupt individuals who work at corporations.” Likewise, Berg said Wilson would use the metaphor that “if a car is involved in an accident, would you arrest the car? No, you would arrest the driver,” the individual. Wilson was “a man who believed so strongly, as we all know, in institutions and constitutions,” Berg concluded, “But wherever he went, whatever he did, he was constantly trying to humanize that.”

Carole Fink, who addressed Wilson's part in establishing a post-World War I peace in 1919, observed that Wilson's role was not limited to peacemaking; he was also “the originator of a brand new regime in the history of minority rights,” as four empires collapsed in the wake of WWI “and a new and enlarged polyglot of states emerged in Eastern Europe.”

Fink noted that in 1919 “the Great Powers faced a crisis over the spoils of victory.” Germany's initial victories and ultimate defeat in Europe “left a vacuum in the lands between Berlin in Moscow,” she said. In addition, there were outbreaks of disease across Europe, the problem of post-war refugees, pogroms that swept the region, and the civil war that broke out in Russia and led to the ascent of Bolshevism. The U.S., Britain, and France, Fink explained, had to create a new and stable political order, not only in Germany but in Eastern Europe as well, where minorities fueled by nationalist impulses demanded to become “free and independent persons.”

Yet, Fink observed, Wilson and the U.S. generally “had a very different experience of the national question,” as when Wilson was elected president in 1912 he came to power when America “was moving towards restrictive immigration legislation, to keep the United States as white, as Christian, and as northern European as possible,” she asserted. In addition, “Wilson also shared some of the anti-Semitism,” prevalent in America at that time “against the burgeoning numbers of Jewish newcomers,” to America and to American political life, particularly those concerned with protecting persecuted Jews in Europe, Fink stated. As such, she argued that some have mistakenly regarded Wilson’s Fourteen Points “as an invitation to self-determination by these oppressed people in Eastern Europe. But they are nothing of the sort.” Wilson made no reference to minority rights in the Fourteen Points, but rather “envisaged a flexible institution that would enable people to strive for self-determination over a long period,” Fink noted. So, as disease, armed struggles, and instability threatened Europe in January 1919, Fink said, “Wilson concluded that the new Europe needed stable borders, docile minorities, and firm international guarantees.”

Amid the chaos of the Paris Peace Conference, complicated by competing interests among the parties at the negotiating table, the perceived threat of the spread of Bolshevism from Russia, and strong anti-German resentment, Wilson at first attempted to put clauses into the covenant of the League of Nations ensuring racial and religious rights, but failed. Rather than secure a global solution through the League the peacemakers decided to “write special and separate clauses in the treaties with the new states,” Fink said, guaranteeing minority rights for states formed in the aftermath of WWI and the collapse of empires.

Fink added that twelve states were eventually forced to sign these separate treaties despite their serious objections, with Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Serbia, and Greece all protesting at the Paris Peace Conference about “being treated in this second-class manner.” Wilson’s response to such protests was practical, in that he asked the representatives of these states “what the world would

be like,” should the treaties guaranteeing such rights not be signed, “between a vindictive Germany and the frightening situation in Russia, if the Great Powers did not protect them,” via the mechanisms of these treaties. In terms of these treaties’ consequences, Fink pointed out that “the new international service of the 1920s, made up largely of people from neutral countries . . . became tutors to the new states of Eastern Europe,” helping to craft legislation and use other means to nudge these countries to protect minority rights. However, America was not involved in such follow-through, and despite Wilson’s vision for the League of Nations the U.S. was absent from the international organization, to the point where America never answered the League’s communications. With the rise of Hitler and the advent of the Third Reich in Germany in the 1930s the system collapsed, Fink noted. “And it’s ironic that too late . . . the small states of Eastern Europe began to realize the virtues of Wilson’s idea,” she continued, though in the final analysis, the twelve treaties “were not idealistic instruments. . . . They were designed to create a minimal number of basic rights, to create basic citizens in Eastern Europe, and ultimately to prepare the way for national integration.” Concluding her remarks, Fink said that as part of Wilson’s legacy, today “there still is that great tension that exists between minority rights and human rights.”

Erez Manela began his comments by noting that by 1919 the figure and rhetoric of Woodrow Wilson, “what he was thought to mean for world affairs, directly influenced, in many ways helped mobilize, the great immediate post-war upheavals in numerous colonial societies.” Manela pointed to “watershed upheavals” in the spring of 1919 in Egypt, India, China, and Korea as evidence of this. As a global figure and not merely as U.S. president, Manela asserted, Wilson “was central in mobilizing these broad popular upheavals, orchestrated by national leaders, to campaign, both domestically, but especially internationally, for self-determination.”

While Wilson and self-determination have become inextricably linked, Manela noted that the term did not originate with Wilson. In fact, the first time Wilson ever

used the term was in a speech given in February 1918, dubbed the Four Points, five weeks after Wilson gave his Fourteen Points speech. Wilson introduced the term “not as a mere phrase,” Manela said. “It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will ignore at their own peril.” Wilson, Manela explained, “understood very well that he was introducing a term that he has never before spoken, that had never really before been heard” by the American public. According to Manela, while the Bolsheviks were of course familiar with the concept, Wilson introduced self-determination as a “bright new idea” about how the world should be ordered.

Wilson believed that peoples of the world wanted self-determination and he saw himself as a voice for these people across the globe. Wilson saw it as “his responsibility as a global leader to give it to them,” Manela stated. In terms of Wilson’s influence on the colonial world, he continued, those striving for self-determination did not think that he was introducing a “bright new idea,” but rather that “Wilson had the power and the will to implement” such ideas. As a result of this perception, countries such as India hailed the Allied victory after WWI as a legitimization of claims for self-determination. For example, Manela noted how one Indian editorialist wrote “if Poland, Belgium, Serbia, and even the African colonies are to be given the right of self-determination, will there not be the same standard of right and privilege for India?” With Wilson leading the Paris Peace Conference, Manela argued, the conference became a “transformative space.” Manela closed his remarks by noting “the Wilsonian moment of 1919” was a “delegitimation of empire,” as well as “a crucial transformative moment in the history of anti-colonial nationalism, and even more broadly, in the history of the transformation of the international arena, from an arena of empires to an arena of states, of nation-states.”

Patrick Cohrs picked up on the theme of transformation, opening his remarks noting that by 1919 the international system experienced a transformation from a war-prone and discredited balance-of-power system

maintained by European empires, “toward something unprecedented.” He continued, “The Euro-Atlantic peace order” took shape “not in 1919, and not exactly on Wilson’s terms, but only in the end after another World War.” Wilson’s experience at Versailles during the peace conference, Cohrs suggested, may be read “as a part of a personal learning process, in not only forging visions of establishing a new world order, but as actually to implement [these visions] politically.” He added that this was something “unprecedented, for a U.S. president to play such a role vis-à-vis the European powers and in the wider world.”

Cohrs pointed out that “realist” international relations theorists explain Wilson’s foreign policy failures by asserting he misunderstood international politics and the role of power, and idealists argue Wilson was duped by “European power politicians like Lloyd George and Clemenceau,” and thus compromised his principles. Moreover, Cohrs took issue with the more recent notion that the twentieth century was a largely “Wilsonian” century, particularly regarding the notion of collective security. The central challenge Wilson faced after WWI, Cohrs asserted, “was not only to propose to the world a set of principles and rules that were to replace what he rightly saw as the discredited and corrupted European . . . rivalries between empires,” and mechanistic blocs of alliances. But in addition, Cohrs noted, Wilson sought to replace this system with “what he called a concert of power, that would be based, find its instrument, in the League of Nations.”

To construct this vision, Cohrs stated that Wilson had to build “for the first time in history a Euro-Atlantic system of international politics, to legitimate the transformation of the international order,” and “find political ground rules for convincing European leaders and people of the time that the days of power political rivalries had gone, and they should subscribe to standards of collective security.” This, Cohrs explained, required Wilson to employ a “two-dimensional process,” wherein Wilson forged “compromises and settlements on the international sphere,” and attempted the unprecedented task of finding “new ways of legitimating them on the home front.”

Cohrs also highlighted an unprecedented movement in the early stages of the peace conference that advanced into the 1920s and 1930s, wherein American political leaders developed a sense of what Cohrs called “progressive international politics,” a shift away from discredited and corrupt European principles of political order. For the first time in history, Cohrs said, American leaders began to “engage with other elected representatives of democratizing states . . . not imposing a vision on others, but to find common ground rules for a liberal world order.” But the core questions peacemakers faced at Versailles, Cohrs argued, was the German question. Particularly, Cohrs defined this as “how it was possible, and how far Wilson’s principles and political approach offered a path toward integrating what he wanted to be a democratizing Germany . . . into a new liberal international order.” While realists have criticized Wilson “for not more strongly coming out and containing Germany,” after WWI, Cohrs said from another perspective his view was “to see more critically to what extent Wilson, in the case of Germany, offered a path towards an earlier integration of this Weimar Germany into what he envisaged as a new world order” under the League of Nations. A key issue remains, Cohrs explained, that Wilson “never had a chance to prove how far the League, had it been supported by the United States, could have played this part.” But as such, he noted, “it was a colossal failure.”

In analyzing the limits and lessons that can be drawn from Wilson’s attempts to establish peace in 1919, Cohrs’ perspective was that Wilson began “to see the need to actually forge coalitions to cooperate in the international sphere with the other major powers,” not only to establish a liberal world order but to help ensure “that the path towards this was also done in a legitimate way, that included the participation of all those who supposedly were to determine their own future, even Germany.” The real task for the U.S. at the Paris Peace Conference, Cohrs asserted, was “to try not just to envisage a liberal world order, but to find ways of sustaining a constructive engagement in guaranteeing the very principles that were enunciated at the conference.” The process that led to a realization of this aim “can only be seen as coming to fruition,” after World War II, Cohrs illustrated, with President Franklin

D. Roosevelt appearing to be “a rather adept student of Wilson, who actually continued upon a process that Wilson began to embark upon.” Unfortunately, Cohrs concluded, “Wilson died before he could make further progress.”

Woodrow Wilson for the Twenty-First Century

The mission of the Princeton Colloquium on Public and International Affairs was to debate and discuss important issues of public policy and to propose solutions to contemporary problems. In this spirit, the assessments made about Woodrow Wilson as a Princeton University president and as a leader at the state, national, and international levels shed light on ways to understand Wilson and his legacy in the twenty-first century. Although a wide variety of viewpoints were expressed, the following themes emerged from the colloquium dialogue.

- Building on Woodrow Wilson’s vision for higher education, leaders of colleges and universities must approach learning as a holistic endeavor—one that is integrated, intergenerational, and focused on building skills that will encourage and inform lifetimes of interaction with the wider world. Equally, in an attempt to counter Wilson’s failings regarding his views of the roles of people of color and women in society, institutions of higher education must also work to encourage diversity among students and faculty on campuses.
- As governor, Woodrow Wilson crafted a policy package, worked actively with the legislature, engaged the people in substantive policy debate, and secured the passage of transformative laws, ultimately reinventing the governorship and creating a model that state executives of the twenty-first century continue to emulate. This is a lesson for politicians of today who focus on a “constant campaign” rather than on taking action on major issues that threaten to divide voters, but have the potential to foster constructive change.
- Woodrow Wilson assumed the U.S. presidency at the high-tide of the progressive movement and his ad-

ministration oversaw the passage of legislation that addressed social and economic ills without unduly aggrandizing the power of the state. His administration also, however, used the state to rigidly segregate the federal government and to stifle dissent and debate during wartime. World War I derailed the progressive movement, and Wilson's U.S. presidency is an object lesson for leaders today who are seeking to balance state power and civil liberties, and who are working to balance the priorities of domestic and foreign policy.

- Woodrow Wilson crafted a foreign policy agenda where nations would work in concert to make reality his vision for a "world safe for democracy." The heirs to Wilson's foreign policy vision, therefore, are those who favor democracy promotion, not through American unilateral action, but rather through a multilateral, international order which utilizes the international dispute mechanism of collective security.
- Woodrow Wilson viewed the wide expanse of "public affairs" as a higher purpose for citizens, and as a man of both thought and action saw Princeton as an institution that could inculcate public service values and provide the necessary knowledge and training for service-minded students. Today, institutions like Princeton and the Woodrow Wilson School have the opportunity to prepare a new generation of service-minded citizens to address the problems facing their countries and the wider world, issues that look strikingly similar to those of Wilson's time, including racism, immigration reform, epidemics, ethnic conflict, and the proper role of the U.S. in the world.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The 2006 Colloquium, hosted by the Woodrow Wilson School, continued its tradition of University-wide collaboration, with sponsors including the Princeton Project on National Security, the Program in African American Studies, the Policy Research Institute for the Region, the Office of the President, the Program in American Studies, and the Department of History.

*Princeton Colloquium on Public and International Affairs
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
Princeton University
Robertson Hall
Princeton, New Jersey 08544-1013*

*For more information please contact:
Steven Barnes
Assistant Dean for of Public Affairs
(609) 258-5988
sbarnes@princeton.edu*

