DO TERRORISTS WIN?
REBELS’ USE OF TERRORISM AND CIVIL WAR OUTCOMES

Page Fortna
Columbia University

DRAFT: November 28, 2011

please do not cite without permission
comments very welcome

vpf4@columbia.edu

Acknowledgments
A very early precursor of this paper was presented at a Festschrift panel in honor of Martha Crenshaw at APSA 2008, the MIT Security Studies Program, and at Yale University. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of Pennsylvania, University of Pittsburgh, Duke University, the University of Virginia, Cornell University, ISA, and APSA. Thanks to participants, and especially discussants, at these presentations for very useful comments on this slowly evolving project. Special thanks to David Cunningham and Jessica Stanton for sharing data, to Adriana Lins de Albuquerque for research assistance, and to Max Abrahms, David Altman, Mike Findley, David Laitin, Jake Shapiro, Abbey Steele, and Joe Young for comments. Thanks to Martha Crenshaw for comments on early thoughts for this paper, and especially for her continuing mentoring and friendship.
DO TERRORISTS WIN?
REBELS’ USE OF TERRORISM AND CIVIL WAR OUTCOMES

Abstract
How effective is terrorism? This question has generated lively scholarly debate and is of obvious importance to policy makers. Most existing studies of terrorism are not well-equipped to answer this question, however, as they lack an appropriate comparison. This paper compares the outcomes of civil wars to assess whether rebel groups that use terrorism fare better than those who eschew this tactic. Contra those who argue that terrorism is used because it is effective, I argue that it is, on balance, counter-productive. Because terrorism is not a tactic employed at random, I first explore empirically which groups use terrorism. This analysis calls into question some of the conventional wisdom on terrorism, most prominently that it is a “weapon of the weak.” Controlling for factors that may affect both the use of terrorism and war outcomes, I find, as expected, that while civil wars involving terrorism last longer than other wars, in those that do end, terrorist rebel groups fare no better, indeed they fare worse than non-terrorist groups. Terrorism is less ineffective against democracies, but even in this context, terrorists do not win.
How effective is terrorism? This question has generated lively scholarly debate and is of obvious importance to policy makers. However, most existing studies of terrorism are not particularly well equipped to answer this question for a simple reason – they lack an appropriate comparison. How effective is terrorism, as compared to what? While the most systematic studies of terrorism make comparisons across terrorist organizations, studies of the effects of terrorism, including those on the question of “whether terrorism works?” have not compared conflicts in which terrorism is used to those in which it is not.

This paper assesses the effectiveness of terrorism by comparing the outcomes of civil wars in which rebels engaged in terrorism and those in which they did not. I argue that terrorism is a particularly ineffective tactic for winning outright, or for obtaining concessions at the bargaining table. On balance, terrorists undermine rather than enhance their military effectiveness by attacking civilians. While terrorism is effective for rebel organizations’ survival, terrorist rebels tend to fare worse than non-terrorist rebels in terms of achieving the larger political goals for which they ostensibly fight.

Terrorism, while often representing seemingly “random” violence, is not a tactic chosen at random. In order to assess its effectiveness accurately, we therefore have to take into account why some rebel groups use terrorism while others do not. This paper thus contributes to two highly policy relevant strands of the terrorism literature – why groups use terrorism, and how

---

1 For example, Bapat 2006, 2007; Cronin 2006; Jones and Libicki 2008; McCormick 2003, and the literature reviewed therein; Shapiro 2008.

2 This paper is limited to examining the effects of rebel use of terrorism rather than the use of terror tactics by the government (state terrorism). I thus sidestep the question of whether the definition of terrorism should be limited to non-state actors. On definitions, see more below.
The next section of the paper reviews the literature and debate over the effectiveness of terrorism, and argues that we can draw on literature (and especially data) on civil wars to gauge the relative success of terrorism. The following section presents definitions and explains how “terrorist” rebel groups are distinguished from others, as well how I use war outcomes to gauge “success.” I next outline theoretical reasons why we should expect the use of terrorism by rebels to be relatively ineffective. I then lay out factors expected to affect both the use of terrorism and war outcomes (inclusion of which are important to avoid spurious findings).

After describing the data, I turn to empirical findings, first on terrorism as a dependent variable, and next on the effect of terrorism on war outcomes. These findings call into question some of the conventional wisdom on terrorism, most prominently that it is a “weapon of the weak.” They support hypotheses that while civil wars involving terrorism last longer than other wars, in those that do end, terrorist rebel groups fare no better, indeed they fare worse than non-terrorist groups. Terrorism is less ineffective against democracies, but even in this context, terrorists do not win. The final section presents conclusions and avenues for further research.

The State of the Debate

A number of authors have argued that terrorism works. Robert Pape, for example, argues that suicide terrorism is on the rise because terrorists have learned that it pays. He maintains that suicide terrorism is effective, in the sense of generating “gains for the terrorists’ political

---

cause” about half the time. Pape focuses on a particular kind of terrorist tactic – suicide attacks – and argues that willingness to die on the part of the attacker both magnifies the destructiveness of an individual attack, and sends a particularly credible signal about commitment to continue carrying out attacks. However, much of the strategic logic of his argument seems to apply to terrorism more generally. If suicide terrorism is particularly effective, an implication of the logic of his argument is that non-suicide terrorism is also effective, though perhaps somewhat less so. Indeed, Kydd and Walter make a similar argument for terrorism more generally, that “terrorist violence is a form of costly signaling” and that “terrorism often works.” Wood argues that violence against civilians “pays” for insurgents in that it postpones their demise and denies victory to the government.

On the other side of the debate are those who maintain that terrorism is not particularly effective. Max Abrahms argues that the pessimistic prevailing view that terrorism is an effective coercive strategy is “unwarranted” and rests on scant empirical footing. He shows that campaigns of violence that primarily target civilians almost never succeed. Jones and Libicki

4 Pape 2003, p.351.
5 See also Sprinzak 2000.
6 Pape is ambiguous on whether and to what extent his argument applies to terrorism more broadly, arguing that suicide terrorism is to terrorism as lung cancer is to cancer – a particularly virulent strain. Discussion with the author at Pape’s presentation of Pape and Feldman 2010, Columbia University, November 11, 2010.
7 Kydd and Walter 2006, pp. 49-50.
8 Wood 2010.
9 For his critique of Pape more specifically, see Abrahms 2005.
conclude that only “10 percent of the terrorist groups that ended did so because they had achieved their goals,” and that “there is rarely a causal link between the use of terrorism and the achievement of [group] goals.”

Both Merari and Cronin distinguish between terrorist groups’ tactical (e.g., recruitment, or achieving international attention) or partial objectives and strategic goals. Both concur that while terrorist groups may achieve the former, they almost never achieve their strategic goals in full. Others suggest non-linear effects, but generally come down on the “terrorism is effective” side of the balance sheet. Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson argue that while terrorism can sometimes backfire, creating support for moderates at the expense of extremists, under a fairly wide set of circumstances, terrorism successfully provokes a government response that increases support for the terrorist group. Gould and Klor find that very high levels of terror can backfire, but conclude that the net effect of Palestinian terrorism has been to make (non-Arab) Israelis more likely to support territorial concessions to the Palestinians.

Wanted: Variation on the Independent Variable

So what are we to make of this? If terrorists succeed only 10% of the time, does that

11 Jones and Libicki 2008, pp.32-3. An additional 43% of groups that ended did so with “politicization” – either a decision to pursue the group’s ends non-violently within the political system, or a peace agreement. As I argue below, a peace agreement can be considered a fairly successful outcome for the terrorist group. Jones and Libicki’s figures of 53% ending through victory or politics are thus quite close to Pape’s conclusion that terrorists gain significant concessions about half the time.

12 Merari 1993, pp. 238-9; Cronin 2009, p.11.

13 Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007.

really mean terrorism is ineffective? For that matter, if they succeed as much as 50% of the
time, does that mean that terrorism “pays”? It depends in part on what one counts as success
(only full achievement of the group’s goals, or any political concession, or achievement of
intermediate goals meant eventually to help a group achieve its goals?) – an issue I return to
below. More important, it depends on what the chances of success, however defined, are if
terrorism is not used. Not surprisingly, terrorists achieve higher levels of success when groups
have limited objectives that do not impinge on the core interests of the target state. These
So perhaps terrorism only “works” when achieving political change is relatively easy. Success rates cannot
be judged without some sort of context.

Claims that terrorism “works” or “does not work” reflect a causal argument; that
terrorism leads (or does not lead) to political change in favor of the group using it. Implicit in
any causal argument is an argument about variation: using terrorism leads to more change (or no
more change) than not using terrorism. But almost none of the empirical studies of the
effectiveness of terrorism examine variation on the independent variable; they look only at
terrorist organizations, with no comparison to otherwise similar groups that do not use
terrorism. Just as we cannot evaluate the effectiveness of a medical treatment without a control
group, we cannot know if terrorism is effective without comparing it to the lack of terrorism.

I use data on civil wars to introduce variation. Civil wars represent a universe of cases in
which a group has a serious enough perceived grievance against the state to launch a violent

15 Jones and Libicki 2008, p.34; Abrahms 2006, pp.53-54; Pape 2003, p.355.

16 Wood 2010 is an exception. Abrahms’ work has more variation than some others, however,
because his study is limited to groups designated as “foreign terrorist organizations” by the State
Department, variation on this independent variable is truncated.
rebellion, in which some groups choose to use terrorism as part of their repertoire of tactics while others do not. Data on civil wars are relatively well developed, allowing me to explore and control for a number of factors that are likely to affect both this tactical choice and the outcome we wish to explain.

The study of terrorism and the study of civil wars have generally proceeded in isolation from one another. However, if we think of prominent cases such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) or Hamas, the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey, or the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, it is clear that much terrorism, indeed the vast majority of terrorism, takes place in the context of civil conflicts. This paper hopes to merge insights from the two literatures.

This brings us to the thorny question of the definition of terrorism, however, because some scholars maintain that in the Venn diagram of political violence, terrorism and civil war do not overlap, while for others it overlaps completely.

**Definitions**

**“Terrorist” Rebel Groups**

Defining terrorism is notoriously difficult; as the cliché goes, one person’s terrorist is

17 Sambanis 2008 and Findley 2011 are exceptions. See also Boulden 2009.

18 Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009, p.32.

19 As of 2007, the running tally of definitions of the term was at 273. Stohl 2007, p.258.
another’s freedom fighter, and this is perhaps particularly true in the context of civil wars. Because it is such a loaded term, its definition is highly contested. The definitions used in the empirical literature on terrorism attempt to overcome this problem by establishing relatively objective criteria for defining terrorism.

Many of these definitions are not particularly useful for our purposes here for one of a number of reasons. Some are so broad as to encompass all rebel groups in all civil wars, making it impossible to distinguish between those civil wars in which terrorism is used as a tactic and those in which it is not.

Others define terrorism in opposition to civil wars such that no rebel groups are included. Here, a distinction is drawn between terrorism and guerilla warfare or insurgency, but this distinction is often not well-defined, and tends to include factors, such as group size or strength, ability to control territory, and even the regime type of the opponent, in the definition of terrorism. These are variables whose relationship to terrorism we should examine, something we cannot do if they are part of the definition.

While most definitions stipulate that violence be targeted at non-combatants or

20 McCormick 2003, p.473. For a good discussion of definitions, see Merari 1993.

21 See most prominently, the US State Department’s definitions which essentially cover any unlawful violent activity. Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm (accessed 7/24/08). To be included on the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) (used by Kydd and Walter 2006; and Abrahms 2006; Forthcoming 2012), a group must also threaten US security, making this list is thus in no way a comprehensive or even representative list of terrorist groups.

22 For discussions, see Schmid and Jongman 1988, esp. pp. 13-18; Silke 1996; Cronin 2006, pp.31-32; Sambanis 2008.

23 Guelke 1995, pp. 30-31; Merari 1993, pp.217, 225; Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009, p.34.
civilians,24 this, too, turns out to be too broad a criterion by itself. As Stanton’s research shows, almost all rebel groups (and almost all governments involved in civil wars) attack civilians in some way or another. The most common strategy of civilian targeting is what she refers to as “control” – the use of “violence as a means of coercing civilian cooperation and deterring civilians from providing aid to the opponent.”25 According to her data, which cover 1989-2005, there are only three rebel groups not coded as using this particular strategy of violence against civilians.26 In other, words, targeting civilians, in this fashion is ubiquitous.27 Moreover, this type of violence against civilians to punish or deter collaboration with the other side is not what we normally think of as “terrorism.” We thus need to know more about how rebel groups target civilians.

Another common definitional criterion is that the violence be aimed at influencing not the immediate victims of the violence but some wider audience. The violence is thus often described as “symbolic” or aimed at communicating a political message.28 Here the distinctions

24 Kydd and Walter 2006, p.52. Cronin 2002/2003, pp.32-33 lists the deliberate targeting of the innocent among “aspects of the concept that are fundamental” to the definition of terrorism. The others are its political nature, nonstate character, and its seeming randomness.


26 The three exceptions are: FRUD in Djibouti (1991-1994); the rebel military faction in Guinea Bissau (1998-1999); and Polisario in Morocco (1975-1989). Email correspondence with author, 7/30/08.

27 Stanton codes only well-established patterns of violence against civilians; a single incident that might be attributed to individual criminal action does not qualify. Similarly, she does not count cases in which one side accuses the other of a particular form of violence against civilians but no third party confirms it. For these and other reasons, her data if anything undercount the use of violence against civilians. Stanton 2008, Chapter 3.

Stanton draws between different strategies of violence against civilians are particularly valuable. She distinguishes strategies of “coercion” from the abovementioned control (and other strategies, such as cleansing or destabilization) by focusing on the “the use of violence as a means of forcing the opponent to take a particular desired action – to agree to negotiations, to reduce its war aims, to make concessions, to surrender.” This strategy is “intended not to coerce civilians themselves, but to coerce the opponent into making concessions” (her emphasis). Her operational measure of this type of violence accords with our general-use sense of the term “terrorism.” She codes:

whether or not a rebel group used bombs to attack civilian targets during the course of the civil war; here [she refers] not to artillery bombings or shelling of towns or cities, but to the use of smaller scale bombs, such as car and bus bombs, suicide bombs, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), to attack very specific civilian targets – often buses, restaurants, markets, and other public areas in a town or city.

For the purposes of this paper, then, I define terrorist rebel groups as those who use symbolic and indiscriminate violence against public civilian targets. The aim of this type of violence is to coerce the government to make political concessions, up to and including conceding outright defeat. This definition is relatively narrow so as to distinguish among rebel groups, but not so narrow as to exclude all rebel groups that are involved in civil war. Nor does it include in the definition other variables whose relationship to terrorism we wish to

---


30 She does not include in this measure the use of suicide bombs or IEDs to attack military bases or convoys, only “cases where bombs were aimed at unambiguously civilian targets.” Ibid., p.17.

31 It is similar to the criteria for inclusion in the newer version of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), but requires that all six (rather than 5/6) of these be met. See http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/.
examine.

Stanton’s strategies of destabilization and cleansing, which she distinguishes from coercion, also sound like terrorism to some degree. These involve attacks on civilians intended to destabilize a country or to force people to flee by terrorizing the population. However, Stanton’s operational coding of these strategies involve massacres and scorched earth campaigns (burning homes and crops), which, while involving “terror” are farther from our intuitive understanding of terrorism than the indiscriminate attacks she codes under coercion. Thus, not all who “terrorize” are “terrorist” – groups like the RUF in Sierra Leone or the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda are not coded as terrorist under the definition used here. Some terrorist groups (such as ANC) might thus be considered morally preferable to some non-terrorist groups.

War Outcomes and Relative “Success”

Civil wars end in one of four ways: either the government or the rebels win outright, or they reach a peace agreement of some sort, or the rebellion fizzles out. A fifth possible “outcome” is ongoing fighting. These five possibilities can be thought of as representing a continuum of “success” for the rebel group. Government victory and rebel victory obviously lie at opposite ends of this continuum. I argue that “agreement” represents a second-best outcome from the rebels’ perspective. Agreements entail concessions and compromise by both sides, but given that rebels in civil war are fighting to change the status quo, while the government is

32 Some of the groups that engage in these strategies are also coded as engaging in coercion (Stanton’s strategies are not mutually exclusive), so will be included in our list of terrorist rebel organizations in any case. An example is the LTTE in Sri Lanka.

33 On judging the relative morality of terrorism, see Crenshaw 1983, p. 3 and Merari 1993, pp.227-231.
fighting to maintain it, that the government agrees to any significant concessions represents at least a partial political victory for the rebels. Moreover, agreements indicate that the rebel group has been accepted as a legitimate negotiating partner, itself a significant concession from the government. Indeed, many civil wars coded as ending in a peace agreement could easily be recoded as rebel victories. For example, the peace agreement between South Africa and the ANC represented the fulfillment of that group’s primary goal, the end of apartheid.\(^34\)

A counter-argument to this position might be that terrorism is sometimes used to prevent rather than encourage a peace agreement.\(^35\) However, this spoiler argument maintains that a group is trying to prevent an agreement between another more moderate group and the government. This can prolong a conflict overall (see below), but the data used here code separately the outcome for each group within a conflict. It is hard to argue that an extremist group would see an agreement between itself and the government as a failure.

Second best from the government’s perspective are wars that end when the rebellion fizzles out with violence ending or falling to such a low level (under 25 deaths per year in the data used here) that the conflict is no longer considered ongoing.\(^36\) While the rebel group may still exist, it is clearly not causing much trouble at this extremely low level of violence. Rebellions generally fizzle out because they have been largely defeated, though not eliminated outright. This category includes cases such as Sendero Luminoso in Peru, which ended its fight

\(^{34}\) There may be cases in which an agreement was reached even though rebels were, for all intents and purposes, defeated. This could be said of the peace agreement that ended the RUF’s war against Sierra Leone, for example. There is admittedly some noise in this outcome measure. In most cases, however, agreements represent a fairly high measure of success for the rebels.

\(^{35}\) Kydd and Walter 2002.

\(^{36}\) The Uppsala Armed Conflict Data project refers to this as “low or no activity.”
after the capture of its leader, and the MQM in Pakistan, which “decided to pursue a peaceful strategy rather than a violent one” after the Pakistani military dealt “a serious blow to the militants.”

I argue that ongoing conflict represents a rather neutral outcome. If the war is ongoing, then neither side has been able to defeat the other, no significant concessions have been agreed to, but the rebel group continues to exist and to inflict pain on the country. Abrahms argues that ongoing conflict should count as failure, while others argue that organizational survival should count as a measure of success. I resolve this debate by placing “success” along a continuum.

We can thus rank the five outcomes as follows, in ascending order of desirability from the perspective of the rebel group:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government victory</td>
<td>rebellion fizzle</td>
<td>ongoing war</td>
<td>negotiated agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This outcome variable is the dependent variable for the main analyses below.

The question, then, is whether terrorist rebel groups fare better or worse along this continuum than other rebel groups. I argue that they generally fare worse.

**Why Terrorist Rebels Fight a Long Time, but Rarely Win**

Relative to rebel groups that do not use terrorism, I argue that terrorist rebel groups are

---

37 CGS Data coding notes, p.350.

38 Abrahms 2006, and email correspondence with the author (9/15/2008).

39 Jones and Libicki 2008; Wood 2010.
unlikely to prevail in civil wars, either on the battlefield or at the negotiating table. Terrorist groups are also difficult to defeat, however, making civil wars that involve terrorism particularly hard to end. Ongoing war thus becomes a particularly likely “outcome” for these conflicts. But of those wars that do end, terrorist rebel groups are more likely to be defeated or to fizzle out than to achieve some or all of their goals.

Terrorist rebel groups generally combine indiscriminate attacks on civilians with attacks on military forces – that is, most if not all rebel groups attack military targets; terrorist rebel groups are distinguished by the fact that they also purposively attack civilians in indiscriminate and symbolic ways.\textsuperscript{40} The question then becomes whether terrorist attacks help the rebels’ larger military effort or hinder it. I argue that while terrorism has some advantages, it also entails significant disadvantages. On balance, I expect it to hinder military effectiveness more than it helps. I discuss a number of the ways terrorism is thought to “work” to show that it is unlikely to achieve military victory, or concessions at the bargaining table. I then turn to reasons terrorism might be expected to lead to longer wars.

Above, I define terrorist attacks as distinct from other attacks on civilians by the fact that their message is aimed not at the victims of the attack but at a wider audience. But there are several potential audiences to consider. In exploring the effects of terrorism, I thus draw distinctions among effects on several different audiences. First, terrorism might affect the government and the civilians on the “other” side of the conflict from the rebels – those who generally support the government or generally consent to be governed by it. For lack of a better

\textsuperscript{40} Terrorist groups may also attack civilians in other, more discriminating ways, as discussed above (e.g., attacks to punish collaboration with the enemy). Groups that attack only civilians and no military targets are unlikely to be involved in conflicts that reach the threshold of civil war – on selection effects, see below.
term, I refer to this group as the “mainstream” population, which includes both “complicitous civilians”\textsuperscript{41} who benefit from and support the state and its use of violence against the rebel group, and those “fence-sitters” who are neither members of the aggrieved group nor active supporters of the state’s policies toward the aggrieved group. Second, terrorism might affect members of the general population on the rebels’ “own” side – what Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson refer to as the “aggrieved” population, a term I borrow here.\textsuperscript{42} This distinction is clearest in ethnic or identity-based conflicts (for example, the Kurds are the aggrieved population for whom the PKK ostensibly fights, even though not all of them necessarily support the PKK, while non-Kurdish citizens of Turkey constitute the mainstream population), but it can also apply to ideological conflicts in the sense that not all on the left, say, fully support the tactics of a particular Marxist rebel group, even if they share some of their political goals. Finally, terrorism might affect international public opinion and support.

\textbf{Terrorism and Rebel Victory}

Terrorism is not an effective tactic for winning outright because attacking civilians in an indiscriminate and symbolic manner is not useful for taking and holding territory or the capital. Unlike direct attacks on the government’s military forces, or even other types of attacks on civilians (such as ethnic cleansing of territory, or attacks to prevent collaboration with the enemy), bombing targets such as markets or buses has no direct military value. It is, rather, part of an indirect strategy, one of attrition or punishment, meant to inflict pain on the other side so as

\textsuperscript{41} The term is from Goodwin 2006.

\textsuperscript{42} Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007, p.369.
to undermine the adversary’s will, rather than its capacity, to fight. This is true of other, non-terrorist rebel tactics as well. Insurgency or guerilla warfare tactics classically employ hit-and-run attacks to dog the adversary’s forces and undermine its will to continue the fight. However, non-terrorist insurgency tactics by definition target military forces and so degrade the adversary’s military capacity at least to some extent.

Terrorist attacks do entail some advantages in terms of the sheer ability to inflict pain in a cost-effective manner. It is less costly (at least in material terms) to attack “soft” civilian targets than “hard” military ones. Terrorism is intended to impose costs on the civilian population such that the population pressures its government to give in to terrorist demands. There is some evidence that this can be effective, up to a point, (perhaps particularly so in democracies – see below). However, it can also backfire, creating a rally-round the flag effect among the complicitous population, and undermining support among fence-sitters who might be relatively sympathetic to the plight of the aggrieved but who are disgusted by attacks on civilians.

More than its direct effects of inflicting pain on the other side, terrorism is thought to be a communication device. Terrorism is often said to be an effective signal of strength and resolve, meant to communicate to the opponent that the war of attrition will be long and costly,

43 Pape 2003, p.346; Kydd and Walter 2006. Kydd and Walter describe five strategies of terrorist violence, of which attrition is arguably the most important. One of the others, intimidation is, as noted above, not included in my definition of terrorism because virtually all rebel groups (and all governments) engaged in civil war use this type of violence against civilians. The other three, provocation, spoiling, and outbidding are discussed further below. On the distinction between direct and indirect strategies of warfighting, see Arreguín-Toft 2001, esp. p. 105.

in the hopes that the opponent will thus choose to concede now rather than later.\textsuperscript{45} Compared to not attacking anyone or anything, terrorism may indeed be effective as a costly signal, but the relevant comparison here is whether terrorist attacks against civilians or attacks against the military provide a better signal. As a signal of resolve, terrorism signals a willingness to use extreme tactics that violate widely held norms, and this may be interpreted as a signal of resolve. However, extremism and resolve are not necessarily the same thing. A willingness to attack civilians signals a willingness to impose these costs in the future. To the extent that the government cares more about the loss of civilian life than the loss of soldiers’ lives, this willingness potentially provides a signaling advantage to terrorist tactics.

As a signal of strength, however, terrorist attacks are clearly inferior. Despite the empirical findings presented below, the deeply embedded conventional wisdom is that terrorism is a “weapon of the weak.” Its use thus signals military impotence rather than strength. Indeed, precisely because it is less costly to attack “soft” civilian targets than hardened military ones, and because to be credible, signals have to be costly, terrorism serves as an ineffective signal of strength.\textsuperscript{46}

Rebellion, particularly insurgency or guerilla warfare, as Mao famously stressed, requires a supportive population.\textsuperscript{47} The terrorism literature generally maintains that terrorism is a

\textsuperscript{45} Kydd and Walter 2006, pp.59-60; Merari 1993.

\textsuperscript{46} Terrorism can also be used to signal strength and resolve, or “commitment to the cause” to one’s own side. This is generally part of a process of outbidding, of convincing the aggrieved population that one’s own faction is more committed to the cause, or more capable of defending it, than rival factions on the same side of the conflict. As such, it is part of a process of mobilizing support in an intra-group rivalry (on which more below). Note that Laitin and Shapiro 2006, p. 7 suggest that terrorist attacks signal lack of popular support to the aggrieved.

\textsuperscript{47} Mao 1937. See also Arreguín-Toft 2001, p. 104.
strategy used to mobilize support. But do indiscriminate attacks on civilians enhance or undermine popular support? In addition to demonstrating commitment to the struggle, terrorism can be used to publicize grievances – the “propaganda of the deed.” The attention paid to terrorist attacks, which usually generate more publicity than attacks against the military, precisely because they are more outrageous, can create a sense of urgency about resolving a political issue. However, the aggrieved population is already aware of the grievances (hence the term), and in situations that have escalated to the level of civil war, the mainstream population probably does as well. So publicizing grievances is probably less of an important role for terrorism in civil wars than in lower-level conflicts. It could, however, be important for publicizing grievances to an international audience if the parties are vying for international public support, or in some conflicts over secession or autonomy, for publicizing the plight of an aggrieved population whose lives are quite remote to citizens in other parts of the country. However, as Abrahms argues, the publicity gained by terrorism often focuses on the “senseless” or irrational nature of the violence rather than the grievances or demands the terrorist group wishes to make.

More important, relative to non-terrorist rebel tactics, terrorism is also more likely to

48 See for example, Pape 2003; Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007; DeNardo 1985.

49 To my knowledge, there is no empirical work supporting the contention that terrorism mobilizes support more effectively than other forms of resistance.


51 This may be particularly important for transnational terrorism meant to create a sense of international urgency, and therefore pressure, to resolve a political dispute.

52 Abrahms Forthcoming 2012, p.21.
backfire in its attempt to generate political support among all of these audiences.\textsuperscript{53} While some may see attacks on civilians as justified given their view of the justness of the terrorists’ cause, these people are almost by definition the most radical of the aggrieved population, and likely already support the rebellion. Terrorism preaches to the choir. Those potential supporters who might be mobilized – less radical or politicized members of the aggrieved population, “fence-sitting” members of the mainstream population who are generally sympathetic to the plight of the aggrieved, and the international community – are more likely to feel revulsion at the taking of innocent life. In the battle for legitimacy and “hearts and minds” terrorism is counterproductive.\textsuperscript{54}

The terrorism literature also suggests that terrorism is used to provoke the state to overreact. By inducing the government to attack the general population whose cause the terrorists claim to represent, they create a backlash in their favor.\textsuperscript{55} This may certainly work to terrorist rebels’ advantage in some cases – by causing pain to be inflicted on the aggrieved population, this provocation creates new grievances and exacerbates old ones, thus inducing more support for the rebel organization. But by attacking civilians, terrorist attacks also make it easier for the government to justify draconian measures to crush the rebellion. The opprobrium directed against a government that employs extreme measures will be lower when it is fighting a terrorist rebel group than a non-terrorist rebel group. As Kydd and Walter explain, for provocation to

\textsuperscript{53} Cronin 2009, p.11.

\textsuperscript{54} Cronin 2009, p.93. See also Stephan and Chenoweth 2008 who argue that violence in general decreases legitimacy and discourages broad-based participation.

\textsuperscript{55} Kydd and Walter 2006, esp. pp.69-72; Lake 2002. Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007 model a situation in which such provocation is part of a struggle for support among extremists and moderates (see below).
work, the rebels must be able to goad the government into a “middling level of brutality.” A
government willing and able to resort to extreme levels of brutality in its fight will be able to
wipe out the rebels and the constituency they claim to represent. On the other hand, a
government deeply committed to human rights and the rule of law is difficult to provoke. As
compared to non-terrorist attacks, attacks on civilians may make it more likely that a government
will move from “too soft” to the middle level where provocation is possible, but it will also
make it more likely that a government otherwise in the middle will move to the “too hard” end
of the spectrum, allowing the government to justify measures to crush the rebels rather than
creating a backlash of support in their favor.

On balance then, terrorism generally undermines military effectiveness. It does not
dergrade the government’s military capability, nor can it be used to take and hold territory. It
may help signal resolve, but it also signals weakness. It may help advertise the cause, but it also
drives potential supporters away. It can provoke a government into self-destructive
overreaction, but it can also help the government justify draconian measures in their fight against
rebels. For all of these reasons,

\( H1: \) Terrorist rebels are unlikely to achieve outright military victory.

Terrorism and Negotiated Settlement

What of the second best outcome for rebels? If terrorism works, it does so by increasing
the cost of the conflict to the government side, inducing it to seek an end to the war through a

---

56 Kydd and Walter 2006, p.70.


58 For a similar argument about some of the pros and cons of terrorism, see Goodwin 2006.
negotiated settlement that involves concessions to the rebels. However, there are several reasons to think that terrorism makes negotiated settlement less likely as well. First, as has just been argued, attacking civilians undermines military effectiveness on balance; the government will be less willing to make concessions, all else equal, to an opponent that is less militarily effective.

Second, terrorists face a problem of trust. By deliberately violating the norm against targeting noncombatants, terrorists place themselves beyond the pale and paint themselves as untrustworthy extremists expected to break their promises rather than abide by a negotiated agreement. Abrahms argues that the targets of terrorism are likely to infer from the extreme nature of the tactics used that the groups’ demands are also extreme, that terrorists seek to destroy their society rather than merely achieve more limited policy change. Targets will therefore view negotiations as an act of appeasement. In other words, terrorism makes one’s would-be negotiating partner less, rather than more, willing to make political concessions.

Terrorist rebel groups may also be particularly suspicious of the government in any potential negotiations to end the conflict. This may be, in part, due to a selection effect, if only particularly hardline groups choose terrorist tactics. But it could also be induced by this choice. Having committed terrorist attacks, rebels may not believe that they will be accepted into a peaceful post-war political order. Government promises of amnesty or of a power-sharing role for rebels may therefore not be credible to terrorist rebel groups. Mistrust and problems of credible commitment plague all civil wars, but terrorism makes them even worse.

---


60 Abrahms Forthcoming 2012, p.22.

61 This can make terrorism a self-perpetuating tactic. Laitin and Shapiro 2006, p.12

Finally, many governments have a stated policy never to negotiate with terrorists. The rationale for this position is obvious – terrorism must never be rewarded with concessions, negotiations would set a dangerous precedent, and even sitting down to talk with terrorists can grant them political legitimacy. This “rule” is often broken of course, governments do in fact negotiate with terrorists, and governments are reluctant to negotiate with and grant concessions to any rebel group, but the rhetoric of non-negotiation with terrorists can make it especially politically difficult to do so. For all of these reasons, then, negotiated settlements should be less likely in civil wars where rebels use terrorism than when they do not.\(^{63}\)

\textit{H2: Civil wars involving terrorism are less likely to end in negotiated settlement.}

Terrorism and War Duration

Terrorist rebel groups can also be quite difficult to defeat or eliminate. Because they attack soft targets that are inherently hard to defend against, preventing every single attack is difficult. As Condoleeza Rice described counter-terrorism efforts: “They only have to be right once. We have to be right 100% of the time.”\(^{64}\) It takes relatively fewer people to organize and carry out a terrorist attack, so fully eliminating a terrorist group is more difficult than eliminating other rebel groups; mere remnants can continue to inflict damage.

Two other strategic uses of terrorism, spoiling and outbidding, also contribute to longer

\(^{63}\) Cronin 2009, p. 41. An implication of Gould and Klor’s 2010 finding that terrorism induces right-wing parties to move leftward and thus to gain more votes (at least in Israel), in combination with Schultz’s 2005 argument that moderate hawks are most able to achieve peace, suggests a more optimistic hypothesis for terrorism and the prospects for negotiated peace.

\(^{64}\) Quoted in Nina Easton, “Condi: The Should-Be Face of the GOP” \textit{Fortune Magazine} September 22, 2009.
conflicts. Both involve struggles between factions each claiming to represent the interests of an aggrieved group. Terrorism used to spoil agreements with more moderate groups, if successful (from the spoilers’ perspective) prolongs conflicts that would otherwise have ended in negotiated settlement. The spoilers’ hope is that the eventual outcome will be more favorable to their cause than the one moderates were willing to settle for, but spoiling does nothing to ensure this more favorable outcome rather than a less favorable one (such as defeat).

Outbidding, if successful, mobilizes popular support away from moderates who are more willing to negotiate a settlement, and towards extremists who are less so (or more accurately, whose reservation price for an agreement is higher). This makes settlement less likely, but if a settlement is eventually achieved, successful outbidding could make the settlement more favorable to the aggrieved population.

In theories of outbidding, or of terrorism used as provocation by extremists to mobilize support in a competition among factions, it is not entirely clear, however, why the aggrieved population should support extremists rather than moderates – why go along with a group whose reservation price is, by definition of extremism, higher than that of the average member of the aggrieved population, especially when continuation of the conflict is costly? The question is

\[65\] Findley 2011 finds that terrorism in the context of civil war prolongs the fighting, but his study does not distinguish between terrorism by the main rebel group and by spoilers.

\[66\] On outbidding, see also Bloom 2005. Stanton 2008 (pp. 232-3) finds little support for the hypothesis that outbidding leads rebels to use terrorism. [cite young & findley paper]

\[67\] Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2007, p.375 suggest that the aggrieved face a commitment problem in that they cannot credibly threaten to punish extremists for provoking the government’s crackdown because the crackdown itself (by diminishing economic opportunities) makes the population inclined toward direct struggle. But why the population should react to diminished opportunities brought on by the conflict by choosing to continue it, rather than settle, is not entirely clear.
then whether outbidding by attacking civilians indiscriminately is more conducive to such a favorable outcome than attempting to show effectiveness by attacking military targets. Here the ways in which attacks on civilians can backfire suggest that the answer is unclear at best.

Fearon and Shapiro suggest another reason that terrorist civil wars will tend to persist, but not end in successful outcomes for rebels. They note that effective counterterrorist strategies by governments will tend to “flatten” the organizational structure of rebel groups, inducing them to rely more on decentralized cells rather than centralized command and control. This can lead, paradoxically, to an increase in terror attacks but these attacks will be less well-funded and less well-adjusted to strategy, making it “more likely that terrorists will fail to achieve their political goals.”

Civil wars involving terrorist rebel groups are therefore particularly difficult to end. Civil wars involving terrorist rebel groups are therefore particularly difficult to end.

H3: Wars involving terrorist rebels are likely to last longer and to be ongoing in any given data set on civil wars.

 Nonetheless, for the reasons given above, it is easier for governments to defeat terrorist rebel groups than for terrorist rebel groups to defeat governments. Of the wars that have ended, then, I argue terrorists tend to fare worse than non-terrorist rebel groups.

Democracy and Terrorist Success

Overall, I argue that terrorism should undermine the strategic effectiveness of rebellion. But there are several reasons to think that terrorism might be more effective (or less ineffective) against democracies than against autocracies.

---


69 Wood 2010 finds that strategies of violence against civilians increase the lifespan of rebel organizations.
First, democratic governments are likely more sensitive to civilian loss of life.\textsuperscript{70} If terrorism is meant to work by inflicting pain on civilians who then pressure their government to make concessions, then it stands to reason that the more accountable the government is to popular pressure, the more likely this strategy will work.

Second, democracies are thought to have trouble repressing or preventing and policing terrorist groups.\textsuperscript{71} Because they start on the “soft” end of the spectrum, democracies should be more likely to be provoked by terrorism into the “middling level of brutality” discussed above, while anocracies and autocracies will be provoked into a response that is “too hard” and that brutally but effectively represses rebellion.

Terrorist violence should also be less likely to backfire in terms of mobilizing support among the aggrieved when its victims are seen as “complicitous” in government policy, such as when they have voted the government into power in democratic elections. We should thus expect:

\textit{H4 Terrorism will be relatively more effective against democratic governments than against non-democratic governments.}

Before testing these hypotheses, however, I need to address the issue of which rebel groups use terrorism, because while terrorism inflicts seemingly random violence, it is not a tactic chosen randomly.

\textsuperscript{70} Stanton 2008.

\textsuperscript{71} Cronin 2006 p.31; Crenshaw 1981, p.383. Pape 2003, pp.349-350. See also Eubank and Weinberg 1994. But see Lyall 2010 for evidence that democracies are no more likely to lose against insurgencies more generally.
Which Groups Use Terrorism?

Of the rebel groups involved in civil wars between 1989 and 2004, approximately 30% used terrorism as a tactic in their fight against the government, while 70% did not. What accounts for this variation? The literature on the causes of terrorism, particularly on why terrorism rears its ugly head in some places rather than others, sheds some light on this question.

For the purpose of assessing the effectiveness of terrorism, we need to pay particular attention to any variables that might affect both the use of terrorism and the outcome of the war. The literature identifies several factors of note: the relative strength of the group, democracy, rebel aims and identity, population, GDP per capita, and geographical region.

The most obvious and important potential confounding variable is the relative strength of the rebel group. If terrorism is a tactic chosen by weak groups, those whose militarily capacity is relatively feeble compared to the government, failure to take this into account will make terrorism look less effective than it really is. That terrorism is a “weapon of the weak” is perhaps the most common explanation of why some groups choose terrorism while others do not.\(^72\) Almost no empirical work has tested this conventional wisdom directly, however.\(^73\)

Regime type is another possible confounding factor. The relationship between democracy and terrorism has generated significant theoretical and empirical debate,\(^74\) but many


\(^{73}\) An exception is Stanton 2008, who finds no support for it. Goodwin 2006 also provides anecdotal evidence against it.

\(^{74}\) For a good overview, see Chenoweth 2010. Most empirical studies in this debate examine transnational terrorism, not domestic terrorism of the type examined here. See Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009 (p.37) for a critique. Exceptions include Stanton 2008; Chenoweth 2010; Abadie 2005 and Savun and Phillips 2009.
see a positive relationship between democracy and terrorism, in part because it is thought to be more effective against democracies, as discussed above.\textsuperscript{75} Arguments that terrorism is related to a lack of opportunities for political participation, such that terrorism should be less likely in democracies,\textsuperscript{76} should apply to rebellion more generally, so should not appear in a study of terrorism in civil war – as democracies are simply less likely to experience civil wars in the first place.

The goals for which a rebel group is fighting might also affect both whether terrorism is used and the outcome of the war. Terrorism is often thought to be a tactic used by groups with particularly extreme aims. This argument is often nothing more than a tautology – terrorism is an extreme tactic, so those who engage in it must be extremists.\textsuperscript{77} Non-tautological data on the extremity of rebel groups’ aims are, unfortunately, not available. However, Pape’s argument, that “suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation,”\textsuperscript{78} and Stanton’s, that separatist rebels are more likely to use terrorism because they have to worry less about alienating mainstream civilians they hope eventually to govern,\textsuperscript{79} both suggest that terrorism should be more likely in secessionist conflicts. An implication of Fazal’s argument suggests just the opposite, however; that separatist movements are more likely to comply with the laws of war, and therefore would avoid targeting civilians indiscriminately, because they desire to become

\textsuperscript{75} See, for example, Stanton 2008.

\textsuperscript{76} Crenshaw 1981; Schmid 1992; Sambanis 2008. See also Li 2005; and Drakos and Gofas 2006.

\textsuperscript{77} The argument need not be circular, however. See Lake 2002, p.18, as well as DeNardo 1985, p.231.

\textsuperscript{78} Pape 2005, p.23. More recently, Pape 2010 argues that suicide terrorism occurs against foreign occupation by a democracy.

\textsuperscript{79} Stanton 2008, esp. Chapter 5.
accepted members of the international system. Either way, if war aims affect civil war outcomes, I need to take them into account.

Pape also argues that suicide terrorism is especially likely where the occupied and occupier are from different religions. His logic here seemingly applies to terrorism more generally. More broadly we might expect terrorism to be more common in ethnic or identity-based conflicts. In the popular imagination, at least in the West, terrorism tends to be associated not just with religious conflict, but with Islam in particular. While I see little theoretical reason to think that some religions are more likely to spawn terrorists than others, it is worth investigating the question empirically.

Population, GDP per capita, and Geography

A number of studies have found an association between a state’s population and domestic terrorism, either because more populous states have a harder time finding and fighting terrorists, or simply because a larger population increases the number of potential radicals by increasing the number of people in the tails of the distribution of opinion.

I also investigate whether there is a relationship between GDP per capita and the use of terrorism. Although studies have debunked the theory that individual terrorists tend to be poor, 

---

80 Fazal Forthcoming.
82 Many studies suggest that ethnic and identity conflicts are different from those fought over ideology or other differences. For examples, see Kaufmann 1996, Doyle and Sambanis 2000, DeRouen & Sobek 2004, Fearon and Laitin 2003, Toft 2003.
83 Moghadam 2008; [add Fish cite].
84 Chenoweth 2010; Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009.
there may be a relationship between a country’s economic state and the likelihood of terrorism.\textsuperscript{85}

Finally, Boulden suggests that terrorism is less likely to occur in Africa than in other regions of the world.\textsuperscript{86} Reasons for this regional variation have not been explored theoretically or empirically, nonetheless, regional variation in terrorism is worth investigating, not least because civil war has been so prevalent in Africa.\textsuperscript{87}

At least one study has found some relationship between most of these variables and civil war outcomes.\textsuperscript{88} This set of variables by no means exhausts the list of factors that might make rebel groups more likely to choose terrorism.\textsuperscript{89} This is obviously an important question in its own right. For the purposes of this paper, however, my focus is on variables whose omission might lead to spurious findings about the effectiveness of terrorism.\textsuperscript{90}

**Selection, Data, and Empirical Findings**

To test these relationships, and the main hypotheses about the effectiveness of terrorism

---

\textsuperscript{85} On economic conditions and the prevalence of terrorism, see among others, Burgoon 2006; Li and Schaub 2004; Abadie 2006.

\textsuperscript{86} Boulden 2009, p.13.

\textsuperscript{87} Laitin and Shapiro 2006 speculate that rough terrain, weak government armies, and lack of democracy all make non-terrorist insurgency more attractive in Africa, thus accounting for the dearth of terrorism.

\textsuperscript{88} Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; DeRouen and Sobek 2004; Fortna 2008. See also Enterline and Balch-Lindsay 2002; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999.

\textsuperscript{89} For others, see Chenoweth 2010; Horowitz 2010; Sánchez-Cuenca 2006; DeNardo 1985; Enders and Sandler 1999.

\textsuperscript{90} I have also investigated the effect of multiple dyad wars on both the use of terrorism (the outbidding hypothesis) and war outcomes, finding no significant effect on either.
laid out above, I combined existing data to create a data set of terrorism by rebel groups in civil wars. Because I look at the use of terrorism only in the context of civil wars, the list of terrorist rebel groups does not yield a comprehensive list of all terrorist organizations, which raises issues of selection bias. This study excludes transnational and international terrorist groups that attack primarily across borders rather than in their home state. It also excludes organizations involved in conflicts that do not meet the standard 1,000 battle death threshold of a civil war. The smallest and weakest groups are thus excluded. As a subset of terrorist groups, the selection of those involved in civil wars likely also over-represents ethnonationalist/separatist organizations, which are more likely to have clear political or territorial goals that are more easily negotiable than the goals of other types of terrorist organizations. The data used here also exclude coups, which are quite unlikely to involve terrorism and which may be more often successful than other types of rebellion. All of these selection issues bias the study toward finding terrorism successful, and against my own argument.

The temporal bounds of the data used here (post-1989) do not cover the era of

91 It is not clear what the equivalent non-terrorist actors would be for a comparison with transnational terrorist groups. The exclusion of transnational terrorism may undermine the policy relevance of this study from the US perspective, but the vast majority of terrorism occurs within domestic conflicts, making the type of terrorism studied here the most policy relevant globally.

92 In some terrorism data bases, the majority of “terrorist” groups have never killed anyone. Asal and Rethemeyer 2008. Sánchez-Cuenca and de la Calle 2009, p.35. The exclusion here is not definitional, merely one driven by data availability. It is defensible on policy grounds, however, as we should arguably care most about the groups capable of killing the most people.

93 Cronin 2002/2003, pp .39-40. Among rebel groups, separatist or identity based groups are no more likely to use terrorism, in fact the opposite is true (see below), but terrorist groups with these goals may be more likely involved in conflicts that reach the level of civil war.

94 Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009.
decolonization, and therefore exclude a set of highly successful rebellions; virtually all of these cases led to independence. Some notable cases of terrorist success (e.g., in Algeria) are thus omitted. If terrorism was used disproportionately in anti-colonial wars of this era (an open empirical question), excluding this era will bias the results away from finding terrorism effective. On the other hand, anti-colonial struggles were seen as particularly legitimate, and relationships in that era may not apply to more recent conflicts.\footnote{An examination of tactics used in extra-systemic wars would help shed light on this issue, but is beyond the scope of this paper.}

To code whether a rebel group uses terrorist tactics, I use Stanton’s coercion variable, discussed above. This variable captures groups generally classified as “terrorist” by other sources, such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the Taliban in Afghanistan (after 2003), the FARC and ELN in Colombia, the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland, and so on.

One advantage of using Stanton’s data to code terrorist rebel groups rather than the databases more commonly used in the terrorism literature is that this minimizes some of the well-known geographical biases in the terrorism data, particularly their over-representation of terrorism in Western democracies and under-representation or spotty coverage of groups in Africa and other strategically less important (to the US) places.\footnote{Other than the GTD database noted above, the large databases of terrorism used frequently in the empirical literature include ITERATE, which focuses on international and transnational terrorism, and the RAND-MIPT data, which cover some domestic terrorism only after 1998 and which are not currently freely available.}

Other than the terrorism variable, most of the data analyzed here come from Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan’s (CGS) data set.\footnote{Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009. Also known as the “Expanded Uppsala Armed Conflict Data,” and the “Non-State Actor data (NSA). Available at\textless http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/eacd.html\r
\textgreater. These data build on the Uppsala-PRIIO Armed Conflict}
several reasons. First, the unit of analysis is the government-rebel group dyad, rather than the conflict as is common in many data sets on civil war. Second, the relative strength of the government and each rebel group is coded. I use a time-varying version of the CGS data, in which the observation is the dyad-period to allow for variables that change over the course of the conflict, for example, changes in the relative strength of the actors, or changes in democracy or economic variables. Merging the CGS and Stanton data yields 104 cases and 1,016 observations. They are listed in the appendix.

The CGS data include the war’s outcome for each dyad as of 2003, covering five possibilities: government victory, rebel victory, agreement (including peace agreements and cease-fire agreements), low or no activity, and ongoing. I updated this through 2009, and filled in some missing data. For example, the outcome for Indonesia-GAM was changed to agreement to reflect the peace agreement reached in that conflict in 2005, while the outcome for Sri Lanka-LTTE was changed to government victory to reflect the end of that war in 2009.

The CGS data set includes a 5-point indicator of rebel group strength relative to the government, ranging from much weaker to much stronger. This variable summarizes assessments of the rebel group’s ability to mobilize supporters, arms procurement ability, and fighting capacity, which Cunningham et al. argue capture the rebel group’s ability to target

Data (ACD) by identifying each non-state (or rebel) actor. ACD data are available at <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/data_and_publications/datasets.htm>.

Notes on this merging available from the author.

Note that for the time-varying versions of the data, this introduces an inconsistency for 5 cases where the outcome coded occurred after 2003, as some variables are only coded through that year. Results below are robust when the cases affected by this are dropped.
government forces, or “offensive strength.” The vast majority of rebel groups fall at the weak end of this spectrum; only 14 are at parity with or stronger than the government. The variation therefore takes place among three categories: much weaker (34%), weaker (53%), and parity or better (13%). I thus use two dummy variables to compare groups at parity with the government or stronger (high strength), and those that are much weaker (low strength), to those merely weaker (the omitted category).

Democracy is measured with a dummy variable marking cases with a Polity score of 6 or higher. The measure of rebel aims is derived from the CGS variable conflicttype and is a dummy variable for any conflict identified as “secessionist,” “autonomy,” or “independence/anti-occupation.” I also include a measure of ethnic conflict, although not at the same time as the secessionist measure, as they are highly correlated (0.81). Measures of the natural log of population and the natural log of GDP per capita are also from CGS. To measure the influence of religion, I include a measure of the rebel group’s religion, and a measure of whether this differs from that of government. The former codes for the major religion of the rebel group (Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, etc.), while the latter makes finer grade distinctions where these are relevant (distinguishing among Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox Christians, and among Sunni and Shia Islam, for example). A dummy variable identifies whether the civil war was fought in Sub-Saharan Africa.

---

100 Cunningham et al. 2009.

101 These data are derived from Svennson 2007 and Lindberg 2008 and the sources listed in Lindberg’s appendix.
Terrorism as the Dependent Variable

What do the data tell us about which rebel groups use this tactic and which do not? Table 1 shows the results of logistic analysis with terrorist rebel group as the dependent variable. Because some conflicts include more than one dyad, I calculate robust standard errors with cases clustered by conflict. Models 1 and 2 employ all observations for each dyad, models 3 and 4 use only values from the first year of the dyad as the dependent variable generally does not vary over time.\textsuperscript{102} Models 1 and 3 show the results for the secessionism measure, models 2 and 4 substitute the ethnic conflict measure.

[Table 1 about here]

The most surprising result is that for the measures of relative strength. If the weakest groups (relative to the government they fight) were most likely to resort to terrorism, then we would see a positive coefficient for low rebel strength and a negative one for high rebel strength. Instead we see just the opposite. These coefficients are not statistically significant, so we cannot conclude that terrorism is necessarily a weapon of the strong. However, at least within the universe of civil war cases (which admittedly selects relatively strong groups), the conventional wisdom here does not hold water.

There is also no evidence for the popular, but theoretically ungrounded, notion that terrorism is associated with Islam. Muslim rebels are no more likely to use terrorist tactics than are rebels following other major religions, in fact the Islam coefficient is slightly negative (but

\textsuperscript{102} It is possible that some rebel groups who used terrorism in some parts of the war did not do so in others, but Stanton’s impression, having coded the data herself, is that this is very rare, with two exceptions — the PKK (Turkey) only began bombing civilian targets after 1993; the MILF (Philippines) after 1986 (email correspondence with author, July 25, 2008). In these cases, I only code the group as terrorist after these dates.
The results for rebel aims and identity are also surprising; rebels fighting for secession are significantly less likely to employ terrorism, as are those fighting ethnic or identity-based wars. This finding runs counter to the existing terrorism literature (e.g. Pape), but is consistent with Fazal’s argument that rebels fighting for secession will attempt to behave like “good citizens” in order to gain acceptance into the society of sovereign states. Pape’s argument about religious differences fares better – the coefficient is positive as predicted, but only statistically significant in some models.

These results show strong support for the notion that domestic terrorism is more likely within democracy. Rebel groups fighting democratic states are significantly more likely to resort to terrorism. Terrorism is also significantly more likely in more populous countries and in richer countries. It is, however, strikingly unlikely to be used by rebels in Sub-Saharan Africa (the ANC is the only African rebel group to have resorted to terrorism in the period examined here).

While these findings may not apply to the likelihood of terrorism in lower level conflicts, the comparison of civil wars in which rebel groups resort to terrorism and those in which they

103 Of the Hindu and Sikh rebel groups in the data, all (100%) use terrorist tactics, while Buddhist rebels seem (in a simple bivariate cross-tab) to be relatively unlikely to resort to terror (10%).

104 Fazal Forthcoming.

105 There is mixed support for the hypothesis suggested by Pape 2010 that terrorism might be more likely in secessionist conflicts in democracies (or against occupation by democracies as he puts it). The coefficients for an interaction term of democracy and secessionist conflicts, as well as each of the base terms, indicate that terrorism is more likely in secessionist conflicts in democracies than in non-democracies, but this effect appears only when we look at the first observation for each conflict, and disappears in the time-varying analysis (results not shown).
refrain from targeting civilians in this way sheds light on questions about when and where terrorism arises.

Do Terrorists Win? The Effects of Terrorism on War Outcomes

Now that we have some sense of which rebel groups are most likely to use terrorism, we can return to the question that motivates this paper – is terrorism an effective tactic for rebels in civil war? Table 2 shows a simple cross-tabulation of the outcomes of the 104 government-rebel group dyads analyzed in this paper. Figure 1 shows the same thing graphically. While this bivariate relationship obviously does not yet take into account the endogeneity of terrorism, it does suggest support for hypotheses 1-3. Most tellingly, there is not a single case of terrorist rebel victory. Peace agreements, which I argue represent significant concessions to the rebel cause, are also less frequent when rebels use terrorism. Meanwhile, government victories and wars ending through low or no activity are slightly more common in civil wars involving terrorism. Wars in which rebels use terror are much more likely to be ongoing than are wars with non-terrorist rebels, suggesting that terrorism makes wars particularly difficult to terminate.

[Table 2 and Figure 1 about here]

Table 3 presents the results of multivariate analysis of civil war outcomes, controlling for the possible confounding variables discussed above.\textsuperscript{106} Because the rank ordering of outcomes represents an argument rather than an established fact, and especially because my argument is

\textsuperscript{106} While there are not enough cases here to use matching techniques in an ideal way (matching among the first observation in each dyad), results from coarsened exact matching on democracy, secessionism, population size, GDP/capita, and Africa are substantially the same as those reported here. I have not been able to identify suitable instrumental variables to allow for the modeling of use of terrorism and war outcome together in a selection model [SUGGESTIONS FOR INSTRUMENTS VERY WELCOME!]
that terrorism’s effect on outcomes is non-monotonic (the middle outcome is predicted as most likely) I first employ a multinomial logistic regression model, in which no assumption is made about the order of the five outcomes categories. Robust standard errors are calculated, as above. I also control for the log of the duration of war to date (or “time at state”) to account for the effects of time and duration dependence.\textsuperscript{107} These results are presented with ongoing war as the baseline category.

[Table 3 about here]

The negative coefficients for terrorist rebels in Table 3 indicate, as did the bivariate comparison in table 2, that terrorism makes all outcomes less likely relative to ongoing war. Or to put it more plainly, terrorism makes civil wars less likely to end, supporting hypothesis 3. But among the wars that do end, the negative effect of terrorism is much larger, especially on rebel victory but also on formal agreements, than it is on low/no activity or government victory. Indeed, terrorism makes the “good” outcomes for rebels significantly less likely (supporting hypotheses 1 and 2), but there is no statistically significant difference between ongoing war and the “bad” outcomes for terrorist rebels.\textsuperscript{108} In other words, terrorist rebel groups are much less likely to win outright or to achieve concessions in the form of an agreement than are non-terrorist rebel groups, all else equal, and they are at best only marginally less likely to fizzle out or be defeated rather than to live to fight another day.\textsuperscript{109} Rebellion by terrorists lasts longer than

\textsuperscript{107} Following Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009. See also Box-Steppensmeier and Jones 1997.

\textsuperscript{108} These results are substantively the same if the ethnic war variable substitutes for the secessionist one, and whether the secessionist measure includes autonomy conflicts or not. They are also robust to dropping cases in which I updated outcome with events that occurred after 2003.

\textsuperscript{109} Contra Wood’s 2010 finding that rebel violence against civilians helps them avoid defeat.
rebellion by other groups, but is less likely to succeed. Given that almost all of the potential biases in this study should make it easier to find a positive effect for terrorism on rebel group success, the negative effect is particularly striking.

Table 4 shows the results of terrorism on war outcomes among only those cases in which the war has ended. Models 1 and 2 present the results of an ordered logit of the four possible outcomes, while models 3 and 4 combine the “good” outcomes for rebels (rebel victory and negotiated settlement) as compared to the “bad” outcomes (government victory and wars that fizzle out) in a logit regression. Models 2 and 4 include an interaction term to assess hypothesis 4, that terrorism is more successful against democratic governments.

In all 4 models, the coefficient for terrorist rebels is negative, though not quite significant in models 1 and 3. The interaction terms in models 2 and 4 must be interpreted along with the base terms. The coefficient for the democracy base term (showing the effect of a democratic government in cases where rebels eschew terrorism) is inconsistent; negative in model 2 and positive in model 4, indicating no clear effect of democracy by itself. The base term for terrorism is substantively large and negative in both cases, meeting the p<.05 threshold for significance in model 2 and the weaker p<.10 threshold in model 4. Against autocracies, terrorism is counterproductive for rebels in terms of achieving their primary political objectives. The interaction term of terrorist rebels fighting democratic governments is substantively rather large and positive, though not significant. This provides at least some support for hypothesis 4, that terrorism is more effective (or less ineffective) against democracies than against non-

democracies.\textsuperscript{111} Note, however, that the confidence intervals of terrorism against democracies (the interaction term) and non-terrorism against democracies (the democracy base coefficient) overlap substantially, so while the effect of terrorism against democracies is positive, it is not significantly so.

It is worth examining the cases of terrorist rebellion against democratic governments more closely. There are 22 cases in this category. Of these, 12 are ongoing, 3 fizzled out, and 2 ended in defeat for the rebels. Five yielded a negotiated settlement: El Salvador vs. FMLN (1991), Bangladesh vs. JSS/Shanti Bahini (1992), Israel vs. Fatah (1993), Papua New Guinea vs. the BRA (1996), and the United Kingdom vs. Real IRA (1998). In one of these cases (Israel-Fatah) the war has resumed since, and in another many of the agreement’s terms have not been implemented by the government (Bangladesh-JSS/Shanti Bahini), calling these “success stories” for terrorism into some question. Terrorism thus appears to be less ineffective against democracies than against non-democracies, but even against democracy does not have a stellar track record.

\textbf{Conclusion and Directions for Further Research}

In sum, the short answer to the question “Do terrorists win?” is “No.” Rebels who use terrorism never win outright, and they are less likely to achieve concessions in a negotiated outcome (though less so against democracies than against autocracies). One might reasonably ask, then, why rebel groups use terrorism, especially rebels who are not fighting democratic

\textsuperscript{111} Because there are no cases of rebel victories by terrorists, another way of putting this is that terrorism makes negotiated settlement more likely in democracies than in non-democracies.
governments.\textsuperscript{112} The answer may lie in the finding that terrorist wars last longer than others.

The use of terrorism contributes to rebel organizations’ survival.\textsuperscript{113} But it does so at the expense of rebels’ political goals. Rebels thus face a dilemma – using terrorism as a tactic is good for the short-term goal of survival, but bad for the long-term goals for which rebels are, ultimately (or ostensibly), fighting.

This study could fruitfully be expanded in several ways to further our understanding both of where terrorism arises and how successful it is. Extending the analysis temporally before 1989, and to lower level conflicts would strengthen the findings, and in particular allow for fuller testing of the conventional wisdom, called into question here, that terrorism is a “weapon of the weak.”\textsuperscript{114}

The broader question of why some groups use terrorism while others do not is a subject fit for a much larger study. Here I have focused only on variables that might also affect war outcomes, to avoid spurious results, but expanding this portion of the study, both theoretically and empirically, is another obvious avenue for further research. Finally, using the idea of ordering outcomes from the relative perspective of the government and rebel groups could be used to further build on the existing empirical literature on war outcomes.

The literature on terrorism has exploded (no pun intended) since 2001 for obvious

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{112} Forty-five percent of the rebels who use terrorism were engaged in civil war in a non-democratic state) Note that this figures is based on democracy measures for the year the war started. A higher percentage of terrorist rebels fought against governments that were democracies when the war ended. This suggests, interestingly, that wars involving terrorism may move countries toward democracy – a relationship worthy of further inquiry.
\item \textsuperscript{113} See also Wood 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{114} Both extensions can be done with the CGS data, which include minor conflicts involving as few as 25 deaths annually as far back as 1945, but the coding of whether rebel groups use terrorism needs to be expanded to cover the longer time span and these smaller conflicts.
\end{itemize}
reasons. The literature includes many good systematic studies of variation within terrorism. But its ability to answer some fundamental questions has been hampered by the fact that empirical research has not compared groups that use terrorism with those that do not. This project uses variation within civil wars, namely the fact that some rebel groups use terrorism while others do not, to advance our understanding of two important questions for policy makers: where does terrorism occur? and does it succeed?

By looking at this variation, I find that the conventional wisdom that terrorism is a “weapon of the weak” may be wrong. Among rebels fighting full-fledged civil wars, weaker groups are, if anything, actually less likely to use terrorism than stronger ones. The popular notion that terrorism is associated with Islam also has no empirical foundation. Terrorism is more likely in civil wars in democracies, as many have argued, but it is less likely, again contrary to conventional wisdom, in secessionist and ethnic wars (though perhaps more likely where religious differences separate rebels from the government they fight). It is more likely in civil wars in more populous, and in richer countries, but much less likely to be used in Africa.

On the question of the effectiveness of terrorism, this study finds much more support for the “terrorism doesn’t work” side of the debate than for the argument that it is effective. The majority of civil wars (approximately 3/4 of the cases studied here) are fought in non-democratic countries, and in this context terrorism is clearly counterproductive. Terrorism is less ineffective against democracies, but it still cannot achieve rebel victory and can count only a few truly successful negotiated settlements to its credit.

Terrorism may achieve tactical results, and it clearly helps rebel organizations survive longer, but it makes it much harder, perhaps impossible, for rebels to win outright. There are no cases of terrorist victories between 1989 and 2009 (regardless of regime type). Civil wars
involving terrorism are also less likely to end with an agreement that confers concessions and legitimacy on the rebels. Terrorism may be perceived as an effective tactic, and it may be useful for the organizational survival of terrorist groups, but terrorists do not win.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef. (RSE)</td>
<td>P&gt;</td>
<td>z</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Rebel Strength Low</td>
<td>-0.57 (.72)</td>
<td>.431</td>
<td>-0.30 (.82)</td>
<td>.713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Rebel Strength High</td>
<td>1.47 (1.15)</td>
<td>.203</td>
<td>1.10 (1.03)</td>
<td>.288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>2.87 (.71)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2.58 (.78)</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secessionist</td>
<td>-3.05 (1.06)</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>-3.08 (1.06)</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic War</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.04 (.99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Difference</td>
<td>1.67 (.79)</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>1.20 (.75)</td>
<td>.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Rebels</td>
<td>-0.52 (0.88)</td>
<td>.552</td>
<td>-0.51 (0.89)</td>
<td>.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.95 (0.33)</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>0.85 (0.35)</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
<td>2.45 (0.54)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.92 (0.48)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>-2.38 (0.76)</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>-1.77 (0.75)</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-29.30 (6.24)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-24.26 (5.73)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1015</td>
<td></td>
<td>1015</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.636</td>
<td></td>
<td>.594</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Pseudo Likelihood</td>
<td>-250.13</td>
<td></td>
<td>-279.19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Terrorism and War Outcomes: Bivariate Relationship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rebel Group is:</th>
<th>Government Victory</th>
<th>Low Activity</th>
<th>Ongoing War</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Rebel Victory</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Terrorist</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.33%</td>
<td>15.28%</td>
<td>6.94%</td>
<td>47.22%</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.38%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>40.63%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.65%</td>
<td>18.27%</td>
<td>17.31%</td>
<td>40.38%</td>
<td>15.38%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Terrorism and War Outcomes (percentage)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government Victory</th>
<th>Low or No Activity</th>
<th>Negotiated Agreement</th>
<th>Rebel Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Terrorist Rebel Group</strong></td>
<td>-0.06 (0.72)</td>
<td>-0.65 (0.83)</td>
<td>-1.32 (0.65)</td>
<td>-15.10 (1.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relative Rebel Strength Low</strong></td>
<td>-1.42 (0.79)</td>
<td>0.63 (0.50)</td>
<td>-1.34 (0.54)</td>
<td>-0.28 (0.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relative Rebel Strength High</strong></td>
<td>-16.75 (0.99)</td>
<td>-16.22 (0.94)</td>
<td>1.14 (0.44)</td>
<td>1.37 (0.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td>-0.77 (1.05)</td>
<td>-1.24 (1.07)</td>
<td>0.46 (0.60)</td>
<td>-14.02 (1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secessionist</strong></td>
<td>1.99 (0.94)</td>
<td>-0.50 (0.70)</td>
<td>-0.03 (0.40)</td>
<td>-0.64 (0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td>0.10 (0.43)</td>
<td>0.48 (0.32)</td>
<td>-0.25 (0.18)</td>
<td>0.26 (0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GDP/cap</strong></td>
<td>0.57 (0.55)</td>
<td>0.74 (0.42)</td>
<td>0.20 (0.27)</td>
<td>-0.73 (0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Africa</strong></td>
<td>-15.54 (0.97)</td>
<td>1.70 (1.46)</td>
<td>-1.29 (1.24)</td>
<td>-0.84 (1.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religious Difference</strong></td>
<td>-0.72 (0.93)</td>
<td>0.36 (0.57)</td>
<td>0.90 (0.38)</td>
<td>0.79 (0.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muslim Rebels</strong></td>
<td>-1.13 (0.83)</td>
<td>0.67 (0.66)</td>
<td>-0.32 (0.33)</td>
<td>1.30 (0.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Log Duration to Date</strong></td>
<td>-0.40 (0.17)</td>
<td>0.20 (0.30)</td>
<td>-0.13 (0.20)</td>
<td>-0.23 (0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-6.94 (7.09)</td>
<td>-16.25 (7.47)</td>
<td>-0.87 (3.26)</td>
<td>0.07 (6.66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**N** 1015  
**Pseudo R²** 0.14  
**Log Pseudo Likelihood** -345.95
Table 4. Terrorism and War Outcomes: Ordered Logistic and Logistic Regression of Rebel Success

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef.</td>
<td>P&gt;</td>
<td>z</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(RSE)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(RSE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist Rebel Group</td>
<td>-1.12</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td>-1.63</td>
<td>.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>.657</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>.612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.77)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism * Democracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>.275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Rebel Strength</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>.511</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative Rebel Strength</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secessionist</td>
<td>-1.12</td>
<td>.097</td>
<td>-1.24</td>
<td>.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>.828</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>.631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP/cap</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
<td>.235</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>.278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>.857</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>.726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.13)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.78)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Difference</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>.398</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Rebels</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>.423</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Duration to Date</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>.978</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>.949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut 1</td>
<td>-6.65</td>
<td>(4.08)</td>
<td>-5.82</td>
<td>(4.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut 2</td>
<td>-4.99</td>
<td>(4.07)</td>
<td>-4.17</td>
<td>(4.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cut 3</td>
<td>-2.18</td>
<td>(3.98)</td>
<td>-1.30</td>
<td>(4.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.58</td>
<td>.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4.74)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Pseudo Likelihood</td>
<td>-92.94</td>
<td></td>
<td>-92.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix. The Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rebel Group</th>
<th>Government Victory</th>
<th>Low Activity</th>
<th>Ongoing War</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Rebel Victory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
* Note that this case appears to be miscoded. The CNDD stopped fighting in 1998 at the start of the Arusha negotiations, though a more extremist splinter group the CNDD-FDD continued to fight until 2003 (see next cell). This case should thus be coded as ending in agreement. [I have not yet recoded it as I need to confirm the details of this case, but doing so will strengthen the finding that terrorist rebel groups fare poorly, as the CNDD did not use terrorism as a tactic.]
References


Fazal, Tanisha M. Forthcoming. *Declaring War and Peace: Unpublished Book Ms (Columbia University).*


Laitin, David D., and Jacob N. Shapiro. 2006. The Political, Economic and Organizational Sources of Terrorism. Mimeo Stanford University. [update cite and p. #s]


Li, Quan. 2005. Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents. *Journal*


