

**ALTRUISM, POLICY FRAMES, AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY PREFERENCES**

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## **ABSTRACT**

In this paper, we argue that altruism is a critical component of lens with which citizens evaluate public policies. In this project, we examine the effects of altruism on public opinion across a number of issues within the broad domain of social welfare, using observational data from the General Social Surveys, which allows us to connect altruistic predispositions to a broad swath of public preferences. In addition, we experimentally examine the extent to which political debate can invoke altruistic predispositions, by designing and conducting our own framing experiments. Our findings suggest that altruistic predispositions act as persistent components of opinion toward social welfare in its many flavors. In addition, we find that the relationship between altruism and social welfare policy preferences can to some extent be attenuated and accentuated as a function of policy frames: in particular, by the mention of who stands to benefit and lose from public policies.

## ALTRUISM, POLICY FRAMES, AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY PREFERENCES

Normative theorists and social scientists have long placed self-interest at the center of many influential models of human motivations. Contemporary political scientists have devoted inordinate attention to trying to track down the effect of self-interest on public opinion – with little success in the general scheme of things. Instead of discovering that self-interest is the guiding foundation of policy preferences, self-interest instead appears to be the exception, found in narrow, circumscribed instances: when the stakes are clear and large in magnitude, when the parties who stand to benefit and who stand to lose are easily discernible, and when the costs and rewards are proximate in space and time (e.g., Campbell 2002; Citrin and Green 1990; Green and Cowden 1992; Sears and Citrin 1985).

Where self-interest fails, a variety of other considerations come to the forefront, including partisanship, group membership, values, and ideology. A general concern for others and a willingness to sacrifice for others – *altruism* – has held a substantially less central role in political science – and we think this is a mistake.<sup>1</sup> We think this is a mistake because altruism can be observed in a wide range of contexts (Piliavin and Charng 1990; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003).

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<sup>1</sup> Work by Wilson and Banfield (1963; 1971, 1964) is relevant here, although the specific term “altruism” is not used. Instead, Wilson and Banfield suggest that individuals are either “public-regarding” or self-oriented in their dispositions towards politics, as evidenced, say, by support for public good provision or willingness to pay taxes for the provision of public goods that benefit others.

As such, we think its consequences should be observable in political life as well. We argue that altruism<sup>2</sup> is a critical component of lens with which citizens evaluate public policies.

We propose to contribute to the literature by arguing that individuals care not just about their own benefits and costs but also about others, and they apply this regard for others to how they evaluate public policies. Even Downs, so often portrayed as the archetypal champion of self-interest as a motivating factor political choice, states that a concern for the welfare of others might influence political attitudes and behaviors: "In reality, men are not always selfish, even in politics. They frequently do what appears to be individually irrational because they believe it is socially rational—i.e., it benefits others even though it harms them socially" (1957/1985, 27).

Research has increasingly begun to acknowledge the role of other-regarding motivations on behavior, such as volunteering, blood donation, and, importantly for our purposes, political behavior. While turnout and political participation have long been modeled theoretically as a

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<sup>2</sup> Defining altruism is a subject of ongoing controversy – one we do not intend to resolve here. Some scholars require motivation, intent, and sacrifice; one foundational definition defines altruism as "behavior carried out to benefit another without anticipation of rewards from external sources" (Macaulay and Berkowitz 1970, p. 3). Some definitions require a successful outcome for the target; others merely intent. Others say an altruistic act is any act in which "the actor could have done better for himself had he chosen to ignore the effect of his choice on others" (Margolis 1982, p. 15), thus an altruistic act "need not have zero or negative value to the actor" (Margolis 1982, p. 15). Some equate altruism with any form of other-regardingness (including group-based preferences – Margolis 1982). Others restrict altruism to refer to a willingness to help anyone, regardless of who they are (Monroe 1998). Finally, some definitions of altruism require that the motivation be *strictly* other-oriented: acts that benefit others but driven by egoistic motivations (say, alleviation of guilt, or feeling better about oneself, or mood maintenance) do not count as altruism (see, e.g., a discussion by Simmons 1991, p. 6). Andreoni's (1990) discussion of "pure" and "impure" altruism allows for this distinction: under pure altruism, individuals "care about the well-being of others" (Meier 2007, p. 18). For impure altruism, individuals are motivated by the "warm glow" that they themselves receive from conducting the altruistic act: "People care not only about the utility of the recipient but receive some private goods benefit from their pro-social behavior *per se*" (Meier 2007, p. 19). For a parallel discussion from the psychological literature, see Karylowski's (1982) typology of "exocentric" and "endocentric" sources of altruism. The former refers to concern for others; the latter to concern for the self. A characteristic of altruistic behavior (which makes it distinct from, say, group favoritism) is that altruistic individuals do not generally restrict their altruistic actions to those that will benefit specific groups. Altruists tend to identify with humanity generally rather than any specific subgroup (Monroe 1998).

self-interested act, recent work has shown that both turnout and participation more generally are strongly predicted by altruistic predispositions (Edlin et al. 2007; Fowler 2006; Fowler and Kam 2007; Jankowski 2002, 2007). Research moving beyond the domain of participation suggests an even greater role for altruism in politics, linking altruistic beliefs to ideology (Zettler and Hilbig 2010), which holds pronounced implications for the role of altruism in politics.

In this project, we examine the effects of altruism on public opinion across a number of issues within the broad domain of social welfare, using observational data from the General Social Surveys, which allows us to connect altruistic predispositions to a broad swath of public preferences. In addition, we experimentally examine the extent to which political debate can invoke altruistic predispositions, by designing and conducting our own framing experiments. Our findings suggest that altruistic predispositions act as persistent components of opinion toward social welfare in its many flavors. In addition, we find that the relationship between altruism and social welfare policy preferences can to some extent be attenuated and accentuated as a function of policy frames: in particular, by the mention of who stands to benefit and lose from public policies.

#### **ALTRUISM AND PUBLIC OPINION**

Research on altruism, or regard for others, is not new. Academic inquiries into *altruism* span several disciplines, including the biological sciences – where the actions of parasites, ants,

bees, and guppies are the focus of analysis<sup>3</sup> – and the social sciences of psychology, sociology, economics, and, at a more halting pace, in political science.

In psychology, the study of *prosocial* behavior enjoyed its heyday in the 1960s and 1970s, with research focusing on the conditions under which individuals help others.<sup>4</sup> In the ensuing decades, psychologists continued to investigate the developmental, cognitive, and emotional mechanisms underlying why people help others, as well as the situational determinants of helping behaviors (for a comprehensive review, see Dovidio et al. 2006). Sociologists have examined, among other things, the causes and consequences of voluntary acts such as blood and organ donation and civic volunteering as well as disaster assistance, focusing to a greater degree than psychologists on the creation and maintenance of social norms and relying to a lesser degree on experimental research (Piliavin and Charng 1990; Simmons 1991). Even economists have incorporated the notion of regard for others in their models (for example, trying to explain decisions to contribute to charitable causes; see, e.g., Schokkaert 2006 for an extensive review of this literature) and in behavioral economics (e.g., in

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<sup>3</sup> Darwin's "survival of the fittest" doctrine suggests that self-interested organisms will have the greatest fitness (or chance of survival): "natural selection appears to be a process that promotes selfishness and stamps out altruism" (Sober and Wilson 1998, p. 3). At the group level, Darwin's doctrine does not fare so well, as Darwin himself noted. Groups in which certain members are willing to engage in altruistic acts heighten the group's overall fitness, suggesting there is some evolutionary advantage to altruism within groups. Here, note that *altruism* as it is defined by evolutionary biologists does not require intention – merely an act by which an individual organism "increases the fitness of others and decreases the fitness of the actor" (Sober and Wilson 1998, p. 17). For a review of the evolutionary biologists' approach to altruism, see Sober and Wilson (1998).

<sup>4</sup> This research on why people offer help (or fail to offer help) to others was stimulated by the Kitty Genovese incident, in which a young woman was brutally attacked on the street, in view or within earshot of at least 38 bystanders, and was eventually killed. Not a single bystander intervened. See Dovidio et al. (2006, p. 19-20) for a discussion. Prosocial behavior incorporates a wide variety of acts, including *helping* (in which an individual performs an act that benefits someone else), *altruism* (which, in Dovidio et al.'s formulation, requires benevolent intention and assistance provided without the expectation of benefits to the self), and *cooperation* (where more than one individual works to produce a common good that is beneficial to more than a single actor).

understanding non-equilibrium behavior in experimental markets, public goods, ultimatum, and dictator games; for reviews, see Camerer 2003 and Fehr and Schmidt 2006).<sup>5</sup>

In political science, sustained research on altruism is harder to find. Kristen Monroe's (1998) remarkable work on Jewish rescuers during World War II has provided the field with the most comprehensive, and most moving, depiction of altruism (but, ironically, the protagonists themselves would probably have disagreed with the notion that they were engaging in *political* acts). In Monroe's work, individuals engage in acts of *altruism*, or "behavior intended to benefit another, even when this risks possible sacrifice to the welfare of the actor" (Monroe 1996, 6). Monroe (1996) explains that individuals who are willing to engage in uncommon acts of altruism express a sense of universalism in viewing the human condition. Instead of viewing an individual (and the self, in particular) as tied to specific social groupings, altruists "share a view of the world in which all people are one" (1996, 198). Altruists are unlikely to discriminate in whom they help.<sup>6</sup>

Altruism may be thought of in a number of ways. While some perspectives stress costs to the actor (Margolis 1982; Wilson 1975), the common thread in definitions of altruism focuses on motivations facing individuals: "altruistic behavior (a) must benefit another person, (b) must be performed voluntarily, (c) must be performed intentionally, (d) the benefit must be the goal by itself, and (e) must be performed without expecting any external reward" (Bar-Tal 1985-86, p. 5). At its core, this orientation has been linked to, and is argued to be fostered by a

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<sup>5</sup> In their stunning set of cross-cultural experiments in fifteen small-scale societies, Henrich et al. (2004) report that "there is no society in which experimental behavior is even roughly consistent with the canonical model of self-interested actors" (5).

<sup>6</sup> Note that we do not address the evolutionary or social origins of altruism and other forms of non-self-interested behavior as has been done elsewhere (e.g., Samuelson 1993). Our primary interest here is in how variation in altruism predicts public opinion.

predisposition toward empathy (Stocks et al. 2009; de Waal 2008), as empathy produces a sense of caring for the well-being of others (Farsides 2007).

As such, altruism can be thought of as anchoring one side of a continuum: where altruists see human beings as interchangeable and thus should be willing to support programs that support all human beings. Altruism might also be seen as a companion to cosmopolitanism, where a genuine cosmopolitan's primary allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings. Such a person gives serious attention, in ethical and political matters, "to the good of all humanity – and not just individuals, families, or specific communities" (Smith 2008, p. 40).

Proceeding along the continuum, we encounter ethnocentrism: the predisposition to partitioning the world into ingroups and outgroups (Kinder and Kam 2009). Ethnocentrists, in contrast to altruists, do not see human beings as interchangeable. Indeed, ethnocentrists see the world as a dangerous place, one in which ingroups offer safety and outgroups pose threats. Ethnocentrists favor policies that benefit members of the ingroup and/or punish members of the outgroup; they oppose policies that benefit members of the outgroup and/or withhold benefits from the ingroup (Kinder and Kam 2009).

Proceeding to the endpoint of the continuum are egoists (or the self-interested), for whom the ingroup so revered by ethnocentrists is confined so narrowly as to include only the self (and immediate family members, per Sears and Funk 1990). Self-interested individuals will evaluate policies favorably if they themselves stand to benefit and oppose them if they themselves stand to pay the cost.

but sacrifice  
for ingroup may  
be closely  
related to  
altruism while  
punishment of  
outgroup is not.



Existing work has already highlighted the specificity of the self-interest paradigm for public opinion. We also know that ethnocentrism matters. But, relatively less work has established the extent to which the more generous view of human nature – that individuals care indiscriminately about others – can predict public opinion.

In this paper, we examine the relationship between altruism and support for social welfare programs. While previous work has examined the role of more traditional values and beliefs, such as egalitarianism and individualism in the formation opinion on attitudes toward social welfare spending (Jacoby 2006; Feldman 1988; Kinder and Mendelberg 2000; Sears et al. 2000), few have extended the notion of values to consider the role which altruistic predispositions may play.

These few exceptions are worth noting. Two come out of the behavioral economics tradition, measuring altruistic predispositions using forms of the dictator game. Loewen (2008) examines the relationship between dictator-game giving and support for social welfare policies, finding that altruists are more likely to support spending on public and semi-public goods, even when they must bear the costs of providing those goods. Fong (2007) finds evidence for conditional altruism in charitable giving, demonstrating that even altruists may consider the deservingness of the recipient in their patterns of giving.

Probably the most related work to ours is that of Feldman and Steenbergen (2001), who focus on the concept of humanitarianism, defining it as “the belief that people have responsibilities toward their fellow human beings and should come to the assistance of others in need” (659). Feldman and Steenbergen (2001) conceptualize humanitarianism as a form of prosocial orientation, which is similar to our view of altruistic predispositions. In connecting

humanitarianism to the social welfare state, Feldman and Steenbergen argue that humanitarianism should predict preferences for policies that “redress immediate *needs* that arise in *limited* sections of the population” (p. 661). In short: humanitarianism, as Feldman and Steenbergen argue and find, is largely limited to predicting support for *targeted*, needs-based social welfare policies. Humanitarians are primarily focused on the needs of the disadvantaged, or “people at the bottom,” and not about collective welfare. Hence, unlike Feldman and Steenbergen’s view of humanitarianism, which suggests a focus only on aiding the disadvantaged, we believe that altruistic predispositions reach further in shaping views of social spending. While humanitarianism focuses on aiding the few who are most in need, we argue that altruism should have a broader reach, where altruists seek to benefit not only the few, but also society as a whole. Consequently we expect (and find) the effects of altruistic values not only for targeted spending programs, but also programs with universal reach, unconditioned by views of the recipients.

Social welfare programs may take on a number of forms, depending on the scope and focus of the policy. Some programs are aimed at providing collective benefits, such as policies that focused on health, education, or the environment, while others are aimed more specifically at targeted groups: the elderly, minorities, children, etc.

We expect that when citizens are asked to consider spending on programs with collective benefits, that altruists should be more likely than egoists to support such programs. Additionally, when citizens are asked to consider spending on programs with targeted benefits, altruists should also be more likely than egoists to support such programs.

## ALTRUISM AND ITS CORRELATES

To measure the impact of altruistic predispositions on public opinion across a wide range of issues, we take advantage of an battery included in the 2002 and 2004 editions of the General Social Surveys (Smith 2006). In this battery, respondents were asked to respond to four items designed to determine the extent to which the respondents held altruistic values (Nickell 1998; Webb et al. 2000), in addition to measures designed to assess an individuals' tendency toward empathy, and the frequency with which they engaged in altruistic acts. We focus on the altruistic value items as our estimate of altruistic beliefs because these items provide a superior measure of altruistic tendencies (Smith 2006).

The additive scale is comprised of the following items: "People should be willing to help those who are less fortunate." "Those in need have to learn to take care of themselves and not depend on others" (reverse coded). "Personally assisting people in trouble is very important to me." "These days people need to look after themselves and not overly worry about others" (reverse coded). The additive scale runs from 0 (least altruistic) to 1 (most altruistic), with scale mean 0.63, s.d. 0.15, Chronbach's  $\alpha=0.55$ . Full item text and descriptive appear in Appendix A.<sup>7</sup>

Before delving into the extent to which altruistic values predict policy preferences, we probe a bit into the correlates of altruistic values. Who is more or less altruistic? To answer

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<sup>7</sup> These items are similar to those used by Feldman and Steenbergen (2001), but there are some significant differences between the two. The Feldman and Steenbergen humanitarianism scale includes eight items; the GSS scale includes four. Three of the four items that are on the GSS battery bear some resemblance to items in the humanitarianism scale, but there is one unique item on the GSS battery, which asks about the respondent's view on the importance of "personally assisting those in need." The NES battery does not contain an item asking about whether the respondent feels it is important to *personally assist* others. That said, we could and will analyze the NES battery in the future.



this question, we present partial correlation coefficients in Table 1.<sup>8</sup> As these values suggest, Democrats are significantly more altruistic than Republicans. Being unemployed does not correlate with altruism. Greater household income is associated with higher scores on altruism. Blacks score lower on altruism than whites. Females score significantly higher than males on altruism, and altruism seems to increase with age. These patterns are consistent with the existing literature on altruistic values and gender (Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001; Kamas et al. 2008), on humanitarianism (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001), and prosocial behavior generally (Einolf 2008).

#### ALTRUISM AND SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY PREFERENCES

Also included in the GSS were a series of questions asking respondents to evaluate the extent to which they believed the government was spending, “too little,” “too much,” or “just the right amount” on a series of social welfare issues<sup>9</sup>. We categorize these issues into two distinct domains: universal spending and targeted spending.

The universal spending items purport to benefits all citizens. These include government spending for conventionally considered social welfare programs such as health and education, as well spending on the environment plus infrastructure in the form of highways and bridges, mass transportation, and parks and recreation. Spending on the conventional social welfare programs is quite popular, with 76% of respondents believing that we spend “too little” on

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<sup>8</sup> Partisanship is measured in seven categories, from strong Democrat (0) to strong Republican (1). Employment status is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent is unemployed or temporarily not working and 0 otherwise. Income is an eight category variable, ranging from 0 (<\$12,500) to 1 (\$110,000). A separate dummy variable is included to account for nonresponse to the income question. Race of respondent is captured by two dummy variables: Black and Hispanic, with Whites serving as the suppressed reference group. Sex is a dummy that is coded 1 for females, 0 for males. Age is a continuous variable ranging from 18 (coded 0) to 89 (coded 1).

<sup>9</sup> All items are recoded so that higher values indicate that the respondent believes we are spending “too little.”

health and the same percentage for spending on education. The environment is also popular, with 63% of respondents believing we spend “too little” on the environment. Spending on infrastructure is slightly less popular; only 33% of respondents think we spend “too little” on highways and bridges; 36% hold that view regarding mass transportation; 33% on parks and recreation.<sup>10</sup>

The targeted spending items are designated as those that benefit distinct subsets of the population (or are at least perceived to do so). The available instrumentation in the GSS allows us to examine popular support for a variety of targeted spending items. Support for these items varies significantly from support for the broader programs of education and health (and environment). Of the targeted programs, assistance to the poor and Social Security garner wide support, with over 60% of respondents stating that we are spending “too little” on those programs. Programs for drug addicts and drug rehabilitation, as well as childcare, are also popular, with over 50% of respondents believing we are spending “too little” on them. Other programs are far less popular. Only 30% of respondents believe we are spending “too little” on programs for blacks, only 31% believe so regarding spending on big cities, and spending on welfare is by far the least popular of the targeted programs, with only 22% of respondents stating that we are spending “too little” on it (and over 40% saying we are spending “too much”).

Public support for these programs that pose collective and targeted benefits thus varies widely, with some Americans voicing support for spending more on these programs and some voicing support for spending less. To what extent can altruistic predispositions explain this

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<sup>10</sup> These are weighted frequencies. The full table of frequencies appears in Appendix A.

variation? To answer this question, we model opinion on each of these issues as a function of our measure of altruistic values, as well as a series of control variables that include partisanship, being unemployed, income, race and ethnicity, sex, and age. All variables are scaled to run from 0 to 1 in order to compare effect sizes.

Results from this series of ordered probit regressions appear in Tables 2 and 3. Across the first row of results in Table 1, we see that altruism has a strong and significant effect on support for spending, in all cases but one. We illustrate the magnitude of these effects in Figure 1, which graphs the predicted probability of saying we are spending “too little” based on the estimates in Table 2. Here, we see that across the range of values for altruism, the effect of altruism is substantial: on the issues of health care and environmental spending, altruistic values increase support for spending by 30 and 40 percentage points, respectively. Even for spending on education and transportation, where the effects are not as dramatic, altruism increases support by 20 percentage points over the range of the data.

Altruism matters, but of course it is not the only independent variable that predicts support for spending. We would be suspicious of the results if it were. Across most of the dependent variables, we see that partisanship also has a strong and significant effect, with Democrats more likely than Republicans to say that we are spending “too little” on the various universal programs. Since both variables are coded on the 0-1 interval, we can compare effect sizes by examining the coefficients. We see that the effect of altruism is sometimes smaller than partisanship (health, education), sometimes bigger than partisanship (transportation, parks and recreation), and sometimes even on par with partisanship (environment).

Other variables also have significant effects on support for spending on these universal programs. Income has a generally positive effect, generating support for spending on education, environment, and infrastructure (highways and bridges; mass transportation). Blacks are more supportive than whites for spending on health, education, and parks, and less supportive than whites for spending on environment and highways and bridges. Women are more supportive than men for spending on health and education and less supportive when it comes to infrastructure.

Table 3 presents the results for opinion on targeted programs. Here, we see that altruistic values again have a strong and significant effect on public support for social welfare spending. The effects are particularly large when it comes to spending on programs for minorities, race-coded issues, and the poor; they are a bit weaker for child care and social security, but still, the effects are significant and sizable. In nearly all cases, the effects of altruism dwarf those of partisanship and are in many cases the largest across all covariates in the model. We illustrate the substantive effects in Figure 2, which graphs the predicted probabilities of saying we are spending “too little” on these various targeted programs. Across the range of altruism, we see that support for these targeted programs rises dramatically. When considering spending on the poor or welfare, altruists become 40 percentage points more likely to support such programs compared with non-altruists. For the other programs such as Social Security, aid to big cities, assistance for drug addiction, and aid for child care, an increase along the range of altruism is associated with a 20 percentage point increase in support. The effect for aid to blacks is a bit more modest, with a 15 percentage point increase in support over the range of altruism.

When considered together, these results suggest that altruistic values predict opinions across a range of social welfare oriented programs, from universal programs that enhance human capital (education) to universal programs that enhance infrastructure (mass transportation and parks/recreation), to targeted programs that identify specific (blacks, the poor) and less specific (big cities, drug addicts) groups. Altruism has been shown to have some predictive power on donation to public goods (Andreoni 1990), albeit with some caveats (Laury and Taylor 2008). For purposes of this discussion we consider infrastructure (parks, roads, etc.) to be an example of public goods, as their consumption by others does not reduce their availability, and we too have found that regard for others predicts support for it. The pervasive and sizable effects of altruism suggest an important component of opinion which has previously been paid little attention. Moreover, the wide-ranging effects we have documented stand in contrast with the work on humanitarianism, which argues for a much more constrained effect, limited to needs-based programs targeted at the most disadvantaged.

We conducted a series of robustness checks to make sure that we were capturing altruism and not some other individual-level dispositions. For all of the models in Tables 2 and 3, we included a measure of *limited government*, and found that the effects of altruism on spending opinion are diminished a bit when accounting for limited government when considering universal programs (but remain large and significant in three cases). For targeted programs, inclusion of limited government makes no difference. We also included a measure of self-reported *ideological identification*, and also found that the effects of altruism persist across



both universal and targeted spending programs.<sup>11</sup> Overall, these results give us confidence that what we are capturing is regard for others, or altruistic values, and not some other value of importance.<sup>12</sup>

And, consistent with our theorizing that altruism is one anchor on a continuum of other-regardingness, the general results run in stark contrast to the effects of ethnocentrism on social welfare policy support documented by Kinder and Kam (2009). Kinder and Kam (2009) note that ethnocentrism (at least among whites) predicts support for social insurance programs that assist the elderly (such as Social Security and Medicare), and predict opposition to means-tested programs that target the poor (and especially the racially-coded poor, such as welfare recipients); moreover, ethnocentrism has no significant effect on support for broad human capital programs such as education. Ethnocentric Americans distinguish between “us” and “them,” and their support for social welfare programs thus is qualified by who is targeted and whether the targeted beneficiaries fit into the ingroup or the outgroup. Altruistic Americans, in contrast, make no such distinctions across programs: they support policies that stand to provide universal and collective benefits, and they support policies that target specific groups – even groups to which they might not belong.

These widespread and intriguing findings bring us to the second aspect of the analysis. Altruism has a pervasive and strong influence on support for social welfare spending. But is this support unwavering? Can the relationship between altruism and support for social welfare policies be accentuated or attenuated by features of elite debate that highlight the potential

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<sup>11</sup> These results appear in Appendix A.

<sup>12</sup> We of course would have liked to include a measure of egalitarianism, but it was not available in the GSS.

beneficiaries and potential payees of social welfare programs? To answer this question, we developed and administered a series of framing experiments in which we examine the effects of altruism on opinion across frames that emphasize collective, targeted, and distributive benefits.

#### **FRAMING, ALTRUISM, AND SUPPORT FOR SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES**

Up to this point, we have shown that altruism predicts support for policies that provide collective benefits and policies that provide targeted benefits as well. Still, politics are often defined not just as “why gets what, when” but *also* by who stands to lose, or foot the bill for, policy initiatives. With every costly policy that is put forward, someone (either now, or later) must pay for it. So, we move now to explore the extent to which the connection between altruism and support for social welfare policies remains, in the face of rhetoric that emphasize the distributive aspect of politics.

Highlighting who benefits and who pays are important aspects of how policies are presented, as most issues can be framed in multiple ways. The challenge for political elites is to craft rhetoric to gain advantage among key constituencies. Frames are most effective for issues without well-defined interpretations (Chong and Druckman 2007). Lacking a strong context, such issues are capable of being framed and re-framed continuously by elites over time (Sniderman and Theriault 2004).

Indeed, the current health care debate serves as a case in point, where a wide variety of frames have circulated. Health care reform proposals have been framed by some as offering a collective good, by promising to boost the economy and reduce waste in the health care system. By others, proposals are framed as benefiting specific, targeted groups (e.g., the

unemployed and underemployed, and small businesses). Still by others, health care reform proposals are maligned for merely shifting the costs of coverage from currently undercovered or uncovered groups (e.g., the underemployed or unemployed) to other groups (e.g., the wealthy, or those who currently have private insurance).

A primary focus of framing research examines the characteristics of the *message*, and how varying these characteristics increases or decreases the impact of elite appeals. Strictly privileging message characteristics ignores another important factor: characteristics of the message *recipient*. The “matching effect in persuasion” (Lavine et al. 1999) suggests that the degree to which messages are persuasive should depend upon a set of individual-level characteristics. The key individual characteristic we examine is *altruism*. While frames (and political discourse) provide individuals with information about the choices they can make, individuals’ own predispositions towards others likely influence the extent to which they respond to frames that identify the collective benefits offered by particular policy stances, frames that identify targeted benefits, or frames that highlight distributive benefits, where one group stands to gain at the direct expense of another group. We test the following hypotheses:

H2: Altruists should be *more likely* to favor policies that emphasize *collective benefits* and *targeted benefits* compared with policies that do not emphasize such benefits.

H3: Altruists should be *less likely* to favor policies that emphasize *distributive* benefits, where some parties gain at the cost of other parties.

H2 reflects the expected impact of framing on altruists. When choosing between an outcome framed as providing collective benefits to society or targeted benefits or no explicit

benefits, we expect support among altruists to be swayed by the explicit presentation of who stands to benefit.

With H3, we test the possibility that the relationship between altruism and political activity should be contingent upon benefits and costs; if the outcome of action produces no visible net benefits to society and/or is merely redistributive (shifting costs or benefits from one party to another), then altruists will see nothing to gain (Kam et al. 2009). In these circumstances, when the outcome is framed as simply redistributive, altruists should be less supportive of policies than when they offer collective or targeted benefits.

We conducted two experiments to investigate the extent to which different types of frames might activate or depress the effect of altruistic predispositions. The experiments focus on two different issues: health care reform and federal spending on high school retention programs. They each contain different ways of framing the programs, by emphasizing collective benefits, targeted benefits, or distributive benefits. Table 4 describes the two experiments.

#### **FRAMING STUDY 1**

The 384 respondents in Study 1 were recruited from political science courses at a large, public, western university. The framing studies were delivered within a computer-based self-administered “survey.” The collective benefits frame emphasized the benefits of health care reform for Americans “across all walks of life” and emphasized the broad-reaching benefits across economic and health domains “for all citizens.” The targeted benefits frame emphasized the specific groups who would benefit from a government insurance plan: people who have had to delay treatment because they could not afford it, as well as specific demographic groups such as the “self-employed, poor senior citizens, unemployed workers, and families making less

than \$75,000 per year.” The distributive benefits frame emphasized the above targeted recipients but also noted who would pay for the program: households making over \$150,000 per year. At the end, all respondents were asked, “Do you favor or oppose a government insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital expenses for everyone?” Five response options were available, ranging from strongly favor to strongly oppose. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of these three conditions, or the control.

We first analyze whether the frame makes a difference to respondents’ views on health care reform. We include dummy variables for *Collective Frame* and *Targeted Frame*, with the *Distributive Frame* remaining the suppressed reference group. These results (Model I) appear in the first column of Table 5. As the results suggest, the frame, on average, did little to alter support for health care reform, as the coefficients are small in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero.

It may be that the frame affects individuals with differing levels of altruistic predispositions to different extent. To determine if this is so, we first add altruistic predispositions into the analysis, along with a modest set of control variables<sup>13</sup> (Model II), and then we interact the altruistic predispositions with the frames (Model III). In Study 1, altruistic predispositions consist of a five-item scale tapping altruistic values.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Partisanship is the standard seven-point scale ranges from 0 (strong Democrat) to 1 (strong Republican). Female is a dummy coded 1 for females. Nonwhite is a dummy coded 1 for nonwhites.

<sup>14</sup> The altruistic values index here is a bit closer to the humanitarianism scale included on the NES. It includes the following items: “One should always find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself,” “It is best not to get too involved in taking care of other people’s needs,” “A person should always be concerned about the well-being of others,” “The dignity and well-being of all should be the most important concerns in any society,” and “People tend to pay more attention to the well-being of others than they should.” Items were reverse coded where necessary. The additive index ranges from 0 (least altruistic) to 1 (most altruistic) and has a scale mean of 0.73, s.d. = 0.18, and Cronbach’s  $\alpha$  = 0.74.

As we can see in Model II, altruistic predispositions do predict support for health care reform. Since all covariates are coded from 0-1, we can compare their relative size. We see that the altruistic values index significantly shaped support for a government health insurance plan, such that the effect of altruistic predispositions was approximately equal to the effect of partisanship. Here, partisanship predicts support for government health insurance plan, with Republicans being less supportive and Democrats more supportive. In addition, we see that females are less supportive of the plan and nonwhites more supportive, once we have controlled for altruistic values and partisanship.

In Model III, we include interactions between altruistic values and the framing scenarios. First, the coefficient on *Collective Benefits* is negative, suggesting that among the least altruistic, the collective benefits frame depresses support for the government insurance plan. The coefficients on the three interaction terms between *Altruistic Values* and frames are all positive, and large in magnitude, suggesting that identifying who benefits from the policy increases support for it among altruists. This is particularly the case when it comes to the *Collective Benefits* frame, where the magnitude of the interaction term is largest and where the term is statistically distinguishable from zero. Contrary to our expectations, the *Distributive Frame* does not appear to deter altruists: perhaps they are drawn to helping those targeted for assistance, regardless of which specific groups are required to shoulder the burden.

Table 6 provides a selection of predicted probabilities, for the least and most altruistic. We see that among the least altruistic, the question wording that is most popular is the one that is the stripped version administered to the control group – the one that mentions no explicit beneficiaries. Among the most altruistic, support goes up for all three framed

conditions, compared with the stripped version. The gap between the most and least altruistic widens in the presence of frames that highlight who stands to benefit – especially in the case of collective benefits, where over 70 percentage points separate the most and least altruistic respondents.

## **FRAMING STUDY 2**

During the same session as Study 1, we included an additional framing study on a different issue. Our concern was that focusing on a high-salience issue such as health care reform, while politically important, could have made it more difficult to observe any framing effects, given that subjects might have already formed opinions on the issue. Hence, we selected a new issue: high school retention programs, where we thought pre-existing opinions, to the extent that they existed, would be less firmly rooted, where we thought partisan effects would be less powerful, and where we thought we could craft believable arguments identifying collective benefits, targeted benefits, and distributive benefits. All subjects participated in the health care reform experiment prior to the high school retention experiment.

As with Study 1, subjects were randomly assigned to one of four groups: the collective benefits frame, the targeted benefits frame, the distributive benefits frame, or the control group. The collective benefits frame emphasized the benefits of increasing high school retention rates for Americans “across all walks of life” and emphasized the broad-reaching benefits across economic domains, in terms of innovation, growth, and international competition. The targeted benefits frame emphasized the specific groups who would benefit from increasing retention rates: low-income youth, underperforming school districts, and lower-skilled workers. The distributive benefits frame emphasized the above targeted

recipients but also noted who would pay for the program: households making over \$150,000 per year. At the end, all respondents were asked, “What do you think? Do you think federal spending on high school retention programs should be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?”

As with Study 1, we estimate three models, shown in Table 7. Here, we actually see that there is an effect of the frame: the *Distributive Benefits Frame* significantly depresses support for high school retention programs, whereas the *Collective Benefits Frame* marginally increases support for high school retention programs (the difference between the *Distributive Benefits Frame* and the *Collective Benefits Frame* is statistically distinguishable from zero at  $p < 0.000$ ). When we add altruistic predispositions and control variables to the model, we see that both *Altruistic Values* and *Partisanship* have statistically significant effects, such that the altruistic support increased spending on high school retention programs and Republicans support decreased spending relative to Democrats, but we also see that altruistic predispositions now drastically dwarf the effect of partisanship, which makes sense given the less partisan nature of the issue.

In Model III, we add interactions between the frame and altruistic predispositions. Here, we see that there are quite different patterns of effects. Predicted probabilities may provide the clearest comparisons. These predicted probabilities appear in Table 8.

The predicted probabilities suggest that the frames did have significant effects on the extent to which altruistic predispositions shape support for high school retention programs. In the control group, the least and most altruistic are dramatically separated, on entirely opposite sides of the spending continuum. This is also the case with the *Targeted Benefits* frame:



identifying targeted benefits has no effect on the extent to which altruism predicts support for funding high school retention programs. The interesting patterns arise for the *Collective Benefits* and the *Distributive Benefits* groups. We see that *Collective Benefits* dramatically increase support for high school retention programs among the *least* altruistic, and they only modestly decrease support among the most altruistic. We also see, consistent with our expectations, that the *Distributive Benefits* frame dramatically decreases support for high school retention programs among the most altruistic and modestly increases it among the least altruistic.

#### DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

From both our observational and lab analyses, it appears that altruism is a steady force in the shaping of opinion on social welfare policies. In the analysis of the GSS altruism battery, we found that altruism predicts support for programs that offer both universal and targeted benefits – often to a degree that equals or sometimes exceeds that of partisanship. We found that, contrary to the work on humanitarianism, that altruistic support for policies extends beyond policies that cater to the most disadvantaged; indeed, altruists support policies that provide collective/universal benefits and public goods.

Still, the observational data had some drawbacks. The key one from our perspective was that the questions do not explicitly identify a key part of distributive policies: who pays for the programs. Using a pair of experiments focused on two different social welfare policies, we examined the extent to which the link between altruism and policy support might be attenuated or accentuated by policy frames. First, we find that altruism predicts support for health care reform and high school retention funding. Still, we also find that the effects of

altruism can shift as a consequence of elite rhetoric. For health care reform, a policy that has been salient in the news and particularly polarizing, we found that any mention of benefits (collective, targeted, or distributive) resulted in opinion polarization across the most and least altruistic in the sample. The least altruistic were turned off by explicit mention of benefits, and the most altruistic were generally drawn to the policy when it explicitly mentioned who benefited (regardless of whether it also mentioned who stood to pay for it). When it came to high school retention programs, a less salient and less politically charged issue, we found a different pattern of results: collective benefits appealed to the least altruistic, and distributive benefits drove away the most altruistic. Across the experiments, the findings suggest some inconsistency in response to the same nature of frames.

While politics has historically been painted as the domain of egoists, a growing body of literature has demonstrated the need to consider the influence of other-regarding values such as altruism when evaluating political behavior and public opinion. In our analysis, we show that altruism not only influences opinion across a broad range of social welfare policies, but also its effects are on par with, or even greater than, more traditional explanations for opinion such as partisanship. We have also demonstrated that the reach of altruism on opinion is not invariant. Altruists may be moved to reconsider the way in which they apply those values to behavior through the use of rhetorical frames, and egoists, too, may under some circumstances be persuaded by collective benefits frames. While altruism does seem to affect a wide range of opinions, the magnitude of effect can shift as a consequence of elite frames.

Table 1. Correlates of Altruistic Values

Individual-level characteristic	Partial correlation coefficient
Partisanship	-0.082***
Unemployed	0.002
Household Income	0.052***
Income Refused	0.002
Black	-0.045**
Hispanic	-0.030
Female	0.179***
Age	0.080***

\* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , two-tailed

Table 2. Altruistic Predispositions and Social Welfare Spending, Universal programs

	Health	Education	Environment	Highways & Bridges	Mass Transportation	Parks & Recreation
Altruism	0.54*** 0.19	0.40** 0.19	0.86*** 0.18	0.14 0.16	0.58*** 0.16	0.28* 0.17
Partisanship	-0.69*** 0.09	-0.66*** 0.09	-0.91*** 0.08	-0.07 0.07	-0.29*** 0.08	-0.45*** 0.08
Unemployed	-0.08 0.11	-0.05 0.11	0.20* 0.11	-0.02 0.09	-0.16* 0.09	-0.07 0.10
Household Income	-0.06 0.09	0.29*** 0.09	0.16* 0.09	0.16** 0.08	0.17** 0.08	-0.09 0.08
Income Refused	-0.07 0.12	0.07 0.11	0.11 0.11	0.17* 0.10	0.11 0.11	-0.08 0.11
Black	0.23** 0.10	0.31*** 0.10	-0.24*** 0.08	-0.22*** 0.07	-0.09 0.08	0.31*** 0.08
Hispanic	0.04 0.10	0.18 0.11	0.04 0.10	-0.29*** 0.09	-0.14 0.09	0.01 0.09
Female	0.22*** 0.06	0.13** 0.06	-0.03 0.05	-0.26*** 0.05	-0.11** 0.05	-0.08 0.05
Age	-0.05 0.12	-0.74*** 0.11	-0.82*** 0.11	0.58*** 0.10	0.05 0.10	-0.35*** 0.10
$\tau_1$	-1.54 0.15	-1.82 0.15	-1.71 0.14	-1.01 0.13	-0.99 0.13	-1.85 0.14
$\tau_2$	-0.63 0.15	-0.80 0.15	-0.50 0.14	0.62 0.13	0.56 0.13	0.25 0.13
lnL	-1585.67	-1605.28	-1910.68	-2229.21	-2174.86	-1922.78
$p > \chi^2$	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
N	2408	2426	2377	2382	2301	2393

Table entry is the ordered probit regression coefficient with standard error below.

\* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , two-tailed

Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate support for spending.

Table 3. Altruistic Predispositions and Social Welfare Spending, Targeted programs

	Blacks	Welfare	Poor	Social Security	Big Cities	Drug Addiction	Child Care
<b>Altruism</b>	0.98*** 0.17	1.39*** 0.23	1.12*** 0.26	0.42** 0.18	0.86*** 0.17	0.99*** 0.17	0.60*** 0.17
<b>Partisanship</b>	-0.60*** 0.08	-0.60*** 0.11	-1.16*** 0.12	-0.56*** 0.08	-0.32*** 0.08	-0.39*** 0.08	-0.52*** 0.08
<b>Unemployed</b>	-0.04 0.10	0.22* 0.13	0.12 0.17	-0.23** 0.10	-0.08 0.10	-0.05 0.10	0.03 0.10
<b>Household Income</b>	0.17** 0.08	-0.25** 0.11	-0.34*** 0.13	-0.23*** 0.08	0.07 0.08	-0.21*** 0.08	-0.15* 0.08
<b>Income Refused</b>	0.17 0.11	-0.08 0.14	-0.24 0.17	-0.11 0.11	0.18 0.11	-0.03 0.11	-0.07 0.11
<b>Black</b>	1.27*** 0.09	0.47*** 0.11	0.62*** 0.14	0.14 0.09	0.20*** 0.08	0.23*** 0.08	0.24*** 0.08
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.28*** 0.09	0.07 0.12	0.19 0.15	0.13 0.10	0.24*** 0.09	0.24** 0.09	0.16 0.10
<b>Female</b>	0.06 0.05	-0.08 0.07	-0.09 0.08	0.30*** 0.05	0.10** 0.05	0.00 0.05	0.11** 0.05
<b>Age</b>	-0.23** 0.10	0.19 0.15	0.06 0.15	-0.41*** 0.11	-0.33*** 0.10	0.26** 0.11	-0.47*** 0.11
<b>τ1</b>	-0.39 0.13	0.41 0.18	-1.53 0.20	-1.78 0.14	-0.32 0.13	-0.75 0.13	-1.53 0.14
<b>τ2</b>	1.17 0.13	1.48 0.18	-0.39 0.20	-0.41 0.14	0.92 0.13	0.38 0.13	-0.22 0.13
<b>lnL</b>	-2079.72	-1173.38	-899.55	-1864.31	-2285.10	-2139.43	-1939.02
<b>p&gt;χ2</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>N</b>	2244	1174	1213	2361	2190	2323	2285

Table entry is the ordered probit regression coefficient with standard error below.

\* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , two-tailed

Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate support for spending.

Table 4: Experimental designs

	Study 1 January 2010	Study 2 January 2010
Issue	Health care reform	High school retention programs
Collective benefits frame	Supporters argue that a government insurance plan would <u>benefit Americans across all walks of life</u> by improving efficiency in health care spending and stimulating the nation's economy through job creation. They also argue it would lead to better overall health and longer life expectancies for all citizens.	Supporters argue that increasing retention rates would benefit Americans across all walks of life by producing a more educated workforce that will bring increased innovation and economic growth in the future. They also argue it would improve the ability of the country's workforce to compete with overseas workforces.
Targeted benefits frame	Supporters argue that a government insurance plan would particularly <u>benefit people who have had to put off medical treatment</u> because they have trouble affording it. These groups include people who are self-employed, poor senior citizens, unemployed workers, and families making less than \$75,000 per year.	Supporters argue that increasing retention rates would benefit youth from low-income households and underperforming school districts. They also argue it would improve the ability of lower-skilled workers to compete with overseas workers.
Distributive benefits frame	Supporters argue that a government insurance plan would particularly <u>benefit those who have had trouble affording medical treatment, the self-employed, poor senior citizens, the unemployed, and families making less than \$75,000 per year.</u> The costs would be offset through <u>taxing households making over \$150,000 per year.</u>	Supporters argue that increasing retention rates would benefit youth from low-income households and underperforming school districts. They also argue it would improve the ability of lower-skilled workers to compete with overseas workers. The costs would be offset through taxing households making over \$150,000 per year.

Table 5. Framing and Altruistic Predispositions, Study 1  
DV: Support for Government Health Insurance Plan

	Model I Conditions	Model II Covariates	Model III Interactions
Collective Benefits	0.09 0.15	0.15 0.16	-1.19* 0.68
Targeted Benefits	0.09 0.16	0.25 0.17	-0.62 0.70
Distributive Benefits	0.13 0.16	0.14 0.16	-0.90 0.70
Altruistic Values		1.99*** 0.36	0.87 0.66
Partisanship		-1.97*** 0.22	-1.98*** 0.22
Female		-0.20* 0.12	-0.20* 0.12
Nonwhite		0.19* 0.12	0.21* 0.12
Altruistic Values x Collective Benefits			1.85** 0.91
Altruistic Values x Targeted Benefits			1.19 0.95
Altruistic Values x Distributive Benefits			1.42 0.93
$\tau_1$	-1.34 0.13	-0.87 0.33	-1.68 0.52
$\tau_2$	-0.74 0.12	-0.02 0.32	-0.83 0.52
$\tau_3$	-0.46 0.12	0.37 0.32	-0.43 0.52
$\tau_4$	0.40 0.12	1.49 0.33	0.69 0.52
N	384	384	384

Table entry is the ordered probit regression coefficient with standard error below.

\* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , two-tailed

Dependent variable ranges from 0 (strongly oppose government insurance plan) to 1 (strongly favor government insurance plan).

Table 6. Predicted Support for Government Insurance Plan.

	Least altruistic (sample minimum: 0.2)	Most altruistic (sample maximum: 1)
Control Group	0.28	0.56
Collective Benefits	0.08	0.79
Targeted Benefits	0.17	0.76
Distributive Benefits	0.12	0.75

Predicted probabilities from Table 5, Model III.



Table 7. Framing and Altruistic Predispositions, Study 2

DV: Support for Increased Spending on High School Retention Programs

	Model I Conditions	Model II Covariates	Model III Interactions
Collective Benefits	0.30 0.19	0.28 0.19	2.16*** 0.78
Targeted Benefits	0.10 0.19	0.09 0.20	0.06 0.84
Distributive Benefits	-0.43** 0.17	-0.50*** 0.18	1.20 0.73
Altruistic Values		1.77*** 0.40	3.29*** 0.82
Partisanship		-0.39* 0.23	-0.39* 0.24
Female		0.22 0.14	0.20 0.14
Nonwhite		-0.06 0.14	-0.09 0.14
Altruistic Values x Collective Benefits			-2.70** 1.09
Altruistic Values x Targeted Benefits			0.03 1.20
Altruistic Values x Distributive Benefits			-2.42** 1.02
$\tau_1$	-1.67 0.16	-0.56 0.36	0.43 0.58
$\tau_2$	-0.45 0.13	0.78 0.36	1.80 0.59
N	384	384	384

Table entry is the ordered probit regression coefficient with standard error below.

\* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , two-tailed

Dependent variable ranges from 0 (decrease spending by a lot) to 1 (increase spending by a lot).

Table 8. Predicted Support for Increased Spending on High School Retention Programs.

	Least altruistic (sample minimum: 0.2)	Most altruistic (sample maximum: 1)
Control Group	0.08	0.89
Collective Benefits <i>all</i>	0.59	0.76
Targeted Benefits <i>low inc</i>	0.09	0.91
Distributive Benefits <i>low inc high pay</i>	0.25	0.52

Predicted probabilities from Table 6, Model III.

Figure 1. Altruistic Support for Universal Spending





Figure 2. Altruistic Support for Targeted Spending



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Appendix A.

Altruistic Values Items

Item	Mean (s.e.)
"People should be willing to help those who are less fortunate."	0.83 (0.004)
"Those in need have to learn to take care of themselves and not depend on others" (reverse coded).	0.42 (0.005)
"Personally assisting people in trouble is very important to me."	0.74 (0.004)
"These days people need to look after themselves and not overly worry about others" (reverse coded).	0.56 (0.006)

Source: GSS 2002 & 2004. Weighted analysis, using "adults" as probability weight.  
Coded from 0 (not altruistic) to 1 (altruistic).



Dependent variables

Item	% "Too Much"	% "About the Right amount"	% "Too Little"
Health "Health" (natheal) and "Improving and protecting the nation's health" (nathealy)	5.8	18.4	75.8
Education "Education" (nateduc) and "Improving the nation's education system" (nateducy)	5.1	19.3	75.6
Environment "Environment" (natenvir) and "Improving and protecting the environment" (natenviy)	7.6	29.1	63.3
Highways and bridges (natroad)	12.9	54.2	33.0
Mass transportation (natmass)	10.7	52.8	36.5
Parks and recreation (natpark)	6.3	60.5	33.3
Blacks "Improving the conditions of blacks" (natrace) and "Assistance to blacks" (natracey)	20.2	49.4	30.4
Welfare (natfare)	41.1	36.4	22.5
Assistance to the poor (natfarey)	7.3	24.2	68.4
Social Security (natsoc)	5.1	31.6	63.3
Big cities "Solving the problems of the big cities" (nacity) "Assistance to big cities" (nacityy)	24.2	44.6	31.3
Drugs "Dealing with drug addiction" (natdrug) "Drug rehabilitation" (natdrugy)	11.1	34.2	54.8
Childcare (natchld)	7.1	34.4	58.5

Source: GSS 2002 & 2004. Weighted analysis, using "adults" as probability weight.

Altruistic Predispositions and Social Welfare Spending, Universal programs  
Controlling for Limited Government

	Health	Education	Environment	Highways & Bridges	Mass Transportation	Parks & Recreation
<b>Altruism</b>	0.78*** 0.24	0.25 0.24	0.93*** 0.22	0.07 0.20	0.39* 0.21	0.21 0.21
<b>Limited Government</b>	-0.45*** 0.12	-0.60*** 0.12	-0.40*** 0.11	-0.17* 0.10	-0.15 0.11	-0.21** 0.11
<b>Partisanship</b>	-0.61*** 0.11	-0.64*** 0.11	-0.84*** 0.10	-0.03 0.10	-0.26*** 0.10	-0.40*** 0.10
<b>Unemployed</b>	-0.05 0.14	-0.07 0.14	0.06 0.13	-0.05 0.12	-0.12 0.12	-0.22* 0.12
<b>Household Income</b>	0.05 0.11	0.32*** 0.11	0.24** 0.11	0.17* 0.10	0.26*** 0.10	-0.07 0.10
<b>Income Refused</b>	-0.02 0.15	0.09 0.15	0.11 0.14	0.13 0.14	0.28** 0.14	-0.05 0.14
<b>Black</b>	0.14** 0.12	0.18 0.12	-0.31*** 0.10	-0.15 0.10	0.02 0.10	0.20** 0.10
<b>Hispanic</b>	-0.07 0.13	0.05 0.13	0.00 0.12	-0.28** 0.11	-0.09 0.11	-0.06 0.11
<b>Female</b>	0.23*** 0.07	0.11 0.07	0.05 0.06	-0.29*** 0.06	-0.14** 0.06	-0.07 0.06
<b>Age</b>	-0.18 0.15	-0.70*** 0.15	-0.86*** 0.14	0.59*** 0.13	0.13 0.13	-0.40*** 0.13
<b><math>\tau_1</math></b>	-1.56 0.20	-2.20 0.20	-1.82 0.18	-1.11 0.17	-1.08 0.17	-2.01 0.18
<b><math>\tau_2</math></b>	-0.65 0.19	-1.21 0.20	-0.54 0.18	0.53 0.16	0.45 0.17	0.12 0.17
<b>lnL</b>	-1044.60	-1028.36	-1230.63	-1440.72	-1415.13	-1236.70
<b><math>p &gt; \chi^2</math></b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>N</b>	1554	1566	1537	1542	1493	1550

Table entry is the ordered probit regression coefficient with standard error below.

\* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , two-tailed

Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate support for spending.

Altruistic Predispositions and Social Welfare Spending, Targeted programs  
Controlling for Limited Government

	Blacks	Welfare	Poor	Social Security	Big Cities	Drug Addiction	Child Care
<b>Altruism</b>	0.96*** 0.21	1.22*** 0.29	1.12*** 0.33	0.74*** 0.22	0.83*** 0.21	0.77*** 0.21	0.54** 0.22
<b>Limited Government</b>	-0.41*** 0.11	-0.63*** 0.16	-0.74*** 0.17	-0.51*** 0.12	-0.48*** 0.11	-0.51*** 0.11	-0.35*** 0.11
<b>Partisanship</b>	-0.49*** 0.10	-0.38*** 0.14	-0.90*** 0.15	-0.45*** 0.10	-0.22** 0.10	-0.29*** 0.20	-0.42*** 0.10
<b>Unemployed</b>	-0.05 0.12	0.11 0.16	0.12 0.22	-0.20 0.13	-0.12 0.12	-0.02 0.12	-0.09 0.13
<b>Household Income</b>	0.18** 0.10	-0.17 0.14	-0.29* 0.15	-0.12 0.11	0.03 0.10	-0.15 0.10	-0.05 0.10
<b>Income Refused</b>	0.18 0.14	-0.04 0.17	0.19 0.26	-0.17 0.14	0.27* 0.14	0.01 0.14	-0.20 0.14
<b>Black</b>	1.23*** 0.11	0.49*** 0.14	0.64*** 0.18	0.09 0.11	0.18* 0.10	0.23** 0.11	0.14 0.11
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.30*** 0.11	0.16 0.16	0.19 0.18	0.16 0.12	0.16 0.11	0.26** 0.12	0.09 0.12
<b>Female</b>	0.10* 0.06	-0.12 0.09	-0.11 0.09	0.33*** 0.06	0.10 0.06	0.00 0.06	0.18*** 0.06
<b>Age</b>	-0.08 0.13	0.29 0.19	0.10 0.19	-0.32** 0.14	-0.27** 0.13	0.34* 0.13	-0.48*** 0.14
<b>τ1</b>	-0.45 0.17	0.14 0.24	-1.80 0.26	-1.69 0.18	-0.56 0.17	-1.06 0.17	-1.67 0.18
<b>τ2</b>	1.15 0.17	1.23 0.24	-0.58 0.26	-0.32 0.18	0.68 0.17	0.09 0.17	-0.34 0.18
<b>lnL</b>	-1337.64	-744.45	-583.64	-1193.82	-1476.72	-1375.86	-1240.76
<b>p&gt;χ2</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>N</b>	1452	751	795	1526	1424	1510	1475

Table entry is the ordered probit regression coefficient with standard error below.

\* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , two-tailed

Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate support for spending.

Altruistic Predispositions and Social Welfare Spending, Universal programs  
Controlling for Ideology

	Health	Education	Environment	Highways & Bridges	Mass Transportation	Parks & Recreation
<b>Altruism</b>	0.53*** 0.19	0.39** 0.19	0.83*** 0.18	0.18 0.16	0.56*** 0.17	0.27 0.17
<b>Ideology</b>	-0.65*** 0.14	-0.68*** 0.14	-1.13*** 0.13	-0.28** 0.11	-0.32*** 0.12	-0.54*** 0.12
<b>Partisanship</b>	-0.47*** 0.10	-0.45*** 0.10	-0.60*** 0.09	-0.16* 0.08	-0.19** 0.08	-0.28*** 0.09
<b>Unemployed</b>	-0.07 0.11	-0.07 0.11	0.18 0.11	-0.01 0.10	-0.14 0.10	-0.08 0.10
<b>Household Income</b>	-0.07 0.09	0.28*** 0.09	0.16* 0.09	0.17** 0.08	0.17** 0.08	-0.09 0.08
<b>Income Refused</b>	-0.04 0.12	0.09 0.12	0.11 0.16	0.24** 0.11	0.17 0.11	-0.08 0.11
<b>Black</b>	0.32*** 0.10	0.37*** 0.10	-0.17* 0.09	-0.24*** 0.08	-0.06 0.08	0.37*** 0.08
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.05 0.11	0.20* 0.11	0.06 0.10	-0.28*** 0.09	-0.15* 0.09	0.00 0.09
<b>Female</b>	0.23*** 0.06	0.12** 0.06	-0.04 0.05	-0.27*** 0.05	-0.11** 0.05	-0.09* 0.05
<b>Age</b>	0.02 0.12	-0.68*** 0.12	-0.73*** 0.11	0.56*** 0.10	0.07 0.10	-0.29*** 0.11
<b><math>\tau_1</math></b>	-1.77 0.16	-2.08 0.16	-2.18 0.15	-0.90 0.13	-1.12 0.14	-2.03 0.14
<b><math>\tau_2</math></b>	-0.85 0.16	-1.05 0.16	-0.94 0.15	0.74 0.13	0.43 0.14	0.07 0.14
<b>lnL</b>	-1537.97	-1559.94	-1829.93	-2183.84	-2138.79	-1884.01
<b><math>p &gt; \chi^2</math></b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>N</b>	2367	2384	2339	2344	2270	2351

Table entry is the ordered probit regression coefficient with standard error below.

\* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , two-tailed

Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate support for spending.

Altruistic Predispositions and Social Welfare Spending, Targeted programs  
Controlling for Ideology

	Blacks	Welfare	Poor	Social Security	Big Cities	Drug Addiction	Child Care
<b>Altruism</b>	0.92*** 0.17	1.41*** 0.23	1.07*** 0.26	0.43** 0.18	0.80*** 0.17	0.99*** 0.17	0.56*** 0.18
<b>Ideology</b>	-0.69*** 0.12	-0.76*** 0.16	-0.63*** 0.19	-0.24* 0.12	-0.49*** 0.12	-0.26** 0.12	-0.65*** 0.12
<b>Partisanship</b>	-0.38*** 0.09	-0.40*** 0.12	-0.93*** 0.13	-0.49*** 0.09	-0.17* 0.09	-0.31*** 0.09	-0.31*** 0.09
<b>Unemployed</b>	-0.04 0.10	0.24* 0.13	0.16 0.27	-0.24** 0.10	-0.06 0.10	-0.07 0.10	0.01 0.10
<b>Household Income</b>	0.16* 0.08	-0.26** 0.11	-0.31** 0.13	-0.22*** 0.09	0.05 0.08	-0.21** 0.08	-0.16* 0.08
<b>Income Refused</b>	0.15 0.11	-0.06 0.14	-0.22 0.28	-0.08 0.12	0.18 0.11	0.01 0.11	-0.05 0.12
<b>Black</b>	1.34*** 0.09	0.50*** 0.11	0.79*** 0.15	0.17 0.09	0.26*** 0.08	0.25*** 0.08	0.29*** 0.09
<b>Hispanic</b>	0.29*** 0.09	0.06 0.13	0.20 0.15	0.12 0.10	0.25*** 0.09	0.25*** 0.10	0.17* 0.10
<b>Female</b>	0.07 0.05	-0.10 0.07	-0.07 0.08	0.30*** 0.05	0.11** 0.05	0.02 0.05	0.11** 0.05
<b>Age</b>	-0.17 0.11	0.26 0.15	0.15 0.16	-0.40*** 0.11	-0.28*** 0.11	0.28*** 0.11	-0.42*** 0.11
<b>τ1</b>	-0.67 0.14	0.13 0.19	-1.72 0.22	-1.86 0.15	-0.52 0.14	-0.83 0.14	-1.80 0.15
<b>τ2</b>	0.91 0.14	1.22 0.19	-0.58 0.22	-0.49 0.14	0.73 0.14	0.31 0.14	-0.47 0.14
<b>lnL</b>	-1337.64	-744.45	-583.64	-1193.82	-1476.72	-1375.86	-1240.76
<b>p&gt;χ2</b>	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>N</b>	2209	1155	1192	2324	2162	2286	2250

Table entry is the ordered probit regression coefficient with standard error below.

\* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , two-tailed

Dependent variable is coded such that higher values indicate support for spending.