

**The Value and Values of Diplomacy:  
Rationalism, Psychology and European Security in the 1920s**

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*Abstract*

By reducing the dynamics and outcomes of negotiation to structural factors, rationalist theories explicitly or implicitly dismiss the role that diplomacy plays in states' ability to realize their interests. Drawing on psychological studies of negotiation, this article argues that negotiating strategies and outcomes are not purely a function of the distribution of power or interests. Diplomacy has value. Decision-makers with the same set of interests and the same level of power can and do choose between different diplomatic styles based on the individual-level attributes of social and epistemic motivation. As political ideology is a function of both motivations, the left and far right approach diplomacy differently. Independent of structural circumstances, the left favors integrative negotiation and the right coercive bargaining. Only the center-right approaches diplomacy in the way foreseen by rationalist theories, pragmatic negotiation adjusting to structural circumstances. The interaction of these different diplomatic styles gives way to a particular character of diplomatic interactions, either value-creation or value-claiming, that has an effect on outcomes independent of the distribution of power and interests. I apply this argument to a series of diplomatic interactions among the European powers in the 1920s.

What is the value of diplomacy? How does it affect the course of foreign affairs independent of the distribution of power and foreign policy interests? Structural theories of international relations, whether neorealist or rationalist, often reduce the dynamics and outcomes of diplomacy to the distribution of interests, power, and information, all things that are generally out of control of those who engage in diplomacy. How states negotiate is a function of their leverage in a particular negotiating setting. It is endogenous to structure. States who are more satisfied with the status quo drive a harder bargain than those who are not by holding out or using weaker states' greater interest in a deal to extort concessions on other issues. Weaker states have no choice but to adopt a conciliatory strategy of side payments and compromise. The outcome of a distributive bargaining game will be a function of the distribution of bargaining power, with the strong prevailing. Those more able to send costly signals of resolve might be favored in a negotiation, but this too is largely out of the hand of diplomats (Fearon 1994, 1995; Gartzke 1999; Schultz 2001). States might reach win-win outcomes but only when their interests are asymmetrical -- that is they value different issues on the negotiating agenda differently and can engage in tradeoffs and logrolls in which each side gains what it values most. The structure of interests, not diplomacy, determines the outcome, and diplomats are expected to accurately read their environment and adjust appropriately. The role of agency is ignored and sometimes even dismissed. Diplomacy is epiphenomenal.

Psychologists studying negotiation, however, have long found arguments relying on structural features such as the distribution of power and incentives incomplete (De Dreu and Carnevale 2003). Experiments reveal that some individuals take very different approaches to negotiation *even in the same situational circumstances*, yielding very different outcomes and payoffs. That is, they have already engaged in the type of agent-structure debate advised here. This research is of great relevance to the study of diplomacy in international relations.

Psychologists point to the role played by two motivational goals that are attributes of individuals -- social motivation and epistemic motivation. Negotiators have different preferences as to what they regard as the ideal distribution of benefits. Some are more prosocial, valuing an outcome that leaves both satisfied. Others are simply egoistic. Social motivations are based on heuristics, cognitive shortcuts with which individuals develop expectations about what interactions will generally be like. Heuristics, however, impede the objective evaluation of new information, promoting confirmatory information search in which signals are interpreted in light of prior expectations. Those with greater epistemic motivation demonstrate a greater willingness to transcend these cognitive obstacles and develop an accurate understanding of their environment. They are better able to adapt their negotiating strategy to the particular strategic circumstances they find themselves in.

Given that prosocial and epistemic motivation are positively correlated in politics, a crude combination of social and epistemic motivations reveals three styles of negotiation -- in our case, diplomacy. Proselfs with low epistemic motivation are *coercive bargainers* who frame negotiations in zero-sum and adversarial terms. They engage in "distributive" negotiation behavior, using leverage to extract the greatest benefits possible. Coercive bargainers are also more likely to dismiss costly signals of conciliatory and cooperative intent by others but take seriously cheap talk of a confrontational nature as it reinforces their fixed-pie framing of the situation.

Prosocials, in contrast, approach negotiations as an opportunity to generate win-win outcomes for both sides through the exchange of concessions and honest information. In distributive games with a fixed pie, their offers to others are more generous than those of proselfs, and they are quicker to make concessions. In games of integrative potential, prosocials practice an "integrative" negotiating

style in which they share information openly and honestly with others, despite the vulnerable position this places them in. They are likely to be more open to signals of conciliation by others and more dismissive of the credibility of confrontational tactics given their framing of the situation. However, the effect of a prosocial motivation is not simply to roll over and concede. Committed to reciprocity, they will not engage in integrative negotiation against those who do not do the same.

Finally, those with a prosocial motivation but a high level of epistemic motivation behave as *pragmatists*. Epistemic motivation makes pragmatists better able to judge their environment and helps them to remain open to credible signals of both conciliation and confrontation. This combination of attributes allow them to instrumentally shift their negotiating style from distributive to integrative when this helps to realize goals more effectively given the structural circumstances, such as the nature of the game, their level of power, and/or the negotiating style of their partner.

It is only *pragmatists* who meet the strict test of rationality typically assumed in formal bargaining theory. They engage in a calm, deliberate and hard-headed evaluation of all relevant data with an eye towards maximizing egoistic interests. Therefore, it is not, as behavioral economists sometimes imply, that individuals are never instrumentally rational. Just as it is inappropriate to assume that all political actors are calculating utility-maximizers, it is wrong to assume that none are. Psychology tells us that some are while others are not. Rationality is not a useful assumption of universal behavior, but nor is it an ideal to which none can aspire. It is a variable.

A theory of the value of diplomacy requires a theory of the values in diplomacy. This way we can develop expectations about who on the political spectrum is likely, in the same structural circumstances, to pursue different styles of diplomacy and exclude the possibility that diplomatic style is simply endogenous to the negotiating environment. In domestic politics, political parties of the left have a more prosocial motivation, evident in their commitment to providing for others and ensuring equality. Those who identify with the left of the political spectrum express greater support for the values of what the great theorist of values, Salomon Schwartz, calls “self-transcendence.” They will be integrative negotiators. The right embrace “conservation” values that promote in-group solidarity. They will exhibit a prosocial motivation in diplomacy. Epistemic motivation has been consistently found to decline towards the right of the political spectrum. Given this combination, the right should therefore be the advocate of coercive bargaining. The center-right, lower in the need for closure than their more extreme counterparts yet still prosocial in its social motivation, is the likely political home of pragmatic negotiation.

The particular combination of diplomatic styles among interacting statesmen gives way to diplomatic interactions of a particular character, which might have an impact on negotiation outcomes independent of the structure of the situation, such as the distribution of interests, and power. These interactions might be marked by value-creating, distributive bargaining on both sides, or value-creating, integrative negotiation by both sides. *Ceteris paribus*, we expect value-claiming negotiation between coercive bargainers and any type of opponent. It only takes one to induce distributive bargaining. For instrumental reasons, pragmatists will see no point in trying to elicit mutual concessions from such an opponent, and prosocials will defect out of a moral commitment to reciprocity. Value-creation, in contrast, takes two. It prevails among prosocial dyads, but also potentially between pragmatists and between pragmatists and prosocials, particularly if pragmatists are in a weak position or expect to be in the future.

Diplomacy cannot bring about agreements where there is no outcome that both prefer to the status quo. However, it can frustrate or facilitate agreement where there is the potential for success based on the distribution of preferences. And depending on the diplomatic style of players, those outcomes might not be skewed towards the more powerful. By holding their cards close to their vest, those engaged in value-claiming are harder pressed to reach mutually beneficial outcomes, even in situation of integrative potential in which each side can obtain what it values most provided it concedes on items of less importance. Mutually beneficial outcomes are more likely when states engage in value-creation.

In the pages that follow, I first review the rationalist literature on negotiation and then the psychological literature that has tried to improve upon it by showing the importance of agency in the form of individual-level attributes. Introducing the variables of social and epistemic motivation creates three types of diplomatic styles whose political home can, based on the distribution of these psychological factors across the left and the right, be specified in advance. I then develop empirical expectations. The six potential combinations of the three different diplomatic styles will generate either value-creating or value-claiming dynamics that make diplomatic success, and success of a particular win-win kind, more or less likely. I test the argument using a series of carefully researched case studies, using almost exclusively primary materials, drawn from negotiations between Britain, France and Germany on security issues during the 1920s in which the six possible combinations of diplomatic style among dyads are represented.

### **The Value of Diplomacy: Rational and Psychological Theories of Negotiation**

Both the formal and the psychological literatures on negotiation generally distinguish between two broad strategies. “Value-claiming,” sometimes called “distributive” or “contending” behavior, is marked by “non-cooperative” negotiation – making significant demands of the other side and refusing or only grudgingly making concessions. The aim is to pressure the other side into making concessions, coercing others into deals closer to one’s ideal point. One never reveals private information about his or her “reservation point,” the lowest possible outcome he or she would be ready to accept (Odell 2000; DeDreu and Boles 1998; Beersma and DeDreu 1999; Olekalns, Smithy and Kibby 1996; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; DeDreu and Carnevale 2003; McKibben; Weingart et al 2007). Indeed value-claiming revolves around trying to make the other believe that point is as high as possible. Opening bids are high. Forcing others to make concessions first prevents commitment problems in which negotiators have to trust that others will come through on their promises. It also allows them to pocket others’ concessions and to ask for more without having spent any of their negotiating capital. Concessions from others are derided as inadequate. One expresses pessimism that deals can be reached and exaggerates differences between the sides. Negotiators play hard to get, staking out red lines and holding out in a game of chicken and brinksmanship.

All sources of leverage are used in value-claiming. One might hold an issue of value to the other (but not to himself) hostage, refusing to concede on it so as to extract concessions on more important issues. However, there is no incentive to reveal the relative unimportance of the captive as this is valuable information. Value-claiming also tries to deny efforts by the other side to pursue such a coercive linking strategy that can be used to extract concessions. It is advised to keep issues on which one places great value separate, so that one cannot be used to force concessions on the other.

Value-claiming negotiation should be familiar to students of international relations, as it is the basis of models of coercive bargaining, as pioneered by Schelling and elaborated more recently in bargaining theories of war (Fearon 1995; Gartzke 1999; Schultz 2001). Schelling writes: “The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy –vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy” (1966: 2). Good diplomacy consists of making credible positional commitments and refusing to back down so as to obtain the largest share of the pie possible.

“Value-creating,” on the other hand, aims at a win-win outcome in which each side secures his most important goals. Also called “cooperative,” “integrative,” or “problem-solving” negotiation, value creation involves conceding on issues of lesser importance, rather than holding them hostage, in exchange for concessions by the other side on those issues that one values more. It proceeds through reciprocity rather than coercion and through the exchange of honest information rather than inflated threats. Negotiators make fairer offers and acknowledge concessions made by the other side. They express optimism about the prospects for agreement, even if that is not the case. Negotiation proceeds in good faith and with goodwill.

Value creation is designed to “expand rather than split the pie” (Odell 2000: 21). Perhaps the most common experimental scenario used in negotiation research involves two negotiators trying to reach a solution on three or more interconnected issues on which the pair has contrasting but also asymmetrical interests. In other words, each would prefer to prevail on all the questions at hand, but the matter of most importance to both is different. The key is to find it. In this way, integrative negotiation does not so much create value as discovers it (Odell 2000; DeDreu and Boles 1998; Beersma and DeDreu 1999; Olekalns, Smithy and Kibby 1996; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; DeDreu and Carnevale 2003; McKibben; Weingart et al 2007). It should be pointed out that a value-creation strategy does *not* imply that one is “failing to work diligently to gain value for one’s own side” (Odell 2000: 32). It is no less self-interested than value-claiming.

### *Rationalist Bargaining Theory*

Formal and rationalist bargaining theory is largely structuralist in character, arguing or assuming that the choice of negotiating strategy, what I will call diplomatic style, is a function of the structural situation in which decision-makers find themselves.<sup>1</sup> Stronger parties, that is, those who are less dissatisfied with the status quo or who have the resources to coerce others, generally adopt value-claiming strategies, something first argued by Nash (1953) and subsequently applied to international relations (Moravcsik 1998; Morrow 1999; Muthoo 1999; Voeten 2001). They are also likely to achieve outcomes that better reflect their interests (Krasner 1991; Fearon 1998; Moravcsik 1998; Morelli 1999; Koremenos 2005). Weaker parties are forced either to make greater concessions or attempt to use a value-creation strategy of adding to the agenda issues of value to the stronger side so as gain a better outcome, what are known as “side payments.”

The underlying preference structure also affects the choice of strategies, rationalists claim. Value creating strategies are more likely to be used when parties value different issues on the negotiating agenda differently, facilitating a package deal. Where parties have symmetrical preferences – that is, the same preference function -- negotiation takes on a zero-sum, distributive character and value-

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<sup>1</sup> I am highly indebted to Heather McKibben for help with this section. I rely heavily on her manuscript on negotiating strategies.

claiming prevails (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; McGinnis 1986; Martin 1992; Lohmann 1997; Tollison and Willett 1979; Sebenius 1983; Martin 1994; Davis 2004; Sebenius 1983; Morgan 1990).

Rationalist bargaining theory suffers from some empirical and theoretical problems. Behavioral economists stress how individuals generally do not live up to rationalist expectations. The failure of rationalist theories to explain actual negotiating behavior spawned an interest in “social cognition” approaches to negotiation, drawing on both social and cognitive psychology (Neale and Bazerman 1991). Implicit in the formal rationalist literature on negotiation is that all those placed in the same situation with the same information and goals will see the situation similarly and will pursue the same strategy. In contrast, as Neale and Fragale explain: “[U]nlike traditional economic models of negotiator behavior, the social cognition approach to negotiation recognizes that two negotiators, facing the same objective circumstances, may have different goals, express different behaviors, and obtain different benefits, simply because these two negotiators perceive their circumstances differently” (2006: 27).

Rationalism also has logical problems, particularly in explaining win-win outcomes. Rationalists are at a loss of how to explain the *process* by which integrative deals are reached, even if the outcome is collectively rational and more Pareto-optimal. Finding an outcome that creates value requires players to reveal private information about which issues are most important to them and how far they can actually compromise without crossing their red lines (Olekals and Smith 2009: 347-348; Risse 2000: 21). Yet rationalist approaches to negotiation and diplomacy continually stress incentives to “dissemble” (Schelling 1966; Fearon 1995; Gartzke 1999). Negotiators do not have an incentive to reveal their ranking of their most important issues or their reservation points unless others reciprocate *and* one can trust those revelations (De Dreu, Koole and Steinel 2000; O’Connor and Carnevale 1997). Indeed absent knowledge of others’ preferences, negotiators have reasons to retain and inflate the value of low priority issues for use as bargaining chips. Even if states were willing to provide such information, others would have reason to doubt their sincerity. Reaching integrative outcomes requires parties to feel comfortable offering honest information that leaves them vulnerable to exploitation (Tomlinson, Dineen and Lewick 2009; Pruitt and Lewis 1975).

### *Psychological Findings on Negotiation*

The psychological literature on negotiation highlights two individual-level motivations that affect negotiating behavior – social and epistemic. Each of these varies by individual even in the same negotiation environment. And by showing how some (but not all) depart from the predictions of formal bargaining theory, insights from the psychological literature are able to solve many of rationalism’s empirical and theoretical problems.

Social motivation is the “desire to attain certain distributions of outcomes between oneself and the other party” (De Dreu and Carnevale 2003). It is the most powerful predictor of individual-level differences in negotiation analysis to date (Deutsch 1960; McClintock 1972; Messick and McClintock 1968). *Prosocial* motivation is marked by a concern for not only one’s own outcome, but that of others as well. Prosocials want to maximize joint benefits. They are also more concerned with guaranteeing an equal distribution of gains (De Cremer and Van Lange 2001). In contrast, *proselfs* have only egoistic interests. Social motivation is either primed in experiments through instructions, so as to reduce omitted variable bias, or captured as an intrinsic quality through “social value orientations” measured prior to experimental participation, with the same results (Carnevale and De Dreu 2003).

Those with different social motivations behave differently because they approach negotiations with different framings of the same situation. Carnevale and Pruitt describe negotiating strategies as “mind-sets” (1992), De Dreu and Boles (1998) as “heuristics.” Proselfs are more likely than prosocials to adopt a “fixed-pie” framing, viewing negotiations in distributive and zero-sum terms even when there is the potential for outcomes of mutual benefit (DeDreu and Boles 1998; DeDreu, Weingart and Kwon 2000; De Dreu, Koole and Steinel 2000). They are guided by notions such as “winner take all” and “your loss is my gain” (De Dreu and Boles 1998). Prosocials, in contrast, see more possibility for joint gains because they are more likely to frame negotiations in mixed-motive terms in which interests are only partially incompatible (Olekalns, Smith and Kibby 1996; Golec and Federico 2004). Prosocials endorse sentiments such as “share and share alike,” an “equal split is fair,” and “be willing to compromise” (De Dreu and Boles 1998). They view negotiations as a problem to be solved and search for outcomes that benefit both sides.

Social motivation affects actual bargaining behavior as individuals adopt negotiating styles consistent with these overall framings of the situation. Prosocials tend to approach negotiation in a problem-solving mindset conducive to mutual benefit and value-creation, proselfs in a distributive fashion leading to value-claiming (Olekalns, Smith and Kibby 1996; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Fry 1985; Beersma and DeDreu 1999). In experiments, proselfs make less conciliatory first offers and lower overall concessions than prosocials (De Dreu and Boles 1998; De Dreu and Van Lange 1995; Carnevale and Lawler 1986; Van Lange 1999; Van Lange and Kuhlman 1994; De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; Liebrand et al 1986) and higher demands of others (De Dreu and van Lange 1995; Olekalns, Smith and Kibby 1996; De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004). Proselfs engage in more “positional commitments,” in which they draw a line they claim they will not cross (Carnevale and Lawler 1986). Committed to equal outcomes, prosocials often forgo gains in distributive situations so that others might also share in the spoils (Van Lange 1999; De Cremer and Van Lange 2001). Prosocials express a greater interest in the welfare of others in post-experiment (De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; De Dreu and Van Lange 1995). Rationalist bargaining theories expect those with the bargaining leverage that comes with an “exit option,” such as being more satisfied with the status quo, or asymmetric information to exploit it. However, experimental research indicates that while proselfs generally take advantage of such opportunities, prosocials do not (De Dreu, Giebels and Van de Vliert 2000; Schei and Rognes 2003; De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004).

Prosocials’ pursuit of integrative negotiation, however, is contingent on reciprocity. In mixed-motive cooperation games, prosocials do not consistently choose the outcome that maximizes joint gains if the other is not cooperating (Kuhlman and Marshello 1975; Kuhlman and Wimberley 1976). In a phenomenon known as “behavioral assimilation,” they defect against consistent defection (Stouten, De Cremer and Van Dijk 2006; Kanagaretnam et al 2009; Kelley and Stahelski 1970; Kuhlman and Marshello 1975; Kuhlman and Wimberley 1976; McClintock and Liebrand 1988; Rotter 1980). Consequently, it would be inaccurate to describe prosocials as lacking in egoism. Rather they are committed in principle to mutual gains. Prosocials want to expand the pie, not simply let others eat all of it.

Heuristics provide cognitive shortcuts that tell individuals how the world generally works and what their interactions with others will generally be like. Individuals generally expect others to share their social value orientation, what is known in the literature as the ‘egocentric’ bias (Iedema and Poppe 1994; Kuhlman and Wimberley 1976). However, as shortcuts, heuristics can distort reality and interfere with the accurate interpretation of information. Behavioral economists use heuristics to

explain how individuals are less than rational. They lead individuals to engage in confirmatory information search, searching out and interpreting incoming information so as to be in line with preexisting beliefs (Van Kleef and De Dreu 2002). For instance, prosocials are more open to signals of cooperative intent than proselves as it confirms their preexisting beliefs in the joint benefits of cooperation. They are more inclined to dismiss distributive bargaining by others as a cheap-talk negotiating tactic. Proselfs will find value-claiming by others to be a genuine signal of distributive bargaining and efforts (perhaps even costly ones) at integrative negotiation as cheap talk aiming at exploitation. Costly signaling may or may not be seen as more credible than cheap talk. It depends on the recipient and the type of talk.

**Table 1: Determinants of Diplomatic Style**

		<i>Epistemic Motivation</i>	
		Low	High
<i>Social Motivation</i>	Proself	Distributive	Pragmatic
	Prosocial	Obliging	Integrative

However, psychological researchers point to the role played by epistemic motivation, “the need to develop a rich and accurate understanding of the world” (De Dreu and Carnevale 2003), in moderating the use of heuristics (De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe and Euwema 2006; De Dreu, Koole and Oldersma 1999). Epistemic motivation encourages openness to, and complex processing of, new information. Those who are lower in epistemic motivation demonstrate more of a “need for closure.” Their information processing is marked by “seizing” and “freezing.” They feel an urgency to make a decision quickly and are disinclined to revisit it as they are uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity (Kruglanski and Webster 1996; Webster and Kruglanski 1994). Those who lack epistemic motivation are less committed to developing a completely objective view of the situation they are in.

Different levels of epistemic and social motivation combine to create a number of different types of negotiators with their own diplomatic style, seen in Table 1. While proselves with low epistemic motivation will consistently engage in coercive bargaining, proselves with high epistemic motivation likely behave differently. While still retaining a completely egoistic orientation, they will adjust their behavior to suit the situational circumstances. They should be pragmatists who find themselves better able to overcome the “fixed-pie” bias in situations in which there is integrative potential. Pragmatists are particularly likely to shift to integrative negotiating when they have less power (or expect to have less power in the future) and distributive bargaining is not feasible, that is when coercive diplomacy is inefficient and inappropriate in the particular situational circumstances. They



are open to signs of all kinds provided they are informative. In short, they behave as formal and rationalist models typically expect all to behave, highly attuned to structure.

Conversely, prosocials with a high epistemic motivation will prefer value-creating and integrative negotiation, but be better able to recognize when negotiations have a distributive, zero-sum character. Those without will believe that deals can always be found and give others the benefit of the doubt, consistently pursuing integrative negotiation, which in the absence of reciprocity amounts to what negotiating theorists call “obliging.” They will take longer to pull the trigger on behavioral assimilation, seeking to explain away behavior by others that is coercive in nature through perhaps reference to the constraints they face.

### **The Values of Diplomacy: Ideology and Negotiation Style**

What are the origins of diplomatic style? The fact that one of the ways that social motivation is captured in experiments is by measuring values provides a clue. We should look to the literature on values to gain a sense of who will negotiate in which way. And by connecting these values to political ideology, we know who on the political spectrum will prefer which diplomatic style independent of negotiating behavior. If we see partisan variation by country in the same structural circumstances, we are more confident that diplomatic style is not, as rationalists might contend, a product of the situation.

A number of theorists have tried to reduce the diversity of human values to a manageable set of constructs and dimensions, the most prominent being and Schwartz (1992; also Schwartz and Bilsky 1987). Drawing on earlier work by Rokeach (1973), Schwartz has developed a universal theory of human values. He argues that particular values tend to cluster in larger patterns, subgroups that have predictable relationships to other subgroups. Values are “trans-situational goals that vary in importance and serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or a group” (Schwartz 2007: 712).

“Self-transcendence” is marked by “benevolence,” that is concern for the welfare of close others in everyday interaction, and “universalism,” “understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection of *all* people and nature” (Schwartz 1992: 12 (emphasis added)). Its constituent elements include responsibility, equality, social justice, helpfulness, forgiveness, wisdom, broadmindedness and honesty (Schwartz 1992: 24). Self-transcendence is juxtaposed to a set of “self-enhancement” values of power and achievement, forming one of the two primary axes that define the structure of human values. The other axis is formed by the value poles of “conservation” and “openness to change.” Conservation is constituted by a set of sub-values that include conformity, tradition, and security. The purpose of conformity is to restrain the individual expression that would violate social expectations and norms. Tradition involves respect for the customs of one’s society. Security indicates a high valuation of the safety of one’s society. All of these values promote social order, stability and predictability by suppressing the individual, binding him or her to the in-group.

Self-transcendence should promote prosocial motivation. Indeed Schwartz explicitly uses the term “prosocial” to describe the values of benevolence and universalism. De Cremer and Van Lange (2001), in seeking a better understanding of what creates prosocial motivation, evoke the twin “morally-defined motives” of “social responsibility” and “justice,” which closely parallel the values of universalism and equality that help define “self-transcendence.” Conservation values, in contrast,

should promote a prosocial motivation in foreign affairs. Conformity, tradition and security all aim at creating a stable and cohesive in-group.

Schwartz's universal values scheme has been found to predict political ideology and attitudes. Ideologies are after all packages of different attitudes linked by core values and principles (Rathbun 2004; 2007). Political ideology can therefore be thought of as a vehicle for bringing values into politics, even international politics. The left has been found to embrace the values of self-transcendence and openness, the right primarily the values of conservation (Duriez and Van Hiel 2002; Cohrs, Moschner et al. 2005). When I refer to a prosocial value orientation in foreign affairs, the self is defined in terms of the nation-state, not the individual politicians' personal interest.

The right resolve the tradeoff between personal autonomy and social order in favor of the latter (Feldman 2003). They place a great stress on conformity and tradition as diversity and change are seen as a threat to social cohesion and stability (Feldman and Stenner 1997). The right is more wary of civil liberties such as freedom of speech, press and assembly as they undermine social solidarity and order (Duckitt 2001; Duckitt and Fisher 2003; Duckitt and Sibley 2009; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Janoff-Bulman 2009a 2009b; Jugert and Duckitt 2009; Stenner 2009). This explains the stronger support of the right for more stringent policies in the areas of civil liberties and criminal justice (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987; Kitschelt 1988a 1988b 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Liberals see less threat to society from free expression and personal liberty. It is more comfortable and supportive of diversity. The right is more likely to sanction those regarded as deviating from the dictates of social conformity (Duckitt 2001; Duckitt and Fisher 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Janoff-Bulman 2009b; Jugert and Duckitt 2009; Stenner 2009; Van Leeuwen and Park 2009).

The left has an "approach" orientation to provide for others, which explains their support for state programs to help the most disadvantaged (Janoff-Bulman et al 2007). Whereas conservatives enthusiasm for government is premised on preventing negative outcomes through institutional restraints, liberal support for government action aims at positively providing for society, harnessing the power of the state to redistribute wealth or reach collectively more optimal resource allocation (Dworkin 1985). Janoff-Bulman (2009b) writes that while conservatives want to "protect" society from threats, liberals want to "provide" for others. Helping those in the most need also serves to make society more equal, which is historically at the heart of distinguishing left from the right (Lipset 1954: 1135; Gerring 1998; Putnam 1973. Jost et al (2003) argue that a preference for social hierarchy is one of conservatism's defining principles.

Right and left differ in their epistemic motivation as well. Epistemic motivation places limits on motivated bias, that is engaging in confirmatory information search to maintain one's current beliefs. Research has found that those on the extremes of the political spectrum, who are more committed to their beliefs and values, will demonstrate less epistemic motivation (Rathbun 2004; Tetlock 1983, 1984). Ideological extremity creates a need for closure in regards to one's political beliefs. However, research has also continually show that those with a higher need for closure, measured without any reference to political ideology, are more likely to be drawn to conservative ideology since its contents provides stability, predictability and certainty in a way that leftist ideology does not. Jost et al call this the right's "epistemic motive" (Altemeyer 1998; Duckitt 2001; Janoff-Bulman 2009a 2009b; Jost et al. 2003; Webster and Kruglanski 1994; Wilson 1973). Need for closure also tends to lead to greater in-group bias (Shah, Kruglanski and Thompson 1998). Therefore, while epistemic

motivation's relationship to the political spectrum is curvilinear, the extreme left will demonstrate something less of a need for closure than the extreme right.

On the basis of these findings, we can expect that the political center-left will exhibit a combination of prosocial and high epistemic motivation leading to value-creating diplomacy predicated on reciprocity. As pragmatic diplomacy rests on a combination of proself motivation and high epistemic motivation, and epistemic motivation is thought to decline towards the conservative end of the political spectrum, the center-right will be natural home of pragmatism. As individuals move towards the right, with a more proself social motivation and a higher need for closure, they will take on a preference for coercive bargaining. The expectations are laid out in Table 2.

**Table 2: Political Ideology and Psychological Motivations**

		<i>Epistemic Motivation</i>	
		Low	High
<i>Social Motivation</i>	Proself	Far Right	Center-Right
	Prosocial	Far Left	Center-Left

The far left will have low epistemic motivation and a prosocial motivation. However, for a number of reasons I neglect this particular type in the pages that follow. First, this combination is relatively rarer than the its exact opposite on the far right. Second, none of the cases below involve a government manned by the extreme left, I neglect it going forward. And third, the extreme left in this time period is often occupied by communists. This is a qualitatively different type of left whose position on the issues at the time were not a function of their psychological motivations but their ideological commitment to forestall any Western agreement that might encourage a Western alliance against the Soviet Union. Their role is relatively marginal in any case, and does not undermine my ability to account for Anglo-Franco-German relations. Therefore we confine ourselves mostly to the three diplomatic styles of coercive bargainers, pragmatists, and prosocials, by which I mean the more prevalent category of prosocials with a high epistemic motivation.

### **Theoretical Expectations and Research Design**

Having laid out our different types of diplomacy and who is likely to favor them, it becomes possible to develop expectations about the type of interactions that will mark the diplomatic relations among particular dyads – crudely either value-creating or value-claiming. Although they are used to describe individual behavior, below I use the terms “value-creating” and “value-claiming” as characterizations of the dyadic pattern of interactions. One country's choice of how to negotiate is not always monadic in nature but often depends on the choices made by other states. And this

combination is what affects the outcomes. This does not give us a firm prediction about the success of diplomacy and the nature of that victory, which depends on other factors that must be treated exogenously, on a case-by-case basis. However, research continually shows that, *ceteris paribus*, value creation facilitates the striking of integrative deals in which both sides obtain what they value most (Schei and Rognes 2003; Weingart et al 2007; De Dreu, Giebels and Van de Vliert 1998; Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Schulz and Pruitt 1978; De Dreu, Koole and Steinel 2000).

By crossing the three types of negotiators, we generate six different types of potential dyads, summarized in Table 3 with expectations and the relevant cases.

#1: Prosocial-prosocial dyads: We expect, *ceteris paribus*, value-creation to be most likely among prosocial dyads. The most consistent finding in the social motivation literature on negotiation is that prosocial dyads are better able than proselves to reach joint outcomes that are more beneficial for both partners (Schei and Rognes 2003; Weingart et al 2007; De Dreu, Giebels and Van de Vliert 1998; Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Schulz and Pruitt 1978; De Dreu, Koole and Steinel 2000). The key to higher joint outcomes is the exchange of honest information. Absent prosocial motivation, the simple exchange of information does not lead to more integrative outcomes (Schulz and Pruitt 1978; De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe and Euwema 2006). This is because whereas proselves practice more deception, prosocials engage in more sincere communication (De Dreu, Nijstad and Van Knippenberg 2008; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; O'Connor and Carnevale 1997). Such a process requires trust. In pre-experimental surveys, proselves endorse the mantra: 'never trust your opponent' whereas prosocials tend to endorse the principles of 'play fair' and 'lying never pays' (De Dreu and Boles 1998). Trust facilitates the development of a collaborative, problem-solving atmosphere (De Dreu and Boles; Pruitt and Lewis 1975). Experiments consistently find that prosocial dyads engage in more information exchange with, and express higher degrees of trust in, their partners (De Dreu, Giebels and Van de Vliert 1998; De Dreu, Weingart and Kwon 2000; Olekalns, Smith and Kibby 1996; Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Schulz and Pruitt 1978; De Dreu, Koole and Steinel 2000; Carnevale and Lawler 1986).<sup>2</sup>

#2: Coercive bargainer-coercive bargainer dyads: Purely egoistic, prosself dyads consistently leave gains on the table when compared to prosocials because they do not share information or reciprocate concessions (Schei and Rognes 2003; Weingart et al 2007; De Dreu, Giebels and Van de Vliert 1998; Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Schulz and Pruitt 1978; De Dreu, Koole and Steinel 2000). These dyads are less able to reach integrative outcomes in which both sides obtain what they value most even when such a zone of possible agreement exists. Value-claiming will predominate. Successful outcomes are less likely and stalemates more likely when states engage in such brinksmanship bargaining. Agreements that are reached will likely reflect the crude distribution of bargaining power, if the weaker side finally capitulates.

#3: Pragmatic-pragmatic dyads: Whereas distributive bargainers are prisoners of their heuristics, pragmatic proselves who are better able to adjust to their situation might be able to reach the more mutually beneficial outcomes that prosocial dyads do. There is evidence for this in a cognate psychological literature on the effect of social motivation on cooperation. A subset of proselves called "individualists" consistently behave as true rational utility-maximizers, cooperating when there are

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<sup>2</sup> Prosocials express greater degrees of trust in their negotiating partners even before negotiations commence, indicating that trust is not an afterglow of a successful outcome (Kanagaretnam, Mestelman, Nainar and Shehata; Van Lange 1999).

**Table 3: Expectations and Case Studies**

	Distributive	Pragmatic	Integrative
Distributive	Franco-Anglo Relations, 1922-1923		
Pragmatic	Franco-German Relations, 1926-1929; Franco-Anglo Relations, 1926-1928	Anglo-German Relations, 1925-1928; Franco-Anglo Relations, 1925	
Integrative	Franco-Anglo Relations, 1928-1929	Franco-German Relations, 1925-1926; Anglo-German Relations, 1928-1929	Franco-Anglo Relations, 1924
Value-Creating Likely			
Value-Creating Possible			
Value-Claiming Likely			

egoistic gains to be had and defecting where there are not (Kuhlman and Marshello 1975; Kuhlman and Wimberley 1976; McClintock and Liebrand 1988). Other proselves consistently defect regardless of the structure of the game. The value-creation of pragmatist dyads, however, is more precarious as neither side is morally committed to reciprocal gain. It will likely succeed when both sides do not feel like they are in a position to exploit the other side, particularly if they are balanced in terms of power and bargaining leverage. Value-creation is possible but not easy.

**#4: Pragmatic-prosocial dyads:** Pragmatists should recognize that given the nature of prosocials, it makes more sense to engage in value-creation than in value-claiming. Research shows that prosocials do not behave differently toward prosocials and proselves pursuing a tit-for-tat strategy (McClintock and Liebrand 1988). In other words, they do not distinguish between those who practice reciprocity out of moral considerations from those who do so instrumentally. These findings open up the possibility of collaboration between pragmatists and prosocials to reach the joint gains of an integrative deal, particularly if the pragmatist is not in a position to exploit the other side's weakness (Schei and Rognes 2003). This likelihood of value creation in this instance is higher than within a pragmatist dyad and will likely be marked by considerably more reciprocity given the presence of a prosocial.

**#5: Coercive bargainer-prosocial dyads:** Because of behavioral assimilation, mixed distributive-prosocial dyads will also have difficulty engaging in value-creation. Efforts by prosocials to induce an exchange of information and concessions on the part of coercive bargainers will be dismissed by the latter as cheap talk. And prosocials have been found to shift from an integrative to a distributive and value-claiming negotiating style when the number of proselves in a group increases (Weingart et 2007; Beermsa and De Dreu 1999). Prosocials significantly award generosity and punish stinginess

(De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; Van Lange 1999; also Liebrand et al 1986). They are less honest with proselves than other prosocials (Steinel and De Dreu 2004). Research shows that the joint outcomes of prosocials and proselves in experiments tend to be as low as those between proselves (Fry 1985; Beersma and De Dreu 1999). We expect hung negotiations or surrender by the side with less bargaining leverage.

#6: Coercive bargainer-pragmatist dyads: Neither will pragmatists make concessions to distributive bargainers if there is no hope of future gains and reciprocity because of the latter's resistance to modifying its zero-sum heuristics. However, pragmatists' uncooperative behavior will be more instrumental than principled in nature than in comparison with prosocials. Again, value-claiming is expected with stalemates or capitulation by the weaker side.

Now that expectations are on the table, showing the value of diplomacy requires two steps. The first is that structural factors do not determine the choice of diplomatic style but rather that the preference of diplomatic style varies within countries by virtue of ideological differences. Is diplomatic style as a dependent variable explained better by structure or agency, by situation or by values? This is accomplished first by assessing whether there is variation between political parties within a country across time and across government and opposition and even within a government coalition at any point in time should it encompass parties with a variety of ideological positions. Focusing on security issues that should not have different distributional benefits for different constituencies within a country allows us to use political party as a proxy for the twin motivations – epistemic and social – that produce diplomatic style. Second, I also look for instances in which diplomatic style is not rational given a state's structural position.

The second step is assessing whether the pattern of diplomatic interactions matters for international outcomes independent of the distribution of power and interests. Does diplomacy amount to an important independent variable in its own right? The preference structure always matters for the outcome, as it creates the very possibility of mutual benefit. Yet if distribution of interests is sufficient to explain outcomes, diplomacy per se does not matter. I cannot develop an a priori expectations independent of specific cases about whether diplomacy is enough to impede or facilitate agreement as interests and power are exogenous to the model. Therefore, evaluating the influence of the character of diplomatic interactions requires careful process-tracing. The cases allow for variation in the independent variable, the ideology of the governments in power, so that we have an instance of all six kinds of diplomatic interactions.

In the cases, I am therefore judging the fit of the cases to two causal models. In the first, diplomatic style is epiphenomenal to structural factors, which are the real driver of outcomes. In the second, diplomatic style is an independent factor produced by psychological motivations that, in combination with other diplomatic styles, helps determine the result and channels the effect of the distribution of power and interests on outcomes.

### **Franco-British Security Negotiations, 1922-1924 (Dyads #1 and #2)**

European foreign relations in the early 1920s were preoccupied with the question of French security. This was to great degree the product of structural circumstances. Germany was France's immediate neighbor, and France could not take the same wait-and-see approach as the British. Additionally, France had suffered losses in the Great War that were disproportionately larger than Germany or Britain. Demographically it was estimated that the German population would in a few decades

outnumber that of France by 20 to 30 million and have a decisive advantage, particularly in the number of men of fighting age. What unified the French most was the desire for a firm commitment by Britain to protect them in case of renewed conflict with Germany (Wolfers 1940: 76; Keeton 1987: 207). Negotiations with Britain began in 1922. But France's "alternative to no agreement" was the exposed position it currently occupied vis-à-vis Germany. She had little leverage.

### *The Coercive Bargainer Dyad*

Despite their very different bargaining positions, however, both Britain and France pursued the ensuing negotiations with a distributive, value claiming strategy of the kind expected of dyad #2. This is because both countries were led by governments of the right. Britain was governed by Conservatives and a rump Liberal Party that had been devastated by splits over policy towards the war. It was effectively a conservative coalition with Tories supplying the vast majority of the ministers. There were centrist pragmatists in the government and party as it was the only part of the British right. However, the key post of Foreign Secretary was occupied by the very conservative Lord Curzon. The few Liberals in cabinet came from the right wing of their party, which had not decamped to the opposition. France was led by the *Bloc National*, a coalition of rightist parties with a conservative agenda of preventing major societal upheaval and social reform (Keiger 1997: 40).<sup>3</sup>

Although France was in the role of *demandeur*, its initial offer was almost outrageously high. Rather than revive the idea of a guarantee that had fallen through in 1919 due to U.S. failure to ratify the League Covenant, in which Britain unilaterally pledged to guarantee France against unprovoked aggression, The French wanted a "very broad alliance in which the Two Powers would guarantee each other's interests in all parts of the world, act closely together in all things and go to each other's assistance whenever these things were threatened" (Cmd. 2169, No. 33). In its proposed draft treaty, France asked Britain to intervene with all its military forces not only in case of a direct invasion of French soil but also in the event of any German violation of its treaty obligations -- to remain disarmed and to keep the Rhineland demilitarized. Great Britain and France were also to collectively agree on the strength of their respective military, naval and air forces. France wanted a military convention, a specific commitment of particular British assets to its defense in advance, as well as a constant collaboration between the countries' general staffs. This was, in French eyes, a "*vast* international arrangement .... based on the close union of France and Great Britain" (Cmd. 2169, No. 35 (emphasis added)).

Raymond Poincaré, the premier framed the interaction as a zero-sum, fixed-pie negotiation. He expected a value-claiming negotiation in which both sides held firm, only conceding gradually and out of necessity. Poincaré predicted that it would not be easy to find common ground (DD, No. 32). In an indication of a distributive negotiating style, the premier British very minimal offer of a unilateral guarantee against direct aggression, calling it "useless" and of "very little effective value in France without a military convention" (CP 3612 (22)).

So as not to appear too eager for the conclusion of a pact, thereby reducing French leverage, Poincaré cautioned his ambassador to remain patient and to not make any offers until there was a formal British response to France's proposal for an alliance. It was "not for us to remind them" of

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<sup>3</sup> These included the Groupe de l'Entente républicaine démocratique, the Groupe de l'Action républicaine et sociale, the Groupe des Républicains de Gauche, and the Groupe de la Gauche républicaine démocratique. All were allied outside of parliament in a party known as the Action nationale républicaine (BDFA, Part II, Series F, Vol. 17, No. 91, p. 381). See also Keeton 1987: 10.

the French interest in the pact (DD, No. 28; also Marks 1982). When Poincaré met Lloyd George in Boulogne, the British Prime Minister raised the security issue at the beginning of the meeting, according to minutes. But the French premier deferred the question and never brought it up again, except to express feigned regret. They might have discussed it “had there been time,” he said, even though the meeting was taken up with much less important issues (Cmd. 2169, No.45).

Poincaré took all of these actions in a security environment that should have made him more conciliatory rather than less. As discussions with the British were taking (or not taking) place, Germany signed the Treaty of Rapallo with the Soviet Union, which raised the specter of Russian-German cooperation against the West. It convinced the French premier that Germany was “destined” to disrupt the peace. Yet he dug in his heels further (DD, No. 32).

For their part, the British were sincerely interested in a security pact of the minimal kind they proposed. It “did not throw heavy obligations upon us” (CC 1(22)) but would also be in Britain’s interest, as Lloyd George recognized. This kind of guarantee would serve to deter Germany in a way that she had not been when Britain remained non-committal in the run up to the Great War (Cmd. 2169, No. 34). However, the British did not share this with the French, preferring to conceal this private information. Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, told the French ambassador of a pact that “France would unquestionably be the gainer, and I did not quite see what advantages would accrue to ourselves” (Cmd. 2169, No. 23). The British also decided to use the pact to extract other benefits, holding it hostage to the resolution of a number of outstanding issues between the two countries in Britain’s favor (Cmd. 2169, No. 23). In a formal memorandum to the French, Lloyd George stated that the British opposed “any piecemeal treatment of the questions by which the conference is faced. On the contrary, they consider it absolutely necessary that the problem should be treated as a whole” (Cmd. 2169, No. 34). Agreement on other issue was to precede serious negotiations as well. Only “when the whole of these matters had been concluded then would be the time to resume the discussion... of the Pact,” wrote Curzon (Cmd. 2169, No. 45).

Finding the French unwilling to compromise, the British decided to stall to place pressure on them. Curzon reported to his colleagues the “extreme importance which the French Government attach to the conclusion of the Pact, upon which the existence of Monsieur Poincaré’s Ministry may be said in fact to depend, and left me with the impression that while we hold it in suspense...we may find in it a powerful lever for securing a favourable settlement of the other issues” (CP 3664 (22)). “It would be unwise on our part to abandon the very powerful form of pressure which its non-conclusion enables us to exercise,” he concluded (CP 3760(22)). Yet the French resisted Britain’s effort to extract concessions on these other issues, even though they were in their eyes “second rate questions” of much less value to her (DD, No. 31).

Even though Poincaré’s actions amounted to cheap talk, or perhaps more accurately cheap silence, the British inferred from it an unwillingness on the part of the French to strike a mutually beneficial deal (Marks 1982: 540). The British had genuinely concluded that the French were uninterested in a pact. In cabinet deliberations, Lloyd George told his colleagues, based on his experience at Boulogne, that Poincaré did not “put much stress on the conclusion of the Pact...He could easily have discussed the matter at Boulogne had he so chosen” (CC 29(22)).



### *The Prosocial Dyad*

The prosocial dyad of French and British conservatives was unable to find an outcome that both would have preferred to the status quo due to diplomatic style. However, just a few years later, a prosocial dyad of the British and French left, expectations for which are identified above under #1, came very close to a very different security arrangement based on value-creating, integrative negotiation. Even though the foreign policy goals of the two sides were further apart, each side engaged in a different type of negotiating. In 1924, the Conservative government in Britain had been defeated by the Labour Party, which formed a weak minority government relying on the support of what was left of the Liberals. In France, a new electoral alliance composed of the center left Radicals and the Socialists called the *Cartel des Gauches* took over from the Bloc National.

Although there was profound displeasure on the left with the results of Poincaré's unilateralism and his use of force to subjugate Germany in the Ruhr, the Cartel was just as terrified of a German *revanche* as the right and therefore just as fixated on guaranteeing French security. The new joint premier and foreign minister Edouard Herriot, told Ramsay MacDonald, who held both the positions of British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary: "My country has a dagger pointed at its breast, within an inch of its heart...I think that I should not have done my duty towards my country if I did not place Germany in a condition to do no harm...One takes precautions against common criminals" (PRO 30/69/123, C11976/70/18; also Keeton 1987: 90; DBFP I, Vol. 26, No. 508). Like the Bloc National, the Cartel des Gauches placed most value on an alliance with Britain. Aristide Briand, who was foreign (and later also prime) minister in the coalition called this "the *sine qua non* of everything else" (Keeton 1987: 108). Early on, the French resuscitated the idea of a bilateral treaty with the British (DBFP I, Vol. 26, no. 508; also PRO 30/69/123, C 11976/70/18; Stambrook 1968: 235).

Given, however, the change in foreign policy goals that resulted from the ideological shift from right to left in Britain, the British were no longer interested in such an arrangement. British and French preferences were further apart than when the Tories and Bloc National governed. MacDonald would not countenance a traditional bilateral alliance or pact as it was inconsistent with Labour's values and told the French so (Winkler 1994: 86-87; PRO 30/69/123, C 11976/70/18). Labour favored instead a strengthening of the arbitration procedures of the League of Nations so as to nip potential disputes in the bud (DBFP I, Vol. 26, No. 508).

As it then stood, members of the League were supposed to submit disputes that might lead to the outbreak of armed conflict to some form of conflict resolution--judicial if they were matters of international law, arbitration through experts or League Council consideration if they were solely political matters. However, were the Council members to find themselves unable to form a unanimous judgment about how the conflict should be resolved, war was legal under the terms of the Covenant. MacDonald proposed to plug what was called the "gap" in the Covenant by requiring states to arbitrate all of their disputes, even if the Council could not agree on a settlement. Herriot's speech placed emphasis on the sanctions that would follow any violation of the terms of the Covenant. Consistent with the French focus on security, Herriot argued that arbitration was not enough and wanted to institute tougher collective punishment in case of failure to submit to peaceful conflict resolution (Marquand 1977: 353; Walters 1952: Vol. 1, 269). In the fall of 1924 in Geneva, French and British representatives spearheaded a joint effort to negotiate a new protocol to the League of Nations covenant that would meet both French and British concerns.

The tenor of negotiations was remarkably different than that between the two governments' conservative predecessors. A French delegate stated at the first meeting: "He desired to put before the committee the ideas of the French delegation, and he was not going to withhold any part of them. It was not party of the policy of the French delegation, as used to be the fashion in the old form of negotiations, to withhold something in order to have something to bargain with. The French delegation wanted to put all their cards on the table; their desire was to collaborate wholeheartedly in any modifications that the committee might wish to put forward and to see to arrive at some agreed text which would reconcile all views" (FO 371/10570, W8159/134/98). This might of course have been cheap talk, but it was seconded in private by British delegate and prominent Labour politician, Arthur Henderson, who paid tribute to the "spirit...amongst the members of this subcommittee" (FO 371/10570, W8146/134/98). This was true even though the interests of the two countries were now further apart. MacDonald later recounted the differences with France: "This was not a mere evolution of good will like the pentecostal peace that we read about in the Acts of the Apostles. Not at all. The greeting was cold and critical, but that changed" (Hansard Series 5, Vol. 182: col. 345).

The British made significant concessions to the French on security in a way that the previous government under the Conservatives had not. Henderson admitted that "adequate sanctions should be provided for seeing that award or decision should be carried out" and even pointed out technical issues that might impede the initiation of collective punishment whose concealment would have been in their interest (FO 371/10570, W8159/134/98 and W7877/134/98). The British agreed to automatic economic sanctions under Article 16 of the League Covenant should states resort to force rather than submit their disputes to collective settlement, a great expansion of British obligations under collective security (FO 371/10570, W8897/134/98).

The French, in turn, conceded on an issue important to the British. Henderson was not eager for his country to assume new obligations to enforce the protocol without the guarantee that others would agree to disarm, Labour's primary security goal (FO 371/10570, W8063/134/98). The two countries agreed that preparations for a disarmament conference would begin immediately, the parties would assemble in only a few months, and Britain would ratify the protocol in the interim, giving France greater certainty of the British commitment. However, Britain would deposit the treaty, thereby making it operational, only in the event of a successful disarmament agreement. Had the Labour representatives utilized a hard distributive strategy, they would have refused to discuss enhanced sanctions until disarmament was complete, given their bargaining leverage. The French accepted the British offer gracefully and even "rendered homage to the great effort of conciliation made by the British delegation." In response, the British representative, Lord Parmoor, expressed his gratitude to the conciliatory way in which Paul-Boncour "had received the suggestion" (FO 371/10570, W8063/134/98).

Although it was unclear whether the British cabinet in Labour's hands would have ultimately ratified the proposed treaty, the return of the Conservatives to power after the agreement was drafted killed its prospects. The Tories were generally opposed to universalist arrangements to provide security, preferring "special arrangements in order to meet special needs" (CP 136(25); also DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 349 and Hansard Series 5, Vol. 185: cols. 1560-2).

### **Trilateral Security Negotiations, 1925 (Dyads #3 and #4)**

Security issues were taken up again in 1925, this time with German participation, presenting three dyadic cases: Germany-France, France-Britain and Germany-Britain. The return of the British Conservatives to power, in conjunction with the allied decision to not evacuate the first of the postwar occupation zones, worried the German government. Under the Treaty of Versailles, the allies were to withdraw gradually from the Rhineland, beginning with the Cologne area in 1925. However, Germany was found guilty of minor infractions in regards to their disarmament obligations, leading France to insist on postponing their removal. Rumors begin to swirl in Berlin that Britain under the pro-French Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, would soon form an alliance with France, which would further isolate Germany (Jacobson 1972: 10-12; Gratwohl 1980: 62-63; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 97-113, *Vermächtnis* II: 73-80; Wright 2002: 303).

#### *Germany's Pragmatic Diplomacy*

To block a Franco-British alliance, the center-right politician and foreign minister Gustav Stresemann proposed a multilateral security pact in which France and Germany would both legally renounce the use of force to change their mutual border, backed by a British guarantee of both sides against aggression from the other. Stresemann was the leader of the German People's Party (DVP), which was in a coalition with other centrist parties as well as the hard right. Practicing pragmatic negotiation, Stresemann was deeply "conscious of the limitations on our power" (Wright 2002: 298). "Power politics works to our disadvantage presently," he wrote. "It is necessary to draw the consequences from that in order to be able to move forward, as difficult as it is to admit" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 88-95). Stresemann had a proself motivation, but the epistemic motivation that allowed him recognize that Germany could best realize its interests through conciliatory diplomacy rather than coercive bargaining. Nations "are always egoists," he claimed, and cooperation with other states depended on "parallel interest" (Wright 2002: 344). Stresemann was constantly adjusting to the situation: "I frankly declare that it is to-day not possible to lay out a programme of policy, because in certain circumstances events dash onward like a torrent, and in others, barely trickle forward at all" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 225), he wrote. He used Metternich's term of "finesse," and cautioned that German must avoid "fundamental decisions" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 503-506; Wright 2002: 327; Gratwohl 1980: 118).

The German proposal, if it came to fruition, would be politically costly for Germany. First, the guarantee of the current territorial status quo between Germany and France amounted to a German "renunciation" of the Alsace-Lorraine, former German territory that many in his country still coveted and considered ethnically German (Gratwohl 1980: 78; ADAP, A12, No. 67). And Stresemann offered in his memos to negotiate arbitration treaties with any other states that desired them, a clear reference to Germany's eastern neighbors (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 189; ADAP, A12, Nos. 64, 67). It was meant as a "sign of good faith" (ADAP, A12, No. 99).

Stresemann did not link the pact to other concessions Germany desired. The foreign minister cautioned that "a nation must not adopt the attitude of a child that writes a list of its wants on Christmas Eve, which contains everything that the child will need for the next fifteen years" (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 221; Wright 2002: 345). Rather than making the German renunciation contingent on French counter-concessions in the areas of German disarmament, the evacuation of Cologne or the alleviation of the occupation's conditions, Stresemann explicitly advised German representatives to separate these questions as a way of credibly indicating Germany's peaceful and cooperative intentions (ADAP, A12, Nos. 40, 67, 81). The questions were of course connected in

the German mind. But German representatives under Stresemann's leadership hoped such an offer would create trust that would allow them to negotiate some of the remaining difficulties in a more cooperative climate, including a shortening of the occupation (ADAP, A12, Nos. 40, 67; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 67).

Germany's pragmatic diplomacy was hardly structurally determined. Stresemann's far right coalition partners, the German National People's Party (DNVP) advocated a distributive negotiating style despite Germany's structural disadvantages. They shared Stresemann's foreign policy goals of ending the occupation, rectifying Germany's eastern borders and eventually unifying with Austria. But they did not like his diplomacy (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 159, 503-506). Despite Germany's weakness, Stresemann had to justify his policy of conciliation and cooperation at home. "The preservation of peace and the attempts to secure it are not weakness, are not timidity, they are the realistic recognition of our own national interest," Stresemann said (Wright 2002: 472). In true utilitarian fashion, Stresemann thought the ends would justify the means, only in this case the means were cooperative in something of a reversal of the usual Machiavellian dictum. "Do not always worry about the methods so long as one is moving forward. For in the end success decides which methods are right" (ADAP, B1/2: 665-9).

In the DNVP's first statement concerning the pact idea in the parliament, its caucus leader Graf von Westarp noted that France wanted Germany to first completely disarm, enter the League and negotiate a security pact, only after which would they leave Cologne. For the DNVP, he argued the order was the reverse (VDR 62: 1894-1903). As part of its coercive diplomatic style, it demanded that France make concessions before Germany lest it be placed in a weaker bargaining position. Nationalists objected to the very basis of the pact, the fixing of the borders of Alsace-Lorraine by treaty as a signal of reassurance to France. Schiele, the liaison between the DNVP's parliamentary party caucus and the cabinet, argued that by surrendering a concession without a counter-concession, Germany had "thrown a net over its own head" (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, Vol. 1, No. 123). Schiele called for a revision of the occupation regime as part of any deal on the security pact and an evacuation of the Cologne zone before the conference took place so that it would not become an "object" of negotiations, a bargaining chip that the allies could use to pressure Germany to accept other terms (Gratwohl 1980: 110-111; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 158). As part of coercive diplomacy, the right-wing politician was attempting to remove a source of leverage from the allies.

### *Britain's Pragmatic Diplomacy*

Britain's participation in the scheme was crucial. Her leaders had been reluctant to make a security commitment to France in 1922 without trying first to extract a greater price through coercive diplomacy. Although there was consensus in the British cabinet that it was in Britain's interest to facilitate a rapprochement between France and Germany so as not be drawn into another costly conflict, there were a number of cabinet members, representing the views of the right wing of the party, who nevertheless did not want to make any such promise before inducing the French to make more concessions, in this case in the direction of Germany on issues such as the occupation and disarmament (CP 118(25); CP 105(25), 19 February CID).

Chancellor of Exchequer Winston Churchill, who tended to side with this more conservative faction on foreign affairs, believed that "increasing French anxiety will make them all the more desirous of obtaining our assistance. We may be in a position at a later date to procure more from the French

concessions to Germany of a far more sweeping character than any they contemplate at the present time” (CP 105(25), 19 February). Were Britain to make such a commitment prior to French concessions, it would lose its influence. Churchill argued: “[I]t is by standing aloof and not by offering ourselves that we shall ascertain the degree of importance which France really attaches to our troth”(CP 118(25)). Cabinet members Amery, Balfour, Birkenhead, and Curzon agreed (Grayson 1997: 49; Jacobson 1972: 15; Cohrs 2006: 209). “So extensive a commitment” could not be made, “*at any rate at this stage of the negotiations*” (CC(14(25) (emphasis added)). Any firm promise, even one in Britain’s interest, was to be held back until later, after the French conceded more.

The difference between 1922 and 1925 was that Curzon had been replaced as Foreign Secretary by Austen Chamberlain, a Conservative Party moderate. He had been leader of the party in the early 1920s and failed in a bid to unify the Tories with the conservative Lloyd George Liberals in an effort to moderate his party. Chamberlain advocated a pragmatic course evident in one of his first memoranda upon taking up the post. Demonstrating epistemic and proselyt motivations, Chamberlain wrote: “A successful British foreign policy depends, first, on a clear appreciation of the facts of the situation with which we have to deal, and secondly, on an equally clear conception of British interests and of their relation to the facts. In a situation of such incertitude, the only sound line of British policy is the path of British interests. The road is too dark for any altruism or digression; it is our own security which must remain the sole consideration” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 205).

Concessions to France were necessary out of concern for British national interests, Chamberlain argued: “[T]he case for an agreement with France does not rest only or mainly upon these considerations. British interests are affected at every turn by the insecurity of the European situation. We live too close to its shores to escape being affected by the unrest of the Continent” (CP(122(25)). Facing resistance in the cabinet, only a threat by Chamberlain to resign induced the cabinet to make a commitment to guarantee a pact between France and Germany prior to the beginning of formal negotiations (Jacobson 1972: 20; DBFP I, Vol. 27, Nos. 224-225). Britain’s diplomacy was not structurally determined but rather the subject of internal contestation. Chamberlain chose not to exploit British leverage.

In regards to the Germans, given his high level of epistemic motivation, Chamberlain appreciated the costly signal offered in the German memorandum. It “appeared to me an incident of the utmost importance, which might be of vital consequence to the Allies and have a determining influence upon the whole question of our future security. As I understood the German proposal, it was in the first place a voluntary acceptance of the present western frontiers of Germany. These frontiers Germany had accepted under compulsion at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. Now they not only for the first time accepted them voluntarily, but they offered their guarantee” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 212).<sup>4</sup>

The German-British pragmatist dyad were creating value, as is possible under dyad #3. Britain might have also chosen to exploit Germany’s weakness. However, Britain’s predominance would not last

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<sup>4</sup> He also noted Germany’s pledge to resolve eastern border changes peacefully “as a fact of great importance and as an earnest of their good faith and their pacific intentions” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 283). As Stresemann had hoped, Chamberlain also appreciated that Germany had not made its offer conditional on a shortening of occupation (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 200).

forever. Chamberlain wrote that the allies “could not hold Germany down for ever, and our object ought to be to bring about such a change in the situation that by the time that Germany might really have become dangerous again she should enjoy sufficient well-being and have travelled too far away from the bitter thoughts of today to care to risk what she then possessed on the chance that she might recover what she had lost in 1914” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 225; also DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 205).

### *France’s Prosocial Diplomacy*

Despite France’s intense fear of Germany, her leftist leaders in the Cartel des Gauches remained open-minded about the possibility of a pact. When approached by the German ambassador, the French premier expressed the “greatest interest” in the German memorandum (ADAP A12, No. 99). Rather than remaining studiously disinterested and aloof so as to drive a harder bargain, Herriot told the Germans their proposal would be studied with “utmost seriousness” (ADAP, A12, No. 134).

Like the British, the French appreciated the gesture of the German memorandum. Herriot called Stresemann “well intentioned and honorable” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 198). The most important figure during the period in France was Aristide Briand, who took over as foreign minister in April 1925 in a cabinet reorganization. Briand admired Germany for how it had “acted courageously” in sending its memorandum (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 516). The French recognized the German memorandum “as an earnest of pacific intentions which agree with their own” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 349; Locarno-Konferenz, No. 14). Chamberlain noted Briand’s epistemic and social motivation, describing him as “a man of supple & ingenious mind, capable of admitting disagreeable truths & forming broad & liberal views” (Grayson 1997: 57). The Germans themselves reported that Briand demonstrated “far-sightedness without narrow-mindedness” and always had the “best intentions” (ADAP, A14, No. 212; also ADAP, A14, No. 176). This was a case of pragmatic-prosocial value-creation under dyad #4.

This contrasted with the views of the right. French conservatives accused Herriot, by engaging in an exploration of conciliation, of “naïve idealism” and believed that his government’s “policy of understanding” would lead to a “fiasco,” according to the British ambassador to France (ADAP, A12, No. 48). Even before the security pact had developed a specific form, Poincaré was opposed and saw little need to negotiate. He denigrated the value of the German offer: “In exchange for a few concessions, we are obtaining a commitment from the Reich worth only what the reigning mood in Germany is worth” (Keiger 2004:103). Poincaré declined to update his views of Germany on the basis of its recent diplomatic signals. Herriot replied directly that the French should keep an open mind to see how discussions developed (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 134).

France’s diplomacy was not a simple capitulation to German demands, but rather in effort to create value. In their formal response to the German government’s exploratory memorandum, the French proposed a very different security pact, in which Germany would join the League of Nations with all of its obligations, France would be allowed to guarantee Germany’s treaties with its eastern neighbors so as to protect them in case of German violation, and Britain and France would be required to use force in the event of any breach of the Versailles Treaty provisions on disarmament and demilitarization of the Rhineland (DBFP I, Vol. 27, Nos. 318, 349; CP 268(25)). However, France proposed no formal conditions, red lines that she could not cross. Briand “had no intention of dictating the sense of the Germany reply. He wished to give them full freedom as to the character

of their answer, and not in any way to appear to force upon them a Yes or a No” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 322). As the French foreign minister described it, “His object had been to show that he accepted the German overtures as made in good faith” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 322).

Vis-à-vis the British, the leftist French government was much more compromising than the conservative Bloc National government had been (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 424). Briand quickly conceded to the British view that only flagrant violations of the Versailles Treaty that were preludes to armed aggression would give rise to the security guarantee. Empathetically, he had “showed himself fully alive to the need of distinguishing between flagrant violations and purely technical infractions” and “admitted frankly that Great Britain could not be expected to give a guarantee which might involve her in a war as a result of a trivial incident” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 443). This was what we would expect from France’s bargaining position, of course. However, Poincaré had not acted in this spirit given his conservative penchant for value-claiming diplomacy. There was a marked difference between a coercive bargainer dyad and a prosocial-pragmatic combination.

### *Franco-German Diplomatic Interactions*

France’s value-creating negotiating style is perhaps most evident in France’s response to shift in Germany’s diplomacy as the plan for a security pact was considered by the German cabinet and parliament. Despite French efforts, DNVP ministers treated French demands as a fixed and unalterable ultimatum. Lacking epistemic motivation, they were unreceptive to signals of France’s openness to negotiation. Instead the nationalists saw the French note as a credible reflection of an unacceptable French position that made any formal talks pointless (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, Vol. 1, No. 110; Wright 2002: 316-17; Gratwohl 1980: 86-88; Jacobson 1972: 53). Had the nationalists not been in a coalition, or had they occupied the foreign ministry, the negotiations would never have begun.

Even though Stresemann had major objections to the French conception of a security pact (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, Vol. 1, No. 110), he felt the best way to proceed was by raising all questions in a diplomatic conference rather than laying out firm negotiating red lines in an exchange of diplomatic notes (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 62; also Gratwohl 1980: 73-75, Stresemann, Vol. 2: 79). He cautioned not to “burden the memorandum with conditions, or with questions that will be dealt with as a matter of course during the negotiations” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 135). Stresemann and Chancellor Hans Luther were supported by the centrist parties, who all favored the continuation of negotiations without prejudging the results (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, Vol. 1, No. 110; Wright 2002: 316-17; Gratwohl 1980: 86-88; Jacobson 1972: 53).

However, under pressure from the DNVP, before the formal conference in Locarno where the three parties would convene for negotiations, Germany for the first time made reference to the alleviation of the occupation conditions in the other two zones as a “ramification” of the conclusion of a security agreement. In a formal memorandum, Stresemann wrote that the “security pact would be such an important improvement that it could not be without consequences for the arrangements in the occupied zones and the whole question of the occupation” (Locarno Konferenz, No. 16; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 143; Jacobson 1972: 55-56). The foreign minister, however, told his diplomats to stress that this was not a formal condition for agreement on a pact (ADAP, A13, No. 211). Stresemann did, however, explicitly link Cologne’s belated evacuation with the conclusion of a security treaty (ADAP, A13, No. 211; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, Vol. 1, No. 116), whereas to that

point the foreign minister had refrained from doing so formally (Jacobson 1972: 53-54; Gratwohl 1980: 95; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 113, 134).

Stresemann believed that this position would lead “French public opinion...[to] boil over” (Stresemann, Vol. 2:135). The foreign minister wrote: “It is so unfavourable ... that I should not be surprised if the whole matter dropped. Much diplomacy will be needed to get the matter through at all” (Stresemann, Vol. 2:141). However, although he was under more pressure at home than the British Foreign Secretary, the French foreign minister was not particularly annoyed by the German responses. Briand said it was necessary to read between the lines of the German note (Unger 2005: 491). The German ambassador to Paris, after meeting Briand, reported that his meeting “went as well as one could have hoped....The understanding he has for our position even surprises me somewhat” (ADAP, A13, No. 219). The prosocial French government was more accommodating than the pragmatic British.

### *Diplomatic Success in Locarno*

After this exchange of notes, the three countries, accompanied by representatives of Belgium, Italy, Poland and Czechoslovakia, met in Switzerland to successfully negotiate the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee in October 1925. This became known as the Treaty of Locarno and largely resembled Germany’s original blueprint. Remaining contentious issues, on the terms of Germany’s membership in the League of Nations and the terms of Germany’s arbitration treaties with its eastern neighbors, were dealt with easily given the adoption of a value-creating negotiating style by all three sides marked by good faith and goodwill. Chamberlain remarked on the “noteworthy absence of any spirit of bargaining” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 547; also No. 516)). The British civil servant Lampson wrote, “Briand, Stresemann and Luther sit opposite to one another in the Conference Room and discuss with the utmost discretion and good humour their various difficulties. Each goes out of his way to show that he realizes those of the other; each is obviously genuinely desirous of helping the other out so far as he possibly can consistently with his own national interests. In short, there is a complete absence of bitterness or back biting.” He continued: “Frankly I am amazed – I think everyone must be – by the absence of all chicanery. All parties come to the table and explain their particular difficulties in the simplest and most straightforward language” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 529). The Germans agreed.<sup>5</sup> Pragmatic proselves and prosocials found agreement relatively easy to find having created an earlier relationship of trust and reciprocity.

Prosocially-minded France also was the driving force behind a package of “ramifications” for Germany, a post-treaty reward for Germany’s new pragmatic diplomacy. In mid-November, the allies sent a note to Germany listing their envisioned alleviations of the Rhineland occupation, including the removal of most ordinances governing civilian life, the reduction of the size of foreign garrisons, the abolition of the hated delegates that served as liaisons between German local government and foreign troops, and the full evacuation of Cologne by December 1 (Jacobson 1972: 64; Wright 2002: 347; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 223; DBFP Ia, Vol. 1, No. 69; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 211). This was a dramatic series of alleviations. In transmitting their note to Germany, the allies wrote: “In the same spirit of confidence, good faith and good will, the Powers concerned in the occupation of the Rhineland have decided in regard to this occupation to introduce all the

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<sup>5</sup> Luther reported to the German cabinet: “The goodwill of the English, French and Belgians to reach a positive outcome that is also acceptable to Germany cannot be doubted based on all that we see. The type of cooperation and the mutual dealings have been completely irreproachable” (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 180).



modifications compatible with the Treaty of Versailles” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 214-5). The ramifications were the product of reciprocal, value-creating negotiation. They were to be a “first gift” to Germany in British words (ADAP, A14, No. 49).

While the pragmatic British supported the concessions because they promoted reconciliation between France and Germany, the French were the driving force behind them. Even at Locarno, the leftist French government promised to set about realizing German aims. Briand told the Germans that “it would be his first task to press this on the French Cabinet on his return to Paris” and even promised to resign if it did not bear fruit. Rather than dismissing German desires as impossible of realization, as one would do when using coercive diplomacy, he told the Germans it was “natural” that after the pact was signed that they “should consider everything for the realization for which we hoped” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, Appendix 11). German desires were “completely normal” (ADAP, A14, No. 138). Briand expressed optimism. “In a general way, Dr. Stresemann’s list did not *a priori* seem impossible of realization. Quite the contrary. He would say for himself that he could even conceive further points which might be considered” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, Appendix 11). The eventual ramifications still went beyond the Germany’s wildest hopes. Stresemann confessed in private that they were “much more considerable than any of us could have imagined” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 232-4).

### **Trilateral Occupation and Reparation Negotiations, 1926-1926 (Dyads #5 and #6)**

The nature of diplomatic interactions between France and Germany changed decisively when the conservatives returned to power, again under the premiership of Poincaré. In opposition the conservative leader had opposed any security guarantee with Germany at its inception and after its conclusion, denigrating the significance of the German offer: “In exchange for a few concessions, we are obtaining a commitment from the Reich worth only what the reigning mood in Germany is worth,” he complained (Keiger 2004: 103). Briand, due to the public popularity engendered by his success at Locarno, remained on as foreign minister, but his efforts to consolidate the Treaty of Locarno were continually checked by conservatives in the government. When he proposed to Stresemann in late 1926 in exchange for an early payment of a reparations installment the complete evacuation of the Rhineland within the year, as well as the return of the Saarland and its valuable coal mines to German control and the termination of allied inspection of German disarmament, his wings were clipped. In January 1927, Briand was forced to publicly disavow any support for withdrawing French troops from occupied Germany in advance of schedule in a statement unanimously approved by the cabinet (Jacobson 1972, 103, 138; Wright 2002, 382, 404; Keeton 1987, 176; Stresemann Vol. 3, 57-59, 73-77). Under Poincaré, the French demanded a much higher price for the early evacuation of the Rhineland, a comprehensive reparations settlement fixing Germany’s total payments to France.

Nevertheless, there was what should have been an easy integrative deal. Germany’s annual payments of reparations under the Dawes Plan, the provisional reparations deal reached in 1924, were scheduled to balloon shortly, potentially exceeding Germany’s capacity to pay. This was neither in France’s interest nor Germany’s. In the meantime, France had begun the construction of the Maginot Line, the series of fortifications on its eastern border that conservatives genuinely believed would provide them a degree of permanent security (Keeton 1987: 229, 306). The occupation of the Rhineland was therefore of decreasing value to them in terms of security, and there was an incentive to cash in on it while it still maintained value for Germany. As the Rhineland was scheduled to be evacuated in 1935, every year that passed made early evacuation less and less meaningful for

Germany. France could trade premature withdrawal for a final settlement on reparations that would cover its war debts to the United States and Great Britain.

French conservatives' diplomatic style, however, made such an outcome difficult. The conservatives replaced Briand's prosocial diplomacy with coercive bargaining. Poincaré, backed by the most conservative colleagues in the cabinet, Andre Tardieu and Louis Marin, proposed that evacuation of the Rhineland would only begin after Paris began to receive advance payments of reparations paid for through Germany's issuance of debt in the private market. German debt would have to first be capitalized, commercialized, and gradually sold in the bond markets (Wright 2002, 413; Jacobson 1972, 157, 279, 301). French troops would be gradually pulled out only if Germany continued to make its payments (ADAP, B9, Nos. 139, 263; Stresemann Vol. 3, 383-392; Jacobson 1972, 173-4, 193). The Rhineland was held to be held hostage as a bargaining chip, even as it was of less and less use to France. Poincaré was transparent about his diplomatic style. He told the German ambassador that security considerations no longer made continued occupation necessary. Yet it would only abandon German territory piecemeal so as to maintain its leverage (ADAP, B9, No. 139; Jacobson 1972: 173). When the German ambassador asked for an evacuation of the second zone two years ahead of schedule as a demonstration of France's cooperative intentions in the Locarno spirit, Poincaré refused. "The French would not understand if France, suddenly out of high heaven, made direct sacrifices to Germany," he said. "There must be an occasion." He opposed "any acts of spontaneous accommodation" (ADAP, B9, No. 139; Jacobson 1972, 173).

Stresemann's initial response to France's change in diplomatic style was to remain patient and wait for the return of the left, at Briand's urging (Jacobson 1972: 138-139; Stresemann, Vol. 3: 180-2; Wright 2002: 382-2; Keeton 1987: 234). However, his pragmatic diplomacy was predicated on concrete results. It was not prosocial in nature. The foreign minister cautioned Briand in spring 1927: "Any further dilatoriness in these matters is impossible in the interest of both our foreign and internal policy. The centre-point of my foreign policy is the understanding with France, and this will be most seriously imperiled if something does not happen soon which can be taken as evidence that the French Government intends to continue it" (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 149-150).

In the face of French distributive bargaining, Stresemann switched to value-claiming diplomacy, demanding in 1927 for the first time publicly that the allies remove all their troops from the Rhineland (VDR 371: 12490, 373: 12556-60; Jacobson 1972: 143-47; Wright 2002: 412; Stresemann, Vol. 3: 350). The German foreign minister offered no offer of compensation in terms of reparations and refused French attempts to formally link the two issues. The German government recognized that France would never consent to this. The issues were de facto connected because France had greater leverage and would insist on it. But making such a positional commitment would put Germany in a stronger bargaining position when the two issues did become joined formally (Jacobson 1972: 164-8, 175-83; ADAP, B10: 609-14; Wright 2002: 436). France and Germany's diplomatic interactions had changed character, shifting from dyad #4 to #6.

In the fall of 1928, France, German and Britain agreed on parallel but technically separate negotiations on reparations and the early end of the occupation that began in July 1929 in the Hague. Persisting with coercive bargaining, the French, however, refused to negotiate seriously on the latter issue until progress was made on the thornier financial question. The French foreign minister would not even begin discussions on the potential terms of a deal, such as a beginning date for the withdrawal of French forces, much less a termination date (ADAP, B12, Nos. 155, 161; Jacobson 1972: 316; DBFP Ia, Vol. 6, No. 313). Briand stressed that he was now in charge of the

conservative coalition that Poincaré had recently left behind when he resigned for health reasons. Most of the ministers were “comparable to Graf Westarp,” he said, in an allusion to the ultra-conservative German politician (ADAP, B12, No. 168). Stresemann objected to the French line, reiterating at the conference the German view that two issues were not in fact linked and that there was no reason why division over financial questions should impact progress on the political ones (ADAP, B12, No. 158; DBFP Ia, Vol. 6, No. 313).

It was only at this point, in the face of France’s lack of cooperation, that the British announced British plans to withdraw all forces from the Rhineland, regardless of the outcome of the reparation negotiations. This was coercive bargaining, an attempt to leave France isolated and shouldering the entire burden of the occupation. Their removal would begin in just a few months and all troops would be home before Christmas (ADAP, B12, Nos. 157, 158; DBFP Ia, Vol. 6, No. 316). Britain was now led by a leftist Labour minority government that had recently taken over from the Conservatives. While the latter had grown increasingly frustrated with France’s refusal to negotiate an early end to the occupation and had warned that Britain would not stay forever, it was the Labour Party that pulled the trigger. Given their prosocial motivation, Labour was morally committed to better treatment of Germany. Even before the end of the war, the party had condemned the harsh peace terms being contemplated and Germany’s exclusion from the League. And Labour consistently came out against French subjugation of Germany on egalitarian grounds during the 1920s. The party had declared itself against the coercive use of the occupation, derisively calling it “the use of human beings as ‘pawns’ (Labour Party 1919). In its election manifesto in 1929 Labour promised the “immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Rhineland, the continued occupation of which is indefensible in view of the fact that Germany has fulfilled her obligations under the Treaty of Versailles” (Labour Party 1928; also Jacobson 1972: 210, 242, 281-3). Franco-British diplomatic interactions now had the character of dyad #5.

The prospect of being left isolated in the Rhineland induced Briand to agree to begin the French withdrawal of the Rhineland alongside the British irrespective of progress on reparations (Winkler 1994: 235). Britain’s move had helped unlink the two issues to some extent. However, the French still intended to maintain French troops in the Rhineland until after the ratification and implementation by all parties of a financial agreement, should it ever be concluded. And the two countries, now finally negotiating, nevertheless still engaged in the brinksmanship bargaining that characterizes value-claiming negotiation. Germany insisted on full evacuation by spring of 1930 and the French in October 1930. In a game of chicken, the two exchanged threats and stubbornly held out for days before finally accepting June 30, 1930 as the termination date for the occupation, five years ahead of schedule (ADAP, B12, Nos. 158, 188, 191, 196).

### **Conclusion: The Value of Diplomatic Theory**

This paper has offered a theory of diplomacy that takes agency seriously. Too often academics have dismissed diplomacy, which amounts to ignoring perhaps the most prominent practice in international relations. Theorizing about agency is difficult but not impossible. And it need not be unsystematic or lacking in rigor. I have relied on negotiating styles found in the psychological literature, providing a strong conceptual foundation. I then connected these styles logically to well-established theories of values and subsequently to particular homes on the political spectrum, showing that diplomacy reflects something more than the personal idiosyncrasies of leaders or some vague error term not accounted for by structural variables.

Theorizing about agency not only has the empirical advantage of adding to our explanatory power. It also makes international relations theory more relevant for policy-makers. If diplomatic outcomes are simply a reflection of the distribution of power and interests, we are simply at a loss for advice about how to successfully resolve conflicts. My argument about diplomacy does not provide a silver bullet. When negotiating with coercive bargainers, there might be little option save the application of leverage. However, it might be possible to cultivate and empower prosocials and pragmatists who could serve as a Baptist-Bootlegger coalition on which to base better relations. Providing such solutions is the real value of a theory of diplomacy.

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### Abbreviations for archival sources:

- CP: Cabinet Papers circulated to ministers. Papers are numbered sequentially throughout the year, with the last two digits of the year in parentheses.
- CC: Conclusions of the British cabinet, sometimes providing a summary of discussions. Minutes are numbered sequentially throughout the year, with the last two digits of the year in parentheses.
- FO 371: Political files of the Foreign Office. 'W' refers to Western Europe.

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