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## *European Agenda*

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# **Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism and European Integration: A Review Article**

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*European Integration and Supranational Governance*, edited by W. Sandholtz and A. Stone Sweet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 389pp., \$24.95 pb.

*The Governance of the Single European Market*, by K. Armstrong and S. Bulmer (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998) 340 pp., £15.99 pb.

*The Choice For Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, by A. Moravcsik (Ithaca: Cornell University Press/London: UCL Press, 1998), 515pp., \$19.95 pb.

Andrew Moravcsik affirms as he concludes *The Choice for Europe* that ‘over forty years European politicians and peoples have repeatedly widened and deepened the EC’. He applauds this peaceful ‘transfer of sovereign prerogatives’ as a ‘unique achievement in world history’. Yet explaining it, Moravcsik modestly acknowledges in his closing sentence, remains ‘the ongoing social scientific puzzle’.

Interestingly, fitting together this puzzle has become a cause among scholars charged with the kinds of emotions that only academics seem able to arouse over

esoteric matters. If the writings under review here are at all indicative of goings on in European Union studies, what was once a rather subdued dialogue among analysts concerning the nature and dynamics of European integration, has recently evolved into a full-scale, hard-fought debate. In it, so-called *institutionalists* have aligned themselves against so-called *intergovernmentalists*. Each school offers up 'theories' of European integration founded upon assumptions and leading to explanations that are as strongly endorsed by their proponents as they are contested by their opponents. This debate is surely important because it is about what is happening among European states and peoples, and why it is happening. But the manner in which the debate is being engaged, with contenders jumping upon one another's attributed weaknesses while disregarding one another's insights, is less than constructive. Admittedly though, it makes for interesting reading.

Because readers of the *Journal of Common Market Studies* are likely to be already familiar with the standpoints of both the institutionalists and the intergovernmentalists, an elaborate mapping of positions is not necessary here. Let it suffice to say institutionalist assumptions about European integration evoke the neofunctionalist tradition of integration theorizing, wherein 'institutions make a difference'. Here, the advance of European integration is both indexed by and contained within the expanding authority, competence and jurisdiction of supranational institutions, accompanied conversely by the constrained autonomy, diminishing competence and contracting exclusive jurisdiction of national governments. Though international integration may be initiated by agreements among governments, international institutions, once established, take on a political life of their own, and the rule-making authority delegated to them by states collectively binds and bounds governments by locking in patterns of collective behaviour and ratcheting supranationality. Moreover, as international integration gathers momentum, supranational agents, increasingly supported and abetted by transnational forces, become the entrepreneurs of further integration. Their effectiveness follows from their command and control of information, their technical expertise and their ability efficiently to orchestrate and mediate collective international problem-solving. Supranational agents are themselves political actors interested in enhancing their power via the increased authority of the institutions they direct. But their objective is to protect and promote the welfare and security of the transnational society that is coming increasingly under their jurisdiction. While institutionalists readily accept that European integration is structurally and procedurally complex, they nonetheless insist that the key to explaining how it is happening, and why it is happening, lies in understanding the influence of European institutions and the people who direct them.

For their part, intergovernmentalists attribute little influence to supranational agents or institutions, and some detect little genuine supranationality in the European Union. They recognize, accept and welcome the historical progression from customs union to political union and toward Economic and Monetary Union among the Six, Nine, Ten, Twelve and Fifteen, and they acknowledge the contribution of international secretariats in managing co-operation among states and the role of international courts in enforcing it. But they see the movement toward, and the timing of, closer international co-operation in Europe as resulting from the converging national interests of states (economic interests in particular) emerging out of the currents and pressures of national politics. Intergovernmentalists see the terms of international co-operation, the accompanying rules that guide it and the institutions that frame it, as reflecting the relative bargaining power of different governments who, while never abnegating their sovereignty, may be willing to 'pool' or 'delegate' it as efficiency and effectiveness require. Assigning responsibilities for monitoring and implementing intergovernmental agreements to international secretariats and courts is accepted by governments as a means of locking one another into commitments. In this intergovernmentalist conceptualization, the initiators, promoters, mediators, legislators and promulgators of deepening and broadening European integration are the national governments in general, the governments of the major EU countries in particular, and heads of government, heads of state and powerful ministers most specifically. Agents associated with European institutions, exercise only marginal influence at best, the intergovernmentalists contend, and this, on many occasions, turns out to be either redundant or self-defeating.

Ever since the flourishing of neofunctionalism during the 1960s, institutionalist interpretations have constituted the conventional theoretical wisdom of European Union studies. Even though Ernst Haas (1958, 1975) was moved to cast doubts on the efficacy of the theory he formulated, it is probably fair to say that thereafter most students of European integration, when inclined to think theoretically, nevertheless continued to think in neofunctionalist ways. Hardly anyone denied the efficacy and influence of European institutions, or the entrepreneurial impacts of Commissioners, judges or MEPs, or the progressive, integrative implications of unintended consequences, or the ratcheting (if not the spilling over or spilling around) effects of institutionalization. Indeed, with the passing of the extraordinary world economic and political conditions of the 1970s, European integration was set back on track by the mid-1980s – deepening in rather spectacular ways as with the Single European Act, and broadening as well – and much of what was occurring, as well as why it was occurring, could be interpreted in neofunctionalist terms. European institutions, grasping enhanced competence, were observed to be the increasingly preferred arenas for transnational problem-solving; they also seemed to be increasingly the objects

of political attention; initiatives appeared to originate within these institutions; Jacques Delors, Karl Heinz Narjes, Etienne Davignon and Arthur Cockfield, the apparent entrepreneurs of relaunched integration, were the 'European' heroes.

Though their authors and editors seek to distance themselves from neofunctionalism, two of the three books under review here clearly come out of the neofunctionalist tradition. The main message of both *European Integration* and *Supranational Governance* edited by Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, and *The Governance of the Single European Market* by Kenneth Armstrong and Simon Bulmer is that 'institutional arrangements matter'. These respective affirmations of the institutionalist approach vary in scope: the Sandholtz and Stone Sweet volume is a broad sweep across a number of the European Union's policy domains, while the Armstrong and Bulmer book focuses almost microscopically on the realization of the single European market (SEM). The volumes also vary in cohesion and therefore in overall impact. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet's anthology, as is so often the case with this genre, cobbles together relevant and not very relevant offerings, as well as some troublesome internal contradictions. By contrast, the Armstrong and Bulmer book develops a consistent, cumulative argument across a number of substantive issues and drives to a conclusion that students of European integration must take seriously. These two renditions of institutionalism and European integration also vary in theoretical insight, as perhaps becomes most apparent when they are directly compared.

*European Integration and Supranational Governance* assembles a collection of papers which emerged from a collaborative project on supranational governance housed at the University of California. The editors and almost all of the contributing authors make known in a variety of emphatic ways that their purposes in displaying their work are (1) to show how 'the European Union has transformed itself from a largely intergovernmental arrangement ... into a supranational polity' (p. 135); and (2) to demonstrate how and why their institutionalist approach to explaining European integration is more powerful than intergovernmentalist analyses, which in their estimation are 'incapable of capturing crucial temporal elements of European integration' (p. 4). Intergovernmentalist analyses are characterized by the Sandholtz and Stone Sweet contributors as 'rigid', 'static' and presentable only after the fact, where the world is fitted to the analysis rather than the analysis adapted to the world. Andrew Moravcsik and his articles (1991, 1993) are the particular foci of Sandholtz, Stone Sweet and company's rebuttal.

To its credit, the Sandholtz and Stone Sweet collection contains two very strong contributions that well serve the purposes of the volume. Sandholtz's own chapter on 'The Emergence of a Supranational Telecommunications Regime' describes in well-documented detail how demands from the telecommunications industry and its customers elicited welcoming responses from the European

Commission leading to a series of initiatives that (1) 'ultimately rendered national PTT monopolies untenable', (2) defeated recalcitrant governments' attempts to protect these, (3) opened EU borders to competition in the sector and (4) produced European standards for the 'interoperability' of equipment. Sandholtz also shows how important decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) buttressed the Commission's ability to challenge public monopolies under Art. 90 of the Treaty of Rome. ECJ contributions to enhancing central authority in the European Union are stressed throughout the volume. Needless to say, much of what happened regarding telecommunications was pushed forward in the liberalizing atmosphere created by the Single European Act, and liberalization also had the important support of the British government. Still, Commission initiatives 'had an impact on member state thinking and preference formation', and 'if the interactions and discourses of the EU significantly shape state preferences, then interstate bargains are not what intergovernmentalists assume them to be' (p. 162).

Equally noteworthy for its support of the volume's main arguments is the Dolores O'Reilly and Alec Stone Sweet chapter on 'The Liberalization and European Regulation of Air Transport'. Again, demands from society – some airlines, travel agents, freight shippers, consumer associations – for the opening of competition in the air transport industry brought forth a supportive response from the Commission that was initially rejected by the national governments. Later, continuing pressures, both internal and external (i.e. the example of airline deregulation in the United States), plus the supportive rulings of the ECJ which invited the application of the EC's competition rules to air transport, brought forth a succession of EC agreements that by 1997 had removed internal barriers to competition in air transport and moved regulation to the EC level. Summarizing their findings, O'Reilly and Stone Sweet note that 'interest groups organized at European level, forged alliances with the Commission, and lobbied national governments for change. The Commission, at first timidly then ever more aggressively, pursued an increasingly comprehensive agenda of full scale reregulation of the industry at the European level'. Amid all of this political tugging and hauling by supranational agents, the authors conclude, the influence of national governments was 'analytically secondary' (p. 184).

Other substantive inclusions in the Sandholtz and Stone Sweet collection, though well done and interesting, as in the case of Alberta Sbragia's chapter on the evolution of EU participation in global environmental diplomacy and Michael E. Smith's discussion of European political co-operation, fall somewhat off the mark of supporting the book's central argument. That imperatives from the outside world have fostered European institution-building is true, and how this has come about is revealing, but the import in this for supranational

governance is unclear, particularly since there is not very much of it in evidence in either environmental affairs or foreign policy.

Then there is a most paradoxical chapter by David Cameron on the 'sources and effects of EMU'. As is typical of Cameron's fine work, his article was carefully researched, splendidly organized and clearly written. But, it offers a fundamentally intergovernmentalist – not an institutionalist – argument, which neither the editors in their introduction, nor James Caporaso in his conclusion, take note of. Cameron opens by explaining that his analysis will concern 'why the member states of the EC concluded several decades ago, and, for the most part, have persisted in believing, that their national interest is best served by extending the authority of existing supranational institutions and creating new ones in the domains of monetary and exchange rate policy' (p. 190). He develops a narrative centred on the preferences, initiatives and influence of national governments, which demonstrates that 'the extension of supranational authority associated with the EMU' served 'their national interest' (p. 191). In proceeding as he does, Cameron is the only contributor to this volume who directly affirms that European integration was being driven by the preferences and agents of national governments. But again, paradoxically, this is not what the Sandholtz and Stone Sweet book was supposed to affirm.

The editors' claims notwithstanding, the theoretical superstructure justifying the collection of papers included in the Sandholtz and Stone Sweet volume is neither very original nor as precisely conceptualized as it might be. The notion that intensifying transactional activity generates problems, which in turn generate demands for problem-solving, which can then lead to international collaboration and institutionalization is certainly not new. Similar propositions were entertained by the integration theorists of the last generation, Karl Deutsch (1957) and Amitai Etzioni (1965) in particular, indeed even by David Mitrany, and they also lie at the core of more recent theorizing about complex interdependence and the formation of regimes. That as integration deepens, policy-making shifts from intergovernmental modes toward supranational ones is plausible, generally speaking, and conforms closely to the tenets of neofunctionalism, which are also not new. That this was not the case with the European Coal and Steel Community or with agriculture in the EEC may be anomalous. What exactly the European Union is, what exactly a transnational society is, and what exactly supranational governance means or amounts to, are not entirely clear in the Sandholtz and Stone Sweet conceptualization (which is complicated by various reconceptualizations offered by contributing authors), and what all of this may be becoming is even murkier, as attempts at specification tend to be qualified as 'quasi', 'nascent' or 'emergent'. At least with Lindberg and Scheingold's 'would be polity,' depicted in 1970, the nature of the polity that would be was made quite clear. By contrast, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet's 'multi-

tiered', 'multi-dimensional', 'vertically and horizontally linked' and 'fragmented' attributions fail to bring their EU image into comprehensible focus.

Overall, the worthwhile pursuit of Sandholtz and Stone Sweet's first purpose, that is, tracing and explaining the emergence of a supranational polity in Europe, is in their book sidetracked by the overly zealous pursuit of their second purpose – discrediting intergovernmentalism. Their project's stern unwillingness to give ground to the intergovernmentalists leads them to suspect states, to attribute mostly negative, obstructionist and dilatory motives and actions to national governments and to caricature national interest as protecting sovereignty pure and simple. Readers are almost invited to accept that European integration is happening in spite of the national governments involved. In a word, this is wrong: European governments by and large favour European integration, and they are certainly less preoccupied with sovereignty than they are interested in deriving benefits from international collaboration.

Distaste for intergovernmentalism also invites contributors to the Sandholtz and Stone Sweet volume to overlook the importance of the interplay of national economic interests in the motoring of European integration, and to devalue the influence of the EU's intergovernmental institutions such as the Council of Ministers, its secretariat and associated subsidiary bodies and the European Council. On the other hand, the activities of the Commission and the ECJ are overemphasized. The Sandholtz and Stone Sweet project might have been more successful if participants had approached their differences with intergovernmentalists as a dialogue instead of a donnybrook fair.

*The Governance of the Single European Market* is also somewhat tinged by the academic gamesmanship that mars the Sandholtz and Stone Sweet volume. Armstrong and Bulmer do have occasion to underline their disagreements with Moravcsik while affirming their own commitment to historical institutionalism as the appropriate analytical pathway to understanding the European Union. But, debating with and discrediting the intergovernmentalists is not a purpose of Armstrong and Bulmer's work. What the study is about is explaining how the single European market (SEM) was realized, and more importantly, how it is regulated. The explanation that Armstrong and Bulmer develop through a series of case studies dealing with crucial policy problems that had to be resolved along the way to the SEM is commendable for its meticulousness. The construction of the SEM, as Armstrong and Bulmer show in their analyses, involved deregulation, reregulation, shifting the locus of regulatory authority, sorting policy instruments among policy implementers and generally developing complementarities instead of reinforcing contradictions among local, national and supranational interests.

Did European institutions influence the construction of the SEM? Yes, most emphatically. The European Commission's responsibilities in the area of com-

petition policy, embodied in the Treaty of Rome and later enhanced by important judgments of the ECJ proved decisive in rule-making and implementation in the area of mergers and acquisitions. Commission initiatives in response to business interests and other societal pressures, greatly facilitated by ECJ pronouncements concerning 'mutual recognition', together with the acceptance of the norm of 'reference to standards' and the institutionalization of European standard-setting, all combined to make possible the removal of technical barriers to trade. This, of course, is the core of the single market regime. Armstrong and Bulmer's rendition of air transport liberalization closely follows O'Reilly and Stone Sweet's analysis discussed earlier, and reaffirms the influence of the Commission prodded by societal interests and supported by the Court. Other problem areas investigated by Armstrong and Bulmer concern opening EU borders to competition among public utilities and the social issue of protecting pregnant women in the workplace. These too were explainable in terms of the analytical algorithm that applied appropriately to case after case:

From the modest beginnings of a first Commission initiative in a policy area, itself preceded by a phase of agenda setting, interest groups establish their claims to consultation. National governments and civil servants are engaged in many meetings before the first piece of legislation is agreed. Gradually a governance regime is established. Then comes the learning process of how implementation by national authorities corresponds to intentions. Further, ECJ jurisprudence develops legal norms. New legislation may be proposed, reflecting pressure from affected interests and incorporating the benefits of institutional learning. And so policy evolves in a manner which is structured by the institutional capacity of the EU generally and of a specific governance regime as well. (p. 56)

To those involved in the institutionalist–intergovernmentalist debate, Armstrong and Bulmer's analysis and findings could be interpreted as a rather smashing blow for institutionalism. Yet, this is probably not the case, because the behaviour that Armstrong and Bulmer explain as they work from the tenets and with the techniques of historical institutionalism is by and large not the behaviour that intergovernmentalists attempt to explain by applying their precepts. Most of the issues and policy processes examined by Armstrong and Bulmer had to do with secondary or follow-on rule-making and implementation, or, in Moravcsik's phrasing, the EC's 'everyday' legislation delegated to EU institutions as a result of the prior intergovernmental decisions that endorsed the Cockfield White Paper, authorized an Intergovernmental Conference at the Milan summit and finalized the Single European Act at Luxembourg. Therefore, we should expect, and intergovernmentalists may well accept, that EU institutions would be and should be effective in the realms of delegated competence, and if ECJ pronouncements reinforce this competence, so much the better.

Where Armstrong and Bulmer and the intergovernmentalists might engage is over the question of the origins of the Single European Act itself and the genesis of the drive toward a single market. Here indeed we find that interpretations are quite different, with Armstrong and Bulmer giving emphasis to the pressures of transnational business, the mobilizing activities of Etienne Davignon, the leadership of Jacques Delors and the inspiration of Arthur Cockfield. Intergovernmentalists, and here Moravcsik in particular, question the influence of transnational business and greatly downplay the influence of the distinguished Commissioners. Instead, they see the beginnings of what emerged as the SEA in nationally perceived imperatives for global economic competitiveness, in pressures from national export industries, in Margaret Thatcher's zealous economic liberalism, François Mitterrand's failed socialism in France and Helmut Kohl's acquiescence in the SEM because of his interest in moving other 'European' issues onto the IGC agenda. Ultimately, such differences in interpretation, and there are many, many such differences between intergovernmentalists and institutionalists, have to be resolved not by professing theoretical faith, but by closely examining and evaluating historical evidence.

While *The Governance of the Single European Market* should be read for the useful historical institutional story it tells, its more significant contribution to European Union studies may be in its conceptual imaginativeness. Armstrong and Bulmer paint a conceptual picture of European integration that both gives operational meaning to supranational governance and shows why such governance may well be a precondition for successful international economic collaboration among post-modern states in the late twentieth century. Drawing upon the work of John Ruggie (1993), Armstrong and Bulmer acknowledge that territoriality may be the Achilles heel of the modern (or post-modern) state inasmuch as a great deal of the societal activity, especially economic activity, that states must regulate in the interest of the security and well-being of their citizens, occurs across spacial domains that extend beyond the jurisdictions of national governments. That is, 'the emergence of governance beyond the state has been a response to the inability of traditional formal state institutions to manage the size and complexity of the regulatory tasks facing them' (p. 259). It may be within the capacity of some states to insulate themselves against transnational activities which they cannot control, but it may no longer be within any state's capacity to benefit from such activities without co-operatively engaging other states. Therefore, we see increasingly in relations among modern states, efforts to expand the territorial scope of regulation (having to do with securing benefits and avoiding penalties for citizens and their associations) outward to the boundaries of the domains within which transnational societal activities are actually occurring.

Herein lies the essence and functional significance of supranationality. This, in Armstrong and Bulmer's conceptualization, is what European integration is really all about, and for them it follows that the European Union is in reality an assemblage of regulatory regimes, that is, *governance regimes* variously organized, variously mixing local, national and supranational agents, variously institutionalized, variously rule based and concurrently operating to order transnational society. While governments acting separately cannot order transnational society, governments acting collectively can, when they interact in international institutional contexts. Hence, according to Armstrong and Bulmer, 'our use of the term "governance"' describes 'the political process of collective problem solving' (p. 255), and this is what goes on in the European Union. Such governance regimes will multiply because they must as post-modern society increasingly organizes and interacts across national borders, and as this occurs in Europe, integration will deepen. The student of European integration is therefore encouraged by Armstrong and Bulmer's work to push forward knowledge about the origins, structure, functioning, strengths and weaknesses of governance regimes.

Andrew Moravcsik does this. In *The Choice for Europe*, he pushes forward our understanding of several of the most significant governance regimes constructed over the cumulative course of European integration. Moravcsik, however, works from intergovernmentalist assumptions. He gathers evidence and tests positions derived from these, and produces what he himself readily acknowledges to be a controversial, revisionist explanation of the course of European integration. His analytical field extends from the inspiration for the Treaty of Rome to the negotiations at Maastricht. While Moravcsik's project has been caricatured by others as a series of snapshots capturing isolated moments when 'grand bargains' were struck among major EC Member States, it is not this at all, but rather a continuous political history of the evolution of the key policies that have been the essence of 40 years' intra-European economic co-operation. The book is about the supranationalization of trade policy, agricultural policy and monetary policy, i.e. the substantive core of European integration. As such, it seeks to explain why and how European integration happened.

'My central claim', Moravcsik records at the outset of his exposition,

is that the broad lines of European integration since 1955 reflect three factors: patterns of commercial exchange, the relative bargaining power of national governments, and the incentives to enhance the credibility of interstate commitments. Most fundamental of these was commercial interest. European integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national leaders who consistently pursued economic interests – primarily the commercial interests of powerful economic producers and secondarily the macroeconomic

preferences of ruling governmental coalitions – that evolved slowly in response to structural incentives in the global economy.

When such interests converged, integration advanced. (p. 3)

In offering his intergovernmentalist interpretation, Moravcsik also advances a revisionism that questions conventional alternative interpretations, including those of the institutionalists:

This explanation of integration breaks with the bulk of existing scholarship on the EC. It rejects the view that integration has been driven primarily – as Jean Monnet and his social scientific counterparts, the neofunctionalists, long maintained – by a technocratic process reflecting imperatives of modern economic planning, the unintended consequences of previous decisions, and the entrepreneurship of disinterested supranational experts. The integration process did not supersede or circumvent the political will of national leaders; it *reflected* their will. (p. 4)

Differences between Moravcsik and the institutionalists (as well as differences between him and other analysts who variously attribute European integration to the geopolitical imperatives of the Cold War era or to the ideological appeal of Europeanism) do not mainly concern *what happened* in Western Europe between 1955 and 1991. They rather concern *why it happened*. Almost everyone agrees that the course of European integration has been marked by the establishment of governance regimes that have cumulatively moved the regulation of European economic affairs into policy-making forums beyond the nation-state. So too do most analysts accept that, in establishing such regimes and conforming to their prescriptions, national governments have ‘pooled’ or ‘delegated’ sovereignty, or ‘accepted supranationality’ or in any event willingly relinquished considerable autonomy. Institutionalists, as elaborated earlier, see these transformations in intra-European international relations primarily driven by the influences of supranational agents responding to demands from transnational society. Moravcsik sees them driven primarily by the leaders of national governments responding to demands from national constituencies and reacting to imperatives from the global economy. Needless to say, these differing interpretations affect the historical stature of celebrated Europeans like Jean Monnet, Walter Hallstein and Jacques Delors as well as the ‘European’ reputations of national leaders like Charles de Gaulle, Harold Macmillan, François Mitterrand, Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher, who all emerge in new and rather unconventional light in Moravcsik’s writing. But what is more to the point is that the differing interpretations have to do fundamentally with the causes of European integration, and they are therefore very important.

What are we to make of Andrew Moravcsik’s argument? In a word: it is compelling. In episode after episode, Moravcsik shows that supranational regime-building progressed after national economic preferences converged,

after governments designed, proposed and initiated, after national statesmen entrepreneured, after asymmetries in national bargaining power were brought to bear, and after international institutions were given the task of locking in national commitments. What makes Moravcsik's case so compelling is the overwhelming evidence he provides. *The Choice for Europe* is a splendid example of contemporary social science at its very best. It is informed by relevant theories of international political economy, structured as a careful hypothesis-testing exercise, operationally elegant in its definitions of relevant bodies of data, exhaustive in its collection of data and balanced and prudent in its analyses. Moravcsik's historiography is also commendable: he works in three languages, largely on primary, cross-checked source materials, enlivened by personal interviews with major participants in the episodes he reconstructs. As an accomplishment in erudition, *The Choice for Europe* is of the stature of Ernst Haas's *The Uniting of Europe* (1958).

Entering almost anywhere into Moravcsik's retelling of the story of European integration invariably jars conventional understanding. He downplays the influence of Jean Monnet and of 'Europeanist' ideological zeal more generally in his explanation of the origins of the Treaty of Rome. He similarly minimizes the contributions of Walter Hallstein and Sicco Mansholt to the construction of the EC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and he gives Jacques Delors a good deal less credit for paving the way to European Monetary Union than standard interpretations usually allow. For that matter, in Moravcsik's analysis, the European Commission appears significantly less effective overall than neofunctionalists writing in the 1960s supposed and institutionalists today contend. Even during the period between 1958 and 1963, an accepted heyday of Commission accomplishment duly celebrated in Leon Lindberg's (1963) *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*, Brussels almost never got what it wanted from the national governments. '[T]he simplest and strongest piece of evidence against the thesis that the Commission was influential', Moravcsik argues, 'is the simple fact that the outcomes in the most important areas were the opposite of what the Commission initially sought. Transport integration was an outright failure and the CAP was close to opposite of the Commission's ideal' (pp. 233–4).

In contrast, Moravcsik elevates the insight and influence of national leaders, and in so doing intriguingly revises the history of European integration. For example, the third chapter of *The Choice for Europe* is entitled, 'Grain and Grandeur'. It is mostly about Charles de Gaulle, but a de Gaulle who is rather different from the player at high politics, the purveyor and personifier of French grandeur, or the inveterate foe of Anglo-Saxons that we have come to imagine. Through careful, comprehensive (and convincing) scrutiny of public and private documents, memoirs, diaries, accounts and recollections, Moravcsik gives us a

de Gaulle fixed on the object of promoting French agriculture in the emergent European Common Market. De Gaulle's understanding of the economic stakes involved in European integration, and his determination that the economics of integration should favour France, underpinned much of his European as well as a good deal of his Atlantic diplomacy between 1958 and 1966. Here we have a 'low politics' de Gaulle, fighting in the trenches of market access, prices and levies, and contributing directly and decisively to the creation of a CAP that gave France what it wanted from European economic integration. Moravcsik (p. 197) summarizes his analysis of de Gaulle's decisive, positive influence on European integration by letting the General speak for himself via his *Mémoires*:

Wealth ... is the principle object of public concern. No government can afford to ignore these realities ... I was to keep economic and social problems continually in the forefront of my actions ... which explains, incidentally, why the accusation of indifference to such matters so obstinately levelled against de Gaulle always struck me as absurd. (p. 197)

At the very least, Moravcsik's de Gaulle will generate some interesting discussion among students of European integration as, for that matter, will Moravcsik's Macmillan, Adenauer, Mitterrand, Thatcher and Kohl.

Of course, the publication of *The Choice for Europe* is not going to resolve the debate between institutionalists and intergovernmentalists. But this new contribution from the intergovernmentalist side will move the debate into a new phase, because hereafter alternative interpretations will have to be evaluated on the basis of evidence that compares in quality and credibility with that of Moravcsik. Even then, it will henceforth be difficult to talk about the construction of Europe without taking account of national political economic interests; it will be difficult to accept at face value political oratory about 'Europe' tailored for political consumption; it will be difficult to attribute major influence to supranational agents who press to take steps that national governments had already decided to take; and it will be difficult to argue that European integration has been happening in spite of the EU's Member States.

As the institutionalist–intergovernmentalist debate eventually mellows again into a constructive dialogue, contributors may come to recognize that what has been happening within the EC/EU – and because of the EC/EU – is both the sophisticated accommodation of converged national interests via the construction of governance regimes and the consolidation of a supranational polity. Much more of social significance has probably been happening as well. Surely much that Armstrong and Bulmer and the Sandholtz and Stone Sweet contributors describe is in fact going on, and it is happening for the reasons they offer. Governance is occurring: everyday legislation happens every day; regulations are made every day; rules are enforced every day; supranational decisions penetrate national societies and affect Europeans' lives every day. The govern-

ing of Europe, most of which already is or predictably will be within the EU, has a great deal to do with the functioning of the European Union's institutions. But the origins of this governance and its future evolution certainly have much to do with the explicit interests of Member States, their initiatives and influence and asymmetries in power among them. If Europe is still the 'bag of marbles' that Andrew Shonfield (1973) likened many years ago, the 'bag' has over time become increasingly important and the individual marbles perhaps less so. But without the marbles the bag would be empty. What has been driving European integration is still somewhat of an open question, though Andrew Moravcsik has taken a giant step toward closing it. But how, how effectively, how efficiently, how equitably, how responsibly, how responsively and how humanely Europe is governed are today exciting new questions because they all arise in the context of what European integration has done to Europe.

European integration will for the foreseeable future continue to be an ongoing social scientific puzzle. From the writings on display here, and the nature of the ongoing debate among theorists, it is likely that some will conclude that the next major challenge to integration theorizing lies in somehow synthesizing the insights of institutionalism and intergovernmentalism and elaborating some version of a unified theory. This would probably be a mistake: institutionalism and intergovernmentalism respectively appear to explain different phenomena that have been occurring in the experience of the EU. European integration is clearly more than one thing, and much of the theoretical confusion generated in attempts to explain it has stemmed from theorists' insistence that it has been a single, 'complex' phenomenon. Particularly useful for now would be a more modest attempt to define and delimit what institutionalism and intergovernmentalism, as well as other approaches, respectively do explain about the half-century long transformation of intra-European international relations, and *what they respectively do not explain*. Such an exercise might at least lead toward an inventory of the separate and different phenomena that we have been collapsing into the general notion of 'European integration'. Then, after scholarship has produced a better understanding of what it is that needs to be explained, and indeed of all of the different phenomena that need to be explained, the theoretical challenge would be to explain each of them better.

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