Chapter 17

Foreign and Security Policy

The Painful Path from Shadow to Substance

William Wallace

Summary

Defence and diplomacy are part of the core of state sovereignty, around which practitioners of functional integration tiptoed throughout the formative years of the European Union (EU). Transfer of effective authority (and budgetary responsibility) over foreign policy and defence would require a European federation. Policy cooperation in this field has therefore operated under contradictory pressures. The EU developed as a self-consciously ‘civilian’ power, European security provided through Nato under a US guarantee. Nevertheless, since the mid-1990s significant steps have been taken towards more effective structures for the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including elements of defence integration. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) established the post of ‘High Representative’ for CFSP. The Franco-British Declaration at St. Malo, in December 1998, unblocked long-standing differences over defence cooperation. The Helsinki European Council, in December 1999, set ‘headline goals’ for defence. Defence ministers began meeting within the EU framework, and a Military Committee and military staff were set up. In 2003-4 the EU took over civil police and military operations in Bosnia and Macedonia, and conducted its first autonomous operation outside Europe,
despatching 1,800 troops to Eastern Congo. In December 2003, EU heads of government agreed their first common security strategy, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*. The winter of 2002–3, however, also witnessed the most bitter dispute over foreign policy since 1973–4, as member governments fell out over the US intervention in Iraq.

CFSP has developed through a cycle of crises, followed by limited moves forward: moderate successes building on major failures. At the conclusion of each cycle, patterns of European cooperation have been re-established on a rather firmer basis, institutional mechanisms reinforced; but underlying contradictions remain. Ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, which establishes a ‘European Foreign Minister’, and an EU External Action Service, mark a further significant advance, but still leave key instruments in the hands of member states.

The Atlantic context for European foreign and security policy

Foreign policy and defence have been coordinated among west European states since 1949 within the broader framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, under US leadership. For as long as the cold war lasted, maintenance of the US commitment seemed to most west European governments vital to their security. Behind concerns about the Soviet threat lay parallel concerns about Europe’s ‘alternative hegemon’, Germany, as a truncated West German state re-emerged as the dynamo of the west European economy. Proposals to develop an autonomous capability to coordinate foreign and defence policies among European Community members thus opened up fundamental questions: about the transatlantic relationship; about the balance of influence and power within Europe itself; and about ‘the Atlantic idea and its European rivals’, including the Gaullist challenge to US security leadership (van Cleveland 1966; Grosser 1980).

None of the three founding treaties touched on foreign policy, let alone defence. The Treaty of Rome (EEC) included only limited competences to conduct external relations, under Articles 113–116 (EEC) (now Arts. 31–134 TEC) (common commercial policy), Articles 228–231 (EEC) (now Arts. 300–304 TEC) (relations with third states and international organizations), and Article 238 (EEC) (now Art. 310 TEC) (‘... agreements establishing an association involving reciprocal rights and obligations, common action and special procedures’ with ‘a third State, a union of States or an international organization’). In the distinction made by Gaullists between ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics the EEC was clearly limited to the low politics of commercial diplomacy, leaving the high politics of foreign policy and defence to sovereign states—and to Nato.

Yet issues of national security and foreign policy were fundamental to the development of west European integration. The Schuman Plan for a European Coal and Steel Community was launched in 1950 by the French government in response to intense US pressure to accept the full reconstruction of German heavy industry, in a divided Germany facing apparent internal and external communist threats. US pressure to accept West German rearmament, after the outbreak of the Korean War, led a reluctant
French government to advance the Pleven Plan for a European Defence Community (EDC), into which German units might be integrated. The European Defence Treaty, signed in Paris in May 1952, committed its signatories (under Art. 38) to examine the form of the political superstructure needed to give the EDC direction and legitimacy. The resulting de Gasperi Plan for a European political community would have transformed the Six into an effective federation, with a European Executive accountable to a directly-elected European Parliament.

After the death of Stalin and the Korean armistice in 1954, however, this direct attack on the core of national sovereignty was rejected by the French National Assembly. An intergovernmental compromise, promoted by the British, transformed the 1948 Treaty of Western Union (signed by Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, as a preliminary commitment in the negotiations which led to the Atlantic Alliance), into the seven-member Western European Union (WEU), bringing in West Germany and Italy. The WEU had a ministerial council, a small secretariat, a consultative assembly, and an armaments agency (primarily to control German arms production); but its military functions were integrated into Nato. The collapse of these ambitious proposals for defence and political communities was a defeat for European federalists, who concluded that future developments could only be gradual and indirect, through economic and social integration. It was also a defeat for US policy-makers, who looked to the development of an integrated Europe as a future partner with the US, which would shoulder a larger share of the burden of Western international order which the US had carried since 1947 (Fursdon 1980; Lundestad 1998).

Five years later, President de Gaulle chose foreign policy cooperation as the ground on which to make his double challenge to the US hegemony and to the supranational ambitions of the infant EEC. A ‘conference of heads of state and government and foreign ministers’ of the Six met, at French invitation, in Paris in February 1961 ‘to discover suitable means of organizing closer political cooperation’ as a basis for ‘a progressively developing union’. This Fouchet Plan was vigorously opposed by the Dutch, and found little support even within the German government. With Britain applying to join the EEC, and the Kennedy administration calling for a new ‘Atlantic partnership’, this was an evident challenge to US leadership and to Nato as such. De Gaulle subsequently withdrew French forces from Nato’s integrated structure, pursuing bilateral consultations with Bonn under the 1963 Franco–German Treaty. Foreign policy and defence consultations among other EEC members remained firmly within the Nato framework.

The Commission’s competences under the Treaties of Paris and Rome for external trade and for assisting development in former colonial territories nevertheless formed the basis for limited authority in external relations (see Chapter 15). Walter Hallstein, the first president of the EEC Commission, set out to establish its international status through active external relations, by, for example, negotiating association agreements with third countries: most significantly agreements with Greece in 1960, and Turkey in 1963. Commission delegations were established in major third countries and the associated developing states, with a Directorate-General for External Relations (DGI) to support them. His ambitions to claim international legal personality for the EEC, by formally accrediting ambassadors from third countries, were, however, blocked by de Gaulle, as a direct challenge to national sovereignty.
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European political cooperation: 1970–90

The ‘relaunch’ of European integration at the summit meeting in The Hague in December 1969, which followed de Gaulle’s departure, was a carefully-crafted package deal. French acceptance of ‘widening’ with negotiations for British accession was balanced by insistence on ‘completion’ of the system of agricultural finance within the Community budget, by commitments to ‘deepen’ economic and monetary union (EMU), and by renewed efforts at ‘political cooperation’. Yet European political cooperation (EPC), which began with quarterly meetings of foreign ministers and officials in 1970, more clearly served German international interests than French in its early years. It provided multilateral support for West Germany’s Ostpolitik (towards East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union), through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in a period when US policy-makers were preoccupied with Vietnam; and it provided a caucus within which to operate when the two German states were admitted into the UN in 1973.

The initial scepticism of other governments lessened as foreign ministers discovered the utility of informal consultations, and as their diplomats learned to appreciate this private framework for multilateral diplomacy. EPC was an entirely intergovernmental process, outside the treaties, agreed among governments and managed by diplomats. Foreign ministers’ meetings were prepared by the Political Committee, consisting of ‘political directors’ from foreign ministries, under which developed a network of working groups. The Commission was rigorously excluded in the early years, though the overlap between foreign policy and economic relations in the CSCE soon gave European Commission officials a limited role. In sharp contrast to the leaky policy-making processes of the EEC, EPC was managed confidentially, with infrequent reporting to national parliaments and little coverage in the press. Coreu, a secure telex link managed by the Dutch foreign ministry, provided direct communications; working groups, joint reporting from EPC embassies in third countries, and later exchanges of personnel, slowly transformed working practices within national diplomatic services.

The evolution of EPC can be seen as a cycle of hesitant steps to strengthen the framework, followed by periods of increasing frustration at the meagre results achieved, culminating in further reluctant reinforcement of the rules and procedures. Relations with the US were a significant factor in this cycle; the Middle East was the most frequent and difficult focus for transatlantic dispute. Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State, provoked a debate on the links between European and Atlantic political cooperation in his ‘Year of Europe’ speech of April 1973. Divergent reactions to the Arab–Israeli War of October 1973 escalated this debate into a bitter Franco–US confrontation, with other west European governments caught in between. The dispute was resolved in the ‘Ottawa Declaration’ of June 1974, in the context of a Nato summit; this set up an additional consultative mechanism between the rotating presidency of EPC and the US State Department before and after each EPC ministerial meeting (H. Wallace 1983). The French, who in 1973 had proposed to use WEU as the vehicle for a more autonomous European defence, remained formally outside Nato’s integrated structure, though in the years which followed they attached informal
‘liaison missions’ to Nato headquarters. Extensive military cooperation among other EU members developed during the 1970s and 1980s within the Nato framework, largely without French participation; the lightly-armed Franco–German Brigade, which was formed in 1983, was little more than a symbolic alternative (W. Wallace 1989).

European dismay at the drift of US policy in 1979–81, over the coup in Poland and over the revolution in Iran, as well as at their own failure to concert their response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, led to renewed efforts to promote cooperation: first, the London Report, under the 1981 British presidency, which provided for a small travelling secretariat to assist the presidency and ended restrictions on Commission participation in EPC; and then the much more ambitious 1992 Genscher–Colombo Plan for a ‘single’ European Union. But other governments, in particular the Danish, the neutral Irish, and the Greeks (who joined the EC and the EPC procedures in 1981), retained strong reservations over sharing sovereignty in such a sensitive area, where the views of the larger member governments were likely to prevail. The 1986 Single European Act (SEA), formally brought EPC together with the EC under the framework of the European Council, but provided for only limited reinforcement of foreign policy consultations among member governments (de Schoutheete 1986; Nuttall 1992).

Western Europe’s self-image as a ‘civilian power’ in the 1970s and 1980s partly reflected the exclusion of security and defence issues which followed from the unresolved Gaullist challenge to the US security leadership (Bull 1982). It took accumulated dissatisfaction with the quality of US leadership at the end of the 1970s to weaken the taboo. A Franco–German defence dialogue was re-launched in 1982, and then extended through a trilateral meeting with the British into a revival of six-monthly WEU ministerial meetings (of foreign and defence ministers) in 1983 (W. Wallace 1984). WEU membership expanded to nine with the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1987, following their accession to the EC, although not without a sharp debate on the merits of expansion. But warnings from Washington continued to accompany every gesture towards closer European cooperation, with the German, Dutch, and British governments in particular anxious to reassure the Atlantic hegemon of their prior loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance (Menon, Forster and Wallace 1992).

By the end of the 1980s the procedures of EPC had evolved into an extensive network, drawing in some thousands of diplomats in the foreign ministries of the member states, in their embassies outside the EU and in missions to international organizations. The rotating Council presidency acted as convenor and coordinator until the SEA was signed. The development of the Council presidency into a key EU mechanism, indeed, was partly due to the development of EPC. But the discontinuities created by the six-monthly rotation led, first, to the development of the ‘rolling troika’ (three representatives, of the previous presidency and the next in line as well as the current office-holder, named after the Russian three-horse sleigh), and then to the slow emergence of a secretariat, a mixed group of seconded officials who moved with each presidency from capital to capital. The SEA settled the EPC Secretariat in Brussels.

Looking back over twenty years, the transformation of diplomatic working practices was evident. Traffic around the Coreu telex network had grown from an initial 2–3,000 telegrams a year to some 9,000 in 1989. Desk officers in foreign ministers now dealt directly with their opposite numbers, in working groups, by telephone, and through Coreu. Cooperation and joint reporting among embassies in third countries
was of particular value to smaller member governments. The habits and assumptions
of a generation of national diplomats were thus reshaped, reinforced by joint training
courses, exchanges of personnel, even sharing of embassy facilities in some third
countries (Nuttall 1994). Commission officials, who had at first been rigorously
excluded on French insistence from participation, had been accepted as observers
into working group after working group. The small EPC office within the Commission
Secretariat-General grew after the SEA into a Directorate (Nuttall 1994).

For its defenders, in Paris and London, EPC in 1989 represented a working model of
intergovernmental cooperation without formal integration. The model had indeed
been extended to justice and home affairs (JHA), a similarly sensitive area in terms of
sovereignty. Foreign ministers, and foreign ministries, now spent much of their work-
ing life within this multilateral context, moving from EC Councils of Ministers to EPC
ministerial meetings to WEU, each with their subordinate committee structures,
meeting with each other more often than they met with their colleagues in national
cabinets. But it was entirely self-contained within this circle of foreign ministries.
Defence ministries remained entirely outside EPC; nine EU defence ministries and
armed forces (all except those of France, Spain and Ireland) worked together instead
within Nato’s integrated military structure. The structure resembled a diplomatic
game, providing work for officials without engaging or informing parliaments, or
press, let alone public opinion. It thus failed to promote any substantial convergence
of national attitudes. There was little evidence that EPC had exerted any direct influ-
ence on Arab–Israeli relations, for example, or on events in sub-Saharan Africa or in
the course of western interests throughout the regions to Europe’s immediate south.

European transformation and political union: 1990–92

The IGC planned for 1990–91 was initially intended to focus on monetary union and
its institutional consequences, not directly on political union defined in terms of
foreign and defence policy. The revolutions in central and eastern Europe in the
course of 1989, and the rapid moves towards German unification which followed in
1990, forced foreign and security policy up the IGC agenda. One of the underlying
purposes of west European integration since the Schuman Plan had, after all, been to
constrain the sovereignty of a reconstructed Germany (Soetendorp 1990: 103); the
end of the cold war brought Germany back to the centre of a potentially reunited
continent. Washington was, however, the first to respond. James Baker, US Secretary
of State, in his Brussels speech of 12 December 1989, proposed a reshaping of the
Atlantic political community, with an agenda extending across the full range of
politico-military, economic, and environmental issues. West European governments
resisted the idea of incorporating this redefined relationship into a formal new treaty.
The Transatlantic Declaration, which was signed in the autumn of 1990, more
modestly formalized and extended the network of contacts between the EC, the EPC
presidency, and the US administration (Peterson 1994), and did not touch the defence
relationship.
European governments moved much more slowly. In March 1990 the Belgian government proposed a second IGC on ‘political union’. Paris and Bonn jointly endorsed the Belgian initiative, proposing that the IGC formulate a common foreign and security policy as a central feature of the European Union (Laursen and Vanhoonacker 1992). There were, however, significant differences over the link between economic and political union, and much reluctance to recognize that rhetorical commitments implied real resources and practical obligations. Chancellor Kohl and the German political élite saw their acceptance of monetary union as part of a package which should include the development of common foreign policy within an integrated (and democratically accountable) Community framework. The Benelux states shared this perspective. The French and British governments, however, resisted the transfer of authority over foreign policy from a confidential intergovernmental framework to the Community proper. On security policy and defence there was a different dividing line between Atlanticists (in Britain, the Netherlands, and Portugal), resisting any substantial weakening of the Nato framework, and Europeanists (in France, Belgium, and Italy), with the German government in the middle (Gnesotto 1990). Negotiations over preferred policy outputs were thus entangled with ideological and constitutional questions throughout the IGC.

As important a dividing line, less willingly recognized by many delegations, lay between those states with the capacity and the domestic support for active foreign policies and those for which an engaged foreign policy (let alone defence) was surrounded by political inhibitions. Here France and Britain lay at one end of the spectrum, with Germany, the government most determinedly pushing for a CFSP, at the other. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990 Britain responded to US calls for military support by sending an armoured division; France (to the embarrassment of its military and political leaders, who wished to demonstrate a comparable commitment) could assemble and despatch from its depleted conventional forces only an under-strength and lightly-armed division, which the US considered of marginal utility. Italian ships and planes provided support; Germany contributed (substantially) to the financial costs of the military operation, without any military involvement. This reflected historical and constitutional inhibitions about the projection of military power beyond German borders, an inhibition to which public opinion and the opposition parties within the Bundestag remained firmly committed. Belgium turned down a British request for ammunition to supply its forces in the Gulf, mainly, it was rumoured, because the ammunition was unreliable.

It was impossible to contemplate options for European defence integration without first establishing how these might affect the relationship between the Atlantic Alliance and the EU (E. Foster 1992). The US was thus an active player throughout the IGC, across the whole common foreign and security policy dossier, determined to maintain the primacy of Nato in post-cold war Europe. Successful agreement on the conclusions of the Alliance Strategic Review, launched in April 1990 and running in parallel with the EU deliberations, was a precondition for successful agreement among the Twelve (Menon, Forster and Wallace 1992). Negotiations thus proceeded in 1990–1 in three parallel forums: Nato, WEU, and EU-IGC, with overlapping but non-identical memberships.

If the negotiators had been able to focus on the issues at stake undistracted by extraneous developments, the Maastricht package on CFSP might conceivably have
been tied up more neatly. But external developments intruded from beginning to end. New regimes to the EU’s east were pressing for trade concessions and the promise of membership (see Chapter 16). US forces transferred from Germany to the Gulf returned direct to the US in 1991, accelerating a rundown of US troops in Europe from 350,000 in 1989 to 150,000 by 1994. The disappearance of the Soviet threat encouraged finance ministries across Western Europe to take the ‘peace dividend’ through cuts in defence spending, far deeper than Washington’s post-cold war retrenchment.

Foreign ministers were also preoccupied by the fraught atmosphere of US–EC negotiations (and intra-EC differences) in the final stages of the Uruguay Round. When the Yugoslav crisis broke in June 1991, many of the most sensitive issues in the IGC remained unresolved. Ministers assembled to discuss the principles of future common policy, but found themselves disagreeing over immediate actions. The Luxembourg foreign minister, as President of the Council for the first six months of 1991, unwisely declared that: ‘This is the hour of Europe, not of the United States’. The attempt to establish a cease-fire in Croatia quickly moved beyond diplomacy to the deployment of EC peace monitors, and then, reluctantly, to the dispatch of peace-keeping forces under the auspices of the UN. The attempted putsch of 19 August in Moscow, and the progressive disintegration of the Soviet Union from then until the declarations of independence in its constituent states in December 1991, accompanied the final stages of the IGC negotiations. Foreign ministers and their representatives were thus caught up in negotiating the terms under which they might act together, while under acute external pressures to take common action in a rapidly-changing international environment. As the IGC reached its end game the German government, which had been pressing for a binding commitment to a CFSP, was threatening to recognize Croatia unilaterally, in defiance of the consensus among its partners not to do so.

Negotiations within the IGC focused instead on institutional issues. The German and Benelux governments were in favour of bringing foreign policy—and in time defence—within the integrated framework of the EC. The French and British argued against this that an effective foreign policy, which included the ‘hard’ issues of security and defence, could rest only on the commitments of governments representing states. The Luxembourg Presidency’s first ‘non-paper’, circulated in April, sketched out a ‘pillar’ model, with CFSP and justice and home affairs (JHA) remaining outside the EC proper. The succeeding Dutch presidency was more determinedly communautaire; but the radical nature of its proposals to integrate foreign and security policy fully within the EC attracted support only from the Belgians (Cloo et al. 1994; Buchan 1993). Negotiations on the appropriate link between the EU and WEU proceeded in parallel. On this the French and Dutch governments exchanged positions, with the Dutch (and the British) visualizing WEU as a permanent ‘bridge’, linking the EU and Nato, and the French (supported by the Belgian, Italian, and Spanish delegations) envisaging a ‘ferry’ which would gradually transfer defence functions from Nato to the Union. The British and Italians proposed to re-define WEU as the European pillar of Nato, with a WEU Rapid Reaction Force based on ‘double-hatted’ Nato and national contributions. The French and German governments countered by proposing to transform the Franco–German Brigade into a ‘Eurocorps’, as the basis for an integrated European military structure (Menon, Forster and Wallace 1992; A. Forster 1994). A compromise was struck at the Nato summit in Rome of 7–8 November 1991,
after some sharp exchanges between French and US leaders, from Presidents down. The new Nato ‘Strategic Concept’, which heads of government agreed, approved the development of European multinational forces, but also reaffirmed the primacy of Nato as the forum for defence cooperation.

The confident opening statement of Article J of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU)\(^2\)—‘A common foreign and security policy is hereby established’—was thus qualified by carefully-crafted subsequent clauses, which registered unresolved differences. Heads of government arrived in Maastricht to find square brackets and alternative drafts scattered throughout the CFSP text. They devoted much of their time to other politically-sensitive chapters, leaving to foreign ministers and political directors the task of negotiating mutually acceptable language. The outcome represented a modification of existing institutional arrangements, rather than the major change that the language of the treaty implied.

Policy initiative, representation, and implementation were explicitly reserved to the Council presidency, ‘assisted if need be by the previous and next member states to hold the Presidency’ (thus institutionalizing the existing troika). The Commission was to be ‘fully associated’ with discussions in this inter-governmental pillar, and ‘the views of the European Parliament . . . duly taken into consideration’ (Arts. J.5, J.9, J.7 TEU; now Arts. 18 and 21 CTEU). The WEU was designated ‘an integral part of the development of the Union’, with its secretariat strengthened and moved from London and Paris to Brussels (Art. J.4.(2) TEU; now Art. 17(1) CTEU; Declaration on Western European Union). Ambiguous language allowed for ‘joint actions’ in pursuit of agreed common aims, and referred to ‘the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’ (Arts. J.3, and J.4.(1) TEU; now Arts. 14 and 17(1) CTEU). An unresolved dispute between the British and the French over further enlargement of WEU was overtaken by the Greek government’s last-minute declaration that it would veto the entire TEU unless it was allowed to join the WEU. This forced negotiators to offer associated status to Turkey and to other European (but not necessarily EU) Nato members as well.

The most remarkable aspect of the CFSP negotiations in 1990–91 was how successfully they were contained within the network of foreign ministries established through EPC, and how little attention was paid to them by the press, by politicians outside government, by national parliaments or by the wider public. Even defence ministries in Paris and Bonn were excluded from consultation on Franco–German policy initiatives, a factor which explained the absence of detail in successive French proposals. If negotiators had addressed the resources and capabilities required to fulfil the expectations raised by their ambitious rhetoric, then finance ministries and parliaments would have had to be drawn in, with press and public following (Hill 1998). But much of the CFSP negotiations at Maastricht amounted to shadow-boxing behind the security cover which the US provided, while monetary union and social policy preoccupied heads of government. Article J.4 (TEU) (now Art. 17(5) CTEU) committed the signatories to report on the operation of CFSP to a further IGC, to be convened (under Art. N TEU; now Art. 48 CTEU) in 1996, linking this to the fifty-year review of the WEU Treaty due in 1998.
Learning by doing: 1992–96

Subsequent developments, however, resolved some of Maastricht’s unfinished business, without waiting for ratification. Partly under the pressure of events in eastern and south-eastern Europe, partly thanks to the excellent personal relations between Nato’s German Secretary-General and his Dutch counterpart at WEU, the WEU ministerial meeting in Bonn in June 1992 was able in the ‘Petersberg Declaration’ (see Box 17.1) to outline a distinctive role for WEU in undertaking peacekeeping and peacemaking operations (WEU 1992). Franco–British rivalry over European joint forces abated; the expanded Franco–German Brigade, now as the Eurocorps to be joined by double-hatted Spanish and Belgian contingents, was in future to be ‘assigned’ to WEU alongside other double-hatted ‘European’ forces in Nato (most importantly the British-led Rapid Reaction Corps), and ‘made available’ for possible WEU use (A. Forster 1992).

It was the evolution of the Yugoslav crisis, however, that was the key learning process for European governments. West Europeans had instinctively looked to the USA to provide leadership, while the US administration had firmly signalled that the west Europeans should take responsibility. WEU lacked the command and control structures required to mount the complex intervention needed in Croatia and Bosnia. The French commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNPROFOR), the initial peacekeeping force, based his headquarters on a Nato structure, with US and German officers taken out and French brought in. The US was sharply critical of the hesitant and incoherent West European policies in former Yugoslavia; but there were also conflicting policies within Washington. The French and the British provided the largest single forces on the ground; the Spanish and Dutch also contributed substantial contingents. Five of the other eleven EU member states had troops in Bosnia or Croatia in early 1995, Danes and Swedes with Norwegians and Finns in a joint Nordic battalion. French attitudes both to Nato and to Britain shifted further under the experience of cooperation with British forces in the field, and closer appreciation of the utility of Nato military assets, now partly under French command. An active, though confidential, Franco–British defence dialogue was under way by the end of 1993; the two foreign ministers publicly announced its existence in November 1994, setting up a joint air wing (van Eekelen 1993; Gnesotto 1994).

Despite the permissive conclusions of the Nato summit in Rome, both the US State Department and the Pentagon continued to assume that Nato would define European security and foreign policy. They regarded WEU’s creation of a consultative forum with the foreign and defence ministers of eight central and east European states as a competitor to Nato’s recently-created Advisory Council for Cooperation (NACC). While west European governments collectively and individually provided by far the largest proportion of economic assistance to the former socialist states, including Russia, the US defined East-West political strategy. The Clinton administration proposed yet another reformulation of the Atlantic politico-military partnership at the Nato summit in Brussels of January 1994, now to include enlargement of Nato to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The EU’s approach to eastern enlargement was a slower and more deliberate process. In the Middle East, the EU and its members
were providing the largest share of economic assistance to the Palestinians, but without any significant influence over Israeli–Palestinian relations. The EU’s southern members pressed for Mediterranean programmes, oriented particularly towards the Maghreb, to parallel the eastern-oriented Phare and TACIS, and with a comparable share of the EU budget; the Spanish presidency convened a Euro–Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona in November 1995, which committed the EU in principle to a generous long-term programme (Barbé 1998).

The machinery, activity, and personnel involved in CFSP nevertheless expanded. The EPC Secretariat, now with twenty staff, became part of the Council Secretariat. It had, however, little contact with the WEU Secretariat and almost none with the Nato Secretariat, both less than three kilometres away. For the European Commission, external relations were fast becoming one of its most thickly-staffed fields. The rapid expansion of Community activities in central and eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union led to the creation of Commission representations in those states. With over 100 missions in third countries, it had a wider network than many member states, with significant funds to distribute in developing countries and in the former socialist states. In the allocation of portfolios for the new Commission in January 1992, Jacques Delors as Commission President expanded the EPC directorate into a full Directorate-General: DG IA External Political Relations, alongside (and partly duplicating the work of) DG I External Economic Relations. This tactical move provided prestigious posts for two rival Commissioners, at the cost of institutionalizing competition among Commissioners and officials. Two other directorates-general, each reporting to different Commissioners, were responsible for relations with Mediterranean states and with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states (associated through the Lomé Convention). This scarcely made for an integrated approach to economic and political issues, or for a global approach to the EU’s external relations.

There were also institutional obstacles within national governments to integrating the political, security, and economic strands of foreign policy. Most foreign ministries had separate political and economic directorates, the former relating to CFSP and Nato, the latter to the EU, with separate national missions in Brussels to Nato and to the EU. Coordination of this unwieldy machinery depended heavily on foreign ministers, most of whom attended Nato Councils and WEU ministerial meetings, as well as General Affairs Councils and formal and informal CFSP meetings. But foreign ministers were often distracted by immediate issues or domestic politics, and had limited time or inclination either to ensure that different organizations dovetailed neatly or to think strategically.

The Bosnian conflict was not the only issue on which EU member governments, constrained by different domestic assumptions about foreign policy and national interests, found it difficult to agree on a common approach. French engagement in the linked conflicts in Zaire and Rwanda embarrassed other member states. The Greek government’s sustained veto over recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia infuriated its partners. The accession in 1995 of three more non-aligned states (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) further complicated attempts to add defence to EU responsibilities. The emergence of a northern perspective among a strengthened Nordic group also shifted the focus of concerns towards the Baltic and Barents Seas and to problems of stability and nuclear safety in north-western Russia, and generated vigorous support for the Baltic states in their approach to EU membership.
Geographical diversity created unavoidable differences of priorities in national capitals. The German government was most directly concerned about its eastern neighbours, and about Ukraine and Russia; France reserved relations with Algeria to itself; while Spain was preoccupied with Morocco, and with the stability of North Africa as a whole.

France, Germany, and Britain were the key players in moves towards a more effective CFSP. Painful reassessment of post-cold war German responsibilities was leading to a gradual ‘normalization’ of German foreign and defence policy, starting with the deployment of German aircrew in multinational AWACs aircraft over Bosnia in 1992. Nevertheless continuing support for the principle of a citizen army, based on conscription, left its armed forces poorly structured and ill-equipped for the different demands of peacekeeping and peacemaking. Attitudes in the French and British governments, antagonists in the debate about European versus Atlantic frameworks for foreign policy and defence over the previous forty years, were converging. The French government had explicitly modelled its post-Gulf War defence review on the British, ending conscription to focus on a smaller, better-equipped and more deployable military force. Cooperation on the ground in Bosnia was building mutual respect between the French and British military. At the political level the British and French shared similar frustrations over the reassertion of US leadership in the Balkans, with its assumption that the European allies would support the imposition of the Dayton Agreement in December 1995—a settlement less generous to the Bosnians than earlier EU proposals which the US had refused to support. All this contributed to a convergence of attitudes between London and Paris, though the strength of Euroscepticism within the Conservative party and within the British press meant that its implications did not become evident until well after the election of a Labour government in May 1997 (Neville-Jones 1997).

The Amsterdam Review

There was little enthusiasm among member governments for the major review of progress towards CFSP which they were committed by the TEU to conduct in 1996. With ratification of the TEU completed only in 1993, there was little useful experience to draw on; nor was there any consensus about whether to strengthen, transform, or abolish WEU when the treaty reached its fiftieth anniversary (Deighton 1997). Proposals from member governments revived the debate of five years before. The French government pressed for the appointment of a High Representative for CFSP, to provide for the continuity and leadership which—French ministers claimed—the rotating presidency and the troika were unable to ensure. Governments from the smaller states suspected this was an attempt to consolidate large-state dominance of CFSP, already evident in the Bosnian Contact Group, within which the British, French, Germans, and Italians worked with Russia and the USA. There was broader agreement on the appointment of a policy planning unit within the Council Secretariat, to strengthen central support for the intergovernmental structure of CFSP. Several preliminary papers reopened the question of qualified majority voting (QMV); the
French, in mid-IGC, proposed to move on from the TEU’s ‘joint actions’ to ‘common strategies’ (B. Smith 1999). The British Conservative government, determinedly focusing on ‘practical’ measures, saw the High Representative post as suitable for a senior official rather than a political figure, integrated into the Council Secretariat and reporting to the Council and Presidency; the German government agreed, not wishing to create competition in status with national foreign ministers.

As in 1990–91, intra-European negotiations on security policy and defence moved in parallel with developments within Nato. The French and US governments had been attempting to find a compromise between their formerly entrenched positions since their agreement on the new Nato Strategic Concept in November 1991. At the Brussels Nato summit in January 1994, the US delegation launched the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), intended to enable European governments to launch operations without direct US commitment, but also with the right to request the use of Nato’s headquarters, command facilities, communications systems, and logistical support—assets disproportionately provided by the US. France in its turn had been edging back towards participation in the Nato integrated military structure. The concept of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), on which the alliance had now agreed, expressed US willingness to accommodate French sensitivities, as well as US insistence that the European allies should play a larger role in maintaining the security of their own region. In December 1995 the French government announced a formal return to some parts of the Nato structure, although President Chirac made clear, in a speech to the US Congress the following February, that France expected a genuine ‘Europeanization’ of the alliance in return. But President Chirac (much to the dismay of his defence ministry) then publicly demanded that a French officer should take over Nato’s southern command, directly challenging US strategic priorities in the eastern Mediterranean. Washington’s refusal dashed hopes in several capitals that French re-entry into Nato’s integrated military structure would permit the emergence of a stronger European pillar within the alliance, closely integrated with the EU.

Paradoxically, Franco-British convergence on defence was not reflected in the formal outcome of the 1996–7 IGC. Both governments were inhibited by commitment to sovereignty within their own parliaments and public from admitting how far they had moved; both therefore stressed practical cooperation, an approach with much more content but much less symbolism than that which characterized Franco-German defence cooperation. The lengthy IGC had moved from Italian to Irish presidency in the second semester of 1996, a neutral with little interest in pressing this dossier forward. The Dutch government, which took over the presidency in January 1997, was internally divided between different coalition parties and different ministries over how far Atlantic defence integration should be modified by Europeanization. The German foreign ministry was enthusiastic for greater defence integration, the German defence ministry much more hesitant. The Finnish and Swedish governments, new members and neutrals, were nevertheless strong proponents of closer association between the WEU and EU in crisis management, conflict prevention and peace-keeping—the Petersberg tasks (see Box 7.1). Confusion in Paris, after the blocking of moves towards full French re-entry into Nato’s military structure, left the Italians, Luxembourgers, Belgians, and Spanish as the strongest protagonists of a full merger of WEU and EU in the IGC endgame.
Hardly surprisingly, the language of Article 17 CTEU (ex Art. J.4 TEU) was thus opaque. The European Council could now ‘avail itself’ of WEU action, with the possibility of a merger ‘should the European Council so decide’. Article 13 CTEU (ex Art. J.3 TEU) declared that the European Council ‘shall define the principles and general guidelines’ for CFSP, ‘including for matters with defence implications’, leaving for future negotiation what matters might be agreed. It also allowed for agreement on ‘common strategies...to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common...in particular by adopting joint actions and common positions’. But there was no common understanding as to what this implied. Irritation at the way in which the Greeks had blocked common policies on Macedonia and Turkey had however led to some movement away from insistence on unanimity, registered in Article 23 (CTEU). Decisions could be taken on the basis of ‘constructive abstention’, where abstention by up to three member governments would not prevent the Union adopting a position.

The ToA commitment (Arts. 18 and 26, CTEU) to a High Representative marked potentially a larger step forward: the post was to be combined with that of Secretary-General of the Council, with a post of Deputy Secretary-General to manage the Council Secretariat. Article 18(5) (CTEU) empowered the Council to appoint ‘a special representative’ with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues—generalizing the experiment adopted (with Lord Carrington, David Owen, and Carl Bildt) in the

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**Box 17.1 The Petersberg tasks**

Petersberg Declaration, June 1992, Section II, On Strengthening WEU’s Operational Role, par. 4:

‘Apart from contributing to the common defence in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty respectively, military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peacekeeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.’


The Treaty of Amsterdam’s substantial revisions of the Maastricht Treaty provisions on CFSP incorporated this list, as Article J TEU (ex Art. 7(2) TEU). The Constitutional Treaty would replace the Petersberg Tasks with the following (Art. I–41(1) CT):

‘The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.’
Bosnian conflict. Creation of a new policy planning unit, alongside the existing CFSP secretariat, registered the continuing increase in the size and influence of the Council Secretariat.

Distracted heads of government, among them newly-elected prime ministers from both Britain and France, did not wish to move further on this difficult dossier when they met at Amsterdam to settle the final terms of the treaty. Agreement at official level as the IGC progressed had produced texts which registered marginal strengthening of the positions of the Commission and the European Parliament (EP) in the second pillar. The Commission was now to be ‘fully associated’ (Art. 18.4, CTEU), but the Council and presidency retained the initiative; the presidency ‘shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and basic choices’ of the CFSP (Art. 21, CTEU). Expenditure on CFSP had been a contentious issue in the Maastricht IGC, because of French and British resistance to the EP acquiring an oversight of spending which might give it future leverage over CFSP. Article 28 (CTEU) charged administrative expenditure and non-military operational expenditure to the EU budget, leaving ‘operations having military or defence implications’ to be funded by those states which have not exercised their right of constructive abstention. Modest improvements in machinery thus left for post-IGC negotiation many of the most contentious issues which governments had been reluctant to address at Amsterdam.

After Amsterdam: Britain and France as leaders

A key factor in the unblocking of the defence dimension in the eighteen months after the end of the IGC, and in acceptance of Javier Solana, a political figure, as High Representative, was the continuing learning experience of managing conflict in south-eastern Europe. European-US differences were again evident as conflict developed in Kosovo in late 1998. The US administration favoured the use of air power alone, in which its contribution was also dominant; the French and British were willing to use ground forces. The new British government had conducted its own strategic defence review in the course of 1997–8, with the European dimension only a background factor. Tony Blair, the British prime minister, was now shocked to discover how limited a force the European allies were able to mobilize in an emergency, and how dependent they were on US transport and communications; the mantra that European governments spent two-thirds as much as the US on defence, but could deploy only 10 per cent as many troops, was thereafter repeated in prime ministerial speeches and government statements. Contingency planning for a ground invasion of Kosovo, too late to prevent Serbian expulsion of a substantial proportion of its ethnic Albanian population, depended heavily on the professional forces provided by the British and French. The unilateral style of US policy, as refugees poured into Macedonia and Albania and from there into Italy, Germany, and other EU member states, shifted opinion in London, The Hague, and Berlin further towards accepting the principle of a European pillar within the Atlantic Alliance. German willingness to deploy ground troops, with over a thousand posted to Macedonia in 1998, met another necessary precondition for an autonomous European defence capability.
In parallel with developments in Kosovo, the British government was now moving from laggard to leader in promoting European defence integration. At the Pörtschach informal European Council in October 1998, Tony Blair introduced a number of proposals on closer defence cooperation. This was followed by the Franco–British St. Malo Declaration of December 1998 (see Box 17.2), which robustly stated that ‘the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces’, with member governments operating ‘within the institutional framework of the European Union’, including ‘meetings of defence ministers’. Intensive Franco–British consultations between political directors and senior defence officials expanded bilaterally to other key EU governments, and then to the US, the Norwegians, and the Turks. Within the EU the Germans and Dutch were most closely drawn in, although the new coalition government in Berlin, with a social democrat defence minister and a green foreign minister, found it hard to formulate a coherent response.

Initial reactions in Washington were mixed; like its predecessors, the Clinton administration publicly supported the greater Europeanization of Nato, but warned of the danger of such an initiative being misconceived, or mishandled. The North Atlantic Council which met in Washington in April 1999 to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance and to welcome three new members—Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—declared in its carefully-balanced communiqué that ‘we reaffirm our commitment to preserve the transatlantic link’, but also ‘welcome the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defence’. Discussions then moved forward, under the German presidency of both the EU and WEU, through the WEU Council of foreign and defence ministers and through EU foreign ministers in the Council of Ministers, to the Cologne European Council in early June. Its communiqué stated that ‘we are now determined to launch a new step in the construction of the European Union... our aim is to take the necessary decisions by the end of the year 2000. In that event, the WEU as an organization would have completed its purpose’.

Franco–British partnership, with the support of the German presidency, had pushed through other significant innovations. At an informal foreign affairs Council in March 1999, the presidency’s proposal to establish an EU military committee met with some initial resistance, most strongly from the neutral Irish; but the British proposal to create a permanent committee of deputy political directors in Brussels (in parallel with Coreper), to improve coordination of CFSP, was accepted. After the meeting the Spanish foreign minister told the press that he had the impression he was ‘seeing the beginning of a process similar to that which marked the beginning of reflection leading to the single currency’ (Agence Europe, 15 March 1999). In June the German government proposed a broader EU ‘stability pact’ for south-eastern Europe. At the Cologne European Council in June 1999 member governments adopted their first ‘Common Strategy’, a lengthy statement of principles for future relations between the EU and Russia. There was now general agreement that the new secretary-general should be a senior political figure, rather than an official. The nomination of Javier Solana, former Spanish foreign minister and current Nato Secretary-General, was both appropriate and symbolic. Secretaries-General of Nato had always been Europeans, accepted by the US as an interlocuteur on behalf of its allies; Solana was already well-known, and well-trusted, in Washington. George Robertson, the British defence minister, who had played a leading role in promoting the Franco–British initiative, succeeded Solana as Nato Secretary-General.
3–4 December 1998: France and the UK issue the St. Malo Declaration which stated that ‘the Union (EU) must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the EU will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within Nato’s European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the Nato framework).’

10–11 December 1999: The European Council in Helsinki defines the EU Headline Goal of creating a military capacity by 2003 to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year a force of 50–60,000 personnel, with support elements, capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks. The European Council further decides to set up the necessary political and military bodies to manage ESDP. Interim bodies begin operating in the spring of 2000.

20–21 November 2000: At the Capabilities Commitment Conference, EU defence ministers pledge initial national contributions to the rapid reaction force envisioned in the Headline Goal. The voluntary national contributions added up to a pool of more than 100,000 personnel, approximately 400 combat aircraft and 100 vessels.

7–9 December 2000: At the European Council in Nice, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Committee of the EU (EUMC), and the Military Staff of the EU (EUMS), are incorporated into the Treaties.

19–20 November 2001: EU Foreign and Defence Ministers make additional pledges to the Headline Goal at the Capabilities Improvement Conference and launch the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP).

1 January 2002: The WEU subsidiary bodies, the Torrejon Satellite Centre, and the Paris-based Institute for Security Studies become EU agencies.

12–13 December 2002: The European Council in Copenhagen approves terms for EU access to Nato planning, logistics, and intelligence for missions in which Nato is not involved; after three years of negotiations over implementing the ‘Berlin Plus’ Nato–EU agreement, in which the status of Turkey as a non-EU Nato member has proved the most difficult issue.

1 January 2003: The EU Police Mission takes over from the UN International Policy Task Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the first ESDP mission, with a three year mandate. The initial contingent has 530 police officers from EU members and third states.

31 March 2003: The EU launches Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, taking over from Nato, and with access to Nato assets under the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement. This is the first military ESDP mission: 350 lightly armed soldiers from 13 EU member states and 14 non-member states. Concordia was requested by the government of FYROM, was backed by a UN Security Council resolution and contributed to the implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement.
5 June 2003: Responding to an appeal by the UN Secretary General, Operation Artemis, a military mission, is despatched to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The force, 1,800 strong, begins to deploy within seven days of the UN request. Stationed in the eastern DRC until September, Artemis handed responsibility over to a larger but slowly-assembled UN force. Artemis was the first ESDP mission outside of Europe and the first military mission not to involve Nato assets and capabilities.


15 December 2003: The EU police Operation Proxima replaces the military operation Concordia in FYROM. At the invitation of the Prime Minister of FYROM, the 200 strong police force trains local law enforcement agencies, focusing particularly on the fight against organized crime.


12 July 2004: The Council of the European Union establishes the European Defence Agency. The agency is given four principal tasks: development of defence capabilities in the field of crisis management; promotion and enhancement of European armaments cooperation; to strengthen the European defence technological and industrial base; and to enhance European defence research and technology.

16 July 2004: Launch of the first EU Rule of Law mission EUJUST Themis to Georgia. A group of approximately ten senior civilian experts supported by local staff support and advise ministers, senior officials and appropriate bodies at the level of the central government. They are located in Ministries and governmental bodies in the Georgian capital. This mission falls under the rule of law priority area of the civilian side of ESDP and is foreseen to last 12 months.

2 December 2004: The EU operation Althea replaces the Nato-led SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina—with recourse to Nato assets and capabilities. It starts with the same force levels as Nato-led SFOR (7,000 troops), drawn from the same states. Althea’s primary mission is to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton/Paris Agreement and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
From CFSP to ESDP

The impact of the Kosovo conflict was a crucial element in this post-Amsterdam surge towards more effective foreign and defence policy (ESDP) cooperation. As after earlier crises, however, it proved difficult to maintain the momentum once memories of Kosovo began to fade. In the summer of 1999 there were already signs of backtracking on commitments made to south-eastern Europe, as EU governments considered the costs to the EU, and to national budgets, of implementing the stability pact and of preparing all states in the region for the long-term prospect of EU membership. Nevertheless, it had again spurred member governments to improve their institutional
framework—this time, very substantially. The Political and Security Committee (COPS, from its French title), began operating, on an ‘interim’ basis pending a further revision of the Treaty, in March 2000; so did the Military Committee, with representatives of national chiefs of staff. Expansion of the Council Secretariat to include a military staff (some 130 officers by 2004, with a further twenty civilian officials, all on secondment from national governments) required a sharp adjustment in traditionally open EU working practices, with a ‘secure’ area established within the Council Secretariat building.

The Franco–British strategy was to focus first on capabilities, and only later on institutional reform. They challenged their European partners to reshape their armed forces, and in some cases to increase their defence spending, in order to enable European states to manage conflicts in their own region, and to contribute to peacekeeping operations outside their region, without depending on the US for crucial equipment and reinforcement. Their intention, outlined in the Cologne communiqué, was to gain stronger commitments from their partners to build deployable European forces, and then to merge WEU into the EU in the negotiations on revision of the treaties at the IGC planned to conclude in December 2000. They achieved the first of these aims at the December 1999 European Council, which adopted the ‘Helsinki headline goals’, pledging EU governments collectively to constitute a European Rapid Reaction Force of up to fifteen brigades (60,000 troops), ‘militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements on operations beyond their borders’—and to achieve this aim ‘by 2003.’

A follow-up Capabilities Commitment Conference, in November 2000, identified the major shortcomings in weapons and transport systems, and drew up a list of pledges and priorities. The working method was similar to that of the Lisbon process, intended to spread ‘best practice’ from the most advanced to the laggards, and to shame the most deficient governments into improving their performance. Nineteen working groups were set up to consider each target and shortfall in more detail, and to report back. As so often before, the US was sponsoring a parallel process through Nato, the Defence Capabilities Initiative, which focused on a similar agenda. Neither process, however, made much impact on most governments. Meetings of EU defence ministers received almost no attention in parliaments or press. Competing pressures on national budgets blocked any reversal in the reduction of defence spending. Hesitation in many member states over the domestic acceptability of planning to project power outside Europe blocked explicit discussion of where such a force might be deployed. The German government, which had only recently persuaded the Bundestag to deploy troops to Kosovo, discouraged discussion of whether the Rapid Reaction Force might be sent beyond Europe to Africa or the Middle East.

In south-eastern Europe, however, the succession of crises had left behind a much higher level of European political and military engagement. The Pentagon pressed for European forces to take over its share of the task of maintaining and reconstructing order, within the Nato framework. In Washington, policy-makers, however, remained deeply ambivalent about allowing their European allies to take over political and military responsibility as well. Meanwhile, the proportion of US declined, and the number of contributing European countries rose: Latvians and Estonians within a Baltic battalion, Swiss support troops with the Austrian contingent, Poles, Czechs and
others from EU candidate states. The prominent, and professional, role that German forces played in Kosovo and Macedonia was an important stage in accustoming Germans to a ‘normal’ international role; it was a learning process also for many other participating states.

Beyond Europe, only the British and French governments were prepared to project military forces for more than UN peacekeeping operations. A small British force re-established order in Sierra Leone in 2001, after a UN force of over 17,000 had failed to contain civil conflict. French forces intervened in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002. In a gesture of shared commitment to the stability of a continent where Franco-British rivalry had persisted into the 1990s, the British and French foreign ministers travelled round Africa together the same year. Nordic governments, the Irish and Austrians had long contributed to UN peacekeeping operations, in Africa and the Middle East. The Germans were maintaining a chemical warfare battalion in Kuwait in support of the sanctions regime against Iraq. The dominance of US power across the Middle East, however, left European governments able only to issue diplomatic declarations, to provide core financial assistance to the Palestine Authority—or to pursue commercial interests. After the collapse of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process at the end of 2000, Israeli aircraft destroyed much of the infrastructure which the EU had financed.

The implications of the EU’s forthcoming eastern enlargement for the European region preoccupied European governments much more directly. If enlargement is seen as a part of the EU’s foreign policy, the extension of security, prosperity and democracy within a strong international framework across eastern Europe must be counted as a major achievement. The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 also saw reluctant heads of state and government accept Turkey as a formal candidate, under intense US pressure—justified on the grounds of Turkey’s strategic importance to Western interest across the Middle East. Negotiations with Russia—managed in unwieldy fashion by representatives of the Commission, the High Representative, and the rotating Council Presidency—ranged from relations with Belarus to energy security to the future of Kaliningrad to cross-border criminal networks. Nato enlargement, which passed another milestone with the Prague summit of 2002, was relatively straightforward in institutional terms. EU enlargement necessitated delicate adjustments of common policies, financial flows, institutional representation, and voting weights.

Failure to agree these at Amsterdam led to a further IGC, ending with President Chirac’s mismanaged late-night compromises at Nice in December 2000. This, in turn, set the framework for the ambitious proposal for a Convention on the Future of Europe, with representatives of thirteen applicant states (including Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey) as participating observers, which met from mid-2002 to July 2003. Meanwhile the European Commission was attempting to focus the attention of member governments on the implications of enlargement for the wider European periphery, east and south. In early 2003 it floated proposals for a broader ‘Neighbourhood Policy’, aimed at providing a framework for economic association, and political consultation, for the states of Western Eurasia and the southern Mediterranean.
Unity over Afghanistan, discord over Iraq

The change of administration in Washington in January 2001 brought in a foreign policy team resistant to transatlantic partnership, focused instead on the geopolitics of the ‘greater Middle East’ and East Asia, and determined to leave nation building and peacekeeping to others. President Bush’s first visit to Europe, for an EU–US summit in Gothenburg in June 2001, was a disastrous exchange of misunderstandings, and a demonstration of the unwillingness of national leaders to subordinate domestic concerns to shared European interests. Fifteen heads of government repeated similar criticisms of US policy on climate change, to report back to their domestic audiences, rather than seizing the opportunity to convey agreed messages to their most important external partner.

In 2001 the terrorist attacks of 9/11 transformed the context, both for European foreign and security policy and for transatlantic relations—and the rapid move of US attention from armed intervention in Afghanistan to preparations for the invasion of Iraq transformed the context again. European solidarity with the USA over the attacks on New York and Washington led to the first-ever invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, that ‘an armed attack against one . . . shall be considered an attack against them all and consequent . . . each of them . . . shall assist the party of parties so attacked’. But the Bush administration, far less committed to Nato as a political alliance than its predecessors, refused—at that stage—the suggestion that Nato should provide the multilateral framework for a shared response. Nevertheless, under US command, French, German, and Spanish ships patrolled the Indian Ocean, British air tankers refuelled US planes, German and Danish special forces operated inside Afghanistan—marking a further point of transition in the gradual adjustment of European governments to global commitments. In April 2002 the alternative troika of Javier Solana, the (Danish) foreign minister in the Presidency, and the External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten, joined US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, the UN Secretary-General and the Russian Foreign Minister, in forming the ‘the Quartet’ to relaunch efforts at a negotiated solution for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

In moving rapidly on from Afghanistan to Iraq, however, US policy-makers made little effort to carry their European allies with them. The flimsy structures of CFSP, weakened further by poor personal relations between British and French leaders and by the domestic politics of a German election campaign, buckled under the strain. The British and French governments reverted to their divergent approaches to transatlantic relations: the British offered full public support, in the hope of influencing the direction of US policy, and British troops entered Iraq with the US; the French refused support without US concessions, and undermined the British–US efforts to gain authorization from the UN Security Council for military action. The Franco–German claim to represent ‘European’ opposition to the invasion provoked competing statements by other groups of governments. In April 2003 the Belgian government worsened divisions by convening a ‘summit’ to establish an independent European defence headquarters, in Tervuren, which was attended only by the French, German, and Luxembourg heads of government. Washington policy-makers celebrated the division between ‘old Europe’ and ‘new Europe’, as Donald Rumsfeld dubbed them.
Disintegration of European common foreign policy over the invasion of Iraq, in the winter of 2002–3, demonstrated the fragility of the consensus established among EU governments. It revealed the wide gap between a ‘common’ policy, created out of political negotiations among heads of government and foreign ministries, and a ‘single’ policy built on integrated institutions and expenditure and on a Europe-wide public debate. CFSP had remained a field in which ministers and officials controlled the agenda, assisted by increasing numbers of staff within the Commission and the Council Secretariat. A few scrutiny committees of national parliaments were beginning to examine its declarations and joint actions by the end of the 1990s. The European Parliament (EP) was too preoccupied with its own detailed legislative responsibilities to address the EU’s international priorities, and lacked the authority to scrutinize CFSP. Europe’s national media reported common European actions (if they thought them significant enough) in terms of different domestic preconceptions; convergence among national approaches to foreign policy, filtered through each government’s interpretation of its European commitments to parliament and public, had a long way to go. The arrival of ten new EU members—active players in the disagreements of 2002–3, provoking an ill-tempered outburst from President Chirac—widened the diversity of national perspectives.

The US-led intervention in Iraq was, however, a peculiarly difficult test for European common policy, in such a sensitive area. The United States had been a major external player in European foreign policy cooperation from the outset; the Bush administration was demanding European support without consultation, for a military intervention about which most European governments harboured doubts, and to which their publics were largely opposed. Policy towards the Middle East had become, since the end of the cold war, the most contested area in the transatlantic relationship. The war in Iraq divided America as well as Europe; it was the authority of the federal government, and the shared sense of patriotism among US citizens, that nevertheless enabled Washington to act.

After Iraq

The intervention in Iraq constituted the sharpest crisis in transatlantic relations since 1973–4. The underlying issue for common foreign and security policy remained how far European governments should converge towards an autonomous international role, as opposed to one rooted within the Atlantic framework; on this the EU25 in 2004 were still far from any consensus. Bitter words among Europe’s political leaders, and across the Atlantic, did not however prevent a rapid return to cooperation among EU governments. Here, as after previous crises, the European response to failure was painfully to reconstruct, on a firmer base where possible. The British, French, and German foreign ministers continued to pursue joint negotiations with the Iranian government over its contested nuclear programme, in spite of Washington’s preference for confrontation. The British and French governments were pushing the ESDP agenda forward together only months after the invasion of Iraq (Menon 2004). Frustrated with the failure of other governments in the multilateral capabilities-pledging process to
achieve the Helsinki goals, they declared in February 2004 that they would advance in
defence through ‘enhanced cooperation’; they declared that they would provide
‘battle groups’ of 1,500 troops, at fifteen days’ readiness, in response to international
crises, and invited other members (or groups of members) which could demonstrate
a comparable capability to join them. The German government announced its
commitment to join them the following day. The Swedes and the Finns announced a
joint battle group in the autumn of 2004, while negotiating with Norway to contribute
a contingent; a Benelux joint force was also under negotiation.

Under the pressures of US determination to remove its forces from south-eastern
Europe, while expecting their Nato allies to share the burden across the greater
Middle East, inhibitions over long-range military deployment were giving way. Every
EU member government (and applicant states Turkey and Bulgaria) had contributed
troops to Afghanistan since the end of 2001: the International Stabilization Assistance
Force in Kabul, Operation Enduring Freedom in other provinces, or both. Most EU25
governments contributed troops to post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq: recognizing
their shared interest in successful reconstruction, whatever their views of the conflict
itself. The EU as a security organization formally took over command of the modest
civil and military operations in Macedonia in 2003, and took over military respons-
bility from Nato in Bosnia in December 2004. In Eastern Congo, in the summer of
2003, the EU mounted its first rapid deployment, Operation Artemis, in response to a UN
request, with the first troops arriving within seven days. European governments
sustained 60–70,000 troops on operations outside the boundaries of the EU and Nato
throughout 2003—thus meeting the level of the Headline Goals even as they missed
their formal deadline (Giegerich and Wallace 2004).

The structures for supporting common policy in Brussels had been transformed
since the mid-1990s. Javier Solana had proved a hyper-active High Representative, in
and out of Belgrade, Moscow, Washington, and across the Middle East—operating in
the Quartet and elsewhere as part of the new (and sometimes unwieldy) troika with
the External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten, and the foreign minister of the
Council Presidency. The location of COPS, of the Military Committee and a parallel
Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, together with supporting staffs
in the Council Secretariat, had shifted the balance of CFSP to Brussels. Alongside this
the Commission now had some 5,000 staff in its external relations and development
DGs, including external representations. Duplication of functions between the
Commission and the now-substantial external directorate-general of the Council
Secretariat had been moderated by the easy personal relations between Solana and
Patten, although bureaucratic rivalry, in particular from those within the
Commission who viewed the expansion of the Council Secretariat as a threat to its
powers and privileges, was a constant problem. There were turf battles, too, over
funding CFSP activities; the Commission and the European Parliament, were seeking
to use the 1 per cent of External Action expenditure (€60 million) allocated to the CFSP
to introduce Community procedures and oversight, while governments were torn
between seeking additional common funding and defending the intergovernmental
approach.

The Constitutional Convention of 2002–3 included federalists who wanted to
establish the primacy of the Commission over European foreign policy, as well as
others who recognized the unavoidable tensions between these parallel structures.
Their proposals, incorporated in the Constitutional Treaty, therefore included a single EU ‘foreign minister’, who would be both a vice-president of the Commission and chair of the foreign affairs Council of Ministers. They also recommended a common ‘EU External Action Service’, to staff upgraded representations in third countries, to be constituted from staff attached from national governments as well as from the Commission and the Council Secretariat. A European Defence Agency, to promote and develop defence capabilities, shared procurement, and defence industrial research, had been agreed by governments as it was under discussion in the Convention; it was already recruiting staff in late 2004. Two other agencies supported aspects of CFSP: the European Satellite Centre near Madrid, inherited from the WEU and dedicated to the interpretation of available satellite images; and the Global Navigation Satellite System Supervisory Authority, established in mid–2004 to oversee the security aspects of the European Galileo satellite system.

Conclusions

The EU is now a civilian power, which is making some progress towards shared military capabilities—and towards shared civilian capabilities, building on police missions, and police training missions, in south-eastern Europe. A rising proportion (now approaching 10 per cent) of its common budget is spent on external relations, including nation-building in south-east Europe; further development of neighbourhood policy would increase this further. But authority remains disaggregated, even over financial transfers. The EU15 in 2003 collectively provided over 40 per cent of the UN regular budget, and 55 per cent of global development assistance; but most of the latter came through national budgets, from governments with distinctive priorities, distrustful of the Commission’s cumbersome procedures. EU member governments take common positions in over 90 per cent of votes in international organizations, with an effective caucus at the UN and a Commission UN representation. Solidarity has, however, proved most difficult within the UN Security Council, where Britain and France are permanent members, and other EU states alternate in two elected seats, while Germany in 2004 was campaigning, alongside Japan, to gain an additional permanent seat.

The absence of a European public space—of a shared public debate, communicating through shared media, think tanks, political parties, responding to and criticizing authoritative policy-makers—remains the greatest inhibitor of further subordination of sovereignty, national traditions, and national expenditure to common policy. A transnational expert community has gradually developed across the EU, communicating through specialist journals and think tanks, such as the EU Institute for Security Studies (the transformed WEU Institute). National parliaments and mass media, however, were only intermittently interested. In June 2003 Solana’s Secretariat produced a draft European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, partly as a response to the Bush administration’s National Security Strategy, but also as a means of stimulating an EU-wide debate. A revised version was adopted by heads of government at the December 2003 European Council, declaring inter alia that ‘the European Union is inevitably a global actor . . . it should be ready to share in
the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’. In the intervening six months, however, it had received scarcely any mention in the EU’s national media, and had been briefly debated only in the Bundestag and the Finnish Parliament’s scrutiny committee. National governments, in spite of approving the document, had not wanted to encourage an open debate.

At the end of another cycle of crisis and reconstruction, European cooperation in foreign policy has gone far beyond the framework of sovereign state diplomacy, but still remains far short of an integrated single policy, with integrated diplomatic, financial and military instruments. The dominant modes of policy-making (see Chapter 3) are to be found in policy coordination, underpinned by intensive transgovernmentalism among foreign ministries within the EU and among embassies in third countries. Within its restricted fields of competence for external relations the European Commission pursues the Community method, with national representatives monitoring its ambitions to extend its authority. Variable geometry is a frequent characteristic: both in closer cooperation between Britain and France, often also with Germany in an informal leadership group of states with active international interests, and across the EU’s external boundaries, with Turkey, Norway, and even Switzerland contributing to external actions. There remain evident tensions between national autonomy and common policy, and (particularly for the smaller member states) between national passivity and the acceptance of the ‘global... responsibilities’ which the European Security Strategy spelled out. Acceptance of shared responsibilities and institutions, since 1970, had been driven as much by a succession of external demands and crises as by competing Gaullist and federalist grand designs. It seemed likely that further development would similarly be driven by external pressures, but with the significant path dependence of established structures and procedures through which to respond.

Notes

1 This chapter draws on Forster and Wallace, Chapter 17, in Wallace and Wallace, Policy-Making in the European Union, 4th edn., and sections have been reproduced with the kind permission of Anthony Forster.

2 This foundational statement of the CFSP is no longer found in subsequent treaties, ToA or ToN.

Further reading

There is a substantial and growing literature on European foreign and defence policy, and EU external relations. Hill and K. E. Smith (2000), provides a useful guide to the accumulation of declarations, joint actions and common strategies. Among the more recent publications, see K. E. Smith (2003) Carlsnaes et. al. (2004), and C. J. Hill and M. H. Smith (2005). For the security


