

POLITICS 530
THE POLITICS OF GROWTH AND REDISTRIBUTION

Fall 2020, Tuesday 1:30-4:20.

Professor Carles Boix
Robertson 406
E-mail: cboix@princeton.edu
Office hours: Fri. 3-5 pm. or by appointment

Faculty Assistant: Eleni Koukourdeli, elenik@princeton.edu

Course Design and Objectives

This course is designed to survey and discuss the political and institutional factors underlying cross-national variation in economic performance. The course is structured around the following issues or questions: (1) why do countries differ so much in their level of economic development?; (2) which are the different paths through which countries have modernized economically?; (3) what is the impact of elections, parties and domestic institutions on the management of the economy?; (4) to what extent are democracy and capitalism?; and (5) in what ways does the international economy shape state autonomy and the size of welfare states? The scope of the course is analytical in its theoretical perspective and comparative from a methodological point of view.

Course Procedures and Evaluation

The course will be in principle taught through a hybrid format: in person with video conference capabilities to connect with those students who will be off campus. If, for any reason, this option becomes unfeasible, we will move to remote teaching.

Each student is expected to read (before class) the items listed as 'required readings' for each session. In some sessions 'background' reading, which is optional, is intended to provide introductions to the week's main readings.

In addition, students are expected to complete:

(1) Four short papers (around 3 pages) answering one of the week's discussion questions. Papers will be due by 5 pm every Monday (with answers to the questions of that week's session). No exceptions will be made and no extensions will be granted. The answers should not just summarize readings, but show reflection on how the readings address important issues, are flawed in particular dimensions, or can be developed or improved in specific directions.

(2) A final exam or a research paper with a topic to be determined in advanced with the instructor. Due date of research paper: January 15, 2021.

Participation in class will count for about 1/4 of the grade. The other assignment (short papers, exam) will count for 3/4 per cent of the course grade.

Books marked with (B) may be bought at Labyrinth.

1. Institutions, Growth, and the First Economic Revolution. (September 1)

Required reading

Robert Barro. *Macroeconomics*. Chapter 11. (or N. Gregory Mankiw. 1992. *Macroeconomics*. (New York: Worth Publishers. Chapter 4).

Lucas, Robert. 2000. "Some Macroeconomics for the 21st Century," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14 (Winter): 159-168.

Douglass North. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pages 1-69. (B)

Boix, Carles. 2015. *Political Order and Inequality*. Cambridge University Press. Pages 60-65, 79-83, 87-88, 92-127.

Further Reading

Clark, Gregory. 2007. *A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World*. Princeton University Press. Chapters 2-5. (B)

James E. Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (eds). 1990. *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 6.

Barro, Robert. 1997. *Determinants of Economic Growth*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Olson, Mancur. 2000. *Power and Prosperity*. New York: Basic Books.

Jared Diamond. 1999. *Guns, Germs and Steel*. New York: Norton. Pages 103-156, 174-191, 265-192.

Hibbs, Douglass and Ola Olsson. 2004. "Geography, Biogeography and Why Some Countries Are Rich and Others Poor," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States* 101 (10): 3715-3740.

Demsetz, Harold. 1967. "Toward a theory of property rights," *American Economic Review* 57: 347-359.

North, Douglass. 1981. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. New York: Norton. Chapter 3.

Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pages 1-21, 30-109.

2. The Modern Breakthrough. (September 8)

Required reading

North, Douglass C. And Barry R. Weingast, 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutional Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *The Journal of Economic History* 49, (December): 803-832.

David Stasavage. 2002. "Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited," *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 18(1): 155-186.

E. Glaeser, R. La Porta, and F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer. 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, September, 2004. Pages 271-303.

Jones, Eric. 2003. *The European Miracle*. Cambridge. Third edition. Introduction to second edition, chapters 1-6, and afterword to third edition. (B)

Abramson, Scott F., and Carles Boix. 2019. "Endogenous Parliaments: The Domestic and International Roots of Long-Term Economic Growth and Executive Constraints in Europe." *International Organization* 73 (4): 793-837.

Further reading

DeLong, Bradford J. and Andrei Shleifer. 1993. "Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution," *Journal of Law and Economics* 36 (October): 671-702.

Voigtländer, Nico and Joachim Voth. 2006. "Why England? Demographic Factors, Structural Change and Physical Capital Accumulation During the Industrial Revolution," *Journal of Economic Growth* 11 (4).

Joel Mokyr. *The Gift of Athena*. Princeton University Press. Chapters 1,2,3 and 6.

David Stasavage. 2003. *Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Adam Przeworski et al. 2002. *Democracy and Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3.

North, Douglass C. and Robert P. Thomas. 1981. *The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History*.

Field, Alexander J., "The Problem with Neoclassical Institutional Economics: a Critique with Special Reference to the North/Thomas model of pre-1500 Europe," *Explorations in Economic History* 18 (April 1981): 174-198.

Douglass North. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1993. "Political Regimes and Economic Growth," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7: 51-69.

- Clark, Gregory. 2007. *A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World*. Princeton University Press. Chapters 10-14. (B)
- Mokyr, Joel. 2009. "The Origins of British Technological Leadership." In J. Mokyr, *The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1850*. Yale University Press. Chapter 6. Pages 99-123.
- Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales. 2006. "The Persistence of Underdevelopment: Institutions, Human Capital, or Constituencies?," NBER Working paper, # 12093. March
- Roberto Perotti. 1996. "Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say," *Journal of Economic Growth* 1: 149-187. (E)
- Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. 1994. "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?," *American Economic Review* 84: 600-621.
- Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti. 1994. "The Political Economics of Growth: A Selective Survey and Some New Results," *World Bank Economic Review*, September 1994, pages 351-371.
- Kristin J. Forbes. 2000. "A Reassessment of the Relationship Between Inequality and Growth," *American Economic Review* 90 (September): 869-887.
- Kevin M. Murphy; Andrei Shleifer; Robert W. Vishny. 1989. "Industrialization and the Big Push." *Journal of Political Economy*, 97 (October): 1003-1026.
- Samuel Huntington. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Yale University Press. Chapters 1, 3-7.
- John Londregan and Keith Poole. 1990. "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power," *World Politics* 42(January) 151-83.
- Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti. 1996. "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment," *European Economic Review* 40 (June): 1203-1228.
- Paul Bairoch. *Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Chapters 5, 6 and 8. (B)
- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117: 1231-1294. (E)
- Haber, Stephen, Armando Razo and Noel Maurer. 2003. *The Politics of Property Rights. Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929*. Cambridge University Press. Read chapters 1, 2, skim chapter 3, and read either chapter 4 or 5. (B)
- Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo K.S., eds. 2000. *Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pages 1-5, 21-144.
- Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. *Violence and Social Orders A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pages 110-136, 148-181, 190-250.

Bourguignon, François and Morrisson, Christian. 2002. "Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820-1992," *American Economic Review* 92: 727—744.

Further reading on endogenous institutions

Anderson, Perry. 1974. *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. London: Verso. Pages 15-59, 113-142, 195-235, 328-360, 397-431. (B)

Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Yale University Press. Chapter 2.

Tilly, Charles. 1990. *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992*. Blackwell. Chapter 5.

Weingast, Barry. 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions. Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 11.

Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales. 2003. *Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists*. New York: Crown Business. Chapter 6.

Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, and Roy Bin Wong. 2011. *Before and beyond divergence*. Harvard University Press. (B)

3. Lagging Behind. (September 15)

Required reading

Elisa Mariscal and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2000. "Schooling, Suffrage, and the Persistence of Inequality in the Americas, 1800-1945," in Stephen Harber, ed. *Political Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America. Essays in Policy, History, and Political Economy*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Chapter 5, pp. 159-217.

Clark, Gregory. 2007. *A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World*. Princeton University Press. Chapters 15-17.

Robert H. Bates. 1984. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. University of California Press. (B)

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2000. "Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development," *American Economic Review* 90 (May): 126-130.

Jha, Saumitra. [Sharing the Future: Financial Solutions to the Political Economy Challenges of Development](#), in *Institutions and Comparative Economic Development*, edited by Masahiko Aoki, Timur Kuran and Gerard Roland, Volume I of the Proceedings of the 16th World Congress of the International Economic Association, IEA Conference Series 150: Palgrave Macmillan, November 2012

Rajan, Raghuram and Rodney Ramcharan (forthcoming) *Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight over the McFadden Act*.

Further reading

Michael Ross. 2012. *The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations*. Princeton University Press. Chapter 6.

James E. Alt. 1987. "Crude Politics: Oil and the Political Economy of Unemployment in Britain and Norway," *British Journal of Political Science*, 17, pp. 149-199.

Haber, Stephen and Victor Menaldo. 2010. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse," *American Political Science Review* 105: 1-26.

Kevin Morrison. 2014. *Nontaxation and Representation: The Fiscal Foundations of Political Stability*. Cambridge University Press.

4. Colonialism. (September 22)

Required reading

Kohli, Atul. 2020. *Imperialism and the Developing World*. Oxford University Press. Pages 1-18, 65-205, 249-324, 388-426. (B)

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," *American Economic Review* 91 (December): 1369-1401.

Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa." *American Economic Review* 101 (7): 3221-52.

Paul Bairoch. *Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Chapters 5, 6 and 8.

5. Catching-Up without Converging (1) (September 29)

Required reading

Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1962. *Economic backwardness in historical perspective, a book of essays*. Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Pages 5-30 (“Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective”) and 353-364 (“The Approach to European Industrialization: A Postscript”).

Landes, David S. *The Unbound Prometheus*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 4 and 5.

Chandler, Alfred D. 1990. *Scale and Scope*. Harvard University Press. Pages 14-36, 47-49, 235-237, 393-395, 593-605.

Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James and Jean-Pierre Landau. 2016. *The Euro and the Battle of Ideas*. Princeton University. Chapter 3 (“German-French Differences in Economic Philosophies”), pages 58-84.

6. Catching-up without Converging (2) (October 6)

Required reading

Robert Wade. 1992. "East Asia's Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights, Shaky Evidence," *World Politics* 44: 270-320.

Paul Krugman, "The Myth of Asia's Miracle," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1994:63-79.

Milanovic, Branko. 2019. *Capitalism, Alone*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Chapter 3, pages 67-128.

Jennifer Pan. 2020. *Welfare for Autocrats*. Oxford University Press. (B)

Further reading

Herrigel, Gary. 1996. *Industrial constructions: the sources of German industrial power*. New York : Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2.

Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin. 1985. "Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets and Technology in Nineteenth-Century Industrialization," *Past & Present* 108 (August): 133-176.

Kurth, James R. 1979. "The Political Consequences of the Product Cycle: Industrial History and Political Outcomes," *International Organization* 33 (Winter): 1-34.

Stephan Haggard. 1986. "The Newly Industrializing Countries in the International System," *World Politics* 38 (January): 343-370.

Stephan Haggard. 1990. *Pathways from the Periphery*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Engerman, Stanley L. and Sokoloff, Kenneth L. 2002. "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies," *Economia*, 3: 41-102.

7. Ideas, Beliefs and Development. (October 20)

Required reading

Max Weber. 2001. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Routledge, London. [Electronic resource at Princeton Library system.]

Robert B. Putnam. 1993. *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 3-6. (B)

Henrich, J., R. Boyd, S. Bowles, H. Gintis, C. Camerer, R. McElreath, E. Fehr, M. Gurven, K. Hill, A. Barr, J. Ensminger, D. Tracer, F. Marlow, J. Patton, M. Alvard, F. Gil-White and N. Henrich. 2005. "Economic Man' in Cross-Cultural Perspective: Ethnography and Experiments from 15 Small-Scale Societies," *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 28: 795–855.

Fehr, Ernst, Karla Hoff and Mayuresh Kshetramade. 2008. "Spite and Development," *American Economic Review* 98 (2): 494-499.

Further reading

Fehr, Ernst and Simon Gächter. 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," *American Economic Review* 90: 980-994.

Hoff, Karla, Mayuresh Kshetramade and Ernst Fehr. 2009. "Caste and Punishment: The Legacy of Caste Culture in Norm Enforcement," IZA Working Paper No. 4343. August.

Abbink, Klaus and Benedikt Herrmann. 2009. "Pointless Vendettas." *American Economic Review*.

Barro, Robert and Rachel McCleary. "Religion and Economic Growth." *American Sociological Review* (October 2003).

Avner Greif. 2006. *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Alexis de Tocqueville. *Democracy in America*.

Guido Tabellini. "Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe." Forthcoming in *Journal of the European Economic Association*.

8. Managing the Economy in the Twentieth Century. The Keynesian Settlement (1) (October 27)

Required reading

Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein. 1986. "Democratic Capitalism at the Crossroads," in A. Przeworski. *Capitalism and Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pages 205-217.

Peter Hall, ed. 1989. *The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations*. Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 3-4, 5, 9-10, 12, 14. (B)

Alberto Alesina et al. 1997. *Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy*. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. Pages 1-110. (B)

Background reading

Robert J. Barro. 1990. "Developments in the Theory of Rules versus Discretion," in Barro, *Macroeconomic Policy* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press), chapter 1, pp. 9-28.

Robert J. Barro. 1987. *Macroeconomics*. 2nd edition. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Chapters 13-14.

Further reading on political business cycles

Alberto Alesina and Howard Rosenthal. 1995. *Political Parties, Divided Government, and the Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2.

Morris Fiorina. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapters 1 and 4.

Alberto Alesina and Jeffrey Sachs. 1988. "Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984," *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, 20, pp. 63-83.

James E. Alt. 1985. "Political Parties, World Demand and Unemployment: Domestic and International Sources of Economic Activity," *American Political Science Review*, 79, pp. 1016-1040.

James E. Alt and K. Alec Chrystal. 1983. *Political Economics*. Berkeley: University of California Press. Chapter 5.

Douglas A. Hibbs. 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," *American Political Science Review*, 71, pp. 1467-1487. Through page 1475.

Douglas A. Hibbs. 1987a. *The Political Economy of Industrial Democracies*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Douglas A. Hibbs. 1987b. *The American Political Economy. Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

William Nordhaus. 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," *Review of Economic Studies*, 42, pp. 169-190.

William Nordhaus. 1989. "Alternative Models to Political Business Cycles," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 2, pp. 1-56.

Edward B. Tufte. 1978. *Political Control of the Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1-3.1

Schultz, Kenneth, "The Politics of the Political Business Cycle," *British Journal of Political Science* 25, 79-99.

William Keech. 1995. *Economic Politics. The Costs of Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-4.

Martin Paldam. 1997. "Political Business Cycles," in Mueller, Dennis C., ed. *Perspectives on Public Choice*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 16.

Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers. 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance," *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 25: 151-162. (E)

Further reading on models of economic voting

a) Spatial models:

Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger. 1997. *Analytical Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

b) Restrospective voting and accountability models:

Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin, eds. 1999. *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pages 1-16, 29-54, 98-130.

Powell, Bingham and Guy Whitten. 1993. "A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context," *American Journal of Political Science* 37.

Ray Fair. 1978. "The Effects of Economic Events on Votes for Presidents," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 60, pp. 159-72.

Ray Fair. 1982. "The Effects of Economic Events on Votes for Presidents: 1980 Results," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 65, pp. 322-325.

Ray Fair. 1988. "The Effects of Economic Events on Votes for Presidents: 1984 Update," *Political Behavior*, 10, pp. 168-179.

Morris Fiorina. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

R. Kiewiet. 1983. *Macroeconomics and Micro Politics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues*. Chicago: University of Chicago.

M. Lewis-Beck. 1988. *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

c) Economic Policies as Political Coalition Building:

Gosta Esping-Andersen. 1984. *Politics Against Markets*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pages 26-38, 145-190, 204-243, 244-285.

Jonas Pontusson. 1988. Swedish Social Democracy and British Labour: Essays on the Nature and Condition of Social Democratic Hegemony. Western Societies Program, Occasional Paper, no. 19, Center for International Studies, Cornell University.

Geoffrey Garrett. 1993. "The Politics of Structural Change," *Comparative Political Studies*, 25, pp. 521-547.

Adam Przeworski and John Sprague. 1986. *Paper Stones. A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Pages 29-56 (quick reading), 57-96, 101-126, 143-179.

9. Managing the Economy in the Twentieth Century. The Keynesian Settlement (2) (November 3)

Required reading

Alberto Alesina et al. 1997. *Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy*. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. Pages 141-209. (B)

Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers. 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance," *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking* 25: 151-162.

R.M. Alvarez, G. Garrett and P. Lange. 1991. "Government Partisanship, Labor Organization and Macroeconomic Performance, 1967-1984", *American Political Science Review* 85: 539-556.

Blyth, Mark. 2013. *Austerity: The history of a dangerous idea*. Oxford University Press. Chapters 4 and 5.

Further reading

Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage. 2009. "Institutions, Partisanship, and Inequality in the Long Run," *World Politics*, 61 (April): 215-253.

Wallerstein, Michael. "Wage-Setting Institutions and Pay Inequality in Advanced Industrial Societies," *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (July): 649-680.

Olivier Blanchard and Justin Wolfers. 2000. "The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: the Aggregate Evidence," *Economic Journal* 110 (March) 1-33.

Boix, Carles. 1998. *Political Parties, Growth and Equality*. Cambridge University Press.

Hall, Peter and David Soskice, eds. 2001. *Varieties of Capitalism*. Oxford University Press.

Peter Gottschalk; Timothy M. Smeeding. 1997. "Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality," *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 35 (2): 633-687.

Lars Calmfors and J. Driffill. 1988. "Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance," *Economic Policy* 6: 13-47.

Peter Swenson. "Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden," *World Politics* 1991, pages 513-45.

10. Democratic Capitalism in the Twenty-First Century (November 10)

Required Reading

Atkinson, Anthony B., Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez. "Top incomes in the long run of history." *Journal of economic literature* 49, no. 1 (2011): 3-71.

Debraj Ray. 2014. "Nit-Piketty. A comment on Thomas Piketty's Capital in the Twenty First Century," Blog post.

Boix, Carles. 2019. *Democratic Capitalism at the Crossroads*. Princeton University Press. Pages 49-96.

Milanovic, Branko. *Global inequality: a new approach for the age of globalization*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2016. Chapter 2

Robert Ford & Matthew J Goodwin. 2014. *Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain (Extremism and Democracy)*. London: Routledge. Pages 107-142 ("Origins: a long time coming").

Further reading

Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press..

Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstein. 1986. "Material Interests, Class Compromise, and the State," in A. Przeworski. *Capitalism and Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pages 171-203.

Claudia Goldin, Lawrence F Katz. 2007. "The race between education and technology: the evolution of US educational wage differentials, 1890 to 2005." NBER WP no. 12984.

Autor, D. 2010. "The polarization of job opportunities in the US labor market: Implications for employment and earnings." Center for American Progress and The Hamilton Project.

Debraj Ray. 1998. *Development Economics*. Princeton University Press. Chapter 6.

Simon Kuznets. 1955. "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," *American Economic Review* 45 (March): 1-28.

Branko Milanovic, Peter H. Lindert and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2007. "Measuring Ancient Inequality," NBER Working Papers # 13550.

Lindert, Peter H. 2000. "Three Centuries of Inequality in Britain and America." In A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon, eds. *Handbook of Income Distribution*. North Holland. Chapter 3.

Bourguignon, François and Morrisson, Christian. 2002. "Inequality Among World Citizens: 1820-1992," *American Economic Review* 92: 727—744.

Branko Milanovic. 2007. *Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality*. Princeton University Press.

Sala-i-Martin, Xavier. 2006. "The World Distribution of Income: Falling Poverty and...Convergence, Period," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 121: 351-397.

A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon. 2000. "Introduction: Income Distribution and Economics." In A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon, eds. *Handbook of Income Distribution*. North Holland. Pages 1-26.

Loukas Karabarbounis and Brent Neiman. 2014. "The Global Decline of the Labor Share," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129 (1): 61-103.

Steven Kaplan and Joshua Rauh. 2013. "It's the Market: The Broad-Based Rise in the Return to Top Talent." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*.

Robert H. Frank and Philip J. Cook. *The Winner Take-all Society: Why the Few at the Top Get so Much More than the Rest of Us*. Penguin.

David N. Weil. 2015. "Capital and Wealth in the 21st Century." *National Bureau of Economic Research WP* no. 20919.

11. Democratic Capitalism in the Twenty-first Century (2) (November 17)

Required reading

Pistor, Katharina. *The code of capital: How the law creates wealth and inequality*. Princeton University Press, 2019.

12. Open Political Economies. (November 24)

Required reading

Przeworski, Adam and Covadonga Meseguer. 2006. "Globalization and Democracy." In Pranab Bardhan, Samuel Bowles and Michael Wallerstein, eds. 2006. *Globalization and Egalitarian Redistribution*. Princeton University and Russell Sage Foundation. Chapter 7.

Rodrik, Dani. 2011. *The Globalization Paradox*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. (B)

Further readings

a/ Trade Politics

Ronald Rogowski. 1989. *Commerce and Coalitions. How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1,7, and any one of chapters 2 to 4.

Jeffrey Frankel and Rudiger Dornbusch. 1987. "Macroeconomics and Protection," in Robert Stern (ed.) *US Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy*, Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. Pages 77-130.

Alt, James, Jeffrey Frieden, Michael Gilligan, Dani Rodrik and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. "The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry," *Comparative Political Studies*, 29: 689-717.

Stephen P. Magee. 1980. "Three simple tests of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem." In P. Oppenheimer, ed., *Issues in International Economics*. Pp. 138-153. London: Oriel.

Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock and Leslie Young, *Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Protection*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3, 5, 13, 16.

Peter A. Gourevitch. 1978. "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization*, 10 (Autumn), pp. 881-912.

Albert O. Hirschman. 1981. *Essays in Trespassing. Economics to Politics and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 9 ("Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent Contributions"), 10 ("Exit and Voice: Some Further Distinctions").

Peter Gourevitch. 1986. *Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chapters 1-4, 6. Pages 17-180, 221-240.

Jeffrey A. Frieden and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. "The impact of the international economy on national policies: An analytical overview," In Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds. *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 2, pages 25-47.

Albert O. Hirschman. 1981. "Exit, Voice, and the State," *Essays in Trespassing. Economics to Politics and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 11.

Jeffrey G. Williamson. 1998. "Globalization and the labor market: using history to inform policy." In Philippe Aghion and Jeffrey G. Williamson. *Growth, Inequality and Globalization*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pages 105-200. (B)

b/ Compensatory Politics

Boix, Carles. 2011. Redistribution Policies in a Globalized World. In Marion Jansen & Marc Bachetta, ed. *Making Globalization Socially Sustainable*. Geneva: WTO-ILO. Chapter 8.

Boix, Carles. 2006. "Between Protectionism and Compensation: The Political Economy of Trade." In Pranab Bardhan, Samuel Bowles and Michael Wallerstein, eds. *Globalization and Egalitarian Redistribution*. Princeton University and Russell Sage Foundation.

Rodrik, Dani. 1998. "Why Do Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?" *Journal of Political Economy* 106: 997-1032.

Romer, David. 1993. "Openness and Inflation: Theory and Evidence," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107: 869-904.

David R. Cameron. 1978. "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, 72, pp. 1243-1261.

Alicia Adserà and Carles Boix . 2002. "Trade, Democracy and the Size of the Public Sector," *International Organization*.

Dani Rodrik. 199?. "What Does the Political Economy Literature on Trade Policy (Not) Tell Us That We Ought to Know," *Handbook of International Economics*, vol. III

Odd Aukrust. "Inflation in the Open Economy: A Norwegian Model," in L. Krause and W. Salant, eds., *Worldwide Inflation*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings. Pages 109-126, especially pages 113-117.

Wibbels, E. and Ahlquist, J. S. (2011), Development, Trade, and Social Insurance. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55: 125–149. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00638.x

c/ Open Macroeconomics

Paul De Grauwe. 1997. *The Economics of Monetary Integration*. Chapters 1 to 3.

Hayek, Friedrich A. 1939. "The economic conditions of interstate federalism." *New Commonwealth Quarterly* 131. Reprinted F. von Hayek, 1948, *Individualism and Economic Order*, ch. 12.

Michael D. Bordo, Agnieszka Markiewicz, Lars Jonung. 2011. "A Fiscal Union for the Euro: Some Lessons from History," NBER Working Paper No. 17380.

Ruggie, John Gerard. 1982. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." *International Organization* 36(2).

Gruber, Lloyd. 1999a. "Rationalist Approaches to International Cooperation: A Call for Theoretical Reorientation," *The Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies. Working Paper Series* 99.14.

Gruber, Lloyd. 1999b. "Interstate Cooperation and the Hidden Face of Power: The Case of European Money," *The Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies. Working Paper Series* 99.16.

Barry Eichengreen. 1996. *Globalizing Capital*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapters 4,5.

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Development*. New York: Cambridge University Press. (B)

John Goodman and Louis W. Pauly, "The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets," *World Politics* 46, 1(1993):50-82.

Dennis Quinn and Carla Inclan, "The Origins of Financial Openness: A Study of Current and Capital Account Liberalization." *American Journal of Political Science* 31, 3 (July 1997):771-813.

Jacob A. Frenkel and Michael L. Mussa, "Monetary and Fiscal Policies in an Open Economy." *American Economic Review* 71, 2 (May 1981):253-58.

Maurice Obstfeld, "The Global Capital Market: Benefactor or Menace?" NBER Working Paper No. 6559 (May 1998).

Michael Wallerstein and Adam Przeworski, "Capital Taxation with Open Borders." *Review of International Political Economy* 2 (Summer 1995):425-45.