This article explains how the institutional context of international negotiations influences their outcomes. I argue that issue linkage counteracts domestic obstacles to liberalization by broadening the negotiation stakes. Institutions bolster the credibility of the linkage to make it more effective. I test the argument in the agricultural sector, which has been among the most difficult sectors for governments to liberalize. Statistical analysis of U.S. negotiations with Japan and the EU from 1970 to 1999 indicates that an institutionalized linkage between agricultural and industrial issues encourages agricultural liberalization in both Japan and Europe. Through case studies of key negotiations, I first examine why countries choose to link issues. Then, I show how the linkage changes interest group mobilization and shifts the policy process to promote liberalization.
In spite of their apparent lack of bargaining leverage, in some negotiations developing countries have been able to achieve positive outcomes -- even the overturn of protectionist measures against their exports by the United States and EU. Simply evaluating the relative market power of the two sides in an economic negotiation is inadequate. I argue that the WTO dispute settlement procedures help developing countries to gain better outcomes in negotiations with their more powerful trade partners. There are four mechanisms that are important: guarantee of the right to negotiate, the use of a common standard to evaluate outcomes, the potential for several countries to join a dispute, and the addition of incentives that favor changing a policy that violates trade rules. The paper compares two case studies about food labeling policies that raised similar trade interests for two pairs of countries with roughly parallel positions in the international economy. The first case represents the options available to a developing country WTO member. Facing European labeling policies that discriminated against its scallops and sardines exports, Peru participated in two WTO disputes that brought about changes in the problematic policies. The second case represents the situation of a developing country that cannot appeal to WTO rules for leverage. As a non-WTO member, Vietnam must negotiate to maintain access for its catfish exports to the U.S. market on the basis of a bilateral trade agreement. Ultimately, Vietnam was unable to prevent the United States from adopting a labeling regulation and anti-dumping suit that effectively exclude Vietnamese catfish from the U.S. market. The two cases illustrate how the institutional context influences the negotiation process and the ways in which WTO adjudication helps to level the playing field for developing countries.
What explains the selection of cases for WTO adjudication? This article explores the business conditions under which industries lobby their home government to use the WTO adjudication process and the political factors that influence government decisions. It explains the industry pattern of selection for international trade disputes as a function of the velocity of the business environment. While WTO adjudication is seen as costly and slow, a positive ruling brings broader benefits in terms of deterrence against future discrimination. Firms in static industries will invest in WTO dispute settlement to achieve these benefits, but firms in industries shaped by dynamic competition have high opportunity costs that make them less willing to pursue adjudication. This argument accounts for why there are fewer WTO cases about electronics industry issues than the likely incidence of protectionist measures. Since Japan is a leading exporter and provides a government report with unique data on potential WTO disputes, it was chosen to test the argument in greater depth. Interviews with Japanese business officials and statistical analysis of an original data set provide support for the argument. The authors conclude that the passive attitude towards WTO adjudication by Japan’s largest export industry, electronics, and the sensitivity of Japan’s diplomatic relations with China have constrained the cases that Japan files. These findings suggest that the effectiveness of the WTO for dispute settlement is conditional upon the time horizon of the industry and the political relations among members.
Agriculture has long been one of the most protected sectors in advanced industrial democracies. The rural biases of electoral systems, high organization by farmer interest groups, and an autonomous policy community have allowed agriculture to resist reform efforts. Over the past decade, however, major policy changes have begun to introduce market principles and partial liberalization. We examine this process in the case of Japan, which has among the highest levels of agricultural protection. Political changes, budget constraints, consumer demands, and international pressure all pushed for a major overhaul of Japanese agricultural policies, but international pressure was necessary to produce genuine reforms. We highlight the role of international agreements to bring domestic reforms in policy areas with strong vested interests.
How do states use economic-security linkages in international bargaining? Governments can provide economic benefits as a side-payment to reinforce security cooperation and use close security ties as a source of bargaining leverage in economic negotiations. I hypothesize that domestic political pressures constrain the form of linkage. First, economic side-payments are more likely to be chosen in areas that will not harm the key interests of the ruling party. Second, involvement by the legislature pushes a government toward using security ties as bargaining leverage for economic gains. This argument addresses existing debates on economic interdependence and cooperation. Evidence from negotiations between Britain and Japan during the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 to 1923 supports the constraining role of domestic politics. Economic-security linkages occurred as Britain gave favorable economic treatment to Japan in order to strengthen the alliance. However, economic competition between the allies made it difficult for Britain to grant asymmetrical economic benefits. In tariff negotiations where business interests had more influence in the domestic policy process, the alliance was used as leverage to force reciprocity.
This article examines the effect of overlapping institutions in trade policy, where the World Trade Organization, preferential trade agreements, and other economic negotiation venues give states many options for negotiating rules and settling disputes. This article argues that overlapping institutions influence trade politics at three stages: selection of venue, negotiation of liberalization commitments, and enforcement of compliance. First, lobby groups and governments on both sides of a trade negotiation try to choose the set of rules that will favor their preferred outcome. WTO rules that restrict use of coercive tactics outside of the WTO generate a selection process that filters the most difficult trade issues into WTO trade rounds or dispute adjudication while easier issues are settled in bilateral and regional fora. This selection dynamic creates a challenge at the negotiation stage by disaggregating interest group pressure for liberalization commitments. The narrowing of interest group lobbying for the multilateral process may impede negotiation of liberalization agreements that could only gain political support through a broad coalition of exporter mobilization. At the enforcement stage international regime complexity creates the potential for contradictory legal rulings that undermine compliance, but also adds greater penalties for noncompliance if reputation effects operate across agreements.
This paper examines the conditions under which countries use international courts to defend their trade interests. Many express concerns that power relations and low capacity prevent developing countries from fully participating in the international trade system. Yet some developing countries have been among the most active participants in GATT/WTO adjudication. Why do some developing countries repeatedly use adjudication to resolve their trade disputes while others do not? We argue that the high information costs for bringing forward a case are a barrier for developing country use of the dispute settlement process. Prior experience with litigation, either as complainant or defendant, lowers the start-up information costs for subsequent initiation. Statistical analysis of dispute initiation from 1975 to 2003 shows that when controlling for economic and political variables, past experience in trade adjudication increases the likelihood that a country will initiate disputes. We also highlight the role of the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, which allows developing countries to pool their common experience to gain the benefits of repeat players in litigation.
Do political tensions harm economic relations? Theories claim that trade prevents war and political relations motivate trade, but less is known about whether smaller shifts in political relations impact economic exchange. Looking at two major economies, we show that negative events have not hurt U.S. or Japanese trade or investment flows. We then examine specific incidents of tensions in U.S.-French and Sino-Japanese relations over the past decade --two case pairs that allow us to compare varying levels of political tension given high existing economic interdependence and different alliance relations. Aggregate economic flows and high salience sectors like wine and autos are unaffected by the deterioration of political relations. In an era of globalization, actors lack incentives to link political and economic relations. We argue that sunk costs in existing trade and investment make governments, firms, and consumers unlikely to change their behavior in response to political disputes.
Hard times give rise to greater demand for protection. International trade rules include provisions that allow for raising barriers to aid industries when they suffer economic injury. Yet widespread use of flexibility measures may undermine the trade system and worsen economic conditions. How do states balance these conflicting pressures? This article assesses the effect of crises on cooperation in trade. We hypothesize that governments impose less protectionism during economic crisis when economic troubles are widespread across countries than when they face crisis in isolation. The lesson of Smoot-Hawley and coordination through international economic institutions represent mechanisms of informal governance that encourage cooperation to avoid a spiral of protectionism. Analysis of industry level data on protection measures for the period from 1996 to 2011 provides support for our claim that under conditions of shared hard times, states exercise strategic self-restraint to avoid beggar-thy-neighbor policies.
How has the trade regime expanded from a small club to a nearly universal organization with 159 member countries at the end of 2013? Rather than maintaining strict conditionality for potential members, the regime offers discretion to negotiate accession terms on a case-by-case basis. This allows non-trade issues to influence membership decisions. We argue that geopolitical interests play a central role as the basis for expanding membership. We first use case studies of the accession decisions for Japan and a group of East European states during the Cold War to illustrate how geopolitical mechanisms influence both the demand and supply side of membership. Members selectively allow easier entry in pursuit of foreign policy goals, and common interests with current members help to pull into the organization applicants who are not yet committed free traders. In statistical analysis, we show the pattern more generally for 145 countries from 1948 through 2011. We use a duration model to estimate time to application for eligible countries and the length of accession negotiations. Our findings challenge the view that states liberalize first in order to join the regime. Instead, democracy and foreign policy similarity with members are important conditions that encourage states to join.
In the context of overlapping bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade agreements, states face a wide array of options for market opening strategies. This paper examines why states choose to adjudicate some trade disputes in the WTO dispute settlement process while negotiating or ignoring others. It then compares outcomes given the choice among alternative strategies. I argue that governments use choice of negotiation forum to signal commitment to resolve a dispute. This choice provides information that contributes to settlement by reducing uncertainty about government resolve to defend or challenge a given trade barrier. The argument is tested with statistical analysis of an original dataset of potential trade disputes coded from U.S. government reports on foreign trade barriers. Evidence shows that U.S. selection of WTO disputes follows a political logic favoring industries that are highly mobilized in the United States and where there is strong support for protection by the foreign trade partner. Taking into account the factors that push politicized cases into WTO adjudication, the legal forum is shown to be effective to resolve trade conflict in terms of policy change and dispute duration.
This paper argues that EU institutions reduce the effectiveness of the mechanisms that enforce international trade law. Legal strategies that narrow the policy agenda fail to circumvent veto actors, while competing claims of European integration and the diffusion of accountability across members reduce the pressure for compliance with WTO rulings. The paper analyzes EU compliance in GATT/WTO adjudication and discusses in detail the beef hormone dispute, which represents the most longstanding case of noncompliance with WTO rules.
This paper examines how interest groups influence the decision to negotiate trade problems at the bilateral level, through adjudication, or in a comprehensive trade round. The institutional venues available for trade negotiations vary in terms of issues, rules, actors, and duration. Interest groups have preferences over the choice of institutional venue because differences in the scope and timing of the negotiation will directly impact their interests. Consequently, groups will lobby for both a specific fora and policy outcome. This paper presents a framework for understanding how the relative balance between interest group pressure on both sides influences the choice of negotiation forum. I argue that this dynamic pushes some of the most difficult trade problems into WTO dispute adjudication or trade rounds, while easier issues are likely to be dealt with in bilateral or regional negotiations. Deadlock in the WTO may lead governments to focus on alternative fora, but doing so reduces the prospect of resolving the toughest trade problems.