

11/10/2016
Thursday

Secrecy Metric

induced $\downarrow$ some distr. $\uparrow$

$$\|P_{M, Z^n} - P_M Q_{Z^n}\|_{TV} < \epsilon$$

secret message $\uparrow$ eavesdropper observation $\uparrow$

About $P_M Q_{Z^n}$: Message and observed Z^n are independent
 Z^n is what eavesdropper observes.

→ "Strong secrecy" $I(M; Z^n) < \epsilon$. Note that $I(M; Z^n) < \epsilon \Rightarrow \|P_{M, Z^n} - P_M Q_{Z^n}\|_{TV} < \sqrt{\epsilon/2}$
(by Pinsker's ineq.)

⊛ If $|Z| < \infty$ and Q is i.i.d. and P_M is uniform and $\epsilon_n \rightarrow 0$ exponentially with n .

$D(P_{M, Z^n} \| P_M Q_{Z^n}) \rightarrow 0$ exponentially fast (w/ some exponent, see last Tuesday's notes)

$$D(P_{M, Z^n} \| P_M P_{Z^n}) \leq D(P_{M, Z^n} \| P_M Q_{Z^n}) \quad \forall Q$$

proof: $D(P_{X,Y} \| P_X Q_Y) = \mathbb{E}_{P_{X,Y}} \log \frac{dP_{X,Y}}{dP_X Q_Y} = \mathbb{E}_{P_{X,Y}} \left[\log \frac{dP_{X,Y}}{dP_X P_Y} \right] + \mathbb{E}_{P_{X,Y}} \left[\log \frac{dP_Y}{dQ_Y} \right]$

So the two notions of secrecy are almost equivalent (in most cases assumptions in ⊛ hold!)

Weakness: "on average secret"

$$\|P_{M, Z^n} - P_M Q_{Z^n}\|_{TV} = \sum_m P_M(m) \|P_{Z^n|M=m} - Q_{Z^n}\|_{TV}$$

Similarly

$$I(M, Z^n) = D(P_{M, Z^n} \| P_M P_{Z^n}) = \sum_m P_M(m) D(P_{Z^n|M=m} \| P_{Z^n})$$

You'll have
a HW showing that
this really
is a weakness.

Semantic Security (1982)

ϵ -ss ^{semantic security} if $\forall (m_0, m_1)$, m_b is transmitted where $B \sim \text{Bern}(\frac{1}{2})$ then no ~~polynomial~~ time test can detect B with error $\frac{1-\epsilon}{2}$.

↑
In information theory

$$\Leftrightarrow \|P_{Z^n|M=m_0} - P_{Z^n|M=m_1}\|_{TV} \leq \epsilon \quad \forall (m_0, m_1) \text{ pairs.}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \forall m \quad \|P_{Z^n|M=m} - Q_{Z^n}\|_{TV} \leq \epsilon'$$

Bellare - Tessaro - Vardie 2012:

$\max_{P_X} I(M; Z^n) < \epsilon$ is equivalent to s.s.

Wiretap Channel Secrecy Proof:

Choose $\bar{P}_X$ s.t. $R < I(X; Y) - I(X; Z)$

$$\bar{P}_{X^n} = \Pi \bar{P}_X$$

Choose R_g : $R_g > I(X; Z)$

$$\bar{P}_{XYZ} = \bar{P}_X P_{Y|X}$$

$$R_g + R < I(X; Y)$$

$$\bar{P}_{Z^n} = \Pi \bar{P}_Z$$

Random Codebook: $\{X^n(m, m_g)\} \sim \Pi \bar{P}_X$

Reliability: $P[(\hat{M}, \hat{M}_g) \neq (M, M_g)] \rightarrow 0$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$ proven for ^{various channel: $P_{Y|X}$} P2P channel
Averaged over $\mathcal{C}$.

Secrecy: $\forall m$: $\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{C}} \|P_{Z^n|M=m} - \bar{P}_{Z^n}\|_{TV} \rightarrow 0$ by SCL.

because $R_g > I_{\bar{P}}(X; Z)$


$$\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{C}} \|P_{M, Z^n} - P_M \bar{P}_{Z^n}\|_{TV} \rightarrow 0 \text{ by linearity}$$

↓ ↓

$$\mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{C}}[A] + \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{C}}[B] \rightarrow 0 \Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{C}}[A+B] \rightarrow 0 \Rightarrow \exists \mathcal{C} \text{ s.t. both } A \rightarrow 0 \text{ and } B \rightarrow 0.$$

Likelihood Encoder:

Encoder: $S^n \rightarrow M$




Given a codebook, $\{\hat{S}^n(m)\}$ and a "Test channel" $\bar{P}_{S^n} \Rightarrow \bar{P}_{S^n|S}$

(no need for ϵ)

"Likelihood" through the test channel)

$$\bar{P}_{S^n|\hat{S}^n}(s^n|\hat{S}^n(m))$$



Likelihood Encoder (LE): Choose M stoch. proportional to likelihood

$$P_{M|S^n}(m|s^n) = \frac{\bar{P}_{S^n|\hat{S}^n}(s^n|\hat{S}^n(m))}{\sum_{m'} \bar{P}_{S^n|\hat{S}^n}(s^n|\hat{S}^n(m'))}$$

Two distributions:

Induced:

$$P_{S^n} P_{M|S^n} = P_{S^n,M}$$

↑ ↑
IID source LE

Ideal:

$$Q_{S^n,M} = Q_M Q_{S^n|M}$$

↑ ↑
uniform distr. on messages codebook look-up and test channel

$$Q_{S^n,M}(s^n, m) = \frac{1}{|M|} \bar{P}_{S^n|\hat{S}^n}(s^n|\hat{S}^n(m))$$

Notice $P_{M|S^n} = Q_{M|S^n}$ ← apply Bayes rule to see
→ reason for Likelihood Encoder.

$$\Rightarrow \|P_{M|S^n} - Q_{M|S^n}\|_{TV} = \|P_{S^n} - Q_{S^n}\|_{TV}$$

↑ ↑
 πP_S ← does not depend on codebook
depends on codebook.

use random codebook and $|M| = 2^{nR}$ w/ $R > I_p(s, \hat{s})$ ($\sim \bar{P}_{S^n}$)

$$\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_e \|P_{M|S^n} - Q_{M|S^n}\|_{TV} \rightarrow 0 \text{ as } n \rightarrow \infty$$

$$\mathbb{E}_e [\mathbb{E}_p [d(s^1, \hat{s}^1)]] \leq \mathbb{E}_e [\mathbb{E}_Q d(s^1, \hat{s}^1) + d_{\max} \|P-Q\|_{TV}]$$

$$= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{E}_Q} d(s^1, \hat{s}^1) + d_{\max} \mathbb{E}_e \|P-Q\|_{TV}$$

$\downarrow 0$

$$\mathbb{E}_e Q_{s^1 \hat{s}^1}(s^1, \hat{s}^1) = \prod_{i=1}^n \bar{P}_{s \hat{s}}(s_i, \hat{s}_i)$$

Thus "ideal"

$$\mathbb{E}_{\bar{P}} d(s, \hat{s})$$

Choose a $\bar{P}_{s|\hat{s}}$ s.t.

$$\mathbb{E}_{\bar{P}} [d(s, \hat{s})] < D$$

and $R < I_{\bar{P}}(s, \hat{s})$

where $Q_{s^1 \hat{s}^1} |_{\mu}$ is a look up (deterministic)