Bas C. van Fraassen

• "Logic and the Philosophy of Science" (penultimate draft; publ. Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 27 (2011), #2
  

• "Elgin on Lewis' Putnam's Paradox" (1997).
  To read the paper at once and skip the abstract, go to "Elgin"

• "Extension, Intension, and Comprehension", in Logic and Ontology, ed. M. Munitz (1973).

• "Facts and Tautological Entailment" (1969) (Acrobat Version)

• "Gentlemen's Wagers: Relevant Logic and Probability" (1983). Acrobat version: read with patience, for the pages come on in stages.

•   "Identity in Intensional Logic: Subjective Semantics"    (1986)
  (Acrobat version)

• "The Logic of Conditional Obligation" (1972), Acrobat version.

• "On (Ix)(x = Lambert" (1991) This is about my teacher Karel Lambert's free description theory, with fond reminiscences of how I became a philosopher

•   "Probabilistic Semantics Objectified, I."     (1981)(Acrobat version)

• "Putnam's Paradox: Metaphysics Revamped and Evaded" (1997).
  To read this paper at once and skip the abstract, go to "Putnam's Paradox" (Acrobat document)

• "Values and the Heart's Command"
  Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973), 5-19; Acrobat version

Elgin on Lewis' Putnam's Paradox

Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997), 85-93.

To read this paper on the Web, go to "Elgin" Brief outline:

I. 'Initial' form of Putnam's argument; tacit principle (EQ)

II. Restrictions to ideal theory play no role in the proof: what is their real function? (EQ) revised to (EQ*) to accomodate intended/unintended distinction. Result that if a theory is ideal, and this consists in "just more theory", then it is true by (EQ*) if true by (EQ).

III. The dilemma. Elgin accepts the dilemma but opts for other horn

IV. The form of a solution; Lewis' specific instantiation of the form and his two tasks. Elgin's aim: to show that the second task cannot be successfully completed regardless of how the first task is performed.

V. (EQ) reduces to absurdity. What about (EQ*)? The same argument shows that (EQ*) implies that there exists just one, unique admissible interpretation.

VI. There is a proper role, more or less, for (EQ) and its variants, which explains their appeal. The point about what that proper role is, is related to Tarski's conclusions about how to avoid semantic paradoxes, is easily obscured and, in some respects, subtle. Mysteries of translation of the T-sentence.

VII. Interpretation of a real theory. Sceptical doubts about whether we have managed to fix reference, with or without help of nature? Just what are the doubts we are meant to harbor? Incoherence of the demand.

VIII The 'carve at the joints' solution to why the T-sentences must all be true. Display of confusion in the reasoning that invites such a 'solution'

IX. Agreements and disagreements. Pragmatics.

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Putnam's Paradox: Metaphysics Revamped and Evaded

to appear in Philosophical Perspectives,vol. 11 (Boston: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 17-42.

To read this paper on the Web, go to "Putnam's Paradox"

ABSTRACT

In Putnam's paper "Realism and Reason" he gave an argument ("the model theoretic argument" it is sometimes called) which he intended as a refutation of metaphysical realism. Unfortunately it seemed to leave everyone, realists or not, in a difficult position. David Lewis called the argument "Putnam's paradox" and advanced a solution (also suggested by Gary Merrill): a bit more realism about the structure of the world or of nature will block the argument. In this way Putnam's argument was turned into putative support for a brand of realism, supposedly the only means to escape its apparently disastrous implications. I offer a different reading of the argument, with a non-realist escape from paradox as well as an (unsympathetic) diagnosis of the realist response.

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