

## **STYLIZED FACTS ON SECURITY RETURNS**

adopted from Heinz Zimmermann, Elmar Mertens

# AGENDA

**We will look at how security returns behave . . .**

- . . . across **asset classes**
- . . . compared with their "**risk**"
- . . . once they are grouped into **baskets**
- . . . in relation to the **macroeconomy**
- . . . depending on **firm characteristics**
- . . . with regard to **prior performance**
- . . . when there is **new information**
- . . . and what **investment managers** get out of them

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
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# Historical returns on various asset classes differ considerably


## AVERAGE RETURNS ON FINANCIAL AND PHYSICAL ASSETS Percent p.a. in U\$, average over the 1980s



Source: Malkiel (1996), p. 383

# The long-term gains from the stock market have been astounding


## TODAY'S VALUE OF 1\$ INVESTED IN 1972 Including reinvestment of interests and dividends



Source: Mertens, Data from Ibbotson Associates

## The variability in returns differs, too

### TYPICAL RETURNS ON U.S. STOCKS AND BONDS Percent p.a.



Source: Elton and Gruber (1995), p. 20

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
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# The relation between average return and dispersion is not straightforward

## RISK AND RETURN OF INTERNATIONAL ASSET CLASSES

Percent per month



Source: Mertens, Data from Investment Consulting Group




For a single asset class, like stocks, there is almost no relationship

## RISK AND RETURN OF SOME U.S. STOCK PORTFOLIOS

Percent per month

BACKUP



Source: Mertens, Data from Fama and French (1992)

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
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# Even a naïve mix of just a few stocks reduces risk considerably

## ADDING STOCKS IN ALPHABETIC ORDER TO A PORTFOLIO Volatility of portfolio returns (dispersion around mean) in percent p.a.




Source: Zimmermann

# Some stocks move more, other less closely with the market


## COMOVEMENT OF STOCKS WITH MARKET

Returns in percent per month

SGS vs Market (x-axis)



Credit Suisse vs Market (x-axis)



# AGENDA


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# There is a well established link between business cycles and stock market returns

## RECESSIONS AND THE U.S. STOCK MARKET SINCE 1926

Indexed S&P 500 (with dividends), logarithmic scale



Source: Mertens, Data from NBER and Ibbotson Associates


# The relation between stock market, GDP and short rates is not straightforward

## U.S. STOCK MARKET AND THE MACROECONOMY


Patterns of yearly returns / changes (different scales)

BACKUP


Annual return  
on S&P 500



Change in  
annual GDP



Yearly average  
of 1-month  
T-Bill rates



Source: Mertens, Data from Investment Consulting Group

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## TYPICAL FIRM CHARACTERISTICS


- Size
- Industry affiliation
- Accounting Ratios:
  - Price-Earnings
  - Book-to-Market
  - Price-to-Cash-Flow
  - Leverage ratio
  - . . .
- Location of Headquarters and the place of major share listing
- Type of securities issued (stock, preferred, bonds, derivatives)
- Type of activities: conglomerate, start-up etc.
- . . .

**Accounting Ratios are supposed to convey growth expectations.  
Note: Most ratios are scaled prices**

# Small firms have higher returns, but the most extraordinary results apply only to „micro-caps“

## RETURNS AND FIRM SIZE


Million U\$, value of \$10,000 invested from 1952-1994



Source: O'Shaughnessy, „What works on Wall Street“, 1996, Figure 2-4

# Small „value“ companies have higher returns


## AVERAGE RETURNS ON U.S. STOCKS DEPENDING ON SIZE AND B/M Percent per month



Source: Mertens, Data from Fama and French (1992)

For a long time, the performance of buying „value“ companies seemed very persistent

**PORTFOLIO OF BUYING „VALUE“ AND SELLING „GROWTH“ '68-'90**  
Percent p.a., U.S. Stocks BACKUP




Source: Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994)

# Recently, the tide has turned against „value“ investors

## PORTFOLIO OF BUYING „VALUE“ AND SELLING „GROWTH“ '90s Percent p.a., STOXX Euro Style Indices

BACKUP



Source: Mertens, Data from STOXX

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
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# In the long-term, returns of extreme winner/loser tend to reverse

## RETURNS TO PREVIOUS 5-YEAR'S WINNER/LOSER STOCKS (U.S.) Market adjusted returns


Figure 1 Cumulative Average Residuals for Winner and Loser Portfolios of 35 Stocks (1-36 months into the test period)



Source: DeBondt and Thaler (1985) reproduced in Thaler (1993)

## Short-run continuations seem to be persistent, too

### RETURN TO BUYING SHORT-RUN WINNER AND SELLING LOSER Market adjusted return, international sample of stocks





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
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Clearly, stocks react to news about a company. And they react swiftly

## REACTION TO ANNOUNCEMENT OF CORPORATE ACTIONS

„Event Returns“ when stock splits are announced



- The paper of Fama, Fischer, Jensen and Roll (1969) is a.k.a. „mother of all event-studies“
- Hypothesis: Splits are sign of „good profits“
- Fama: „We were lucky. We expected to have some drift “

Source: Mertens, Chart from Fama, Fischer, Jensen and Roll (1969)

**Stocks rise when earnings are good, fall when they are bad and remain flat when the announcement has „no news“**

## RETURNS AROUND EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS




Figure 2a. Plot of cumulative abnormal return for earning announcements from event day -20 to event day 20. The abnormal return is calculated using the market model as the normal return measure.


Source: MacKinlay (1997)

Surprisingly, stocks returns drift even once the news are well known

## LONG-TERM REACTION AFTER NEWS

BACKUP

Figure 1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) for SUE Portfolios (84,792 earnings announcements, 1974–1986)




Ball and Brown  
(1968) preceded the  
work of FFJR (1969)!

# Prices and volume react to analyst recommendations . . .

## NEWS, RETURNS AND VOLUME: ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS (A)

[BACKUP](#)


**Panel A - Added-to-Buy Recommendation Changes -  
Excess Returns and Volume**



... and the reaction is markedly stronger for sell-recommendations


## NEWS, RETURNS AND VOLUME: ANALYST RECOMMENDATIONS (B)

BACKUP



# Some people leave the market way behind

## WARREN BUFFET: ORACLE OF OMAHA 1\$ invested in 1964




Source: Mertens, Data from Berkshire Hathaway

**For the average fund, the odds of beating the market are less than even**

## **FUNDS UNDERPERFORMING WILSHIRE 5'000 INDEX**

**Percent of total U.S. general equity funds**




Source: Malkiel (1996), p. 215



# Spotting a good manager in the past is not much help

## PERSISTENCE OF INVESTMENT MANAGERS' SKILLS

Probability of next year's ranking in performance



Source: Carhart (1997)

# Management fees raise the threshold for a fund's performance and dilute the record even further

## PERFORMANCE AND EXPENSES: A CLASSIC

### Frequency distribution of outperformance

Before Expenses




FIGURE 2

Frequency distribution (from col. (2), Table 4) of estimated intercepts ( $\hat{\alpha}$ ) for eq. (8) for 115 mutual funds for all years available for each fund. Fund returns calculated *gross* of all management expenses.

After Expenses




FIGURE 1

Frequency distribution (from col. (1), Table 4) of estimated intercepts ( $\hat{\alpha}$ ) for eq. (8) for 115 mutual funds for all years available for each fund. Fund returns calculated *net* of all expenses.

## SUMMING UP: KEY QUESTIONS

- What determines asset prices?
- What is risk and where does it come from?
- Which factors influence the stock market and how?
- What information do we need for pricing?
- How shall we invest?

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## LIST OF REFERENCES 1/2

**Ball/ Brown** (1968). „An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers“, Journal of Accounting Research, pp. 159 - 178

**Bernard** (1993). „Stock Price Reaction to Earnings Announcements“ in **Thaler** (1985), Advances in Behavioral Finance, Russel Sage Foundation, New York, chapter 11

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**DeBondt/ Thaler** (1985). „Does the Stock Market Overreact?“, Journal of Finance 40:3, pp. 793-807

**Elton/ Gruber** (1995). Modern portfolio theory and investment analysis, Wiley, New York

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**Lakonishok/ Shleifer/ Vishny** (1994). "Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk," Journal of Finance 49:5, pp. 1541-1578

## LIST OF REFERENCES 2/2

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- MacKinlay** (1997). „Event Studies in Economics and Finance“, Journal of Economic Literature 35, pp. 13-39
- <sup>b</sup>**Malkiel** (1996). A Random Walk Down Wall Street, Norton, New York
- <sup>b</sup>**O'Shaughnessy** (1996). What works on Wall Street, McGraw-Hill, New York
- Rouwenhorst** (1998). „International Momentum Strategies“, Journal of Finance 53:1, pp. 267-284
- Thaler** (1993). Advances in Behavioral Finance, Russel Sage Foundation, New York
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<sup>b</sup> : „bed-time“ reading (and still useful in daylight)