Index

Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on Verification (of	monitoring delivery vehicles, 42-43
Biological Weapons Convention), 19	proliferant's delivery systems, 14,68-69
Advanced delivery systems, 34,51-52,69. See also specific	proliferation motivations, 101
types by name	in suspected proliferant nations, 46, 66-68
Aerodynamic separation techniques, 36	Belarus. See also Former Soviet republics
Africa, 64. See also specific countries by name	control of weapons in, 111
Agents of mass destruction	risks from breakup of Soviet Union, 4, 75
biological weapons, 6,38-39	weapons of mass destruction in, 12, 63-65
chemical weapons, 6, 36-37	Benefits offered to forgo weapons of mass destruction. See
lethality of, 46,48-49	Rewarding nonproliferation; Security improvements
surveyed, 47	as nonproliferation incentive
Aircraft	Biological weapons
as advanced delivery systems, 3-4,41-42, 51-52	characteristics of, 2-3, 8-9, 47-50
detection of development and testing, 43	delivery of, 6, 39-40, 50-52
proliferant's delivery systems, 68-69	destructive effects of, 4748,52-56
Algeria, 13,64,66	dual-use technologies and, 6,38-40
Approaches to nonproliferation policy	environmental effects, 72-73
coercive v. consensual policies, 31	implications of new technology, 40
intelligence collection v. use, 32	institutional bases of nonproliferation regime, 85
scope of control efforts, 29-30	militarily significant levels of violation for, 115
targeted v. universal approaches, 31-32	military utility of, 56-57,60-61,62-63
unilateral v. international approaches, 30-31	monitoring production, 39-40
Arab nations. See also specific countries by name	onsite inspections and, 7
nuclear weapons in the Mideast and, 70, 71, 102, 108	production, 9-11,38-39
regional conflicts and, 16, 109	proliferation motivations, 100-101
Argentina	reducing international role of weapons, 106
delivery systems in, 67-69	strategic uses of, 62-63
policy reversals, 18	in suspected proliferant nations, 14-15, 63-66
nuclear weapon program in, 14, 64	tactical uses of, 55-61
and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 101	technical basis for monitoring and controlling prolifera-
reducing incentives for weapons, 107	tion, 38-40
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 25	unconventional delivery systems and, 69
Arms Export Control Act, 85,87	U.S. military operations and, 74
Arms races, 71, 106-107	Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
Atomic Energy Act, 85-87,90,95	institutional bases of nonproliferation regime, 85
Australia Group, 5, 85, 88	international norms and, 2
	linking assistance to nonproliferation, 103
Ballistic missiles	monitoring compliance, 40
as advanced delivery systems, 3-4, 41-42	proliferation motivations and, 99
detection of development and testing, 42-43	rewarding nonproliferation, 22
indigenous production capabilities for, 67	security benefits as nonproliferation incentive, 104-106

118 | Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

suspected proliferant nations and, 63-66	Civil defense measures, 62-63
technical training obligations and, 91	Classified information
toxin bans, 3	implications of, 15, 32
verification regime, 18-19, 22-25, 113	protection of during inspections, 23-24, 113-115
Brazil	CoCorn. See Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export
delivery systems in, 67-69	
	Controls
nuclear weapon program in, 14, 64	Coercive policies. See Disincentives and sanctions against
policy reversals, 18	proliferants
proliferation motivations, 101	Cold War end and implications for proliferation, 15-18
reducing incentives for weapons, 107	Commerce, Department of, 25
Burma, 65-66	Commonwealth of Independent States, 63-64. See also
Bush administration, 90	
BWC. See Biological Weapons Convention	Former Soviet republics
BWC. See Biological Weapons Convention	Conflicting nonproliferation policy approaches and objec-
C + 1F 74 S -1 :G	tives. See Approaches to nonproliferation policy;
Central Europe, 74. See also specific countries by name	Objectives of nonproliferation policy
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare	Consensual treaties. See International agreements
Elimination Act, 85,87,90,95	Consequences of proliferation
Chemical weapons	characteristics of weapons of mass destruction, 2-3, 7-11,
characteristics of, 2-3, 8-9,46-50	46-50
delivery systems, 50-52	
destructive effects of, 52-56	Cold War end and implications for proliferation, 15-18
dual-use technologies and, 6,36-38	international community, implications for, 11-12, 69-73
	Soviet Union breakup effects, 1,4, 15,75-77, 111-112
institutional bases of nonproliferation regime, 85	summary, 45-46
Iraqi failure to use against coalition troops, 110	U.S. political-military policies, implications for, 4, 11-12,
militarily significant levels of violation for, 115	73-75
military utility of, 56-57,58-60,62	
onsite inspections and, 7	weapon effects compared, 52-63
production, 9-11,36-37	Contagious weapon agents, 49-50
proliferation motivations, 100-101	Controlling proliferation. See Monitoring and controlling
quantities for various missions, 60	proliferation
	Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biologi-
reducing international role of weapons, 17, 106	cal) and Toxin Weapons. See Biological Weapons
strategic uses of, 62	Convention
in suspected proliferant nations, 14-15,63-66	
tactical uses of, 55-61	Conventional weapons
technical basis for monitoring and controlling prolifera-	compared with weapons of mass destruction, 46, 56-57
tion, 36-38	motivating development of weapons of mass destruction,
Chemical Weapons Convention (cWC)	29, 102
chemical weapons disarmament and, 18	linkages to weapons of mass destruction, 29-30
institutional bases of nonproliferation regime, 85	Cooperative security concept, 109
	Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls,
international norms and, 2, 5, 18	85,89
linking assistance to nonproliferation, 103	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
onsite inspections and, 7	Cordesman, Anthony, 58-59
proliferation motivations and, 99	Counterproliferation, 19-20,25,29,84,91-92, 94-97
rewarding nonproliferation , 22	Covert activities, 7,92. See <i>also</i> Intelligence agencies
security benefits as nonproliferation incentive, 104-105	Cruise missiles, 3-4,43,51-52,68-69
stockpile destruction specifications, 72	CWC. See Chemical Weapons Convention
suspected proliferant nations, 63-66	
	Delivery systems. See also Aircraft; Ballistic missiles;
technical training obligations and, 91	Cruise missiles
toxin bans, 3	
verification regime, 22-25, 113	barriers to missile and aircraft proliferation, 41-42
China	biological weapons and, 39
conflicting U.S. policy objectives with respect to, 5, 26	chemical weapons and, 37
delivery systems in, 66-69	comparison of aircraft and missile delivery of chemical
lack of requirement of 'full-scope safeguards' for nuclear	and biological agents, 53-54
exports, 18	monitoring delivery vehicles, 42-43
mass destruction weapon programs in, 12, 14, 17, 63-66	nuclear weapons and, 34-35
proliferation motivations, 102	in suspected proliferant nations, 14, 66-69
regional security concerns and, 16, 108	
regional security concerns and, 10, 100	technical basis for monitoring and controlling, 40-43

types of, 3-4,50-52	Exports. See <i>also</i> Export controls
unconventional delivery systems, 69	Former Soviet Union, critical information, equipment, or
Department of Defense, 25,29, 110	materials, 76-77
Destructive agents. See Agents of mass destruction	limiting regional arms races, 107
Destructive effects of weapons, 52-55	Soviet Union, delivery systems, 66
Deterrence policies, 28,73-74	Soviet Union, weapons or components, 76, 112
Diplomatic responses to proliferation, 97-98	
Disc riminatory nonproliferation regimes, 17, 32, 101	Failures of nonproliferation, 25, 109-111
Disincentives and sanctions against proliferants	Financial assistance and nonproliferation policy, 22,102-104
balancing coercive v. consensual policies, 31	Fissile materials. See Nuclear materials.
balancing targeted v. universal approaches, 31-32	Foreign Assistance Act, 85,90,95
coercion benefits and limits, 97-98	Foreign trade. See Export controls; Exports
diplomatic and military responses, 5,20-21,94-97	Former Soviet republics
economic sanctions, 5, 93-94	control of weapons in, 72, 75-76, 111-112
	delivery systems in, 66-67
Dual-use technologies biological weapons and, 6,3840	
	emigration of technical personnel, 112
chemical weapons and, 6, 36-38	environmental effects of weapons of mass destruction,
controls on as obstacle to proliferation, 6, 86	72-73
exports from former Soviet Union and, 76-77	export of critical information, equipment, or materials,
technical basis for monitoring and controlling prolifera-	33-34,41-42,76-77, 111-112
tion, 32	export of weapons or components, 76, 112
spread of contributing to proliferation, 16	risks from breakup of Soviet Union, 4, 15,75-77, 111-112
	weapons in, 14, 63-65, 75-77, 111-112
EAA. See Export Admini stration Act	France, 12, 17,63,70
East Asia, 64-69. See also specific countries by name	Freedom Support Act, 85
Economic issues	
as incentive to forgo weapons of mass destruction, 22,	Gas centrifuge technology, 35-36
102-104	Genetic engineering techniques, biological agents and, 40
costs of producing nuclear materials, 11, 33-34	Geneva Protocol, 17,85, 106
onsite inspection, costs and benefits of, 28, 113-115	Glenn-Symington amendments to Foreign Assistance Act,
sanctions against proliferants and suppliers, 5, 20, 27,	90,95
88-89,93-95	GPS. See U.S. Global Positioning System
Education of foreigners, transfers of expertise and, 91	<i>5</i> ,
Effects of weapons of mass destruction. See also Conse-	Health and safety effects of producing weapons of mass
quences of proliferation	destruction, 39,72-73
destructive effects of weapons, 46-50,52-55	Hussein, Saddam, 100, 102, 110
environmental effects, 39, 72-73	
military utility of weapons, 55-63	IAEA. See International Atomic Energy Agency
strategic uses of weapons, 55, 61-63	India
tactical uses of weapons, 55-61	coercion benefits and limits, 97-98
Egypt, 65-67	delivery systems programs, 66-69
Energy, Department of, 25	difficulty of bringing into nuclear nonproliferation regime,
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, 90	104
Environmental effects of weapons of mass destruction, 39,	proliferation motivations, 71, 102
72-73	purchase of Russian missile technology, 76
Europe, 108. See also specific countries by name	regional security concerns and, 16, 108
Executive branch discretion in nonproliferation policies,	weapon of mass destruction programs, 13, 17, 64-66,
31-32,94	104-105
Executive Order 12735,87	Infectious weapon agents, 49-50,72-73
Export Administration Act, 85, 87,90	Intelligence agencies
Export controls	collection v. use of intelligence, 32
barriers to missile and aircraft proliferation, 41-42	monitoring of proliferation, 32-33, 112
exemptions from, 104	role of intelligence in nonproliferation policy, 94, 96
export promotion v. export controls, 26-28	Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, 114
multilateral cooperation in export control regimes, 18	International agreements, 22-25, 31, 84-85, 104-105. See
as information sources, 19,86	also specific agreements by name
as obstacles to proliferation, 5, 16, 19-20, 84-88	International Atomic Energy Agency
Export controls groups. See Multilateral control groups	creation of, 102
	- , -

120 | Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

Iraqi facilities, monitoring of, 93, 114 nuclear safeguards, 18, 23, 34, 101, 108 international Atomic Energy Agency Statute, 85 International community	seizure of Soviet weapons by non-Russian authorities, 75-76 weapons of mass destruction in, 12, 63-65 Korean peninsula, 4, 12. See also North Korea; South Korea
cooperation among necessary for nonproliferation, 4-5	Roteun peninsula, 4, 12. See also Horar Roteu, South Roteu
domino effect and proliferation, 71, 102	Laser isotope separation, 36
double standards and proliferation, 101	Latin America, 64, 67-69. See also specific countries by
norm against proliferation, 17	name
prerequisites to effective nonproliferation policy, 4-6	Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty. See Treaty of
proliferation costs and risks, 71-73	Tlatelolco
proliferation, implications for, 11-12,69-73	Legal sanctions. See Sanctions against suppliers
reducing international role of weapons, 106	Lethality of weapon agents
and military action against proliferants, 20,92	factors affecting, 46,48-49,53-54
International norms	nuclear weapons, 34-35
erosion of, 17, 71	weapon characteristics and comparisons, 7-9
importance of for nonproliferation objectives, 1-2, 17,21,	weapon effects, 52-55, 61
30,94-96	Libya, 13,65-69 London Club. See Nuclear Suppliers Group
unilateral and international policy approaches, 30	Long-range delivery systems. See specific types of system by
International Science and Technology Centers, 112	name
International security arrangements, 22-25, 107-109	
"Internationalist' approach to policy, 30-31	Middle East. See also specific countries by name
Iran	delivery systems in, 67-69
delivery systems in, 66-69 weapon of mass destruction programs in, 13, 64-66	reducing incentives for weapons, 107
Iran-Iraq Non-proliferation Act, 85,90	regional security concerns, and, 16, 107-108
Iran-Iraq war, 17,58-59,64-66	weapon of mass destruction programs in, 4,64-66,70-71,
Iraq Wai, 17,38-39,04-00	102, 108
costs of nuclear weapon program, 33, 72	Militarily significance of treaty violations, 114-115
delivery system programs in, 66-69	Military delivery systems, 50-51. See also Advanced deliv-
environmental effects of weapon of mass destruction	ery systems
program, 72	Military operations
international response to, if nuclear-armed, 70-71	as responses to proliferation, 19-20, 25, 84, 91-92, 94-97
military response to proliferation, illustration of, 91, %-97	proliferation implications for U.S., 12,74
monitoring of facilities in, 93, 114	U.S. defense commitments as nonproliferation incentive, 107
proliferation motivations, 100	Military rivalries , proliferation motivations and, 102
U.N. Security Council cease-fro agreement, 18,91,92-93	Military utility of weapons of mass destruction, 7-9,55-63.
U.S. political-military policies and, 73	See <i>also</i> Strategic uses of weapons of mass destruc-
weapons of mass destruction, use by Gulf War, 10,61, 110	tion; Tactical uses of weapons of mass destruction
weapon of mass destruction programs in, 12-13, 15,63-66	Missile Technology Control Act, 85,90
Israel	Missile Technology Control Regime, 35,4142, 66,76, 85,
conflicting U.S. policy objectives with respect to, 26 delivery systems in, 66-69	89
	Missiles. See also Ballistic missiles; Cruise missiles
difficulty of bringing into nuclear nonproliferation regime, 104	institutional bases of nonproliferation regimes, 85
proliferation motivations, 102	Monitoring and controlling proliferation. See also Onsite
regional security concerns, 16, 108	inspections monitoring others v. avoiding costs of being monitored, 28
weapon of mass destruction programs in, 13, 17, 64-66,	monitoring proliferation and verifying compliance with
104	agreements, 6-7
	technical basis for, 32-43
Japan, 34, 107	Motivations for proliferation
	domino effect and, 71, 102
Kazakhstan. See <i>also</i> Former Soviet republics	international double standards and, 101-102
control of weapons in, 111	military rivalries and, 102
indigenous weapons production and development, 77	perceived value of weapons, 99-101
production facilities in, 77	MTCR. See Missile Technology Control Regime
risks from breakup of Soviet Union, 4	Multi-use technologies. See Dual-use technologies

Multilateral export control groups, 5,18,85. See also specific	Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines, 85, 88
groups by name	Nuclear tests
Multilateral export controls, 86-89	detection of, 35
Myanmar, 65-66	lack of need for, 35
Notional armost controls 96.97	Nuclear weapons
National export controls, 86-87	ballistic missile programs and, 46
Near-term proliferation threats. See Suspected proliferant	characteristics of, 2-3, 7-8, 47-50
nations	costs to mount weapon program, 33, 72
Nitze, Paul, 114	delivery systems, 50-52
Nonproliferation policy. See <i>also</i> Deterrence policies; Policy	destructive effects of, 52-56
choices and tradeoffs	institutional bases of nonproliferation regimes, 84-85
categories of, 5, 83-84 disincentives and sanctions against proliferants , 5, 20-21,	likelihood of use, 9, 28-29,69-70, 110 militarily significant levels of violation for, 115
93-98	military utility of, 55-62
failures of nonproliferation, 25, 109-111	noncoercive measures to manage proliferation, 110
former Soviet republic situation, 111-112	production, 9-11, 33-35
imposing obstacles to proliferation, 5, 19-20, 84-93	proliferation motivations, 99-101
institutional bases of nonproliferation regimes, 84-85	reducing international role of weapons, 106
rewards for abstention, 5, 21-22, 98-104	regional conflicts and, 16, 108
security benefits, 5, 22-25, 104-109	secrecy as obstacle to proliferation, 84
summary, 4-6, 83-84	strategic uses of, 61-62
North Africa, 64. See also specific countries by name	in suspected proliferant nations, 14-15, 63-66
North Korea	tactical uses of, 55-61
delivery systems in, 66-69	technical basis for monitoring and controlling prolifera-
missile exports, 41	tion, 33-36
and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 13-14, 108	unconventional delivery systems and, 69
policy reversals, 18	U.S. military operations and, 74
reducing incentives for weapons, 107	
regional security concerns, 4, 16, 108	Objectives of nonproliferation policy, conflicts among,
weapon of mass destruction programs in, 13-14, 17,64-66	export controls v . export promotion, 26-28
Northeast Asia, 97, 108, See also specific countries by name	monitoring others v. avoiding costs of being monitored, 28
NPT. See Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	nuclear deterrence v. nuclear nonproliferation, 28
Nuclear deterrence policies, 28,73-74	preventing proliferation v. preventing use, 28-29
Nuclear Exporters Committee (Zangger Committee), 85,88	Obstacles to proliferation
Nuclear materials, 6, 10,23, 33-36, 76-77	export controls, 19-20, 84-88
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, 85,87,95, 103	forcible interference, 19-20,25,84,91-92,94-97
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	hampering transfers of expertise, 90-91
adherence to by former Soviet republics, 4, 75-76, 111	Iraq and, 92-93
background, 1	sanctions against suppliers, 20, 88-90
ban on unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, 35	secrecy, 84
central bargain of, 22, 104-106	summary, 4-5
disc riminatory nonproliferation regimes issue, 17, 101	Onsite inspections, 105, 113-115, See also Monitoring and
and export controls, 88	controlling proliferation
increasing membership of, 17	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 23
institutional bases of nonproliferation regimes, 85	D.11.
and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 23	Pakistan 20 67 60
international norms and, 2, 17	delivery systems in, 30,67-69
linkage of technical assistance to nonproliferation, 22,98, 102-103	difficulty of bringing n nuclear nonproliferation regime, 104
modifying to accommodate additional nuclear powers,	proliferation motivations, 102
28-29	regional security concerns and, 16, 108
security improvements as nonproliferation incentive, 104- 106	weapon of mass destruction programs in, 13, 17, 64-66, 104-105
technical training obligations and, 91	Perceived value of weapons, 99-101
treaty status of suspected proliferant nations, 13-14, 64	Plutonium, material production and, 33-34
verification regime, 22-25, 113	Policy, See Nonproliferation Policy
Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, 99	Policy choices and tradeoffs
Nuclear Suppliers Group, 5, 18, 76,85, 88	conflicting approaches to policy, 29-32

122 | Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks

conflicting objectives of policy, 25-29	security benefits as nonproliferation incentive, 105
introduction, 1-4	weapon of mass destruction programs in, 4, 64
major findings, 4-6	South Korea
policy background, 19-25	delivery systems in, 67-69
Political fragmentation, weapons of mass destruction and, 72	proliferation motivations, 102
Presidential role in sanctions, 94	reducing incentives for weapons, 107
Pressier amendment to Foreign Assistance Act, 95	reduction of security threats, 108
Proprietary information, protection of during inspections,	U.S. role in reversing nuclear weapon program, 94
23-24, 113-115	weapon of mass destruction programs in, 18
	Southeast Asia, 65-66. See also specific countries by name
Regional conflicts, nuclear weapons and, 16, 108	Southern Africa. See also specific countries by name
Regional security arrangements, 24-25, 107-108	Soviet Union, former. See Belarus; Commonwealth of
Rewarding nonproliferation, 21-22,98-99, 102-104	Independent States; Former Soviet republics; Ka-
Risks of proliferation. See Consequences of proliferation	zakhstan; Russia; Ukraine
Russia. See also Former Soviet republics	START I Treaty , 64-65,75, 111-112
Cold War end and, 17-18	START II agreement, 112
delivery systems in, 14,66	State, Department of, 25
dramatic reductions in deployed nuclear forces of, 17,75,	Strategic bombing, 61-62
99-100	Strategic uses of weapons of mass destruction, 55,61-63
environmental effects of producing weapons of mass	Supplier groups. See Multilateral export control groups
destruction, 72-73	Suppliers of weapons of mass destruction
maintaining control of nuclear weapons and materials in,	proliferation implications, 71
72,76, 111-112	sanctions against, 5, 20, 27, 88-90
political stability of, 72,76	Suspected proliferant nations
security assurances from, 105, 108	delivery systems in, 66-69
risks from breakup of Soviet Union, 4,15,75-77,111-112	proliferation threat and, 4
weapons of mass destruction in, 12, 17, 63, 65	weapon of mass destruction programs in, 12-16, 63-66
Russian Republic. See Russia	Sweden, 18
Sanations assist modificants 5 27 02 05	Syria, 65-69
Sanctions against proliferants, 5,27,93-95	T4:-1
Sanctions against suppliers, 5,20,27, 88-90	Tactical uses of weapons of mass destruction, 55-61
Saudi Arabia, 67-69	Taiwan
Schultz, George, 114-115	delivery systems in, 66-67
Security benefits as nonproliferation incentive arms control, 106-107	U.S. role in reversing nuclear weapon program, 94
assurances from existing owners of weapons of mass	weapon of mass destruction programs in, 18, 65-66
	Targeted v. universal policy approaches, 31-32
destruction, 105-106 consensual agreements, 104-105	Technical aspects of nonproliferation policy. See <i>also</i>
defense commitments, 107	Technical basis for monitoring and controlling prolif- eration
global security arrangements, 22-24, 108-109	
reducing international role of weapon of mass destruction,	issues for controlling proliferation, 6 monitoring proliferation and verifying compliance, 6-7
106	spread of technology and industrialization, 16
regional security arrangements, 24-25, 107-108	technical assistance and nonproliferation policy, 102-104
security benefit possibilities, 98-99	Technical basis for monitoring and controlling proliferation.
summary, 5	See <i>also</i> Technical aspects of nonproliferation policy
Short-range delivery systems, 51	biological weapons, 38-40
Signatures of weapons facilities, 9,32-33,35-40	chemical weapons, 36-38
Solarz amendment to Foreign Assistance Act, 95	delivery systems, 40-43
South Africa	nuclear weapons, 33-36
delivery systems in, 67-69	summary, 32-33
formalization of nuclear status, 104	Technical personnel
policy reversals, 18	emigration from former Soviet Union, 76, 112
proliferation motives, 73, 100	hampering transfers of expertise, 90-91
weapon of mass destruction programs in, 13, 17, 64-66	nuclear weapon programs and, 35
South Asia	Terrorist activity, 50,71-72
delivery systems in, 67-69	Toxins
reducing incentives for weapons, 107	barming of, 3
regiona ¹ - security concerns and , 16, 108	characteristics of weapon agents, 47

dual-use technologies and, 6,39-40	deterrence, 11-12,73-74
onsite inspections and, 7	dramatic reductions in deployed nuclear forces of, 17,
Trade sanctions. See Sanctions against suppliers	99-100
Transfers of expertise, 76,90-91, 112	environmental effects of weapon of mass destruction
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin	programs, 72-73
America. See Treaty of Tlatelolco	implications of proliferation for political-military policies,
Treaty of Rarotonga, 22-25,85	4, 11-12,73-75
Treaty of Tlatelolco , 22-25,85, 101, 104	importance of in reducing international role of weapons,
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. See	106
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty	military operations, 11-12,74
Trends favoring nonproliferation, 17-19	positive security assurances, 105-106
Trends fostering proliferation, 15-17	U.Sforeign bilateral export control agreements, 89
	weapon of mass destruction programs in, 12, 17, 63
Ukraine. See <i>also</i> Former Soviet republics	United States legislation. See also specific legislation by
control of weapons in, 111	name
exports of critical information, equipment, or materials, 76	export controls, 86-87
exports of missiles, 41	institutional bases of nonproliferation regimes, 84-85
International Science and Technology Centers, 112	sanctions against proliferant countries, 95
reduction of security threats, 108	sanctions against suppliers, 90
risks from breakup of Soviet Union, 4, 15,75-77,111-112	Universal policy approaches, 31-32
seizure of Soviet weapons by non-Russian authorities,	Uranium, material production and, 33-34
75-76	U.S. Global Positioning System, 42, 52
weapons of mass destruction in, 12, 63-65	Uzbekistan, 77
U.N. General Assembly, 105	
U.N. Resolution 687,93,97	Verification regimes
U.N. Security Council	costs and benefits of inspections for, 113-115
international security arrangements, 108-109	international treaties and, 22-25
Iraq cease-fire agreement, 14, 18,91,92-93	monitoring proliferation and verifying compliance with
on military response to proliferation threats, 20, 92	agreements, 6-7, 28
multilateral agreement enforcement, 20-21, 94	onsite verification measures, 105
positive security assurances, 105	technical basis for monitoring and controlling prolifera-
revitalization of, 5	tion, 32-43
role of permanent members in influencing the perceived	Vietnam, 65-66
value of nuclear weapons, 99	
role of permanent members in conventional arms sales,	Weapons of mass destruction. See also Biological weapons;
107	Chemical weapons; Delivery systems; Nuclear weap-
U.N. Special Commission on Iraq, 93	ons
Unilateral approach to policy v. International Approaches,	compared with conventional weapons, 1, 29-30, 46
30-31	ease of acquisition, 9
Unilateral export controls, 86-87	exports from former Soviet Union, 76-77
United Kingdom, 12,63	military utility of, 55-61
positive security assurances from, 105	probability of use, 9-11
United Nations. See U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Resolu-	Weapons of Mass Destruction Control Act, 85
tion 687, and U.N. Security Council	
United States	Yemen, 67-69
alliances or coalitions, 75, 107	
Cold War end and, 17-18	Zangger Committee. See Nuclear Exporters Committee
defense commitments as nonproliferation incentive, 107	