

Lessons from Cambodia: Strengthening United States Intervention

5

THE CHALLENGE FOR PEACEKEEPING

■ Learning the Lessons

Thank you for the opportunity to present this paper on behalf of Lieutenant General Sanderson. Since completion of the mandate of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), I have had the good fortune to accompany him while he has participated in many such conferences, seminars, and workshops on United Nations issues and peacekeeping in particular. The success of that operation has aroused considerable interest in various parts of the world especially in view of the complexity, its precedent-setting nature, and its intrusiveness into the affairs of a failed sovereign state.

The interest has been heightened in view of the increased scope and frequency of United Nations operations and the crisis image that many convey. I hasten to add that in no way is this intended as criticism of commanders, staff, and contingents in those other operations. Each operation is unique and each has its own successes and failures. Cambodia was certainly no exception in this regard. However, if we are to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to intervene in pursuit of the high morality of its Charter, we need to build on the successes and learn from the failures.

Involvement in the international debate has enabled General Sanderson to discuss his views with a diverse range of observers, practitioners, analysts, and authorities. The reception he has received has been excellent and has helped him refine his position over the last 12 to 18 months. I have tabled a paper: Peace-

by

Lieutenant Colonel J.D. Healy, International Policy Division, Department of Defence, Australia, on behalf of Lieutenant General J.M. Sanderson, Commander Joint Forces Australia and Force Commander, United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 1992 to 1993

keeping or Peace Enforcement? Global Flux and the Dilemmas of United Nations Intervention, which reflects this position. The title of this paper recognizes that, confronted with increasing turmoil of a cultural and racial nature following the end of the Cold War, the critical issue for the World is to make the United Nations Charter work in a way that can preempt or resolve these crises effectively and lawfully. The difficulties faced in this regard by the United Nations Organization have been all too manifest in recent missions, in Somalia, in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia.

Also, there is little question that the United Nations Charter continues to provide the best available mechanism for the resolution of international conflict. It draws its authority from the 185 sovereign Member states that have ratified its provisions and are bound by them. The Charter is a document with highly moral foundations, which obliges settlement of disputes by peaceful means, respect for fundamental human rights, conformity with international law, and social progress. How to translate these high ideals into action is the question challenging the international community.

In analyzing United Nations operations, one is often surprised to find that many problems manifest in UNTAC have been experienced elsewhere. In view of the awesome responsibilities of the United Nations, lessons should not have to be relearned in this way. Also, the keys to success in UNTAC do not yet seem to have been fully comprehended. Several measures have been proposed to address the difficulties experienced there and elsewhere, but regrettably, these are all-too-often peripheral. None really comes to grips with the key issues.

A close analysis of the UNTAC and other operations suggests that many difficulties are due to deficiencies in the philosophical approach to the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Moreover, there are serious problems in the way the United Nations plans for, mounts and directs peacekeeping operations, and also issues of an ethical nature. The first requirement is to address these in a fundamental way. Once this has been

done, the benefits accruing from measures such as improved readiness, doctrine, training, tactics, and technology can increase the effectiveness of peacekeeping. But it is important to make the point that these measures can never be solutions in themselves. The main focus of General Sanderson's paper, therefore, is the more fundamental issues, from which broad areas can be identified for specific programs of interest to the Bellagio Workshop.

THE USE OF FORCE

Among the most vexing of the matters which have damaged the United Nations' credibility is the issue of the use of force. United Nations personnel often seem confused over whether and when to use force, and how much is too much. The problem is that any use of force can create its own dynamic of escalating violence. The established peacekeeping ethos recognizes three fundamental principles: consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense. These principles are interdependent and any use of force beyond self-defense would be inconsistent with impartiality and would be likely to undermine consent.

Peacekeeping operations are authorized under Chapter VI of the Charter. While peace enforcement is an option under Chapter VII, it represents a totally different ethos to peacekeeping, being more akin to war. It is critical that a clear line is drawn between the two to avoid confusion over objectives and commitments by participating nations. Peacekeepers are instruments of diplomacy, not of war.

■ Strategic Objectivity

At the political level, it is important for the United Nations to be seen to be working for the interests of all Member states. Through their accession to the Charter, Member States have given their consent to the exercise of authority according to its provisions by the organs of the United Nations Organization. Inevitably, in exercising that authority, compromises are needed between the disparate interests involved to gen-

erate consensus. However, objectivity in United Nations resolutions must not be sacrificed to achieve this consensus. Mandates must draw their moral authority from the Charter. There has to be a clear and objective moral foundation in United Nations mandates to develop and sustain international consent.

It is also essential that political objectives are passed to those who must implement them in the field in a way that focuses and inspires action. Most military structures identify three levels of command for this purpose: strategic, operational, and tactical (these will be covered in more detail shortly). In the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, for example, these were respectively: the Security Council in New York, the United Nations Headquarters in Phnom Penh, and the units and various agencies in the field. The success in Cambodia was due to the operational level in Phnom Penh binding the others into harmony through horizontal and vertical collaborative structures established for the purpose. These provide a ready model for other United Nations operations.

Regrettably, under existing arrangements, a major weakness exists at the strategic level, where the United Nations Secretariat is unable to function as an effective strategic headquarters, one capable of providing comprehensive advice to the Security Council and giving strategic direction to operations. The United Nations Charter never envisaged such a role for the Secretariat, which is neither structured nor equipped to run complex military operations. Instead, the Charter provides for a Military Staff Committee to assist the Security Council; this serves to underline the need for the structures envisaged in the Charter for very necessary purposes and based on sound precedent in wartime to be put in place.

General Sanderson's paper urges the empowerment of the Military Staff Committee, provided for in the United Nations Charter, to fulfil the essential functions identified for it. This is the key issue and the priority area for reform of the way the United Nations does business. Once this is done, the multiplier effect of supporting mea-

sures can be brought to bear to strengthen United Nations peacekeeping. What I propose to discuss here are issues very important in supporting operations that are strategically well planned and directed.

SUPPORTING ENHANCED UNITED NATIONS INTERVENTION

■ Strategic Context-Operational Focus

When seeking ways to improve United Nations peacekeeping, it is unfortunate that a great deal of energy seems to be expended on the secondary issues. For example, one of the more recent responses from the United Nations Secretariat to react quickly to crises has been to seek solutions that place forces more readily at its disposal. While international consensus supports a more rapid or preemptive response to crises, employment of forces in a way that could lead to failure is likely to be counterproductive. Similarly, there seems to have been considerable effort over the years directed at the tactical level. Examples include tactical training in rules of engagement (ROE), laws of armed conflict (LOAC) and international humanitarian law (IHL) generally, as well as training in specific peacekeeping activities in the field such as the conduct of check points, negotiating skills and the like.

These important initiatives need to continue. But they also need to be able to be placed in their proper strategic context without which they can have no meaningful purpose. Their development needs to occur while contributing to an effectively functioning strategic framework. It is their link to the collective strategic objectives of the Member states of the United Nations, which gives any conflict resolution measures their relevance and therefore defines what they might be and the form they should take. Besides ensuring effective strategic planning and direction, the central role of the operational level in linking tactics to strategy needs to be recognized. In peacekeeping, as in war, it is at the operational level that political objectives are won or lost. This suggests that the operational level should be

the main focus of priority efforts to support enhanced United Nations intervention.

It is critical for the operational level to establish the bona fides of the mission as early as possible and to maintain it until the operational objective is secured. This involves relationships with the international supporters of and contributors to the operation, the parties in conflict, and the population in the mission area. Operations have to be conducted in a way that fosters their cooperation. In particular, if the support of the people is lacking, the continued viability of the presence of the United Nations peacekeepers will be placed in doubt. Discrimination in the conduct of operations is the key issue here.

■ Doctrine

The issue of doctrine is central to effectiveness at the operational level. Peacekeepers from diverse Member states need to have their unity of purpose reflected in the adherence to common principles and procedures. Regrettably, much of the operational doctrinal focus in recent times has been directed at reconciling the dilemmas confronting the United Nations in places such as Bosnia. However, preoccupation with problems in Europe, many of which are the result of dis-united strategic decision-making, risks distorting the approach to United Nations peacekeeping in a way that might make it irrelevant for other missions in other parts of the World.

Peacekeeping operations in Africa, Asia, and the Americas and also the United States-led Chapter VII operation in Haiti, have led the way in a new age of successful United Nations intervention supported by focused diplomacy. The successes there must not be held hostage to problems elsewhere. In this regard, it is important for peacekeeping doctrine to be based on proven success.

The central doctrinal lessons that can be drawn from the Cambodian experience are in the two related areas that have already been touched on, namely, command and control, and the use of force. To conduct operations in pursuit of the strategic purpose, peacekeepers, both military

and civilians, need to be able to operate in a secure environment. Security is normally guaranteed by the parties in conflict when they agree to the United Nations presence. However, general political protection might not always ensure tactical security and defensive measures by military peacekeepers might be necessary. With this focus, it is possible to approach issues such as the use of force and other acts by peacekeepers in a more rational and comprehensive way. Force defends the agreement, it does not impose it.

In his paper, General Sanderson emphasizes that force carries enormous political implications. It must therefore, simultaneously be constrained and used with discrimination to ensure consistency with the political objective. To do this, it has to be directed by effective structures. Sustainment of coalitions is the issue that will drive those considerations.

■ Command and Control Doctrine

An important first step in our doctrinal work is to define the command and control framework within which United Nations operations will be executed. Doctrine needs to identify the three different command levels noted earlier, their different roles and their complementary nature. In brief, these are as follows:

- **Strategic level.** In the case of the United Nations intervention, the focus of the strategic level must be especially broad, involving issues of ongoing harmony between member states, groupings, and international bodies. It is at the strategic level that the ambiguities of the political nuances have to be absorbed and focused into directives to the next level, which are at once designed to provide clarity, flexibility, and inspiration to action. This is a hugely demanding task. Decisions made by member states are collective, but the purposes of pursuing and balancing the objectives of the Charter must be paramount. While the Security Council is in a position to provide a lead, its capacity for action will be limited without broad international commitment. The central task lies in determining the international will

on issues raised within the context of the Charter.

- **Operational level.** The operational level of command is that level at which field elements are orchestrated to achieve the objectives of command strategy. The key determinant of success at this level of command is the military principle of the selection and maintenance of the aim. This is the principle that connects the strategic level to the operational level of command and should therefore emerge from strategic level analysis to which the operational level commander must be a contributor. A combination of insight and superior knowledge is most conducive to the achievement of the desired psychological effects. At the operational level, it is unity of command that provides strength and cohesion. While the complexity of many post Cold War peacekeeping operations usually means that they are civil-military affairs, it nevertheless remains critical that all elements engaged come under one common authority.
- **Tactical level.** The tactical level is more finite, with objectives being defined in the more material terms of boundaries, time, numbers, and resources. In peacekeeping operations, the tactical level involves much more than military units and, in some circumstances, military forces might only be in a supporting role. It could, for example, involve electoral teams, human rights monitors, police, and monitors of the Parties' administrations, as it did in Cambodia. It is very important within this complex framework that tactical units do not respond to national or other chains of command on operational matters. Nor can they be allowed to develop their own interpretations, outside the operational level commander's intent, especially on critical issues such as the use of force.

If one of these levels is deficient, or their roles become merged, the capacity of the others to function effectively is severely limited. If the strategic level becomes involved with tactics, it is likely to lose its broad perspective and dimin-

ish the power of commanders on the ground. At the same time, tactical actions that are not focused can impact adversely on the strategic plan. Each level collects and analyzes information to define tasks, then empowers subordinate commanders to accomplish them. The operational level both separates and binds the strategic and tactical levels, ensuring that tactical actions are coordinated to achieve strategic objectives.

In Cambodia, the strategic level objective of the Paris Agreements was the creation of a unique legitimate government that could be recognized by the international community as the sovereign authority for Cambodia and the formal international actor with whom they could conduct their relations. The electoral process was the only way that this could be achieved which would be acceptable to all concerned. The conduct of the election was the operational level objective and tactical level elements were orchestrated to this end.

The first strategic level task was to generate and maintain diplomatic support for the operation. The second task was to develop a plan for the overall operation and to obtain troops and civilian elements according to it, deploy them to Cambodia, and put in place arrangements to support them there. It is fair to say that the first of these was only done up to the signing of the Paris Agreements and also, it had largely been effected by interested member states. After their signing, the same member states continued to do so in concert with the operational level. With the second task, it was not done well, nor was it done in a timely manner sufficient to maintain the momentum for peace.

The operational level of UNTAC largely worked with the Security Council through the diplomatic missions. In effect, it functioned without a strategic headquarters. Interventions from the United Nations Secretariat were frequently on tactical or operational level issues in response to media reports, and reflected an almost complete lack of comprehension of the realities on the ground. In particular, when a change to the operational level plan was required by political developments, the operational level

had to generate its own diplomatic support. It would appear that much of the difficulties experienced on other missions have been due to similar incapacities. It is critical for the United Nations Organization and deployed United Nations missions to comprehend these different levels, their different roles and their complementary nature, and to function accordingly.

■ Self-Defense and Offensive Force

At a Workshop in Stockholm in mid-April, the issue of the use of force in peacekeeping operations was examined. The Workshop was jointly sponsored by the Swedish and Australian foreign ministries and was attended by personnel from the United States, Australia, and Europe, (mainly Nordic countries), and included many former Force Commanders. Although no formal outcomes were sought, a consensus seemed to emerge on the need for a clear separation between operations conducted under Chapter VI, on the one hand, and Chapter VII, on the other. This would classify operations as follows:

- **Chapter VI.** These are characterized by consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense. They include:
 - traditional peacekeeping (i.e., observer and) separation of forces missions, such as UNTSO and UNDOF respectively); and
 - wider or expanded peacekeeping (i.e., the more complex post-Cold War missions such as UNTAG and UNTAC).
- **Chapter VII.** These operations involve the use of force beyond self-defense and could include:
 - “peace-enforcement,” meaning low-level pacification operations, such as in Haiti, which might include activities resembling those used in peacekeeping; and
 - war-fighting operations such as Korea and the Gulf War.

It should be noted that wider or expanded peacekeeping provides considerable flexibility for the defensive use of force. But if offensive force is to be used, then, in the prevailing view of

the Stockholm Workshop, it is not peacekeeping and Chapter VII authorization is required. However, Chapter VII operations do not necessarily mean all-out force. It might be possible to conclude operations with little or no force. The essential point is that consent is lacking and the necessary political protection cannot be afforded to peacekeepers. Force levels must be sufficient to defeat the threats posed.

Following the difficulties in places such as Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council might have reservations about mandating further multinational United Nations peace enforcement operations (as opposed to a coalition-led one). The point that emerged from the Stockholm Workshop is that the United Nations has more options than simply traditional peacekeeping, war-fighting or doing nothing, as the conceptual framework above shows. Resources are always a major constraint, but it nevertheless needs to be borne in mind that under-resourced missions have reduced prospects for success, and normally end up either costing more or failing.

The precise definitions might require some further development before being accepted as agreed doctrine, but the distinctly separate frameworks established by the two Chapters are germane.

■ Training and Tactics

With the rapid increase in the size and complexity of peacekeeping operations in recent years, there has been much discussion on the need for training of military peacekeepers to improve their effectiveness. It is important to make the point that even with the best trained troops available, a campaign can be lost if command or planning is deficient. These must be included in training for peacekeeping.

It is particularly important to develop skills in the planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations at the operational level. I repeat that it is at the operational level that peacekeeping operations are won or lost. It seems that the problem with many missions is due to a disconnect between the strategic and tactical levels. This is

almost inevitable if the operational art bringing the capabilities of diverse elements into harmony working toward the common objective is not exploited to its fullest extent. Despite enormous difficulties, in UNTAC we established this essential link, which is clearly explained in General Sanderson's paper.

The UNTAC operation also showed that peacekeepers are often obliged to deal with people without honor. This requires considerable self-control, and the steadfastness and forbearance of the military profession is the key to success under these circumstances. Only the military has the organizational characteristics and the ethos to operate under the conditions generally prevailing in a peacekeeping mission. This is an important issue because it is suggested from time-to-time that civilians might better perform peacekeeping tasks. This view is normally accompanied by some account of failure in military behavior, which is destructive of the United Nations' credibility as a compassionate and reliable organization. Failures do occur, but clearly the military peacekeepers' task cannot be performed by anything less than a trained professional.

It is true that the quality of troops involved in peacekeeping varies widely and some units are better prepared than others. To correct this, there are good grounds for some form of an inspector general's office within the United Nations structure, preferably as part of a secretariat attached to the Military Staff Committee. The purpose of this office would be to identify potential contingents that meet minimum standards and advising on the needs of those that do not. The varying capacities would be known, but rather than being exclusive, the objective should be to find ways to bring those with deficiencies up to the minimum in a way that enhances broad international participation in peacekeeping.

With 34 nations contributing military contingents to UNTAC, it was possible to make comparisons of the preparedness of military units to participate in a formation of the Cambodian type. Cambodia demonstrated that nothing substitutes for sound and solid military training. The idea of

throwing together a group of untrained reservists and shipping them into an environment like Cambodia, Somalia or Yugoslavia does not make sense. In Cambodia, the deeper the training, the more able units were to respond to changes in the operational environment.

The Cambodian operation showed that circumstances can also arise where peacekeepers have to take a firm stand in defense of the mandate. In peacekeeping, combat skills are still essential for self-defense. Specific training for peacekeepers should involve combat training to instil confidence and familiarity with their weapons. The nature of the mandate will define the tasks, which in turn will identify the extent of defensive force to be used. Many of the tactical techniques used in low-level pacification or internal security operations are similar, such as defense of key posts, selective engagement of targets, patrolling, road blocks, and the development of relations with the civilian community. Training can therefore readily cover both. However, for peacekeeping, the international nature and the different ethical and jurisdictional foundations need to be emphasized.

Supporting units including logistics, engineering, and medical units must also have the capacity to secure and defend themselves. Otherwise they can make excessive demands on the rest of the force if the tactical situation changes. Some nations might take the view that to deploy a completely passive logistic unit into a peacekeeping environment somehow reinforces their humanitarian intent. This might be all that is politically acceptable at home, but it is not really humanitarian to place soldiers in a dangerous environment for which they are not mentally and physically prepared. It is also not really fair to charge a United Nations force commander with the responsibility for this deficiency.

While some units were better equipped for operations in Cambodia than others, and also had the benefits of deeper and more costly training, this was not necessarily a measure of their ability to create a successful peacekeeping environment around them. This is a very difficult thing to measure. On the one hand, United Nations civil-

ians might feel more secure with a certain unit. On the other hand, some units had a greater affinity with the Cambodians and could generate confidence by at least being perceived to share the daily experiences of the people in a way that generates understanding. This is one demonstration of the advantage to be drawn from international diversity. It is important from a training point of view for contingents to understand the culture as much as possible. It is also important to have a number of linguists who can communicate with the people from the very beginning of an operation and explain why they are there.

Of critical importance from the perspective of a Cambodian type operation is the ability to be able to operate in small groups across large areas, while remaining secure. This demands junior leadership of a very high order. Young officers and non-commissioned leaders have to be confident of their ability to take the initiative, communicate and command soldiers. This demands a form of directive control, where mission objectives are clearly understood to a deep level and junior leaders are expected to get on with the job. Standing operating procedures have to be clear, but not too prescriptive, and the staff has to work hard to reinforce the confidence of the soldier in the field.

Training is important for civilians also. The increasing size and scope of peacekeeping operations have brought many deficiencies in this area into stark relief. The reluctance of some civilians to work with the military in an integrated environment is an established fact with missions. It is not simply the linguistic and cultural barriers that have to be broken down, but sociological ones as well. United Nations civilians are generally individuals rather than team members. Very few of them have any leadership training, and not many have previous experience working with the military. Some, particularly those coming straight out of academia, have a positive aversion to the military.

In Cambodia, several civilians denigrated the Military Component and made decisions that were destructive to morale and effectiveness. Many were reluctant to take military advice and

were prone to make demands about their own security without being prepared to sacrifice any of their own freedom of action to achieve it. In the end, absolute necessity forced the civilians into a closer working relationship in UNTAC, but this required great patience by commanders at all levels and, for most commanders, this would have been one of the great learning experiences of the mission.

The question of integrated training is an issue of great concern because in the past, the United Nations has more often than not relied on the international amateur rather than the trained professional when it comes to civilian recruitment. This is not to say that there are no gifted professionals in the United Nations; there are many dedicated and talented people. It is simply that there are not enough, given the scope of these types of operations. Many people were selected for UNTAC and appointed to positions for which they were not equipped by either training or experience. When doing something as serious as attempting to run a conflict-ridden country, this is really not good enough. UN member states are either going to have to make people of the right quality available, or accept and be honest about the inability of the organization to fulfil responsibilities of the magnitude given in the Paris Agreements.

Some serious operational level deficiencies were the result of the procedural approach to financing peacekeeping missions. This delayed initial deployment and impeded adjustments to plans in the light of emerging dynamics. It is quite reasonable to have control of finances in the hands of experts, provided they follow operational priorities and are flexible enough to respond to changing circumstances. Civilian staff in such positions must have a comprehensive understanding of the potential cost of their decisions in lives, infrastructure, and wasted effort.

An important area for integrated civil-military training is in civic action. In an environment such as Cambodia, hearts and minds activities form a central part of military operations. The purpose is to establish the critical link with the people to convince them of the United Nations commit-

ment. The military of many nations have deep experience in nation-building and a close relationship with humanitarian agencies and those non-governmental organizations that perceive benefits from integration can be mutually supporting.

All staff need to focus on their *raison d'être*, with an integrated approach to timely planning—across the components and involved agencies—from the Secretariat to the forward area. Personnel need to be trained to plan and operate in an integrated environment. Civilian peacekeepers need to understand the obligations to mission outcomes and their broader responsibilities to the international community. They also need to comprehend the need to work within a functioning command and control system designed to ease coordination and foster unity. In particular, they must understand the objectives of peacekeeping and the implications and necessary constraints on military operations.

■ Technology in Support of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is not part of the conflict spectrum and the demands it imposes are quite different to those of combat. The protection afforded to peacekeepers is political and the openness of their operations is an overt political act. The philosophical approach to technology support to peacekeeping achieves its best effect if it enhances the peacekeepers' capacity to affect their political purpose.

Experience suggests that, generally, the systems needed for effective peacekeeping are readily available commercially. Military systems are usually more than adequate, but of course the redundancy leads to some unnecessary additional expense. For example, peacekeeping operations are unlikely to require the full capacities of the observation, combat support systems, or the armored protection and firepower used during the Gulf War. Peacekeepers normally do not need these levels of sophistication since, by their nature, they do not use offensive force and the presence of such systems could prove provocative.

On the other hand, there could be much more focus on methods of weapons destruction in a non-conflict environment. For example, the requirement for de-mining is often more extensive in peacekeeping than in combat. But the existing military technology and methods are equally inadequate. Any technologies that could increase the rate at which areas can be cleared of the polluting effect of mines should command a high priority.

In many cases, the most efficient de-mining is achieved through training numerous local personnel. Consequently, improved training technology can help. The de-mining equipment used in these circumstances should be robust and simple, so that it can be used by local personnel with little technical background. The safety of the deminers remains a key issue in enhancing their confidence and the pace of their work. Active support to provisions in the Inhumane Weapons Conventions that help detection and destruction, and limit proliferation, is also important. This would form a critically important complement at the political level to the development of detection and destruction technology in the field.

Similarly, where the confidence building process requires disarmament of forces, ready and safe means of weapons destruction might be the key ingredient in developing a peaceful environment that can foster conflict resolution. This involves destruction of armaments ranging from pistols to tanks and aircraft, and the disposal of all types of ammunition, much of which is likely to be unstable.

With peacekeeping equipment generally, the development of non-lethal technologies that provide options for greater discrimination in the use of defensive force could form a priority area. The risks of these making force easier to use would need to be overcome by doctrine, training and clear orders. Warning technologies would also be useful.

In addition, the increasing complexity of peacekeeping operations requires a higher degree of sophistication than is presently evident in two particular areas:

- First, command, control, and communications systems are required for the strategic level, and for dispersed forces over a large area for both the operational and tactical levels. Cohesion between levels remains a central need.
- Second, systems are required for information gathering and analysis for strategic and operational decision-making, including surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

Access to national systems could provide a cost efficient way of achieving these ends, however, there are political risks in this. Using several sources could help overcome this, but in any case, independent analysis is critical.

In training for peacekeeping, the use of simulation for planning and analytical exercises, including command training, is an important area for focus.

Ultimately, as the United Nations Charter indicates, peacekeeping is about people. A critical area for technology focus is in areas that help United Nations peacekeepers establish their bona fides with the population in the mission area. In Cambodia, the civic action campaign was key in forging alliances with the Cambodian people in a way that convinced them of our commitment and allowed us to bypass the power struggles between and within the factions. Simple systems to support civic action, such as agricultural and

road-building equipment, and management packages could prove helpful.

A closely related instrument for transmitting UNTAC's message was its own radio station. This used established technology. However, initially this was opposed by the United Nations Secretariat on the grounds of expense, although its utility and cost-effectiveness have been recognized since the successful conclusion of the operation.

Also required was a more effective means of getting the UNTAC message to the broader international community in a way that could overcome the distortions inherent in contemporary journalism. Media reports influenced the international support to UNTAC and at times came close to undermining a mission that was ultimately shown to be achievable. Advancement of the broader message of the United Nations Charter is a highly desirable general international objective. Development of effective public communications systems, such as an area broadcast facility for peacekeeping operations would be a particularly useful area of focus. Adaptation of existing satellite communications might achieve this.

It is perhaps in the area of communications and information technology that enhance effectiveness at both the strategic and operational levels that a most significant impact can be made on the success of peacekeeping operations.