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EMPLOYMENT Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Northwestern University, 1992-96.
Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Northwestern University, 1996-97
Professor, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1997-2007.
Theodore A. Wells '29 Professor of Economics, Princeton University, 2007 -
Chair, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 2018 -

FELLOWSHIPS
AND AWARDS Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellow, 1997.
Fellow of the Econometric Society, 2001.
Member of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2010.
Fellow, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, 2013.

EDITORIAL ACTIVITIES
Econometrica: Co-Editor (2008-2012); Associate Editor (2000-2008)
American Economic Review: Member of the Editorial Board. (1996 - 2002).

PUBLICATIONS
Calibrated Uncertainty, with Faruk Gul. *Journal of Economic Theory*, accepted for publication.

Behavioral Competitive Equilibrium and Extreme Prices, with Faruk Gul and Tomasz Strzalecki. *American Economic Review*, 2017.

Interdependent Preference Models as a Theory of Intentions, with Faruk Gul. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 2016.

Hurwicz Expected Utility and Multiple Sources, with Faruk Gul. *Journal of Economic Theory*, September 2015.

Random Choice as Behavioral Optimization, with Faruk Gul and Paulo Natenzon. *Econometrica*, September 2014.

Expected Uncertain Utility Theory, with Faruk Gul. *Econometrica*, January 2014.

The War of Information, with Faruk Gul. *Review of Economic Studies*, December 2012.

Strategic Redistricting, with Faruk Gul. *American Economic Review*, September 2010.

Partisan Politics and Aggregation Failure with Ignorant Voters, with Faruk Gul. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 2009.

The Case for Mindless Economics, with Faruk Gul. in: A. Caplin and A. Shotter (ed): *Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics*, Oxford University Press, 2008.

Welfare Without Happiness, with Faruk Gul. *American Economic Review*, P&P, 2007.

The Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation, with David K. Levine. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 58, January 2007, pp. 293–315.

Harmful Addiction, with Faruk Gul. *Review of Economic Studies*, 2007, 74(1), 147-172.

Behavioral Economics Comes of Age, *Journal of Economic Literature*, 2006.

Random Expected Utility, with Faruk Gul. *Econometrica*, January 2006, 74 (1), pp. 121 – 146.

Reputation with Equal Discounting in Repeated Games with Strictly Conflicting Interests, with Martin W. Cripps and Eddie Dekel. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 2005, 121, pp. 259-272.

The Revealed Preference Theory of Changing Tastes, with Faruk Gul. *Review of Economic Studies*, 72, 2005, pp. 429-448, 2005.

Self-Control, Revealed Preference and Consumption Choice, with Faruk Gul. *Review of Economic Dynamics* 7, 2004, pp. 243-264.

Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption, with Faruk Gul. *Econometrica* 72, No. 1, January 2004, pp.119-158.

Second Opinions and Price Competition: Inefficiency in the Market for Expert Advice, with Asher Wolinsky. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 70 (2), April 2003. 417-439.

Evolution and Information in a Gift-Giving Game, with David K. Levine and Phillip Johnson. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 100, No 1. September 2001, pp. 1-21.

Temptation and Self-Control, with Faruk Gul. *Econometrica*, 69, No. 6, November 2001 pp. 1403-1435.

Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions , with Jeroen M. Swinkels. *American Economic Review*, June 2000.

Election, Information Aggregation and Strategic Voting", with Timothy J. Feddersen, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 1999 96: 10585-10587.

Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric information and Diverse preferences, with Timothy J. Feddersen, *American Political Science Review*, 93, Number 2, June 1999 pp. 381-398.

Convicting the Innocent: the Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts, with Timothy J. Feddersen, *American Political Science Review* March 1998.

When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible, with Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 79 (1) 1998 pp. 46-71.

The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Auctions, with Jeroen M. Swinkels. *Econometrica*, 65, No. 6, November 1997 pp. 1247-1281.

Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information, with Timothy Feddersen. *Econometrica*, 65, No. 5, September 1997 pp.1029-12058.

The Swing Voter's Curse, with Timothy J. Feddersen, *American Economic Review*, 86, No. 3, June 1996, pp. 408-424.

Reputation in Dynamic Games, with Marco Celentani, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 70, 1996, No. 1, pp. 109-132

Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent, with Marco Celentani, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine. *Econometrica*, 64, 1996, 691-704.

When are Agents Negligible?, with David K. Levine, *American Economic Review*, 85(5), December 1995, pp. 1160-1170.

Design Innovation and Fashion Cycles, *American Economic Review*, 85(4), September 1995, pp. 771-792.

Financial Innovation in a General Equilibrium Model, *Journal of Economic Theory* 65, 1995, No. 1, pg. 79-116.

WORKING PAPERS

Faruk Gul, Paulo Natenzon and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Random Evolving Lotteries and Intrinsic Preference for Information, revision requested by *Econometrica*.

Faruk Gul, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Evaluating Ambiguous Random Variables and Updating by Proxy, May 2018.

Faruk Gul, Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Mu Zhang, Market Design and Walrasian Equilibrium, September, 2018.