The question of what the ancient Greeks can tell us about democracy can be answered by reference to three fields that have traditionally been pursued with little reference to one another: ancient history, classical political theory, and political science. These fields have been coming into more fruitful contact over the last 20 years, as evidenced by a spate of interdisciplinary work. Historians, political theorists, and political scientists interested in classical Greek democracy are increasingly capable of leveraging results across disciplinary lines. As a result, the classical Greek experience has more to tell us about the origins and definition of democracy, and about the relationship between participatory democracy and formal institutions, rhetoric, civic identity, political values, political criticism, war, economy, culture, and religion.

Fortcoming in *Annual Reviews in Political Science* 2007
Who are “we”?

It might appear, at first glance, that there is no coherent scholarly or academic “us” who might be told something of value by studies of the ancient Greeks. The political legacy of the Greeks is very important to three major branches of scholarship -- ancient history, political theory, and political science -- and at least of collateral importance to a good many others (for example anthropology, communications, and literary studies). Ancient Greek history, political theory, and political science are distinctly different intellectual traditions, with distinctive forms of expression. Very few theorists or political scientists, for example, assume that their audiences have a reading knowledge of ancient Greek; few theorists or historians assume a knowledge of mathematics, statistics, or game theory; few historians or political scientists are comfortable with the vocabulary of normative and evaluative philosophy.

Moreover, within each major field there is considerable diversity in approaches to the Greek legacy: Ancient historians are variously committed to the positivist project of “history for its own sake” (Rhodes 2003a), and to self-conscious model-building and theory testing (Ober 1996 ch 2, 2005 ch 8). Classical political theory concerned with democracy falls into what have traditionally been clearly demarcated approaches, notably Straussian (e.g. Orwin 1994, Kochin 2002); intellectual historical (Ober 1998, Allen 2000, Balot 2006); and critical/postmodern (Euben 1986, 1997, 2003). Within political science, comparativists have focused on how institutions allow for credible commitment to law (Schwartzberg 2007), whereas IR theorists tend to focus on the value of Thucydides’ analysis of power and conflict (Lebow 2003). So the whole enterprise of learning about democracy from the Greeks may fall victim to an all-too-familiar Academic Tower of Babel Syndrome.

Yet this seems to be less true than it once was. Whereas there is still a great deal of scholarly work Greek democracy that is done strictly within a particular academic field and subfield, there appears to be a growing awareness by some specialists within each of the three primary fields (ancient history, political theory, political science) of work done in at least one, and sometimes both, of the others. Thus, a few ancient historians with a primary interest in democracy are beginning to employ the methodologies of game theory and rational choice (Quillin 2002, Teegarden 2007, Ober 2008) and to engage extensively with political theory (Balot 2001, Allen 2000, Ober 2005). Work on Greek democratic institutions by social scientists, especially in the area of political economy, makes extensive use of contemporary scholarship on ancient history (Fleck and Hanssen 2006, Kaiser 2007). Many classical theorists are accomplished philologists with a mastery of both language and culture, and have become very sophisticated in their approach to historical context. Essay collections, some arising from conferences and symposia, bring together political theorists and Greek historians (Dunn 1992; Euben, Wallach, and Ober 1994; Sakellariou 1996; Ober and Hedrick 1996). There has, so far, been less formal interchange between ancient historians and political scientists working on Greek democracy, but this is likely to change. There have recently been appointments of classical historians who work on Greek democracy to Political Science departments (Danielle Allen: Chicago; Giulia Sissa: UCLA; Ryan Balot: University of Toronto; Josiah Ober: Stanford). It is increasingly common for political theorists who work on

It is becoming easier for scholars to familiarize themselves with the essentials of the interdisciplinary field of classical democracy studies: Several recent and forthcoming handbooks on classical political thought (Rowe and Schofield 2000; Balot 2006) deal extensively with Greek democracy, and reflect the cross fertilization between history and political theory. Meanwhile, readers (Rhodes 2004; Robinson 2004; Raaflaub, Wallace and Ober 2007) focusing on the history of Greek democracy allow theorists and political scientists to gain a grounding in historical approaches to Greek democracy.

The study of classical democracy, especially in the academic fields of history and intellectual history, is an international enterprise, in which English-language scholarship is only fraction (although a large one) of the total annual production. A sense of the international scope of classical scholarship on democracy can be gained by perusing the relevant sections of the standard annual bibliography: L’Année Philologique (http://www.annee-philologique.com/aph/). I focus here on Anglophone scholarship, but important work by continental European scholars has been translated into English (examples are cited below). Good introduction to European traditions of scholarship on Greek democracy include, in German: Bleicken 1985; Kinzl and Raaflaub 1995; French: Mossé 1986; Italian: Nardi 1971, Camassa 2007; Spanish: Adrados 1997.

Democracy first emerged in a very extensive ecology of approximately 1000 city-states (Hansen and Nielsen 2004; Hansen 2006 Polis) geographically centered on the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Those city-states (poleis) shared a language and core cultural characteristics, but differed in size, government, and economics. The study of ancient Greek democracy inevitably focuses on the first instance on the large, democratic, and prosperous state of Athens -- the most prominent and well documented of all the Greek city-states. Athens remains the “model case study” (Creager, Lunbeck and Wise 2007), but it is important to keep in mind that Athens was an exceptional city-state -- much larger, more prosperous, and more influential than the median Greek state; see thoughtful discussion in the essays collected by Brock and Hodkinson (2000), and survey of the evidence by Hansen (2006). Scholarly opinion differs as to how many of the ca. 1000 city-states that existed in the classical era (ca. 500-325 B.C.) were democratic. Eric Robinson (1997 and forthcoming) has collected and analyzed the evidence for ancient Greek democratic institutions and ideology outside Athens. The best documented of the major non-Athenian democracies were Sicilian Syracuse (Rutter 2000, Robinson 2000) and Peloponnesian Argos (Piérart 2000).

Many poleis were oligarchies; Martin Ostwald (2000a) offers a concise and reasonably up-to-date discussion of oligarchy as a constitutional form, but more analytic work on Greek oligarchy is called for. The most prominent Greek oligarchy, and the state with which democratic Athens is most often and most fruitfully compared, was Sparta. Yet Sparta, in its rejection of private wealth as a primary social differentiator, was a peculiar kind of oligarchy; Cartledge 2001 is the best available introduction. Other poleis were ruled by tyrants; we lack a good, recent English language survey of Greek tyranny, but important aspects of tyranny are discussed by McGlew (1993: focus on culture) and Lavelle (2005: tyranny in predemocratic Athens). The complexities of the democratic Athenian engagement with the idea of tyranny are well explored by Deborah Steiner
(1994: focus on the technology of writing) and in the essays on the idea and practice of “popular tyranny” collected by Kathryn Morgan (2003).

**History of the question**

The question “what can we learn from ancient Greek democracy dates back to Greek antiquity. Roberts (1994) is an erudite and well informed survey (see also Hansen 1989). Eric Nelson (2004) has shown that the Greek political tradition was influential in European thought in the 15th through 18th centuries, yet he argues that Platonic elitism rather than participatory democracy was the central theme of this work. It was not until the 19th century that Athens and its democracy were taken as a positive model by political thinkers. The revolution is closely associated with the great Greek history of George Grote (1869: vol. 1 appeared in 1846); Oswyn Murray has recently shown that some of Grote’s ideas were anticipated by Edward Bulwer Lytton, who still remains better known as the originator of the Gothic novel (Lytton and Murray 2004). The impact of Athenian democracy’s concern with civic education and innovation on the thinking of the greatest nineteenth century theorist of representative democracy, J.S. Mill, has been brilliantly recovered by Nadia Urbinati (2002). The dark story of how certain German ancient historians reworked the history of Athenian democracy in the Nazi era is told by Näf (1986). In the twentieth century, the two most influential Greek-oriented political theorists writing in America, Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss, had a highly problematic relationship to the question of learning from democracy; on Arendt and Greek democracy see Villa 2000 (essays by Villa, Kateb, and Euben), Markell 2006. On Strauss, see Zuckert and Zuckert 2006; Stow 2007.

Moses I. Finley, an American who founded an important school of thought at the University of Cambridge, stands out among twentieth-century ancient historians who have engaged directly with social science. Finley (1985) referred to the success of Athens under the democracy in order to challenge the validity of Robert Michels “Iron Law of Oligarchy” and to counter the arguments of twentieth-century “democratic elitists” (such as Walter Lippman and Joseph Schumpeter). Finley’s Oxford University rival and critical interlocutor, the Marxist ancient historian Geoffrey de Ste. Croix (1972, 1983, 2004), was also an enthusiast for Athenian democracy, arguing that the struggle for and against democracy defined the cutting edge of the class struggle in the ancient Greek world. Meanwhile, in the U.S., the Yale ancient historian Donald Kagan, now famous as a intellectual leader of the neoconservative movement, saw Athenian democracy as a manifestation of its aristocratic leadership, most notably Pericles (Kagan 1991). Finley, Ste. Croix, and Kagan each influenced many younger historians.

**Definition and origins**

Ancient Greek democracy has long offered students of political regimes a sort of whetstone against which they may sharpen their own definitions. The Greek word démokratia conjoins kratos, a term for power, and démos, a term for “the people.” Thus, Greek democracy is typically and rightly seen as differing from most modern forms of democracy in its emphasis on the relevance of the direct participation of ordinary people in collective self-governance. Yet the question remains, “power” and “people” in what sense? One way to approach this definitional question is to ask: When was the term démokratia coined, and for what purpose? The answers to these questions have proved to
be elusive. One school of thought, represented by the Berkeley Greek historian Raphael Sealey (notably 1987) argues that “democracy” was a mid-fifth century (thus quite late) coinage: a term of abuse, made up by Athenian democracy’s internal enemies to claim that popular rule was arbitrary power wielded by the lower-class citizens. Thus, for Sealey, the original definition of democracy becomes something like “mob domination.” For Sealey, the signal political success of the ancient Greek world was not inventing a form of popular rule, but the rule of law (see also Ostwald 1986).

Yet, as the prolific and influential Danish historian of Greek institutions, Mogens Hansen (1986), points out, it is likely that démokratia was an approbative term; used in the early fifth century, and perhaps even in the revolutionary era of the last decade of the sixth century. While Sealey is right to say that ancient critics of popular rule defined democracy as simple (and brutal) majoritarianism, this is not how the term was ordinarily used by democrats themselves. On the basis of a comparison with other Greek regime terminology, it appears that the original meaning of democracy was “the capacity of a public, consisting of all native adult males, to accomplish things of value in the public realm” – thus “the empowered people” rather than simply “the power of the people” (Ober 2006b). The instrumental means by which the demos accomplished its collective end changed over time. The formal constraints of constitutional law were increasingly recognized as instrumentally valuable in sustaining that essential collective capacity, rather than being seen as a diminution of the people’s power.

A second issue of definition concerns the legitimacy of using the term “democracy” for a slaveholding regime in which the political franchise was limited to men. While such a regime would not be regarded as democratic in the twenty-first century, the fact that the basic constitutional rules regarded as fundamental to modern democracy antedate the abolition of slavery and women’s suffrage suggests that it would be counter-productive to lump all premodern states into the category “forms of domination from which we are unlikely to have anything [positively] to learn.”

Where does democracy come from? Given that Greek democracy is the earliest known case of the emergence of democracy in a complex society, the question of its origins is of particular interest. Democracy in the Greek context is best understood as a strong form of “Greek republicanism” – that is, of regimes in which a substantial part of the native male population enjoys full political standing (active citizenship), based on an assumed rough equality of public standing among citizens. Republics of this sort reject the political monopoly of very small and restrictive bodies of elites, but also reject the right to participate of those persons who fall below a certain socio-economic level. The citizens of a standard Greek republic are the metrioi – the “middling men.” The most familiar is the “hoplite-republic” in which the franchise is monopolized by those native males who possess sufficient resources, based on the possession of real estate (usually agricultural), to provide themselves with the panoply of the heavy-armed infantryman (hoplite). Ian Morris (1996) has argued that in the seventh and early sixth centuries B.C., regimes dominated by metrioi became standard in Greece, and that the associated ideology celebrating martial values, moderation, polis patriotism, and self-control won out over an alternative ideology (on which see Kurke 1992) that celebrated elitism, luxuriousness, and looked to the non-Greek East for political and behavioral models.

By the later sixth century B.C., a number of poleis had developed institutions later associated with full democracy at Athens – most notably a deliberative popular council
(Robinson 1997). What factors influenced a given Greek republic to make the move to more full-fledged democracy? Social scientists Robert Fleck and Andrew Hanssen (2006) develop an economic model for archaic Greece, that predicts that democratic institutions will expand where they mitigate important time-inconsistency problems and, therefore, encourage investment. The key exogenous factor Fleck and Hanssen identify as influencing time-inconsistency is geography: In regions (like Sparta’s core territory) in which large open plains allow for efficient monitoring of labor, democracy will fail to develop because wealth can be generated through command and control. In other regions, like the territory of Attica, in which broken terrain renders effective monitoring of labor more difficult, democratic institutions provide the necessary incentives to promote robust economic growth. The model might be tested through expanding the evidence base to other city-states.

Accounts of the development of democracy at Athens written by ancient historians often focus on historically contingent factors. At Athens, there were several stages in the development of the political institutions that become the central features of the fully developed democracy of the fifth century. The reforms of the lawgiver Solon in 594 B.C., devised to avert a social crisis, gave Athens its first comprehensive code of law. Comprehensive law codes are rare in archaic Greece; the only other example is from the relatively obscure Cretan polis of Gortyn (Höleskamp 1992, 1999). Solon’s reforms eliminated enslavement of Athenians by Athenians, established rules for legal redress against over-reaching magistrates, and assigned political privileges on the basis of productive wealth rather than noble birth. A recent floruit of work on Solon has clarified his role; see Blok and Lardinois 2006; Wallace in Raaflaub, Wallace, and Ober 2007.

Solon’s laws were respected, in principle, by the tyrants who took control of Athens in the mid-sixth-century (Lavelle 2005). The next major institutional changes in the direction of democracy took place in the last decade of the sixth century, in the aftermath of the collapse of the tyranny. A back-and-forth conflict between aristocratic families for domination led to a Spartan invasion in 508 B.C., a successful uprising against the Spartan occupiers and their Athenian supporters, and the institution of a series of substantial political reforms in the aftermath. This series of events has been described as “the Athenian Revolution” (Ober 1996). A long generation later, in 462 B.C., certain powers were taken from the “Areopagus Council” (a council of former magistrates), removing its authority to veto decisions made by the citizen Assembly. By the middle of the fifth century, all of the institutions associated with “radical” democracy (see Millet 2000 for why the label “radical” is misleading) were in place, including pay for many forms of political participation. Substantial institutional reforms were made in the late fifth century and through the fourth century (Hansen 1999). While Walter Eder (1995) has argued that democracy at Athens did not truly emerge until the fourth century B.C., the mainstream debate has focused on the relative importance of the events of 594, 508, and 462; that debate is laid out in detail in Raaflaub, Wallace, and Ober 2007.

The democratic origins debate is concerned in the first instance with defining democracy. The sequence of events and the institutional development of Athens are tolerably well understood; the question is what developmental stage is rightly described as “democracy.” The question of dating remains important, however, because it answers the following questions: Is democracy the result of an individual’s plan (594) or of the collective actions of a large and diverse body of persons (508)? Does democracy arise...
before (594, 508) or only after (462) Athens becomes a dominant imperial power? Is the inclusion of “sub-hoplite” lower-class natives as active citizens a long-term result of law and constitutional changes (594), an immediate effect of revolutionary action (508) that makes possible an unprecedented mobilization (and thus imperial power), or an unintended by-product of inter-class negotiations arising from the state’s need to mobilize military manpower (462)? My own position is that the right date for the emergence of democracy is 508 and the years immediately following, a date that I believe is consistent with the basic definition of democracy offered above. The question of whether democracy is originally the result of revolutionary action or of institutional normalization has remained important in political theory in part because of the influential work of Sheldon Wolin, who has weighed in on historical/theoretical questions of Greek democracy in seminal essays (1993, 1994, 1996).

Institutions

Until the mid-nineteenth century, the operations of Athenian democracy were largely mysterious – early modern political theorists (like Hobbes and Rousseau) and constitutional designers (like the American Founders) were careful readers of classical literary texts (notably Thucydides, Plato, and Plutarch), but had neither the resources of critical history nor much in the way of documentary evidence to work with. George Grote’s painstaking recuperation of Athenian democratic history was an influential and substantial advance; Grote’s interpretation of democratic institutions was based on an exhaustive analysis of available sources and is amazingly insightful. Yet much about the workings of democracy remained mysterious until the twentieth century, when a mass of new evidence came to light. Thanks to the dedicated work of twentieth-century historians in analyzing literary (especially the Aristotelian “Constitution of Athens” recovered in a near-complete papyrus copy in 1890), numerous public records of the democratic government inscribed on stone, and other forms of archaeological evidence (mostly discovered in the American excavations of the Athenian Agora, beginning in the 1930s), the formal institutions of Athenian democracy are now quite well understood.

Until the 1970s, the emphasis of standard surveys of Athenian democracy was on the fifth century, the “golden age of Pericles” (e.g. Hignett 1952). Due in substantial measure to the groundbreaking work of Mogens Hansen, the emphasis has shifted to the much better documented fourth century B.C., the “age of Demosthenes.” Hansen’s (1999) survey is the best readily-available handbook of Athenian democracy, and arguably the best ever written. For the purposes of learning from democracy, both the developed fourth-century institutional apparatus itself, and historical studies of the developmental process that contributed to the making of that apparatus are of value. Among general accounts of democratic institutions and their development, Sinclair (1988) focusing on the role of participation, and Ostwald (1986) on historical development to the end of the fifth century are outstanding.

For the twenty-first century student of democratic practice, the most striking formal Greek institution is the citizen Assembly. The Assembly met (in the mid-fourth century) some 40 times each year to deal with all aspects of state policy; approximately 6000-8000 citizens attended each meeting (Hansen 1987). How could thousands of amateurs -- openly debating complex matters of (e.g.) taxation, diplomacy, and military appropriations -- make policy for a complex state? Contemporary experience and
experiments with deliberative groups lead some modern commentators to doubt that deliberation is likely to be of positive value (e.g. Sunstein 2007). Yet Athens outperformed its rivals on various measures of overall state flourishing (Ober 2008). The answer is found in analyzing several aspects of democracy as a system of governance: formal institutions, rhetoric and leadership, citizen identity and civic education. The system as a whole promoted the development of substantial agreement across a diverse population of citizens on core values, while encouraging debate on particulars. It sustained decision-making practices that enabled effective policy formation and timely implementation.

Athenian democracy lacked any formal system of checks and balances, even after the important legal reforms of the late fifth and early fourth centuries had established a formal distinction between “laws” (nomoi: passed exclusively by formally constituted bodies of “lawmakers”) and “decrees” (psêphismata: ordinarily passed by the citizen Assembly: Ostwald 1986). In stark contrast to modern democratic systems, Athenian government bodies did not develop strong institutional identities (Gomme 1951). Most government bodies had a stable membership only for very short periods of time -- ordinarily not longer than a year and sometimes, as in the case of the Assembly, for only a day. Many government offices were filled by lotteries rather than by elections. Terms in office were ordinarily limited to a year; iteration in office seems to have been relatively rare (the board of generals and certain financial magistrates are exceptions) All government officials were subject to strict accountability procedures. There was little motivation or opportunity for coordinated strategic behavior aimed at fostering the power of a given body relative to that of others.

In terms of making a participatory Greek democracy work, the key institution was a popular deliberative council chosen from the entire citizen body. The Greek recognition of the centrality of a popular council for democracy is underlined by a recently discovered inscription from Eretria. In ca. 340 B.C. the Eretrian democracy promulgated a decree offering rewards to a potential tyrant killer, that is, to anyone who took direct and violent action against those who sought to overthrow the existing democratic government. In a revealing passage, the decree orders all citizens to fight without waiting to receive orders if anyone tries to establish “some constitution other than a Council and a prutaneia (a subset of the Council) appointed by lot from all Eretrians.” (Knoepfler 2001, 2002; translation Teegarden 2007).

The Athenian popular Council of 500 citizens was established in the immediate aftermath of the revolution of 508 (Rhodes 1985 remains the essential treatment). The members of the new Council, who served one-year terms and were selected by lottery, according to a new “deme/tribal” system. The population of Athens was at this time was divided into 139 demes (pre-existing villages or city neighborhoods), and the demes were aggregated into ten new and blatantly artificial tribes. The demes and tribes would from here on play important roles in the new political system and would also become key markers of Athenian identity (Osborne 1985). Greg Anderson (2003) emphasizes the importance of the immediate post-revolutionary institutional changes for creating an “imagined political community” of citizens. %he new tribes were not territorially contiguous; each tribe drew about a third of its membership from demes located in coastal, inland, and urbanized regions of Athenian territory. The Council of 500 was made up of ten 50-man delegations – one delegation from each of the ten newly-created
Tribe. The members of each tribal delegation were in turn selected at deme level. Each year every deme chose by lot a certain number of Councilors, based on the deme’s citizen population.

Each tribal team of 50 spent a tenth of the year in “presidency” — i.e. had a primary role in the Council’s main function of setting the agenda for the meetings of the citizen assembly, as well as special responsibility for diplomacy and day-to-day administration of the polis. No citizen served more than two terms on the Council, and terms were in practice (and perhaps by law) non-consecutive. The experience of service on the Council was a common one for an Athenian citizen — although estimates vary with population models (see Hansen 1986a), it is certain that at least a third of all Athenian citizens who lived past the age of thirty (the minimum age for service) would have served a term on the Council. The point is that a very high percentage of mature male Athenians had the remarkable experience of spending a substantial amount of time engaged directly in the most important work of their polis (Ober 2006a).

The inter-mixing of men from different villages, and different geographic regions, along with strong social incentives (useful contacts, public honors: Ober 2008, chapter 4) served to break down insular, local strong-tie networks. As a result the Council effectively aggregated dispersed knowledge (cf. E. Anderson 2006), built practical experience in cooperative and public joint action, and served to give reasonably effective direction to the mass meetings of the Assembly. Because the agenda for each assembly meeting was set, and recommendations on many key items were formulated by a representative cross-section of the entire native male population of the polis, the system was relatively immune from elite capture. Moreover, because so many Athenians had the educational experience of serving for a year on the Council, and because after his year as Councilor, an Athenian might well serve in other public offices, all other Athenian formal institutions were staffed, at least in part, by men with very substantial experience in the direct and daily workings of the democratic government. The army, the Assembly, the Peoples’ courts, the many boards of magistrates, all potentially benefited from the experience and contacts of former Councilors. A.W. Gomme (1951) accurately described the Council of 500 as a “linchpin” institution; it is not hard to see why the democrats of Eretria so easily identified democracy with a Council-centered constitution, and contrasted that constitution with oligarchy and tyranny.

The administration of law in democratic Athens was, in the first instance, in the hands of the People’s Courts: large (200+) juries listened to oral arguments made by litigants in both civil and criminal cases, and voted on the outcome. The last fifteen years have seen first-rate work on Greek law generally (Gagarin and Cohen 2005 is a helpful handbook) and on Athenian law in particular. Stephen Todd (1993) has argued persuasively that democratic Athenian law has a very strongly proceduralist emphasis — that is, it is concerned with establishing fair rules for resolving disputes and prosecuting criminal wrong-doing, rather than seeking substantively just outcomes (although see Carey 1998 for important qualifications). This fits well with the arguments of the social psychologist Tom R. Tyler and his collaborators (Lind and Tyler 1988, Tyler 1990, Tyler and Huo 2002) who suggest that a highly procedural approach to law can produce social goods, even if outcomes are not always consistent with distributive ideals of justice.

Adriaan Lanni (2006) emphasizes the extensive scope for discretionary decision-making on the part of Athenian juries, which she opposes to the standard modern
understanding of “the rule of law” as legislatively framing the law in order to reduce discretion to near zero. Lanni also notes, however, that in “maritime cases” in which individuals involved in long-distance trade were the litigants, discretion was limited and predictability of outcome appears the primary goal. Rather than viewing Athenian law as moving developmentally, from a more “primitive” discretionary approach to a advanced “rule of law” approach, Lanni argues for a mixed legal regime, in which judicial discretion was recognized as a fundamental and valuable legal principle. The system implicitly recognized that predictability and discretion were each of primary value in particular legal venues. Danielle Allen (2000) also rejects an evolutionary interpretation, arguing that Athenian law deliberately retained a role for the emotion of righteous anger; a conclusion that illuminate the modern practice of “victim testimony” at sentencing hearings. The political scientist Melissa Schwartzberg (2004, 2007) has made important contributions to the study of democracy and law by explaining the exceptional cases in which the Athenians used legal entrenchment clauses. Schwartzberg notes that the capacity for legal innovation was, in antiquity, a well understood strength of the Athenian political system. Athenians employed entrenchment clauses, Schwartzberg shows, only in cases in which credible pre-commitment (to allies in foreign policy contexts and to non-Athenian traders in a mercantile context was especially important and especially difficult to establish otherwise.

Democratic decision-making in Assembly, Council, and People’s courts was predicated on public speech-making, that is, on the public practice of rhetoric. Athenian democracy and Greek political and legal rhetoric are very closely identified; often negatively, largely because of Plato’s highly influential equation of rhetoric with the deceptive misuse of a technical skill that is antithetical to the pursuit of truth. Plato’s case against rhetoric has been restored to its original argumentative context by Nightingale (1995), Wardy (1996), and Ober (1998). The last 20 years have seen a revival of the study of Greek rhetoric as an essential component of a vibrant democratic political culture, and as an effective means for exploring decision options in mass fora in which the deliberative ideal of each individual present expressing an opinion is not feasible. Ober (1989) argued that in the Athenian Assembly, Council, and lawcourts, mass audiences judged and responded vocally to speeches. As a result, elite speakers who hoped to win the audience’s approval were constrained to express allegiance to cherished values. This audience-response centered model of mass-elite rhetorical interaction was elaborated by D. Cohen (1995), Yunis (1996), and Hesk (2000). Lisa Kallet (Kallet-Marx 1994) has argued, to the contrary, that elite leaders controlled the rhetorical situation through their monopoly of expertise, especially in the area of finance. Kallet’s elite monopoly of expertise model is disputed by Rhodes (forthcoming) and Ober (2008). Worthington (1994) collects a number of valuable essays on the practice of rhetoric in Greek deliberative and legal contexts.

The famous Athenian practice of ostracism is a striking example of a mass non-deliberative decision-making process. Each year, the Athenian Assembly voted whether to hold an ostracism. If the vote was positive, each citizen had the opportunity to cast a vote (in the form of a sherd of pottery – ostrakon – inscribed with the name of an individual) for expelling a citizen from the polis for 10 years. The “winner” (the recipient of the plurality of votes) need not have been accused (much less convicted) of a crime. His property was not forfeit, and his relatives could remain if they chose. But he was
required to leave the city for a decade. Recent archaeological investigations in the Kerameikos district of Athens have greatly increased the physical evidence (inscribed *ostaka*) for this practice. By taking account of all the relevant evidence and analyzing ostracism in the context of inter-elite struggles and the common use of mass exile as a political weapon by victors in Greek factional struggles, Sara Forsdyke (2005) has put the study of ostracism and democracy on a new footing. She explains the Assembly’s annual decision of whether to hold an ostracism, and the occasional (only 15 recorded instances) of actual ostracisms, as a repeated ritual through which the mass of ordinary Athenian citizens reminded Athenian elites of the power of the people to intervene in inter-elite conflicts if and when those conflicts threatened the stability of the polis. Forsdyke argues that the Athenian revolution itself, and thus the origin of democracy, is best understood as a mass intervention in what was formerly a exclusively elite field of political competition – and that the signal success of Athenian democracy was in the regime stabilization that emerged with the credible threat of mass intervention.

Ostracism is notable, among other reasons, because it involves writing. The Athenian democracy produced an unusually large amount of writing. Classical Athens was the Greek world’s major center of literary production, but it was also distinctive for what archaeologists call the “epigraphic habit” of inscribing public decisions on stone and displaying them publicly. The strong association between this epigraphic habit and democracy has been analyzed in detail by Charles Hedrick (1999), who notes not only the extent of Athenian epigraphic production, but also the presence of “formulae of disclosure” – formulaic language to the effect that the inscription has been produced and displayed specifically in order make its contents transparently available to anyone who wishes to know what had been decided.

**Civic identity and values**

Citizenship, civic identity and civic education are among of the major areas in which the study of ancient democracy has been widely recognized as having value for modern assessments of how democracy works and why. W.R. Connor (1987) pioneered the employment of cultural anthropology to explain how civic identity was constructed through public rituals, especially processions. Brook Manville’s (1990) important book on the origins of citizenship at Athens develops an anthropological model, focusing on the significance of the Solonian and Cleisthenic reforms for the construction of strong civic bonds. Several collections of essays are particularly valuable: A collection edited by Dougherty and Kurke (1993) brought Connor’s Geertzian anthropological approach together with literary approaches to “new historicism”; Boegehold and Scafuro (1994) offered some seminal essays on Athenian identity and civic ideology. Too (2001 – on Greek and Roman education) and Poulakos (2004 – on Greek rhetoric) included a number of important essays on democratic Athenian civic education, focusing on how citizens at Athens were educated by “working the machine” of democratic institutions, and from attending to legal and political rhetoric. Many of the works discussed below, under the heading “democracy and culture” are also centrally concerned with the question of how democratic civic identity was formed and challenged.

Among the key debates in recent work on Greek democratic civic ideology is whether or not it represented a substantially new and distinctively “demotic” political psychology (as argued, for example, by Ober 1989, and by Manville 1990), or whether
Athenian civic ideology, and the identities that were formed by it remained captive to a hierarchical and aristocratic world view. In a justly influential study of the Athenian institution of the Funeral Oration (delivered by a prominent orator to commemorate the sacrifice of Athenian soldiers who had died in a given year), the French scholar Nicole Loraux (1986) argued that democratic discourse remained captive to an earlier aristocratic vocabulary of worth. Wohl 1996 and 2002 employs a Lacanian psychoanalytic model to make a similar argument. On the other side of the argument, Cynthia Farrar (1988) forcefully argues that identifiable forms “democratic thinking” originated in the fifth century in Athens as new ways to conceptualize leadership, human potential, and the public sphere.

Ancient commentators on democracy consistently equate democratic government with the values of freedom and equality. The fullest contemporary discussion of the Greek idea of freedom is by Raaflaub (2004, an updated version of a book published in German in 1985), who argues that the concept of freedom only gained currency in the context of the Greek wars against the Persians in the early fifth century, and that ideas of individual freedom were developed out of the idea of the freedom of the polis. The sociologist Orlando Patterson (1991) argues, however, that the origins of the Greek idea of freedom must be sought in the juridical condition of slavery, and thus suggests that a concern for individual freedom is considerably earlier. In another, related, line of inquiry, Mogens Hansen (1989, 1996) seeks to refute Isaiah Berlin’s (1959) influential claim that the ancients knew nothing of “negative” liberty by showing that the liberty of the citizen against intrusive state magistrates was an important aspect of the Athenians understanding of democratic freedom. Arlene Saxonhouse (2006) fruitfully focuses on free speech in Athens as a rejection of traditional conceptions of the shameful. Robert Wallace (1994, 1996) argues that the Athenian commitment to freedom of thought and freedom of behavior were robust, in some ways more so than modern democracies with their concern for regulating (e.g. sexual) morality. In work complementary to that of Hedrick (above) Diane Harris (1994) connects Athenian commitment to freedom of public information to democratic accountability.

Unlike freedom, equality, as a value and social practice, was not uniquely associated in Greek culture with democracy. Ian Morris (1996) argues that an analogy of what Robert Dahl (1989) called “the strong principle of equality” was the common currency of pre-democratic Greek republicanism. Paul Cartledge (1996) contrasts the strong Spartan conception of equality as “all the way down” social and behavioral “similarity” among a citizen body with more constrained Athenian notions of political equality and equal right to engage in public speech. Martin Ostwald (1996, cf. 2000b) contrasts Greek and contemporary American conceptions of equality, by emphasizing that the Greeks predicated the potential for equality upon a prior condition of freedom (non-slavery). Maureen Cavanaugh (2003), a classically trained legal scholar, discusses the relationship between the maintenance of political equality at Athens with the practice of differentially taxing the wealthy, and uses this history to argue against the revision of progressive taxation in favor of a flat tax. In a quite different vein, Stephen Miller (2000) suggests that the prevalent Greek practice of nudity in sports anticipated democratic commitment to equality of opportunity: the practice of public nudity advertises, he argues, that beneath our clothing, which is likely to signal class difference, men are all pretty much the same. David Pritchard (2003), however, argues that competitive athletics
remained a highly class-specific activity in Greek culture, and an aristocratic prerogative. The contrast between political equality within the bounds of the native male citizen body and inequality outside it is emphasized by Jennifer Roberts (1996); see also below, on contemporary criticisms of the limitations of classical democratic equality.

While freedom and equality were, in antiquity as in modernity, the primary values associated with democracy, Greek democracy was associated with other fundamental values as well. In a study of Athenian laws against *hubris* (“disrespecting”; see the massive study of Fisher 1992), Ober (1996 chapter 7) emphasizes the concern of the democracy for the protection of personal dignity and for promoting the value of mutual recognition. Ryan Balot (2001a) discusses Greek attitudes toward the vice of greed, and the ways in which democratic institutions and culture attempted to control both over-reaching in respect to fair distribution of goods (seeking to grab more than one’s fair share) and unhealthy over-indulgence in pleasures. Balot also (2001b, 2004a, 2004b) distinguishes democratic courage as a matter of risks rationally chosen. Balot emphasizes democratic courage’s difference from standard Greek conceptions of courage as innate or inculcated by disciplinary education, while also noting the dark side of democratic courage as aggressive militarism. One of the key roles of Athenian democratic political culture was to foster both a commitment to self-control and public good-seeking on the one hand, and to allowing people to do pretty much as they wished on the other; Brook Manville (1997) notes that this “both/and” approach was essential to uniting democratic ideology with day-to-day practice. Manville and Ober (2003) suggest that a variety of general political principles (including transparency, accountability, closure, and jurisdiction) are implicit in the practices common to democratic institutions.

**Criticism of democracy, ancient and modern**

The apparent contradictions among the values and behaviors endorsed or permitted by the democratic regime provided fertile ground for intellectual critics which has provided ammunition for critics of popular rule ever since; Arlene Saxonhouse (1996) surveys some of the main lines of argument. Despite the notorious trial of Socrates (see below), the Athenian democratic regime actually tolerated, indeed in certain ways actively encouraged, a very substantial level of political criticism. The dramas presented in the Theater of Dionysus were chosen by a lotteried magistrate and financed by the state system of liturgies – special taxes on the very wealthy (Christ 2006, detailing ways in which wealthy citizens sought to avoid their liturgical service). Comedies were typically sharply critical of political practices of the citizen masses and their leaders alike. While some scholars still regard even comedy as essentially irrelevant to democratic politics (Rhodes 2003), others point to the deep political critique of comedy (Rosenbloom 2002, 2004). Moreover, a substantial body of scholarship argues that Athenian tragedies, like comedy, were fundamentally involved in a critical enterprise – investigating and challenging core democratic values (Euben 1986, 1990; Goldhill and Osborne 1999). Ober (1998) argues for the emergence, in the late fifth and fourth centuries of a self-conscious “critical community” of Athenian intellectuals – including dramatists, philosophers, historians, and rhetoricians – engaged in what amounted to a collaborative project to expose inherent contradictions in the democratic political order.

Intellectual critics of democracy pointed to a number of ways in which democracy fell short. For example, the democratic approach to distributive justice erred, some
claimed, in seeking to distribute goods equally to persons who were inherently unequal. Some of the sophists (e.g. Thrasymachus, as famously depicted in Plato’s Republic) contended that democracy conflicted with a natural order in which the strong dominated the weak and enjoyed a superabundant share of goods. The uneasy relationship between democracy and “natural hierarchy” is a staple of Straussian political theorizing (Strauss 1953). Plato’s Socrates in the Republic argued that democracy violated the first principle of justice by encouraging individuals to engage in more than one domain of activity. The concern with diversity, social and political, was, according to Saxonhouse (1992), a leitmotif of Greek critical thought. Aristotle in the Politics was concerned that democracy encouraged majorities to employ arbitrary and selfish rather than consistent and fair criteria when making judgments with public import, and led majorities to seek their own factional good to the detriment of the public good. The problem of greed was another fertile source of complaint Thucydides and Aristophanes each emphasized ways in which democratic culture stimulated an unhealthy desire for excessive consumption and possession (Balot 2001a).

Contemporary political theorists have paid special attention to ways in which the interchange between Athenian democratic political culture and a critical sensibility yielded distinctive insights into political psychology and practice, and have stressed the value of those insights for rethinking modern democracy. Recent work by political theorists on Plato has been surveyed in this journal by Danielle Allen (2006); Peter Euben (2003), John Wallach (2001), and Sarah Monoson (2000) are particularly concerned to relate Plato – his dialogic practice as well as his philosophical ideas, to the practice of modern democracy. There has been renewed attention among classicists (Ludwig 2002) and political theorists (Zumbrunnen 2006) to Aristophanes as a critic of democracy with unique and valuable insights for students of democracy. Aristotle’s attempt to create a “democracy of distinction” by merging democratic with aristocratic elements is fruitfully explored by Jill Frank (2005).

Socrates and his relationship to the democratic city, and especially his trial and execution, were matters of central concern to ancient critics of democracy; the figure of Socrates continues to loom large in contemporary discussions of the moral and practical value of Greek democracy. Some contemporary critics regard the trial and execution as clear evidence of Athenian democracy’s moral turpitude: Samons (2004) offers a bill of particulars on the subject “what’s wrong with democracy?” He concentrates on the wrongfulness of Socrates’ conviction, but also accuses ancient Greek and modern democracy alike of the flaws of being inattentive to traditional forms of religious belief, disrespectful of the nuclear family, and insufficiently devoted to love of country. At the opposite extreme, but equally polemical, I.F. Stone (1988) argued what Socrates was an oligarchic sympathizer who more or less got what was coming to him. James Colaccaio (2001) is a detailed and balanced treatment of the “Socrates and Athens” question. Schofield (2002) offers a measured and insightful critique of recent American work on “Socrates on Trial”; Schofield’s (2006) monograph on Plato’s political thought is superb. See, also, for the very recent treatments of all aspects of “the Socrates problem,” the essays collected Kamtekar and Ahbel Rappe (2006).

Contemporary criticisms of Athenian democracy tend to focus on its systematic injustice in respect to women and to slaves. Michael Jameson (1978) argued that slave-owning was very widespread, even among lower-class citizens, and was essential to
democracy because only slavery could provide the leisure-time that allowed lower-class citizens (especially in rural areas) the time required for them to participate in politics. That argument was challenged by Ellen Wood (1988), on the grounds that democracy allowed free citizen-peasants to spend free time in political participation; that time was available to them because democracy prevented the systematic exploitation of peasants by landlords or a rent-seeking government. Robin Osborne (1995; reprinted in Robinson 2004) seeks to demonstrate that Greek slavery was economically productive, and thus undergirded both democratic and oligarchic regimes. Review essays by Michael Jameson (1997) and Marilyn Katz (1999 - both reprinted in Robinson 2004) explore ways in which the solidarity of the all-male citizen body benefited from the exclusion of women from active political participation, while rejecting earlier views of the strict separation of public and private spheres, and recognizing the ways in which Athenian women played prominent public roles, especially in religion. The questions of ideology and hegemony recur: Loraux (1993) shows how the ideology of autochthony buttressed democratic citizen identity; Morris (1998) seeks to explain the invisibility of distinct women’s spaces and slave culture in archaeological excavations by reference to the robustness of the citizen-centered ideology.

**War, economy, culture**

Violent conflict was endemic among the Greek city-states, and fairly often ended in state-death: While many inter-state conflicts, especially before the mid-fifth century B.C., were more or less ritualized contests with little demographic impact (Connor 1988), some battles had extremely high casualties (Krentz 1985, 2002) and the extermination or enslavement of entire state populations was a realistically possible outcome of inter-state war. The relationship between democracy and warfare has been a feature of analytic work on democracy from the very beginning, and is prominent in the work of both Herodotus and Thucydides. Both these founders of the conjoined Greek historical (and social scientific: Ober 2006c) enterprise were interested in explaining how the democracy might affect military capacity; contemporary work has continued to focus on this problem. The apparent correlation between democratic regime and greater military capacity (a phenomenon traced in modern warfare by Reiter and Stam 2002) has been explained in terms of the enhanced morale of free men, self-consciously fighting wars of liberation (Hanson 1999), much higher mobilization rates, following upon the bargaining between classes, with the result that political participation on the part of lower classes is offered in exchange for their willingness to fight (especially as rowers in the fleet: Scheidel 2005, Morris 2005b), and the superior ability of democracies to make effective use of dispersed knowledge and thereby to inaugurate more innovative and flexible strategies (Ober 2008).

A closely related issue is the relationship between democracy and imperialism. M.I. Finley (1978, 1983) noted that both lower and upper class Athenians profited from the empire, and regarded the increased wealth that came to Athens with imperialism as essential to the survival of democratic institutions. Kurt Raaflaub (1996, 1998) has argued that the institutions of democracy only emerge after 462 B.C., once the Athenian imperial project of the mid-fifth century is well under way, and that lower class Athenians (thetes) remained in some ways marginal, and were grudgingly acknowledged by citizens of the hoplite class only because they provided manpower essential to the
empire-building project. Mogens Hansen (1999) has, however, pointed to the continuing vigor of democratic institutions in the (largely) post-imperial fourth century. While a “ghost of empire” (Badian 1995) continued to haunt the Athenian democratic consciousness, fourth-century Athenian revenues were not much drawn from imperial sources and democratic institutions remained vibrant – the link between democracy and empire had become largely one of historical memory: whether that memory was one of nostalgia or disgust was one of the sources of attitudinal diversity with which Athenian democracy contended.

International relations theorists have long been drawn to the world of the Greek poleis, which offers a non-modern field on which to test the robustness of their theories. Collections of essays edited by Lebow and Strauss (1991) and McCann and Strauss (2001) bring together classicists with international relations theorists to explore the nature of bipolar international systems in which one of the players is a democracy, and the relationship between democratic regimes and war using the test cases of the Peloponnesian and Korean Wars. The world of the city-states is particularly salient to scholars interested in “democratic peace.” Eric W. Robinson (2001a, 2006) explores the issue in detail, arguing that the Greek democracies did in fact go to war with one another quite frequently. Robinson suggests that this does not necessarily undercut the validity a modern democratic peace, because of the differences between ancient and modern democracies, and the fact that Greek city-states focused intensely on local interests rather than on constitutional issues. Stuart Weart (2001) argues, against Robinson, that Athens (and by extrapolation other Greek democracies) did not perceive other democratic city-states as democratic; Robinson (2001b) counters that there is no evidence for that supposition. Greek democracies could be intensely and successfully aggressive. Ian Morris (2005a) notes that the empire founded by democratic Athens was by far the largest and most successful imperial enterprise ever sustained by a Greek city-state.

The last 15 years have seen an extraordinary resurgence of work on the ancient Greek economy, much of it challenging the long-standard position of M.I. Finley (1999) that “the ancient economy” was entirely “embedded” in social relations, that market exchanges were limited and local, and that given the lack of capitalization and sustained technological innovation, essentially stagnant. Democratic Athens in the post-imperial fourth century provides an important test case. Edward E. Cohen has published a series of works (most significantly, 1992 and 2000) which cumulatively go a long way in showing that fourth-century Athens was well provided with formal (special legal provisions) and informal (unregulated banks) institutions that supported a vigorous market economy with some (although not all) of the relevant features of modern market economies – notably sophisticated credit instruments and impersonal third-party exchanges. Edmund Burke (1985, 1992) argues that the very high level of public wealth in the 330s (comparable to that of the high imperial era of the 430s) must be explained in terms of successful Athenian attempts to attract transit trade. The democratic state actively and self-consciously promoted trade, for example by providing relatively impartial dispute resolution procedures (Cohen 1973; Lanni 2006), and by providing “Approvers” of silver coinage who could guarantee traders that the specie in which they traded was good (Van Alfen 2005). Cohen (2002) has linked this expansion of access to economic and legal institutions to a generally expansive democratic Athenian attitude towards citizenship; his conception of the “Athenian nation” as based on residence rather than on nativity, a move
that would effectively eliminate the distinction between long-term resident and native-born Athenian, has, however, been challenged (e.g. Lape 2003). Among the most important insights of recent work on embedded aspects of the Athenian economy is Paul Millett’s (1989 – cf. Zelnick-Abramowitz 2000) demonstration that democracy at Athens effectively limited the development formal relationships of personal patronage that figure so largely in other pre-modern economies. Democratic Athenian taxation policies have attracted interest by political scientists and economists. In a series of studies the Swedish social scientist Carl Lyttkens (1992, 1994, 1997) examined Athenian liturgies (special taxes on the wealthiest citizens) and other forms of taxation on wealth as examples of bargaining between elites and lower classes; suggesting that democratic politicians catered to their lower-class constituents by seeking to establish a predatory regime of taxation, but that over time, elite bargaining power led to a more restrained taxation regime and lower transaction costs. Brooks Kaiser (2007), an economist, has developed a game theoretic model to explain the operations of the Athenian trierarchic (warship preparation tax) liturgy system, analyzing the Athenian citizens' incentives within a game of asymmetric information to explain the democratic system's relative success at meeting the conflicting goals of efficiency, feasibility, and budget balance.

The relationship between democracy culture has been a growth area in the last two decades. Classicists have sought to analyze the ways in which political institutions and social relations unique to democracy (including the issues of identity and ideology noted above) affected the emergence and development of cultural expression: performance/music, visual arts, architecture, literature, and philosophy. Good introductions to this body of work are the essay collections edited by Goldhill and Osborne (1994), Coulson (1994), and by Boedeker and Raaflaub (1998). David Castriota (1992) looks at how the fifth-century Athenian democracy reconfigured mythic narrative in public art (notably architectural sculpture). Richard Neer (2002) argues that the Athenian revolution of the late sixth century fostered the emergence of radical experiments in vase-painting (the so-called Pioneer Group of vase-painters) – with the new artistic forms borrowing from the new social relations made possible by the institutions of democracy. has been particularly productive. A collection of essays edited by Winkler and Zeitlin (1990) broke new ground the question of how democracy affected public performance art and music (comedy, tragedy, choral singing and dancing). Subsequent studies, notably by Simon Goldhill (Goldhill and Osborne 1999) and Peter Wilson (2000), have made a very strong case that democracy had a pervasive affect on the evolving form and content of dramatic and choral culture. Classical scholars have also been important participants in discussions of how political forms affect the development of political space; see, for example, Detienne 2001.

**Coda: The American Ephebe**

Greek religion was very different from the powerful religious traditions that have shaped the modern world: There was no question of separating religion from the state, and basic questions of what would count as orthodoxy, conversion, even belief take on fundamentally different meanings in the ancient Greek context; Simon Price (1999) offers a thoughtful introduction. While all students of ancient Greek politics acknowledge that religious ritual remained a highly visible aspect of democratic Athenian public
practice, there is no scholarly consensus on the actual importance of religion to Greek democracy, or the impact of democracy on religious belief or expression. Hugh Bowden (2005) has argued that communicating with the gods and doing their will was the most important undertaking of the democratic state. Other scholars, by contrast, emphasize the ways in which religious ritual furthered civic purposes (Zaidman and Schmitt-Pantel 1992; Parker 1996). A notable characteristic of the democratic Athenian approach to religion was the state’s willingness to accept new gods into the community -- but only if they had been officially granted entry (and the right to own property on which temple could be constructed) by a vote of the democratic assembly (Garlan 1992).

It might appear that, in light of the different ways in which antiquity and modernity understand religion, that religious-civic ritual is one area in which modernity has little to learn from Greek antiquity. Yet Charles Hedrick (2004) has recently brought to light an American appropriation of a highly distinctive Athenian religious ritual: the Oath of the Ephebes. In the later fourth century B.C. (and perhaps much earlier) eighteen-year old Athenian (male) youths who were being inducted into military service took a sacred oath, witnessed by an array of gods, to acquit themselves well, along with their comrades in arms, in defending and extending their fatherland. In the middle decades of the twentieth century, students at a number of American colleges and universities were made to chant the ephebic oath:

I will not disgrace my sacred arms/Nor desert my comrade, wherever/ I am stationed./ I will fight for things sacred./ And things profane./ And both alone and with all to help me./ I will transmit my fatherland not diminished/ But greater and better than before./ I will obey/the ruling magistrates/ Who rule reasonably/ And I will observe the established laws/ And whatever laws in the future/ May be reasonably established./ If any person seek to overturn the laws,/ Both alone and with all to help me,/ I will oppose him./ I will honor the religion of my fathers./ I call to witness the Gods …/ The borders of my fatherland,/ The wheat, the barley, the vines,/ And the trees of the olive and the fig.


The explicit intention of university administrators who promoted this startling recreation of an ancient Greek ritual was to promote in the citizens of a modern state an active civic spirit capable of sustaining a great democratic nation through periods of military and social crisis. While the chanting of the ephebic oath is no longer commonly (if ever) practiced on American campuses, the sustained concern with uniting civic culture with democratic institutions is at least one reason that we moderns continue to learn from the ancient Greeks.
LITERATURE CITED

Burke EM. 1985. Lycurgan Finances. Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 26: 251-64


Press
Knoepfler D. 2002. Loi d'Eretrie contre la tyrannie et l'oligarchie, II. *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellenique* 126: 149-204
Loraux N. 1986. *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City.* Cambridge,


Poulakos T, Depew D, eds. 2004. *Isocrates and Civic Education*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press


Princeton University, Princeton
Too YL, ed. 2001. Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity. Leiden: E.J. Brill
Wolin SS. 1993. Democracy, electoral and Athenian. PS: Political Science and Politics 26: 475-77